1
The summer of 1940 was one that dictated the fate of Britain, and indeed, the
outcome of World War II. As Winston Churchill once said in his famous speech
delivered to the House of Commons in the spring of 1940, “…the Battle of France is
over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.”1 He was right. From May 1940
through October 1940, Britain endured a ferocious assault from the German Air Force,
the Luftwaffe, which tested Britain’s national defenses, military power and citizen
morale. The nation persevered through five consecutive months of German air raids that
were conducted as a preliminary strike towards the ultimate goal of a German invasion of
the British Isles. Had Britain’s defenses collapsed, Hitler and the Third Reich would have
dominated all of Europe and been able to turn their full attention east to the Soviet Union.
Instead, Great Britain prevailed in the tumultuous battle not only as the leading Allied
power in Europe, but also as a new respected Air Force nation in the world.
Under the primary organization of Fighter Command, the Royal Air Force was
equipped with a formidable fighting machine that secured the victory Britain desperately
needed to survive in World War II. Many associations are made about Britain’s number
one fighter machine, and they usually do not include the role of the Hawker Hurricane.
Seemingly unglamorous and unattractive, the Hurricane was the understated hero of the
Battle of Britain. However, the nature of the tactics and strategy deployed by the
Luftwaffe sanctioned the Hurricane as the only saviour Britain could fully rely upon, yet
it received little credit in bringing down the mighty Luftwaffe. Without its robust build
and traditional design, the outcome of the Battle of Britain could have been enormously
1
Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 84.
2
different. Understanding why and how the battle for Britain occurred, the obvious role of
the Hurricane can be unveiled through its design and production history, primary
accounts from pilots who flew it into battle, and its high rate of success in the dogfights
fought in the sky that summer. It goes without saying that the Spitfire aircraft also had a
fundamental part in Britain’s victory. By comparing and detailing the differences
between both RAF fighter planes, the Spitfire is revealed in all its beauty and innovative
design and steals the spotlight and glory from the conservative Hurricane. The Spitfire
may be the superior aircraft in design, but it was not the reason the Battle of Britain was
won for Britain. Through its exemplary construction and performance, the Hawker
Hurricane is revealed as the forgotten fighter that saved a nation.
However much of a role the Hawker Hurricane played in winning the battle for
Britain, the Battle of Britain itself played a pivotal role in determining the next phase of
World War II. It was not the final installment that would defeat the Nazi empire, but it
did become a fundamental event that proved Hitler and his armies were not invincible. It
would take another five more years of brutal fighting and total war to annihilate Hitler
completely. His ruthless campaign to conquer Europe began in September 1939, one year
before the Hurricane became the saviour of Britain.
The Eye of the Hurricane
By May 1940, the German army began the invasion of France and the Low
Countries. Striking hard and fast, Hitler began his brutal campaign to dominate the West,
which he proclaimed would “decide the fate of the German nation for the next thousand
years.”2 After the defeat of the BEF3 at the battle of Dunkirk, the evacuation and rescue
2
James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, May-October
1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 11.
3
of many British troops from the French coast became a mandatory mission, as mainland
Europe began to succumb to Nazi domination. It was at this time that the battle for
France was considered lost, and the battle for Britain was about to begin.
As Hitler savored in his victories over Poland, Belgium and much of France, he
began to set his sights across the Channel, to the island of Great Britain. Conquering the
resilient European island would cement Hitler’s control over Western Europe, and
provide the Nazis’ with a climactic victory that had not been achieved since the Norman
invasion of 1066. An invasion of the British Isles would not only complete Hitler’s
Western European domination plan, but also knock out the United States as a potential
threat. However, Hitler was led into a false sense of security about his plans to attack and
invade Britain by his highly entrusted cabinet members. His lack of clarity and
reconnaissance about the islands defensive nature, power and leadership made him
believe Britain would be an easy target after his victories on the Continent. So began the
preparation for the invasion of Great Britain. Operation Sea Lion was to be put into
effect.
Operation Sea Lion would only be successful if the Commander in Chief of the
German Air Force, Hermann Goering and his infamous Luftwaffe, were able to dominate
the skies of England and secure London under German control. Goering was an
exceptional character with an unpredictable personality, reckless behavior traits and drugaddled characteristics. His rise to power with Hitler from the earliest formations of the
Nazi party enabled him to control much of the Nazi party influence, which resulted in
him creating the powerful Luftwaffe Air Force, the Secret Police (Gestapo), the SS Guard
3
British Expeditionary Force
4
and the establishment of the concentration camps.4 Under Goering’s leadership, the
Luftwaffe was in capable hands to strive for a total war against Great Britain. By the time
France had fallen, the Luftwaffe was still an extremely strong force with 2,550
serviceable aircraft.5 Five days after the conclusion of the fall of France, Goering issued a
general order regarding the air war against the British Iles. This comprised of building up
the Luftwaffe forces across the English Channel in France, Belgium and Holland, so that
Messerschmitt 109’s could accompany bomber formations of Heinkel 111’s to sound out
the British defenses, destroy warships, bomb important harbors along the English
Channel thus cutting off supply and replenishment to the country, and then throw the full
weight of the Luftwaffe into the destruction of the RAF and the surrounding airfields.6
By June 1940, it seemed as though the Luftwaffe had the world at its feet, its power and
strength undoubted. So long as Britain could be knocked out of the war swiftly, then
Hitler and his henchman Goering could precede with their world dominating plan.
By May 1940, Britain had already taken a brutal beating by the Germans on
mainland Europe. Having sent over 1,000 pilots to help rescue France, Britain it seemed
was ill-prepared to prevent a Nazi invasion on her own shores.7 With the German army
approaching their doorstep, it was only a matter of time until the German army would
begin their frontal assault on Britain’s southern coastlines and countryside. Great Britain
stood alone, and it became her responsibility to dictate the future for the rest of the free
world.
4
James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, MayOctober 1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 54.
5
Ibid., 55.
6
Ibid., 117.
7
Patrick Bishop, Battle of Britain (Oxford: ISIS, 2010), 52.
5
However alone Britain felt during the summer of 1940, the small island would be
saved by a small band of heroes in important positions. Such recognition and honour falls
to individuals such Sir Winston Churchill and Sir Hugh Dowding, among many others.
However different these two leaders were in their visions of fighting Hitler and
organizing the British military, they worked together to develop prevailing political
tactics and military strategies that would defeat Hermann Goering’s over zealous and
over ambitious plan to make Operation Sea Lion operational. As Churchill once said, “ It
is always dangerous for soldiers, sailors or airmen to play at politics. They enter a sphere
in which the values are quite different from those to which they have hitherto been
accustomed.”8 The newly appointed Prime Minister and his Air Chief Marshal developed
a plan that eventually managed to pull together both politicians and military leaders into a
coalition that saved Great Britain. However it was not an easy agreement.
On 13th May 1940, British Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden received a
personal telegram from the Commander of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F), Lord
John Gort stating that, “We have to support in the air not only the B.E.F. but also our
Allies who have suffered heavy air attacks…our main defense in the air is fighters…I
earnestly hope War Cabinet will decide to give additional air assistance…for Allied
success in the coming battle.”9 While fully aware of the situation in France, and the
mounting pressure Lord Gort was under for more air support, Dowding had to consider a
different battle: the defense of Britain. The continued supply of British fighters and
aircrews to France horrified him. He had already lost over two hundred Hurricanes, and
as historian Robert Wright states, this was “an alarming figure in view of the onslaught
8
9
Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 123.
