WP1176
Verification in the 21st Century
Plausibly Proving the Negative
The Case for Normalising a General Technical
Accountability Obligation (GTA0)
in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Paul Schulte
Carnegie Endowment , KCL , SOAS
& UK Defence Academy
Proposed
WORKING
DEFlNlTlON
GTAO :
‘ A widespread normative international expectation
that the Government nationally responsible for a
programme raising proliferation concerns should
take responsibility for ensuring a plausible technical
explanation of design , acquisition or production
decisions , open to focused international expert
questioning, while preserving legitimate (usually
commercially sensitive ) areas of confidentiality.”
Iraq 1991-2003
• A test case for international arms control (if Saddam
couldn’t be disarmed as a condition of ceasefire after
the Kuwait War, whoever could?)
• A uniquely strong obligation on Iraq, not just to disarm
but to cooperate in disarmament.
• Simple prohibitions of complete classes of weapons:
– Nuclear
– Biological
– Chemical
– Missiles with ranges over 150 km
No complex issues over numbers and types
UN Disarmament Requirements on lraq
Cooperation was demanded over:
• Establishing a Full Understanding of Past Prohibited
Programmes , through
-Full Final and Complete Declaration (FFCD)
-Provision of Documentation
-Truthful and Wide Ranging Interviews with
previous technical authorities
• Access to Sites for inspection to check Iraqi statements
• Ongoing Monitoring and Verification (OMV)(e.g. with
video cameras in chemical factories)
Unsuccessful Disarmament Processes
• Early (and explicitly forbidden ) Iraqi destruction and
hiding of material
• Substantially, and obviously, false FFCDs, which failed
to take account of counter information which the UN
had already quoted
• Famous stand-offs over access for OSI : ”Verification
Theatre” over Sensitive Sites and accusations of
intrusion and spying
• Refusals to furnish documents- partially overcome by
unexpected UN seizures of computer hard drives
• Two-way Espionage, and intrigue ,in Iraq and in UN
HQ
Technical Evaluation Meetings (TEMs)
• Proposed unexpectedly by the Iraqis to Richard
Butler , Chairman of UNSCOM , in December 1997
• Conducted in early 1998:
- Baghdad in February for the
Chemical(VX) and Missile Areas;
- Vienna in March for the entire BW programme
• Internationally convened panels of technical experts,
including Russians and Chinese, talked their Iraqi
counterparts through their narratives and compared
them with the evidence , reaching damning
judgements based on technical plausibility.
Results of the TEMs
• VX and Missiles:
“Despite Iraq’s assertions and …a full opportunity to
present its views on all matters pertaining to the two
issues, the team of UNSCOM international experts
conclude unanimously that Iraq has still not provided
sufficient information for the Commission to
conclude that Iraq had undertaken all the
disarmament steps required of it in these areas. The
Commission’s experts provide the Council with an
oral briefing of the outcome on these two TEMS in
March 1998”
Results of the TEMs
• BW
“As with the other TEMs, the
experts unanimously conclude
that Iraq’s declaration on its
biological weapons programme is
incomplete and inadequate.”
The 3 UNSCOM TEMs
• A Forgotten Success for Arms Control
• 3 Triumphs of Professional Neutrality over Anticipated
Politicisation
• TEMs enabled intelligence – including that provided to
the UN by friendly states - to be leveraged into policy
conclusions and public diplomacy
• Wide (if temporary ) effect on international public
opinion
But the process is a rarity in Arms Control and Non
Proliferation
UNMOVIC : Blix’s Request to Commissioners for Advice on Defining
Cooperation in case the Iraqis ever offered it again
• I responded with a think piece in 2002, written
with the TEMs in mind .
• Attention should shift from judging degrees of
physical access to sites to provision of a
plausible and falsifiable technical narrative :
-were accurate and checkable details
provided?
- were unrestricted interviews allowed?
- and ,was OSI being blocked?
