Internal Investigations By Outside Counsel: Implications for Anti-Corruption Enforcement JAMES E. HOUGH American Bar Association’s “The Role of Lawyers, the Bar, and the Bench in Preventing and Combating Corruption within the Justice System” February 19, 2007 © 2006 Morrison & Foerster LLP All Rights Reserved Internal Investigations By Outside Counsel WH0 ? WHAT is investigated WHEN are investigations performed WHY 1 ? conducts corruption-related investigations are investigations conducted ? ? Internal Investigations: WHO? • Global companies whose home jurisdictions prohibit foreign corrupt payments. • Thirty-six “supply-side” countries now prohibit use of corporate funds to pay bribes to foreign officials. 2 3 Examples of Companies Subject to Prohibitions on Foreign Bribery USA Netherlands South Korea UK France Switzerland Germany USA Japan USA 4 EXAMPLES OF APPLICABLE SANCTIONS COUNTRY PRISON (maximum penalty) FINES for natural persons (NP) and legal person (LP) OTHER SANCTIONS upon criminal conviction JAPAN 3 years NPs: JPY 3 million (THB 949,282 ) LPs: JPY 300 million (THB 94,937,554 ) Not directly on foreign bribery offence convictions KOREA 5 years NPs: KRW 20 million (THB 749,377) or twice the amount of profit if > KRW 10 million LPs: KRW 1 billion or twice the amount of profit if profit > KRW 500 million (THB 18,738,378) Not directly on foreign bribery offence conviction to date, but under consideration (disbarment from public procurement) UNITED KINGDOM 6 months (summary) 7 years (indictment) THB 320,962 (summary) NO upper limit (indictment) NPs: disqualification of directors from certain functions LPs: Not directly on foreign bribery offence conviction UNITED STATES 15 years NPs: Up to USD 100,000 (THB 3,729,861) LPs: Up to USD 2 million (THB 74,606,384); actual fine up to 2x the benefit sought Civil penalties up to USD 10,000 (THB 341,253; additional SEC fine; debarment from U.S. government procurement 5 Internal Investigations: WHAT U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT • Anti-Bribery Provisions • 6 Apply to all U.S. companies (including officers, directors, employee, agents and shareholders) and all U.S. nationals Apply to non-U.S. companies and nationals who act in U.S. Accounting/Books and Records Provision Applies only to U.S. “issuers” Affect foreign subsidiaries and affiliates of issuers Internal Investigations: WHAT • Primarily Fact Investigation Collecting, reviewing and preserving evidence • E-mail and electronic data • Hard copy documents Conducting interviews • Key executives • Staff • Consultants, agents and/or customers 7 Internal Investigations: WHEN • Whistleblower allegations SOX provides protections and incentives • M&A due diligence • Auditor questions • Investigations already underway by authorities 8 Internal Investigations: WHY? “. . . Foreign bribery is a difficult offense to detect, since it is committed in secret and involves two satisfied parties . . . .” OECD Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports, p. 92 (available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/39/36872226.pdf) 9 Internal Investigations: WHY • Reduces exposure to government action • Puts company in better position to respond to charges/lawsuits • Prevents future wrongdoing • Provides information that management needs to fulfill responsibilities 10 Internal Investigations: WHY Advantages of outside counsel: • Increased control over information discovered U.S. law: Attorney-Client Privilege; Work Product Protection • Independence from management Ethical obligations Avoids conflicting interests • 11 Credibility if company decides to selfreport Internal Investigations: WHY • Voluntary disclosure to government over improper conduct discovered by internal investigation U.S. reporting FCPA violations made both to DOJ and SEC • Criminal case against company by DOJ • 12 less likely Lowers or eliminates SEC penalty Self-Reporting Example: Schnitzer Steel • Korean subsidiary made over $1.8M in improper payments to customers, many of whom were Chinese state-owned entities • Self-reported to DOJ and SEC • Reported both bribery of foreign government officials, and books and records violations • Korean subsidiary entered guilty plea; Schnitzer Steel entered deferred prosecution agreement with DOJ • Schnitzer Steel and Korean subsidiary paid over $15M to settle matter 13 Self-Reporting Example: Baker Hughes • Paid $75,000 through an agent to Indonesian tax official to reduce assessed tax • Self-reported • Company, CFO, Controller charged by SEC • $30 million estimated cost of remediation required by government 14 RECENT FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Year Company/Individual 2004 ABB, Ltd. 2004 Schering-Plough Corp. 2004 GE InVision Technologies, Inc. 2005 Micrus Corporation 2005 Titan Corp. How discovered problem? Self-reported? Action by Government Agency (SEC/DOJ) M&A due diligence Yes $5.9M in civil disgorgement and prejudgment interest; retain outside FCPA compliance monitor; $10.5M criminal fine; subsidiary entered guilty plea Internal investigation Yes $500,000 civil fine; retain independent consultant M&A due diligence Yes $589,000 civil disgorgement; $500,000 civil fine; non-prosecution agreement with DOJ; $800,000 criminal fine; continued cooperation with DOJ and adopt FCPA compliance program Internal investigation Yes Non-prosecution agreement with DOJ; $450,000 fine; retain independent consultant M&A due diligence Yes $15.5M in civil disgorgement and prejudgment interest; $13M criminal fine; company plead guilty; agreed to retain independent consultant 15 RECENT FCPA ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Year Company/Individual How discovered problem? Self-reported? Action by Government Agency (SEC/DOJ) 2005 Monsanto Company Routine internal audit Yes Non-prosecution agreement with DOJ; $1.5M civil fine; appoint independent consultant 2005 Diagnostic Products Corp. and DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. ("DePu") Internal investigation Yes $2.04M in civil disgorgement + $750,000 in prejudgment interest; $2M criminal fine; DePu entered guilty plea 2005 Yaw Osei Amaoki (former regional director for ITXC Corp.) Internal investigation Yes Case by SEC pending 2006 Schnitzer Steel and SSI International Far East Ltd. ("SSI Korea) Internal investigation Yes $6.27M in civil disgorgement by Schnitzer + $1.45M in prejudgment interest; deferred prosecution agreement with DOJ by Schnitzer Steel; retain independent consultant; SSI Korea plead guilty and $7.5M criminal fine 2006 Statoil, ASA Norwegian press report triggered U.S. investigation No deferred prosecution agreement with DOJ; $21M total fine in civil and criminal penalties; retain independent consultant 16 Internal Investigations: WHY • U.S. Law: incentives to disclose if find problems • Governments increasingly likely to share information with authorities where corrupt activity took place OECD Convention incorporates “Mutual Legal Assistance” UN Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions 17 THANK YOU James E. Hough Morrison & Foerster LLP 18