Eden and Gort Telegram, 100.
6
that Dowding anticipated.”10 But the demanding telegraph from Gort strongly requested
that Dowding was to send another thirty-two fighters, and fight the war that was
happening now in France, not the anticipated invasion that loomed once France had
fallen.
Faced with the possibility of having to give up more of his precious fighters to
what seemed was a losing battle, Dowding asked to appear before the government
Cabinet to plead his case. He believed he could not go through the regular channel of
communication via the Air Ministry, because he thought, “themselves ought to have been
fighting tooth and nail. Perhaps some of them were, but I could not be sure of that. I felt
that everybody was too frightened of Winston Churchill,” but rather reiterate his
reasoning straight to the Prime Minister and his cabinet officials personally.11 Armed
with the understanding and foresight that was uniquely his, Dowding battled for the
remaining fighter planes to be saved for Britain’s own defense. In his own diary he
recalls the most significant moment of the meeting, which silenced the Cabinet room
after much of Churchill’s powering words,
I got to my feet, and taking my graph with me I walked around to the seat
occupied by the Prime Minister. I leant forward and laid the graph on the table in
front of him, an I said: “If the present rate of wastage continues for another
fortnight we shall not have a single Hurricane left in France or in this country.” I
laid a particular emphasis on ‘or in this country’.12
To Dowding’s frustration, after the meeting Churchill gave orders for four more fighter
squadrons to be sent to France immediately. In Churchill’s own account he states, “…The
Cabinet had given me authority to move four more squadrons to France.”13 He made no
10
Eden and Gort Telegram.,101.
Dowding’s Diary., 101
12
Dowding’s., 104.
13
Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 88.
11
7
mention of the meeting with Dowding and the Cabinet, as it ceased to make an
impression on him. Dowding’s distrust of any decisions made by politicians only
compelled him to take further action to warn of the seriousness of the position Britain
was about to be in. In his last attempt, Dowding wrote a letter addressed formally to the
Under Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, which categorically stated that not one more
fighter should be sent to France.14
The impression made in Whitehall by Dowding’s 16th May letter was immediate,
and new actions were taken by the Chief of the Air Staff, Cyril Newall, who asked fellow
Chiefs of Staff if they would support him in putting forward Dowding’s claims again to
the War Cabinet. The Air Council came to the conclusion that if Germany’s next move
was to indeed attack Great Britain, Fighter Command needed to be compiled of at least
53 squadrons, with necessary reserves.15 Newall pointed out that since the proposed
sending of additional fighters to France and other parts of mainland Europe, Fighter
Command had been reduced to 37 squadrons, with barely any reserves of fully equipped
fighters, leaving Britain and her airspace vulnerable. Time was running out for the Allied
cause in France, and on the 19th of May, Churchill rescinded his decision to send
additional fighters to France by stating, “No more squadrons of fighters will leave the
country whatever the need of France.”16
During the continental battle, 320 British pilots were killed in action, reported
missing or died from injuries later, while 115 were held as prisoners of war; altogether
915 aircrew members of all categories were lost and 944 aircraft operating from Britain
14
The full letter written by Dowding can be seen in Appendix I.
A Fighter Command squadron usually had 22 pilots and at least 16 operational aircraft,
plus two or more for reserve.
16
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: a History of the Battle of Britain
(London: Aurum Press, 2000), 73.
15
8
and France were destroyed.17 The relief of not losing any more British aircrafts or pilots
to France did not comfort Dowding, and his growing anxiety for his remaining 1,094
pilots never ceased. By June 1940 the dire need for Britain to develop her defenses was
paramount.
Dowding took full operational control, and started to organize the
coordination for Fighter Command that fittingly became known as “the Dowding
System.”18
One of the most vital aspects of Fighter Command’s organization was to ensure
that the fighters could track the enemy’s where-abouts. The key instrument developed
that enabled Fighter Command stations to detect incoming enemy raids was radar or
“radio direction finding”. Invented by Scottish scientist Robert Watson-Watt in 1935, the
British government adopted radar as a fully operational detection system with stations
scattered around the country.19 Stretching from Scotland, down to the southern English
coast, 350-foot transmitter aerials were mounted with a 250-foot receiver mast that was
accompanied by a small brick shed to house the operators and radar display screens. As
historian Leo McKinstry writes, “The system was the masterpiece of Sir Hugh Dowding,
who, unlike other RAF leaders of the 1930’s had recognized the necessity of building a
fighter defense network that exploited the latest technology.”20 The structure of Fighter
Command fully relied on the radar system, but without detecting what type or exactly
how many incoming aircrafts were flying towards the coast, many other forms of
17
Derek Wood and Deerk Dempster, Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise
of Air Power 1930-1940 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), 101.
18
Len Deighton, Fighter: the True Story of the Battle of Britain (London: Jonathan Cape,
1978), 130.
19
David E. Fisher, A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding,
Radar, and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain (Washington, D.C.: Shoemaker &
Hoard:, 2005), 31.
20
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 123.
9
information were needed. The RAF soon relied on the 30,000 strong volunteer Royal
Observer Corps, whose job was to watch over the skies and report using binoculars and
simple equipment to relay what they saw to Bentley Priory, where it was then distributed
to fighter groups and sectors at the airfields. This was the chain of communication
Dowding developed with Fighter Command that enabled Britain to use radar effectively
and efficiently. As Derek Wood and Derek Dempster wrote in their book, The Narrow
Margin; The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power 1930-1940, “The radar chain
provided a long-range ‘picture’ of the air situation without which defense was almost
impossible.”21Without the use of radar, England would not have achieved the same
amount of success as they did during the summer of 1940. It provided the means for
Fighter Command to fully anticipate where and when Luftwaffe planes were entering
British air space, giving Hurricane and Spitfire pilots a head start intercepting the
incoming German bomber strikes. As military technology developed, so did wartime
signal intelligence. Soon after the Battle of Britain, Ultra was developed to break highlevel encrypted enemy radio communications. Although not used during the Battle of
Britain, it became an essential piece of equipment during the rest of World War II.22
The pressure exerted on Fighter Command to organize and prepare was extensive,
but the brunt of the strain was distributed across southern England to the small, underprepared airfields. Divided geographically, Britain was quartered into four different
sections, each with their own headquarters and satellite airfields.23 11 Group, which
21
Derek Wood and Deerk Dempster, Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise
of Air Power 1930-1940 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), 67.
22
David E. Fisher, A Summer Bright and Terrible: Winston Churchill, Lord Dowding,
Radar, and the Impossible Triumph of the Battle of Britain (Washington, D.C.: Shoemaker &
Hoard:, 2005), 123.
23
A map of England divided with the allocated airfields can be seen in Appendix II.
10
centered around London and the south-east of England, was expected to take the full
force of the Luftwaffe aerial assault. Headquarters for 11 Group were stationed at
Uxbridge, where sector airfields at North Weald, Hornchurch, Biggin Hill, Kenley,
Northolt, Tangmere, Filton and Middle Wallop, were all under the command of New
Zealander Air Vice Marshal Keith Park.24 It was at these airfields that the majority of the
serviceable aircrafts were stationed. The task of meeting the Luftwaffe devolved upon the
Spitfire and Hurricane fighter planes alone because, as Historians Wood and Dempster
reiterate they were “the only suitable machines operationally available at the time.”25 The
growing emphasis on invasion began to show itself in the Luftwaffe’s plans by early July.