Historical Warnings and
Precedents
• Germany in 1919 (relentlessly obstructive) and
1945(broken backed) offered important
examples of responses to imposed disarmament
• Iraq characteristically insisted that it was in a
1945 situation, to mask apparently 1919-style
behaviour
• But South African efforts in the 1990s proved
that effective denuclearisation , to international
satisfaction, was possible - by giving provable
technical explanations backed by evidence .
Results of the Think Piece
• Blix “almost completely” agreed.
• But felt it too sensitive to table
• I passed the paper to French and
US colleagues
• A similar approach appeared in
the next UN resolution UNSCR
1441
UNSCR 1441 - 8 November 2002
Iraq’s “final opportunity to comply
with its disarmament obligations”
Operative Paragraph IV
"...false statements or omissions in the
declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant
to this resolution and failure by Iraq at
any time to comply with, and cooperate
fully in the implementation of, this
resolution shall constitute a further
material breach of Iraq's obligations.”
The Adequacy Issue in the Run-Up to the War
• The Final Iraqi Full Final and Complete Declaration was
no significant improvement on its predecessors(“The
Longest Suicide Note in History”)
• No major improvements (e.g. unrestricted interviews in
Cyprus) were offered to UNMOVIC’s ability to cross
question Iraqi Programme Directors
• But in early 2003 the Iraqis did offer more access to sites
• Anxious to avoid war, Blix stated that this improved OSI
would be sufficient to verify Iraqi compliance in a
number of months
• The US and UK did not agree – but were relying upon
what proved to be faulty intelligence
Understanding the Double lraqi Signal
• Even faced with war , Saddam once again refused the most
powerful methods of proving cooperation and compliance.
• An indication of continued defiance, evident to key
international and domestic audiences.
• But partial cooperation on OSI was aimed at ending the
compliance crisis , leaving uncertainty about continued
possession of WMDs - useful for internal and external
deterrence?
• (The Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq planned to
move quickly to reacquire prohibited weapons.)
Selective Global Memory Loss
After the Coalition Invasion
• Overwhelming world attention to the failure to
find Prohibited WMD or Missiles.
• The offer of improved cooperation over OSI was
seen as justifying Blix’s judgement that he could
have avoided war.
• The persistent Iraqi refusal to give anything
approaching an adequate general technical
account of its past programs was forgotten, or its
implications never understood.
• Many UNSCOM successes came from immediate
technical questioning during or after inspections
Unsettling and Overlooked Implications of
the Iraqi Compliance Crisis
• The 2003 War is a continuing human disaster,
and ,possibly, America’s major 21st-century
foreign policy mistake.
• But in proliferation terms was it worse than
the likely alternative: an Iraq that major states
believed had successfully defied its
disarmament obligations, largely because of
its refusal of any credible TAO?.What chance
of stopping Iranian programs then?
Precedents and near
analogies for a GTAO
Standing Consultative arrangements in
formal arms control treaties ,
institutionalising specific accountability
obligations
• 1972 ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM )Treaty
established the Standing Consultative
Commission (SCC) to handle treaty-related
compliance and implementation issues in the
SALT 1/ABMT Regime .
• Long-running disputes over the design and
intended purpose of radar arrays such as
Krasnoyarsk
ABMT Article XIII
1. The Parties shall establish promptly a Standing
Consultative Commission, within the framework
of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance
with the obligations assumed and related
situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information
as either Party considers necessary to assure
confidence in compliance with the obligations
assumed;
Further Formal Arms Control
Standing Consultative
Arrangements
• 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
established the the Special Verification
Commission (SVC) in Geneva.
• 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe(CFE) Treaty
established the Joint Consultative Group (JCG)in
Vienna, to
-Resolve ambiguities and differences in interpretation
-Consider measures that enhance the Treaty's viability and
effectiveness
-Resolve technical questions
-Look into disputes from the Treaty's implementation
GTAO Possibilities in
Multilateral Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation
GTAO Possibilities in the BTWC
• No established verification organisation in the
Biotechnology field , but consultation and
cooperation may take place :
“through appropriate international procedures within
the framework of the United Nations and in
accordance with its Charter” (Article V).
