PMC Affirmative - Open Evidence Archive
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PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***PMC Affirmative*** ***PMC Affirmative*** ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1 1AC Plan Text ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 ***Inherency*** ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Inherency – High Now ............................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Inherency – High Now ............................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Inherency – High Now ............................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Inherency – High Now/Courts Failing ....................................................................................................................................................... 9 Inherency – PMCs Unsustainable ............................................................................................................................................................ 10 Inherency – Fate Undetermined ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 Inherency – PMC ≠ Under UCMJ ........................................................................................................................................................... 12 Inherency – PMC Unregulated Now ........................................................................................................................................................ 13 ***Afghanistan Advantage*** ................................................................................................................................................................ 14 1AC Afghanistan Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................... 15 1AC Afghanistan Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................... 16 1AC Afghanistan Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................... 17 1AC Afghanistan Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................... 18 1AC Afghanistan Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................... 19 1AC Afghanistan Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................... 20 Afghanistan – A2: Turns .......................................................................................................................................................................... 21 Afghanistan – Civilian Casualties ............................................................................................................................................................ 22 Afghanistan – Civilian Casualties ............................................................................................................................................................ 23 Afghanistan – Relations/Stability ............................................................................................................................................................ 24 Afghanistan – Terrorism/Counter-Insurgency ......................................................................................................................................... 25 ***Human Rights Advantage*** ............................................................................................................................................................ 26 1AC Human Rights .................................................................................................................................................................................. 27 Human Rights – Terrorism ...................................................................................................................................................................... 28 Human Rights – Leadership ..................................................................................................................................................................... 29 Human Rights – Leadership ..................................................................................................................................................................... 30 Human Rights – North Korea .................................................................................................................................................................. 31 Human Rights – EXT............................................................................................................................................................................... 32 Human Rights – EXT............................................................................................................................................................................... 33 Human Rights – EXT............................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Human Rights – EXT............................................................................................................................................................................... 35 Human Rights – EXT............................................................................................................................................................................... 36 ***International Law Advantage*** ....................................................................................................................................................... 37 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 38 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 39 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 40 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 41 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 42 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 43 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 44 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 45 1AC International Law Advantage .......................................................................................................................................................... 46 International Law – Geneva ..................................................................................................................................................................... 47 International Law – Geneva ..................................................................................................................................................................... 48 International Law – Geneva ..................................................................................................................................................................... 49 International Law – Geneva ..................................................................................................................................................................... 50 International Law – Geneva ..................................................................................................................................................................... 51 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 1 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva ..................................................................................................................................................................... 52 International Law – Generic .................................................................................................................................................................... 53 International Law – Mercenaries ............................................................................................................................................................. 54 International Law – Mercenaries ............................................................................................................................................................. 55 International Law – Mercenaries ............................................................................................................................................................. 56 International Law – Human Rights .......................................................................................................................................................... 57 International Law – Inherency ................................................................................................................................................................. 58 International Law – Geneva/A2: PMC Not Mercenary ........................................................................................................................... 59 International Law – Geneva – Spec Recruited ......................................................................................................................................... 60 International Law – Geneva – Direct Participation .................................................................................................................................. 61 International Law – Geneva – Financial Gain ......................................................................................................................................... 62 International Law – Geneva – A2: Corporate Structure........................................................................................................................... 63 International Law – A2: No Basis for PMC in I’Law .............................................................................................................................. 64 International Law – A2: UMCJ Now ....................................................................................................................................................... 65 International Law – A2: UMCJ Now ....................................................................................................................................................... 66 International Law – A2: UMCJ Now ....................................................................................................................................................... 67 International Law – A2: Different Ground CP ........................................................................................................................................ 68 International Law – A2: Statutes Now ..................................................................................................................................................... 69 International Law – A2: Private Actors Not State Actors ........................................................................................................................ 70 ***Iraq Advantage*** ............................................................................................................................................................................. 71 1AC Iraq Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................................ 72 1AC Iraq Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................................ 73 1AC Iraq Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................................ 74 1AC Iraq Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................................ 75 1AC Iraq Advantage ................................................................................................................................................................................ 76 Iraq – Stability ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 77 Iraq – No Accountability ......................................................................................................................................................................... 78 Iraq – No Accountability ......................................................................................................................................................................... 79 Iraq – Counter Insurgency ....................................................................................................................................................................... 80 ***Multilateralism Advantage*** ........................................................................................................................................................... 81 Multilateralism – Internal ........................................................................................................................................................................ 82 Multilateralism – Internal ........................................................................................................................................................................ 83 Multilateralism – Internal ........................................................................................................................................................................ 84 Multilateralism – Internal ........................................................................................................................................................................ 85 Multilateralism – Iraq HR Internal ........................................................................................................................................................... 86 Multilateralism Impact ............................................................................................................................................................................. 87 ***PMC Bad***...................................................................................................................................................................................... 88 PMC Bad – Extinction ............................................................................................................................................................................. 89 PMC Bad – War ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 90 PMC Bad – Stability ................................................................................................................................................................................ 91 PMC Bad – Stability ................................................................................................................................................................................ 92 PMC Bad – Stability ................................................................................................................................................................................ 93 PMC Bad – Stability ................................................................................................................................................................................ 94 PMC Bad – Global Spillover ................................................................................................................................................................... 95 PMC Bad – Laundry List ......................................................................................................................................................................... 96 PMC Bad – Democracy ........................................................................................................................................................................... 97 PMC Bad – Warfighting .......................................................................................................................................................................... 98 PMC Bad – Warfighting .......................................................................................................................................................................... 99 PMC Bad – Warfighting ........................................................................................................................................................................ 100 PMC Bad – Monopolizing Violence ...................................................................................................................................................... 101 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 2 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Solvency***..................................................................................................................................................................................... 102 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 103 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 104 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 105 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 106 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 107 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 108 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 109 Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards .................................................................................................................................................. 110 Solvency – Regulation ........................................................................................................................................................................... 111 Solvency – Legal Action Key ................................................................................................................................................................ 112 ***A2: Stuff*** .................................................................................................................................................................................... 113 A2: Spending ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 114 A2: Spending ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 115 A2: Market Checks / Cost Effective ...................................................................................................................................................... 116 A2: Presidential Powers ......................................................................................................................................................................... 117 A2: T – Presence .................................................................................................................................................................................... 118 A2: T – Presence/Substantial ................................................................................................................................................................. 119 A2: Withdraw Not Possible ................................................................................................................................................................... 120 A2: PMC Good ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 121 A2: Neoliberalism .................................................................................................................................................................................. 122 A2: Neoliberalism .................................................................................................................................................................................. 124 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 3 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Plan Text PLAN: The United States federal judiciary should rule that its contracts with private military companies performing combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq should be terminated on the ground they violate international law by meeting the definition of a “mercenary” under Article 47 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions. We’ll clarify. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 4 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Inherency*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 5 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – High Now Private military contractors are on the rise in Afghanistan – 60,000 more this year – despite lack of accountability and overlapping contracts Siddique ‘10 Abubakar Siddique, Private U.S. Contractors Back In The Spotlight In Iraq, Afghanistan, January 8 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Use_Of_Private_Contractors_Back_In_Spotlight_In_Iraq_Afghanistan/1924419.html In her opening statement to the U.S. Senate's Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight on December 17, Senator Claire McCaskill (Democrat, Missouri) said that the number and cost of contractors in Afghanistan is projected to rise substantially with the anticipated increase in U.S. troops in the country. "We know that there are more than 100,000 contractors currently working in Afghanistan," McCaskill said. "The number of Defense Department contractors alone may reach 160,000 in the next year." U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill McCaskill then noted the key findings of her recent trip to Iraq. "I had many different things that happened on that trip that are seared into my hard drive," she told the subcommittee hearing. "Realizations about the lack of coordination and organization between various pots of money," McCaskill said. "Amazing lapses in scoping contracts. And making contracts definite enough so that they can be enforced particularly, from any kind of accountability standpoint and the government getting their money back, when it had been abused and misused by contractors." In 2008, the U.S. nonprofit Human Rights First estimated that there were "well over 200,000 U.S. government private contractors in Iraq, far greater than the number of U.S. military personnel." Former European Union diplomat Martine van Bijlert, who spent years in Afghanistan, tells RFE/RL that contracting in general and security contracting in particular is a "big unknown." Van Bijlert, who now works for the Afghan Analyst Network, a private nonprofit research group, says private contracting is a big issue for several reasons. "First of all, you have the issue of the [U.S.] Department of Defense contracting and then subcontracting a lot of its responsibilities and you lose some of the accountability there," she says. "[Then] there is the issue of having international private security companies often acting on their own behalf -- acting with quite a sense of impunity as well -- as illustrates in incidents like the killing of local nationals and difficulties in bringing that to trial." Obama is increasing private security levels despite pledges not to Siddique ‘10 Abubakar Siddique, Private U.S. Contractors Back In The Spotlight In Iraq, Afghanistan, January 8 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Use_Of_Private_Contractors_Back_In_Spotlight_In_Iraq_Afghanistan/1924419.html Van Bijlert suggests that the employment of local Afghan security firms is also a major, but less known, problem. "You are arming and entrenching local armed groups," she says. "And where international groups...would leave -- they are [only] a problem as long as they are there -- the national groups will actually stay to be a problem potentially for quite a long while." She suggests that, despite public pledges by U.S. President Barack Obama's administration to change how U.S. troops and civilians operate on the ground, the administration is finding it difficult to change "patterns and relationships." A recent report issued by Senator McCaskill's staff states that in the case of Afghanistan, the use of private contractors has risen sharply under the Obama administration. “From June 2009 to September 2009, there was a 40 percent increase in Defense Department contractors in Afghanistan. During the same period, the number of armed private security contractors working for the Defense Department in Afghanistan doubled, increasing from approximately 5,000 to more than 10,000," the report states. Van Bijlert says the Obama administration is under a lot of pressure to show short-term results, and "security concerns tend to override other concerns." Van Bijlert argues that with the Afghan, American, and European public increasingly becoming aware of the problems associated with the hiring of private contractors in war zones, governments should keep accountability in mind when considering hiring more. Van Bijlert notes that "One of the issues is that they cannot act with impunity," citing a "worst-case scenario" in which such individuals kill citizens and are not held accountable. "Another issue is [the] accountable spending of money." Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 6 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – High Now Private Military Corporation contracts high now and are set to increase – DoD contracts, future military projections and favorable political climates ensure the growth of the industry in the coming century Wallwork ‘05 Major Richard D Wallwork, RA British Army, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1/2/2005, “Operational Implications of Private Military Companies in the Global War on Terror,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA436294&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Since 1994, the U.S. DoD has entered into 3601 contracts with twelve PMCs worth over $300 billion. Since the commencement of the GWOT, in simplistic terms, the expectations of U.S. foreign policy versus capabilities of the U.S. military can only mean more business for PMCs given the oft complained “overstretch” of U.S. forces and the avowed policy of not using the draft by the Bush administration. According to D.B. Des Roches, spokesman for the Pentagon’s Defence Security Cooperation Agency, “the war on terrorism is the full employment act for these guys.”84 The market appears ready for wider employment of PMCs and the key for companies to access future international contracts will be to develop good reputations for efficiency, ethics and humanitarianism.85 Since the tacit acceptance by the U.S. government in the 1990s of the utility of PMCs, despite many opinions to the contrary, the political climate is now such, as is the attitude to privatization, that the utilization of these companies is politically acceptable and is widely supported.86 Companies are rushing to take the opportunities presented to them by the DoD not only overseas, but also in the Continental United States. For example, the DoD contracts out 4300 private security jobs to guard Army bases in contracts worth around $1.2 billion. This fact has raised concern amongst the Senate Armed Services committee, especially over the guarding of sensitive sites that contain, for example, chemical and nuclear weapons.87 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 7 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – High Now PMC’s are flourishing now, they have been on the rise since the end of the Cold War – there is been NO effort at regulation, oversight, or a code of conduct leaving PMC’s in a legal grey zone Debusmann ‘06 Bernd Debusmann, Special Correspondent for Reuters, FEATURE-In Iraq, contractor deaths near 650, legal fog thickens, 10/10/06 http://today.reuters.com/news/articleinvesting.aspex?view=CN&storyID=2006-10-10T150938Z_01_N10275842_0_IRAQ-USACONTRACTORS-FEATURE.XML&rpc=66&type=qcna The war in Iraq has killed at least 647 civilian contractors to date, according to official figures that provide a stark reminder of the huge role of civilians in supporting the U.S. military. The contractor death toll is tracked by the U.S. Department of Labor on the basis of claims under an insurance policy, the Defense Base Act, that all U.S. government contractors and subcontractors working outside the United States must take out for their civilian employees. In response to questions from Reuters, a Labor Department spokesman said there had been 647 claims for death benefits between March 1, 2003, and Sept. 30, 2006. The Defense Base Act covers both Americans and foreigners, and there is no breakdown of the nationalities of those killed. The Pentagon does not monitor civilian contractor casualties. The death toll of civilians working alongside U.S. forces in Iraq compares with more than 2,700 military dead and, experts say, underscores the risks of outsourcing war to private military contractors. Their number in Iraq is estimated at up to 100,000, from highly-trained former special forces soldiers to drivers, cooks, mechanics, plumbers, translators, electricians and laundry workers and other support personnel. A trend toward "privatizing war" has been accelerating steadily since the end of the Cold War, when the United States and its former adversaries began cutting back professional armies. U.S. armed forces shrank from 2.1 million when the Berlin Wall came down in 1989 to 1.4 million today. "At its present size, the U.S. military could not function without civilian contractors," said Jeffrey Addicott, an expert at St. Mary's University in San Antonio. "The problem is that the civilians operate in a legal gray zone. There has been little effort at regulation, oversight, standardized training and a uniform code of conduct. It's the Wild West out there." Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 8 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – High Now/Courts Failing The use of PMCs have grown dramatically but the USFG has no means to control them – US Courts specifically have been impotent in checking abuses Tepperman ‘02 Jonathan D., Editor of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2002, The New Republic, “Can Mercenaries Protect Hamid Karzai?” The use of PMCs has grown dramatically over the last decade; there are now about 35 such firms in the United States alone. DynCorp, a 56-year-old corporation with 23,000 employees and an annual income of almost $2 billion, is one of the biggest. Its rivals include Virginia-based mpri and Texas-based Kellogg Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, Dick Cheney's former employer. The newfound popularity of such companies is easy to understand. After the end of the cold war, the United States slashed its active-duty military personnel from around two million to 1.4 million. This shrinkage has caused manpower shortages within the services and a glut of retired officers flooding the private sector. The contraction of the American military also coincided with the largest economic expansion in U.S. history, an era when many policymakers came to assume that private companies could perform public tasks better than government bureaucrats. And sometimes they can. PMCs often perform a wide variety of noncombatant roles with a high level of professionalism. DynCorp maintains military aircraft, runs communications systems, and helps to manufacture the U.S. Army's anthrax vaccine, among other tasks. But, while PMCs may hate being thought of as mercenaries, they sometimes do end up sending men with guns to foreign countries under American auspices. Unfortunately for Karzai, in this area, PMCs' records have been disastrous. The first problem with using PMCs as soldiers may ironically help to explain the idea's appeal. It is almost impossible to figure out what they or their client— in this case, the U.S. government— is up to. PMC employees abroad work in a legal netherworld. As contract employees, they are not subject to the U.S. military's code of conduct. Nor are they subject to U.S. law, since it does not extend to most offenses committed abroad. And, while PMC employees are technically subject to the laws of the country in which they serve, those states usually have weak judicial systems. According to Peter W. Singer, a Brookings Institution expert on PMCs and author of the forthcoming book Corporate Warriors, "These companies operate in areas where the local legal system is either unable or unwilling to hold these guys accountable." In practice, then, America's freelance warriors are free to misbehave— and to escape the consequences. When a number of DynCorp employees working in Bosnia were recently found to be running a sex-slavery ring, the Army's Criminal Investigation Division dropped its inquiry after determining the men fell outside of its jurisdiction. U.S. courts proved to be similarly impotent, and the fragile, corrupt Bosnian legal system did no better. Similarly, if Karzai's new bodyguards decide to flout the law in Afghanistan, a nation with ample opportunity for profiteering and corruption, there is very little that anyone— Karzai, the Pentagon, or U.S. courts— will be able to do about it. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 9 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – PMCs Unsustainable Private militaries are not sustainable or inevitable – they are training ex-Afghan milita that want will start an Afghani civil war once the U.S. leaves Robichaud ‘07 Carl Robichaud is a Program Officer at the Century Foundation, where he writes on nonproliferation and directs the Foundation's Afghanistan Watch program. “Private Military Contractors also Creating Problems in Afghanistan”, World Politics Review, 10/31/2007, http://www.centuryfoundation.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1721 The men comprising these forces are mostly Afghans, former combatants from mujahideen militias. As a result, reliance upon these forces has had the pernicious consequence of sustaining and empowering some of the nation's most irresponsible actors. Barnett Rubin, a leading expert on Afghanistan, argues that security contractors "have hired, armed, and trained militias that were supposed to be demobilized and disarmed, enabling them to persist and profit as part of the 'private sector,' awaiting the spark that will set off another civil war." One example cited by Rubin is Din Muhammad Jurat. Jurat, a Northern Alliance militia leader who has been implicated in organized crime and in the murder of a parliamentarian, secured a lucrative position with USPI. He now provides "former" fighters from his militia as security guards for reconstruction projects. Just this year, his men were involved in the beating of Afghanistan Attorney General Abdul Jabbar Sabet, who belongs to a different faction. Reliance on these sorts of actors, argues Rubin, is "corrupting the Afghan police and administration." Behind the Crackdown A "crackdown" on some of these firms may well be in order. According to some sources, however, the Ministry of the Interior's recent closures were not driven by a desire to achieve accountability but a desire to consolidate power. One Kabul insider, quoted by Rubin on his blog, noted that the timing of the "crackdown" is suspicious, since it comes just as the ministry completed a set of legal regulations that would bring the industry under control. The regulations, finalized on Aug. 5, have "since been put on the shelf by the [government of Afghanistan] which has started now to 'crack down' instead of introducing a legal procedure. . . . I cannot help the impression that some competitors closely linked to the president are trying to (a) extract bribes from the PSCs for not being shut down arbitrarily and (b) eliminate rivals." It is no coincidence, he argues, that "nobody so far has questioned the PSCs owned by illustrious people" or "operating under the control of local warlords . . . in the East and South either." Looking Ahead In Afghanistan, as in Iraq, security contractors have filled a power vacuum that was created when the administration opted for a military deployment with neither the size nor the mandate to stabilize the country. The coalition's inability to establish security, and its subsequent failure to stand up an effective police training effort, forced it to rely upon hired help. "If you don't have enough military forces, very often that is a way out then, to count on private security companies," observes Maj. Gen. Bruno Kasdorf, chief of staff with the NATO forces in Afghanistan. Even the Kabul official quoted by Rubin acknowledges that "The real challenge to the government is the fact that the Ministry of Interior does not have the capacity to replace the protection guaranteed by the private companies outside of Kabul." National police could replace some of the guards in the capital, but they are not yet up to harder missions like guarding the Kajaki Dam in Helmand. So in the short run, the United States and NATO will rely heavily upon private firms to provide security and to train the Afghan police. This is especially the case in police training, for which DynCorps won a multibillion dollar contract, and in counternarcotics. But this necessity should not obscure the fact that this model has grave costs that go far beyond the financial. In the case of Afghanistan, over-reliance upon Afghan security firms threatens to corrupt the government and perpetuate illegal militias even as over-reliance upon international security firms threatens to undermine Afghan support for a foreign presence. In the short run, we may be stuck with a heavy reliance upon private security contractors, but we should not pretend that this approach was inevitable—or that it is sustainable. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 10 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – Fate Undetermined Private military firms are being examined on the grounds of human rights abuses and treaty violations but the their fate is uncertain Barnes ‘07 America's own unlawful combatants? Using private guards in Iraq could expose the U.S. to accusations of treaty violations, some experts think. THE WORLD, October 15, 2007, Julian E. Barnes, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration deals with the fallout from the recent killings of civilians by private security firms in Iraq, some officials are asking whether the contractors could be considered unlawful combatants under international agreements. The question is an outgrowth of federal reviews of the shootings, in part because the U.S. officials want to determine whether the administration could be accused of treaty violations that could fuel an international outcry. But the issue also holds practical and political implications for the administration's war effort and the image of the U.S. abroad. If U.S. officials conclude that the use of guards is a potential violation, they may have to limit guards' tasks in war zones, which could leave more work for the already overstretched military. Unresolved questions are likely to touch off new criticism of Bush's conduct of the unpopular Iraq war, especially given the broad definition of unlawful combatants the president has used in justifying his detention policies at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The issues surrounding the private security contractors are being examined by lawyers at the departments of State, Defense and Justice. Disagreements about the contractors' status exist between agencies and within the Pentagon itself. "I think it is an unresolved issue that needs to be addressed," said a senior Defense Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the subject. "But if that is in fact the case, what the heck are we doing?" The use of private contractors by the U.S. military and governments worldwide began long before the U.S invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but it has mushroomed in recent years. With relatively little controversy, contractors have assumed a greater share of support and logistics duties traditionally handled by uniformed military, such as protecting diplomats inside a war zone. On Sept. 16, a Blackwater USA security team guarding U.S. diplomats was involved in a shooting that killed as many as 17 Iraqis. Blackwater said its personnel were under attack, but Iraqis said the team began the shooting. Other incidents portraying the private guards as aggressive and heavily armed have since come to light. The guards also operate under immunity from Iraqi law -- immunity was granted in 2004 by U.S. officials -- and in a murky status with respect to American laws. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 11 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – PMC ≠ Under UCMJ Private military contractors are not legally bound by chain of command or the Uniform Code of Military Justice, lax regulation and non-existent information sharing makes abuses by PMC’s inevitable Avant ‘04 Deborah Avant, associate professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University, Sunday, Washington Post, May 9 2004, “What Are Those Contractors Doing in Iraq?” http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A101632004May8?language=printer When the United States deploys its military forces, the process is easily understood: Active or reserve officers, who report up the chain of command to the president according to rules set by Congress and governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, go overseas. The media cover deployments and the public is informed. But there are no standard procedures for deploying private security workers under military contracts, which makes it far more difficult to gather information about who they are, what they're doing and for whom. They are not part of the military command; they are not covered by the code of military justice. The events of the last few days illustrate those differences well. When reports of abuses at Abu Ghraib surfaced, it was clear that the 800th Military Police Brigade (which includes the 372nd Military Police Company, home to many of the accused) was in charge of the prison; prisoner interrogations were run by the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. But Taguba's report also mentions four civilian contractors, all of whom were assigned to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. Two of those civilians, Steven Stephanowicz and John Israel, were "either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses" at Abu Ghraib, the report says. A third contractor, Adel Nakhla, is named as a translator -- and a suspect. A fourth, Torin Nelson, was said to be a witness. Both Nakhla and Nelson are listed as employees of Titan Corp., a security contractor based in San Diego. The report identified Stephanowicz as an interrogator working for CACI; Israel, an interpreter, was also said to be working for CACI, although the company has denied that. Some news reports have identified Israel as an employee of Titan, which in turn has said he works for one of its subcontractors. So, we are not even sure for whom these contractors work or worked. Nor do we know how many other contract employees were -- and may still be -- working at the prison. (In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Friday, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld put the number of contract interrogators and linguists at Abu Ghraib at about 40; other Pentagon officials cited different figures in their testimony.) We do not know precisely what roles these contract employees had at the prison or to which group or agency they were accountable. To trace that, we would need to know the contracting agent -- someone representing a group within the Army, probably, but which one? Military Intelligence? The Iraqi Survey Group (a Defense Intelligence Agency unit responsible for investigating weapons of mass destruction and reportedly in charge of the most important Iraqi prisoners)? And how would civilians such as Stephanowicz and Israel have become such a dominant force at a military facility? To whom did they answer on a daily basis? We cannot simply consider where they sat in the chain of command (as we can with military forces). We need to know who issued the contract and what it said. And that is not easy information to obtain. A General Accounting Office review of contracted military services last year cited problems stemming from this lack of information. The agency's report, which focused on services delivered in the Balkans and Southwest Asia, found that Department of Defense management of contractors varied widely. Smooth operations require that commanders in the field be able to oversee contractors, but in fact the officer who is expected to ensure that a company meets the terms of its contract may be back in the United States. Field commanders have no easy way to find out what exactly a contractor has been sent to do. All of this makes oversight difficult even among the executive agencies that hire private security. These problems with oversight in Iraq are not limited to Abu Ghraib prison. While we know how many military forces are in the country, even the federal government doesn't seem to know how many contractors are there. In an April 2 letter to Rumsfeld, Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.) requested information about the number of private security personnel and their role in Iraq. In a May 4 letter in response, L. Paul Bremer, head of the CPA, put that number at "approximately 20,000," most of whom, he said, were under contract to Iraqi companies or foreign private companies -- not to American forces. His list of the private security companies working in Iraq, though, included neither CACI nor Titan, which suggests that the real number may be far higher. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 12 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Inherency – PMC Unregulated Now PMC’s are unregulated – MEJA still contains loopholes and lacks enforcement (MEJA = Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act Harvey, ’08 (Thomas B. Harvey, J.D. Candidate at the Saint Louis University School of Law, “Comment: Wrapping Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations,” 53 St. Louis L.J. 247, Lexis ) Although there have been several incidents involving PMCs that raised questions of accountability and oversight, n91 most prominently the aforementioned abuses at Abu Blackwater shooting of September 16, 2007 sparked renewed investigations into the oversight, regulation, and liability of PMCs working for the United States abroad. n93 After hearings conducted by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman regarding Blackwater's activities in Iraq, including testimony from Blackwater's founder Erik Prince, n94 the House of Representatives acted. n95 On October 4, 2007, the House passed an expansion of MEJA, attempting to close the loopholes that have allowed PMCs to escape prosecution for crimes committed while in Iraq working for [*258] the U.S. government. n96 Initially passed in 2000 and subsequently expanded after revelations of contractor involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal, the House seemingly believed Ghraib, n92 the that MEJA could provide a mechanism for the oversight and regulation of PMCs in Iraq. n97 The next sections detail how MEJA has evolved over the years in attempts by Congress to close its gaps and to find in it a mechanism to hold PMCs accountable. However, we will see that due to a combination of lack of enforcement and loose drafting, MEJA remains inadequate as a tool to regulate PMCs. A. MEJA 2000 n98 Congress officially extended federal criminal law to civilians working for the DOD when it passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA 2000). n99 MEJA 2000 held certain civilian employees and contractors, [*259] as well as their employees, criminally liable for acts that were a felony under U.S. law. n100 While not explicitly intended to regulate PMCs, MEJA 2000 did apply to those contractors who were hired by the DOD. n101 However, MEJA 2000's language was vague enough that it did not apply to contractors hired by any other governmental department. n102 This jurisdictional gap, which the Act was intended to close, left out employees of the State Department, the Justice Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). n103 Under MEJA 2000, most PMCs were effectively unpunishable under U.S. law for crimes committed abroad. n104 In the next section, this Comment will discuss how Congress sought to address this gap in jurisdiction through a revision of MEJA 2000 following PMC abuse at Abu Ghraib. B. MEJA 2004 n105 The events at Abu Ghraib led to a revision of MEJA 2000 in an attempt to close the above mentioned jurisdictional gaps. n106 Because some of the people involved in Abu Ghraib were civilian contractors working for departments other than the DOD, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of the Interior, they could not be prosecuted under MEJA 2000. n107 To address the gap, Congress passed an Act amending MEJA 2000 "to extend its jurisdictional coverage to employees and contractors of other federal agencies," including "employees and contractors of "any provisional authority.'" n108 Unfortunately, jurisdiction was limited to those engaged in employment related to the support of a "mission" of the DOD.n109 The Act's ambiguity sparked questions about whether its limited jurisdictional extension actually closed the gaps in coverage that concerned its drafters. n110 Contractors could escape liability if their activities did not support a mission of the DOD, even if those activities would be illegal if committed in the MEJA 2007: House Bill 2740: MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007 n111 In response to the Blackwater shooting of September 16, 2007, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 2740 on October 4, 2007. n112 This most recent revision of MEJA reflects the House's desire to address specifically the issue of contractor accountability. n113 The Bill adds the following language after paragraph two of MEJA: while employed under a contract (or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of the United States, where the work under such contract is carried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation. n114 Significantly, the Bill explicitly includes contractors working under any department, n115 which indeed addresses some of the above mentioned concerns with respect to illegal activity committed abroad while under contract with the U.S. government. At first glance, this legislation seems to have taken substantive steps toward closing the significant jurisdictional gaps in the previous versions of MEJA. However, upon closer inspection, it appears that MEJA 2007 remains ambiguous, providing contractors with the room they need to avoid liability. MEJA 2007 creates another loophole by leaving "close proximity" undefined in the clause "or in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense)." n116 This ambiguity seems to allow for any range of interpretations regarding the applicability of the provision. Further, no version of MEJA would apply to assaults by striking, beating, or wounding, in spite of the fact that such actions are a violation of international law when the victim is a prisoner. n117 Thus, if a DOD employee or contractor beat a prisoner while overseas, he or she would not be subject to liability under MEJA. n118 These offenses, although clearly punishable through [*261] the employer, do not meet MEJA's requirement that they be punishable by a one-year minimum penalty. n119 Finally, while more serious offenses are subject to MEJA, no contractors have been prosecuted under it during the "Global War on Terrorism," suggesting "that the Department of Justice lacks the desire and resources necessary to pursue such cases." n120 According to some scholars, the key issue is "whether Congress provides the resources and the Justice Department takes those resources and puts them in the field to conduct these investigations, and ultimately brings cases where they're warranted." n121 In sum, MEJA could work if there were adequate will and resources to enforce it. n122 However, until that moment is reached, criminal prosecution under MEJA cannot address the problems raised by PMCs, and victims of PMC abuse will have to seek alternative measures to redress their injuries. United States. [*260] C. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 13 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Afghanistan Advantage*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 14 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Afghanistan Advantage Observation One: Afghanistan – The number of PMCs in Afghanistan is increasing – This causes civilian backlash and hurts U.S. security objectives HRF, 6-18 Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch Group based in D.C., “Group Urges Commission to Advance Accountability for Private Military Contractors, Protect Civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan,” June 18th 2010, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/usls/2010/alert/624/ Washington, DC – Human Rights First today urged members of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan to advocate policies designed to minimize the risk of harm to civilians and to ensure that private military contractors are held criminally responsible for serious abuses. The group offered reform recommendations in written testimony to the commission and noted that failure to implement changes to current policy will threaten America's national security interests. "Private security contractors are being asked to function in active combat zones in ways that dangerously blur the line between civilians and the military. Consequently, contractors have continued to engage in hostile activity with minimal command, contractual, or judicial oversight. This has put other civilians, and America's security interests, at risk and contributed to a lack of political will to hold contractors accountable when they engage in criminal activity," said Human Rights First. The group went on to note that to correct this, the definition of what is an "inherently governmental" function should reflect a strong preference that contractors not engage in hostile activity. Contractors must also be held responsible by a robust and adequatelyresourced judicial system when they commit crimes, and additional, credible, oversight must be exercised in the field. The organization stated that private sector employees permeate virtually every component of the mission in Iraq and Afghanistan—from filing paperwork to using deadly force. As of May 2010, the Department of Defense estimates that it employs over 207,000 contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, of which at least 28,000 are classified as "Private Security Contractors." Human Rights First noted that this number will grow in the coming months as the Afghan "surge" takes shape. The Congressional Research Service estimates that another 20,000-50,000 will be required to support that strategy. Similarly, the State Department and USAID report that they employ around 9,000 and 16,700 contractors respectively in the United States' main combat zones, an estimate that the GAO suspects severely under-represents the actual contractor force of each agency. Private security contractors provide protection to convoys of vital supplies to U.S. bases, conduct interrogations, guard the perimeter of the U.S. embassies and consulates, and act as the personal security detail for U.S. diplomats. Human Rights First's testimony "The U.S. government has relied more on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan than at any other time. With this increased reliance on contractors have come increased incidents of serious criminal violations. Yet, only a handful of U.S. contractors have been prosecuted for criminal misconduct. By failing to hold contractors accountable for acts of violence and abuse abroad, the United States has created a culture of impunity which has fostered great hostility among civilian populations towards the United States. This threatens the safety of U.S. military personnel and contractors as well as undermines the U.S. mission." noted, PMC’s annihilate local support for American presence Kosiak, ’08 Steven M. Kosiak, 2008, Vice President for Budget Studies at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, frequent speaker on defense issues, providing expert testimony before House and Senate Committees, and has been published in multiple major newspapers, “Military Manpower for the Long Haul,” CSBA Publication, http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_/R.20081015.Military_Manpower_.pdf Although the precise number of private contractors deployed in these operations is unknown, the number in Iraq alone is reportedly approximately 160,000.132 These contractors are used in a wide variety of roles and come from at least 30 different countries, ranging from local Iraqis to American and British workers to Guatemalans and Ugandans.133 Private contractors play a major role in providing in-country logistical support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with some 20,000 American contractors as well as large numbers of host-country or third-country nationals employed in these roles.134 More controversial has been the use of private contractors as security guards. According to one estimate, in 2006 there were some 181 private security companies working in Iraq alone, with some 48,000 employees.135 Military commanders have “A military commander can influence the contractor employee’s behavior through the contracting officer and the contractor’s desire to satisfy the customer, but the commander has limited direct control over any one employee.”136 Moreover, unlike military personnel, civilians and contractors participating in undeclared wars and contingency operations are not generally subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), further reducing their accountability to military commanders. 