At this time, the RAF was comprised of only 644 operational Hurricane and Spitfire
fighters.26 The Luftwaffe assembled a staggering total of 2,250 operational Heinkel 111
bomber aircrafts and Messerschmitt 109 fighter aircrafts.27 The daunting prospect of
going to war with an enemy more than double their strength was the inevitable fate the
Royal Air Force would face, starting officially on the 10th of July 1940.
No Lame Duck
The Battle of Britain redefined the stage for World War II, leaving behind an epic
story of superiority, defiance and national integrity that is still embedded within British
culture today. The victory is owed to the Brits for many reasons; the political figures who
provided superior leadership, the military personnel who conducted strategic planning,
the new and advanced technology of radar, and the advantage of fighting a defensive
24
Patrick Bishop, Battle of Britain. (Oxford: ISIS, 2010) 23.
Derek Wood and Deerk Dempster, Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise
of Air Power 1930-1940 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), 105.
26
Ibid., 306 (Statistics Table of the Number of aircraft available for operations in fighter
squadrons)
27
Ibid., 318 (Statistics Table of the number of Luftwaffe operational strength)
25
11
battle. However the main reason the Battle of Britain was won by ‘so few’, was because
of the aircraft they flew into battle. The iconic images of Supermarine Spitfires racing
into the dogfights in the sky have become a famous British impression in aviation history.
But not all the success should be owed to the superior Spitfire fighter plane. Its more
numerous and rugged ally, the Hawker Hurricane played the central role as the key
fighter that defeated the German Luftwaffe in 1940. If the Hurricane had not been
available, the RAF would have been too limited in their defensive struggle to arm the
British skies. And as a result they may have lost the Battle of Britain, which would have
forever changed the positions of power in the World War II theatres.
Hurricane pilots and Hurricane air squadrons made up the majority of Fighter
Command’s front-line strength in the national battle for survival. When Winston
Churchill made his famous speech to the House of Commons in August 1940 that “Never
in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few”, it was the
squadrons of Hurricanes that deserved Churchill’s accolade. According to Air Ministry
figures, 63 per cent of Fighter Command’s strength was made up of Hawker Hurricane
fighters, which destroyed 61 per cent of all the Luftwaffe losses.28 As the historian
Stephen Bungay wrote, “Camm’s Hurricane was cheap to make, easy to repair and
robust, and gave Fighter Command the numbers it needed in the air in 1940. Without it,
the thin blue line of defenders would have been too thin to hold.”29 The Battle of Britain
was the ‘Finest Hour’ for the Hurricane as well as for the nation. “It was the aircraft for
the right season. It came at a time when it literally saved the country. It was there, it was
28
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 2.
29
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: a History of the Battle of
Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 32.
12
needed, and it performed magnificently,” said Eric ‘Winkle’ Brown, the great test pilot
who flew more different types of British planes than any other man. 30 Providing first
hand testimony on the success of the Hurricanes flying capabilities are the RAF pilots
who flew them. Pilots such as Douglas Bader, Richard Stevens and Peter Townsend
validate the harrowing experiences RAF pilots had to endure flying such fighter planes
with so little time to prepare. Without their acts of valor, the Hurricane and Spitfire
aircrafts would be ‘lame ducks’ idling for their imminent destruction.31 The essential role
of the Hurricane during the Battle of Britain can be researched through its design,
manufacturing, development, and operation. Through this study, the Hurricane is
revealed as the quintessential British plane that shattered the invincible Luftwaffe force,
providing the victory the free world needed to stay liberated from Hitler’s world
domination.
The Hurricane, with its rugged appearance and robust exterior was not an
aesthetically appealing fighter plane. It was designed to be a reliable, tough and solid
aircraft that could prevail and destroy the enemy in a dogfight. The Mark I Hawker
Hurricane used in the Battle of Britain, was armed with eight .303 Browning machine
guns with a range of 250 yards, had a maximum speed of 325 mph, rate climb of 2,420
ft/min, 40 foot wing span, and weighed approximately 6,600 lbs when fully loaded. 32 The
colossal aircraft was also equipped with a Rotol three-blade wooden propeller, which
enabled the aircraft to reach a higher speed during take off powered by a Rolls Royce
30
Eric Brown, Wings of the Weird and Wonderful (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1983), 73.
‘Lame Ducks’ is a reference to the vocabulary used by the RAF for damaged or
unserviceable fighters.
32
James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, MayOctober 1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 74.
31
13
Merlin II engine.33 It became the reliable fighter plane Britain needed during her darkest
hour. Although, the history of the Hurricane’s development is one that almost prevented
it from ever being put into production.
In the early 1930’s, the RAF was inundated with old-fashioned biplane models
comprised of Bristol Bulldogs and Hawker Furies, which were becoming liabilities in the
air. The need for a new fighter plane and the modernization of the Air Ministry was
initially not a major concern for the British government, who did not see the urgency of
revitalizing the nations Air Force with no visible threats after the Treaty of Versailles was
signed after World War I. The need to develop a new fighter plane promptly was
primarily caused by shortsighted politicians who did not understand how fighter planes
were more beneficial than a powerful heavy-bomber force. This lack of planning,
combined with a weak government coalition and lack of funding, delayed the
development of the monoplanes. However, in 1931 the Air Ministry did issue
specification F7/30, which initiated the air race for a new fighter to replace the aging
biplanes. Supermarine secured the F7/30 contract with design Type 224, which would
eventually evolve into the Supermarine’s Spitfire, although it underwent many changes
before becoming the famous elliptical-wing-shaped fighter used in 1940.34
It was in 1934 that the Chief Designer of Hawker Aircraft Limited, Sydney Camm
submitted to the Air Ministry a first proposal for a ‘High Speed Single Seater
Monoplane’, which would have capable speeds over 260 mph at 15,000 feet, a significant
33
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 67.
34
Jonathan Glancey, Spitfire: the Biography (London: Atlantic, 2006), 22.
14
advancement from the biplane capabilities.35 True to form, Camm’s design was a
combination of new features and old designs. Camm himself had little patience or
tolerance towards the Air Ministry’s lack of understanding about his new monoplane
design. His first Hawker Monoplane blueprint consisted of a single-wing layout, fully
enclosed cockpit, fixed undercarriage and powered by an old-fashioned Rolls-Royce
Goshawk engine.36 Already committed to R.J. Mitchells design with Supermarine, the
Air Ministry denied Camm’s proposal for the monoplane design, citing that it was not
reaching the speeds they needed and didn’t have the modern specifications to evolve.37
Camm’s resilient nature only furthered his notions to continue his monoplane design in a
private venture, and then eventually try and deal a contract with the government to utilize
his aviation design as the primary aircraft in RAF squadrons.
After World War I, the Chief Engineer of Rolls Royce, Ernest Hives, noticed the
inadequate performance of the Goshawk engine. Taking the company’s own initiative,
Hives started to develop a new engine for fighters that he knew would have to be larger
and more powerful than that of the Goshawk to meet modern specifications. The creation
of the Kestrel engine was the first design stage of the PV-12 engine, which would later be
renamed the Merlin.38 With a 27-liter capacity, the PV-12 engine could produce 1,000
horsepower, in return for a small increase in weight.39Moreover, as historian Leo
Mckinstry continues to detail, “the PV-12’s used the chemical ethylene glycol, which was
35
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 18.
36
Ibid., 30.
Ibid., 30.
38
PV stood for Private Venture, it was soon renamed the Merlin engine once it was put
into full production
39
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 32.
