Fashions in science policy,
past and present
Arie Rip (University of Twente)
The Fred Jevons Science Policy Lecture,
Manchester, 4 March 2014
A prefatory remark
• Fred Jevons’ 1973 book “Science Observed.
Science as a social and intellectual activity” was
an introduction, sketching the landscape for
aspiring students, in Manchester and elsewhere.
• John Maddox, former editor of Nature, reviewed
it for New Scientist, and queried “Where does
Jevons stand?”, especially on the issue of good
and bad science.
• My paper is about “Science Policy Observed.” I
don’t take a strong stand either. Or at least, I
analyse and diagnose, before taking a stand.
My topic: fashions
• Passing fads (meant pejoratively)
• That what sweeps actors (cf. bandwagon), and
shapes their thinking & action – for a time
• Can be based on an opportunity that is
exploited (cf. goldrush) – and the opportunity
may get exhausted
• Example: a new scientific discovery/approach,
like high-temperature superconductive materials, polywater,
the overall promise of nanotechnology. Or the theory of
determinants in 19th century mathematics.
Growth and
maturity of a
research area (cf.
product-lifecycle)
(The graph of cumulative
publications is an S-curve.)
Research area: mathematical theory of determinants
A: New ideas and new results
B: Textbooks, applications
C: Trivial and repetitive publications
K.O.May, Growth and quality of the mathematical literature,
Isis 59 (1968) 363-371
Gartner Group: Technology Hype Cycle
Visibility
Peak of
Inflated Expectations
Plateau of
Productivity
Slope of
Enlightenment
Trough of
Disillusionment
Technology
Trigger
Time
Is a world
(of science
policy)hype
possible
without fashions?
Is a world
without
possible?
Issue-attention cycle (Downs 1972)
• Often reduced to “newsworthiness” that is
exploited by media (and now also social
media). This “opportunity” becomes exhausted,
media and public lose interest, and move to
another topic.
• But Downs made a broader point, about how
problems are recognized, addressed to some
extent, and then left in limbo.
Downs (1972): Five phases
1) Pre-problem stage (latent, unnoticed, ...)
2) “Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthousiasm”
(about solving it)
Articulation of the issue, negotiations,
investment in action
3) “Realising the cost of significant
progress”
This leaves “residues”:
programs,
institutions,
networks
which persist
4) “Gradual decline of intense
public
interest”
(Downs, p. 40/41)
5) Post-problem stage (“prolonged limbo”)
Fashions in science policy
• One example is the convergence of priorities in
all (late-)industrialized countries (with funding
races as for nanotechnology), driven also by noregret decision making. But that’s not my topic.
• Science policy practitioners need ideas and
approaches that inspire and mobilize, and offer
them an opportunity to act wisely, and be seen
to act wisely.
• Provided by analysts (e.g. Mode 2 of knowledge production), or
occurring in practice and given a name (e.g. open innovation)
Case 1: Big Science
• Alvin Weinberg is said to have coined the term
in a 1961 article in Science (cf. Derek de Solla
Price, Little Science, Big Science, 1963), but
Fred Hoyle may have used it first.
• For actors, it captures a transformation of
science and a decision making problem at the
same time
• A 1987 Task Force of US Congress on the topic was surprised
how much big science occurred before the era of Big Science.
(cf. also the concern about Grossbetrieb in (German) science,
from late 19th century onward)
Important features
• There is a key word or phrase that captures the
underlying diagnosis, and allows it to travel,
and be used in many places
• The key word/phrase is open ended, and used
by different actors for their own purposes.
• The diagnosis may not be historically correct,
but is still forceful.
• An important driver was the post-Sputnik
(1957) reflection on what was actually
happening in US S&T. “Big Science” became one
of the foci. It is now part of the repertoire.
Case 2: Mode 2 of knowledge
production
• The Gibbons et al. booklet (1994) created a
stir in many places because it offered a strong
diagnosis
• Hessels and Van Lente (2008) traced some 1000 citations (in
Scopus) over the period 1996-2006, still increasing (perhaps
slowing down a bit)
• Of these, 80% take Mode 2 as a given, just a background to
the own topic (a safe reference)
• In science policy, reference to Mode 2 was
limited (no decision challenge), and has by
now almost disappeared
A timely diagnosis?
• Yes, but one of many: cf. post-normal science
(Ravetz), Strategic Science (Rip), Triple Helix
(Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz), post-academic
science (Ziman)
• Are attempts of analysts to come to terms
with ongoing changes (transformations?) by
naming them, and drawing out implications.
• Analysts vying for attention ...