137 Another problem is that private contractors tend to have a narrower perspective concerning their roles. For example, private security guards may well focus solely on protecting their clients, and discount the negative impact their actions might have on the broader military aim of wining the “hearts and minds” of the local population. By contrast, military personnel are much more likely to see the necessity of performing their duties in a way that does not, if at all possible, alienate or offend the local population. The result is that, even if private security contractors are well trained and well intentioned, they may operate in a way that undermines the US military’s efforts. substantially less control over private contractors than they do over military personnel. As CBO has noted, Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 15 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Afghanistan Advantage Preventing civilian casualties is critical to cut off the Taliban’s support base, preventing resurgence Jones, ’07 Seth G. Jones, Ph.D. and M.A. in political science, University of Chicago; A.B., Bowdoin College, “Afghanistan's Local Insurgency”, 1-31, http://www.rand.org/commentary/013107IHT.html The rising violence and the near certainty of a Taliban spring offensive have triggered calls for an increase in U.S. military forces in Afghanistan. But a military strategy is not likely to succeed. Counterinsurgencies are almost always won by establishing a viable and legitimate government at the local level that can win popular support. In Afghanistan, all politics is local. The country's history is littered with empires that failed to understand this reality, from Alexander the Great more than 2,000 ago to the British and Soviet empires more recently. The Taliban and its allies certainly understand the importance of local politics. They have successfully re-emerged by co-opting or threatening local villagers, and promising better governance and security than the current Afghan government. On my most recent trip to southern Afghanistan in January, I saw that the message of the Taliban clearly resonated with a growing number of locals in southern and eastern parts of the country. Afghans are frustrated by the lack of development over the past five years, and unhappy with widespread government corruption. This makes the Taliban's threat real and significant. The Taliban and its allies have a strong presence in local villages throughout such provinces as Kandahar and Helmand, and are preparing sustained operations. It is telling that the Taliban's primary target is not U.S. or NATO forces, but local Afghans. This reflects the understanding that the local population represents the center of gravity, as Mao Zedong famously wrote. The lesson for the United States and NATO is stark. They will win or lose Afghanistan in the rural villages and districts of the country, not in the capital city of Kabul. And if they are to win, they must begin by understanding the local nature of the insurgency. PMCs undermine our military war effort and roles in Afghanistan Schulman, ’10 Daniel Schulman is Mother Jones' Washington-based news editor. Are Contractors Undermining US War Efforts? — By Daniel Schulman | Thu Jan. 21, 2010 11:56 AM PST http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/are-contractors-undermining-us-war-efforts According to CRS, "Many analysts believe that regulations governing PSCs are only enforced in Kabul; outside Kabul there is no government reach at present and local governors, chiefs of police, and politicians run their own illegal PSCs." These illegal operations serve various clients, including, the CRS report notes, "NATO and the U.S. Government." This means that as the US and NATO are actively pushing to strengthen Afghan governance, they are simultaneously empowering players who are flouting Afghan law. The CRS report also states pretty plainly that the conduct of security contractors has damaged the US mission in Afghanistan and Iraq: Abuses committed by contractors, including contractors working for other U.S. agencies, can also strengthen anti-American insurgents. There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by DOD contractors in such incidents as the summary shooting by a private security contractor of an Afghan who was handcuffed, the shooting of Iraqi civilians, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. (It should be noted that there have also been reports of military personnel abusing and otherwise mistreating local nationals, including the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. CRS has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the incidence of abuses is higher among contractors than it is among military personnel.) Many of the high-profile reports of PSCs shooting local nationals or otherwise acting irresponsibly were committed by contractors working for the Department of State. Some of these incidents include the reported shooting of Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy employees, the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad traffic circle in Nisoor Square by Blackwater employees, and the recent controversy over the behavior of security contractors from Armour Group who were hired to protect the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. Of the six incidents listed above, five were committed by U.S. companies and U.S. nationals. According to many analysts, these events have in fact undermined the U.S. mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. An Iraqi Interior Ministry official, discussing the behavior of private security contractors, said “Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans.” One senior military officer reportedly stated that the actions of armed PSCs “can turn an entire district against us.” Some analysts also contend that PSCs can be a direct threat to the legitimacy of the local government. These analysts argue that if counter-insurgency operations are a competition for legitimacy but the government is allowing armed contractors to operate in the country without the contractors being held accountable for their actions, then the government itself can be viewed as not legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These analysts point to the recent court decision dismissing the case against former Blackwater employees as a case in point where the legitimacy of the U.S. and local government is being undermined by the actions of PSCs. The perception that DOD and other government agencies are deploying PSCs who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment and strengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place. There have been reports of an anti-American campaign in Pakistan, where stories are circulating of U.S. private security contractors running amok and armed Americans harassing and terrifying residents. U.S. efforts can also be undermined when DOD has ties with groups that kill civilians or government officials, even if the perpetrators were not working for DOD when the killings took place. In June 2009, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was killed by a group that worked as a private security contractor for DOD. Despite the role contractors may have played in setting back US efforts, don't expect the US to end its reliance on them anytime soon. According to CRS, "Many analysts and government officials believe that DOD would be unable to execute its mission without PSCs." The same is surely true of the other agencies working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 16 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Afghanistan Advantage Lack of local support means our counter-insurgency strategy will fall in Afghanistan Khan, ’09 Daud Khan, A Afghan political analyst and a journalist based in Afghanistan (“US Winning Afghans' Hearts and Minds?” http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1248188004863&pagename=Zone-EnglishMuslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout) Now, the US administration has been changed, with a new forces command and a new strategy; to win the hearts and minds of Afghans. Under the new strategy, as ordered by General Stanley McChrystal — the new commander of the US forces in Afghanistan — foreign troops have to avoid air strikes in civilian areas up to the highest possible level. At the same time, they had to get close to Afghans and even to live among them to ensure their safety against the Taliban in order to win their hearts. In this way, they believe that US and UK troops would not only win the hearts of Afghans, but also stop or at least reduce fresh recruitments for the Taliban that mainly draw their main power from the remote, backward, and povertystricken areas. However, a recent statement of the British forces commander General David Richard raised many eyebrows when he said that his country's forces could stay in Afghanistan for 30 or 40 years. This is something new and surprising for Afghans, who want NATO countries to conclude the war and leave the country as soon as possible. This statement by the incoming UK general appeared at a time when a recent survey conducted by the Independent revealed that the majority of the British public believes that the war in Afghanistan is unwinnable, and UK troops shall withdraw immediately. A local news agency in Afghanistan, as part of its election coverage, interviewed almost all key presidential hopefuls. When questioned about the status of the foreign troops on the Afghan soil, most of interviewed candidates replied that they would ask foreign troops to declare a timeframe for their pull-out from the country. Looking at the political and security situation in Afghanistan, no one can say that the future president would be so powerful to ask the NATO and US troops to announce a timeframe. It is obvious that the candidates are asking US and NATO to leave just to attract Afghans toward their agenda, because they fully know that the majority of their countrymen are now fed up with fighting. However, for reasons quite obvious, the US and UK troops want to stay in Afghanistan and continue fighting the Taliban as the two countries, as well as their NATO allies, want to eliminate Al-Qaeda, their real enemy. As Al-Qaeda is still intact, and have their stronghold and bases in the border regions of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States and the United Kingdom feel at risk. They believe that in order to avoid war (against Al-Qaeda) on their own homeland, they want to fight the same in Afghanistan, no matter how long it may take. Fighting Prudent Enemy: Besides, the increasing strength of Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas and other cities of the nuclear-armed country has perturbed the United States and its NATO allies; they are going to double their efforts to overcome the threat to their own people and countries. Commenting on the Afghan scenario and the future of foreign troops in this landlocked country, analyst Waheed Muzhda said that the best option for NATO countries is to have a timeframe, address the security issue at the earliest, and pull out of Afghanistan. Muzhda believes that a longer stay would cause more civilian deaths, attracting much popular anger, and hence leading to more support bases for the Taliban. He foresees more violence in days ahead as militants have now extended their operations to the northern and western zones of the country, once considered peaceful and out-of-the-reach of the Taliban. The similar apprehensions were recently shown by the UN special envoy to Afghanistan Kai Eide and a NATO commander, who both admitted that the Taliban have spread to the northern zone. As for violence, Muzhda said that there was no solution to the problem. "Kill one and it would create 10 more," he added. Muzhda asked for talks through tribal elders with all those who are ready to talk. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 17 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Afghanistan Advantage Taliban resurgence to capture Kandahar and Afghanistan instability will collapse Pakistan – Causes fundamentalist takeover and escalating global nuclear conflict Morgan, ’07 Stephen Morgan, Former British Labour Party Exectutive Committee Member, Political Psychologist, 3/4/2007 [Stephen, ""Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?"," http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639] However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer all of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d'état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was "Osama" (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d'état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. Pakistan coup leads to a nuclear shootout with India and extremist takeover in Saudi Arabia and Egypt Ricks, ’01 Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer, “At Pentagon: Worries Over War's Costs, Consequences; Some Fear Regional Destabilization, Retribution Against U.S.,” 10-21, Lexis The prospect of Pakistan being taken over by Islamic extremists is especially worrisome because it possesses nuclear weapons. The betting among military strategists is that India, another nuclear power, would not stand idly by, if it appeared that the Pakistani nuclear arsenal were about to fall into the hands of extremists. A preemptive action by India to destroy Pakistan's nuclear stockpile could provoke a new war on the subcontinent. The U.S. military has conducted more than 25 war games involving a confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, and each has resulted in nuclear war, said retired Air Force Col. Sam Gardiner, an expert on strategic games. Having both the United States and India fighting Muslims would play into the hands of bin Laden, warned Mackubin Owens, a strategist at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. "He could point out once again that this is the new crusade," Owens said. The next step that worries experts is the regional effect of turmoil in Pakistan. If its government fell, the experts fear, other Muslim governments friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, might follow suit. "The ultimate nightmare is a pan-Islamic regime that possesses both oil and nuclear weapons," said Harlan Ullman, a defense analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 18 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Afghanistan Advantage Pakistan-India conflict leads to extinction Fai, ’01 Executive Director of the Kashmiri American Council, “The most dangerous place,”7-8, lexis The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965, and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thorough reds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated and inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. Takeover of Saudi Arabia cuts off their oil supply Cohen, ’06 Ariel, heritage’s finest, “reducing US dependence on middle eastern oil” http://www.heritage.org/Research/Features/NationalSecurity/bg1926.cfm 4/7 Even more frightening is the prospect of jihadis mounting an outright takeover of the country. Under such a scenario, radical Islamists dedicated to overthrowing the Al Saud regime would slowly build up their forces until they could exploit a revolutionary situation created by a succession struggle, a political assassination, or some other circumstantial trigger. Uprisings, if not checked, could lead to the regime’s overthrow and political turmoil, which would deeply affect oil production capacity and immediately and directly threaten Western experts and workers in Saudi Arabia. Osama bin Laden has stated his belief that oil should cost $145–$200 per barrel.[24] If radical Wahhabis succeeded in taking over Saudi Arabia, they would likely drastically reduce production. The radical regime’s anti-Western policies, including the pursuit of nuclear weapons, could trigger Western economic sanctions, which would likely include limits on investment and spare parts for the oil industry or even an outright trade boycott. Furthermore, if the survival of the world’s economy is threatened, military action to remove an al-Qaeda–type regime could not be ruled out. The impact is extinction Riddoch, ’04 Dr. Malcolm, Faculty of Communications and Creative Industries, http://www.melbourne.indymedia.org/news/2004/06/72000_comment.php Edith Cowan University, June 19, 2004, There are lots of recent 2004 reports speculating about the Saudi's ability to increase production suggesting that the peak plateau may already have arrived with midpoint by 2008. OPEC is apparently pumping at its full rate, while everyone else from the Russians, US, North Sea to our own oil fields are apparently depleting already. The first major oil shock could be as early as the fourth quarter of this year and some analysts suggest that the Saudi's are on the verge of a collapse in their major Gawar oil field, the largest in the world. According to what I've read, if this all turns out to be true then we're currently on the threshold of a gigantic transition in the structure of our modern globalised industrial civilization, a transition that humanity seems completely unprepared for. More than just the price of petrol at your local bowser, cheap oil means cheap road/rail haulage and international shipping as well as air travel, it means cheap food produced by mechanised industrial agriculture with its petrochemical pesticides and fertilizers, more than just underwriting the value of the US dollar and their domestic economy it upholds the global stock markets and banking system. Cheap oil has paid for our will mean a lot more than $4 per litre and rising, just to drive a car around. Beyond the current oil wars and the short term economic effects of unstable oil supply and prices over the next 5 years, peak oil threatens an irreversible global economic decline that will force a massive, radical and sustained change in our way of life as modern lifestyles since WW2. The end of cheap oil we transition to alternative energy sources and the economic/political order they support. The cost of everything will rise and rise with the poorest of us the first to start suffering. A terminal economic decline will begin with a recession in Australia the size of the one that occurred in WW2, and this possibility is already being discussed in our mainstream media. Think an end to public welfare across the board, food stamps and eventually food riots, massive rising unemployment, the collapse of Medicare and public hospitals, a severe crisis in the cost and delivery of water ... but at least the roads will be less congested, more room for the ultra wealthy and their gas guzzling limousines. At peak oil could mean a complete global economic collapse sometime after 2010, middle class poverty and the breakdown of law and and the unrestrained outbreak of global warfare with the risk of numerous 'limited' nuclear conflagrations. It could ultimately mean the extinction of the human species through global nuclear war and its companions famine and pestilence. worst order, truly gigantic starvation in the third world Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 19 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Afghanistan Advantage Failure in Afghanistan leads to spurs of radical instability throughout Central Asia Szayna and Oliker, ’05 Senior international policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and policy analyst at RAND Corporation, Olga and Thomas, Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/RAND_MR1598.sum.pdf The situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the troop presence of U.S., Russian, and other forces in the region may serve to catalyze state failure in a number of ways, perhaps making significant conflict more proximate than it might otherwise have been. Refugee flows into the region could strain the treasuries and stretch the capacities of states to deal with the influx. They can also potentially be a mechanism for countergovernment forces to acquire new recruits and assistance. This is of particular concern given the history of Al Qaeda and Taliban support to insurgent groups in Central Asia, as well as the ethnic links and overlaps between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. To date, the rise of insurgencies linked to radical Islam has either caused or provided an excuse for the leadership in several states to become increasingly authoritarian, in many ways aggravating rather than alleviating the risk of social unrest, and it is entirely plausible that this trend will continue. Moreover, if the U.S.-Russian relationship improves, Russian officials may take advantage of the opportunity, combined with U.S. preoccupation with its counterterror campaign, to take actions in Georgia and Azerbaijan that these states will perceive as aggressive. Meanwhile, U.S. forces in the region may be viewed as targets by combatants in the Afghanistan war and by insurgent efforts against the Central Asian governments. The situation in Afghanistan will almost certainly have an impact on the faultlines in Central Asia and possibly those in the South Caucasus. While it remains too early to predict just what that impact might be, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, there remains excellent reason to believe that over the next 15 years separatists will continue to strive to attain independence (as in Georgia) and insurgency forces to take power (as in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). This could spread from the countries where we see it currently to possibly affect Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. It could also result in responses by states that see a neighboring insurgency as a threat, and by others that pursue insurgents beyond their own borders. Insofar as U.S. forces stay involved in the region, it could draw the United States into these Central Asian and South Caucasus conflicts. Nuclear War Starr, ’01 S. Frederick, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute @ Johns Hopkins, The war against terrorism and u.s. bilateral relations with the nations of central asia, December 13, online However, this does not mean that US actions are without risk to the Central Asian states. Quite the contrary. For a decade they have faced not only the dangers arising from Afghanistan but also the constant threat posed by certain groups in Russia, notably the military and security forces, who are not yet reconciled to the loss of empire. This imperial hangover is not unique to Russia. France exhibited the same tendencies in Algeria, the Spanish in Cuba and Chile, and the British when they burned the White House in 1812. This imperial hangover will eventually pass, but for the time being it remains a threat. It means that the Central Asians, after cooperating with the US, will inevitably face redoubled pressure from Russia if we leave abruptly and without attending to the long-term security needs of the region. That we have looked kindly into Mr. Putins soul does not change this reality. The Central Asians face a similar danger with respect to our efforts in Afghanistan. Some Americans hold that we should destroy Bin Laden, Al Queda, and the Taliban and then leave the postwar stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such a course runs the danger of condemning all Central Asia to further waves of instability from the South. But in the next round it will not only be Russia that is tempted to throw its weight around in the region but possibly China, or even Iran or India. All have as much right to claim Central Asia as their backyard as Russia has had until now. Central Asia may be a distant region but when these nuclear powers begin bumping heads there it will create terrifying threats to world peace that the U.S. cannot ignore. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 20 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Afghanistan – A2: Turns No risk of a turn – PMC are specifically causing backlash against the U.S. military in Afghanistan Lubold, ’10 Gordon Lubold, Staff Writer for The Christian Science Monitor, “Blackwater fallout: Senate moves to rein in military contractors; The Senate holds a hearing Wednesday on ways to improve oversight of private military contractors, after a series of incidents involving Blackwater. On Tuesday, Rep. Jan Schakowsky and Sen. Bernie Sanders introduced a bill that would stop 'outsourcing' security missions” After several incidents of misbehavior in Afghanistan involving the military contractor Blackwater and its employees, US lawmakers are moving to provide greater oversight of an industry that, while key to American military success, may also be undermining the mission there. Even as US forces in Afghanistan operate under orders to protect Afghan civilians, erring on the side of caution and even holding their fire rather than risk harming them while fighting Taliban insurgents, concern is mounting that civilian contractors operate under a different set of rules - or simply don't follow the rules. "If we don't fix the problems of oversight and make sure contractors like Blackwater play by the rules and live up to their commitments, we'll be doing a disservice to our troops by making their already-difficult and dangerous job even more so," said Sen. Carl Levin (D) of Michigan. chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, takes up the topic at a hearing Wednesday. Other lawmakers this week introduced legislation to prevent the American military from "outsourcing" security missions to contractors. Many of the contractors in Afghanistan are overseen by the State Department or USAID, and the Pentagon typically hires contractors only for training. So oversight of a firm like Blackwater/Xe, which provides security services, typically falls under State. Administration officials generally have recognized the problems stemming from contractor behavior, blaming the lack of resources to conduct proper oversight. It is unclear how administration officials view increased oversight from Congress. "The behavior of private contractors has endangered our military, hurt relationships with foreign governments, and undermined our missions overseas," said Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D) of Illinois, in introducing the Stop Outsourcing Security Act with Sen. Bernie Sanders (I) of Vermont. Tuesday. But the Senate hearing Wednesday will focus on incidents involving Blackwater, now known as Xe Services, and a sister firm, Paravant, that have given lawmakers pause. In May of last year, two men working for Paravant killed two Afghans and injured a third in a shooting incident in which alcohol appeared to be involved, creating diplomatic tensions between the two countries and a backlash against American forces in one neighborhood. The head of the American training command, Maj. Gen. Richard Formica, said it appeared the men, Justin Cannon and Christopher Drotleff, had "violated alcohol consumption policies, were not authorized to possess weapons, violated use of force rules and violated movement control policies." The two were later indicted on two counts of homicide and one count of attempted homicide each, as well as firearms charges. But the incident pointed up what even a Blackwater senior executive conceded at the time was an environment in which Paravant had "no regard for policies, rules, or adherence to regulations in country." The rub about American contractors in today's wars is that they are absolutely necessary: Despite its vast size, the American military does not have enough manpower to cook all the food, guard all the buildings, clean all the latrines and conduct all the training in Afghanistan. But in the heartsand-minds campaign in Afghanistan, there is no distinction among the Afghan population between American service members and civilian contractors. Malfeasance is malfeasance. "Local populations draw little or no distinction between American troops and the contractors employed by them," according to a report released in December by John Nagl and Richard Fontaine at the Center for a New American Security, a think tank in Washington. "An act committed by one can have the same effect on local or national opinion as an act carried out by the other." (See Monitor coverage of a Project on Government Oversight report that cited "lewd and deviant" behavior on the part of contractors in Kabul.) According to the CNAS report, about 75,000 contractors are working in Afghanistan, of which about 10,000 are Americans. Paravant was formed in 2008 by Erik Prince, the controversial former head of Blackwater. That company also has been involved in other incidents in both Iraq and Afghanistan, in which Blackwater guards have thrust the US into diplomatic, legal, and military confrontations over their actions. Lawmakers cite another incident in December 2008 in which a Paravant program manager led a training team on a mission in which the team would learn how to shoot their AK-47s from the back of a moving truck and "ride it like a stagecoach," according to quotes attributed to a Paravant program manager contained in Levin's statement. During the training, the truck hit a bump, a weapon discharged, and one Paravant employee was seriously injured. Although the incident was reported to an Army training command, the report of Paravant employees using weapons without proper supervision "failed to set off alarm bells" within the Army or the American training command in Afghanistan, according to Levin. "The reckless disregard for weapons safety is particularly striking given that he and his team were hired for the specific purpose of teaching the Afghan National Army how to safely use their weapons," said Levin. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 21 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Afghanistan – Civilian Casualties Civilian causalities are the number one issue that cause Taliban resurgence – every civilian death means more Taliban recruits and support Burns and Flaherty ‘10 Thursday, May. 13, 2010 06:03 PM US war aim: protect civilians first, then troops By ROBERT BURNS and ANNE FLAHERTY Associated Press Writers http://www.lakewyliepilot.com/2010/05/13/724894/us-war-aim-protect-civilians-first.html A key to the U.S. approach to fighting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is this seemingly backward logic: The more aggressively you protect your own troops, the less secure they may be. The idea is that troops who put themselves at risk to protect innocents will ultimately help decrease violence against Americans. That's because every time U.S. forces inadvertently kill or wound a noncombatant, it outrages the families and communities of the victims and erodes support for the battle against militants, strategists say. So protecting civilians isn't only moral, it's considered good strategy. The idea is enshrined in the 2006 U.S. Army and Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency, or COIN, which says: "Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force." That partly explains why the U.S.-led NATO command in Afghanistan is considering recognizing soldiers for "courageous restraint" if they avoid using force that could endanger innocent lives - a proposal drawing fire in some military quarters. It also shows why President Barack Obama, at his news conference Wednesday with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, emphasized the importance - and the complications - of avoiding civilian deaths and injuries. Sometimes the strategy puts troops at greater immediate risk, he noted, but "that's a burden that we're willing to bear." The specific rules for when troops may use deadly force in Afghanistan are classified, but commanders over the past year have publicly announced stricter guidelines limiting the use of airstrikes and night raids. Although the policy is meant to advance the U.S. and NATO cause by building Afghan support at the grass roots, many soldiers and their families worry that by emphasizing restraint, the Pentagon is showing too much concern for the safety of foreign civilians and tying the hands of its own fighting force. Some lawmakers also have expressed alarm. North Carolina Republican Rep. Walter Jones, who opposes U.S. involvement in the war, said he is unconvinced after being briefed last week on the specific rules about when U.S. troops can use deadly force. "You see these kids with their legs blown off and you just hope they were given a chance," he said. "They are too restricted. ... If you're going to send the U.S. military to fight, then let them fight." The complicating factor, however, is that the final outcome of this fight will depend less on arms than on ideas, in the view of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, and others who say that military force alone cannot defeat the Taliban or stabilize the country. Iraq war veteran John Nagl, who helped write the 2006 counterinsurgency manual and is now president of the Center for a New American Security, acknowledges opinion is divided on the wisdom of making protection of civilians the first priority. "This issue is at the heart of counterinsurgency and of the difficulty that soldiers have in conducting counterinsurgency," he said in a telephone interview Wednesday. "It's one of the fundamental dilemmas we dealt with in writing the counterinsurgency manual. The fact is that to achieve the mission, individual soldiers have to accept more risk." Obama on Wednesday spelled it out in stark terms. "Oftentimes they're holding fire, they're hesitating," he said of U.S. troops seeking to avoid civilian casualties. "They're being cautious about how they operate, even though it would be safer for them to go ahead and just take these locations out." This carefulness, Obama said, is what the U.S. military stands for. "And that puts us more at risk, and it makes it more difficult. But that's a burden that we're willing to bear." Troops doing the fighting, as well as their families, can see it differently, as Defense Secretary Robert Gates heard when he appeared before a couple of hundred soldiers' spouses at Fort Riley, Kan., last Saturday. One spouse told him that she was troubled that soldiers are being asked to think twice before shooting - "in my opinion, to second-guess a spur of the moment decision" in the face of danger. "The first thing I'll tell you," Gates replied, "is that it is clear to every soldier in Afghanistan that he has every right to do whatever is necessary to protect himself. So if a soldier is under threat, he can do the appropriate thing," while keeping in mind the consequences of killing or hurting bystanders. "If we kill an innocent civilian, we recruit a family for the Taliban," he said. Gates said McChrystal, who devised stricter guidelines for avoiding civilian casualties when he assumed command last June, does not dispute that his approach means greater risks for U.S. soldiers in the short run. But he argues that if the Afghan population is protected more reliably, there will be less sympathy and support for the Taliban. That, in turn, will weaken the insurgency. "As you become more successful in winning over the local population ... over time the soldiers are actually safer," Gates said . This has become conventional wisdom in today's U.S. military, a product in part of its experience in the early years of the Iraq war, where aggressive tactics only angered Iraqis and generated support for insurgents. In Afghanistan, the enemy doesn't wear a uniform, leaving the U.S. trying to balance protecting its troops and winning the support of a local population that already complains of a menacing foreign presence. During the February U.S.-led offensive in Marjah, for example, troops were told they could not fire on unarmed people, even if they emerged from Taliban hideouts after shooting erupted. Some troops said that meant a militant could fire at them, set aside his weapon and walk away, possibly toward a weapons cache in another location. "I understand the reason behind it, but it's so hard to fight a war like this," Lance Cpl. Travis Anderson, 20, of Altoona, Iowa, told The Associated Press at the time. Army Col. Wayne Shanks, a U.S. military spokesman in Afghanistan, said Wednesday, "We absolutely support the right of our forces to defend themselves. Valuing restraint in a potentially dangerous situation is not the same thing as denying troops the right to employ lethal force when they determine that it is necessary." Following the Marjah fight, McChrystal said the operation could have been over in one night but took three weeks because troops were so careful to avoid civilian casualties. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 22 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Afghanistan – Civilian Casualties Private security companies are recklessly killing civilians – they are perceived as US troops and give the Taliban a foothold for support amongst the Afghanis Abbot ‘10 Reckless private security companies anger Afghans, AP foreign, Saturday May 1 2010 SEBASTIAN ABBOT http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9056430 Private Afghan security guards protecting NATO supply convoys in southern Kandahar province regularly fire wildly into villages they pass, hindering coalition efforts to build local support ahead of this summer's planned offensive in the area, U.S. and Afghan officials say. The guards shoot into the villages to intimidate any potential militants, the officials say, but also cause the kind of civilian casualties that the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan has tried repeatedly to stop. "Especially as they go through the populated areas, they tend to squeeze the trigger first and ask questions later," said Capt. Matt Quiggle, a member of the U.S. Army's 5th Stryker brigade tasked with patrolling Highway One, which connects Afghanistan's major cities. The troops say they have complained to senior coalition officials and have even detained some guards to lecture them about their conduct, but the problem has continued. Many suspect there has been little response because the security companies are owned by or connected to some of the province's most powerful figures. "The government doesn't care about us," said Sher Mohammed, whose 25-year-old brother, Suleiman, was shot and killed in mid-March by gunmen protecting a NATO convoy as it traveled through the Maiwand district of Kandahar. "Strong people in Kandahar control the companies and they don't care about the poor people." Mohammed said two other of his relatives had been wounded in similar incidents in the past eight months, one a 12-year-old boy. He and many others have traveled to Maiwand's district center, Hutal, to complain to the local governor, Obaidullah Bawari. "This is a big problem not only in Maiwand but all over Kandahar," said Bawari. "They create problems for everyone by shooting at innocent people for no reason." Public anger is directed at the Afghan government and coalition forces, making it more difficult for the U.S. and others to convince locals that they should look to them for protection rather than the Taliban, said Lt. Col. Dave Abrahams, deputy commander of a Stryker battalion that patrols the stretch of Highway One where Suleiman was shot. "The irresponsible actions of these companies" are jeopardizing NATO's attempts to gain the support of local villagers, Abrahams wrote in an e-mail to his superiors late last year. "They are armed, wearing uniforms, escorting U.S. convoys, and indiscriminately shooting into villages," said Abrahams, deputy commander of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, 5th Stryker Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. But some private guards deny they act improperly. "The NATO force trusts us," said Jalad Khan, who works for a private security company that helps move NATO supplies in Kandahar province, adding that NATO hires and trains them. He insisted indiscriminate gunfire happened rarely — if ever. "Mostly we take action only after someone attacks us, or if NATO forces start firing," Khan said. Some villagers also accuse the private guards of shooting at them when they are actually defending the convoy from thieves or armed people who appear to be threatening. The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has repeatedly stressed that avoiding civilian casualties must be a primary focus of coalition forces and their allies if they want to win over the people. Local support in Kandahar is particularly critical as the U.S. plans to pour thousands of additional troops into the province in the coming months to wrestle it from the Taliban militants. Abrahams, the deputy battalion commander, tried to address the problem in November by stopping two convoys as they passed his base. "We basically detained their entire security force, and I sat down to talk to their leaders to tell them not to shoot without reason and basically threatened" to take away their certification to work for NATO, said Abrahams. "But we haven't been able to make good on it, which is part of our frustration." Many of the gunmen have little or no training and many are also high on either heroin or hashish, Afghan and U.S. officials said. The gunmen who allegedly shot Suleiman at a gas station turned out to be Afghan police from neighboring Zhari district moonlighting as convoy security guards, said Abrahams. They were turned over to the Zhari police chief and "are back on the street," he said. A recent report by the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War said it is common for police commanders in Kandahar to have their men work for private security companies to collect a second salary. Although it is extremely rare for victims of private security company shootings to receive compensation, the Zhari district governor recently sent 100,000 Pakistani rupees ($1,150) to his counterpart in Maiwand for Suleiman's family. The payment came after significant U.S. pressure. Local power brokers in Kandahar have worked to maintain this revenue stream by keeping the police force weak, forcing coalition forces to rely on private security companies for protection, the Institute of the Study of War report said. That is precisely the type of behavior by local officials that has alienated residents and provided an opening for the Taliban to establish effective control over much of the province. Abrahams said he has tried to tell locals that he understands their plight, but he is consistently undermined by the wild shooting. "Actions speak louder than words, and the locals see these drugged-out thugs with guns and trucks with 'The United States' painted on the side," said Abrahams. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 23 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Afghanistan – Relations/Stability US-Afghanistan relations are key to regional stability – PMC are killing civilians in Afghanistan – these casualties are unpopular and determine relations Riechmann ‘10 Taliban vow new Afghan offensive with Karzai in US May 8 12:58 PM US/Eastern By DEB RIECHMANN Associated Press Writer Associated Press Writers Mirwais Khan in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Rasool Dawar in Pakistan contributed to this report. http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9FIPGGG0&show_article=1 Karzai also wrote that Afghanistan's partnership with the United States has "not been an easy ride," but that good relations were paramount to achieving peace and stability in his nation. He expressed condolences to the relatives of 971 U.S. troops who have died since the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. Karzai highlighted positive aspects of U.S.-Afghan relations, but also called for an end to night raids and house searches and stepped up efforts to curb the deaths of Afghans caught in the crossfire. "Civilian casualties are harming our cause," he wrote. Top NATO Commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal's leadership "has done a lot to address this, but more needs to be done." At least 2,412 Afghan civilians were killed in fighting last year—up 14 percent from 2008, according to the United Nations. But the U.N. found that the percentage of civilian deaths attributed to NATO and Afghan government forces had dropped. About two-thirds of the civilian deaths were a result of actions initiated by the insurgents. Nevertheless, civilian deaths remain a source of friction between the Afghans and the international forces, and they have been up in recent months. Earlier this year, McChrystal issued a new directive ordering coalition forces to avoid night raids when possible, and bring Afghan troops with them if they must enter homes after dark. During a visit to Bagram Air Field on Saturday, Karzai received a nearly 90-minute briefing on special forces operations and visited wounded troops. While night raids typically are conducted by U.S. special forces, such raids were not the focus of the briefing, said Lt. Col Tadd Sholtis, public affairs officer to McChrystal. Later, Karzai spoke to about 50 U.S. troops, thanking them for their work and encouraging them to focus on the safety of civilians. "When you're out in the fields in Afghanistan alongside Afghan soldiers it is like any other society," Karzai said. "There are families. There are children. There are women. There are elderly people. There are young people and people who are ill. I'm sure that you take appropriate and good care of the situation when you face it. " Separately on Saturday, NATO confirmed that a service member was killed Friday in the south, but did not provide further details. In eastern Afghanistan, private security guards opened fire and killed a civilian after the guards' vehicle hit a roadside bomb in Wardak province, the provincial governor's office said. The Afghan Interior Ministry said that another private security company guard killed another civilian in the same area 10 days ago. The ministry said arrests have been made in the cases and that the government had taken steps to prevent the two security companies from escorting convoys on the highway linking Kabul to Kandahar. On Saturday evening in the capital, Karzai met briefly with U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-California. She is visiting Afghanistan with colleagues Reps. Susan Davis, D-California; Niki Tsongas, DMassachusetts; Donna Edwards, D-Maryland, and Madeline Bordallo, D-Guam. They were to meet with Afghan women and female Marines. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 24 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Afghanistan – Terrorism/Counter-Insurgency Private military operators fuel terrorism – breed anti Americanism and counter insurgency Schulman ‘10 Daniel Schulman is Mother Jones' Washington-based news editor. Are Contractors Undermining US War Efforts? — By Daniel Schulman | Thu Jan. 21, 2010 11:56 AM PST http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/are-contractors-undermining-us-war-efforts Abuses committed by contractors, including contractors working for other U.S. agencies, can also strengthen anti-American insurgents. There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by DOD contractors in such incidents as the summary shooting by a private security contractor of an Afghan who was handcuffed, the shooting of Iraqi civilians, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. (It should be noted that there have also been reports of military personnel abusing and otherwise mistreating local nationals, including the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. CRS has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the incidence of abuses is higher among contractors than it is among military personnel.) Many of the high-profile reports of PSCs shooting local nationals or otherwise acting irresponsibly were committed by contractors working for the Department of State. Some of these incidents include the reported shooting of Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy employees, the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad traffic circle in Nisoor Square by Blackwater employees, and the recent controversy over the behavior of security contractors from Armour Group who were hired to protect the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. Of the six incidents listed above, five were committed by U.S. companies and U.S. nationals. According to many analysts, these events have in fact undermined the U.S. mission in Iraq and Afghanistan. An Iraqi Interior Ministry official, discussing the behavior of private security contractors, said “Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans.” One senior military officer reportedly stated that the actions of armed PSCs “can turn an entire district against us.” Some analysts also contend that PSCs can be a direct threat to the legitimacy of the local government. These analysts argue that if counter-insurgency operations are a competition for legitimacy but the government is allowing armed contractors to operate in the country without the contractors being held accountable for their actions, then the government itself can be viewed as not legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These analysts point to the recent court decision dismissing the case against former Blackwater employees as a case in point where the legitimacy of the U.S. and local government is being undermined by the actions of PSCs. The perception that DOD and other government agencies are deploying PSCs who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment and strengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place. There have been reports of an anti-American campaign in Pakistan, where stories are circulating of U.S. private security contractors running amok and armed Americans harassing and terrifying residents. U.S. efforts can also be undermined when DOD has ties with groups that kill civilians or government officials, even if the perpetrators were not working for DOD when the killings took place. In June 2009, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was killed by a group that worked as a private security contractor for DOD. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 25 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Human Rights Advantage*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 26 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Human Rights PMCs uniquely kill US human rights credibility – rule-free sanctioned zones and Abu Ghraib prove U.S. Newswire ‘06 May 23, 2006, AIUSA to Highlight Emerging Problems with Private Military Contractors During 2006 Annual Report Release, Lexis <Amnesty International USA (AIUSA) today highlighted the role of private military contractors in the U.S. government's current system for outsourcing key military detention, security and intelligence operations. Such outsourcing fuels serious human rights violations and undermines accountability, the organization stated at the release of its 2006 Annual Report on the status of human rights in 150 countries. "The United States has become a world leader in avoiding human rights accountability; a case in point is the reliance of the United States government on private military contractors, which has helped create virtually rules-free zones sanctioned with the American flag and fire power," said Larry Cox, who became AIUSA's executive director May 1. "Business outsourcing may increase efficiency, but war outsourcing may be facilitating impunity. Contractors' illegal behavior and the reluctance of the U.S. government to bring them to justice are further tarnishing the United States' reputation abroad, hurting the image of American troops and contributing to anti-American sentiment. These results are a distressing return on the U.S. taxpayers' billion-dollar- plus investment and undermine what remains of U.S. moral authority abroad." In the rush to war and with little notice, the U.S. government has outsourced billions of dollars in contracts to private military contractors, leaving to civilians some of the most essential and sensitive functions in the war, including protecting supply convoys, translating during interrogations and conducting interrogations. Despite the weak requirements for reporting crimes, allegations have surfaced implicating civilians working for the U.S. government in mistreatment of Iraqi and Afghan civilians, including hundreds of incidents of shootings at Iraqi civilians, several deaths in custody and involvement in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal. Major General George Fay's report on detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib detailed the involvement of two private military companies -- Arlington, Va.-based CACI (NYSE: CAI) and BTG, a subsidiary of San Diego-based Titan Corporation (NYSE: TTN) -- at that notorious prison facility. Titan, under an INSCOM contract with a current ceiling of approximately $650 million, has provided hundreds of linguists. CACI provided interrogators and other intelligence-related personnel under a contract with the National Business Center of the Interior beginning in September 2003. An Army Inspector General's report found that 35 percent of CACI's Iraqi interrogators had no "formal training in military interrogation policies and techniques," let alone training in the standards of international law. Currently the contractors operate in a virtually rules-free zone; they are exempt from Iraqi law per a Coalition Provisional Authority order and they fall outside the military chain of command. Of the 20 known cases of alleged misconduct by civilians in the war on terror that were forwarded by the Pentagon and CIA to the U.S. Department of Justice for investigation, DOJ has dismissed two, brought one indictment, while the remaining 17 are classified as open.> Human Right Credibility solves extinction Copelan 99 Rhonda Copelan, law professor, NYU, NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW, 1999, p. 71-2 The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy. <<<INSERT IMPACTS>>> Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 27 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – Terrorism Human Rights credibility key to solve terrorism Dobriansky ‘01 Paula J., Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, HERITAGE FOUNDATION REPORTS, December 21, 2001 The advancement of human rights and democracy is important in its own right. At the same time, these efforts are the bedrock of our war on terrorism. The violation of human rights by repressive regimes provides fertile ground for popular discontent. In turn, this discontent is cynically exploited by terrorist organizations and their supporters. By contrast, a stable government that responds to the legitimate desires of its people and respects their rights, shares power, respects diversity, and seeks to unleash the creative potential of all elements of society is a powerful antidote to extremism. I am pleased to tell you that this Administration's commitment to human rights, democracy, and religious freedom is unshakeable. The President and other senior officials have emphasized these core principles repeatedly in the aftermath of September 11. The President's National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, at a recent Forum on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, reiterated our commitment to promoting democracy, noting "democratization and stability are the underpinning for a world free of terrorism." Terrorism ensures extinction Speice ‘06 JD Candidate @ College of William and Mary [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427 Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50 In addition to the threat posed by terrorists, leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons. 51 This proliferation will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States [*1440] or its allies by hostile states, 52 as well as increase the likelihood that regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. 