37
15
first manufactured in commercial quantities in the USA in the late 1920’s” to deliver a
better cooling system to the engine.40 However, when prototypes of Hurricanes were
finally flown, the Merlin engine suffered from internal leaks and cracking of the cylinder
heads. Rolls Royce later modified the cylinder heads, and the Merlin II engine, along
with another technological breakthrough of a revolutionized fuel, secured the Hurricane
and the Spitfire’s future. The introduction of 100-octane fuel in 1939, historian L.F.E
Coombes explains, “significantly increased the Merlin engines power, improving the
Hurricane’s rates of climb and top speed”.41The supply of 100-octane fuel came from the
Dutch West Indies, and Britain accumulated enough to supply Hurricane and Spitfires
throughout the Battle of Britain, giving them a fundamental advantage over the Me 109.42
By the summer of 1935, Hawker finalized the structure of the F36/34 prototype,
complete with its Merlin engine. In just under a year, Sydney Camm managed to develop
a monoplane fighter that the Air Ministry approved after many modifications and
alterations to its design. However, it was still five years away from being the gallant
fighter in the Battle of Britain. In an October 31st 1940 issue of Flight Magazine, the
publication relayed the alterations the Hurricane underwent, including a stronger hood
with locking catches, an improved instrument panel, the removal of the struts from the
tailgate, a wooden fixed-pitch two bladed propeller and new metal-covered wings to
replace the stretched fabric-covered ones.43On the 15 December 1937, RAF 111
40
Ibid., 32
L. F. E. Coombs, The Lion Has Wings: the Race to Prepare the RAF for World
War II : 1935-1940 (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1997), 44.
42
Ibid.,44.
43
"The Hawker Hurricane: The Birth and Growth of a Great Fighter." Flight, October 31,
1940. http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive (accessed November 1, 2012).
41
16
Squadron received the first delivery of Hawker Hurricanes.44 A writer for Flight
Magazine was also there to report on the pilots handling of the new aircraft;
One was particularly impressed by the very reasonable landing speed of the
Hurricane, though the take-off did seem on the long side, particularly where
formations were concerned. The wheels disappear without a fuss and once
everything is snug the machine is fit and ready to challenge anything with wings.
A demonstration by an individual machine, though not aerobatic in nature, was a
revelation in maneuverability and awesome speed.45
The flow of production soon sent Hurricanes into service throughout the RAF squadrons.
The new fighters appeared to be “the epitome of the modern age, a source of both
technological fascination and pride in Britain”.46It prevailed as the new pioneering fighter
that had pilots excited to fly. As pilot Roy Dutton, of 46 Squadron recalls;
This was a markedly strange experience, the Hurricane being by comparison to
the ladylike Gauntlet, a large powerful, low-wing monoplane with retractable
undercarriage and flaps. It may horrify the modern pilot but for the first flight
each pilot was under order to accomplish three take-offs and landings without
retracting the undercarriage, and to keep the cockpit fully open. This was exciting
rather than frightening, but in consequence the whole aeroplane shook like the
proverbial leaf. The feel was heavy; the draught seemed in keeping with the type
name of the machine and the noise, speed and sense of power exhilarating, as was
the wide-open view. 47
Its remarkable design could not have arrived at a better time for Great Britain. As
the summer of 1940 approached, the Hurricane provided significant advantages over the
Spitfire and Me 109. For the pilots who flew a Hurricane into battle, such as the famous
Wing Commander Peter Townsend of 43 Squadron, it provided
[…] us such immense confidence, with its mighty engine, its powerful battery of
eight guns and its feel of swift, robust strength and the ability to outdo our
44
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 66.
45
"Hurricanes in Service: No. 111 Squadron Shows Off New Equipment." Flight, March
10, 1938. http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive (accessed October 30, 2012).
46
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 67.
47
Roy Dutton, 66.
17
enemies. Months would go by before the real test of combat but we believed in
the Hurricane. Performance figures- those of the Me 109 and the Spitfire were in
many respects superior- did not in the least dismay us. The Hurricane was our
faithful charger and we felt supremely sure of it and ourselves.48
The Hurricanes had many attributes due to its simplicity of build that led it to become the
better fighter plane used for the Battle of Britain. With the ease of manufacturing,
Camm’s fighter aircraft needed only 170,000 man-hours of design, development and
construction for it to be ready for squadron service, while the Spitfire needed over
300,000 man-hours.49 The high rates of Hurricane production resulted in the Spitfire
being outnumbered two to one in the Battle of Britain, making up only 19 of the 58
squadrons that Sir Hugh Dowding had at his disposal on 1st July.50 The Hurricane
comprised altogether 29 Squadrons of the RAF, with 347 total serviceable aircraft,
accounting for more than fifty per cent of Fighter Commands strength. 51 With heavy
manufacturing programmes both in Britain and Canada,52 Hawker produced 1,084
Hurricanes between the months of June through September 1940, a staggering total
compared to its time-consuming ally.53 Supermarine was only able to generate 605 Spit’s
during the same months, which left Britain relying heavily on Hurricane production to
provide air defense.54 The urgency reflected by the Air Ministry to build as many
Hurricanes as possible is seen in a letter from Air Chief Marshal Wilfred Freeman, to the
head of the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher, stating,
48
49
Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 175.
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982),
152.
50
Len Deighton, Battle of Britain (London: Book Club Associates, 1980), 23.
Ibid., 24.
52
Altogether between 1935 and 1945, 1,451 Hurricanes were built in Canada, more than
a tenth of the entire total.
53
Derek Wood and Deerk Dempster, Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise
of Air Power 1930-1940 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), appendix 6.
54
Ibid., appendix 6.
51
18
This machine is technically clear, the very best machine we have at the present
time and available to get into production forthwith. In the emergency we took
steps to get the whole Hawker combine on the work of jigging and tooling the
Hurricane machine so that it can be produced in a minimum of time and in
quantity at Gloster works.55
As Hurricane production increased, so was the daily delivery of fighters to the
front line. With each passing week, more and more faith was put into the Hurricanes
quick production, which inevitably was reflected in greater numbers of Luftwaffe losses
by Camm’s indestructible design. It was later discovered that, “for every two Luftwaffe
planes brought down by Spitfires during the Battle of Britain, three were destroyed by
Hurricanes”.56 This statistic confirms the Hurricane’s role as the more successful fighter
aircraft used to bring down the Luftwaffe. Its ease of production increased furthermore
because it proved to be extremely cheap to make with most Hurricanes during the war
costing between £4,000 and £5,000.57 However, the Air Ministry also devised a scam to
save more money, and produce what looked like more aircraft. Misleading the Luftwaffe
with dummy aircraft and mock airfields, Hurricane replicas were made of entirely wood
and cardboard and placed in decoy airfields. These decoys became a successful means for
deceiving the enemy, and between 1940 and 1941, nine dummy airfields were
constructed to fool the Germans.58
With its simplicity in design, the Hurricane is noted as having the more traditional
construction. This meant it was also easier to repair. “It was a rugged old thing,” Pilot
Tom Neil states, “To repair a hole in the back of the Hurricane only needed a bit of dope
55
Wilfred Freeman letter, 82.
Chaz Bowyer, Hurricane at War (London: Allan, 1974), 102.
57
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John
Murray, 2010), 238.
58
Ibid., 238.