Case 3: Grand Challenges
• Current buzzword in the European Union (since
the Lund Declaration, 2009); there is a core list of
about six Grand Challenges (with some variations)
• Similar policy talk and action elsewhere, e.g. in the
Obama Administration
• Earlier systematic use by the UK Research Councils, after
the 2007 Government Spending Review: to specify their
cross-cutting themes like “Energy” and “Ageing: Life-long
health and well-being” (which were a way to show they
were doing important things with their money)
Addressing Grand Challenges
• How to actually address such Grand
Challenges, with many actors involved and
open-ended goals? Plus another Challenge:
creating adequate institutions and arrangements.
(Ex. of charitable foundations)
• One driver: need for new opportunities for
science & technology policy making, now that
economic valorisation is more or less in place
• The fashionable term will pass, but there will
be residues
Case 4: Responsible Research &
Innovation (RRI)
• Fashionable discourse with the European
Commission; has become an acronym
• Will be “pervasive” in FP8 (Horizon 2020)
• One root is the call for “responsible
development” of nanotechnology
• RRI is taken up by further actors, in particular
funding agencies and research consortia and
institutes – for their own reasons (may be
impression management, but that can have implications)
Thanks to Erik Fisher, STIR project, for drawing my attention to this poster.
Responsible innovation,
at different levels
Macro-level: societal
discourse
policy
Ideas about future world; division of moral
labour
EU Code of Conduct for Responsible NanoST
Research
Meso-level:
funding agencies
branch organzations
consortia
[New roles/repertoires]
Dutch MVI; extended impact statements
code of conduct etc
ELSA as integral part; Constructive Techn. Ass’t
Micro-level:
scientists (in the lab)
Industrialists/firms
“relevance”, ‘fictive script’
Corp. Social Resp., transparency
Multi-level processes
• This is ongoing, but certain paths become visible:
in responsible development of nanotechnology,
and by extrapolation, in RRI more broadly (e.g.
the neo-liberal principle “do no harm”)
• Emphasis on newly emerging technologies!
• New roles, new routines emerge – will persist
after the fashion has run its course
• One driver: to extend ‘social licence to operate’
because of credibility pressures in/of society
A change in handling new technologies?
• Not just nanotech. Precursors: in Human Genome
Project (ELSI component), but also chemical
industry’s Responsible Care Program. And now
consideration of synthetic biology, geo-engineering.
• Will this continue? And if so, what form will it
take? At the moment, we see reductions to
create some tractability:
• Focus on upstream (to assure acceptance!?)
• Focus on risk issues (which appear to be more
tractable than societal and ethical issues)
• Add: evolving narratives of praise and blame
By way of conclusion
• Big Science and Mode 2 started with a
diagnosis of ongoing transformation. GC and
RRI aim for desirable transformation. Itself a
secular change (of science policy)?
• Fashions are there for a reason, and have
effects (non-linear, cf. multi-level processes)
• STI policy and governance arrangements as
the accumulated residues of fashions?
• There’s more to STI policy. But it does imply
that every now and then one should have a
critical look at what has accumulated.
‘Responsibility’ language
• Also used to attribute praise and blame, cf.
Ravetz’s aphorism:
• “Scientists take credit for penicillin, but
Society takes the blame for the Bomb”
• And there is prospective responsibility, a duty
to do certain things (and avoid others)
• Responsibility for progress, even if the
powerful knowledge can also be misused
• So: various strands that can be taken up in RRI
Consider RRI as an attempt at
social innovation
• New and uncertain, distributed ...
• Requires institutional changes, and subcultural changes. How to “push” this?
• Soft command and control (EU/Member
states stipulating codes of conduct for RI)
• But also a business proposition: to extend
‘social licence to operate’ because of
credibility pressures in/of society
Knowledge
production/
universities
Increasing interactions between
science and society
1870
1945
1970
1985
2000
I’ve used this mapping of institutions as a
diagnostic tool, e.g. for South Africa
By now, strongly
institutionalized
(outer ring is still
being articulated)
Re-contextualization of science
Patient associations influence research agendas and engage in
research themselves, undermining the exclusive rights of scientists
Technology Assessment, Ethical, Legal & Social Aspects
surround ongoing science and technology (Human
Genome Project initiated this)
Outreach, public engagement –
feedback into research
agendas? (ex. interactive TA of
GM vines)
Increasing interactions between
science and society
Knowledge
production/
universities
1870
1945
1970
1985
2000
Also consultancies
(and NGOs) bridging
science and the
economy, science
and the community
Authority over science (knowledge
production) is also claimed by nonscientists (from USA Congressmen to
patients and indigenous people);
counter-authority is not the answer.