Lecture notes for agents of socialization

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(primarily drawn from “American
Government” by James Q. Wilson and John
J. DiIulio)

Family is probably the primary influence on political
affiliation
1- among high school seniors only 9 percent belong to
members of the opposite party of their parents
 2- In adults 60 percent are the same party and the rest are
mostly independents, few are opposite party


Do see more difference in policy areas


Especially in areas of civil liberties and race in today’s
young
(note: if family is highly political then the communication
of those norms is more effective and longstanding)



Elementary school – give sense of national pride,
idealized notion of gov., introduction of authority figures
outside the family, gov. seen often as the president
High school – Greater knowledge of system, can see
erosion in trust of gov (especially among urban youth),
most knowledgeable about current events than past
history
College – (important because about 25 % receive college
degrees)

Students usually become more liberal -- longer they are in college
the more liberal they become

1.
2.
3.
WHY?
People who go to college may be prone to liberalism
People are exposed to a wider variety of materials
(possibly produced by a liberal cultural elite)
College teaches liberalism (because of a belief in
consistent idealism that leads to contempt for
pragmatic compromises, institutions, and public
opinion)

Exception – The higher education level = more
socially liberal (personal freedom), but more fiscally
conservative (economic freedom) – possibly a
reflection of class


College kids today are entering college slightly more
conservative than their predecessors in the 1970s
How long do you stay liberal?

Depends on: did you marry liberal? are your friends liberal?
level of education, level of activism during college


We usually have seen blue collar, or unskilled
workers embrace Democratic and liberal views on
economic policy
Professionals tend to be more conservative on econ.
policy

But the electoral division between the classes seems to be
narrowing
many people vote on social, moral and foreign policy and
not econ. Issues
2. education is liberalizing
1.

African-Americans


Hispanic


Mostly Democratic (54%) but can have crossover (George W.
Bush as governor) – Mexican American = Democratic, CubanAmerican = Republican
Asian


Heavily democratic (78%) (though younger Blacks more willing
to vote Republican)
Slim majority who are Republican (38 % Repub, 35% Dem) –
Japanese = more conservative, Korean = more liberal
White

More likely to be Republican (35% Repub, 37% Dem) than
Black or Hispanic (but not Asian)

Since the 1960s – more men have been becoming
Republicans creating a gender gap (is a pattern seen
throughout the world)


Main reason seems to be men’s conservatism on social
issues like gay rights, abortion, gun control and size of
government
About 58% of women identify as Democrats


Generally Protestants more conservative than
Catholics who are more conservative than Jews
Why?




Class – Jews and Catholics were immigrants who saw more
support with Liberals
Religious tradition – Protestants – individual salvation
Jews – social justice
The difference is fading with time – tend not to see a
lot of diff on economic issues, more difference on
social issues




South – more conservative socially
Northeast – more liberal socially
Midwest – more conservative socially
West – More liberal socially

Take out discussion questions on KEY…

If you do not have some, prepare them….

A basic inquiry into American politics would show
that some elections appear to matter more than
others. To be sure, the amount of people, intensity of
attitudes, nature of expected consequences, and
impacts all vary. However, periodically a "critical"
election comes along and creates durable new
groupings of voters, revealing a sharp alteration in a
pre-existing cleavage in the electorate.

Critical election: An election that creates durable new
groupings of voters, revealing a sharp alteration in a
'pre-existing' cleavage in the electorate.

Key wishes to explain what he means by examining two elections: 1896
and 1928. He argues that 1928 was a realigning election due to the
candidacy of Al Smith. Smith, who was of immigrant stock and Catholic,
garnered support from fellow Catholics and recent immigrant groups. This
set up the Roosevelt revolution (which is a bit ironic since Smith and
Roosevelt did not like each other much). Key looks at two towns,
Somerville (a Boston suburb with a significant Catholic and urban
population) and Ashfield (which is quite the opposite). The towns show a
sharp contrast, where Somerville began to support the Democrats quite
sharply while Ashfield's support for Democrats was largely attenuated. Key
supports this finding further by examining towns across Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, and Vermont (not
presented). Towns that had the largest gains for Democrats remained
Democratic. Those that lost support became Republican. These effects,
Key notes, differ across states and are sometimes ephemeral. Moreover,
enduring partisan shifts might have resulted only from the depression (i.e.
they may have happened regardless of 1928).

Key also analyzes the 1892-1896 period. His findings
are a bit different than common knowledge. First, he
finds that changes were in full swing by 1894.
Second, changes in the electorate appear to not be
along class lines (as common wisdom suggests that
this was a "have vs. have-nots" battle) but rather
regional (East vs. West). Whatever the cause and time
frame, Key argues that both are critical elections
since they, in some fashion, made realignments in
the electorate that were sharp, visible, and relatively
long lasting.


Key's findings, as he admits, are very tentative. For
instance, if the changes were in full swing in 1894, I
would think that there is something we are missing.
What happened in 1894?
New Hampshire is fuzzy--when we are given Figure C
(on page 8) we are presented with 22 Least Gain
towns and 25 Most Gain towns. In Figure D (on page
10) we see New Hampshire now has 29 and 24
towns, respectively
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