56
19
fabric whereas on the Spitfire a panel had to be beaten in and riveted”.59 When Fighter
Command needed all the aircraft it could gather for Britain’s defense, ‘lame ducks’ were
something to avoid sitting in the targeted airfields. RAF Maintenance Units stood by at
the local airfields to repair any aircraft on sight, but if the damage was too severe, CRO
stepped in to assess the plane’s repair needs. The Civilian Repair Organisation, consisting
of a network of contractors and engineers, had two firms that worked on the Hurricane;
one in Leicestershire and the other at Barton near Manchester.60 The repair organizations
provided an efficient return rate of 160 a week during the month of July, and during the
entire Battle of Britain it was recorded that 60 per cent of shot down aircraft were back in
the skies after being fully repaired.61 The rapid restoration of Hurricane’s tallied at almost
4,000 during World War II, providing Allied forces with a durable and lasting fighter
machine throughout the war.62 Its simplicity to mend came from the Hurricane’s dated,
but effective, wood and fabric construction. This allowed for cannon shells and bullets to
pass through the aircraft’s structure, rather than exploding upon impact. The fabriccovered structure was mechanically fastened to a Warren Girder type fuselage, which
was constructed with steel tubes attached by a thin strip of material called a longeron,
which enabled the aircraft to transfer the aerodynamic loads of the frame.63 Overall the
59
Tom Neil, Gun Button to Fire: a Hurricane Pilot's Dramatic Story of the Battle of
Britain (Stroud: Amberley, 2011), 58.
60
Matthew Parker, The Battle of Britain (London: Headline, 2000), 67.
61
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 157.
62
Ibid., 157
63 "The Hurricane Unveiled: A Detailed Description of the Fastest Fighter in Service in
the World." Flight, May 12, 1938. http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive (accessed December
2, 2012) 468.
20
doped64 linen stretched over the steel-tube structure was the basic assembly needed for a
fighter craft to maintain a minimum amount of damage from an indirect hit. Before the
Battle of Britain, the wings of the Hurricane were also structured with the same dope
material technique as the body, but they soon evolved to an all-metal wing construction
that advanced the aircraft’s overall speed and provided the fighter with one of its best
advantages yet.65
A fundamental advantage of Camm’s engineered design was the fitting of the
aircraft’s thick and sturdy wing construction. Compared to the elegant and famous
elliptical-wing creation of the Spitfire by R.J Mitchell, the wings of the Hurricane were
conservative and unattractive, but provided the Hurricane with another advantage over
the Spitfire. The Hurricane had a broad wingspan of 40 feet, giving the fighter a turning
radius of 800 feet with a wing loading weight of 24.1 pounds per square foot, while the
Spitfire wings had a heavier 26 pounds per square foot and a 36-foot wingspan.66 This
ultimately allowed the Hurricane to make tighter turns in a dogfight. An RAF pilot who
flew both Hurricanes and Spitfires, states that “If you put a Spitfire and a Hurricane in a
dogfight together- not a question of speed or climb- the Hurricane would do better than
the Spitfire”.67 The stability of the Hurricane’s wings also gave it another advantage.
The rock solid wing configuration of a Hurricane also provided a perfect platform
for the eight Browning machine guns mounted on the aircraft. With all the guns mounted
on a special platform in the middle of the plane, the concentration of firepower on the
64
Aircraft dope is a type of chemical used to stiffen fabric stretched over an aircraft
frame, making the fabric more durable and weatherproof.
65 Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 158.
66
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982),
109.
67
Ben Bowring, 21.
21
enemy was far greater than the Spitfire. Dowding himself said that the Hurricane would
be able to send out a bullet stream converging at 400 yards, and thus dubbing the fire
range as ‘the Dowding spread’.68However, by the time the Battle of Britain commenced,
pilots noted that a range of 250 yards was more realistic. With a powerful machine gun
staged on the Hurricane’s robust metal wings, the Browning guns also provided another
advantage for the Hurricane. The machine gun was easy to rearm. As a pilot of 151
squadron, John Ellacombe, told historian Steve Darlow in Five of the Few, to rearm a
Hurricane,
You had two batteries of four guns and it used to take about three minutes to open
the top, take out the old thing and put in the new complete set with all the
ammunition. It was superb. This was an advantage over the Spitfire, which took
about eight or nine minutes to rearm.69
Many of the RAF pilots found the Hurricane’s gun performance to be extremely good.
On the morning of 7th September, Tom Neil of 249 Squadron scrambled into the sky and
began the chase for the Heinkel bombers that were entering Kent airspace. As he recalled
opening fire, he writes in his book, Gun Button to Fire,
The Hurricanes eight Brownings did not chatter, the noise was of a thick, coarse
fabric being ripped, a concentrated tearing noise, which shook the aircraft with a
vibration that was indescribably pleasant. Ahead, smoking tentacles reached out
in clutching traces and felt about the leading vic of Heinkel’s with blind,
exploring fingers. The briefest ripple of twinkling lights. Like a child’s sparkler, I
was hitting them! I couldn’t miss!70
68
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 131.
69
Stephen Darlow, Five of the Few: Survivors of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz Tell
Their Story (Oxford: ISIS, 2008), 88.
70
Tom Neil, Gun Button to Fire: a Hurricane Pilot's Dramatic Story of the Battle of
Britain (Stroud: Amberley, 2011), 217.
22
Even the famous disabled fighter pilot, Douglas Bader, who flew both Hurricanes and
Spits in the Battle of France and Britain, valued the Hurricanes gun platform.71 He wrote,
“Best of all, it was a marvelous gun platform. The sloping nose gave you a splendid view
forward, while the eight guns were set in blocks of four in each wing, close to the
fuselage. The aeroplane remained rock and steady when you fired”.72
In addition to the Hurricane’s gunnery performance, the fighter also had a durable
undercarriage, which was beneficial to new and inexperienced pilots who needed all the
training they could receive. The Hurricane’s forgiving nature, as historian Leo Mckinstry
so accurately describes “was the ideal plane for raw recruits, a priceless asset during the
Battle of Britain when the demand from operational squadrons for new fighter pilots was
so high”.73 Giving the fighter a robust form, its retractable undercarriage was valuable in
dangerous landing situations with the worst being that “you will skate and crash through
almost anything without turning over and generally without damage to the pilot.”74The
resilient physique of the undercarriage was only one of the Hurricane’s strong assets.
Camm’s design became a legendary fighter because of its advantage of being
rather indestructible but completely maneuverable. This provided the pilot with more
control and jurisdiction of the aircraft, generating the confidence the young RAF airmen
71
Douglas Bader is a well-remembered RAF pilot that lost both of his legs in a plane
crash in 1931. This did not stop him flying however. He scored his first victories during the Battle
of France and then in the Battle of Britain. He was then shot down by enemy aircraft over
German-occupied France and was taken as a POW in 1941. His rescues story is one of a kind.
72
Douglas Bader, Fight for the Sky; the Story of the Spitfire and the Hurricane. (Garden
City, N.Y. Doubleday, 1973), 18.
73
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 153.
74
"The Hawker Hurricane: The Birth and Growth of a Great Fighter." Flight, October 31,
1940. http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive (accessed November 1, 2012) 372.