• Since the Convention does not define “appropriate
international procedures”, participants in the BW
Review Conferences agreed that such procedures
should include the right of any party to request that
a “consultative meeting”, open to all parties, be
convened promptly at expert level .
(Underused?)
GTAO Possibilities in the CWC
Article IX. Consultations, Cooperation and
Fact-Finding
Para 1. ” States Parties shall consult and
cooperate, directly among themselves …, or
through the Organization or other appropriate
international procedures, …on any matter
….relating to the…Convention. “
CWC Article IX. Consultations,
Cooperation and Fact-Finding
4.” A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive
Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on
any situation …which gives rise to a concern about its
possible non-compliance …
The Executive Council may call on the DG to establish a group
of experts … to examine all available information and
data…[and] submit a factual report to the Executive
Council…
If the ….concern of a State Party about possible noncompliance has not been resolved within 60 days …it may
request a special session of the Conference .”
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY
Article IV -Verification
Consultation and Clarification
• Para 29 : without prejudice to the right …to request an onsite inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible,
first make every effort to clarify and resolve, among
themselves , or with or through the Organization, any
matter that may cause concern about possible noncompliance …
• Para 32 : each State Party may request the Executive
Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on
any matter that may cause concern about possible noncompliance ….
Why so little apparent application of GTAO in the
Chem Bio field, despite Treaty Provision for
consultation and clarification?
• No suspicions require clarification?
• Insufficient intelligence evidence to begin seeking
technical clarifications?
• Diplomatically impracticable to try to launch
consultations because there is no effective GTAO
norm?
• Consultations to achieve technical clarification do
occur satisfactorily?
• Importance of U.S. State Department Annual
Compliance Reports.
NPT / IAEA
• The Additional Protocol , and Information Driven
Safeguards in general , involve additional data rather
than technical discussion and questioning.
• “With safeguards needing to move from a mechanistic to
an information-driven system, there should be much
more information sharing, in both directions, on the part
of both states and the IAEA, with the agency reevaluating its culture of confidentiality and nontransparency”.
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT (EVANS /KAWAGUCHI)
November 2009
Leveraging Intelligence in the NPT field
through GTAO
IAEA inspectors ‘cannot be expected to comb
through every inch of a state's territory blindly
searching for nuclear material and installations.’
Hans Blix, former IAEA Director-General, calling
for increased intelligence sharing from member
states
Could additional intelligence available to the
Agency produce greater results if it were also
used-with appropriate care - to inform a GTAO
process?
Implications for Managing the Future of
Destructive Technologies
• Building upon these Treaty precedents ,
could/should the International
Community develop , strengthen, and
extend a norm stressing a “ General
Technical Accountability Obligation ” ?
• But , in the proliferation field, GTAO is
unlikely to be facilitated by legally
created standing consultative groups
under formal treaties.
GTAO as a significant resource for
managing the Nuclear Renaissance?
• Could/should we create a global expectation that
states embarking on allegedly civil nuclear
projects should have :
-to provide an explanatory narrative of their
design choices ; and, where concerns remain,
- to explain to international expert fora the
logic of questionable features which might
lend themselves to production of
weaponisable material.
• Ideally, could this become an agreed part of the
IAEA's working pattern?
Predictable Objections to increased use of GTAO
• National Sovereignty (‘States cannot be expected to
explain themselves, unless they sign treaties explicitly
requiring them to do so”-”Westphalian Opacity?”)
• Alleged commercial confidentiality ( “Having to
answer questions would benefit commercial rivals”)
• Practicality: (“Better to Stick to Facts rather than
intentions in Arms Control’)
• Denunciations by Proliferators or Sympathisers
(“Espionage and Diplomatic blackmail , beyond any
formal NPT, CWC or BWC requirements – rigging the
original Treaty bargain”)
Positive Counterarguments
• GTAO would be the nonproliferation equivalent of the
powerful and well accepted academic process of Peer
Review- the so far grossly under used Gold Standard of
Verification.