23
needed to fly against the experienced Luftwaffe pilots. As Ray Holmes of 504 Squadron
recalls his first flight of the Hurricane,
I was the master of my very own aircraft … she handled so beautifully that I was
soon at home with all normal maneuvers of turns, stalls and spins…To bank the
Hurricane was as easy as turning a car’s steering wheel. The control column was
cunningly geared and a gentle heave had the aircraft on its side in an instant. Slow
rolls, barrel rolls, rolls off the top of the loop all came so easily. The surge from
its powerful engine climbed you vertically in fine pitch at 3,000 revs as though
heading for outer space.75
The Hurricane’s surprising maneuverability allowed the pilots to command the skies
above Britain without worrying about it being over sensitive or too receptive to pilot
commands. Its reasonable maneuverability for pilots is also credited to Camm’s design of
the mounted cockpit, which gave the pilot all round visibility. The large and spacious
command center of the aircraft was elevated high on the fuselage, fashioning the
Hurricane with a “hump-backed” figure, that seals its obsolete identity. 76 Its rugged
personality soon became the Hurricane’s greatest characteristic. Every iota of the
Hurricane’s indomitable resilience was needed during the Battle of Britain. Compared to
the Spitfire’s sensitivity and meticulous disposition, the Hurricane provided Fighter
Command with the reliability and durability so that it would become a flying legend.
However much of a flying legend the Hurricane became during the Battle of
Britain, it will never achieve the same amount of fame or receive the same amount of
attention as R.J. Mitchell’s design of the Supermarine Spitfire. A fighter aircraft that
exhibited everything the Hurricane was not, the Spitfire defined a new era for fighter
plane standards. Its sleek all metal structure, elliptical-shaped wings and powerful piston
engine made it superior to all other planes in the sky during 1940. Its modern design
75
Ray Holmes, Sky Spy: From Six Miles High to Hitler's Bunker (Shrewsbury: Airlife,
1989), 32.
76
Jackson Robert, Britain’s Greatest Aircraft (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), 86.
24
allowed the Spitfire to continue to develop and evolve with the advancement of aviation
technology, forever cementing its rule of the skies until it was discontinued in 1954.77The
Spitfire’s synonymous victory with winning the Battle of Britain comes from the fighter’s
natural elegance that made it visually more pleasing to admire and commend for the
harrowing fight against Goering’s much feared Me 109. Many Hurricane advocates have
coined the term ‘Spitfire Snobbery’ due to the official accounts sometimes crediting the
Spitfire for the successes the Hurricane achieved against the Luftwaffe. 78 As the
Luftwaffe had never before faced a fighter as good as a Spitfire, many German pilots
claimed that a Spitfire fighter brought them down, even if a Hurricane was responsible.
Peter Townsend’s account of a surviving Heinkel 111 crew claiming “a Spitfire had
attacked them. It was the first sign of ‘Spitfire Snobbery’. There were no Spitfires within
miles” when his Squadron shot them down, indicating that the Spitfires fame preceded
the underlying facts.79However, the facts about the Spitfire should not be ignored. R.J.
Mitchell’s creation is the superior aircraft in design, compared to that of Sydney Camm’s.
Its innovative structure, thinner wing shape, faster speeds80, and ability to refine its
design with new technology becoming readily available; the Spitfire is noted as the
exceptional fighter in the long run.81
During the Battle of Britain, the Hurricane and Spitfire managed to preserve their
glorified image as the freedom fighters of the sky by fighting one of military history’s
most efficient war machines. The Luftwaffe was armed with 1,380 destructive Heinkel
77
A fundamental difference between the Hurricane and Spitfire, as the Hurricane lacked
the design features to further develop and evolve.
78
Jackson Robert, Britain’s Greatest Aircraft (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), 116.
79
Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970) #.
80
Noted as only being 30 mph faster, with a maximum speed of 355 mph, compared to
the Hurricanes maximum speed of 325 mph.
81
Patrick Bishop, Battle of Britain (Oxford: ISIS, 2010), 107.
25
and Dornier bombers, which had maximum speeds of 255 mph and 265 mph at 16,000
ft..82 Considerably slower, the Heinkel and Dornier bombers were accompanied by the
notorious Messerschmitt 109 fighter aircraft. From a period between 1939-1940, the Me
109 was undoubtedly one of the finest single-seat fighter’s in the world, a most worthy
opponent for the Hurricane and Spitfire. With a maximum speed of 354 mph powered by
a 1,100 hp Daimler-Benz 601A engine, and equipped with 7.92 mm machine guns and
two 20 mm cannon, the Bf 109 was fast, maneuverable and deadly.83 The combination of
utilizing a cannon and machine gun gave the enemy aircraft “much more ammunition,
giving them a tremendous advantage” says Pilot Tom Neil.84 The Me 109 was a true
match for the Spitfire in a dogfight, with the only differences, as Alfred Price notes,
…in performance and handling were marginal, and in a combat they were almost
always surmounted by tactical considerations: which side had seen the other first,
had the advantage of sun, altitude, numbers, pilot ability, tactical situation, tactical
co-ordination, amount of fuel remaining, etc.85
However the Bf 109 had its faults. As historian, Jonathan Glancey states, “Its cockpit was
cramped and the track of its undercarriage very narrow indeed” causing many ground
crashes.86The Messerschmitt 109 also lacked the long-range capability required in its
battle over Britain. It was only able to loiter over London for a maximum of ten minutes,
and then had to go back to the Continent to refuel and rearm. If the Bf 109 had the range
of a North American Aviation P51 Mustang, introduced later in the war, it would of
allowed the German pilots with more time over London, and the ability to attack Britain’s
82
Len Deighton, Fighter: the True Story of the Battle of Britain (London: Jonathan Cape,
1978), 36.
83
Ibid., 37.
Tom Neil, Gun Button to Fire: a Hurricane Pilot's Dramatic Story of the Battle of
Britain (Stroud: Amberley, 2011), 94.
85
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982),
78.
86
Jonathan Glancey, Spitfire: the Biography (London: Atlantic, 2006), 148.
84
26
northern airfields.87 Overall, a comparison of the dogfights fought between Hurricane’s
and Messerschmitt’s can only be sufficiently argued by the tactics used by the pilots and
the strategic nature devised by each air force.88
No Piece of Cake for Gerry
After the initial successes on the European continent, the German strategy of
conquering a nations airspace, then continuing to ground domination was supreme.
Blitzkrieg was cementing its name in strategic military history.89 Hitler’s zealous
ambition to vanquish Britain clouded the need for a different strategy to be used to defeat
the island nation. Hitler imposed the same blitzkrieg strategy as used on Poland, Denmark
and France, and ordered Goering to lead the frontal air assault. The Luftwaffe’s strategy
for seizing control of Britain and her air space, which was estimated to only take four
weeks90, can be divided into four phases, each phase discernible by the considerable shift
in German tactics and targets. The initial phase for preparation of Operation Sea Lion
started in early July, when Goering implemented, Kanalkampf, the “Channel battles”.91
This was the attack on British coastal convoys and initiation of air battles over the
Channel to determine the preliminary strength of the RAF. Before Phase One began,
RAF tactics had little to rely upon to understand how to fight an air war.
As the Battle of Britain is considered to be one of the first real air battles in the
sky, Britain had little experience or expectation about how the Luftwaffe planned to
87
The P-51 Mustang was introduced to the RAF service in 1942. With the addition of the
Rolls-Royce Merlin super charged engine, the Mustang was armed with six 12.7 mm M2
Browning machine guns and then later used as a bomber-fighter aircraft.
88
Look at Appendix IV for a comparison of all aircrafts used
89
Blitzkrieg, aka “Lightening War
90
James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, MayOctober 1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 22.
91
Len Deighton, Fighter: the True Story of the Battle of Britain (London: Jonathan Cape,
1978), 158.
27
assault the RAF. Focusing on tactics to destroy bomber formations rather than fighter
combat situations, the RAF adhered to a strict formulated configuration of 12 aircraft’s in
three “V” formations.92 This allowed only the squadron leader to look out for enemy
aircraft, and left the other pilots with the responsibility of keeping in line and staying on
station. Communication was vital to this fighter formation, and if one pilot veered off
course, the squadron risked being venerable and unorganized.93 It was thought to change
the rigid structure of the V formation, but with inexperienced pilots already flying into
combat with little or no flying hours booked, RAF pilots needed all the stability and
consistency they could achieve. As the Battle of Britain commenced, RAF Squadrons
soon learnt what it would take to defend southern England’s skies, and although fighter
formations never changed, fighter tactics would excel and modify with the course of
action. It was during Phase One that No. 111 Hurricane Squadron developed a new tactic
in the V formation to defeat German fighter aggression. Rather than attack the Bf 109
fighter’s head on, the Hurricane Squadron started “flying abreast, head-on through
German bomber formations […] making the bombers break formation.”94This became a
valuable role for the Hurricane squadrons; to break up Luftwaffe schwarms95 by
separating the bombers from their fighter protectors, and attacking the slower, now
exposed, Heinkel 111 and Dornier bombers. This left the majority of dogfights against
the faster, more powerful Me 109 or Me 110, to the Spitfire. As the RAF started to
understand the strategies needed to prevail against the Luftwaffe air strikes, Phase One
92
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: a History of the Battle of
Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 249.
93
Ibid., 249.
94
Ibid., 168.
95
The Schwarm, was a Luftwaffe tactical formation of aircrafts at different altitudes, see
Appendix V A and B.
28
began to turn into Phase Two. Once Germany realized Britain was not as defenseless as
originally suspected, Goering started to plan the massive attack strategy needed to secure
air superiority and to prepare England for the eventual objective of invasion.
Phase Two of the Battle of Britain commenced on the 13th of August. Adlertag, or
Eagle Day, was the first day Goering unleashed his massive air strikes across southern
England. However, Adlertag was not the successful start Goering had hoped for his
Adlerangriff, or Eagle Attack plan. The range of objectives was to bomb a long list of
Fighter Command targets including; airfields, harbors, battleships, radar stations, all in
the midst of fighting Spitfire and Hurricane’s in the sky. This lack of a focus on a precise
objective was one of the main reasons Eagle Day failed. As Len Deighton cites in his
book, “Goering assigned no priorities to this plethora of targets, and no-one was quite
sure whether it was intended to destroy Fighter Command by bombing, or by bringing its
fighters to battle in the air.”96 As Adlerangriff continued, Goering pursued a more and
more aggressive objective to annihilate what was left of the RAF. The remaining defense
for Fighter Command fell to the fighter aircraft. During this phase, the Hurricane secured
its role as defender of the skies on the 15th of August. As aviation historian, Francis
Mason wrote, “15 August was the day that justified the Hurricane. It was then that almost
every Hurricane squadron- built up and nurtured over the past three years- went into
action to defend this country against the heaviest attack that Germany could mount.”97
The greatest day for the Hurricane, was also supposed to be the “Greatest Day” for the
Luftwaffe, which launched its largest number of sorties of the campaign to avenge Eagle
96
Len Deighton, Fighter: the True Story of the Battle of Britain (London: Jonathan Cape,
1978), 203.
97
Francis K. Mason, The Hawker Hurricane (Garden City NY: Doubleday,
1962), 86.
29
Day. This was the first day the Luftwaffe also planned to attack north of London, from
German bases in Norway. However, Luftwaffe 5 did not experience the triumphant win
they expected. Instead, in total 75 enemy aircraft was shot down, compared to only 30
plane losses for the RAF, and 17 RAF pilots.98 T
The 15th of August was not the hardest day to come. The ‘Hardest Day’ came for
the RAF and the Luftwaffe, three days later on the 18th of August.99 In a series of massed
air raids that started at noon, the Luftwaffe flew 970 bombers and fighters across the
Channel with the intention to obliterate 11 Group airfields.100 As Peter Townsend recalls,
scrambling his squadron of twelve Hurricane’s into the enemy filled sky, the strategy was
to “keep reasonably compact formation for mutual protection, for contact in bad
visibility, and above all for concentration in attack. The formation we used in 85 gave us
maneuverability, concentration, yet freedom to search”.101 As his Hurricane squadron
“emerged from the clouds somewhere over the Thames Estuary, there advancing towards
us was a massive column about a mile and a half high of Ju. 87’s, Heinkel’s and then
Dorniers, Ju 88’s, Me 110’s and above that a swarm of Me 109’s”.102 As the air battle
proceeded, Townsend notes the performance of his Hurricane in a dogfight with a
Messerschmitt, “It was a fatal move. My Hurricane climbed round easily inside its turn.
When I fired the Me 109 flicked over and a sudden spurt of white vapor from its belly
98
James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, MayOctober 1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 109.
99
Coined ‘the Hardest Day’ after the Battle of Britain ended because each side lost more
aircraft on this date than any day during the Battle of Britain. It was also the last day the Stuka
was flown in large numbers, and Goering withdrew them from the fight.
100
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 199.
101
Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 335.
102
Ibid., 335.
30
turned into flame.”103The violent day of fighting resulted in both sides losing more
aircraft than any other day during the Battle of Britain. Fighter Command lost a vital
sector airfield, a radar station and 27 fighter planes, in exchange for a total of 71
Luftwaffe aircraft losses.104 The battle for Britain was starting to take a toll on both air
force’s, with the worst still to come.
It wasn’t until Phase Three that Goering started to direct attacks upon 11 Group
airfields. On the 24th August, the Battle of Britain entered its most ‘critical period’.105
Huge raids continued to pound Britain’s southeast countryside, damaging vital airbases at
Hornchuch, Biggin Hill, Croydon and North Weald. On the 31st August, Goering sent an
unprecedented 1,054 sorties towards Britain’s remaining airfields.106 After months of
fighting in his victorious Hawker Hurricane, Peter Townsend recalls his last scramble
into the formidable fighter,
Within a few minutes we were climbing into our Hurricanes, their engines already
running. I glanced back at my squadron, which had formed up behind me. They
looked superb, all those Hurricanes- straining against their brakes with their long,
eager noses tilted skywards and the sun glinting on their whirling propellers.107
The Hurricane ace bailed out of his aircraft after a Me 110 came behind and shot at him.
Critically injured, Townsend was out of action for the rest of the Battle of Britain.108 As
the conflict continued to become more hostile, so did Goering’s tactics. By the end of
August, Goering’s strategy of attacking English airfields with extra fighter escorts for the
bomber aircrafts was beginning to pay off, and the Luftwaffe was beginning to gain
103
Ibid., 336.
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: a History of the Battle of
Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 122.
105
Phase Three is noted as being the most lethal phase of the Battle of Britain, and was
dubbed the ‘Critical Period’ of Britain’s survival.
106
Matthew Parker, The Battle of Britain (London: Headline, 2000), 96.
107
Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 372.
108
Ibid., 372.
104
31
supremacy over the RAF. By the first week of September, Dowding’s supply of pilots
was dwindling. Since the beginning of July, 300 airmen had been killed with only 260
inexperienced pilots to replace them back in the sky.109It was during this phase that the
first bombs were dropped on London’s East End. In retaliation, the RAF flew over Berlin
and began a series of bomb raids that infuriated Hitler, who believed the British would or
could not attack the German capital.110 This sparked the next phase that cemented the
outcome of the Battle of Britain.