• It would facilitate the global transfer of technology by
acting as a further safeguard against misuse
• It could increase the leverage of countries without large
intelligence collection agencies, but with respected
technical experts
• It would provide an efficient method for states suspected
of proliferation to clear themselves, and increase the
pressure of world opinion on those who don’t
Could a GTAO be progressively introduced without International
Diplomatic Consensus ?
• Make the extent to which technical accountability obligations had
been met a formal consideration for suppliers groups to weigh up
before deciding on technology transfers and sales to particular
states;
• Introduce it as a decision factor for investment, contractual
relationships, and insurance -rendering it simply imprudent to do
business with companies and countries that refuse to comply with
the GTAO;
• Insist on it as part of the conditionality for future international
development aid decisions, and
• Turn it into a campaigning issue for green or antimilitary groups
trying to improve the international responsibility of their
government's behaviour (with support from international NGOs)
Bilateral Confidential Invocations of GTAO
• Increase the use of unpublicised back channel
conversations involving national intelligence
agencies as a means of resolving disagreements
over bilateral arms control (many precedents )
• Especially in new fields unregulated by Treaties
, such as nanotechnology and Cyber , this may
be the only practical method
• Build many , informal, undisclosed , ad hoc,
Joint Consultative Groups?
GTAO-Related Issues for Further Consideration
• In each Major Technical Domain ( Civil Nuclear Power?
Biotech? Chemical Engineering? Nano Tech? Cyber?
Others?)
-what aspects of design or production are in fact
seriously commercially sensitive?
-what protocols might be developed to ensure
they were not disclosed during the process of technical
account and clarification : “managed questioning”?
-how far could the questioners be chosen or
trained to be accepted as unbiased and discreet?
Introducing and Facilitating GTAO :
Possible Modalities
• Direct appointment of nationally nominated experts by the
UN or international agencies onto an international
technical panel.
• A Commercial Arbitration Model: both sides appoint
arbitrators to choose other experts acceptable to both.
• A “Strikeout” Arrangement ,where 1 or 2 members of the
investigating panel could be vetoed, as with IAEA
inspectors now.
• A Lead State or States (often the US) would engage in an
informal process of GTAO with a suspected proliferator and
vouch - or not - for its intentions to allies.
GTAO in the Best Case
• GTAO normalised as part of an accepted and benign
process of international technical dialogue, rather
than being seen as an anomalous inquisition.
• In this kind of world , Intelligence information
would remain important to detect and act against
proliferation, but intelligence resources could be
better prioritised to address the most significant
national programmes, with the additional indicators
of refusal , or significant omissions or falsehoods , in
fulfilling the GTAO.
Q : So What?
A : Hypothesis
• Systematic promotion and widespread
acceptance of GTAO is one of a range of
normative and institutional requirements
without which it may be impossible to
contain - or reverse - the spread of
Weapons of Mass Destruction , or
Weapons of Mass Effect, among and
beyond states in the 21st Century.
•
Richard Rhodes, “The Twilight
of the Bombs” 2010
“For the largest scale instruments of man-
made death …., the elements of … [a new]
discipline of public safety have already
begun to assemble themselves: materials
control and accounting, cooperative threat
reduction, security guarantees, agreements
and treaties, surveillance and inspection,
sanctions, forceful disarming if all else fails. “
But -Verification Is Currently In A
Malaise
• increasingly normalised deadlock with Iran: no
explanations for decisions in its nuclear program,
limited IAEA access to documents and relevant
personnel
• Syria’s unpunished autistic refusal to give any
explanation for Dair Alzour and other sites
• lack of any progress in the BW area
• the rusting away of the intended Challenge
Inspection capacity of the OPCW, through
diplomatically induced non-use
GTAO Could Help Change This
Unless Westphalian opacity can be overcome,
here ,or through other modalities , prospects for
progress look slim , and Global Zero impossible.
If achieving and enforcing GTAO is unfeasible:
-why, specifically , is this so?
-what are the chances that the international
community will succeed in obtaining essential
cooperation and information in future
compliance crises?