By September 7th, Fighter Command’s strategy was not about how to win the
battle, but how to survive it. It was during Phase Four that Goering’s Luftwaffe success
began to unravel. If Hitler had not ordered Goering to change aerial attacks to the direct
bombing of London and civilian populations after the RAF attacked Berlin, the Luftwaffe
could have won the Battle of Britain. Instead, Phase Four played out into the London
Blitz.111 With the focus shifted on destroying the country’s capital, RAF airfields were
able to replenish, restore and reorganize their fighter squadrons. The climax of the Battle
of Britain came on the 15th of September.112 Goering organized the last major air strike he
thought he needed to secure Britain’s air space. Mustering 100 Dornier bombers and 200
Me 109’s, the first wave of the Luftwaffe force cruised over the English Channel in the
early morning.113Later in the day, another 150 bombers and 400 fighters were sent to
fight for the rule of Britain. However, unknown to Goering, Fighter Command was
109
John Terraine, The Right of the Line: the Royal Air Force in the European War, 19391945 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 221.
110
Matthew Parker, The Battle of Britain (London: Headline, 2000), 98.
111
The Blitz was the continuous German bombing of London for 57 days and nights in
late 1940.
112
Officially recognized as the Battle of Britain Day
113
Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: a History of the Battle of
Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 142.
32
prepared; radar stations anxiously anticipated the appearance of German aircrafts on their
screens, pilots were set to scramble into their fighters, and the Hurricane was ready to
cement its role as the savior of Britain. As the events of the ‘Battle of Britain Day’
unfolded, the RAF repulsed the two massive air strikes sent by Goering with great
success due to the strategic planning and tiresome effort of Fighter Command at
Uxbridge, which happened to receive a visit from the Prime Minister himself on the
day.114 The final installment of the immense air battle commenced in the early hours of
that Sunday, and continued throughout the day. The pivotal action occurred at the edge of
the nation’s capital around 2 o’clock in the afternoon during the second Luftwaffe
bombardment wave. This second German wave of attack would involve over 600 aircraft,
and require 185 RAF fighters to scramble to Britain’s defense.115 Fighter Command
began by sending No. 249 and 504 Hurricane Squadrons first to attack the incoming
German KG 3 and KG 26 groups, and then sent the remainder No. 17, 46, 257 and 603
squadrons to battle the lasting German bomber formations whose target was London.116
The Luftwaffe bombers were eventually forced out of formation by an RAF tactic
devised by Air Vice Marshal Leigh Mallory and famous fighter pilot, Douglas Bader,
called the ‘Big Wing’. This involved organizing three to five squadrons in the air to fly
together in a large wing-sized formation.117 Criticized by Air Vice Marshal Park and
Dowding himself, the Big Wing tactic took too long to form, required early warning, and
114
115
Ibid., 148.
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982),
85.
116
Ibid., 85.
Douglas Bader, Fight for the Sky; the Story of the Spitfire and the Hurricane.
(Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, 1973), 56.
117
33
was difficult to maneuver into the correct position.118The formation however was adopted
at certain times during Phase Four, and Mallory exaggerated its effectiveness as a means
to claim the victory.119The surviving Luftwaffe aircrafts retreated back to France, but
most of them never made it back across the Channel, tallying 56 destroyed Luftwaffe
aircraft’s by nightfall, versus only 26 RAF loses.120 September 15th signifies the end of
the Battle for Great Britain, as it was the last major air strike attempted by Goering before
Operation Sea Lion was indefinitely postponed two days later.121 However, Londoner’s
had yet to experience the most terrifying aspect of Hitler’s ruthless war campaign yet.
The end of the Battle of Britain only marks the beginning of the London Blitz, which
continues the events of World War II.
A Jolly Good Show
In total, the RAF destroyed 1,887 German aircrafts during the Battle of Britain.122
It is recorded that the Sydney Camm’s fighter was responsible for 61 per cent of the
Luftwaffe losses, a Hurricane statistic that should not be forgotten.123 Those figures led
Dowding himself to deem the Hurricane as “a jolly good machine, a rugged type,
stronger than the Spitfire”, and pilots to believe “they [Hurricane’s] were great, and they
118
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982),
43.
119
John Ray, The Battle of Britain: Dowding and the First Victory, 1940.
(London: Cassel Military Paperbacks, 2009),108.
120
Alfred Price, The Spitfire Story (London: Jane's Publishing Company Limited, 1982),
109.
121 James Holland, The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, MayOctober 1940 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 252.
122
Derek Wood and Deerk Dempster, Narrow Margin: The Battle of Britain and the Rise
of Air Power 1930-1940 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), 238.
123
Leo McKinstry, Hurricane: Victory of the Battle of Britain (London: John Murray,
2010), 2.
34
proved it by shooting down one thousand Luftwaffe aircraft in the battle.”124 The success
of the Hurricane was also owed to the vindication of the Dowding system. The chain of
authority and communication at Fighter Command, devised by Hugh Dowding, gave the
fighter squadrons the advantage of being fully organized by a central organization that
understood the defense of Britain in totality. Understanding what it would take to defend
and survive a German assault on Britain’s shores, Dowding won the Battle of Britain
strategically. However, his disagreements and disputes with the Air Ministry made him
unfavorable personnel to keep in command of the RAF. This led to his dismissal as Air
Chief Marshall on the 24th November 1940. Just like the Hurricane, Dowding was pushed
aside and given no credit or admiration for his success. Twenty-eight years passed before
a public statement was made about Dowding’s strategic achievement of the Battle of
Britain.125 However, the strategic achievement of the Hurricane continued before it was
forgotten.
The overall success of the Hurricane is seen in the victory of Britain in the great
air battle. However, it continued to play a key role during World War II across seas in
Northern Africa and the Middle East to protect Britain’s imperial trade routes of supplies
and oil. It was the only fighter aircraft during World War II to ever fight in every theatre
of war around the world. It was included as the main aircraft defense in Malta, Burma
and Russia, continuing its role as the toughest and strongest fighter aircraft. However, the
Hurricanes ultimate fate was sealed in the defeat of Singapore, which Churchill described
124
125
279.
Peter Townsend, Duel of Eagles (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 297.
Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain (London: Macdonald & Co., 1969),
35
as “the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.”126 Its role as the number
one fighter plane was fading, and Camm’s design began changing into a heavier, bomber
aircraft that was used to carry napalm near the end of the war. It made its final flight with
the RAF in 1946, when it started to be replaced with the Hawker Tempests.127 The
Hurricane’s success was beginning to decline, and its role in the victory of the Battle of
Britain starting to be forgotten.
Sydney Camm’s fighter was a design that decided the future history of Britain. Its
ultimate legacy can be seen in Flight magazines small tribute to the aircraft, stating
Without detracting in any way from the magnificent courage, skill and endurance
of the fighter pilots, the British victory was in some measure due to Hawkers, who
produced the aircraft in time and sufficient numbers to enable the pilots to turn the
day.128
The Hawker Hurricane, conceived under much skepticism and uncertainty in its ability to
perform, exceeded expectations with an ease for production, tough exterior, superior gun
performance, robust wing construction and traditional reliance as the formidable fighter.
Its conservative characteristics, although not advanced or attractive to look at, made it the
dependable and resilient wartime fighter Britain needed to survive Hitler’s totalitarian
expansion efforts. The fate of Europe depended on the resistance of one country, and in
its finest hour the Hurricane became that resistance.
126
Winston Churchill, The Second World War (1948. Reprint, London: Penguin Books,
1959) Volume IV, 256.
127
Chaz Bowyer, Hurricane at War (London: Allan, 1974), 201.
128 "War in Flight." Flight, August 24, 1940. http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive
(accessed November 2, 2012) 338.