53 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 28 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – Leadership Protection of private military actions in Iraq are causing the US to lose credibility with Iraqis and the international community; human rights causes perception of loss of foreign leadership Elsea et al. ‘08 Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues Updated August 25, 2008 Jennifer K. Elsea Legislative Attorney American Law Division Moshe Schwartz Analyst in Defense Acquisition Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Kennon H. Nakamura Analyst in Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf PSCs’ use of deadly force, the killing of allegedly innocent Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy and Blackwater employees, and the State Department’s alleged lack of concern about accountability, many believe, have undermined U.S. foreign policy and specifically U.S. standing in Iraq. Many in the military reportedly expressed concerns that Blackwater’s actions that day and over time could alter and degrade relationships that the military is seeking to build with Iraqis.47 Speaking prior to the September 16 killings, an Iraqi Interior Ministry official discussing Blackwater’s actions in previous deadly fire incidents and the company’s attitude in ignoring Iraqi law and customs, explained that Blackwater and its actions are part of the reason for the hatred of Americans. “Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans.”48 In a broader foreign policy context, the State Department’s alleged protection of Blackwater as its employees act as if they are above Iraqi law and kill Iraqis with impunity makes it difficult to advocate for such issues as the importance of the rule of law and human rights as U.S. foreign policy objectives. Advances in worldwide communications make it possible for allegations of human rights violations by those associated with the United States to be spread worldwide almost instantaneously, and may affect both the perception of the United States as a country respectful of human rights as well as the international environment in which the United States works to advance its foreign policy objectives.49 Decline in U.S. hegemony sparks nuclear wars in every key region---no viable replacement Kagan ‘07 Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August-September 2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Policy Review, online: http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a status. measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War II now impossible. Such would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 29 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – Leadership They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could powers, including the United States. Such be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances . It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change . The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper ground. involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path. or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 30 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – North Korea Human Rights Credibility solve North Korea Burke-White ‘04 William. Lecturer at Princeton University. “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation” Spring. 17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 249 The United States is "forging a partnership with Africa" that will promote peace and stability and foster economic development across the continent, the State Department's special adviser on Sudan, Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 1. United States policy toward North Korea presently focuses almost exclusively on nuclear and ballistic missile issues. While these issues are important, North Korea might be far less likely to use these technologies if its human rights policies improved significantly. Human rights improvement, therefore, should be higher on the agenda and an integral part of any future agreements with the North Korean government. Again, some critics may argue that the United States will waste important diplomatic capital in the pursuit of human rights. The point here is that there are good reasons--beyond ideology and based on national security--to pursue [*272] human rights such that diplomatic capital will not be wasted. Nonetheless, as the Russia-Chechnya case study below illustrates, the United States will still need to balance a range of factors in formulating national security and may, at times, deem it necessary to put human rights lower on the agenda. The human rights-aggression linkage, however, provides an additional factor that augurs for greater attention to human rights in U.S. foreign policy. Nuclear War Chol ‘02 Kim Myong, Executive Director, Tokyo-Based Center for Korean-American Peace, Policy Forum Onlinte, Oct 24, www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0212A_Chol.html The second choice is for the Americans to initiate military action to knock out the nuclear facilities in North Korea. Without precise knowledge of the location of those target facilities, the American policy planners face the real risk of North Korea launching a full-scale war against South Korea, Japan and the U.S. The North Korean Retaliation will most likely leave South Korea and Japan totally devastated with the Metropolitan U.S. being consumed in nuclear conflagration. Looking down on the demolished American homeland, American policy planners aboard a special Boeing jets will have good cause to claim, “We are winners, although our homeland is in ashes. We are safely alive on this jet.” Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 31 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – EXT No state responsibility is being enforced in response to human rights abuses by PMCs now Murianki ‘10 Franklin Mwirigi Murianki, June 01, 2010, “The Rise of Private Military Companies and the Legal Vacuum of Regulation,” Peace and Conflict Monitor, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=724 As mentioned earlier, the 16th century creation of the nation-state and state responsibility took on the state as the sole custodian of the monopoly of violence. The state is responsible for the actions of its military personnel, whether abroad or at home. For any human rights violations, the state has the right to take disciplinary action on military personnel under its domestic legislation or under international law. In the case of PMC personnel, the onus of responsibility is vague and ambiguous. Compared with state-run military and police forces, which are subject to fairly strict regulation by their governments and international laws, PMSCs act with relative impunity in the current international and domestic legal landscape. The result involves increased human rights abuses and decreased accountability for the actors committing those abuses.[21] Further, private military companies, mercenaries and others privately engaged in combat in the shadows of war in weak states, often operate without being accountable for the violations of international law, including human rights[22] and the plundering of resources. The right to self-determination and right to security are seriously impinged by the use of mercenary corporations in war zone areas, their interest being monetary alone. Antony Barnett and Patrick Smith’s highlights. Dramatic evidence that America is involved in illegal mercenary operations in East Africa has emerged. The leaked communications between US private military companies suggest the CIA had knowledge of the plans to run covert military operations inside Somalia - against UN rulings - and they hint at involvement of British security firms [… it further reveals] how US firms have been planning undercover missions in support of President Abdullahi Yusuf's transitional federal government against the Supreme Islamic Courts Council - a radical Muslim militia which took control of Mogadishu, promising national unity under Sharia law.Evidence of foreign involvement in the conflict would not only breach the UN arms embargo but could destabilize the entire region.[23] For PMCs to be directly involved in combat activities raises concerns of whether in the course of their duty they violate human rights and are involved in genocide, crimes against humanity, assassinations and murder which fall under the province of international humanitarian law. The lack of comprehensive national and international law legislation, and the vagueness’ of the legal person of a private military contractor under international law complicates the issue of immunity. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 32 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – EXT PMC use is high now and will increase – they have been implicated in multiple human rights violations Dickinson ‘10 Laura A. Dickinson* Foundation Professor of Law, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law at Arizona State University, ARTICLE: MILITARY LAWYERS, PRIVATE CONTRACTORS, AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPLIANCE, Winter 2010, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 355, lexis It is by now no secret that the United States government depends on private contractors to guard military facilities, escort [*356] convoys, conduct interrogations, train soldiers, and provide logistical support. 1 Indeed, by 2008 the ratio of contractors to uniformed troops in Iraq was approximately 1 to 1, 2 and this ratio is likely to increase further as the U.S. military draws down its forces there. Meanwhile, contractors remain a significant part of the U.S. government's operations elsewhere and are likely to be a continuing presence for the foreseeable future. 3 Private military contractors have been implicated in multiple instances of human rights violations, corruption, and waste. 4 Yet, private contractors are likely to become a permanent [*357] part of the military landscape. Indeed, in testimony before Congress in January 2007, General David Petraeus made clear that the U.S. military would not be able to function in Iraq at all without contract security personnel. 5 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 33 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – EXT PMCs pose the greatest threat to international stability and are responsible for human rights violations Singer 02 P.W., an Olin Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution., “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security” Muse) Market Dynamics And Disruptions A standard conception of international security is that states are the only relevant actors in world politics. Other players are discounted as not having strategic relevance in both political calculations and conflict outcomes. 51 This conception, however, does not anticipate what happens when states are operating in a real market with all its dynamic shifts and uncertainties, rather than within a simplified microeconomic model (such as the "state as micro- economic firm" model that neorealism uses to derive its findings). 52 Military market dynamics and disruptions can potentially complexify international security. When military powers are no longer exclusively sovereign states but include "interdependent players caught in a network of trans-national transactions," familiar concepts such as the simplified "balance of power" lose some of their analytical muscle. 53 Some might argue that the rise of the privatized military industry represents no great change for international security; rather, the industry is merely another resource that states can use to enhance their power. Although true in the sense that states can benefit from hiring PMFs, this claim ignores the fact that the privatized military industry is also an independent, globalized supplier operating beyond any one state's domain. State and nonstate actors alike, including MNCs and even drug cartels, can access formerly exclusive state military capabilities. Where state structures are weak, the result is a direct Even when PMFs are hired by strong states, the locus of judgment can shift beyond these states' control and their military agents' motivations can become warped, with all of the change and uncertainty that these processes entail. The very act of military outsourcing also runs counter to other key tenets of international relations [End Page 208] theory, such as the assertion that states seek to maximize their power through self-sufficiency in order to minimize their reliance on others. 54 The following five subsections explore the interplay of the marketization of violence and the overall global security environment. Each considers an area in which the dynamics of and potential disruptions from a marketplace that includes PMFs might affect international security. These are (1) the ability of PMFs to transform limited economic power into military might, (2) the complications they present for estimating the balance of power, (3) the changes that the market offers for alliance relations, (4) PMFs' ability to empower nonstate actors, and (5) the impact of PMFs on the respect for human rights. The New Fungibility Of Power. The military privatization challenge to the local basis of sovereign authority. phenomenon means that military resources are available on the open market. Where once the creation of a military force required huge investments in both time and resources, today the entire spectrum of conventional forces can be obtained in a matter of weeks, if not days . The barriers to acquiring military strength are thus lowered, making power more fungible than ever. For example, economically rich but population-poor states such as those in the Persian Gulf now hire PMFs to achieve levels of power well beyond what they otherwise could. The same holds for new states and even nonstate groups that lack the institutional support or expertise to build capable military forces. With the help of PMFs, not only can clients add to their existing military forces and obtain highly specialized capacities (e.g., expertise in information warfare), but they may even be able to skip a whole generation of war skills. The result, however, may be a return to the dynamics of sixteenth-century Europe, where wealth and military capability went hand in hand: Pecunia nervus belli (Money nourishes war). 55 This ability to Economic assets can now be rapidly transformed into military threats, making economic power more threatening, which runs contrary to liberalist assumptions Likewise, modern liberalism tends to assume only what is positive about the profit motive. It views the spread of capitalism and globalism as diminishing the incentives for [End Page 209] violent conflict and the rise of global civil society as an immutable good thing. 56 The emergence of a new type of private transnational firm that relies instead on the existence of conflict for its profits counters the assumption that nonstate actors are generally peace orientated. New Complexities In The Balance Of Power. The privatized military industry lies beyond any one state's control. Further, the layering of market uncertainties atop the already-thorny issue of net assessment creates a variety of complications for determining the balance of power, particularly in regional conflicts. Calculating a rival's capabilities or force posture has always been difficult. In an open market, where the range of options is even transform money into force also means a renewal of Kantian fears over the dangers of lowering the costs of war. more variable, likely outcomes become increasingly hard to discern. As the Serbs, Eritreans, Rwandans, and Ugandans (whose opponents hired PMFs prior to successful the involvement of PMFs can quickly and perhaps unexpectedly tilt local balances of power. In addition, arms races could move onto the open market and begin to resemble instant bidding wars. (In the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, a new spin on the traditional arms race emerged when both countries competed first on the global military leasing offensives) all learned, not only can once-predictable deterrence relationships rapidly collapse, but market before taking to the battlefield.) The result is that the pace of the race is accelerated, and "first-mover" advantages are heightened. Indeed such changes could well influence the likelihood of war initiation. 57 Conventional arms control is also made more difficult with the existence of this market, because actual force capacities can be lowered without reducing the overall threat potential. On the other hand, the privatized military industry can act to reduce the tendency toward conflict in certain situations. The announcement of the hiring of a PMF, for example, may make adversaries think twice about initiating war or be more apt to settle an ongoing conflict, by changing the expected costs of victory. 58 Effective corporate branding might thus have a deterrent effect. Likewise, [End Page 210] hiring races in one region might suppress potential races elsewhere, by reducing slack in the market and raising the price for services. Alliance Behavior Privatized. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 34 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – EXT During and after the Cold War, the relationships between strong states (patrons) and weaker, security-dependent states (clients)--often located in the developing world--have been critical. 59 The control that patrons have exerted over their clients has usually resulted from a bargain, whereby the patrons provide military aid and advisers necessary to their clients' security. This support, however, comes at a price. As Olav Stokke notes, it is "used as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient Accessibility to the privatized military market fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship. Instead of having to accede to the demands of their patrons, weaker states can now purchase the military skills, training, and capabilities that they need for their security on the open market. As a result, the patron's leverage is diminished, 61 and by becoming clients of a different sort, weaker states are no longer bound by their patrons' prerogatives . government would not have otherwise agreed to." 60 Papua New Guinea, for example, hired a PMF in 1997 when its patron, Australia, attempted to restrict its military assistance because of human rights concerns. As explained by Papua New Guinea's prime minister, "We have requested the Australians support us in providing the necessary specialist training and equipment. . . . They have consistently declined and therefore I had no choice but to go to the private sector." 62 Studies of alliance behavior also point to functional differentiation as a method of institutionalizing Now PMFs can perform some of these tasks, thus decreasing this reliance and perhaps weakening the ties that bind allied states. For example, if an ally defects or chooses not to participate in a military action, its tactical functions could instead be performed by a PMF. As another illustration, many of the capacities that NATO members rely on the United States to supply for external deployment (e.g., lift capacity, logistics, and alliances. 63 Traditionally, states in alliances have divided up their military tasks, making them more dependent on one another [End Page 211] in the process. even intelligence gathering and analysis) could be adequately supplied by type 3 firms, perhaps by the very firms that already supply these functions to the U.S. military. As a result, allied states may be less restrained by a potential veto on their out-of-area operations than is generally assumed. The PMF market also makes available new forms of aid and alliances. Because PMFs allow the easy transformation of financial resources into military might, allies can provide military aid in the guise of simple cash infusions. For example, in 1995, after the war in the former Yugoslavia, moderate Arab states wanted to assist the Bosnian Muslim government and at the same time counter the radicalizing influence of Iranian military aid. They did so not by sending their own military personnel to the region but rather by paying a PMF--MPRI--to train the Bosnian army. The rationale for this new form of aid is that it lowers potential risks for donors by reducing the likelihood of their becoming embroiled in their allies' fighting. In addition, the pool of possible donors of military assistance need no longer be restricted to states. With an equal ability to pay, nonstate actors--including even rich individuals--can become The unrestricted access to military services ushered in by the rise of the privatized military industry has clearly enhanced the role of nonstate groups, which at one time had been at a significant disadvantage in a system dominated by states. PMFs provide these groups with new options and new paths to power not imagined until very recently. As a result, states may eventually become like dinosaurs toward the end of the valuable allies, able to bolster local forces and even tilt military balances from a distance. 64 Nonstate Actors Empowered. Cretaceous period: powerful but cumbersome, not yet superseded, but no longer the unchallenged masters of their environment. 65 Some PMF executives contend that their firms work just for states, and more specifically, only for those with reputable governments. They argue that PMFs [End Page 212] will not do business with unsavory customers Much the way that PMFs may decide to break contracts for their own interests, under certain conditions high, single-shot payoffs might prove too great a temptation in client choice. In the current unregulated market, the firms decide for whom they work. Thus far, they have contracted with all types of clients, the only limitation being the affordability of their service s. Itinerate type 1 firms because it could harm their ability to obtain future contracts. Both the structure of the market and the record so far, however, argue against this. having difficulty succeeding in a competitive market are the most likely to work with violent nonstate entities. Rebel groups in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Congo have all contracted with type 1 PMFs to receive training and assistance in the use of advanced military technologies. International criminal organizations, including Colombian drug cartels, are also reported to have paid for assistance in counterintelligence, electronic warfare, and the use of sophisticated weaponry from what might be referred to as "rogue firms." One such firm, Hod Hahanit, which was staffed by former Israeli army officers, even trained Colombian paramilitaries who were later involved in the assassination of The increased military capabilities of these and other nonstate groups have had other consequences, including a widen-ing of conflicts and a lessening of weak states' ability to put down internal opposition. Perhaps less pernicious, the market also offers a greater array of military options for more reputable nonstate actors. Normally, the intervention two Colombian presidential candidates and the bombing of a civilian airliner. 66 options of international and regional organizations are limited by the weaknesses of their member states. The use of type 1 and type 3 firms, however, can compensate for such shortfalls, allowing these organizations to undertake operations that they would not be able to otherwise. Take, for instance, ECOWAS, an organization of relatively poor West African states whose militaries are severely limited in certain specializations considered critical for external intervention, particularly air support and logistics. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS forces were nonetheless able to deploy, primarily because of assistance from PMFs such as International Charters. Likewise, United Nations operations, already growing dependent on type 3 firms for logistics, air transport, demining, [End Page 213] and security consultation, have been urged by some PMF industry advocates to hire type 1 firms to act as "enforcers" in stiffening the backs of threatened UN peacekeeping forces. 67If hired, such firms would likely be able to supply much more capable military personnel, but any gains in efficiency come at the risk of increasing problems of control, monitoring, and defection. Human Rights And The Market. Certain tensions also exist regarding the impact of PMFs on the respect for human rights during conflict. On one hand, PMFs point to particular market incentives for engaging in good behavior: Their long-term profits are partly dependent on their public image. PMFs also emphasize the positive impact that they might have in helping to professionalize local forces or in supplanting client forces that cannot end conflicts. Issues of moral hazard, adverse selection, and the potential for the diffusion of Thus PMF aspirations of corporate responsibility and the desire to cultivate a "good guy" image may be overridden by the need to fulfill a contract or by the desire to be seen as the kind of firm "that gets things done." In other words, considerations of the commonweal are matters of morality, while the bottom line is fundamentally amoral. Thus, although it is incorrect to assume that PMFs kill just for money, there are certain situations in which human rights may be transgressed for the corporate interest. Possible examples include Executive Outcomes personnel using indiscriminate force in Sierra Leone and Angola. 68 The firm is also known to have responsibility, however, battle with these positive proclivities. Just as in other areas of commerce, war is a business in which nice firms do not always finish first. used fuel air explosives (FAEs or vacuum bombs) in its Angola operations. 69 International bodies regard the use of FAEs as a transgression against human rights, because they inflict particularly torturous injuries and are prone to indiscriminate use. 70 But they are also highly effective, which explains why a firm would choose to use them. [End Page 214] There may also be an adverse selection mechanism at work in the industry that attracts disreputable players looking for the cover of legitimacy. PMFs provide a new outlet for individuals who may be naturally drawn to mercenary work or have been forced out of the public sphere. It is not reassuring, for example, that many of the major actors in As employers, PMFs want to hire individuals who will be effective, even if this sometimes means casting a blind eye on past human rights abuses . the Iran-Contra illegal arms trade and the BCCI bank fraud scandals are currently affiliated with the industry. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 35 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Human Rights – EXT As a result, many members of the most ruthless military and intelligence units once affiliated with either the communist regime in the Soviet Union or the apartheid regime in South Africa have found employment in the industry. Even when firms scrupulously screen prospective employees (which is easier said than done, given that most CVs do not have an "atrocities committed" section), it is still difficult to monitor troops in the field. If employees do commit violations, there is little incentive for firms to report them. A The ultimate problem with PMFs is that they diffuse responsibility. Questions about who monitors, regulates, and punishes employees or companies that go astray are still to be fully answered. That many of these firms are chartered in offshore accounts complicates matters even further. Traditionally, a state's security institutions are responsible for enforcing the laws within its sovereign territory. However, it is usually the very weakness of these institutions that results in the hire of a PMF. Furthermore, even if external legal action or sanction were attempted, it is doubtful whether any firm would ever allow its employees to be tried in a weak client state's judicial system. 71 Moreover, even when a PMF operates with good intent, there is no assurance that its employees and their military skills will not be used in ways unanticipated by either the PMF or its client. For example, a number of soldiers in the Croatian army who received MPRI military training subsequently resigned to join the rebel firm that does so risks scaring off both clients and prospective employees. Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Among those who resigned was the KLA's commander. Many of these same soldiers have since become involved in the Macedonian conflict across the border. In sum, privatization provides no greater assurance of moral military behavior. It may even produce countervailing incentives. Just as state institutions can serve both good and evil ends, so too can PMFs. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar [End Page 215] 36 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***International Law Advantage*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 37 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Observation Two: International Law – International Law is inevitable but US engagement is critical to its effectiveness Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, ’02 Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, 2002, Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance. Effective international law solves every impact Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, ’02 Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, and the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, 2002, Rule of Power or Rule of Law? An Assessment of U.S. Policies and Actions Regarding Security-Related Treaties, May, http://www.ieer.org/reports/treaties/execsumm.pdf The evolution of international law since World War II is largely a response to the demands of states and individuals living within a global society with a deeply integrated world economy. In this global society, the repercussions of the actions of states, non-state actors, and individuals are not confined within borders, whether we look to greenhouse gas accumulations, nuclear testing, the danger of accidental nuclear war, or the vast massacres of civilians that have taken place over the course of the last hundred years and still continue. Multilateral agreements increasingly have been a primary instrument employed by states to meet extremely serious challenges of this kind, for several reasons. They clearly and publicly embody a set of universally applicable expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies. In other words, they articulate global norms, such as the protection of human rights and the prohibitions of genocide and use of weapons of mass destruction. They establish predictability and accountability in addressing a given issue. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the structured system established by a treaty. However, influential U.S. policymakers are resistant to the idea of a treaty-based international legal system because they fear infringement on U.S. sovereignty and they claim to lack confidence in compliance and enforcement mechanisms. This approach has dangerous practical implications for international cooperation and compliance with norms. U.S. treaty partners do not enter into treaties expecting that they are only political commitments that can be overridden based on U.S. interests. When a powerful and influential state like the United States is seen to treat its legal obligations as a matter of convenience or of national interest alone, other states will see this as a justification to relax or withdraw from their own commitments. When the United States wants to require another state to live up to its treaty obligations, it may find that the state has followed the U.S. example and opted out of compliance. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 38 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage PMC exemplify mercenaries under I’Law – Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions defines them as mercenaries because they threaten state’s monopoly on the use of force Salzman, ’08 (Zoe Saltzman, Clinical Contract Attorney, International Human Rights Clinic, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, “Private Military Contractors and the taint of a Mercenary Reputation”, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 853 (2008), lexis) In the next two Parts of the paper, I argue that labeling private military contractors as mercenaries is supported by both the spirit and the letter of the international law developed to discourage states from hiring mercenaries. As this Part will demonstrate, the term “mercenary” carries an unflattering connotation that the private military industry has been keen to avoid—and with good reason: Closer examination reveals that the concerns with private contractors identified above closely resemble the concerns that led to the development of international law on mercenaries. A. The Taint of a Mercenary Reputation The history of mercenary activity is a long one135 and, until fairly recently, international humanitarian law did not treat mercenaries differently from other combatants.136 Beginning in the 1970s, however, mercenaries came to be seen as a threat and a series of international conventions were drafted to discourage their use.137 The term “mercenary” has been used to describe a wide range of people—from “individuals killing for hire, to troops raised by one country working for another,” and even to PMCs.138 The public perception of mercenaries is one of “dogs of war” and “freelance soldiers of no fixed abode, who, for large amounts of money, fight for dubious causes.”139 Some mercenaries, such as “Mad” Mike Hoare and Bob Denard, gained international notoriety for their violent roles in African decolonization struggles.140 Mercenaries are often ex-soldiers who hire themselves out on a free-lance basis, frequently working for rebel groups, businesses operating in weak states, or racist regimes and movements.141 In addition, mercenaries are generally believed to be motivated by a desire for financial gain, thus distinguishing themselves from volunteers or members of the national armed forces who are thought to fight out of a more noble sense of loyalty or patriotism. 142 Thus, while the term has certainly “acquired an unflattering connotation.”143 The strength of this unflattering connotation can be seen in the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I’s radical declaration that “[a] mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.”144 This exclusion runs contrary to “the general thrust of international humanitarian law to extend protection to as many civilians and combatants as possible,”145 thus illustrating just how negatively international law views mercenaries. Most PMCs have attempted to distance themselves from the unflattering there is no clear consensus on the definition of mercenary, connotations associated with mercenaries, out of fear that a mercenary reputation might undermine their chances at future contracts.146 Indeed, the term “mercenary” is used disparagingly even within the private military industry. For example, one PMC executive criticized some of the other PMCs employed by the United States in Iraq by noting that they were retained because the United States “needs an organ that is from outside the US, far less accountable, and already tainted . . . with a whiff of dirty tricks. . . . The While private contractors seem, in many respects, to have succeeded in “repackaging” themselves as distinct from mercenaries, 148 it is less clear that they are actually any different.149 In fact, the concerns that motivated the development of antimercenary international law are extremely similar to the contemporary concerns about private contractors described in Part III. B. The Concerns with Private Contractors powers that be want mercenaries, for mercenary activity. Dirty stuff doable, non-accountable and at no extra cost to boot!!”147 Resemble the Concerns with Mercenaries This Section examines the existing international law on mercenaries to illustrate that there are “disturbing similarities” between some of today’s private contractors and “the 1960sstyle soldiers of fortune.”150 I use the existing international law on mercenaries to illustrate that the concerns that led to the Mercenaries, much like private contractors, threaten states’ monopoly on the use of force, prioritize the private good over the public good, and generally undermine democratic checks on war-making and the emergence of new democratic regimes. Just as private contractors today can be development of this body of law closely resemble the concerns that I raised in Part III with respect to private contractors. hired to prevent the emergence of a new democratic regime, the initial laws on mercenaries were developed to check the hiring of mercenaries by racist regimes resisting the decolonization movement in Africa.151 The OAU Convention, in particular, reflects the concern that mercenaries can undermine the emergence of new, democratic governments. Citing “the grave threat which the activities of mercenaries represent to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and harmonious development of Member States of OAU,”152 the OAU Convention determined to put an end to “the subversive activities of mercenaries in Africa.”153 The OAU specifically defines the mercenary as an individual aiming to overthrow the government or to undermine the independence or territorial integrity of a Member State, or to block the activities of an OAU Furthermore, Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions appears designed to address the concern that mercenaries, just like private contractors, prioritize the private good over the public good. This concern is reflected in Protocol I’s definition of a “mercenary” as someone whose motivation to take part in the hostilities is “essentially . . . the desire for private gain and [who], in fact, is promised . . . material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces.”155 This provision reflects the intent to distinguish mercenaries from volunteers, who are not feared in the same way and to whom this condemnation does not extend.156 Protocol I’s definition of the term “mercenary” reflects a concern with the commodification of force and a fear of combatants who have allegiance only to profit (a private good), rather than the allegiance to the public good that national armed forces are traditionally assumed to espouse. G8 have signed the Convention Against Mercenaries, and the generally low level of ratification has led some to claim that the Convention is “anti-customary law.”164 Given the low level of ratification and the frequent use of mercenaries by states, there seems to be little state practice or opinio juris for a customary international law ban on mercenaries, let alone on the PMCs and private contractors that are used even more widely and more openly by states.165 Despite the low incidence of ratification of and the lack of respect for recognized liberation movement.154 the mercenary prohibitions, the fact remains that these prohibitions do exist, at least in theory, and there is a general public perception that international law outlaws private military industry has certainly attempted to distance itself from mercenaries,167 suggesting that the existing international law on mercenaries has at least some rhetorical clout, even if full legal clout is still lacking. mercenaries. 166 As examined earlier, the This leads me to conclude that as American legislators begin to seriously consider how to regulate the private military industry, it is important that they remember the similarities between the concerns surrounding private contractors and those raised by mercenaries rather than readily accepting the industry’s attempt to distance itself from the taint of a mercenary reputation. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 39 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Application of international norms leads to broader incorporation of the Geneva Convention Morgan, ’08 Richard Morgan, Law Clerk, the Chambers of the Hon James E Baker, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; Lieutenant (Junior Grade), USN; BA, BM 2002, University of Hartford; BA 2004, Hertford College, University of Oxford; JD 2007, Yale Law School, ARTICLE: Professional Military Firms under International Law, Summer, 2008, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 213, lexis *PMF = Private Military Firm 135 But there are several reasons why it may be prudent for the US to seek a more comprehensive international agreement on standards for the use of PMFs by state actors--through existing international law, a new treaty regime, or advocacy of a new norm of customary international law. First, while it is unnecessary for reciprocity to exist between belligerents before one or both is bound to abide by the Geneva Conventions, 136 the United [*241] States cannot expect adverse parties to accept that PMFs may properly claim prisoner-of-war status or be immune from prosecution by foreign tribunals, if no international norm exists to support those positions. If the United States anticipates employing PMFs in future conflicts, then it is advantageous to seek international support for a conception of the rights and duties of such contractors before the fog of future wars sets in. Second, the United States and the United Kingdom may have incentives to create an international standard while they maintain a relative monopoly on PMF services. As Allison Stanger and Mark Eric Williams note, the United States is currently "not only the world's largest provider of private military services, but also its largest consumer." 137 Stanger and Williams suggest a three-pronged "firewall" currently maintains the United States' virtual monopoly: "a smaller demand for [PMF] services by non-U.S. clients; a smaller supply of military services by non-U.S. and non-UK [PMFs]; and other countries' unwillingness to confront the United States." 138 None of these factors, however, can be considered permanent. 139 Indeed, several factors argue against the United States maintaining its monopoly of consumption of PMF services. If the United States' dominant position in international affairs is challenged by emerging powers such as China, Russia, or the EU, states currently unwilling to draw the ire of the American superpower may become more willing to pursue courses of action at odds with the desires of Washington. Free to deflect the disapproval of the US by allying with another global power, the relative ease of outsourcing military work to highly-trained PMFs may prove irresistible to states unable to overcome the significant financial barriers to the domestic production of twenty-first century military forces. In such an environment, any benefits that the United States may gain through the use of PMFs-such as economic efficiency, reduced attributable casualties, and greater military agility 140 --may be diminished as other states employ PMFs in opposition to the United States. Emerging simultaneously with growing challenges to American interests from other nation-states is the potential decline of the state's monopoly on violence. 141 While declining costs of weapon systems, transportation, and [*242] communications have empowered substate actors willing to use force to achieve their goals, the traditional system of national sovereignty has provided such actors a haven from the reach of the criminal justice system of opponent foreign states. The norm of incorporation helps to side step this problem, by attributing the acts of a substate transgressor to its sponsor state. Without the norm of incorporation, however, the ability of the United States to use international tribunals to achieve its foreign policy goals is greatly decreased. For example, the United States abstained in the vote of Security Council Resolution 1593 (thus helping to assure its passage) to refer the Darfur situation to the ICC, despite objections to the judicial forum. 142 If, arguendo, the Sudanese employed PMFs in addition to the Janjaweed, the lack of a norm of incorporation would necessitate the more problematic finding of implied, rather than explicit, culpability under the Tadic standard in order to hold Sudanese government officials accountable. If both the dominant market role of the United States and the state monopoly on violence are on the wane, then the window in which the US can use its position to establish international norms with regards to the use of PMFs may be short. If direct application of the existing law of armed conflict treaty regime is determined to be either legally or politically unworkable, the United States could use its influence to advocate a new international agreement on the use of PMFs that would incorporate three points from existing treaties. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 40 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Scenario One: Environment – Broader incorporation of international law solves biodiversity loss Glennon, ’90 Michael, Board of Editors @ American Journal of Intl Law, Jan., 84 A.J.I.L. 1 It is now possible to conclude that customary international law requires states to take appropriate steps to protect endangered species. Customary norms are created by state practice "followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." 250 Like highly codified humanitarian law norms that have come to bind even states that are not parties to the instruments promulgating them, 251 wildlife protection norms also have become binding on nonparties as customary law. Closely related to this process of norm creation by practice is that of norm creation by convention: customary norms are created by international agreements "when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted." 252 Several such [*31] agreements are directed at wildlife protection, 253 and CITES is one of them. It is intended for adherence by states generally 254 and is accepted by the 103 states that have become parties. In addition, some nonparties comply with certain CITES documentary requirements so as to trade with parties. 255 CITES is not "rejected by a significant number of states"; 256 only the United Arab Emirates has withdrawn from the agreement. In such circumstances, the International Court of Justice has observed, international agreements constitute state practice and represent law for nonparties. 257 Moreover, customary norms are created by "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 258 Because CITES requires domestic implementation by parties to it, 259 and because the overall level of compliance seems quite high, 260 the general principles embodied in states' domestic endangered species laws may be relied upon as another source of customary law. 261 Even apart from the CITES requirements, states that lack laws protecting endangered species seem now to be the clear exception rather than the rule. 262 That there exists opinio juris as to the binding character of this obligation 263 is suggested by the firm support given endangered species [*32] protection by the UN General Assembly and various international conferences. 264 Extinction Diner, ’94 Diner, David N. B.S. Recipient. Ohio State University. J.D. Recipient. College of Law. Ohio State University. LL.M. The Judge Advocate General’s School. United States Army. Judge Advocate’s General’s Corps. United States Army. “The Army and the Endangered Species Act: Who’s Endangering Whom?” Military Law Review. 143 Mil. L. Rev. 161. Winter, 1994. Lexis-Nexis. No species has ever dominated its fellow species as man has. In most cases, people have assumed the God-like power of life and death -- extinction or survival -- over the plants and animals of the world. For most of history, mankind pursued this domination with a singleminded determination to master the world, tame the wilderness, and exploit nature for the maximum benefit of the human race. n67 In past mass extinction episodes, as many as ninety percent of the existing species perished, and yet the world moved forward, humans live off of other species. At some point, the number of species could decline to the point at which the ecosystem fails, and then humans also would become extinct. No one knows how many [*171] species the world needs to support human life, and to find out -- by allowing certain species to become extinct and new species replaced the old. So why should the world be concerned now? The prime reason is the world's survival. Like all animal life, -- would not be sound policy. In addition to food, species offer many direct and indirect benefits to mankind. n68 2. Ecological Value. -- Ecological value is the value that species have in maintaining the environment. Pest, n69 erosion, and flood control are prime benefits certain species provide to man. Plants and animals also provide additional ecological services -- pollution control, n70 oxygen production, sewage treatment, and biodegradation. n71 3. Scientific and Utilitarian Value. -- Scientific value is the use of species for research into the physical processes of the world. n72 Without plants and animals, a large portion of basic scientific research would be impossible. Utilitarian value is the direct utility humans draw from plants and animals. n73 Only a fraction of the [*172] earth's species have been examined, and mankind may someday desperately need the species that it is exterminating today. To accept that the snail darter, harelip sucker, or Dismal Swamp southeastern shrew n74 could save mankind may be difficult for some. Many, if not most, species are useless to man in a direct utilitarian sense. Nonetheless, they may be critical in an indirect role, because their extirpations could affect a directly In a closely interconnected ecosystem, the loss of a species affects other species dependent on it. n75 Moreover, as the number of species decline, the effect of each new extinction on the remaining species increases dramatically. n76 4. Biological Diversity. -- The main premise of species preservation is that diversity is better than simplicity. n77 As the current mass extinction has useful species negatively. progressed, the world's biological diversity generally has decreased. This trend occurs within ecosystems by reducing the number of species, and within species by reducing the Biologically diverse ecosystems are characterized by a large number of specialist species, filling narrow ecological niches. These ecosystems inherently are more stable than less diverse systems. number of individuals. Both trends carry serious future implications. "The more complex the ecosystem, the more successfully it can resist a stress. . . .[l]ike a net, in which each knot is connected to others by several strands, such a fabric can By causing widespread extinctions, humans have artificially simplified many ecosystems. As biologic simplicity increases, so does the risk of ecosystem failure. The spreading Sahara Desert in Africa, and the dustbowl conditions of the 1930s in the United States are relatively mild examples of what might be expected if this trend continues. Theoretically, each new animal or plant extinction, with all its dimly perceived and intertwined affects, could cause total ecosystem collapse and human extinction. Each new extinction increases the risk of disaster. Like a mechanic removing, one by one, the rivets from an aircraft's wings, [hu]mankind may be edging closer to the abyss. resist collapse better than a simple, unbranched circle of threads -- which if cut anywhere breaks down as a whole." n79 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 41 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Scenario Two: Leadership – Multiple factors make unipolarity unsustainable Haass, ’08 Richard Haass President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Bottom of Form The Age of Nonpolarity What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, 2008, Foreign Affairs, May/June But even if great-power rivals have not emerged, unipolarity has ended. Three explanations for its demise stand out. The first is historical. States develop; they get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial, and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for corporations and other organizations. The rise of these new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. A second cause is U.S. policy. To paraphrase Walt Kelly's Pogo, the post-World War II comic hero, we have met the explanation and it is us. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the United States has accelerated the emergence of alternative power centers in the world and has weakened its own position relative to them. U.S. energy policy (or the lack thereof) is a driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S. consumption of oil has grown by approximately 20 percent, and, more important, U.S. imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price of oil from just over $20 a barrel to over $100 a barrel in less than a decade. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. In short, U.S. energy policy has helped bring about the emergence of oil and gas producers as major power centers. U.S. economic policy has played a role as well. President Lyndon Johnson was widely criticized for simultaneously fighting a war in Vietnam and increasing domestic spending. President Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by an annual rate of eight percent, and cut taxes. As a result, the United States' fiscal position declined from a surplus of over $100 billion in 2001 to an estimated deficit of approximately $250 billion in 2007. Perhaps more relevant is the ballooning current account deficit, which is now more than six percent of GDP. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation, and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the U.S. mortgage market and the credit crisis it has spawned have exacerbated these problems . The war in Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of the United States' position in the world. The war in Iraq has proved to be an expensive war of choice -- militarily, economically, and diplomatically as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about "imperial overstretch," which posited that the United States would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had in the past. Kennedy's theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the United States -- for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism -- has not proved to be immune. It is not simply that the U.S. military will take a generation to recover from Iraq; it is also that the United States lacks sufficient military assets to continue doing what it is doing in Iraq, much less assume new burdens of any scale elsewhere. Finally, today's nonpolar world is not simply a result of the rise of other states and organizations or of the failures and follies of U.S. policy. It is also an inevitable consequence of globalization. Globalization has increased the volume, velocity, and importance of cross-border flows of just about everything, from drugs, e-mails, greenhouse gases, manufactured goods, and people to television and radio signals, viruses (virtual and real), and weapons. Globalization reinforces nonpolarity in two fundamental ways. First, many cross-border flows take place outside the control of governments and without their knowledge. As a result, globalization dilutes the influence of the major powers. Second, these same flows often strengthen the capacities of nonstate actors, such as energy exporters (who are experiencing a dramatic increase in wealth owing to transfers from importers), terrorists (who use the Internet to recruit and train, the international banking system to move resources, and the global transport system to move people), rogue states (who can exploit black and gray markets), and Fortune 500 firms (who quickly move personnel and investments). It is increasingly apparent that being the strongest state no longer means having a near monopoly on power. It is easier than ever before for individuals and groups to accumulate and project substantial power. NONPOLAR DISORDER The increasingly nonpolar world will have mostly negative consequences for the United States -- and for much of the rest of the world as well. It will make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global challenges. One reason has to do with simple arithmetic. Herding dozens is harder than herding a few. The inability to reach agreement in the Doha Round of global trade talks is a telling example. Nonpolarity will also increase the number of threats and vulnerabilities facing a country such as the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the U.S. dollar. The Federal Reserve might want to think twice before continuing to lower interest rates, lest it precipitate a further move away from the dollar. There can be worse things than a recession. Iran is a case in point. Its effort to become a nuclear power is a result of nonpolarity. Thanks more than anything to the surge in oil prices, it has become another meaningful concentration of power, one able to exert influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian territories, and beyond, as well as within OPEC. It has many sources of technology and finance and numerous markets for its energy exports. And due to nonpolarity, the United States cannot manage Iran alone. Rather, Washington is dependent on others to support political and economic sanctions or block Tehran's access to nuclear technology and materials. Nonpolarity begets nonpolarity. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 42 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Unilateralism causes international and domestic backlash, terrorism, and mass proliferation resulting in isolationism Ikenberry, ’02 G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice @ Georgetown, October 2002 ("America's Imperial Ambition – Foreign Affairs) p. lexis Unchecked U.S. power, shorn of legitimacy and disentangled from the postwar norms and institutions of the international order, will usher in a more hostile international system, making it far harder to achieve American interests. The secret of the United States' long brilliant run as the world's leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks, which made its power and agenda more acceptable to allies and other key states around the world. This achievement has now been put at risk by the administration's new thinking. The most immediate problem is that the neoimperialist approach is unsustainable. Going it alone might well succeed in removing Saddam Hussein from power, but it is far less certain that a strategy of counterproliferation, based on American willingness to use An American policy that leaves the United States alone to decide which states are threats and how best to deny them weapons of mass destruction will lead to a diminishment of multilateral mechanisms -- most important of which is the nonproliferation regime. The Bush administration has elevated the threat of WMD to the top of its unilateral force to confront dangerous dictators, can work over the long term. security agenda without investing its power or prestige in fostering, monitoring, and enforcing nonproliferation commitments. The tragedy of September 11 has given the Bush administration the authority and willingness to confront the Iraqs of the world. But that will not be enough when even more complicated cases come along -- when it is not the use of force that is needed but concerted multilateral action to provide sanctions and inspections. Nor is it certain that a preemptive or preventive military intervention will go it might trigger a domestic political backlash to American-led and military-focused interventionism. America's wellmeaning imperial strategy could undermine the principled multilateral agreements, institutional infrastructure, and cooperative spirit needed for the long-term success of nonproliferation goals. The specific doctrine of preemptive action poses a related problem: once the well; United States feels it can take such a course, nothing will stop other countries from doing the same. Does the United States want this doctrine in the hands of Pakistan, or even China or Russia? After all, it would not require the intervening state to first provide evidence for its actions. The United States argues that to wait until all the evidence is in, or until authoritative international bodies support action, is to wait too long. Yet that approach is the only basis that the United States can use if it needs to appeal for restraint in the actions of others. Moreover, and quite paradoxically, overwhelming American conventional military might, combined with a policy of preemptive strikes, could lead hostile states to accelerate programs to acquire their only possible deterrent to the United States: WMD. This is another version of the security dilemma, but one made worse by a neoimperial grand strategy. Another problem follows. The use of force to eliminate WMD capabilities or overturn dangerous regimes is never simple, whether it is pursued unilaterally or by a concert of major states. After the military intervention is over, the target country has to be put back together. Peacekeeping and state building are inevitably required, as are long-term strategies that bring the un, the World Bank, and the major powers together to orchestrate aid and other forms of assistance. This is not heroic work, but it is utterly necessary. Peacekeeping troops may be required for many years, even after a new regime is built. Regional conflicts inflamed by outside military intervention must also be calmed. This is the "long tail" of burdens and When these costs and obligations are added to America's imperial military role, it becomes even more doubtful that the neoimperial strategy can be sustained at home over the long haul -- the classic problem of imperial overstretch. The United States could keep its military predominance for decades if it is supported by a growing and increasingly productive economy. But the indirect burdens of cleaning up the political mess in terrorist-prone failed states levy a hidden cost. Peacekeeping and state building will require coalitions of states and multilateral agencies that can be brought into the process only if the commitments that comes with every major military action. initial decisions about military intervention are hammered out in consultation with other major states. America's older realist and liberal grand strategies suddenly become an imperial grand strategy is that it cannot generate the cooperation needed to solve practical problems at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. In the fight on terrorism, the United States needs cooperation from relevant again. A third problem with European and Asian countries in intelligence, law enforcement, and logistics. Outside the security sphere, realizing U.S. objectives depends even more on a continuous stream of It needs partners for trade liberalization, global financial stabilization, environmental protection, deterring transnational organized crime, managing the rise of China, and a host of other thorny challenges. But it is impossible to expect would-be partners to acquiesce to America's self-appointed global security protectorate and then pursue business as usual in all other domains. The key policy tool for states confronting a unipolar and unilateral America is to withhold cooperation in day-to-day relations with the United States. One obvious means is trade policy; the amicable working relations with major states around the world. European response to the recent American decision to impose tariffs on imported steel is explicable in these terms. This particular struggle concerns specific trade issues, but it economic and political power is more evenly distributed across the globe. The major states may not have much leverage in directly restraining American military policy, but they can make the United States pay a price in other areas. Finally, the neoimperial grand strategy poses a wider problem for the maintenance of American unipolar power. It steps into the oldest trap of powerful imperial states: selfencirclement. When the most powerful state in the world throws its weight around, unconstrained by rules or norms of legitimacy, it risks a backlash. Other countries will bridle at an international order in which the United States plays only by its own rules. The proponents of the is also a struggle over how Washington exercises power. The United States may be a unipolar military power, but new grand strategy have assumed that the United States can single-handedly deploy military power abroad and not suffer untoward consequences; relations will be coarser with friends and allies, they believe, but such are the costs of leadership. But history shows that powerful states tend to trigger self-encirclement by their own overestimation of their power. Charles V, Louis XIV, Napoleon, and the leaders of post-Bismarck Germany sought to expand their imperial domains and impose a coercive order on others. Their imperial orders were all brought down when other countries decided they were not prepared to live in a world dominated by an overweening coercive state. America's imperial goals and modus operandi are much more limited and benign than were those of age-old emperors. But a hard-line imperial grand strategy runs the risk that history will repeat itself. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 43 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Proliferation causes nuclear war – It uniquely increases the risk and magnitude of conflicts. Sokolski, ’09 Henry, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and serves on the US congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, “Avoiding a nuclear crowd,” Policy Review, June/July AT A MINIMUM, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers' strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system (NATO) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the UK). NATO is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclearweapon- armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them "strategic partners" (e.g., India and Russia), NATO nuclear allies (France and the UK), "non-NATO allies" (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear NATO allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.^^ Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state's military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with "strategic" consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world "every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today."^^ In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 44 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Withdrawal of US leadership causes multiple nuclear conflicts Liber, ’05 Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University 2005, Robert J., The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 53-54 Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. U.S. credibility in international law is key to leadership – It stabilized US power, reduces backlash against unilateralism and increases overall credibility Krisch, ’03 Nico. Senior Fellow @ the Center for International Studies @ NYU Law. Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy – edited by Malone and Khong. Pp. 62-63 However, when international instruments reflect U.S. policy preferences vis-à-vis other states – as they often do (eg., in the area of arms control) – careful analysis is needed on whether unilateral action can render similar results or whatever even the short-term interests of the United States demand adherence to the treaty. Even the United States itself recognizes the value of legal regulation of international relations, as the description of its attempts to create and enforce law by unilateral means has shown. It is not ready to renounce law as an instrument, because law stabilizes expectations and reduces the costs of later negotiation and of the enforcement of certain policies. Thus, the question is whether it is in the U.S. interest to accept the more egalitarian process of international law instead of using unilateral, hierarchal legal instruments. Although it is impossible to enter into a comprehensive discussion of the general value of international law in this chapter, I shall outline at least some arguments in favor of such an acceptance. First, a stronger use of international law could help stabilize the current predominant positions of the United States. If the United States now concludes that treaties with other states that reflect its superior negotiating power (even if not to the degree the United States would wish), U.S. preferences can shape international relations in a longer perspective, as change in international law is slower and more difficult than political change. It is worthwhile noting that past great powers similarly influenced the international legal order to such a degree that it is possible to divide the history of international law into epochs dominated by these powers – epochs that have left many traces in contemporary law. Second, even if the U.S. power continues to increase and this argument therefore appears to be less appealing, the United States can gain from stronger reliance on international law because the law can help legitimize its current exercise of power. Unilateralism in international politics is always regarded suspiciously by other states, and it is quite probable that perceptions of “imperialism” or “bully hegemony” will lead to stronger reactions by other states in the long run. Already now, some states show greater unity. Although it remains to be seen whether in the Case of Russia and China this greater unity is only symbolic, other instances, such as the strong stance of the like-minded states in the ICC, indicate a more substantive regrouping in the face of U.S. predominance. Similarly, the accelerated integration of the EU can be regarded as caused in part by the desire to counterbalance the United States. IF the United States were able to channel its power into the more egalitarian process of international law, it could gain much more legitimacy for its exercise of power and significantly reduce the short and long term costs of its policies. This has been recognized in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, and the U.S. president not only sought to build an international ad hoc coalition but also taken steps to bolster the international legal regime against terrorism, in particular by transmitting conventions against terrorism to the Senate in order to proceed with ratification. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 45 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC International Law Advantage Multilateralism is certainly valued more highly by U.S. administration since the attacks, but reluctance still prevails in many areas, as enduring U.S. opposition to the ICC and to the additional protocol to the BWC shows. Third, it is highly questionable whether the United States will in fact be able to pursue its strategy of subjecting international law in the future. In the past, it might have been possible to exert significant influence on the content of international agreements and then not subscribe to them. Repeating this in the future is likely to be more difficult – as the United States discovered in the case of the ICC statute after a certain point. As one observer to the ICC negotiations notes: Increasingly, the other delegations felt that it would be better to stop giving in to the Untied States; they believed that the United States would never be satisfied with the concessions it got and ultimately would never sign the treaty for completely unrelated domestic political reasons. Similarly, the use of reservations in order to secure a privileged position has become increasingly difficult as other states become wary of this strategy and seek to foreclose the possibility of reservations to new treaties entirely, as in the ICC statute and the Ottawa Convention. And discontent with U.S. behavior might backfire in unexpected circumstances – as with the loss of the seat in the Commission for Human Rights, or the suit brought and vigorously defended by Germany in the LaGrand case. In general, these effects are likely to undermine the U.S. capacity for leadership which to a large degree is based on reputation, credibility, and persuasiveness – not only on brute power. Moreover, as the United States discovered in its failure to achieve desired goals in the climate change and the landmine negotiations, leadership can be barred by too great a difference in opinion between the leader and those to be led. Compromise may thus be necessary to maintain the momentum to lead. The United States may be forced to choose between engagement, leadership, and control, on the one hand, and free-riding, isolation, and a loss of influence on the other. The US must exercise positive multilateral leadership to maintain peace and stability Maynes, ’99 World Policy Journal, Charles William Maynes president of the Eurasia Foundation 1999 For most of the postwar period the United States offered what might be termed positive leadership in multilateral diplomacy. It led by positive example and encouraged others by taking the first positive step, usually in the form of a new initiative backed by money. Since 1980, it has reverted primarily to what might be called negative leadership. Rather than leading others by its own positive example, it has threatened to punish others if they did not accept the American lead. It has withheld its dues from various institutions when others did not agree with the American position. Other countries have grown tired and resentful of these tactics. Even faced with financial blackmail in the form of the withholding of America's U.N. dues, other members have been unwilling to accept the American position on U.N. reform, which would severely cripple the organization's potential for development as an important international institution. As Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan has pointed out, America's original contribution to international relations has been precisely in its support for the development of international organizations and international law so as to tame the harsh realities of balance-of-power politics. Henry Kissinger, in his book Diplomacy, acknowledges the point in a different way. He notes that there was a possibility at the beginning of the century that Theodore Roosevelt might have persuaded Americans to adopt the ways of other states in dealing with international realities, that is by placing an emphasis on military might and balance-of-power politics. Instead, Woodrow Wilson, with his commitment to international organizations and international law, won the day, and Wilsonianism became a permanent feature of America's approach to the world. Even conservatives regularly dip into this stream. Richard Nixon, for example, described himself as a Wilsonian. America will not repair its relations with the United Nations and other international organizations until their supporters succeed in convincing conservative internationalists that the relentless campaign against these institutions threatens the commitment of the larger population to internationalism generally. The United States is too diverse a country to develop a fixed view of its national interest. Too many special interests are at work for such a set of beliefs to develop. It needs the glue of a positive ideology to bind the country together and convince it to remain engaged in the world. Public opinion polls demonstrating that the United Nations enjoys strong support among the American people is evidence of this glue at work. Those committed to internationalism must also recognize that they must be prepared to fight for their beliefs. The Clinton administration announced in January 1999 that it intended to support increases in U.S. defense spending of $110 billion over the coming five years. Defenders of internationalism were largely silent on the obvious disparity between the administration's commitment to defense spending and its failure to press Congress for adequate funding for the other elements in the international budget, such as foreign assistance or support for international institutions. The hope for a more orderly and peaceful world lies in the commitment to progressive multilateralism. That hope will never be fulfilled unless the most powerful country in the world does its share. The highest priority on the internationalist agenda in the coming years will be to persuade America's leaders of that reality. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 46 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva PMC’s fall under every requirement of a mercenary under Article 47 of the Geneva Convention Cameron, ’06 (Lindsey Cameron is Doctoral candidate in the Faculty of Law at the University of Geneva. She is a research and teaching assistant at the University of Geneva and the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, “Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and its impact on their regulation,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88 Number 863, September 2006, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-863-p573/$File/irrc_863_Cameron.pdf) Drawing on examples of private military companies operating in Iraq in 2003 and early 2004 (i.e. while the conflict could still unquestionably be classified as international), it can be concluded that some individuals working for such companies may get caught by Article 47 of Protocol I and by the mercenary conventions. Consider, for instance, the hypothetical (but entirely possible) case of a South African former special forces fighter who may have been hired to provide close protection services for the leaders of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Proceeding through the six parts of the definition, we must enquire, first, whether the fact of being hired as a bodyguard would constitute recruitment ‘‘in order to fight’’; it is important to recall here that the phrase ‘‘to fight’’ under international humanitarian law is not synonymous with an offensive attack,35 therefore persons hired to defend a (military) person but who engage in defensive combat can fall under Article 47.2(a) and also meet the second criterion. However, it is understood that to meet this criterion the individual should be recruited specifically to fight in the particular conflict in question, not as a general employee. Aside from the fact that protecting a US commander may itself constitute direct participation in hostilities, there have been reports of heavy fighting by private military companies. One well-known instance occurred in Najaf in 2004, where individuals from one PMC were engaged with enemy fighters, fired ‘‘thousands of rounds of ammunition’’ and had to call in one of the company’s own helicopters not to evacuate them, but to drop more ammunition.36 Some PMC employees thus easily satisfy the second requirement of directly participating in hostilities (sub-para. (b)). As for the third criterion (sub-para. (c)), individuals acting as bodyguards of the US occupation commanders earned up to US$2,000 a day, considerably more than a US private earns in a month and, in the case of South African fighters, are not nationals of a Party to the conflict (fourth criterion, sub-para. (d)). As for the fifth criterion (being a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, sub-para. (e)), suffice it to say briefly at this point that employees of these companies are not members of the armed forces; this criterion will be discussed in more detail below.37 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 47 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva International norms clearly are against the use of mercenaries – However, application of I’Law is lagging behind an evolving interpretation of “mercenary” Coleman, ’04 (James R. Coleman, J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “Constraining Modern Mercenarism,” June, 2004, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, lexis) Nevertheless, the terms of that debate have changed dramatically in the last hundred years as systematic efforts were introduced first to regulate the conduct of mercenaries and later to put explicit limitations on their employment by states. Mercenaries "were tacitly accepted before [*1497] the twentieth century, ... if not by polite society, then by most states, their armies, and international law." 6 During the twentieth century, however, the international community evinced an emerging consensus against their use. In the second half of the century, efforts at international control of mercenarism were undertaken in response to post-colonial developments. In this context, "the first attempts at mercenary regulation focused on eliminating but one type of mercenary, the indiscriminate hired gun who ran roughshod over African self-determination movements in the post-colonial period from 1960 to 1980. As mercenaries evolved, however, mercenary regulations did not." 7 The international scheme for regulation of mercenaries thus failed to keep pace with the emerging category of private corporate soldier. As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on mercenarism acknowledged as early as the 1980s, international laws addressing mercenaries have not "caught-up with the changes brought about by this new kind of security company." 8 The spirit of international law nevertheless remains clearly opposed to the use of soldiers of fortune. The strong international consensus that the use of mercenaries in armed conflict should be prohibited has been unequivocally manifest in the development of positive law under U.N. auspices for two decades. In fact, the international community has been working to place significant legal limitations on the use of mercenaries since 1970, when the United Nations passed a declaration imposing on states the duty to prevent the organization of armed groups for dispatch to other states. 9 In 1984, the General Assembly took an additional step in this direction by adopting Resolution 39/84, entitled "Drafting of an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries." 10 This resolution charged an existing ad hoc committee of representatives from thirty-four member states with the task of completing a draft convention. Resolution 39/84 articulated the motivations for this undertaking as follows: Bearing in mind the need for strict observance of the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity of States and self-determination of peoples, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations ... , [*1498] Recognizing that the activities of mercenaries are contrary to fundamental principles of international law, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, territorial integrity and independence, and seriously impede the process of self-determination of peoples struggling against colonialism, racism and apartheid and all forms of foreign domination, Bearing in mind the pernicious impact that the activities of mercenaries have on international peace and security, Considering that the progressive development and codification of the rules of international law on mercenaries would contribute immensely to the implementation of the purposes and principles of the Charter ... . Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 48 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva Protocol I of the Geneva Convention defines PMC as mercenaries Salzman ‘08 Zoe Saltzman, Clinical Contract Attorney, International Human Rights Clinic, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, “PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY REPUTATION”, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 853 (2008), lexis It is often assumed that the international legal definition of “mercenary” is so vague that no private military contractor could ever be found to qualify as such.168 In this Section, however, a close examination of Protocol I shows that at least some private military contractors may qualify as mercenaries under the four main criteria of Protocol I’s definition. First, private contractors can be deemed to have been “specially recruited”; second, private contractors frequently meet the direct participation requirement; third, private contractors will sometimes meet the foreign nationality requirement; and fourth, private contractors are even more likely to meet the financial motivation requirement than the traditional mercenary. I conclude this Section by rejecting two frequently asserted distinctions between mercenaries and private contractors: first, that contractors cannot be considered mercenaries because of their corporate structure, and second, that they cannot be considered mercenaries because they are employed by legitimate states. Ultimately, I demonstrate that at least some private contractors can be defined as mercenaries. I go on to conclude that defining private contractors as mercenaries will increase public debate surrounding their role and their overall democratic accountability, the lack of which, I have argued, currently characterizes the private military industry and threatens the democratic nation-state. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 49 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva Morgan ‘08 Richard Morgan, Law Clerk, the Chambers of the Hon James E Baker, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; Lieutenant (Junior Grade), USN; BA, BM 2002, University of Hartford; BA 2004, Hertford College, University of Oxford; JD 2007, Yale Law School, ARTICLE: Professional Military Firms under International Law, Summer, 2008, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 213, lexis *PMF = Private Military Firm The foregoing analysis has focused on the use of the Hague and Geneva Conventions to define the legal identity of PMFs. Of course, there is nothing inevitable about reliance on traditional international treaty law in confronting the dilemma posed by the use of security contractors in armed conflict. As a matter of policy, states might choose--either implicitly or explicitly--two other courses of action. As will be shown, neither is viable in the long term from a legal policy perspective, and thus some recourse to international law is ultimately preferable. First, states employing or hosting PMFs may choose to ignore the problem and adopt an ad hoc position of seeking to reap the benefits of the use and association with such firms when advantageous to state interests, while maintaining plausible deniability when it is not. The problem with such an argument is that--assuming arguendo that legal state responsibility cannot be found--a state cannot sever its political liability for PMFs in its employ or comprised of state nationals in the court of public perception. When American national security contractors commit unpopular acts of violence in foreign lands, a disclaimer of legal responsibility by the United States government may be politically ineffectual at best and harmful to international perception of the United States (and American interests by extension) at worst. Furthermore, by refusing to take affirmative responsibility, the United States runs the risk that other states will move to fill the jurisdictional void. For [*240] example, in the wake of the shootings by the PMF firm Blackwater USA on September 16, 2007, the Iraqi Parliament began to take steps to overturn Order 17, the Provisional Coalition rule that exempted military contractors from criminal liability under Iraqi law. 133 While making PMFs operating in Iraq subject to a foreign jurisdiction is arguably better than leaving them in large part unaccountable to any legal body, such a system is likely to create diplomatic tensions between the American and Iraqi governments should Iraqi prosecutions proceed. Additionally, it could make the costs of using PMFs far greater in the future, as the financial risk of potential foreign legal liability is incorporated into contracts. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 50 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva PMCs meet every requirement of mercenary status under Article 47 of the Geneva Convention Morgan ‘08 Richard Morgan, Law Clerk, the Chambers of the Hon James E Baker, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; Lieutenant (Junior Grade), USN; BA, BM 2002, University of Hartford; BA 2004, Hertford College, University of Oxford; JD 2007, Yale Law School, ARTICLE: Professional Military Firms under International Law, Summer, 2008, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 213, lexis *PMF = Private Military Firm A second possible classification of PMFs under the laws of armed conflict is that of being mercenaries. Intuitively, individuals who are not members of the armed forces of a state or revolutionary group, yet are paid to engage in combat, would seem to fit the colloquial definition of "mercenary" perfectly. The international legal definition of this term, however, is far less clear. The most basic definition, used by eleven states of the former Soviet Union, simply defines mercenaries according to their desire for private gain without further elaboration. 38 This definition is clearly problematic, since it focuses on the intent, rather than the actions of the person in question. 39 While the definition adopted by former Soviet states is perhaps too unclear, the definition promulgated in Protocol I is almost certainly too precise. Article 47 states: (1) A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war. (2) A mercenary is any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to [*221] the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. 40 The United States is responsible for PMC under international law Morgan ‘08 Richard Morgan, Law Clerk, the Chambers of the Hon James E Baker, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; Lieutenant (Junior Grade), USN; BA, BM 2002, University of Hartford; BA 2004, Hertford College, University of Oxford; JD 2007, Yale Law School, ARTICLE: Professional Military Firms under International Law, Summer, 2008, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 213, lexis *PMF = Private Military Firm It could be argued that the classification of PMFs as members of the armed forces will bring a degree of responsibility for the actions of PMFs that states do not desire. A review of current international law, however, suggests that--at least in the case of the United States--the state may already be responsible for the actions of some of these groups. Under Article 8 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, "[t]he conduct of a person or group shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct." 99 The degree of control that is required for states to be held liable has been debated in various international tribunals. For example, the degree of control may need to be very high. In Nicaragua v United States, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") set forth an agency test for state responsibility, holding that while [*233] the United States was responsible for its own support for the contras, it was only responsible for individual acts conducted by the contras in specific instances. 100 Generally, in order for the United States to be responsible for the acts of the contras, "it would in principle have to be proved that [the United States] had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." 101 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 51 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva PMC’s commit human rights violations and breach the Geneva Convention Cameron ‘06 Lindsey Cameron is Doctoral candidate in the Faculty of Law at the University of Geneva. She is a research and teaching assistant at the University of Geneva and the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, “Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and its impact on their regulation,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88 Number 863, September 2006, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-863-p573/$File/irrc_863_Cameron.pdf Finally, it is important to have a clear understanding of the existing responsibility of employees of private military companies when conceiving a regulatory scheme. Contrary to some apparent misconceptions, even if private military company employees are civilians, they may still be prosecuted for violations of international humanitarian law. Individual criminal responsibility does not depend on a person’s status – civilians and combatants are equally capable of committing and being prosecuted for war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.79 The current impunity with regard to Abu Ghraib is thus the result of an apparent lack of political will to prosecute civilians who have been implicated in violations of humanitarian law, and is not the result of an international legal vacuum with regard to these individuals. There is much consternation over human rights abuses committed by private military companies, and many articles have been written suggesting ways of ensuring that responsibility is assumed for these acts.80 As for all non-state entities, more arguments must be brought to demonstrate why they may also be accountable for violations of human rights than are necessary to show the responsibility of individuals under international humanitarian law. One way of making human rights legally binding on private military companies is by construing them as state agents; another is to write human rights obligations directly into contracts concluded with these companies.81 A further mechanism would write human rights obligations into the licensing or regulatory scheme under which private military companies are incorporated.82 Clearly, these solutions do not necessarily represent the law as it stands now, but rather reflect the direction in which the law should go. Civil cases have already been brought in the United States against some companies for abuses committed in Abu Ghraib. Even though civil suits against private individuals are one method of enforcing responsibility for violations of human rights, the road to accountability may be long, considering that first-instance judges have held that public international law (human rights, prohibition of torture) does not bind private individuals, with the result that the Alien Tort Claims Act cannot be used to sue employees of the private military company Titan for abuses in the prison.83 This holding may be challenged in a higher court, but nonetheless reflects the still nebulous binding quality of international human rights law on private individuals. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 52 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Generic PMC take advantage of an evolving interpretation of “mercenary” to circumvent ALL constraints by international law Coleman ‘04 James R. Coleman, J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “Constraining Modern Mercenarism,” June, 2004, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, lexis The private military assistance corporation presents a conundrum for international law, with both concrete and theoretical dimensions. On a concrete level, the private military corporation appears at first glance to be merely a full-service business presenting no threat to international security. One need only look closely at the services advertised, however, to see that the security and military assistance such corporations offer fulfill a function analogous to that of the traditional mercenary, whose activities the international community has long endeavored to constrain. Redefined as "security contractors" and sanitized by their connection to the corporate world, these modern mercenaries are able to evade both the sanction of public disapproval and the definition of mercenarism under international law. By effectively permitting de facto mercenaries to masquerade as security contractors, this transformation also eviscerates the accountability of governments for the actions of mercenaries in their employment by hiding them behind a corporate veil. In fact, mercenarism is strongly disfavored under international law. The United Nations has concluded that mercenarism destabilizes sovereign nations and impedes the right of peoples to self-determination, and a consensus in favor of eradicating mercenarism has been manifest in positive and customary international legal developments since 1945. These efforts culminated in the Convention Against Mercenaries, which entered into force in 2001, and in the establishment in 2002 of the International Criminal Court, under the jurisdiction of which traditional mercenaries may be tried for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity, indicating that, after millennia of unconstrained mercenarism, international legal mechanisms were finally taking shape to confront this problem decisively. [*1494] Mercenarism's metamorphosis during the final decades of the twentieth century, however, has so far enabled modern mercenaries to evade the reach of a burgeoning international movement toward their eradication. Efforts to modify international legal definitions to recognize private military corporations as mercenary companies have been hindered, thereby causing the letter of the law to diverge from its spirit. Paradoxically, what was traditionally outside the law now seems to fall within it as a result of a loophole created by repackaging and re-labeling the prohibited activity while the legal definition of mercenarism was held static. As matters now stand, these private contractors effectively circumvent all international constraints, notwithstanding the fact that the use of mercenaries in any form remains a clear violation of the spirit of international law. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 53 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Mercenaries International norms clearly are against mercenarism – however, application of international law is lagging behind an evolving interpretation of “mercenary” Coleman ‘04 James R. Coleman, J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “Constraining Modern Mercenarism,” June, 2004, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, lexis Nevertheless, the terms of that debate have changed dramatically in the last hundred years as systematic efforts were introduced first to regulate the conduct of mercenaries and later to put explicit limitations on their employment by states. Mercenaries "were tacitly accepted before [*1497] the twentieth century, ... if not by polite society, then by most states, their armies, and international law." 6 During the twentieth century, however, the international community evinced an emerging consensus against their use. In the second half of the century, efforts at international control of mercenarism were undertaken in response to post-colonial developments. In this context, "the first attempts at mercenary regulation focused on eliminating but one type of mercenary, the indiscriminate hired gun who ran roughshod over African self-determination movements in the post-colonial period from 1960 to 1980. As mercenaries evolved, however, mercenary regulations did not." 7 The international scheme for regulation of mercenaries thus failed to keep pace with the emerging category of private corporate soldier. As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on mercenarism acknowledged as early as the 1980s, international laws addressing mercenaries have not "caught-up with the changes brought about by this new kind of security company." 8 The spirit of international law nevertheless remains clearly opposed to the use of soldiers of fortune. The strong international consensus that the use of mercenaries in armed conflict should be prohibited has been unequivocally manifest in the development of positive law under U.N. auspices for two decades. In fact, the international community has been working to place significant legal limitations on the use of mercenaries since 1970, when the United Nations passed a declaration imposing on states the duty to prevent the organization of armed groups for dispatch to other states. 9 In 1984, the General Assembly took an additional step in this direction by adopting Resolution 39/84, entitled "Drafting of an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries." 10 This resolution charged an existing ad hoc committee of representatives from thirty-four member states with the task of completing a draft convention. Resolution 39/84 articulated the motivations for this undertaking as follows: Bearing in mind the need for strict observance of the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity of States and self-determination of peoples, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations ... , [*1498] Recognizing that the activities of mercenaries are contrary to fundamental principles of international law, such as non-interference in the internal affairs of States, territorial integrity and independence, and seriously impede the process of self-determination of peoples struggling against colonialism, racism and apartheid and all forms of foreign domination, Bearing in mind the pernicious impact that the activities of mercenaries have on international peace and security, Considering that the progressive development and codification of the rules of international law on mercenaries would contribute immensely to the implementation of the purposes and principles of the Charter ... . Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 54 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Mercenaries Mercenary sanitation has effectively shielded security contractors from rulings under international law Coleman ‘04 James R. Coleman, J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “Constraining Modern Mercenarism,” June, 2004, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, lexis Despite the fact that the Convention Against Mercenaries addresses a problem the United Nations identified as a significant hindrance to the [*1499] implementation of the purposes and principles of its Charter, twenty years after the adoption of Resolution 39/84 the use of mercenaries has burgeoned rather than diminished. This situation is due in part to recent transformations in the image and form of mercenarism, which today presents itself in a new light - as the business of publicly traded private military assistance companies. Instead of continuing to operate in a relatively clandestine manner, the modern mercenary industry is now conducting business in broad daylight, out of respectable corporate offices and under the euphemistic name of "private security," thereby presenting an ever greater challenge to international legal controls. The modern mercenary is a private contractor employed by a corporation that may offer an array of services seemingly having little to do with actual armed combat. The corporations employing these modern mercenaries operate behind a variety of facades and on an increasingly large scale. In that sense, "private military companies take on many labels today, including, among others, mercenary firms, private armies, privatized armies, private military corporations, private security companies or firms, private military contractors, military service providers, non-lethal service providers, and corporate security firms." 14 Mercenary services are now being offered by major corporations, either directly or through their subsidiaries. One leading private military corporation, ArmorGroup, "was listed as one of Fortune's 100 fastest growing companies in 1999 and 2000." 15 Another large military firm, Military Professional Resources Incorporated, "was purchased in 2000 by L-3 Communications, an entity spun off from military manufacturers Loral and Lockheed Martin." 16 Lockheed Martin has also expressed interest in acquiring Titan Corporation, which provides security and intelligence personnel to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. 17 As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on mercenarism recently described them, these companies are modern, multipurpose, transnational companies, which do not hesitate to recruit mercenaries for certain of the activities they offer. They tend to be highly efficient in matters of military science, but they also tend to have few scruples about recruiting mercenaries for difficult, highly dangerous missions in zones and territories where violence and armed conflicts are taking place. 18 [*1500] Although the definition of "mercenary" under international law has not kept pace with the evolution of the private military corporation, as suggested above, this change in form and the resulting evasion of regulation are clearly inconsistent with the spirit of international law. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 55 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Mercenaries International norms strongly disfavor military privatization because they are perceived as mercenaries but current application of international law fails to resolve these sentiments Coleman ‘04 James R. Coleman, J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, “Constraining Modern Mercenarism,” June, 2004, 55 Hastings L.J. 1493, lexis The rise of the corporate mercenary has effectively resulted in a divergence between the letter and the spirit of international law. Because existing international definitions of mercenarism focus more on individual actors than on the actions to be prohibited, today's private military contractors can act as virtual mercenaries without being subject to the laws purporting to govern mercenarism. In essence, they have defined themselves out of existence under international law, so that activities recently falling outside the law now paradoxically appear to fall within the scope of legality when engaged in by private military corporations. The conundrum presented by private military corporations is thus that "the international laws of war that specifically deal with their presence and activity are largely absent or ineffective." 51 This situation exists primarily because "the existing laws do not adequately deal with the full variety of private military actors. That is, they are specifically aimed at only the individuals working against national governments or politically recognized movements of national liberation." 52 Such gaps in the law mean not only that private military corporations themselves are not directly regulated, but also that the organization of mercenary forces behind the corporate veil serves as protection against liability for those who hire them. As a result, neither of the two primary international mechanisms for constraining mercenary conduct is effective against private military contractors or their corporate or ultimate state employers. As noted above, the Convention Against Mercenaries makes it an explicit offense to employ mercenaries; however, the Convention contemplates mercenaries acting as individual combatants and is therefore unlikely to cover corporate mercenaries because of their employment as private "contractors" [*1507] by firms that provide a full array of services and the resulting uncertainty regarding whether these contractors are engaged in conflict. The other possible avenue for constraining the actions of private military contractors is the International Criminal Court (the ICC), established to try "natural persons" for war crimes as described in the Geneva Conventions. 53 A traditional mercenary committing a war crime could be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 54 Under the principles embodied in the Rome Statute, superiors of traditional mercenaries might be triable in the ICC for the crimes of the mercenaries under their supervision. This potential international legal mechanism for trying traditional mercenaries and their superiors for war crimes, like the Convention Against Mercenaries, does not appear to extend to the situation of the modern mercenary. 55 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 56 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Human Rights PMC are untouched by international law – the US has an obligation to resolve human rights abuses committed by private military forces Maogoto and Sheehy ‘09 Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto* and Benedict Sheehy**, * Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Manchester (UK). **Senior Lecturer in Law, RMIT University, Melbourne. PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES & INTERNATIONAL LAW: BUILDING NEW LADDERS OF LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY & RESPONSIBILITY, 2009, CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, http://cojcr.org/vol11no1/99-132.pdf Under international law, responsibility attaches principally to the State as a subject for human rights abuses by personnel, officers or entities under its direction and control. However, post- World War II elaborations of human rights law have expanded the obligations to cover private individual actors so that they may be held accountable for offences such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture. Various treaties codify these standards.74 A peculiar problem emerges, however, when States act through private corporate entities. By and large these corporations remain unrecognized as subjects of international law.75 Small steps have been taken to attach international liability to companies. For example, in the 1950’s, American courts tried various German industrialists for their complicity in Nazi war crimes as the “flesh-andblood” persons existing behind the corporate veil.76 In the process, the courts considered the illegal activities and breaches of corporate duty committed by the companies.77 The corporation, however, is viewed as a private actor and remains untouched by international law. This fact stymies the flow of liability to the company and its principals for the actions and offences of contractors and employees. In this context, we can reconsider the highly contested classical proposition that, because companies are not subjects of international law, their activities are not liable under international law for abuses of international law.78 State complicity in PMC activities bridges the gap between private corporations’ responsibility and international law—the State being the juridical entity attracting juridical attention and liability by way of its agent, the PMC. The PMC is executing government authority by engaging in activity that under both municipal and international law is the exclusive province of the State. State recognition of the PMC as a private person is irrelevant to the consideration of the state’s liability for PMC actions undertaken on behalf of the State. Based on this logical and practical linearity, it is neither too far fetched nor indefensible to argue that on a legal continuum, the State as a corporation with all its actors— from directors to employees to contractors— would share liability. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 57 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Inherency PMC use is high now but international community consensus is uneasy with the active PMC violations of international human rights norms Cameron ‘06 Lindsey Cameron is Doctoral candidate in the Faculty of Law at the University of Geneva. She is a research and teaching assistant at the University of Geneva and the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, “Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and its impact on their regulation,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88 Number 863, September 2006, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-863-p573/$File/irrc_863_Cameron.pdf States are increasingly hiring private military companies to act in zones where armed conflicts are occurring. The predominant feeling in the international community is that it would be best to regulate such companies. Cognizant of much confusion as to the status of the employees of private military companies under international humanitarian law, this article explains the laws on mercenaries, combatants and civilians and explores how private military companies’ employees may fall into any of those categories. It demonstrates that the concept of mercenarism is unhelpful for regulating these companies and that it is unlikely that many of the employees of these companies can be considered to have combatant status. The article considers possible consequences of private military companies’ employees having the status of civilians under international humanitarian law and their potential impact on regulating these companies effectively. Some of the newest armed non-state parties operating in unstable states and conflict situations come from an unusual source: the private sector. Ever since the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, with Coalition forces buoyed by the presence of upwards of 20,000 individuals employed by private military companies (PMCs), the role, status, accountability and regulation of those companies has been hotly debated. States are vitally aware of the need to address the proliferation of private military companies – impelled as much by concerns about losing control of their monopoly over the use of violence and the impact of that industry on national military policy as by a willingness to uphold their obligations under international law. Two incidents in particular have driven the discourse.1 First, the killing and mutilation of four employees of the private military company Blackwater and the following assault on Fallujah in April 2004 using ‘‘overwhelming force’’ have led to questions about the relationship of the military to these contractors and the accuracy of calling them ‘‘civilian’’ contractors. Second, the implication of civilian contractors of the private military company CACI in the torture of internees at the Abu Ghraib detention facility has drawn attention to the qualifications of such contractors for the tasks they are performing, as well as to their accountability for human rights abuses they may commit.2 Although some US military personnel have been tried in courts-martial for their actions at Abu Ghraib, none of the private contractors allegedly involved has been brought to court on criminal charges.3 To a great extent the debates around private military companies fall within wider debates about the privatization of government functions.4 The myriad policy decisions that the rise of this industry demands are best left to others; this article does not seek to judge or condemn these companies but merely to provide a picture as to how international humanitarian law applies to them, for when it comes to the status of private military company employees, confusion abounds. Governments repeatedly assert that PMC employees are ‘‘civilian contractors’’, implying that they do not perceive these individuals as combatants. A minority of the international community treats all PMCs as bands of criminal mercenaries,5 yet employees of some PMCs are attempting to benefit from combatant status to protect themselves against civil lawsuits brought in the United States for their role in torturing prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison.6 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 58 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva/A2: PMC Not Mercenary ***From earlier in the article*** NOTE: Article 47.2 of Additional Protocol I stipulates: A mercenary is any person who: (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. PMC falls under EVERY requirement of mercenary under Article 47 of the Geneva Convention Cameron ‘06 Lindsey Cameron is Doctoral candidate in the Faculty of Law at the University of Geneva. She is a research and teaching assistant at the University of Geneva and the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, “Private military companies: their status under international humanitarian law and its impact on their regulation,” International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88 Number 863, September 2006, http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/review-863-p573/$File/irrc_863_Cameron.pdf Drawing on examples of private military companies operating in Iraq in 2003 and early 2004 (i.e. while the conflict could still unquestionably be classified as international), it can be concluded that some individuals working for such companies may get caught by Article 47 of Protocol I and by the mercenary conventions. Consider, for instance, the hypothetical (but entirely possible) case of a South African former special forces fighter who may have been hired to provide close protection services for the leaders of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Proceeding through the six parts of the definition, we must enquire, first, whether the fact of being hired as a bodyguard would constitute recruitment ‘‘in order to fight’’; it is important to recall here that the phrase ‘‘to fight’’ under international humanitarian law is not synonymous with an offensive attack,35 therefore persons hired to defend a (military) person but who engage in defensive combat can fall under Article 47.2(a) and also meet the second criterion. However, it is understood that to meet this criterion the individual should be recruited specifically to fight in the particular conflict in question, not as a general employee. Aside from the fact that protecting a US commander may itself constitute direct participation in hostilities, there have been reports of heavy fighting by private military companies. One well-known instance occurred in Najaf in 2004, where individuals from one PMC were engaged with enemy fighters, fired ‘‘thousands of rounds of ammunition’’ and had to call in one of the company’s own helicopters not to evacuate them, but to drop more ammunition.36 Some PMC employees thus easily satisfy the second requirement of directly participating in hostilities (sub-para. (b)). As for the third criterion (sub-para. (c)), individuals acting as bodyguards of the US occupation commanders earned up to US$2,000 a day, considerably more than a US private earns in a month and, in the case of South African fighters, are not nationals of a Party to the conflict (fourth criterion, sub-para. (d)). As for the fifth criterion (being a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, sub-para. (e)), suffice it to say briefly at this point that employees of these companies are not members of the armed forces; this criterion will be discussed in more detail below.37 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 59 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva – Spec Recruited PMCs violate Article 47 of Protocol 1’s definition of mercenary because they are specifically recruited Salzman ‘08 Zoe, Clinical Contract Attorney, International Human Rights Clinic, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, “PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY REPUTATION”, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 853 lexis The definition of “mercenary” contained in article 47 of Protocol I requires first that the mercenary be specially recruited to fight in an armed conflict.169 This provision was intended to exclude “volunteers who enter service on a permanent or long-lasting basis in a foreign army, whether as a result of a purely individual enlistment (French Foreign Legion, Spanish Tercio) or an arrangement concluded by their national authorities (for example, the Nepalese Ghurkhas in India, the Swiss Guards of the Vatican).”170 Many private contractors qualify as “specially recruited.” PMCs generally keep databases of personnel from which to recruit to fill contracts as they come up.171 Many private contractors appear in several databases and move easily from one contract to another or operate on a freelance basis.172 Given this arrangement, a private contractor called up from this kind of database when a PMC is awarded a particular contract is likely to be considered “specially recruited.” Some scholars argue, however, that a private contractor would not satisfy the “specially recruited” requirement because many private contractors work on long-term contracts and are not therefore “specially” recruited to fight in a specific armed conflict.173 This argument misconstrues the meaning of the term “specially recruited.” As an initial matter, it is possible to distinguish private contractors from forces like the French Foreign Legion, which are formally incorporated into the national armed forces in a way that private contractors never are, no matter how long-term their contract.174 While the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary on Protocol I (the “ICRC Commentary”) indicates that the term “specially recruited” was meant to exempt forces such as the Foreign Legion, it is not clear whether the key characteristic was the long-term nature of the French Foreign Legion, or the fact that Legionnaires essentially become members of the national army, thus eliminating the concern that mercenaries (and private contractors) are not accountable in the same way as the national armed forces. Were a state to formally incorporate its private contractors into its armed forces, the majority of the concerns discussed in Part III could be dismissed and there would be very little argument that such forces were anything like rogue mercenaries. As it stands, however, while PMC contracts may be long lasting, they certainly do not involve formal incorporation into the armed forces. As a result, private contractors are likely to qualify as “specially recruited.” Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 60 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva – Direct Participation PMCs violate Article 47 of Protocol 1’s definition of mercenary because they are involved in direct participation with the armed forces Salzman ‘08 Zoe, Clinical Contract Attorney, International Human Rights Clinic, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, “PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY REPUTATION”, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 853 lexis Under Protocol I, individuals must participate directly in combat in order to qualify as mercenaries175 because “[o]nly a combatant, and a combatant taking a direct part in hostilities, can be considered as a mercenary in the sense of Article 47.”176 The term “direct participation” is “highly ambiguous,” 177 however, and has been defined in various ways. For some scholars, the phrase requires “but for” causation178 and the ICRC Commentary similarly interprets it to require “a direct causal connection between the activity and the harm.”179 It is clear that the term is meant to narrow the application of article 47 so that it does not apply to the entire war effort, yet not narrow it to the point of being limited solely to active combat operations.180 At the very least, according to the authoritative ICRC Commentary, it clearly excludes “foreign advisers and military technicians.”181 Even under a fairly narrow understanding of the term, however, the conflict in Iraq has highlighted the involvement of private contractors in combat-like situations which are likely to meet the direct participation requirement.182 From maintaining complex weapons such as the B-2 bomber to performing interrogations to selecting targets and flying surveillance missions, private contractors in the Iraq conflict have shown that the industry is increasingly taking on core military responsibilities. 183 Moreover, in Iraq, private contractors are permitted to join coalition forces in combat operations for the pur- poses of self-defense and for the defense of people specified in their contract.184 Private contractors are also permitted to stop, detain, search, and disarm civilians if those actions are specified in their contract.185 Even those private contractors performing less clearly military functions, such as truck driving, may become involved in combat if they have to drive through combat zones.186 Nevertheless, some scholars claim that the great majority of private contractors do not provide combat services,187 but rather support services that do not appear mercenary in nature. 188 Private contractors themselves are quick to deny that they provide tactical military services,189 claiming to provide purely defensive and protective services190 “concerned with the protection of people and premises.”191 As a result, industry proponents argue that the majority of private contractors do not meet the direct participation requirement and thus cannot be conceived of as mercenaries. Instead, they are analogous to expert trainers and advisers192 and primarily fulfill logistical and support roles.193 One author opines that, so long as private contractors are not contracted specifically to engage in combat and do so only in self-defense, they fall outside of the definition of article 47.194 In fact, the line between combat and non-combat services is fuzzy, and private contractors perform a wide range of functions ranging from logistical support to training to more combat- like roles, including serving as commando troops, interrogators, and weapons operators.195 Although private contractors may have initially fulfilled purely support roles, they have today “spread across the full spectrum of government activi- ties.”196 PMCs tend not to openly advertise their more combat- like services197 (no doubt in order to avoid too closely resembling mercenaries), but private contractors are no longer “just running the soup kitchens.”198 Therefore, while it may be true that certain private contractors do not meet the direct participation requirement, an increasing number do. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 61 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva – Financial Gain PMCs violate Article 47 of Protocol 1’s definition of mercenary because they are motivated essentially by financial gain. PMCs meet this requirement more than traditional mercenaries themselves Salzman ‘08 Zoe, Clinical Contract Attorney, International Human Rights Clinic, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, “PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY REPUTATION”, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 853 lexis Article 47 defines a mercenary as an individual who is “motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised . . . material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces.”205 According to the ICRC Commentary, this requirement was introduced to distinguish the mercenary from the noble volunteer.206 At first glance, this requirement appears the easiest for private contractors to satisfy. A private contractor, like a mercenary, “however civilized, skilled, and professional he may be . . . [is still] a private agent, principally motivated by profit.”207 Likewise, private contractors are paid substantially more than their counterparts in the national armed forces, with some making up to $20,000 a month in Iraq.208 In fact, the incitement of the high salaries offered by PMCs has resulted in something of a brain drain from the special forces of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. 209 Nevertheless, this element of the Additional Protocol’s definition has been heavily criticized as the biggest loophole in the international definition of mercenary,210 leading some scholars to joke that anyone convicted under the current definition of mercenary should be shot, and their lawyer with them.211 Scholars argue that this requirement is almost impossible to prove: Many soldiers in the national armed forces are motivated to enlist for monetary gain, while many private soldiers (both mercenaries and private contractors) have nonmonetary motivations.212 It is important to note, however, that Protocol I does not require that mercenaries be motivated exclusively by financial gain, but only essentially.213 Thus, this requirement is not as high an evidentiary burden as some critics have suggested. In addition, Protocol I’s definition also requires that the mercenary actually be paid substantially more than the actual soldier. 214 According to the ICRC Commentary, this concrete qualification was introduced to facilitate proving financial motivation. 215 Indeed, as discussed above, this fact is relatively easy to prove with respect to today’s private contractors. Moreover, as applied to private contractors, this requirement is actually less problematic than when it is applied to traditional mercenaries.216 Unlike the mercenaries of the 1960s, contemporary private contractors do not pick and choose their conflicts on the basis of more or less noble ideas; today’s private contractors are essentially on call for the next available conflict. A private contractor whose name is maintained in at least one PMC database, ready to be called upon when a bid is won, can hardly claim that he operates without a desire for private gain. The very fact that private contractors are organized into a corporate structure to compete on the open, global market suggests that they are driven by business profit.217 While “mercenary labor is not fully commodified,” 218 a multinational PMC clearly has a “purely commercial purpose.”219 A private contractor employed by a PMC is thus more likely to meet the financial gain motivation requirement than is a traditional mercenary. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 62 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – Geneva – A2: Corporate Structure Incorporated status of private contractors and the corporate structure of PMCs does not make them immune from mercenary laws Salzman ‘08 Zoe, Clinical Contract Attorney, International Human Rights Clinic, Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, “PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THE TAINT OF A MERCENARY REPUTATION”, 40 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol. 853 lexis I have argued above that many private contractors do meet the definition of mercenary laid out in article 47. Nevertheless, scholars often distinguish PMCs from mercenaries because of the corporate nature of the PMC, which cannot be neatly analogized to the individual mercenary.221 These scholars argue that because of their corporate structure, PMCs are not covered by existing international law on mercenaries, which was written to regulate mercenaries as individuals222 who sometimes group together on an ad hoc basis but always lack the corporate hierarchy of a PMC.223 This distinction focuses on the PMC as a company rather than on the individual private contractors that the company employs, as I have done in this Note. The question of whether existing laws on mercenaries can be directly applied to legal persons (as opposed to natural persons), that is, directly to the PMCs as corporations, is a complex one beyond the scope of this Note. My examination of the existing law on mercenaries suggests, however, that it is possible to hold at least some private contractors accountable as individuals under the existing laws. The fact that they are employees of a corporation in no way affects the applicability of the mercenary laws, as there is no indication that the concerns underlying the mercenary laws would have been allayed had mercenaries been corporate em- ployees. Rather, as I argued in Section B of this Part, the concerns underlying the development of international law on mercenaries largely parallel the concerns that I expressed with regard to private contractors in Part III: namely, that mercenaries are generally perceived to threaten states’ monopoly on the use of force, to prioritize their desire for private profit over the public’s desire for security, and to undermine democratic government. There is no suggestion anywhere in the law that if mercenaries were to incorporate, these concerns would be in any way diminished.224 It is interesting to note, moreover, that much like PMCs and private contractors today, mercenaries were (and still are) most likely to be involved in conflicts where “vital economic interests are at stake, usually mining and oil interests.”225 While it is clear, therefore, that there are obvious structural differences in terms of how mercenaries and private contractors package their services, it does not follow that the services offered are substantively different. There is no indication that the mere “corporatization of military service provision”226 renders the privatization of force any less problematic. As suggested in Part III, the concerns about private contractors remain despite the fact that they are corporate employees. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 63 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: No Basis for PMC in I’Law Domestic law isn’t clear on PMC status either – even if there is no basis, it is still worse to do nothing Morgan ‘08 Richard Morgan, Law Clerk, the Chambers of the Hon James E Baker, US Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; Lieutenant (Junior Grade), USN; BA, BM 2002, University of Hartford; BA 2004, Hertford College, University of Oxford; JD 2007, Yale Law School, ARTICLE: Professional Military Firms under International Law, Summer, 2008, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 213, lexis *PMF = Private Military Firm Second, states may claim that legal questions governing the use of and responsibility for PMFs are fundamentally matters of domestic law. Certainly, most of the effective methods of holding PMFs accountable for their actions will be dependent on the use of domestic legal tools--for example, criminal courts and civil liability statutes. However, relying solely on domestic law likewise provides few ways (other than ad hoc diplomacy and judicial comity) of resolving competing national claims of jurisdiction over PMFs. 134 Thus, while the previous section showed that the use of existing treaty law to define the legal identity of PMFs resembles fitting square pegs into round holes, the alternatives of doing nothing or relying solely on domestic law are even less appealing from a legal policy perspective. Some sort of international agreement on the use of and state responsibility for PMFs is therefore needed. The exact definition of what comprises the armed forces of a state is unquestionably a matter of domestic law so that it is possible that the US could unilaterally extend the armed forces classification to PMFs. 135 But there are several reasons why it may be prudent for the US to seek a more comprehensive international agreement on standards for the use of PMFs by state actors--through existing international law, a new treaty regime, or advocacy of a new norm of customary international law. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 64 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: UMCJ Now Placing PMC under UMCJ is irrelevant it only provides a framework to interpret their status – its only a question of how UMCJ is incorporated Singer ‘07 Peter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, senior fellow Brookings Institute, “Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its Applicability to Private Military Contractors,” January 12, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0112defenseindustry_singer.aspx The 2007 Defense Bill, enacted in October, places contractors and others who accompany the military in the field under UCMJ (the Uniform Code of Military Justice), by defining UCMJ to cover civilians not just in times of declared war but also contingency operations. To put it another way, basically 100,000 contractors woke up to find themselves potentially under the same set of military laws that govern the armed forces. Who put the clause in and why? The clause was put in by Senator Lindsay Graham of South Carolina. Two things are important to note here. Graham is a Republican, which should pop any conspiracy theory that this is some sort of partisan or liberal issue. Also Graham is a reserve JAG officer, and has stated in the press that he felt it would "give military commanders a more fair and efficient means of discipline on the battlefield" by placing "civilian contractors accompanying the Armed Forces in the field under court-martial jurisdiction during contingency operations as well as in times of declared war." Why does this new law even matter? 1) It's the single biggest legal development for the private military industry since its start. It holds the potential, and I emphasis "potential" here, to finally bring some legal status and accountability to a business that has expanded well past the laws. The old system of hoping to apply extraterritorial civilian law to a military setting 9000 miles away wasn't working, so Congress took a new tack. 2) It gives officers in the field a new tool, that they have asked for a long time, to actually do something about contractor crimes. It also takes away an excuse that is often made to Congress as to why action is not have been taken against a contractor crime, i.e. that military has no authority over such civilians or only has a "coordinating" relationship with contractors in the field. 3) As someone who has tracked this issue for almost 10 years now, the new law and the reactions to it are also striking in how they demonstrate how the lines of debate have changed. For a long time, there was a sense of denial around the whole issue, denial both by the industry, and about the industry (mainly by government leaders, but also many senior generals). These included denial to how big it has gotten, denial as to its critical roles and functions on and off the battlefield, and denial as to the problems and dilemmas it has raised. But now we are starting to get past this denial to acceptance. For example, firms used to argue that there were or would be never any problems, as the market would deter or solve whatever bad might happen. Thus, they originally bristled at the idea of enhanced regulation and oversight by government. Now, many of them are calling for regulation (as long as they help craft it). Likewise, the center of the debate has shifted for individual criminal legal issues. For a long while, firms and their representatives denied any possibility of bad apples and pointed to market solutions as sufficient deterrence and punishment. Then, over the last few years, they moved to a position that admitted the possibility that bad apples could exist in the industry (like in every human endeavor), but that MEJA (the civilian Military Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction Act) was the solution. Whenever someone would point out the legal gaps, they would cite MEJA, as if it was working and no need to worry. Now, the debate has shifted. The new line is, 'OK, actually MEJA wasn't working all along. But let's fix it, rather than do UCMJ.' Big change when you take a step back. 4) This law serves as notice that Congress has essentially woken up on this issue and is kicking into action. It is merely the first of many new attempts at adding law to what had been an unregulated marketplace. Keep your eyes out for more bills and hearings. 5) With the new law, UCMJ also opens up questions of military responsibility towards contractors that have been dodged. I think you will see a larger debate within the military as to whether some roles and functions should not have been outsourced in the first place and a roll back is needed. This will continue as more of the Iraq-generation field officers advance in the ranks. For example, US Army Colonel Peter Mansoor, one of the most influential military thinker on counter-insurgency, just told Jane's Defense Weekly that the US military needs to take "..a real hard look at security contractors on future battlefields and figure out a way to get a handle on them so that they can be better integrated - if we're going to allow them to be used in the first place... I would much rather see basically all armed entities in a counter-insurgency operation fall under a military chain of command." Will it actually be used? Like any new law, it depends on two things: Interpretation and will to implement. That is, it doesn't necessarily kick into action and how it kicks into action depends on much. What about the claims that the new law isn't constitutional? Some lawyers look at it and says its unconstitutional. They may be right. There is a long history of the courts not wanting civilians to fall under military law. But other lawyers have looked at and think it might be constitutional. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 65 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: UMCJ Now For example, Reid v. Covert (which dealt with a wife murdering her USAF husband at a base in the UK back in the 1957) is often cited as the legal precedent that sets that civilians can't be tried by military courts. But, the Supreme Court in its ruling in Reid case stressed that it was 1) focusing on dependents, and 2) that things would have been different in its ruling if civilians were being prosecuted in time of war, which it defines (citing Winthrop) as "in an area of actual fighting." 3) It goes further to say that, "In the face of an actively hostile enemy, military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the battlefront." Finally, 4) the court both alludes to a broader reading of "land and naval forces" and favorably cites 10 USC 802(10), the "accompanying the forces" section, saying this sets out the "maximum historically recognized extent of military jurisdiction over civilians under the concept of 'in the field.'" As one brilliant lawyer emailed me, "That is the provision in question here, and it has now been broadened to include "contingency operations", i.e. Iraq." Although I do love Boston Legal ("Denny Crane"), I am not a lawyer. The important thing to me as a non-lawyer is that the cases people cite as precedent that it is unconstitutional come from before the time of the private military industry and are not caught up to the issues we are wrestling with now (i.e. Reid dealt with a wife murdering her USAF husband at abase in the UK, not operations in a warzone). Secondly, while the lawyers and trade associations duel out on this in the press on what they think, I prefer to stick with what we do know. At this point, the sense of two of the three branches of government (Congress and the President who signed it), is that the law is constitutional. Finally, predicting what the Supreme Court may or may not rule seems a lot like predicting the lottery. We won't know until there is a test case. Until then, it's the law of the land. Anyone who tells contractors to ignore the new law because it might be unconstitutional is giving bad advice. One final note: An important underlying issue, that illustrates the change, is that we can be very certain that the Supreme Court, however it might rule, is not going to state that the previous state of confusion over contractor status and accountability should be returned to. Whatever the outcome, things get clarified. Also, whomever, is that test case person is going to be inside the legal system, rather than getting away scot-free, as has been the case for many incidents so far. What are some issues that it raises? The key controversies are the scope and depth of its interpretation. That is, who does it to apply to and for what issues? Who will it apply to? On the whole, there are all sorts of theories as to whether it will apply to only direct Defense Department contractors or those from other agencies working in the same warzones or to 3rd party nationals. I cited in the original article that even embedded journalists might fall under it if an extreme interpretation was taken. Some say it only should be the direct DoD contractors, but this seems a dodge. It would miss the fact that many are working in support of US mission in Iraq for a variety of agencies, for example, then missing folks like the contractors accused of crimes at Abu Ghraib (who were actually at Department of Interiror, despite being deplotyed in Iraq to do military type jobs). To me, the legislative intent seems to be that what matters is whether they are operating in a warzone in support of an overall US military mission, not which letter in the alphabet soup of agencies they fell under along technical lines. Likewise, for 3rd party nationals. They would seem outside the coverage of the new law if they were employed supporting other nation's militaries. But for those working for the US military mission (note: many of whom are in violation of their home state laws, just for doing that), there has to be some system of accountability, rather than just a 'get out of jail free' card. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 66 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: UMCJ Now UMCJ is not necessarily bad for contractors – the law is still murky about PMC status Singer ‘07 Peter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative, senior fellow Brookings Institute, “Frequently Asked Questions on the UCMJ Change and its Applicability to Private Military Contractors,” January 12, 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0112defenseindustry_singer.aspx Is the new law just bad news for contractors? No, again, many contractors have said they welcome the extension of UCMJ. In the same article in Jane's Defense, Johann Jones, the former director of the Private Security Company Association of Iraq, said he thought firms in general would support being placed under the UCMJ, saying, "I would imagine that the industry would welcome this type of thing because the industry believes that everything is going the right way." Actually, there's another unstated reason it might be positive. Under their previous murky status, a few contractors have been treated like unlawful combatants and detained in ways that shouldn't happen, before they would be punted out of the system (some would point here to the Zapata situation or the recent news story on contractor Donald Vance, held for some 90 days in Baghdad, despite working for FBI). And that was treatment when in custody by US military. Legally, contractors were also in murky situation if captured, as they might now be treated as POWs by other side. This not so much an issue with al Qaeda, who just behead all prisoners and save the paperwork. But say in a conflict with China, contractors caught in such roles could possibly be sent to their version of Gitmo (maybe some converted casino in Macau). They are civilians, but not civilians merely accompanying the force, rather serving military functions within it, but outside the chain of command and uniform. Its sounds bizarre, and it's not something that the firms tell their guys, but this alternative interpretation is what the military lawyers have worried about for years, even for unarmed contractors in support roles. Clarifying that contractors fall under UCMJ could also clarify their status and treatment when in custody, giving legal protections that haven't been there before. Again, though, it all depends on interpretation. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 67 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: Different Ground CP Ruling on any other grounds fails absent binding international frameworks – fluid structure of PMC’s means international law is key Nimkar ‘09 Ruta Nimkar, “From Bosnia to Baghdad The Case for Regulating Private Military and Security Companies,” 2009, http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2009/1.pdf The fluid structure of PMSCs makes it imperative that a binding international policy structure be created to regulate these companies. The history of Executive Outcomes demonstrates the ineffectiveness of domestic regulation alone as an instrument of policy. Executive Outcomes was based in South Africa when the country implemented strong anti-mercenary regulation. In response to the regulation, Executive Outcomes did not shut down or limit its operations – it simply dissolved and reformed into new firms headquartered in other countries (such as Saracen, the company that provides de-mining operations to the UN in Angola). Another firm, Erinys, is headquartered in the British Virgin Islands with subsidiaries in various countries. This corporate structure was chosen both to maximize tax benefits and to circumvent domestic regulation of PMSCs. Because many PMSCs have flexible configurations that enable them to avoid domestic regulation, effective policy measures to regulate PMSCs will involve international commitment. Internationally binding regulation of PMSCs may take the form of binding multilateral treaties whereby many countries agree on minimum standards to be imposed on these firms. Such standards may include: (1) PMSC compliance with international humanitarian law, (2) PMSC adherence to an industry-defined Code of Conduct, and (3) standards to determine conflict of interest (that is, a description of the types of activities that would be considered conflict of interest for a PMSC headquartered in a country that has signed & ratified the treaty). Any treaty attempting to govern mercenaries must be widely accepted by countries that host and countries that use PMSCs. Without such buy-in, it will be possible for PMSCs to re-locate to countries that are not a party to the treaty and to continue to avoid regulation. The proposed policy framework would differ from the Montreux Document in that it would explicitly lay out standards by which conflicts of interest are determined, it would define the minimum standards of a Code of Conduct, and it would be legally binding. The framework created must be legally binding, because without this obligation, neither host countries nor home countries will have an incentive to implement the terms of the treaty. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 68 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: Statutes Now Despite the Court’s acceptance of International Statutes they still protect individual entities such as PMCs Harvey, ’08 (Thomas B. Harvey, J.D. Candidate at the Saint Louis University School of Law, “Comment: Wrapping Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations,” 53 St. Louis L.J. 247, Lexis ) In spite of these arguments against the adaptation of the modern day law of nations to private rights, and over the objections of the U.S. government and Justice Scalia, the Court left open the possibility for "further independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms." n187 The Court asserted: "Judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today." n188 Here, the Court attempted to balance its concern [*268] for the role of the Executive and the Legislative Branches with that of the Judiciary. Acknowledging that Erie limited "judicial recognition of new substantive rules" did not mean that Erie barred the recognition of new substantive rules. n189 Acknowledging that the Executive has an important role in foreign affairs did not change the fact that "for two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations." n190 Justice Souter concluded that the Judiciary ought to be free to consider certain violations of the law of nations today, reasoning that "it would take some explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to protect individuals." n191 The Court pointed to the First Congress as well as later Congresses to support its conclusion that the Judiciary is free to consider international norms. n192 Justice Souter's opinion theorized that the First Congress would not have expected federal courts "to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism." n193 In addition, the Court claimed that later Congresses supported the arguments in Filartiga and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic n194 when Congress passed the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA). n195 The TVPA included a reference to the ATS suggesting that it "should "remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law.'" n196 In fact, Congress "expressly ratified" and carried forth the Court's holding in Filartiga that "United States courts have jurisdiction over suits by aliens alleging torture under color of law." n197 William Casto n198 [*269] commented on Congress's reaction to the Court's decision in Filartiga by noting that "in enacting the TVPA, Congress approved, codified, and elaborated upon this new tort remedy. Rather than rejecting Filartiga, the Congress in effect endorsed Filartiga's common law remedy by codifying it." n199 Further, the court in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. n200 stated: The TVPA thus recognizes explicitly what was perhaps implicit in the Act of 1789 that the law of nations is incorporated into the law of the United States and that a violation of the international law of human rights is (at least with regard to torture) ipso facto a violation of U.S. domestic law. n201 In sum, despite the fact that it ruled against Alvarez, the Court held "that ATS litigation is based upon a federal common law cause of action and involves judicial lawmaking" and "that creating the cause of action involves judicial discretion." n202 What remains to be determined by the courts after Sosa is which norms of international law, other than torture, rise to standards of specificity equivalent to the violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Related to that question, as Sosa's footnote twenty indicated, future courts will have to determine "whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual." n203 Unfortunately, these are perhaps the most important questions with respect to future contractor litigation under the ATS. Further, in the Titan cases, discussed in the next section, when the Supreme Court failed to answer the questions it raised in footnote twenty, it "closed the door" on some ATS litigation because it left open the possibility that: (1) PMCs and other private actors could not be liable for violations of the law of nations; and (2) that even if PMCs were found to be state actors, they would be immune from suit. n204 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 69 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday International Law – A2: Private Actors Not State Actors Private actors can be considered state actors if they act in conjunction with state actions Harvey, ’08 (Thomas B. Harvey, J.D. Candidate at the Saint Louis University School of Law, “Comment: Wrapping Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort Statute, Private Military Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations,” 53 St. Louis L.J. 247, Lexis ) III. What To Do With The State Actor Requirement?: Looking at Kadic, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jurisprudence, and Alternate Interpretations of the ATS A. Kadic v. Karad<hac z>ic. Kadic v. Karad<hac z>ic provided an excellent framework for addressing the issue of whether private actors are accountable under the ATS for violations of international law. Here, victims of the Bosnian-Herzegovina conflict brought an action under the ATS for violations of international law against Radovan Karad<hac z>ic, who was the President of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic of Srpska. n239 The allegations against Karad<hac z>ic as a private actor included genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. n240 The appellate court took up the issue of whether acts committed by non-state actors violate the law of nations. n241 Two important elements for future ATS litigation come from this decision: (1) the notion that private actors can be held accountable for violating international law; and (2) the application of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 model to determine whether a private actor has engaged in official action for the purposes of jurisdiction under the ATS. n242 The court held that the law of nations is not restricted to state action. n243 Rather, "certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals." n244 The court convincingly cited an executive branch opinion and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States to support its argument. n245 The court asserted that the Executive Branch "has emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law." n246 [*274] Perhaps more important than the Executive Branch and the Restatement (Third), however, is the court's use of case law to dispute Karad<hac z>ic's arguments. Citing both Filartiga and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the court read those decisions as either not reaching the question of whether "international law violations other than torture are actionable against private individuals" n247 or suggesting that there were certain crimes "to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility." n248 Finally, the court disputed Karad<hac z>ic's notion that Congress intended the state-action requirement of the TVPA to apply to the ATS. n249 The court said that the opposite is instead the case. n250 Congress explicitly left open the possibility that the ATS would be used for other violations: Claims based on torture and summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered [by the Alien Tort Act]. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law. n251 Thus, if appellants demonstrated that Karad<hac z>ic committed the crimes they alleged, nothing would prevent him from being found liable under the ATS even if he was an individual actor. n252 After establishing that the ATS was applicable to private actors such as Karad<hac z>ic for certain crimes, the court moved on to evaluate the liability of a private actor acting in concert with a foreign state under the ATS. n253 In a small but important section, the court addressed the use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to determine whether a private actor has engaged in official action for the purposes of jurisdiction under the ATS. n254 Under this statute, a private individual can be viewed as a state actor if that individual acted in concert with a state in carrying out an act that violates the law. n255 Such an individual "acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid." n256 The court ruled that appellants should have the chance to demonstrate whether Karad<hac z>ic acted [*275] under color of law in terms of his interaction with Yugoslavia without further explanation of its use of § 1983. n257 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 70 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Iraq Advantage*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 71 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Iraq Advantage Scenario One: Instability – Sunni and Shia relations are improving The Australian ‘08 The Australian newspaper, July 21, 2008, “sunni block end boycott to boost reconciliation, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy1.lib.asu.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9618589391 &format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9618589397&cisb=22_T9618589396&treeMax=true&tr eeWidth=0&csi=244777&docNo=18 BAGHDAD: Iraq's Its parliament overwhelmingly endorsed the main Sunni Arab bloc ended an almost year-long boycott of Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Government yesterday, in a boost for reconciliation in the divided country. appointment of six ministers from the country's main Sunni bloc, the National Concord Front, in a session attended by 190 of the assembly's 275 MPs. The MPs also approved the appointment of four independents to replace ministers from the political bloc of radical Shia leader Moqtada al-Sadr, which has boycotted the Government since April last year. One of the six Sunni ministers, Rafie al-Issawi, was voted in as a deputy prime minister to Mr Maliki. Mr Issawi was minister of state for foreign affairs from 2005 to last year. Sunnis will also hold five other posts: the higher education, culture and communications portfolios, and the ministries of state for foreign and women's affairs. Sunni MP and spokesman for the bloc Salim Abdullah said they had agreed to end the boycott as the Government was ``walking in the right direction''. ``The Front decided to return after the Government struck out at armed groups in the past few months,'' he said, referring to assaults on Shia militiamen ordered by Mr Maliki since March. He said Mr Maliki and Sunni Vice-President Tareq alHashemi had agreed to a ``mutually committed relation between the Front and the Government''. Mr Hashemi is also the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the main political party in the Sunni bloc. In a statement issued by his office, the VicePresident urged the six ministers to work for Iraq and the ``Iraqi people from all the sects''. ``The goal must be to serve the country ... the ministry and the ministers belong to the Iraqi people,'' he said. Relations aren’t perfect, continued violence would send Iraq into a civil war Bazzi 05 Mohammad Bazzi writer for new york news times, May 23, 2005 A violent circle in iraq http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0523-02.htm BEIRUT, LEBANON -- The signs of sectarian warfare are everywhere in Iraq these days: clerics assassinated outside their mosques, dozens of execution victims turning up in ditches and car bombers inflicting heavy casualties on the country's Shia Muslim majority. Nearly four months after Iraq's election, when millions of Iraqis defied insurgent threats by voting for a new parliament, sectarian violence now threatens to drag the country into civil war. Most victims so far have been Shias targeted by Sunni insurgents. But the recent discoveries throughout Iraq of more than 50 bodies - men from both sects, apparently abducted and executed - highlight a new problem: a wave of retaliatory killings between Sunnis and Shias. It is the worst-case scenario that many Iraqis have feared since the insurgency's early days: that persistent attacks against the Shia community would drive Shia militias to seek revenge against Sunni civilians, prompting a new cycle of violence that would destroy any hope of dampening the insurgency and bringing Sunnis into the political process. "A civil war would destroy the democratic program in Iraq," said Sheik Fatih Kashif Ghitta, a respected Shia cleric in Baghdad. "The insurgents want to ignite a civil war with mass killings of Shia civilians, which would produce revenge attacks. The question now is whether the Shia leadership can keep the situation under control. " For more than a year, insurgents have targeted Shia mosques, neighborhoods and religious ceremonies across Iraq. They also have relentlessly attacked the Shia-dominated police and army. While there is no exact death toll, several thousand Shias are believed to have been killed by insurgent bombings and other attacks. Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has urged his followers not to retaliate against Sunnis. But as attacks on Shia civilians mount, Shia militias and vigilantes appear to be fighting back with tit-for-tat killings. "We are at a moment of extreme danger," said Hazem Shammari, a political science professor at Baghdad University. "There is a level of sectarian tension that is unrivaled in Iraq's modern history." It is unclear how long al-Sistani and Shia politicians will be able to restrain young Shia militants. One such force is the militia loyal to renegade Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, which fought extended battles twice last year with U.S. forces. Al-Sadr's militia surrendered most of its weapons to the Iraqi government, but its members are still difficult to control because they do not look to senior clerics such as al-Sistani for guidance. Iraqi leaders warn that a sectarian conflict would fulfill the goals of Islamic militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. They point to a January 2004 letter purportedly written by al-Zarqawi in which he appealed to Osama bin Laden for help in setting off a civil war through a campaign of bombings against Shia institutions. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 72 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Iraq Advantage Violence by PMC outraged the Iraqi people. Washington Post 07 The Washington post newspaper, Oct. 5, 2007 “Blackkwater faulted by us Military http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0439965120071005 At least 11 Iraqis were killed in the September 16 incident, which has outraged Iraqis who see the firm as a private army which acts with impunity. Citing a senior U.S. military official, the Post said the military reports appear to corroborate the Iraqi government's contention that Blackwater was at fault. "It was obviously excessive. It was obviously wrong," a U.S. military official speaking on condition of anonymity told the newspaper. "The civilians that were fired upon, they didn't have any weapons to fire back at them. And none of the IP (Iraqi police) or any of the local security forces fired back at them," the official was quoted as saying. The Blackwater guards appeared to have fired grenade launchers in addition to machine guns, the official told the Post. He said U.S. soldiers had reviewed statements from eyewitnesses and video footage recorded at the scene. An Iraqi Interior Ministry official and five eyewitnesses described a second deadly shooting involving the same Blackwater guards minutes after the incident in Nisoor Square, the Post reported. The FBI is leading a State Department investigation of the incident, which occurred as Blackwater escorted a diplomatic convoy in western Baghdad. The Pentagon and a joint U.S.-Iraqi team are also looking into the incident. North Carolina-based Blackwater has said its guards reacted lawfully to an attack on the convoy they were protecting. In previously unpublished remarks prepared for delivery at a congressional hearing, Blackwater Chairman Erik Prince said the Blackwater guards "came under small-arms fire" and "returned fire at threatening targets," the Post reported. Portions of the remarks dealing with the incident were left out of his testimony after the Justice Department warned Blackwater the incident was under investigation, it reported. The Post did not say how they obtained these remarks. Blackwater is also under scrutiny over other shooting incidents involving Iraqis. Violence in Iraq May Lead to another Civil War Parker 10 Ned Parker, writer for the Los Angelous Times April 07. 2010, As Iraq violence continues many fear civil war http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/07/world/la-fgw-iraq-bombings7-2010apr07 Reporting from Baghdad — Bombings gutted a market and destroyed at least five buildings in working-class Shiite Muslim areas of Baghdad on Tuesday, killing dozens as violence following last month continued to escalate and raise fears among Iraqis that a new civil war could erupt. The blasts left mountains of rubble, burying men, women and children. Cranes lifted jagged walls, and rescuers tossed away bricks in hopes of finding survivors. The explosions appeared carefully planned, with unknown men renting rooms across west Baghdad, packing the rented spaces with explosives and then blowing them up Tuesday morning. The first blasts rocked the city shortly before 9 a.m. in the adjoining Shiite districts of Shula and Shukuk. Within the next two hours, a building that was home to a restaurant and children's arcade was dynamited in the Allawi neighborhood, a car bomb exploded and two more buildings were blown up elsewhere in west Baghdad. More than 50 people were killed, security sources and witnesses said. The attacks followed the Friday massacre of 25 Sunni Muslim men south of Baghdad and suicide car bomb attacks against three foreign missions in the capital that claimed the lives of 41 people on Sunday. People standing near the sites of the bombings expressed rage and demanded answers. Some worried that sectarian war, which convulsed Iraq in 2006 and 2007, might return. "People will get sick and tired," said Hassan Aboudi, looking at a collapsed building in Shula. "We don't wish this thing, but what will happen now? There are people without leaders." Others blamed the warring political sides for seeking to undermine each other after the parliamentary elections produced no decisive winner. The results left Prime Minister Nouri Maliki in a bitter contest with former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a secular Shiite whose faction won a slim plurality. The sides are now maneuvering to see who can form a ruling coalition, and the competition has deteriorated along sectarian lines, with Maliki's Shiite supporters calling Allawi the choice of Sunni Arab extremists and former members of the late Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. Since the spate of violence over the weekend, Allawi has hammered Maliki's government for failing to protect the country, a move that could cause greater divisions. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 73 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Iraq Advantage Sectarian instability triggers an Iraqi civil war that draws in the entire region Fahim ‘05 Ashraf, Aug 20, 2005, “Iraq at the gates of hell,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GH20Ak01.html] Given all this grist, how might the dark mill of civil war begin turning in Iraq? It might simply develop out of a continuing, steady rise in the vicious cycle of revenge killings. Alternatively, a sudden breakdown of the political process could lead each sect to quickly assert its interests by force: the Kurds attempting to seize Kirkuk , for example, or Arab Sunnis and Shi'ites fighting for control of the mixed Sunni-Shi'ite towns south of Baghdad - all of which would entail ethnic cleansing. Further ideological and interdenominational divisions would also arise. Inter-Shi'ite rivalries were recently on display in the southern town of Samawa, where supporters of SCIRI and influential cleric Muqtada al-Sadr clashed. Muqtada espouses a brand of Iraqi and Islamic nationalism that could lead his Mehdi Army to side with those opposed to federalism if civil war did erupt. And then there are the neighbors. As professor Juan Cole, an expert in Iraq and Shi'ism, recently wrote in the Nation: "If Iraq fell into civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites, the Saudis and Jordanians would certainly take the side of the Sunnis, while Iran would support the Shi'ites." In essence, a civil war would see the eightyear Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s replayed on Iraqi territory. To complicate matters, any Kurdish success would draw in Turkey. Beyond Iraq, a civil war could destabilize the Gulf, and thereby the world economy. Sunni-Shi'ite tensions could be kindled in states like Bahrain, Kuwait and most importantly, Saudi Arabia , where an occasionally restive Shi'ite population forms a majority in the eastern part of the country (where all the oil is). Regional instability causes global crises and nuclear war Steinbach ‘02 John Steinbach, nuclear specialist, Secretary of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Committee of the National Capitol Area, 2002, Centre for Research on Globalisation, “Israeli Weapons of Mass Destruction: a Threat to Peace,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war . Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagratio n." (44) Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 74 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Iraq Advantage Scenario Two: Relations – U.S. – Iraq relations are fragile but positive – The U.S. must be cautious and respect Iraq’s interests to ensure that it develops into a strong and friendly regional power Laipson, 10 [Ellen, President of the Stimson Center and director of Stimson’s work on Southwest Asia, April 30, 2010, Stimson Center, “The Future of US-Iraq Relations,” http://www.stimson.org/swa/pdf/Future_of_Iraq-US_Relations-English.pdf] The future of US-Iraq relations holds many uncertainties, but it is sure to be a significant priority for both countries for the foreseeable future. It is possible that future Iraqi politicians and leaders will seek to pursue a national course that repudiates the decade of deep American engagement, or that American officials will articulate their priorities in the region in a way that Iraqis will perceive as neglect. But that is not the most likely course. Iraq and America are likely to continue to see important value in a robust relationship. The bilateral agenda in the coming years will be full. The security transition will demand attention from senior military officials in the United States. Iraq’s lively politics will ensure that it commands attention from senior American diplomats, politicians, and journalists. Our shared interests in energy security and water scarcity issues will build ties between experts. American civil society will be engaged in promoting educational, cultural and scientific exchanges that will bring direct benefit to Iraq’s reconstruction and development, and will expose more Americans to Iraqi talent. Interest groups will emerge in both capitals to promote and defend the importance of the bilateral relationship. These sectoral and institutional ties will build an underpinning for a more strategic relationship, should the political alignments in Baghdad and Washington favor it. Iraq’s reintegration into the Middle East region and its potential as a middle power in international politics will be strengthened by a successful partnership with the United States, along side the evolution of its military and political institutions. Iraq’s role as a bridge to non-Arab regional powers Iran and Turkey, its role in global energy security, and its return to a leadership role in Arab world politics, will also make the case in Washington that an active, cooperative relationship advances US interests and security needs. But such a relationship will require nurturing. Iraq and the United States may not be natural allies, given Iraq’s need to balance its ties to Tehran and Washington, given the wounds and residual effects of our most recent shared history, and given the prospect, perhaps slim, that Iraqi politics will revert to authoritarianism or to an anti-Western ideology. It is prudent to be cautious, but a friendly, even strategic, partnership between Iraq and America over time is surely achievable. \ PMC Destroy US Iraqi Relations Abdul-Zahra 10 (Qassim Abdual Zahra, writer common dreams.org February 10, 2010 Iraq orders backwater guards http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2010/02/10-8) BAGHDAD -- Iraq has ordered hundreds of private security guards linked to Blackwater Worldwide to leave the country within seven days or face possible arrest on visa violations, the interior minister said Wednesday. has ordered about 250 former and current employees of Blackwater Worldwide to leave the country within seven days or face having their visas pulled. The order comes in the wake of a U.S. judge dismissing criminal charges against five Blackwater guards who were accused in the September 2007 shooting deaths of 17 Iraqis in Baghdad The order comes in the wake of a U.S. judge dismissing criminal charges out against five Blackwater guards who were accused in the September 2007 shooting deaths of 17 Iraqis in Baghdad. It applies to about 250 security contractors who worked for Blackwater in Iraq at the time of the incident, Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani told The Associated Press. Some of the guards now work for other security firms in Iraq, while others work for a Blackwater subsidiary, al-Bolani said. He said all "concerned parties" were notified of the order three days ago and now have four days left before they must leave. Blackwater security contractors were protecting U.S. diplomats when the guards opened fire in Nisoor Square, a crowded Baghdad intersection, on Sept. 16, 2007. Seventeen people were killed, including women and children, in a shooting that inflamed anti-American sentiment in Iraq. We want to turn the page," al-Bolani said. "It was a painful experience, and we would like to go forward." Based in Moyock, N.C., Blackwater is now known as Xe Services, a name change that happened after six of the security firm's guards were charged in the Nisoor Square shootout. At the time, Blackwater was the largest of the State Department's three security contractors working in Iraq. One of the accused guards pleaded guilty in the case, but a federal judge in Washington threw out charges agains the other five in December, rapping the Justice Department for mishandling the evidence. The legal ruling infuriated Iraqis, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki vowing to seek punishment for the guards. Last month, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden flew to Baghdad to appease Iraqis with a promise by the Obama administration to appeal the case and bring the guards back to trial. The shooting further strained relations between the United States and Iraq, leading the parliament in Baghdad to seek new laws that would clear the way for foreign contractors to be prosecuted in Iraqi courts. The U.S. government rejected those demands in the Blackwater case. In January 2009, the State Department informed Blackwater that it would not renew its contracts to provide security for U.S. diplomats in Iraq because of the Iraqi government's refusal to grant it an operating license. But last September, the agency said it temporarily extended a contract with a Blackwater subsidiary known as Presidential Airways to provide air support for U.S. diplomats. The Justice Department now is investigating whether Blackwater tried to bribe Iraqi officials with about $1 million to allow the company to keep working there after the Baghdad shooting, according to U.S. officials close to the probe. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 75 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday 1AC Iraq Advantage Good U.S. relations with a strong Iraq are essential to solving the root of international terrorism Krauthammer, 8 [Charles, Nationally Syndicated Columnist, 12/5/08, “Iraq, American Ally,” National Review, http://article.nationalreview.com/380096/iraq-american-ally/charles-krauthammer] But if our drawdown is conducted with the same acumen as was the surge, not probable. A self-sustaining, democratic, and pro-American Iraq is within our reach. It would have two hugely important effects in the region. First, it would constitute a major defeat for Tehran, the putative winner of the Iraq War according to the smart set. Iran’s client, Moqtada al-Sadr, still hiding in Iran, was visibly marginalized in parliament — after being militarily humiliated in Basra and Baghdad by the new Iraqi security forces. Moreover, the major religious Shiite parties were the ones who negotiated, promoted, and assured passage of the strategic alliance with the U.S. — against the most determined Iranian opposition. Second is the regional effect of the new political entity on display in Baghdad — a flawed yet functioning democratic polity with unprecedented free speech, free elections, and freely competing parliamentary factions. For this to happen in the most important Arab country besides Egypt can, over time (over generational time, the timescale of the war on terror), alter the evolution of Arab society. It constitutes our best hope for the kind of fundamental political-cultural change in the Arab sphere that alone will bring about the defeat of Islamic extremism. After all, newly sovereign Iraq is today more engaged in the fight against Arab radicalism than any country on earth, save the United States — with which, mirabile dictu, it has now thrown in its lot. That prevents extinction Alexander, 3 [Yonah 8/25/03 (professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies in Israel and the United States, The Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/commentary/20030827-084256-8999r.htm] Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself. Even the United States and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns. It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers. Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements (hudna). Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"? There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare. Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact. The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism (e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber) with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 76 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Iraq – Stability PMCs hurt military effectiveness and credibility hindering stabilization efforts Terlikowski 08 Marcin, writer for the Polish Institute of International Affairs, “Private Military Companies in the US Stabilization Operation in Iraq”, August Co-ordination of military operations and PMF activities The next issue pertaining to the activities of PMFs in Iraq involves the lack of co-ordination on tactical, operational, and strategic levels, with the army operations undertaken in parallel. At the tactical and operational levels, the civilian employees of PMFs are not subordinated in most cases (except for PMFs closely co-operating with the Army and performing logistical tasks for it) to the military chain of command, but because of the contracts which they carry out, they are present in the combat zone. There are no general rules concerning the possibility of co-operation of the armed forces and PMFs, as well as mutual rights and obligations.89 For these reasons, it is possible that the actions of army units and activities of PMF employees could overlap with dangerous consequences. For example, the army could mistakenly fire on a firms’ vehicles and employees, PMF units could fire at an Army vehicle and soldiers, a PMF vehicles may accidentally appear in the battlefield (which in itself may cause chaos), or army units could be committed to provide necessary assistance to attacked staff members of PMFs.90 These types of cases have already been described by the media, and the issues have stirred much controversy among the commanders of US Army units.91 The strategic level, however, is of even more importance; it involves meshing the PMFs activities into the more general, political strategy aimed at conflict solution. In the case of Iraq, the main task of the coalition forces is to stabilize the country, i.e. above all, the elimination of various paramilitary groups. The way to achieve this objective is not only to fight them, but also to undermine their local support (which is a basis for the strategy of combating guerrilla groups). It succeeds only when a thoughtful and consistent policy of winning the confidence of the local population is followed. For this reason, US armed forces, apart from performing their combat duties, conduct special operations to support the civilian population (e.g. projects within the CIMIC92 framework). As indicated by the analysts, and even the military experts themselves, this US effort has been wasted to a certain extent by the sometimes damaging, uncoordinated actions of private military firms, and particularly those implementing security tasks.93 As reported by the media, the employees of such firms, when discharging their duties, often behave arrogantly and aggressively, use firearms excessively, do not comply with regulations (e.g. traffic rules), or do not observe local customs and social standards to which people raised in Arab culture are particularly sensitive.94 Undoubtedly, all this antagonises the people of Iraq even more so, because more often than not they equate the staff of private firms with coalition soldiers. This issue is surely one of the factors undermining the impact of the stabilization efforts. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 77 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Iraq – No Accountability PMCs are subject to laws during war but lack any enforcement, making PMCs act above law and instability in Iraq Isenberg 06 David, David Isenberg is an independent, Washington-D.C. based analyst and writer on military, foreign policy, national and international security issues He is an expert in U.S. defense policy , WMD proliferation, terrorism, homeland security, peace operations, the intelligence community, international arms trade, small arms proliferation, private military companies, biological weapons, and general arms control issues., “Challenges of Security Privatisation in Iraq”, PMC Regulation Concerns over accountability and regulation of PMCs have long been a staple in academic discussion of the industry.31 However the widespread use of PMCs in Iraq brought increased publicity to and discussion of the issue.32 One problem in regulating PMCs is their somewhat ambiguous legal status in regard to existing international treaties relevant to conflict and war. There is a lack of clarity over the exact relationship between governments and PMCs. Such ambiguity leaves companies open to arbitrary treatment by combatants or other countries if they stray over borders.33 PMC personnel are combatants under the Geneva Conventions if they bear arms and are clearly working on behalf of one side in a conflict; yet they could also be treated as non-combatants if they do not wear recognisable uniforms or are not under military command. A significant development, though not well covered in the press, was the issuance by the Pentagon on October 3, 2005 of DoD Instruction 3020.41 ‘Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces’, issued pursuant to a provision in the FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act. The 33-page document clarifies the legal status of civilians hired to support those forces in a contingency. The new instruction also explains when contractors can carry weapons in areas where US troops operate – for example in Iraq, where armed contractors have been operating for more than two years without clear regulatory guidance. The regulation ties together nearly 60 Pentagon directives and Joint Staff doctrinal statements that relate to the role of contractors on the battlefield. From the viewpoint of the PMC industry the new regulation is important because it establishes criteria for civilian contractors to carry weapons, which are to be used only in self-defence. It also sets forth detailed procedures for arming contingency contractor personnel for security services. However, the key question now is how it will be implemented. Reportedly, a number of Defence Federal Acquisition Regulations are being modified to reflect the guidance in the new instruction. But it may be too difficult to retroactively implement all of the rules and regulations spelled out in the policy to cover the contracts in effect in Iraq. Aside from international legal controls, private security firms are also accountable to the War Crimes Act of 1996, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Anti-Torture Statute, Defense Trade Controls Act, Arms Export Control Act, Gun Control Act, Export Administration Regulations, International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Defense Base Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and the General Orders of the Central Command, Multi-National Corps – Iraq and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). However, the problem has not been a lack of relevant laws, but of means. Regulations existed but were not implemented because the relevant administration existed mainly on paper. Public discussion on immunity granted to foreign contractors has overlooked the fact that, without being granted immunity from the jurisdiction of Iraqi courts, security contractors simply were not going to work in Iraq due to the likelihood of arbitrary legal treatment of their employees. In addition, without immunity, insurers were threatening to increase their premiums significantly. Furthermore, because there is no status of forces agreement in place it has never been clear in what venue legal proceedings against a contractor might take place. Such uncertainty was another reason for granting contractors immunity. The impact of all the above is ambiguous. Theoretically, even with the immunity granted by CPA Memorandum 17, contractors could still be prosecuted under various legal authorities, especially the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). But, until recently, federal prosecutors were not that interested in using the Act and local prosecutors in the states where PMCs are headquartered, and for whom MEJA holds greater relevance, normally do not have sufficient resources to use it. Despite these rules and regulations, it is unlikely that the activities of PMCs in Iraq, numerous as they are, offer many permanent lessons for the industry as a whole. From an industry perspective, nobody believes that they are going to see another Iraq. The United States could not intervene in another country on the same scale as Operation Iraqi Freedom, even if it wanted to. The industry recognises that whatever contracts they get in the future are going to be in countries and situations that will be quite different from those in Iraq. There have been numerous problems with accountability of private contractors of all kinds in Iraq. Consider these excerpts from a study released in February 2006 by the Special Inspector-General for Iraq Reconstruction: • The US government also experienced shortcomings in accounting for personnel deployed to Iraq – especially civilians and contractors. There was, and still is, a lack of effective control procedures at many entry and exit points for Iraq, and there is no inter-agency personnel tracking system. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 78 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Iraq – No Accountability Official and contract personnel often arrived and departed with no systematic tracking of their whereabouts or activities, or in some cases, with no knowledge of their presence in country. Shortly before its dissolution in June 2004, CPA was still unable to account for 10 percent of its staff in Iraq. • Mechanisms to track contractors supporting CPA have been left largely to the contractors’ individual firms and have not been enforced. 34 The most important factor in the riskmanagement trade is choosing and training the right people. While PMCs generally subject employees to vetting35 and have codes of conduct for their staff, there is no uniform check of these actors by government agencies. In the United States, contractors to the government are theoretically liable to prosecution but as yet this has never happened. Disciplining contractor personnel is seen as the contractor’s responsibility. The CPA set some initial minimum standards in Iraq for regulating PMCs and subsequently the Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Trade adopted new mandatory guidelines to vet and register PMCs. However, while the Iraqi government is, in a de jure sense, in charge especially since the end of the CPA and handover of sovereignty back to the Iraqi government, it is a sovereignty that is still largely theoretical, given the challenges posed by the insurgency and its lack of resources. Thus, from the viewpoint of the PMC sector, doing business with the relevant Iraqi ministries is extremely difficult.36 Currently, there is nobody in the Iraqi Interior Ministry who can issue a Weapons Authorisation Card. This means security contractors are using a variety of IDs, making their own, or using none at all. When there exists a variety of identification documents there is no credibility, undermining the point of regulation. One question worth pondering is the potential for PMCs to create an insecure environment by training Iraqi forces without the guarantee that they will have sustainable employment in the future. Beyond the training of members of the Iraqi security forces, PMCs are training men and equipping them with a set of military skills. These men are often earning two to three times more than the average Iraqi. But what happens after Western forces and reconstruction workers leave and those Iraqis no longer have a job? Are we training the next insurgency force? While firms such as DynCorp include democratic policing and respect for rule of law in their training of Iraqi police, other firms probably train Iraqis for future subsidiaries they hope to establish. While Iraqi authorities may recognise such issues, it is unlikely they can do much about them. The truth for them, and for PMCs, is that knowledge is fungible. Once you teach a set of skills there is nothing you can do to prevent it from being used. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 79 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Iraq – Counter Insurgency PMCs are hurting US military counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq Thurnher 08 Major Jeffrey S, Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Presently assigned as Brigade Judge Advocate, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo. LL.M., 2007, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Army, Charlottesville, Va.; J.D., 2004, The College of William and Mary; B.S., 1996, University of Virginia. Previous assignments include Chief, Claims Office, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 2006-2007; Trial Counsel, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 2005-2006; Administrative Law Attorney, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., 2004-2005; Battalion Assistant S-3, 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, Wuerzburg, Germany, 2000-2001; Platoon Leader, 101st Military Intelligence Battalion, Wuerzburg, Germany and Kosovo, 1999-2000; Assistant S2, 2-2 Infantry Battalion, Vilseck, Germany, 1997-1999. “Drowning in Blackwater: How Weak Accountability over Private Security Contractors Significantly Undermines Counterinsurgency Efforts” Lexis) The death of such a large number of Iraqis at the hands of contractors reverberated far beyond the borders of Iraq. n18 It also exposed significant flaws in the United States' policies governing control of PSCs on the battlefield. The most significant of those exposed flaws was the lack of government control or accountability over these contractors. This flaw stemmed from many factors, including the failure to assign enough "American officials in Iraq to enforce the rules that apply to [PSCs]," n19 and a controversial order from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), CPA Order 17, which gave PSCs immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts. n20 Such faults threaten to significantly undermine the overall mission in Iraq. n21 These failures are significant and magnified with respect to America's effort in Iraq for two principle reasons: the scope of involvement of contractors in the campaign and the nature of the conflict in Iraq. First, the United States has relied more upon contractors in Iraq than in previous operations. n22 The United States is estimated to have had over 180,000 contractors supporting its operations in Iraq in 2007. n23 Thus, contractors are one of the largest contributors of manpower in the deployed area. n24 These contractors have been considered part of the Department of Defense (DOD) "Total Force" since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. n25 All these elements of force on the battlefield need to work cohesively. n26 However, as witnessed above, oversight of PSCs in Iraq must dramatically improve. Having such a large contractor force on the battlefield without adequate oversight is dangerous and irresponsible. n27 [*66] Second, the United States is engaged in a counterinsurgency in Iraq. n28 One of the keys to defeating that insurgency is winning the support of the local populace. n29 The impact of elements accompanying the force can be just as significant as the impact of the military force itself. n30 The incident involving Blackwater clearly serves as a case in point. This deadly exchange had strategic implications which adversely affected the United States' efforts to defeat the insurgency in Iraq.n31 The local populace often does not distinguish the military from contractors involved in the operations. n32 In many Iraqi minds, the perceived failures of Blackwater contractors to safeguard Iraqi lives are attributed simply as American failures. n33 As detrimental and tragic as it has been, the September 2007 Blackwater incident has at least prompted the U.S. Government to conduct a long overdue re-examination of its flawed approach to overseeing PSCs. n34 Immediately after the incident, both the DOD and the Department of State (DOS) studied and took steps to improve their supervision of PSCs. n35 Congress also implemented several measures to ensure that PSCs can be held more accountable for any misconduct in Iraq. n36 Despite these initial changes, more must be done to control PSCs operating on a complex battlefield. Fundamentally, the current use and lack of oversight of PSCs are detrimental to winning a counterinsurgency. If the United States chooses to rely on PSCs in unstable counterinsurgency operations in the future, it must significantly change the manner of control it has over these forces. Some essential improvements include placing accountability for all contractors under one overarching command, implementing stronger screening and training programs, and strengthening the options for investigating and prosecuting contractor misconduct. Drastic measures need to be taken to improve the overall United States policy for controlling PSCs and holding those contractors accountable for their actions. Part II of this article provides an overview of the history of PSCs on the battlefield and explains how the United States got itself into such a precarious position in Iraq. Part III addresses the law of war implications of using PSCs while comparing the methods and approaches of the various governmental agencies who hired PSCs in Iraq before the September 2007 Blackwater incident. Part IV examines in depth the changes made in the wake of the Blackwater incident to better control PSCs. Finally, Part V proposes the additional accountability measures over PSCs necessary to ensure American success in future counterinsurgency campaigns. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 80 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Multilateralism Advantage*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 81 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Multilateralism – Internal PMCs reify commitment to the US as global hegemonic unilateralism and kills multilateral foreign policy Isenberg ‘09 “Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” David Isenberg is a researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and the author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Greenwood, 2009) January 2k9. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) REPORT TODAY, THE U.S. GOVERNEMENT’S growing reliance on contractors constitutes an attempt to circumvent or evade public skepticism about the United States’ self-appointed role as global policeman. Viewing PMCs through a market framework focuses attention on questions of efficiency, at the expense of more fundamental considerations about the policy being pursued. The related question of whether force should be used – either by uniformed military personnel or else by private contractors – is often neglected.69 In this respect, the low visibility and presumed low cost of private contractors appealed to those policy analysts who favor a global U.S. military presence, but fear that such a strategy cannot command public support. Max Boot, senior fellow for national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, has long championed the use of contractors on these grounds. Writing in The American Interest Boot explained: In a perfect world, Congress would bring the size of our armed forces into closer alignment with our massive defense commitments. But our legislature, like most democratic legislatures, is loath to spend what’s needed on defense, and it is even more reluctant to conscript its citizens... Just as Victorian parliaments stinted on the size of the British army, forcing reliance on regiments raised in India, so too our Congress will never provide enough uniformed personnel to address every perceived need... Thus, in all likelihood, we will continue to muddle along with a mixture of private and public providers of security ervices.70Governments also rely on contractors in order to shift responsibility and blame for their actions. A state employing contractor personnel to advance its foreign policies faces less international responsibility in terms of attribution than would be the case if it relied on its own armed forces.71 But states bear responsibility for the actions of contractors they employ. They should not be allowed to evade responsibility, especially with respect to contractors functioning as the equivalent of the states’ armed forces. The United States is the world's leading user of private contractors because the U.S. government has assumed the role of guarantor of global stability at a time when the American public is unwilling to provide the resources necessary to support this strategy.72 Washington either has to use private contractors to fill the gap between goals and means or else change its goals, and policymakers have shown little interest in the latter. As the United States relies more heavily upon military contractors to support its role as world hegemon, it reinforces the tendency to approach global crises in a unilateral, as opposed to multilateral manner, further ensuring that the burdens will be carried disproportionately by U.S. taxpayers, and especially U.S. troops.73 Other states have not kept up with the ongoing qualitative changes in the United States military; their armed forces are not readily deployable nor easily interoperable with American personnel and equipment. In contrast, military contractors have not only geared themselves to serving the American marketplace, they have been instrumental in bringing about those changes within the U.S. military. The marketplace, in other words, can often more readily satisfy the United States’ operational requirements than can our allies and prospective regional partners. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 82 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Multilateralism – Internal Military privatization devastates international stability, democratic transitions, and multilateral institutions Stanger and Williams ‘06 Allison Stanger and Mark Eric Williams are respectively Professor and Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College., “Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, Fall | Winter 2006, http://yalejournal.org/sites/default/files/articles/4-19.pdf Given the United States’ global influence and power, privatizing the implementation of American foreign policy has at least three significant implications for world politics. First, although the democratic deficits that outsourcing yields deeply trouble Americans concerned with conserving democratic accountability and transparency at home, these deficits also bear on international stability. Deliberation and transparency are hallmarks of liberal democracy, and in the realm of foreign policy these same properties tend to reassure other states, even undemocratic ones, that a democracy’s foreign policy actions can be anticipated, and that any abrupt policy change will be signaled well in advance. Because states of all stripes base their own calculations upon such signals, the less transparent policymaking becomes via outsourcing, the more likely it is that miscalculations could produce conflict. Further, when Washington delegates military functions to private companies, the question arises of where ultimate accountability and oversight authority actually reside. Should U.S. law, international law, or military commanders in the field carry the day?40 International order cannot be built on such ambiguity. Second, the policy flexibility that Washington gains from outsourcing could, in time, become more of a bane than a boon: the greater the U.S. ability is to pursue policy objectives via PMCs, the fewer incentives Washington has to consult and bargain with other governments about its policy or to make the compromises needed to forge and maintain international coalitions to pursue it. By strengthening the United States’ unilateralist tendencies, this dynamic could weaken the firewall discussed earlier that has sustained the U.S. monopoly in the provision and consumption of PMC services. Finally, the expansive outsourcing practices observed since 1990 have weakened the sinews of established organs of multilateral governance. By default, the authority Washington delegates to PMCs is also authority not delegated to international institutions. Though it is obvious that overlapping spheres of competence are common in an interdependent world, it surely makes a difference for diplomacy, strategic policy, and multilateral governance whether multilateral organizations or under-regulated private corporations are the primary representatives of the world’s most powerful state. The more the United States and other governments delegate state power to private corporations rather than to international institutions, the greater the prospects that outsourcing will sap the strength of what were once considered to be the building blocks of international order. As the world’s preeminent power and the principal consumer and producer of private military services, the United States, either inadvertently or deliberately, shapes the norms that will frame future interstate competition. Outsourcing the implementation of its policy via PMCs can be a useful solution to a range of immediate problems, but the costs such actions generate are likely to be fully realized only in the long term. An under-regulated market for force, therefore, will likely have significant negative consequences down the line, and these effects will only grow more dramatic if other states follow the U.S. lead. Given the benefits that outsourcing generates, the issue is not whether the United States should discontinue this practice or bar private military firms from operating, but whether Washington can see beyond the short-term benefits it realizes from outsourcing and take prudent steps to contain the longterm negative consequences the practice spawns both domestically and internationally. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 83 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Multilateralism – Internal Military privatization devastates American foreign policy – they are perceived as the US military action but don’t abide by military codes of justice – private military violations kill relations with our allies and embolden our enemies to rally popular support against the United States Michaels ‘04 JON D. MICHAELS, Law Clerk to the Honorable Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable David H. Souter, U.S. Supreme Court; J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Oxford University; B.A., Williams College, “ARTICLE: BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZING WAR,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Fall 2004, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1001, lexis Having canvassed the constitutional, legal, and democratic harms in Parts III and IV, I turn now to the international/ diplomatic harms privatization may cause. These harms pose considerable consequences for American foreign policy, for American credibility abroad, and for the interests of containing the proliferation of even less well-regulated military profiteering practices around the world. A. Alienating Friends and Foes Alike: Contracting out allows the U.S. government to purchase strategic outcomes at a much lower political cost than if the boys and girls of America's volunteer army were dispatched. Indeed, an overseas engagement involving contractors might, accordingly, produce neither an official body count nor much political opposition. 398 But, the security and flexibility the United States gains without expending domestic political capital and/or the lives of servicemen and women may, however, serve to validate the perception that the American agenda is driven by dollars rather than ideals; that decisions are made in private, smoke-filled backrooms rather than openly on the floors of Congress. It also invites concerns that the United States is represented in zones of hostilities by individuals who are not subject to the same standards of legal conduct and ethical restraint that this nation and the international community expects of the U.S. Armed Forces. 1. Allies: Among America's allies, when the private cavalry is dispatched instead of the U.S. military, they may think that their particular crisis is outside of core American interests. This suspicion or sense of being slighted can [*1112] breed resentment and a weakening of ties, a response not altogether lost on American leaders. Congressmen Tom Lantos and Henry Hyde had this precise concern in mind when they questioned the wisdom of contracting out President Karzai's security detail. In a joint statement, they noted: "The presence of commercial vendors [protecting Karzai] would send a message to the Afghan people and to President Karzai's adversaries that we are not serious enough about our commitment to Afghanistan to dispatch U.S. personnel." 399 Other allies too may be dissatisfied by the conduct of military engagements by private troops. No doubt the Bosnians would have preferred to receive the help of DynCorp contractors, without their extracurricular involvement in sex-trafficking operations. Moreover, perhaps pro-American leaders in the Middle East similarly feel betrayed, today, by the conduct of American privateers toward Iraqi prisoners. 400 Leaders who endorse American foreign policy aims, often at great domestic peril, 401 are then placed in an even more difficult situation at home when forced to defend their support in the face of American acts of brutality. 402 Of course, transgressions by American soldiers certainly do occur. But, at least those acts can be reported up the chain of command and, in turn, can be swiftly punished, thus demonstrating the U.S. government's commitment to justice and self-restraint; 403 as we have discussed, comparable firmness with contractors is much more difficult to achieve. 404 [*1113] 2. Would-Be Allies: Let us also not forget that American military personnel are, increasingly, serving as diplomats, humanitarian providers, political consultants, and "liberators." 405 Their conduct on such missions could leave as large of an impression on their hosts as would any tangible project or aid package they deliver. Therefore, if the United States is dispatching private actors, who are not comporting themselves well, the conduct of these privateers will inevitably be imputed to all soldiers, if not all Americans, and the goods and services they provide will be, in the long run, devalued. As P.W. Singer notes, a "key realization of contracting is that a firm becomes an extension of government policy and, when operating in foreign lands, its diplomat on the ground. As such, the firm's reputation can ... implicate the government['s] as well." 406 And, finally, America acts not just as an intervenor or liberator, but also as an occupier. While on the ground, in Kabul or Baghdad, the U.S. personnel must work to win the hearts and minds of the locals. 407 If American contractors were to act in an undignified, or offensive manner, it would only hamper the process of gaining the trust of the people. (Again, this assumes that because of the UCMJ and because of the military's ethos of honor, soldiers are less likely to act inappropriately.) [*1114] 3. Adversaries: And, among those who already consider America a corrupting force in the world, the privatization of military might, especially in efforts to circumvent U.N. agreements and arms embargoes, only further fan the flames of international dissent and discontent. 408 The maniacal bombers of September 11 undertook diabolical deeds purportedly in the name of the disgruntled who viewed the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as the West's twin evil exports. Amalgamating and conflating those formerly distinct entities via privatized war makes it that much harder to disabuse the world of its perceptions of the United States as an evil economic-military imperialist. 409 [*1115] Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 84 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Multilateralism – Internal Military privatization undermines multilateralism and global conflict resolution – specifically, PMC are used to bypass the authority of multilateral institutions which devastates effective US foreign policy Michaels ‘04 JON D. MICHAELS, Law Clerk to the Honorable Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable David H. Souter, U.S. Supreme Court; J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Oxford University; B.A., Williams College, “ARTICLE: BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZING WAR,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Fall 2004, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1001, lexis B. Flaunting the Ideals and Undermining the Institutions of Collective Security and Global Governance: The U.N. Security Council is widely viewed as the principal venue for deliberating on matters of collective security. 410 Though hamstrung by internecine fighting among the permanent members during most of the Cold War, 411 the Security Council emerged as an authoritative and relatively effective body in the early 1990s, 412 serving as the centerpiece of what the first President Bush dubbed the "New World Order." 413 For the most part, this renewed faith in the Security Council has been affirmed by member nations; 414 but not entirely. Facing opposition on a proposal to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 and again, in 2002-03, on a decision to invade Iraq, the United States has forsaken the imprimatur of the Security Council and sought legitimation elsewhere. 415 For Kosovo, [*1116] America secured NATO's approval; 416 and for Iraq, the United States cobbled together a band of allies, euphemistically called the "Coalition of the Willing." 417 In the process of circumventing the United Nations, however, the United States has damaged the Security Council's authority and called into question the credibility of collective security writ large. 418 Privatization only makes bypassing the U.N. easier and even more insidious than patching together an alternative source of collective authorization. At least with respect to small-scale interventions, where private troops could act in lieu of public soldiers, the United States could nominally remain a good global citizen and nominally recognize the supremacy of the Security Council, while still achieving those desired aims that the Council refuses to endorse. This would allow the United States to avoid the political backlash it felt (vis-a-vis Kosovo and especially Iraq) when it publicly eschewed the Security Council in favor of a more compliant authorizing community. 419 For instance, say the United States or another member proposes a resolution in support of intervening in a small country, perhaps besieged by a humanitarian crisis or laboring [*1117] under civil war. Such a resolution fails. 420 The United States can abide by the decision not to intervene formally, yet can still make available to the country in question a private American outfit to carry out the objectives that the Council rejected. 421 While this avenue of clandestine circumvention is, probably, unavailable in most instances where an effective force would have to be quite large, there are still opportunities in certain situations where small, discrete units would suffice. For example, small forces might prove especially useful in the nascency of attempted coups or during the early stages of civil unrest in the likes of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, or even Rwanda, where experts have now suggested that if intervention had occurred early enough, a crack outfit could have helped prevent genocidal civil war without the need for an overwhelming show of force. 422 With the use of contractors, therefore, the U.S. government could also achieve some of its foreign policy ends, while not taking any responsibility for promoting them. But the problem with contracting to avoid a Security Council veto is bigger than the mere issue of avoiding responsibility in any particular engagement: What is worse is that the nation would be turning its back on the legitimate collective security apparatus it helped found and promote, and would not even be doing so in a transparent way, i.e., calling for reforms to the Council's procedures and operations or publicly shaming obstinate members. It would be more honest and responsible for the United States, if it were dissatisfied with some aspect of the Security Council, to seek direct reform. 423 Such reform efforts would demonstrate [*1118] the United States's faith in the system of collective security and international law. But, to continue to operate outside its bounds, either via makeshift coalitions or private operations, while still purporting to respect the institution is to make a mockery of the Security Council and, moreover, to jeopardize the integrity of America's foreign policy. 424 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 85 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Multilateralism – Iraq HR Internal Protection of private military actions are causing the US to lose credibility with Iraqis and the international community; human rights causes perception of loss of foreign leadership Elsea et al. 2k8 Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues Updated August 25, 2008 Jennifer K. Elsea Legislative Attorney American Law Division Moshe Schwartz Analyst in Defense Acquisition Policy Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Kennon H. Nakamura Analyst in Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf PSCs’ use of deadly force, the killing of allegedly innocent Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy and Blackwater employees, and the State Department’s alleged lack of concern about accountability, many believe, have undermined U.S. foreign policy and specifically U.S. standing in Iraq. Many in the military reportedly expressed concerns that Blackwater’s actions that day and over time could alter and degrade relationships that the military is seeking to build with Iraqis.47 Speaking prior to the September 16 killings, an Iraqi Interior Ministry official discussing Blackwater’s actions in previous deadly fire incidents and the company’s attitude in ignoring Iraqi law and customs, explained that Blackwater and its actions are part of the reason for the hatred of Americans. “Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans.”48 In a broader foreign policy context, the State Department’s alleged protection of Blackwater as its employees act as if they are above Iraqi law and kill Iraqis with impunity makes it difficult to advocate for such issues as the importance of the rule of law and human rights as U.S. foreign policy objectives. Advances in worldwide communications make it possible for allegations of human rights violations by those associated with the United States to be spread worldwide almost instantaneously, and may affect both the perception of the United States as a country respectful of human rights as well as the international environment in which the United States works to advance its foreign policy objectives.49 Representative Tom Davis, concerned over the actions of PSCs, said: Iraqis understandably resent our preaching about the rule of law when so visible an element of the U.S. presence there appears to be above the law. That is why the events of September 16th sparked such an outcry by the Iraqi government which sees unpunished assaults on civilians as a threat to national sovereignty. The incident is also being used by those seeking to exploit accumulated resentments and draw attacks on private contractors, a force even the Iraqi government concedes is still a vital layer of security.50 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 86 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Multilateralism Impact Multilateralism solves all of the reasons why reducing military presence might be bad – the notion that the United States solves all global threats is constructed by American war hawks and is counterproductive for peace and stability – burden-sharing solves all possible regional and global threats Larison ‘10 Daniel Larison, Ph.D. graduate from the University of Chicago, April 19th, 2010, “Free Riders and Burden-Sharing,” http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/04/19/free-riders-and-burden-sharing/ It is the lack of serious threats that needs to be emphasized. Suppose that Russia becomes even more assertive in postSoviet space. Is this going to trigger a significant European arms build-up? It seems unlikely. It is European governments that have been consistently trying to block moves that would appear provocative to Russia. The Germans in particular are far more interested in building a constructive trading relationship with Russia than they are interested in feuding over political influence on Russia’s periphery. In the last decade, Washington has not been providing protection against a growing Russian threat to Europe, but has instead been trying to goad Russia with continued NATO expansion that most other members of NATO didn’t want and refused to accept. On the whole, American hawks have made a habit of perceiving threats to Europe that most Europeans do not see. Then they congratulate the U.S. for shielding Europe from these threats, marvel at European weakness in the face of said threats, and demand European gratitude and deference to U.S. initiatives on account of the protection we provide. This tends to color hawks’ views of everything else. We see this again with the fear of an Iranian bomb. Most of the other major and rising powers in the region do not regard Iran’s nuclear program as a problem, much less a threat, and even important U.S. allies such as Turkey and India are far more interested in trade with Iran than they are in isolating or punishing it for a program Iran is actually entitled to have. On the whole, Iran’s neighbors do not see why the region should be subjected to another destabilizing conflict that has no realistic chance of halting Iran’s nuclear program in any case. From the American perspective, it would seem to make fiscal and strategic sense to encourage allies to assume additional responsibilities for regional security. Auslin exaggerated the extent to which America was “hollowing out” its military capabilities, but Americans should welcome the prospect of wealthy allies providing for even more of their own defense. How and when allied states choose to do this will largely be up to them, but it should not be regarded as a calamity for them or the U.S. when it happens. Greater allied burden-sharing will reduce or eliminate the need for American military presence in many parts of the world, and that could help to trim the budget and it could help to keep the U.S. out of long, expensive military campaigns. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 87 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***PMC Bad*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 88 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Extinction PMC use breaks the state monopoly on normative violence – causing extinction Orts ‘02 Eric Orts, Professor of Legal Studies and Management, Wharton School @ UPenn, “CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, STAKEHOLDER ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE,” http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp427.pdf In a globalized society, simplified versions of Clausewitz no longer apply. Instead, nation-states are losing their grip on their monopolies of violence. Global society may be returning to a world characterized by complex struggles in which “political, social, economic, and religious motives” become “hopelessly entangled.”53 If so, then we may well expect the return to prominence of “mercenaries” and “swarms of private armies” such as those that characterized the period of the Reformation and the Thirty Years’ War in Europe.54 Perhaps the leading contemporary theorist of war, John Keegan, agrees with the premises of this diagnosis. According to Keegan, war has become too expensive for modern rich states to wage against each other in its “full potentiality,” but it has also “become, paradoxically, a cheap and deadly undertaking for poor states, for enemies of the state idea, and for factions in states falling apart.”55 Rather than states, we therefore face new kinds of enemies. “The rogue ruler, the terrorist and the fundamentalist movement, the ethnic or religious faction,” Keegan writes, “are all enemies as serious as any, in an age of junk weapons, as civilization has ever faced.”56 In other words, new technologies and the political challenges of war in a modern, globalized world have changed significantly. Limited rather than unlimited war becomes the rule, rather than the exception.57 As General Wesley Clark writes, military actions in this “difficult region” are “not quite war – not quite peace.”58 At the same time that Keegan recognizes technological and political changes in the nature of modern war, however, he criticizes Clausewitz’s traditional conception on normative grounds. Keegan sees Clausewitz as producing “the most pernicious philosophy” of war “yet conceived” because it views war as “a value free activity, outside the moral sphere.”59 The history of the catastrophes of the “short” twentieth century and its two global wars provide graphic evidence that Clausewitz was mistaken in thinking that the “rational” calculations of national interests by states would limit warfare.60 Important implications for a contemporary moral perspective on war follow from its new globalized character. War changes over time.61 “Like a disease,” again according to Keegan, “it exhibits the capacity to mutate, and mutates fastest in the fact of efforts to control or eliminate it.”62 Keegan defines war as “collective killing for some collective purpose.”63 It retains a “a scourge-like nature . . . to threaten the very survival of civilization itself.”64 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 89 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – War PMCs make warfare inevitable Twatio, 5-31 (Bill Twatio, Writer for the National Post, “Privatizing War; The Growth of corporate armies raises troubling legal and moral questions about who has the right to wield force,” The National Post, May 31st 2010 ) P.W. Singer estimates that the private provision of military services is now a $100-billion industry worldwide. That private companies make money from war is not news. Since Napoleon's time, armies have hired civilian contractors to supply and support front-line troops. Smart operators knew that bloodshed spelled bonanza and eagerly signed contracts to provide munitions, uniforms, rations and transport. What is different now is that private companies are moving well beyond their traditional support role into areas that were previously the preserve of nation states. Since the end of the Cold War, governments around the world have slimmed down their armed forces. It is estimated that there are seven million fewer soldiers today than there were in 1989. Those former soldiers didn't just fade away. Some reconstituted themselves as corporations, while others sold their skills to the highest bidder. Again, this is nothing new. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars, hundreds of Polish officers who had placed their faith in Napoleon to resurrect the Polish state, ended up fighting a slave rebellion in Haiti on behalf of France. The new order designed by the Congress of Vienna reduced the demand for professional soldiers in Europe, leading to an exodus of junior officers seeking employment in Latin America. The failed revolutions in 1848 led to the emigration of democratically-inclined military personnel, many of whom ended up fighting on the Union side in the American Civil War. It was only after the two World Wars, however, that the full impact of the proliferation of military expertise, personnel and hardware become evident. German military advisers were much in demand around the world, and former Waffen SS formations fought in Algeria and Indochina with the French Foreign Legion, while Dutch members of the SS were shipped off to Korea as a precondition for regaining their citizenship. Veterans of the Second World War formed the first generation of mercenaries that became notorious in the post-independence years in Africa. Executive Outcomes (EO) is an immensely profitable descendant of those early mercenary companies. Founded in South Africa in 1989, it operated as a small closed corporation with only two directors and a dwindling bank account until it landed a two-year contract to provide military services to the Angolan government -- a contract that would earn the company over US$80-million and lucrative oil and diamond concessions. In the years to come, it acquired an impressive arsenal of military hardware, including Soviet-made Mi-24 helicopter gunships, Mi-17 troop carriers, light aircraft and two Boeing 727 transports flying out of Johannesburg and Malta. EO claims to have a significant competitive advantage over its rivals as it has a pan-African communication network, is capable of operating in politically sensitive and high-risk security regions, and has the ability to secure its own and others' assets in extremely confrontational situations. From humble beginnings two decades ago, Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) has become the best-known American private miltary company, nurtured and led by the elite of retired U.S. military personnel. With headquarters in Alexandria, Va., it has 500 permanent employees with a turnover of $52-million annually. Its resource pool consists of more than 7,000 retired service members, including 200 former general or flag officers. In his personal message on the MPRI website, president and CEO Major-General (retired) Vernon B. Lewis is forthright: "We are owned and operated by retired senior military professionals and/or their families. We work in far-flung corners of the world, doing important things. If you have military or other skills that would be of value to our diverse, wide-ranging customers, we invite you to add your name to our database ... and be considered for future employment." MPRI's major contract to date was the innocuous-sounding Democracy Transition Assistance Program for the Republic of Croatia. In March 1994, Gojko Susak, the Croatian defence minister, appealed to the U.S. military for assistance. Although Washington was sympathetic to what it viewed as a potential ally in an unstable region, a United Nations arms embargo tied the hands of the U.S. armed forces. Pentagon officials referred Susak to MPRI. In clear violation of UN resolutions, which also specifically required the United States to restrict the activities of private companies, MPRI provided key personnel, including two retired four-star generals, to train and equip the Croatian army. The impact was immediate and dramatic. Just months after hiring MPRI, the Croats launched the stunningly successful Operation ULJA (Storm) against the Serbs in the Krajina. In a mechanized offensive, integrating artillery and air power, the Croatians quickly overran the defences, sending the Serb army into retreat along with a half-million refugees. UN peacekeepers, including the 2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment (the Van Doos), could do nothing to prevent widespread ethnic cleansing. The growth of corporate armies raises troubling legal and moral questions, not just about the status of the companies providing military services, but also about who has the right to wield force. Are employees of these companies combatants or non-combatants? Blackwater employees in Iraq, for example, were involved in 195 shooting incidents. In 163 of these, including a notorious massacre in Faludja, they opened fire first. Other than the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, there are no regulations governing this burgeoning business. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states that the services of military advisors are not seen as mercenary activities as long as these experts do not take any direct part in hostilities. However, some do. Executive Outcomes deployed infantry and heavy artillery units in Angola and Sierra Leone and Sandline engaged in combat in Papua New Guinea. Furthermore, many of these organizations have assisted governments in their struggles against opposition groups and have propped up dictators -- often at the request of corrupt business leaders or for financial gain. Multinational corporations have used private military companies to guard mines and oil installations and to augment the security forces of governments with some of the most appalling human rights records in the world, enabling them to mortgage future concessions to fuel their wars. The activities of private military companies must be curtailed if the international community is serious about ending the endemic warfare in the developing world. This seems unlikely, though, given the profits to be had. "Frankly, I'd like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole field to private industry," Minderbinder said. Prophetically. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 90 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Stability The monopolization of private militaries poses the greatest threat to stability efforts Singer 02 (P.W., an Olin Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution., “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security” Muse) Contractual Dilemmas The pull between economic incentives and political exigency has created a variety of intriguing dilemmas for the privatized military industry. At issue are divided loyalties and different goals. Clear tensions exist between a PMF client's security objectives and a firm's desire to maximize profit. Put another way, the public good and a private company's good often conflict. A firm may claim that it will act only in its client's best interests, but this may not always be true. Because in these arrangements the locus of judgment shifts from the client to the PMF, the PMF becomes the agent enacting decisions critical to the security of the principal. Thus, in many cases a distinctive twist on conventional principal-agent concerns emerges. In addition, concerns that arise in any normal contracting environment--for example, incomplete information and monitoring, loss of control, and the difficulties of aligning incentives-- are further complicated when the business takes place within the military environment. Incomplete Information And Monitoring Difficulties. Problems of incomplete information and monitoring generally accompany any type of out- sourcing. These difficulties are intensified in the military realm, however, because few clients have experience in contracting with security agents. In most cases, there is either little oversight or a lack of clearly defined requirements, or both. Add in the fog of war, and proper monitoring becomes extremely difficult. Moreover, PMFs are usually autonomous and thus require extraterritorial monitoring, which is always problematic. And at times, the actual consumer [End Page 203] [Begin Page 205] may not be the contracting party: Some states, for example, pay PMFs to supply personnel on their behalf to international organizations. Another difficulty is the firms' focus on the bottom line: PMFs may be tempted to cut corners to increase their profits. No matter how powerful the client, this risk cannot be completely eliminated. During the Balkans conflict, for example, Brown & Root is alleged to have failed to deliver or severely overcharged the U.S. Army on four out of seven of its contractual obligations. 43 A further manifestation of this monitoring difficulty is the danger that PMFs may not perform their missions to the fullest. PMFs have incentives not only to prolong their contracts but also to avoid taking undue risks that might endanger their own corporate assets. The result may be a protracted conflict that perhaps could have been avoided if the client had built up its own military forces or more closely monitored its private agent. This was certainly true of mercenaries in the Biafra conflict in the 1970s, and many suspect that this was also the case with PMFs in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in 1997-99. In the latter instance, the Ethiopians essentially leased a small but complete air force from the Russian aeronautics firm Sukhoi--including Su-27 jet fighter planes, pilots, and ground staff. Some contend, though, that this private Russian force failed to prosecute the war fully--for example, by rarely engaging Eritrea's air force, which itself was rumored to have hired Russian and Ukrainian pilots. 44 A Critical Loss Of Control. As PMFs become increasingly popular, so too does the danger of their clients becoming overly dependent on their services. Reliance on a private firm means that an integral part of one's strategic success is vulnerable to changes in market costs and incentives. This dependence can result in two potential risks to the security of the client: (1) the agent (the firm) might leave its principal (the client) in the lurch, or (2) the agent might gain dominance over the principal. A PMF may have no compunction about suspending its contract if a situation becomes too risky in either financial or physical terms. Because they are typically based elsewhere, and in the absence of applicable international laws to enforce compliance, PMFs face no real risk of punishment if they or their employees defect from their contractual obligations. Industry advocates dismiss these claims by noting that firms failing to fulfill the terms of their contracts [End Page 205] would sully their reputation, thus hurting their chances of obtaining future contracts. Nevertheless, there are a number of situations in which short-term considerations could prevail over long-term market punishment. In game-theoretic terms, each interaction with a private actor is sui generis. Exchanges in the international security market may take the form of one-shot games rather than guaranteed repeated plays. 45 Sierra Leone faced such a situation in 1994, when the type 1 firm that it had hired (the Gurkha Security Guards, made up primarily of Nepalese soldiers) lost its commander in a rebel ambush. Reports suggest that the commander was later cannibalized. The firm decided to break its contract, and its employees fled the country, leaving its client without an effective military option until it was able to hire another firm. 46 The loss of direct control as a result of privatization carries risks even for strong states. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 91 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Stability For U.S. military commanders, an added worry of terrorist targeting or the potential use of weapons of mass destruction is that their forces are more reliant than ever on the surge capacity of type 3 support firms. The employees of these firms, however, cannot be forced to stay at their posts in the face of these or other dangers. 47 Because entire functions such as weapons maintenance and supply have become completely privatized, the entire military machine would break down if even a modest number of PMF employees chose to leave. In addition to sometimes failing to fulfill their contractual obligations, type 1 firms may pose another risk. In weak or failed states, PMFs, which are often the most powerful force on the local scene, may take steps to protect their own interests. Thus early termination of a contract, dissatisfaction with the terms of payment, or disagreements over specific orders could lead to unpleasant repercussions for a weak client. Indeed the corporate term "hostile takeover" may well take on new meaning when speaking of the privatized military industry. The precedent does exist--from thecondottieri, who took over their client regimes in the Middle Ages, to participants in the 1969 Mercenary Revolt in Zaire. More recently, there is continued suspicion that in 1996 Executive Outcomes helped to oust the leader of Sierra Leone, head of the regime that had hired it, in favor of a local general with whom the firm's executives had a better working relationship. 48 [End Page 206] Novel Incentive Measures. Another risk of outsourcing is that a firm's motivations for fighting may differ from those of its client. This is particularly a problem for clients that contract type 1 firms. These clients are often those most in need yet least able to pay and thus at the highest risk of default. In a number of cases, this imbalance has led to the creation of curious structures that attempt to align client and firm incentives. In a sort of Faustian bargain, a client locks in a firm's loyalties by mortgaging valuable public assets, usually to business associates of the PMF. This often takes place through veiled privatization programs. 49 To be paid, a firm must protect its new, at-risk assets, effectively tying its fortunes to those of its client. This was how cash-poor regimes in Angola, Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone allegedly compensated their PMFs--specifically, by selling off mineral and oil rights to related companies. Rebel groups in Sierra Leone and Angola are also rumored to have reached similar arrangements with rival corporations. In the long term, however, potentially valuable resources for the nation as a whole are lost forever to meet short-term exigencies. "Strategic privatization," in which the asset being traded as payment is located within an opponent's territory (e.g., a lucrative mine), provides an added variation. Even if during an intrastate conflict the regime is not in military control of certain public assets, as the internationally recognized sovereign, it can still legally privatize and sell them to a PMF or its associates in return for the PMF's services. In this case, the PMF must then seek out and attack the government's opponent in order to secure payment. This represents a modern parallel to Michael Doyle's notion of "imperialism by invitation," whereby parties that control ties to the international market acquire more power than their local rivals. 50 The Angolan government has been most effective in using this strategy, selling concessions that have placed mining companies and their type 1 protectors astride its opponent's lines of communication, thus adding to the government's recent strategic gains. These are only a few of the complications to consider when outsourcing military services. Other questions include: How would bankruptcies or mergers affect the continuation of services to a client? What would happen in the event of a foreign takeover of the parent company if the new owners are opposed to a PMF's operations? Would an optimum strategy for a losing opponent be a financial takeover of the corporate boardroom rather than [End Page 207] engagement on the battlefield? Each scenario leads to different empirical expectations other than using one's own military, and each requires internally focused contractual monitoring mechanisms to address such contingencies. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 92 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Stability The increasing presence of PMCs threatens global order and stability-the privatization of the military will be too powerful to control and dominate international affairs Sheehy and Maogoto 08 (Benedict and Jackson,Benedict Sheehy: B.Th., M.A., LL.B., M.A., LL.M. Senior Lecturer in Law, RMIT University (Australia); Jackson N. Maogoto: LL.B, LL.M., PhD, LLM, GCertPPT, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Manchester, “THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Lexis) C. PMCs and the State Based International System As PMCs become larger, they entrench themselves as key players in the crucial sovereign function of deployment of military force and now stand in a position to influence and engage traditional governmental exercise of decision-making power. n28 PMCs support numerous military operations throughout the world and act as crucial components in enhancing the capabilities of countries both in the Third World and in the West. Within the military establishment of countries of all sizes, thousands of PMC technical experts operate communications systems, maintain military aircraft, fix weapons systems, link troops to command centers, and in several cases, train national armies. n29 The heavy reliance on PMCs has contributed to increased private contractor presence on the battlefield. Many States (small and large) now rely on them for long-term support for major defense systems. n30 With technologically advanced systems requiring PMCs being, responsible for long-term support, military establishments are losing the capacity to manage and generate the ability to maintain key components of war, including not only command systems, but also military communication systems and surveillance apparatus. n31 PMCs are thus becoming the key supporting actors of military operations, and now stand in a position to "threaten global order with military force that is less accountable and controllable than [S]tate militaries." n32 PMCs are not waiting passively for States to interact with them; rather, PMCs are locating themselves strategically in key militarily strong States and actively lobbying to be retained by States. Despite the State's right to hold a monopoly on the use of force, there is nothing natural about this arrangement. The monopolization of force by the State has never been absolute. The reality, past and present, is that "[a]s long [*158] as humanity has waged war, there have been mercenaries. n33 States have not been averse to incorporating or capturing the "violence of privateers-a form of violence external to the State--and selectively sanction[ing] it when profitable" or expedient. n34 In centuries past, States often relied on private organizations chartering companies that had their own military power to undertake Statesanctioned foreign ventures. n35These ventures included State-centric activities including founding colonies where States themselves lacked the finance, and assisting States' in pursuing hegemonic ambitions by offering extra military muscle. n36 In essence, the State's monopolization of force is a rather recent phenomenon. Indeed, "[u]ntil the midnineteenth century, military knowledge and labor were an alienable commodity in an international market." n37 "Sovereignty bore little or no relation to the control of organized violence." n38 Denationalization of violence to PMCs affects international security by transforming power from State-organized militaries to private militaries. It creates a new threat to the traditional Westphalian paradigm of the State as the natural entity in control of the legal use of lethal military force. This decline of the Nation-State and the growing role of PMCs are symptoms of a larger challenge to the aspirations of order in the world as represented by the system of Nation-States and the rule of law, which is eroded by the alternative system of corporate bargaining and the rule of might. n39 In this new landscape, regardless of whether States choose to interact with PMCs--that is to retain their services and marshal their capacity or not--and as a result of the existence of PMCs, States themselves are changing in character. "[I]nteractions between PMFs and States are generally carried out in private without the glare of international public scrutiny that typically surrounds decisions by States to expand, modernize, or mobilize their military capacity" or take violent action, whether internally or against other States. n40 Further, the profit- making objective of PMCs undermines legitimacy in their deployment, and such legitimacy, which is hard enough to determine in [*159] international politics, becomes even more difficult when billions in potential profits come into play when PMC contracting becomes part of the equation. The PMC does not fit into the paradigm of the State as an entity- bearing monopoly over military force. Commenting on the decentralization of State control over the use of force, Montgomery Sapone notes: "This change in military relationship between States and private entities suggests that some States no longer exert explicit control over military technology or manpower. Military skill is becoming increasingly privatized and commodified." n41 The decentralization of international security from State-organized militaries not only threatens the traditional Westphalian model of State-monopolized force, n42 but also accentuates the inability of international law to hold private actors accountable. n43 One of the dangers of the privatization of force--the dangers of excessive and arbitrary uses of force--materialized on a large and well-publicized scale in the recent invasion of Iraq. "The central claim is that private punishment, policing, and military corporations violate human rights" and international law obligations more often than public punishment, policing, and military institutions n44 in the various scandals that continue to engulf the military operation in Iraq as it did in earlier controversies. n45 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 93 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Stability PMCs pose a threat to international stability and peace Ranganathan 10 Surabhi, PhD Candidate, Cambridge University, Program Officer/Institute Fellow at the New York University Institute for International Law and Justice. “BETWEEN COMPLICITY AND IRRELEVANCE? INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF REGULATING PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS” Georgetown Journal of International Law, Lexis) d) Potential for Conflict PMSCs could destabilize the international system by enhancing the potential for conflict. For one, even without participating in active combat, PMSCs may significantly alter the war-making capacity of any group or state through providing operational support and logistical assistance, training regular troops, planning the conduct of operations, and providing other services such as intelligence collection and analysis. Moreover, democratic accountability of the executive arm of a government for deployment of, and actions of, PMSCs is usually lower than for military personnel. n160 A government could mount an operation subject to far less scrutiny than would be the possible if the entire operation were to consist of military personnel. PMSC actions in the field can also directly catalyze conflicts. An example is the Battle of Fallujah, which was triggered by the capture, mutilation and killing of a team of security guards belonging to Blackwater by Iraqi insurgents. n161 The US army was forced to respond, leading to a bloody battle in which 36 service personnel, 200 insurgents, [*344] and 600 civilians were killed. n162 According to a U.S. Congressional Report, Blackwater had sent an unprepared team to Fallujah, an insurgent stronghold. n163 The report suggested that if the team had been better trained, the Battle of Fallujah could have been avoided. n164 States may be interested in regulating PMSCs either to fully harness the benefits of "economy, efficiency and effectiveness" n165 or to prevent other states from doing so. Inter alia, state regulation of PMSCs may be actuated by an interest in preserving peace and stability in the international system. n166 State responsibility, particularly the duty to prevent and punish unlawful participation in the use of force by nationals, may also drive regulation. In contrast, industry associations are not obliged to prevent domestic or international conflicts, or to consider the effects of sudden changes in balances of power upon the international system. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 94 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Global Spillover The use of private military corporations by the United States makes it impossible to fight military privatization globally – global privateers destabilize countries, prop up rogue regimes, resist selfdetermination, and cause proliferation Michaels ‘04 JON D. MICHAELS, Law Clerk to the Honorable Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable David H. Souter, U.S. Supreme Court; J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Oxford University; B.A., Williams College, “ARTICLE: BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZING WAR,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Fall 2004, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1001, lexis For example, major international military firms such as Executive Outcomes, Stablico, and Omega Support have each worked at various times on both sides of the Zaire-Congo conflict in the late 1990s. 428 [*1119] Executive Outcomes also helped the Sierra Leone government fend off rebel advances in 1995-96, 429 and then had a hand in appointing an interim head of government - one reportedly with whom the South African-based firm could "work." 430 Evidence also points to the fact that Executive Outcomes considered the possibility of assisting the Rwandan Hutu government in 1994 - not too far in advance of the time that the Hutus were planning to unleash their murderous campaign against the Tutsis - and that Sandline came similarly close to working for the Mobutu regime in Zaire, despite its widespread notoriety as repressive and corrupt. 431 More recently, a failed military coup in Equatorial Guinea involved privateers financed by, among others, the son of Margaret Thatcher. The goal, apparently, was to install a more business-friendly leader as head of the oil-rich state. 432 Private military firms help prop up rogue regimes, resist struggles for self-determination, and contribute to the proliferation and diffusion of weaponry and soldiers around the world - axiomatically a destabilizing and thus undesirable phenomenon. 433 The existence of armaments held by stateless groups complicates the task for responsible countries who (for purposes of self-defense and collective security) keep track of and seek to contain the spread of weapons. The availability and acceptability of contractors makes it more difficult for countries to assess the relative strengths of rival nations, since one phone call to a group of out-of-work Ukrainian fighter pilots could radically alter a region's balance of power. 434 Of course, the existence of one such outfit also spawns greater [*1120] demand - as every government would like the security of a few Ukrainian fighter pilots on retainer. 435 Moreover, to the extent that privateers, especially those operating in Africa, may frequently be foreign nationals, the political and human costs of war may be quite low. 436 All of these factors point toward dangerous forms of military proliferation and thus threaten peace and stability. By all accounts, this global trend should be one the United States vociferously condemns. But can it do so credibly with thousands of its own privateers under contract? Even if the United States were to draw distinctions and make exceptions for its "professional" contractors, it probably still would be unable to lead a campaign against privateers. Therefore, privatization by the United States helps set a bad, enduring precedent and lends the global practice an unwarranted veneer of legitimacy. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 95 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Laundry List Private military firms destabilize Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa Michaels ‘04 JON D. MICHAELS, Law Clerk to the Honorable Guido Calabresi, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; Law Clerk designate, the Honorable David H. Souter, U.S. Supreme Court; J.D., Yale Law School; M.A., Oxford University; B.A., Williams College, “ARTICLE: BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL, DEMOCRATIC, AND STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WITH PRIVATIZING WAR,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Fall 2004, 82 Wash. U. L. Q. 1001, lexis [*1024] 3. A Survey of Recent Combat-Related Private Contracts: As mentioned above, in recent years, private military firms have protected the Karzai administration in still-unstable Afghanistan, secured American civil and military installations and served as interrogators in Iraq, bolstered and then counterbalanced the military capabilities of both the Bosnians and Croats in the Balkans, engaged in surveillance, reconnaissance, and coca-crop destroying as well as in counter-insurgency missions in Latin America, staffed security details for American officials in, among other areas, the Middle East, and attempted to bring some stability to war-ravaged Rwanda. This policy of federal contracting with private forces to serve in an array of critical zones of conflict to support American national security and foreign policy interests involves the delegation of not simply commercial responsibilities and accordingly represents a startling departure from previous partnerships with the private sector. In an effort to provide more specific details, I discuss six case studies. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 96 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Democracy PMCs Create a democratic deficit in US foreign policy Isenberg ‘09 “Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” David Isenberg is a researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and the author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Greenwood, 2009) January 2k9. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) REPORT The use of contractors has other deleterious effects, including the weakening of our system of government. Deborah Avant, a professor of political science at the University of California at Irvine and the Director of International Studies and the Center for Research on International and Global Studies, identifies three features that are common to democracies – constitutionalism, transparency and public consent, and concludes that the use of private security contractors in Iraq had “impeded constitutionalism and lowered transpar-ency.” She speculates that it had circumvented or impeded “effective public consent.” 75 Because Congress has less information about and control over the use of contractors than the use of troops, the White House and the Pentagon can rely on contractors to evade congressional (and, indirectly, public) opposition. 76 PMC employees usually remain outside the formal chain of command and are not allowed to take part in hostilities because they are regarded as civilians under International Humanitarian Law. However, in most of the military interventions today the distinction between frontline and hinterland blurs, bringing PMCs who are most active in logistics, site and convoy security and weapon maintenance ever closer to theater and to an active participation in hostilities. This not only increases risks that they will become a target of military attacks, it also calls upon the regular forces to extend their protection to these companies. Additionally, coordination is needed to prevent conflicts between the regular forces and the PMCs. The increase of so-called blue-on-white fire in Iraq — accidental attacks between U.S. forces and the contractors — indicates how difficult that is. 77 On a broader level, because the use of PMC receives less attention than the use of regular troops, this reduces the political cost of using force. Bluntly put, if someone is contributing to the war effort but is not on active duty in the U.S. military, nobody beyond his or her immediate family cares if they get killed. By contrast, the death of even a single infantryman or marine routinely winds up on the front page of the major papers. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 97 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Warfighting Being outside of the military command structure means PMCs make operational effectiveness impossible and tanks battlefield flexibility which is key to war-fighting Schreier ‘05 Fred Schreier, consultant with the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Graduate Institute of International Studies and Marina Caparini, Senior Fellow at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces Department of War Studies, King’s College, University of London, “Privatising Security: Law, Practice and Governance of Private Military and Security Companies” March 2005 http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/op06_privatising –security.pdf Key problems with military contractors exist because they are not part of the regular military hierarchy. At their core, military command centres deal with the planning, synchronization, and the management of violence. The destructive capacity of modern armed force is staggering. It takes an enormous effort to focus that destructive power on the right objectives without killing civilians – the so-called “collateral damage”, or each other – the so-called “friendly fire” or fratricide. Armed contractors operate outside of this military command structure for the most part, and thus their operations are not coordinated with military operations in most circumstances.132 Contractors often live separately, drive nonmilitary vehicles, use nonmilitary radios, and report to their corporate bosses. When their contracts require it, these contractors will establish relationships with local military units and other governmental agencies, but these relationships rarely include important details like precise routes and times for contractor convoys, or frequencies and call-signs for contractor personnel. This creates problems when soldiers and contractors work, or fight, in close proximity to each other. In Iraq, when contractor convoys drive from Baghdad to Fallujah, they are under no legal obligation to inform military commanders that they are on the way. Nor are contractors required to call in reports to the military command, leading to absurd situations like in Najaf, in which private contractors fought off attacks on the CPA headquarters that military officials learned of only hours later. The “ideal battlespace” would not contain any civilians. The presence of noncombatants as well as “civilians authorized to accompany the force” in the area of operations greatly complicates the life of a commander. Complexity is compounded when the commander is dependent upon PMCs to accomplish his mission. From an operational perspective, outsourcing is supposed to improve flexibility and relieve pressures on support personnel. However, one of the most obvious downsides of going into the battle with civilians is the loss of flexibility – one of the key tenets of successfully waging war. A commander’s freedom and ability to improvise quickly in using tactics, employing weapons, and deploying personnel have long been considered essential to victory in combat. Flexibility is equally essential for effective logistics performance – adapting logistics structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts. To resolve the challenges inherent in using contractors, the commanders must have information and awareness of contractors working in and around their areas of responsibility. Maintaining visibility of contractors and coordinating their movements are vital if the commander is to manage his available assets and capabilities efficiently and effectively. However, this visibility is difficult to establish since contractors are not really part of the chain of command and, in general, are not subject to the same orders that apply to soldiers regarding good order and discipline.133 And commanders have no easy way to get answers to questions about contractor support.134 Lack of information and awareness of PMCs or PSCs and their presence in supporting combat operations tend to result in: gaps in doctrine regarding who is responsible for securing lines of communication used by commercial suppliers; loss of visibility of assets moving in and around the theatre of operations; loss of control of contractor personnel and equipment; increased force responsibility for supporting contractor personnel in the areas of life support, force protection, housing, medical care, transportation, and operational and administrative control; use of additional manpower, material, and funding resources to support contractor personnel; concern about the availability of commercial supplies and services in a hostile environment; and gaps in providing logistics support if commercial supply lines become disrupted.135 In addition, Status of Forces Agreements and other arrangements with host nations may complicate the commander’s situation by restricting entry, movement, and action of PMCs and PSCs. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 98 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Warfighting Inability to court-martial PMCs kills hegemony by undermining military structure and alienating allies Donnelly ‘06 Robin M. Donnelly, JD Candidate at Georgetown University, Winter 2006, “Civilian Control of the Military,” The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy, 4 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 237, lexis Failure to hold contractors accountable not only undermines the nation's moral principles but also impedes U.S. strategic objectives in at least three ways: it alienates allies and local nationals, increases operational cost by exposing contractors to unfamiliar legal regimes, and erodes military morale. First, as a DOD Associate Deputy General Counsel told the House Judiciary Committee in 2000: the inability of U.S. authorities to adequately respond to serious misconduct within the civilian component of the U.S. Armed Forces, presents the strong potential for embarrassment in the international community, increases the possibility of hostility in the host nation's local community where our forces are assigned, and threatens relationships with our allies. 23 The U.S.'s apparent inability to punish civilian personnel implicated in Abu Ghraib damages the U.S.'s image abroad, and provides propaganda material for U.S. enemies. 24 This particularly impairs nation-building operations, where mission success requires winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population. 25 Where, as in Iraq, the U.S. seeks to help build a nation governed by the [*241] rule of law, failure to hold legally accountable U.S. personnel who harm local citizens poses a direct threat to the mission by diminishing the perceived value of a system of law and discouraging cooperation. Second, to operate overseas, the U.S. establishes Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which govern the relationships between the U.S. military and the countries in which it operates, usually referred to as the "host-nations." 26 These agreements generally include provisions for host-nation prosecution of crimes committed on its territory or against its interests. 27 Typically, the U.S. may request a waiver of host-nation jurisdiction in exchange for an obligation to prosecute U.S. citizens in the U.S. 28 If it appears to host-nations that the U.S. will not, or cannot, prosecute contractors, host-nations may be less willing to surrender prosecutorial rights with respect to any, including military, personnel when negotiating SOFAs, and may less often agree to waive jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the force. These factors directly increase costs to the military by increasing transaction costs with hostnations. They also impose indirect costs in that contractors will demand greater risk-insurance provisions and compensation for exposure to unfamiliar legal regimes possibly lacking the procedural protections of American courts. Finally, the inability to bring civilians to justice harms strategic objectives by undermining military morale. First, failure to impose criminal liability on civilians allows crimes committed against U.S. servicemembers and their families to go unpunished. 29 Second, military members who engage in criminal misconduct together with civilians face courts-martial while their civilian accomplices go unpunished, engendering a perception of unequal treatment. 30 This second factor intensifies in combat areas when, for example, contractors abandon a mission without sanction, an act for which a service member could face execution. 31 Depleted morale harms the military's mission, including recruitment, [*242] and the principles of professionalism the military emphasizes in its training. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 99 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Warfighting PMCs are reducing the militaries power severely Hill 08 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NATHAN, United States Air Force, “MILITARY CONTRACTORS -TOO MUCH DEPENDENCE?” The use of contractors has undoubtedly enabled the U.S. military to reduce active duty troop levels. But is that a good thing? There is an age-old saying, “there is strength in numbers” and there are endless examples to prove the validity of that saying. Efficiency experts will claim that “extra employees” are unnecessary and should be eliminated from the payroll. Based on that argument (and numerous supporting arguments) the U.S. military has reduced the number of active duty members. On paper, the results may seem to be great. However, the second and third order effects that are experienced in reality have all too often been overlooked. The military is not a company; it is an instrument of national power and needs to be ready to respond to a broad array of problems in a moments notice. This often means transitioning from 10- hour operations to 24-hour operations without prior warning. In addition to the “normal functions” that often must be accomplished during the additional 14 hours, 24-hour operations are usually accompanied by an increase in threat level and an increase in security. All of these “additional jobs” require manpower; usually the manpower does not come from contractors, it is taken “out of hide” from the active duty ranks. An organization manned for perfectly efficient 10-hour operations is suddenly presented with an unsolvable problem when required to go to 24-hour operations. The U.S. military has always valued education and training. But because of troop reductions, commanders at all levels now have less flexibility in allowing military members the opportunity for training and education. The mission must come first; and if allowing a soldier, sailor or airmen to go off for training will cause the mission to falter, a commander may be forced to deny the soldier, sailor or airmen the training. The increased number of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq has had a serious impact on the military in terms of readiness (i.e. readiness for other contingencies) and morale. Increased troop levels would offset some this impact. There is another, more intangible reason for an increase in troop strength rather than an increase in contractor strength. It can be argued that anyone who has ever worn a military uniform in service of their country is forever changed. And generally the change is positive both for themselves and for their country. The military instills discipline. It promotes integrity, physical strength, health, unity, cooperation and teamwork. It combats stereotyping and sexual harassment. It fosters in its members a broader perspective of the world in which we live. It does wonders for patriotism. If more citizens could experience these positive changes, it would be better for the country. However, the trend is not good. The population of the United States is more than 330 million; but less than one percent of the population is currently serving in the Army.59The argument may be made that a one for one replacement of a contractor with a military member saves money. That argument may look good on paper. But if a contractor only works 40 hours per week and the military member works 60 hours per week (or at least they could work that much on any given week), then the military member potentially provides 50% more production. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 100 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday PMC Bad – Monopolizing Violence The monopolization of violence has led to increased involvement of PMCs in politics. Under the disguise as humanitarian aid, profit-based PMCs are increasing operations around the world causing mass violence Sheehy and Maogoto 08 (Benedict and Jackson,Benedict Sheehy: B.Th., M.A., LL.B., M.A., LL.M. Senior Lecturer in Law, RMIT University (Australia); Jackson N. Maogoto: LL.B, LL.M., PhD, LLM, GCertPPT, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Manchester, “THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Lexis) VII. THE CREATION OF A CORPORATE FRANKENSTEIN From Sandline International's connections with the British government to MPRI's relations with the U.S. Army, to the AEGIS, U.S.-CACI, and U.S. links, PMCs need to court favor with the governments has been at the center of their cultivation of extensive political connections. Consider, for example, the current Iraq war. The connections between the PMC and government have been so close that there has been considerable concern expressed among scholars and media alike. Isenberg, for example, makes "Political Connections" leadership, political donations, and lobbying of PMCs the first items of concern in his ground-breaking work on PMCs in Iraq.n146 As one would expect, the extraordinary growth of the PMC sector suggests that it will be undertaking all the normal channels for increasing its business, and particularly, with government being a main client, a heavy reliance on lobbyists. The tentacles of the PMC in commercial and political circles are dwarfed only by their financial ambitions. In 2005, for example, a Blackwater subsidiary put on a by-invitation-only convention for diplomats, oil companies, and weapons manufacturers. n147 Another example of PMC lobby success is that which followed the gruesome killing and desecration of four Blackwater employees in Falluj ah. That killing lead to the assault on the city and a swell of patriotism and support for the occupation of Iraq, and the timing of those events is well known; Blackwater's capitalization on the event is not. The day after the incident, Blackwater retained the well-connected lobby firm, Alexander Strategy Group. While the information shared and services rendered are confidential, and hence, one must be cautious in drawing inferences or conclusions, the record is that two months later, Blackwater had won a coveted international security contract valued at $ 300 million. n148 [*176] In the world of profits, nothing is sacred. In another attempt to drum up new business, PMC lobbyists have engaged in calling for PMCs to be engaged in a new line of work--delivery of humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations. Doug Brooks, the President of the PMC lobby group, International Peace Operations Association, claims that westerners fail to grasp the reality of weak, inept, and corrupt African militaries. n149 Brooks argues that without this important information about Africa, non-Africans incorrectly assume that African militaries can attend to African peacekeeping. n150 In line with his views, Brooks wrote an article for popular consumption advocating surrendering the problem in Darfur to PMCs. n151 Unsurprisingly, among a rather significant lobby, n152 Blackwater has made known its interest in securing a contract for services in Darfur, making its case in the media in March 2006. n153 This intention is supported by Brooks who refers to the well-known cases where PMCs, Executive Outcomes and Gurkha Security Services, made significant positive contributions to end the brutal civil wars in Angola and Sierra Leone, respectively. n154 It is not at all clear, however, that a few cases produce a norm; although, it is inappropriate to rule out some tip of the spear PMC assistance in certain interventions. A relatively significant amount of opinion and advice on PMCs given to Congress in a 2007 research report is based on the opinions of the above-mentioned Brooks.n155 In a research report on the subject entitled, "Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues," Brooks is mentioned ten times, which is more than the combined input of the [*177] world's four leading PMC experts. n156 This industry lobby reflects not only a particular ideology concerning governance, but obviously an agenda to increase the PMC market through further commoditized violence. n157 Professor Anna Leander identifies the issue in its broader, political context: . . . the political processes establishing for what purpose what kind of force is used are fundamental and PMCs do take part in them and do shape them. . . . PMCs are increasingly present as a new cast of efficient, competent, and apolitical security experts. In this context, the . . . way PMCs (as specialists on violence) shape politics is readily swept aside and forgotten. n158 In the African context, it has been described as: "[PMCs] interpret political instability in Africa as a market issue, and position themselves perfectly in that market."n159 Indeed Brooks, when advocating PMCs peacekeeping, sees the problem in Africa as a technical issue, and hence, subject to his exclusively technical solution. n160For the most part, politics escapes the discussion except as lamentable obstacles to the PMC solution. n161 Brooks does make mention of a mediation group as part of a pre-PMC deployment procedure, n162 and notes that in the African context: "There are too many factions involved, too many warlords, and too much money in the offing for the winner." n163 However, he fails to PMC advocates emphasize how PMCs crave legitimacy. n164 They claim PMCs value their good names so highly that there is little or no cause for [*178] concern.n165 They so emphasize the social benefits of PMCs, economic benefits of PMCs, and their humanitarian assistance, sprinkled with discussions of "capacity building" that it begins to sound like PMCs are interested in charity work. n166 In the midst of all the public service bombast, it becomes difficult to remember that under discussion is a group of self-interested, profit-seeking armed individuals whose job it is to fight. Importantly, this picture does not reflect the views and experiences of some employees on the ground with the same address who should get the support of the PMC or on what basis. The famed PMCs on the missions in question. n167 The efficacy of the PMC lobby has drawn academic comment. Markusen observes: "Their congressional success makes it difficult for the nation to adapt to new security realities and to shift resources toward new approaches such as peacekeeping missions, negotiated settlements, and economic development in place of regional warfare." n168 This effective lobbying activity calls attention to a dangerous and fundamental problem with PMCs; there is a combination of commercial imperative with its marketing spin, disregard of (if not outright opposition to) political process and worldview that violence is the solution . The limitation of a worldview is encapsulated in the old adage, "to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail." n169 This dangerous combination of issues suggests that PMC industry's activities, connections, and advice to home governments and in the international community, should be subject to scrutiny and any advice considered and taken only with utmost caution. After all, policy makers do not turn to tobacco companies for advice on health issues. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 101 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***Solvency*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 102 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Blackwater are serial human rights violators – They shouldn’t have a contract Marlowe, 6-26 (Lara Marlowe, Writer for The Irish Times, “Notorious Blackwater firm awarded lucrative Afghanistan Contract,” June 26th 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0626/1224273362918.html ) IN THE week when President Barack Obama fired Gen Stanley McChrystal for the express purpose of preserving civilian command over the military, it was ironic, to say the least, to learn that the US government had awarded nearly a quarter of a billion dollars in contracts to a company that has long evaded accountability and transparency, and repeatedly taken the law into its own hands. The state department is paying Xe (pronounced “zee” – an abbreviation for the inert, non-combustible gas Xenon) $120 million (€ 96.8 million) to guard new US consulates in Afghanistan. Xe is still widely known as Blackwater, but renamed itself in February 2009, in the hope people would forget its 2007 massacre of 17 civilians in Baghdad. And, after announcing last year that it was cutting ties with Blackwater, the CIA will pay the world’s largest private army about $100 million for services in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Blackwater/Xe received more than $1.5 billion in US taxpayer money between 2001 and 2009. Erik Prince, its founder and chairman, a former Navy Seal and heir to an automotive parts fortune, was recruited as an “asset” by the agency in 2004, Vanity Fair magazine stated. Prince is a fundamentalist Christian whom Vanity Fair describes as “clench-jawed and tightly wound” with a “sense of his own place in history [that] can border on the evangelical”. Prince named the youngest of his seven children Charles Donovan after William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the founder of the CIA. A year ago, CIA director Leon Panetta told a congressional intelligence committee that Prince and Blackwater were involved in a “covert action programme” that was to have assassinated al-Qaeda operatives. Panetta said he stopped the programme when he learned of its existence. At least two aborted targets were civilians. In August, the New York Times and Washington Post reported that the CIA had hired Blackwater/Xe to help it kill Jihadists. “At hidden bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan . . . the company’s contractors assemble and load Hellfire missiles and 500-pound laser-guided bombs on remotely piloted Predator aircraft, work previously performed by employees of the CIA,” the New York Times said. Meanwhile, Blackwater/Xe clocked up a shocking criminal record. Last August, two former Blackwater employees filed sworn affidavits in Virginia saying that Prince murdered or facilitated the murder of individuals who co-operated with federal authorities investigating the company. This month, the justice department asked a federal appeals court to reinstate a case against five Blackwater mercenaries who opened fire, unprovoked, on civilians in Nisoor Square in Baghdad in 2007, killing 17 and wounding 30. (A judge had dismissed the case on a technicality last December.) Prince denied a New York Times report that the company tried to bribe Iraqi officials to have charges dropped. Last January, two Blackwater/Xe employees were charged with shooting dead two Afghan civilians in Kabul last May. In March, the Senate armed service committee revealed that the company had used a shell company and made false statements to gain contracts in Afghanistan. On April 16th, the justice department charged five high-ranking Xe officials with 15 offences, including attempted bribery of Jordanian officials, hiding weapons and obstructing justice in the investigation of the illegal possession of automatic weapons on the company’s 7,000-acre private military base in North Carolina. That the state department and CIA have just awarded hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts to such a company is mind-boggling. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 103 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Blackwater’s poor performance means their contracts should be terminated Chatterjee, 6-23 (Pratap Chatterjee, Writer for the Asia Times, “Military Contractors retreat, counter-attack,” June 23rd 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF23Ak03.html ) Blackwater's (Xe's) new Afghan contract: Perhaps the most famous private military contractor in Afghanistan and Iraq North Carolina-based Xe, formerly known as Blackwater - was not invited to sit at the witness table either, despite the fact that the company had been the subject of several investigations into misconduct. For example, in September 2007, security guards from Xe shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad's Nisour Square. Xe staff have also been accused of killing other private security contractors - in December 2006 Andrew J Moonen was accused of killing a security guard of Iraqi vice president Adel Abdul Mahdi. And as recently as May 2009, four Xe contractors were accused of killing an Afghan on the Jalalabad road in Kabul. Members of the commission noted with astonishment that the US State Department had awarded Xe a US$120 million contract to guard US consulates in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan this past Friday. Asked to explain why Xe was awarded the contract, Charlene R Lamb, deputy assistant secretary for international programs at the State Department, stated that the competitors for the contract - DynCorp and Triple Canopy - weren't as qualified. Yet Don Ryder of DynCorp and Ignacio Balderas of Triple Canopy testified that they were both qualified and able to do the contract. The two men said that they would consider lodging a formal protest at the State Department on Tuesday after a debriefing with the government. The choice of Xe, which has been banned by the government of Iraq, left the commissioners with little doubt that the contract award system was flawed. "What does it take for poor contractual performance to result in contract termination or non-award of future contracts?" wondered Thibault. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 104 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Blackwater is getting contracts in Afghanistan despite their dark history CBS News, 6-18 (CBS News, “Blackwater Firm Gets $120M U.S. Gov't Contract,” June 18 th 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-31727_16220008238-10391695.html) CBS News has learned in an exclusive report that the State Department has awarded a part of what was formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide a contract worth more than $120 million for providing security services in Afghanistan. Private security firm U.S. Training Center, a business unit of the Moyock, N.C.-based Blackwater, now called Xe Services, was awarded the contract Friday, a State Department spokeswoman said Friday night. Under the contract, U.S. Training Center will provide "protective security services" at the new U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, the spokeswoman said. The firm can begin work "immediately" and has to start within two months. The contract lasts a year but can be extended twice for three months at a time to last a maximum of 18 months. Should the firm fulfill all 18 months available in the contract, it will be paid a total of $120,123,293, the spokeswoman said. The awarding of the contract comes just more than four months after the government of Iraq ordered hundreds of Blackwater-linked security guards to leave the country within seven days or face possible arrest. The Justice Department is also trying to prosecute a case against five Blackwater guards who had opened fire on a crowded Baghdad street in 2007. Last December, a federal judge dismissed the U.S. government's case against the guards in the deaths of unarmed Iraqi civilians killed in the shooting because prosecutors used sworn statements the guards gave under a promise of immunity. Federal prosecutors are continuing to appeal the dismissal. The Justice Department's case or Blackwater's expulsion from Iraq didn't block U.S. Training Center from bidding on the multi-million dollar contract, the State Department spokeswoman said. "Under federal acquisition regulations, the prosecution of the specific Blackwater individuals does not preclude the company or its successive companies and subsidiaries from bidding on contracts," the spokeswoman said. "On the basis of full and open competition, the department performed a full technical evaluation of all proposals and determined the U.S. Training Center has the best ability and qualifications to meet the contract requirements." Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 105 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Blackwater are getting more contracts but still haven’t sharpened their act Elliot, 6-28 (Justin Elliott, Writer for Talking Points, “Obama just can’t quit Blackwater,” http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/06/obama_just_cant_quit_blackwater.php?ref=mp ) June 28th 2010, In fairness, Barack Obama never said he wanted to quit Blackwater. But it's still notable that the troubled firm made famous by helping to fight George W. Bush's wars has become a permanent part of the U.S. foreign policy tableau, with news of two big contracts issued to the firm by the Obama Administration in recent weeks. CIA chief Leon Panetta, whose agency's $100 million contract with Blackwater for security in Afghanistan was recently revealed, explained on ABC Sunday (emphasis ours): "[Blackwater] provided a bid that was underbid everyone else by about $26 million. And a panel that we had said that they can do the job, that they have shaped up their act. So there really was not much choice but to accept that contract." (More in a bit on whether Blackwater, now known as Xe, has really shaped up its act.) The CIA contract follows the news this month that the State Department awarded the company an 18-month, $120 million contract to protect consulates in Afghanistan. And even that's not all. In December, a Blackwater official told a contracting commission appointed by Congress that the company has training and security contracts as well as a "drug interdiction unit" working for the Defense Department in Afghanistan. And in a must-read story published Sunday, McClatchy reported that the Obama Administration has opted not to pursue criminal charges against Blackwater for possible violations of sanctions in the company's long campaign to sell services to the government of Southern Sudan. As noted above, Obama never took a particularly hard line on the government's increasing reliance on military contractors like Blackwater during the 2008 campaign. He promised only to "establish the legal status of contractor personnel, making possible prosecution of any abuses committed by private military contract." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, for her part, blasted "private mercenary firms" and sponsored legislation to actually ban them from Iraq. It's possible that the government has concluded internally that Blackwater has turned over a new leaf -- Panetta referred Sunday to a CIA panel that determined the company "shaped up their act." But publicly, the allegations of criminal activity and malfeasance continue to flow apace. The best-known example was the killing of 17 civilians by Blackwater contractors in Baghdad's Nisour Square in 2007. Much more recently, two men working for Blackwater in Afghanistan were charged with murder in the killing two Afghan civilians in Kabul in May 2009. A civil lawsuit filed by two former Blackwater employees in February alleged the company put a Filipino prostitute on its taxpayer-funded tab in Afghanistan under the category of "Morale Welfare Recreation." Finally, this past April, several former top company officials were indicted on weapons and obstruction of justice charges. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 106 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Blackwater’s actions have been appalling – They should not have a military contract Marlowe, 6-26 (Lara Marlowe, Writer for The Irish Times, “Notorious Blackwater firm awarded lucrative Afghanistan Contract,” June 26 th 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2010/0626/1224273362918.html ) IN THE week when President Barack Obama fired Gen Stanley McChrystal for the express purpose of preserving civilian command over the military, it was ironic, to say the least, to learn that the US government had awarded nearly a quarter of a billion dollars in contracts to a company that has long evaded accountability and transparency, and repeatedly taken the law into its own hands. The state department is paying Xe (pronounced “zee” – an abbreviation for the inert, non-combustible gas Xenon) $120 million (€ 96.8 million) to guard new US consulates in Afghanistan. Xe is still widely known as Blackwater, but renamed itself in February 2009, in the hope people would forget its 2007 massacre of 17 civilians in Baghdad. And, after announcing last year that it was cutting ties with Blackwater, the CIA will pay the world’s largest private army about $100 million for services in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Blackwater/Xe received more than $1.5 billion in US taxpayer money between 2001 and 2009. Erik Prince, its founder and chairman, a former Navy Seal and heir to an automotive parts fortune, was recruited as an “asset” by the agency in 2004, Vanity Fair magazine stated. Prince is a fundamentalist Christian whom Vanity Fair describes as “clench-jawed and tightly wound” with a “sense of his own place in history [that] can border on the evangelical”. Prince named the youngest of his seven children Charles Donovan after William “Wild Bill” Donovan, the founder of the CIA. A year ago, CIA director Leon Panetta told a congressional intelligence committee that Prince and Blackwater were involved in a “covert action programme” that was to have assassinated al-Qaeda operatives. Panetta said he stopped the programme when he learned of its existence. At least two aborted targets were civilians. In August, the New York Times and Washington Post reported that the CIA had hired Blackwater/Xe to help it kill Jihadists. “At hidden bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan . . . the company’s contractors assemble and load Hellfire missiles and 500-pound laser-guided bombs on remotely piloted Predator aircraft, work previously performed by employees of the CIA,” the New York Times said. Meanwhile, Blackwater/Xe clocked up a shocking criminal record. Last August, two former Blackwater employees filed sworn affidavits in Virginia saying that Prince murdered or facilitated the murder of individuals who co-operated with federal authorities investigating the company. This month, the justice department asked a federal appeals court to reinstate a case against five Blackwater mercenaries who opened fire, unprovoked, on civilians in Nisoor Square in Baghdad in 2007, killing 17 and wounding 30. (A judge had dismissed the case on a technicality last December.) Prince denied a New York Times report that the company tried to bribe Iraqi officials to have charges dropped. Last January, two Blackwater/Xe employees were charged with shooting dead two Afghan civilians in Kabul last May. In March, the Senate armed service committee revealed that the company had used a shell company and made false statements to gain contracts in Afghanistan. On April 16th, the justice department charged five high-ranking Xe officials with 15 offences, including attempted bribery of Jordanian officials, hiding weapons and obstructing justice in the investigation of the illegal possession of automatic weapons on the company’s 7,000-acre private military base in North Carolina. That the state department and CIA have just awarded hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts to such a company is mind-boggling. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 107 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Despite Blackwater’s bad reputation they are still getting contracts in Afghanistan Beaumont, ’09 (Peter Beaumont, Writer for The Guardian (London), “International: Blackwater: The Company: Private army that is still winning contracts in Afghanistan,” August 21st 2009 ) Despite its recent attempt to rebrand itself as Xe Services, Blackwater, the private military empire of Erik Prince, has struggled under a growing weight of allegations about its conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now further questions are raised by claims that it was subcontracted by the CIA during George Bush's presidency to run an unrealised campaign of assassinations of al-Qaida leaders, kept secret from the US Congress. The claims come hard on the heels of allegations by two former Blackwater employees to a federal court in Virginia earlier this month that Prince may have had a role in the murder of individuals co-operating with a US government investigation into the company. While the allegations of the two men cannot be verified independently, the combination of the two affairs - on top of Blackwater's notorious reputation from Iraq - has added an aura of intrigue to a secretive company named after the US Navy Seals name for a "black op". Prince has had to contend with widely reported claims in the sworn statements that he "views himself as a Christian crusader tasked with eliminating Islam from the globe". One of the two anonymous witnesses in the Virginia court this month - who asked for protection because they said they were afraid of Blackwater - also accused it of smuggling weapons into Iraq and destroying incriminating evidence. Xe denies the claims, but they are the latest to dog Prince's firm, which is accused of everything from deceiving the state department to encouraging operatives to kill Iraqi civilians. Blackwater has earned more than $1bn (£600m) in US government contracts. Although the wealthy Prince founded the company in 1997, the name Blackwater only became imprinted on the public consciousness after the war in Iraq. It gained a reputation for being trigger-happy and ruthless, its bandana-wearing, muscular employees riding shotgun on the convoys they protected. They were described once as "mercenaries"; Prince countered that they were "loyal Americans". Blackwater was finally expelled by the Iraqi government, which refused to renew its licence, although some Xe employees still work there for the state department, under the auspices of the so-called US Training Centre. The revelation that the CIA allegedly subcontracted Blackwater into an abortive programme to kill al-Qaida leaders adds weight to evidence that the company's real ambition was to take over military and intelligence functions. That ambition was allegedly alluded to by Cofer Black, director of the CIA's counter-terrorism centre until 2002, and later the department of state's co-ordinator for counter-terrorism, who joined Blackwater in 2005 as vice-chairman. Despite the controversies, Prince's empire continues to benefit from contracts under Barack Obama's presidency. Under Obama, the number of private military contractors has increased in Afghanistan by almost 30%. Among them is Xe Services. After being banned from Iraq, Xe, formerly Blackwater, has been awarded with a new contract for military operations in Afghanistan CNBC 10, (“Former Blackwater Firm Gets Contract For Afghanistan”, http://www.cnbc.com/id/37898957, 6/24) Controversial private security firm Xe Services, formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide, is gearing up for a new mission in Afghanistan—and new ownership. Xe recently won a $120 million State Department contract for consulate security in Afghanistan and a $100 million CIA contract for security services in Afghanistan and elsewhere. “Of the total military spending in the world, the US spends half of that, and that’s an unsustainable number,” Erik Prince, founder and chairman of Xe, told CNBC Thursday. “You’re going to have to turn to private sector efficiency initiatives if the US is going to be able to project power and help its friends,” he added. In addition to the new contracts, the company announced on June 7 that it is seeking new ownership. “After three-and-a-half years of an assault by some of the bureaucracy, a sort of proctology exam brought on by some in Congress, it’s time to hang it up,” Prince, a former Navy Seal, explained. In 2003, Blackwater attained its first high-profile US deal with a $21 million security contract in Iraq. The company is now banned from operating in Iraq after several alleged incidents of its security forces firing on Iraqi civilians during the war. The firm has faced many private lawsuits and several probes by Congress into its practices. In December 2008, a US State Department panel recommended that Xe should be dropped as the main private security contractor for U.S. diplomats in Iraq. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 108 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Current law allows Blackwater to still be rewarded contracts despite the crimes committed by their employees CBS News, 6-18 (CBS News, “Blackwater Firm Gets $120M U.S. Gov't Contract,” June 18 th 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/830131727_162-20008238-10391695.html ) CBS News has learned in an exclusive report that the State Department has awarded a part of what was formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide a contract worth more than $120 million for providing security services in Afghanistan. Private security firm U.S. Training Center, a business unit of the Moyock, N.C.-based Blackwater, now called Xe Services, was awarded the contract Friday, a State Department spokeswoman said Friday night. Under the contract, U.S. Training Center will provide "protective security services" at the new U.S. consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, the spokeswoman said. The firm can begin work "immediately" and has to start within two months. The contract lasts a year but can be extended twice for three months at a time to last a maximum of 18 months. Should the firm fulfill all 18 months available in the contract, it will be paid a total of $120,123,293, the spokeswoman said. The awarding of the contract comes just more than four months after the government of Iraq ordered hundreds of Blackwater-linked security guards to leave the country within seven days or face possible arrest. The Justice Department is also trying to prosecute a case against five Blackwater guards who had opened fire on a crowded Baghdad street in 2007. Last December, a federal judge dismissed the U.S. government's case against the guards in the deaths of unarmed Iraqi civilians killed in the shooting because prosecutors used sworn statements the guards gave under a promise of immunity. Federal prosecutors are continuing to appeal the dismissal. The Justice Department's case or Blackwater's expulsion from Iraq didn't block U.S. Training Center from bidding on the multi-million dollar contract, the State Department spokeswoman said. "Under federal acquisition regulations, the prosecution of the specific Blackwater individuals does not preclude the company or its successive companies and subsidiaries from bidding on contracts," the spokeswoman said. "On the basis of full and open competition, the department performed a full technical evaluation of all proposals and determined the U.S. Training Center has the best ability and qualifications to meet the contract requirements." Blackwater do not deserve their Afghanistan contract Chatterjee, 6-23 (Pratap Chatterjee, Writer for the Asia Times, “Military http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LF23Ak03.html ) Contractors retreat, counter-attack,” June 23rd 2010, Blackwater's (Xe's) new Afghan contract: Perhaps the most famous private military contractor in Afghanistan and Iraq North Carolina-based Xe, formerly known as Blackwater - was not invited to sit at the witness table either, despite the fact that the company had been the subject of several investigations into misconduct. For example, in September 2007, security guards from Xe shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad's Nisour Square. Xe staff have also been accused of killing other private security contractors - in December 2006 Andrew J Moonen was accused of killing a security guard of Iraqi vice president Adel Abdul Mahdi. And as recently as May 2009, four Xe contractors were accused of killing an Afghan on the Jalalabad road in Kabul. Members of the commission noted with astonishment that the US State Department had awarded Xe a US$120 million contract to guard US consulates in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan this past Friday. Asked to explain why Xe was awarded the contract, Charlene R Lamb, deputy assistant secretary for international programs at the State Department, stated that the competitors for the contract - DynCorp and Triple Canopy - weren't as qualified. Yet Don Ryder of DynCorp and Ignacio Balderas of Triple Canopy testified that they were both qualified and able to do the contract. The two men said that they would consider lodging a formal protest at the State Department on Tuesday after a debriefing with the government. The choice of Xe, which has been banned by the government of Iraq, left the commissioners with little doubt that the contract award system was flawed. "What does it take for poor contractual performance to result in contract termination or non-award of future contracts?" wondered Thibault. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 109 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Blackwater Specific Cards Blackwater assigned new contract in Afghanistan but they are still HR violators Eddlem, 6-25 (Thomas R. Eddlem, Writer for the New American, “Xe/Blackwater Wins $100 Million CIA Contract,” June 25 th 2010, http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/politics/3874-xeblackwater-wins-100-million-cia-contract ) The Obama-era CIA has awarded a $100 million contract to the private mercenary firm Xe Services, the former Blackwater Worldwide, to guard its facilities in Afghanistan, according to the Washington Post for June 24. Blackwater became infamous over the past seven years for human-rights violations in Iraq so severe that the new Iraqi government expelled the company from the country over Bush and Obama administration pressure. The Iraqi government also tried to bring several company officials to trial over human-rights violations. Blackwater was accused of murder, torture, indiscriminate shooting of civilians, and bribery of local officials in the Iraqi theater. In the most controversial incident, the Nisour Square massacre, Blackwater officials shot indiscriminately into a Baghdad crowd and killed as many as 17 civilians, including a nine-year-old child. The CIA contract follows up a $120 million contract for the U.S. State Department awarded for “protective security services” at new U.S. consulates in Afghanistan at Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif. An anonymous source told the Washington Post that the old Blackwater firm had changed since its trigger-happy days in Iraq under the Bush administration. "They've had to prove to the government that they're a responsible outfit. Having satisfied every legal requirement, they have the right to compete for contracts. They have people who do good work, at times in some very dangerous places. Nobody should forget that, either." Xe founder and CEO Erik Prince was a little more flippant in a CNBC interview. "After three-and-a-half years of an assault by some of the bureaucracy, a sort of proctology exam brought on by some in Congress, it's time to hang it up." And he's still evoking those same trigger-happy sentiments that got the firm kicked out of Iraq. "You can't drop a bomb from an airplane in Afghanistan without having a lawyer sign off on it," Prince complained to CNBC, adding that the Obama administration, "almost allows lawyers to become what political officers were in the Soviet Union — the guys that truly can approve and nix anything battlefield commanders can do." While President Obama did not promise not stop contracting with Blackwater Worldwide as a candidate for President, he did campaign on the issue of “change.” But the change seems to have been to add the same mercenary human-rights violators to its foreign policy subsidy line. PMCs like Blackwater place a strain on the U.S. economy and undermine our operational capabilities Raja, 6-27 (Asif Haroon Raja, Writer for Veterans Today, Military Veterans & Foreign Affairs Journal, “Nothing is going right for USA in final phase in Afghanistan,” June 27th 2010, http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/06/27/nothing-is-going-right-for-usa-in-final-phase-inafghanistan/ ) Besides curse of drugs, liberal employment of Blackwater and other civilian contractors in Afghanistan on heavy fees is another drain on US economy. Recently $120 million contract has been awarded to Xe Services to provide security to Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif US Consulates. Another $200 million contract has also been assigned to Blackwater which works for CIA and US military to provide bodyguards and security cover to American officials visiting Afghanistan . It has four forward operating bases. CIA camp in Khost that had been successfully targeted on 15 January houses Blackwater operatives as well. It is mandated to conduct covert operations against Pakistan and Iran . In Iraq, KBR Inc was awarded $2.8 billion worth contract last March. Blackwater is busy trying to delay planned withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq to ensure continuation of lucrative contracts. The US military and intelligence have become heavily dependent upon this shady outfit which is seriously undermining their operational capabilities. Their craze for drones is borne out of desire to avoid direct physical action and to play safe. Those pulling trigger to fire hellfire missiles are located in Nevada , Kandahar airbase or Shamsi airbase. Young boys raised on diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Today US air force has more drone operators in training than fighter and bomber pilots. It is robbing the American soldiers of their fighting spirit and turning them into mischievous kids playing killing game instead of soldiering. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 110 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Regulation Monitoring by the US is key-regulates PMC behavior Desai 05 Devin, J.D., 1997, Yale Law School, B.A., in Rhetoric, 1993, University of California, Berkeley. Visiting Professor, Thomas Jefferson School of Law., “Article: Have Your Cake and Eat It Too: A Proposal for a Layered Approach to Regulating Private Military Companies”, University of San Francisco Law Review, Lexis Governments, regional security groups, NGOs, and multi-national corporations are the main entities who need and can afford to hire PMCs for the types of activities that would give rise to the abuse issues. Of course, rogue groups could hire PMCs, but as long as those who can and need to hire PMCs firmly refuse to deal with PMCs who service rogue groups, PMCs working with rogue groups should not be a problem. n183 Given the size of the contracts and the preference for a steady flow of business, PMCs are apt to desire Finally, and most importantly for this Article, given the United States' current market power, the United States alone can wield tremendous power in determining the way in which PMCs behave. n185Contracts routinely contain choice of law, jurisdiction, and warranties and representations clauses. The United States government could easily mandate that all contracts for services, as defined under the ITAR, include clauses whereby the PMC and its employees agree that the law governing the contract will be United States law, thePMC and its employees agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the United States regardless of where the services are performed, and the PMC warrants and represents that it provides human rights and local law training and guidance to all personnel to be deployed under the contract. In addition, such training would be required contracts with established legitimate concerns rather than test a prohibited market n184 and find themselves categorized as rogue or mercenary operations. to meet certain [*859] detailed criteria and training procedures (e.g., international, United States, and local laws to be covered; number of hours of training; minimum Additionally, the government could require that the corporation place attorneys, or even provide independent attorneys to be placed with the pre-deployed and post-deployed group to carry out the contract. n186 These attorneys would function as a private Judge Advocates General who would participate in the contract at all levels, including aiding in legal training or advising regarding the PMC's conduct in the field to monitoring activities that run afoul of the contract and/or the law. Despite the recent pressures on attorneys to provide yes-men answers as was the case in the soqualifications for trainers; etc.) as set forth by the United States government. called torture memos, n187 an independent, private attorney corps staffed by attorneys from groups such as Lawyers Without Borders, n188 would more successfully provide true counsel to those on the ground and not be as susceptible to manipulation.By adhering to such precepts, the United States government would begin to influence the PMC industry such that any company within the industry would be better off instituting standards that meet or exceed the government standards as a way to demonstrate that it is fit to win the lucrative contracts the United States government is capable of executing. Indeed, the government could require that even before qualifying to bid on a contract, the PMC must attest to and verify its capacity to meet the minimum standards. [*860] Insofar as the civilian contractors were not or have not been prosecuted n189 for alleged crimes and human rights abuses in Bosnia, Peru, Columbia, and Abu Ghraib because the United States has claimed it did not have jurisdiction or there is a question regarding the law at issue, these requirements would begin to eliminate such scenarios and plug large holes in bringing to justice the perpetrators of rape, sex trade of women, and torture. To be clear, the government's prosecutorial discretion would remain intact, and it could easily choose not to act. Nonetheless, these provisions would reduce the government's ability to offer facile reasons as to why it has not acted when it ought to have.B. Legislative Actions1. Simple Fixes The first steps in fixing legislation relating to the use of PMCs are clear: reduce, if not eliminate, the $ 50 million requirement that triggers congressional notice. n190MEJA and its proposed amendments do indeed try to provide a measure of control over PMCs. Nevertheless, MEJA and its proposed amendments are hindered by the narrow focus on the DOD. Congress should expand MEJA so that it encompasses not just DOD related contracts, but contracts between any part of the government - e.g., between the State, Department of Justice, the CIA, the FBI and any PMC. For practical purposes, using the definition of contractor under the ITAR would address slippery slope arguments suggesting that all contracts by Homeland Security, for example, or some other large organ of the United States government currently exempt from MEJA, would be encompassed by the amendments. That said, it might be wise for the government to require heightened training and oversight for groups such as Transportation Security Administration, the entity responsible for protecting United States transportation systems, including screening people and baggage at airports. n191Simple legislative fixes are, however, only a starting point. If enacted they would, even without more action, begin to address the [*861] problems in an unregulatedPMC industry. Still, if we are to Whistleblower Protection Additional creative legislative changes, such as to create whistleblower protections, would aid in preventing future abuses by PMCs and their employees. This is particularly so given that PMC contracts are carried out far from the United States, resulting in uninvestigated and unpunished problem situations in the absence of people on location willing to speak up. Indeed, if DynCorp's address problems related to PMCs' field violations of the law, more complex legislation is required. 2. reaction to two whistleblowers in Bosnia is any indication, those seeking to bring abuses to light will have to overcome great fear of retribution if they are to do so. As such, MEJA should be amended to include a whistleblower provision similar to the one currently contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Sarbanes-Oxley"). n192Indeed, much the same rationale behind the inclusion of the whistleblower provision in Sarbanes-Oxley applies to the argument for including such protection in MEJA, in part because of the parallels between the large corporations Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to govern and the PMC industry, which is made up of similar large corporate entities. In passing Sarbanes-Oxley, the Senate found that, although government employees are protected by current law when they "act in the public interest by reporting wrongdoing, there is no similar protection for employees of publicly traded companies who blow the whistle." n193 Further, the Senate stated that "with an unprecedented portion of the American public investing in these companies and depending upon their honesty, this distinction does not serve the public good." n194Similarly, regarding the PMC industry, with an unprecedented portion of American military and international policy and action [*862] being implemented via PMCs,there needs to be protection for PMC employees who blow the whistle on PMCs. The Senate also noted other concerns remedied by enacting Sarbanes-Oxley that similarly exist in the PMC industry context. First, the Senate indicated that without Sarbanes-Oxley, whistleblowers are subject to different laws depending on where they took the action. n195 Similarly, the PMC industry operates across numerous international boundaries easily setting up subsidiaries and using other legal forms to shield themselves from liabilities or prosecution.Further, the Senate noted that "most corporate employers, with help from their lawyers, know exactly what they can do to a whistleblowing employee under the law."n196 A national whistleblower law would cut through the PMCs' ability to retaliate against whistleblowers, such as may have occurred in the DynCorp Bosnia situation, where two employees tried to bring to light other DynCorp employees' possible involvement in prostitution and operating a sex-slave ring; and yet rather than being rewarded for alerting their superiors to the possible violations of the law, they were fired and ended up bringing wrongful termination suits against DynCorp. n197 In addition, given that the acts often affect the United States government, either directly in its pocketbook or generally in its perception on the world stage, protecting whistleblowers at a federal level demonstrates that the government takes these issues seriously and intends to stop them. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 111 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Solvency – Legal Action Key Legal accountability is the only way to effectively curtail illegal PMC action Mandernach 07 Christopher, J.D., Yale Law School, 2008; M.A., George Washington University, 1999; B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1997. “WARRIORS WITHOUT LAW: EMBRACING A SPECTRUM OF STATUS FOR MILITARY ACTORS”, Lexis B. Advantages of a Spectrum of Status A spectrum of status carries five significant advantages over the law's current form. First, embracing a spectrum of status helps international law embrace modern combat realities. Just as the post-World War II Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols updated the laws of war to reflect the changing face of armed conflict, so too must today's law change to reflect characteristics of modern conflict. PMCs, "unlawful combatants," and other irregular forces are a fact of the modern battlefield. Their presence is unlikely to decrease in the future. n163 Indeed, there are sound policy reasons why states and multi-national organizations may want to encourage PMC growth. n164 Unless the law of war adapts to incorporate these actors, more and more battlefield actors will occupy an ill-defined zone outside the law's reach. A spectrum of combatant categories allows easy adaptability to emerging means and actors. As conflict character changes, so too can the salient characteristics and corresponding categories, which will ensure appropriate status classifications and attendant protections. Certainly, the number of combatant categories could become unwieldy, even using only the ten salient characteristics listed above. The key for states and scholars is to create enough status categories within the spectrum to classify modern actors clearly, consistently, and appropriately. As with the combatant categories above, the spectrum's mapping need not remain static. The assigned protections may shift based on changing norms or attitudes about the conduct of armed hostilities. The law may add new protections or remove antiquated protections. Such flexibility ensures continual alignment between protections afforded a combatant category and the law's larger normative objectives. Second, a spectrum of status clarifies accountability and protections for By creating status categories that capture these ill-fitting actors, the law will bring the actors into the legal process. PMCs, unlawful combatants, and other actors would enjoy a clear combatant status within the law of war. Once the law [*173] captures these actors, a spectrum of status will clearly articulate protections, and ultimately, means of accountability that mesh with the law of war's normative objectives for similarly situated actors. actors that are poorly covered, if at all, under existing law. Admittedly, these characteristic-based combatant categories will capture actors who may claim civilian status today, and re-classify them clearly as combatants. Such a reclassification is a step forward for the law. The effect is to remove those from the civilian status who do not conceptually fit. This strengthens the civilian protections by providing those protections only to those removed from hostilities and deserving of the highest levels of legal protections. Third, increased clarity promotes the hand-off and A domestic legal framework would achieve a clear understanding of the procedural guarantees, immunities, and other attendant protections required for each category of actor. The domestic legal framework would gain a clear path towards accountability, eliminating many ambiguities plaguing cases like Hamdi n165 and Hamdan, n166 where domestic courts have struggled to identify both the status and attendant protections of poorly classified actors. This transnational interaction promotes alignment between domestic and international normative objectives. n167This is not to say that all domestic legal systems alignment between international and domestic law. would automatically provide uniform, ironclad protections or means of accountability. Even though the spectrum envisions reliance on domestic courts' better-established enforcement ability, many of the domestic legal systems in which PMCs operate are fledgling states, where the rule of law remains in its infancy or co-opted by external forces. n168 And, as with the law's definition of mercenaries, actors will undoubtedly find ways to test the boundaries of any new categorizations. n169 Still, clarifying procedural and [*174] normative guarantees internationally will help clarify those same guarantees domestically. Fourth, a spectrum of status allows for individuation within the law, targeting protections to characteristically similar groups. Individuation offers a number of advantages. First, including additional characteristics to map actors into more groups allows the law to weight characteristics differently. Such mapping may weight compliance with the laws and customs of war as the most salient characteristic, and therefore link that characteristic to the most significant protections. An actor's nationality may be less salient, and therefore linked to lesser protections. This targeting of dealbreaking characteristics is impossible under the existing law of war's all-or-nothing approach to status and protections. Finally, the spectrum's individuation promotes compliance with the laws of war by offering increased protections for those complying with higher obligations. Just as Jinks and others argue that extending privileges such as combatant immunity "could and should be used as a tool to promote compliance with the rules of war," n170allowing tiered, individuated levels of protection will exert a compliance pull for some. United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Eric Jensen has argued persuasively for similar incentives by relaxing uniform standards for insurgents groups operating in Iraq. n171 Indeed, the objective of Protocol I's Article 44 relaxation of irregular forces' uniform requirements was to provide incentives for greater compliance with the laws of war. n172 The same incentive effect is possible with other characteristics as well. Incentives may attract some to instill a more-hierarchal chain of command resulting in greater compliance with the laws of war. Incentives may bring about greater sanction from a party to the conflict. Those PMCs seeking to operate lawfully may be highly responsive to such incentives. Working in a complementary fashion is the law's ability to decrease protections for those who ignore available incentives, and choose non-compliance. Therefore, the spectrum embodies a limited carrots-and-sticks approach to status classifications, unlike the law's largely all-or-nothing character today. By removing actors of ill-defined status, the spectrum removes any incentive to work outside the law's boundaries. Under existing law, an [*175] actor seeking to accomplish an illegal act could exploit the law's gray areas by contracting an illegal task to an ill-defined actor. For example, a military could sub-contract interrogations - interrogations including tactics that they themselves could not employ - to an actor unlikely to face any accountability under international law. Because a spectrum of status would both capture these actors and outline a clear means of accountability, it removes incentives to subcontract one's dirty work. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 112 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday ***A2: Stuff*** Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 113 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Spending Continued reliance on PMCs is the biggest cost to the military. Even after the U.S. withdraws its forces, PMCs will take over current military operations Hill 08 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NATHAN, United States Air Force, “MILITARY CONTRACTORS -TOO MUCH DEPENDENCE?” “By the government’s own estimates, of the Pentagon’s $300 billion annual procurement outlays, half is for private-sector service contracts.”7 Contractors are expensive. Although there is great debate over whether or not contacting saves money in the long term, it is quite clear that contractors do not come cheap. Salaries for various contract security guards in Iraq range from $100,000 to $200,000 per year which is double to triple what a comparable military salary would be.8 Additionally, the largest private contractor currently in Iraq, Halliburton’s Kellogg, Brown and Root is believed to be under a contract worth $13 billion or more. That figure is approximately two and a half times the cost the United States paid for the entire Persian Gulf War fought in 1991.9 The U.S. Air Force has been working a plan to save money by reducing the ranks of the active duty by 40,000. Now that the plan is underway, the Secretary of the Air Force has said, “It is not working.” His comments were made at a Sept 19, 2007 briefing sponsored by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.10 Much of the reason it is not working has to do with the distribution of potential savings, but another reason it is not working is because when active duty jobs are eliminated, there is still work to be done, and often times that work gets picked up by contractors. The U.S. Air Force is not the only service wrestling with this problem. Pentagon officials working the issue for the entire DoD are “fed up with delays and cost overruns” and have instituted a new system to grade contractor performance to better handle award fee abuse.11 In the past, companies were earning their award fees even when the contractors did not achieve the contractual objectives. The new system is intended to ensure contractors do not receive moneys they have not actually earned. Under the new system, a company needs to receive a “satisfactory” just to get 50% of the fee. A “good,” “excellent” or “outstanding” could bring them up to 75%, 90%, or 100%.12 One example of just how much money is spent (or misspent) on award fees comes from the $256 million award fee recently paid to KBR (formerly Kellog, Brown and Root).13 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 114 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Spending The impossibility of government oversight means PMCs squander billions – no attempt to curb military spending is possible absent the elimination of PMC costs Stanger and Williams ‘06 Allison Stanger and Mark Eric Williams are respectively Professor and Associate Professor of Political Science at Middlebury College., “Private Military Corporations: Benefits and Costs of Outsourcing Security,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, Fall | Winter 2006, http://yalejournal.org/sites/default/files/articles/4-19.pdf Beyond the various political costs, outsourcing as presently practiced appears to generate substantial financial costs. As indicated, rigorous studies of DoD outsourcing have found that cost savings fell far below expectations, largely due to the assumption that outsourcing alone, rather than a competitive PMC market structure, would yield significant savings. Still, these factors tell only half the story. The minimal oversight the departments of State and Defense—plus Congress—devote to PMC operations after a contract has been licensed constitutes another basic problem. In fact, “no single government-wide agency monitors the performance of companies that do get contracts.”30 The Pentagon, for example, maintains no accurate count of how many contractors it employs; it also lacks the information systems to provide reliable data necessary for effective PMC management.31 The State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls does not record how much the government spends, or saves, on PMC contracts it approves, while Congress remains largely in the dark on these issues.32 Such oversight gaps enhance the prospects for inefficiencies, irregularities, and squandered resources. For instance, a September 2000 GAO report demonstrated that Brown and Root collected more than $2.1 billion above contracted expenditures for its work in the Balkans, nearly doubling the amount stipulated in the original contract.33 More recently, the Halliburton corporation and its subsidiary, KBR, have come under fire for a variety of billing irregularities, including $108 million in overcharges for gasoline shipped to Iraq from neighboring Kuwait, and $27 million in overcharges for meals served to American troops at five bases in Iraq and Kuwait in 2003.34 These irregularities may be just the tip of the iceberg. In 2004 the Pentagon’s own auditors determined that Halliburton had failed to account adequately for over $1.8 billion of contracted work in the Iraq and Kuwait theaters of operation.35 In testimony before Congress the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ top procurement official told lawmakers “unequivocally” that “the abuse related to contracts awarded to KBR represents the most blatant and improper contract abuse I have witnessed during the course of my [twenty-year] professional career.”36 Given the potent mix of minimal PMC oversight, a “market for force” whose oligopolistic structure limits competition, and the profit-maximizing nature of PMCs themselves, unnecessary expenditures may well be the norm rather than an aberration.37 Until these problems are resolved, the dramatic cost savings that privatization enthusiasts envision seem unlikely to materialize. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 115 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Market Checks / Cost Effective There is market incentive for PMCs to cover up abuses rather than punish violators – and empirically companies that commit abuses have booming business Tepperman ‘02 Jonathan D. Tepperman, Editor of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2002, The New Republic, “Can Mercenaries Protect Hamid Karzai?” Industry representatives reply that the invisible hand of the market guarantees accountability. Doug Brooks of the International Peace Operations Association, a PMC lobbying group, argues that no firm would deliberately misbehave because it would then risk losing the government contracts on which it depends. Yet DynCorp, which gets 95 percent of its business from the U.S. government (much of this from the State Department), has suffered no loss of income from the ongoing Bosnia scandal. In fact, PMCs have an economic incentive to cover up crimes rather than punish the troublemakers, since such revelations tend to be bad for business. Their models assume a pure version of the Private military market – a lack of competitions disprove their theory Isenberg 2k9 “Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy” David Isenberg is a researcher and leader of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and the author of Shadow Force: Private Security Contractors in Iraq (Greenwood, 2009) January 2k9. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) REPORT DEFENDERS OF CONTRACTING for government services contend that the private sector is more cost-effective than the public sector. With respect to the market in private military services, however, there is some reason to believe that outsourcing increases the cost of military functions. There are two major reasons for this. First, a transparent and competitive market is needed, so that clients can pick and choose among different suppliers. Second, contracts must be subject to transparent bidding procedures, competing offers must be systematically compared and the performance of suppliers on the contract terms has to be closely monitored, and, if necessary, sanctioned. Neither of these characteristics seems to apply to current contracting procedures, however. An analysis by The New York Times showed that fewer than half of all “contract actions”— new contracts and payments against existing contracts — are now subject to full and open competition. Just 48 percent were competitive in 2005, down from 79 percent in 2001. Among other findings the Times reported: Agencies are crippled in their ability to seek low prices, supervise contractors and intervene when work goes off course because the number of government workers overseeing contracts has remained level as spending has shot up. Contracting almost always leads to less public scrutiny as government programs are hidden behind closed corporate doors. Companies, unlike agencies, are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.35 A separate study found that only 40 per cent of all contracts of U.S.-government agencies (between 1998 and 2003) were subject to bidding. Since then the numbers have only slightly increased. In terms of transparency and oversight, more than 50 per cent of all contracts are not subject to any monitoring to ensure the performance of suppliers with contract terms.36 Thus, the market for private security services is only partially competitive, and in some cases (for example in certain areas of logistics) quasi-monopolistic. The champions of the virtues of privatization and outsourcing with respect to the military generally forget one thing: the Pentagon is as far away from a free market as one can possibly get. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 116 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Presidential Powers PMCs allow the executive branch to act unilaterally and conceal combat information from Congress and the public Tepperman ‘02 Jonathan D. Tepperman, Editor of Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2002, The New Republic, “Can Mercenaries Protect Hamid Karzai?” In addition to their employees' impunity, companies like DynCorp create another, similar problem: They allow the executive branch to evade public scrutiny— and, at times, to flout it. Take Afghanistan. When Washington recently announced that the Special Forces were abandoning Karzai, it also declared that the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service would get the gig. State then delegated the assignment to DynCorp. But there the trail runs cold. Apart from giving a boilerplate explanation for why it was subcontracting the mission, no one in government or at DynCorp would tell me when the mission will start or finish, confirm exactly what roles DynCorp will play, or even reveal what the company will be paid. Nor can they be compelled to. The company has no legal responsibility to discuss its business with the media or with Congress, and private contractors are not governed by congressionally mandated limits on troop commitments or rules of engagement. The government is just as immune, since it's not required to disclose the details of what are known as "proprietary contracts" with PMCs. The Defense Department doesn't even need to notify Congress of the existence of contracts that cost less than $50 million. As a result, PMC missions often fly beneath the radar, garnering almost no attention in the press or anywhere else. True, Democratic Representative Jan Schakowsky of Illinois tried last year to block the use of PMCs in the Andes, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee attempted to hold up funding for DynCorp's Karzai mission. But to no avail: State ignored the committee, and most other PMC engagements have escaped comment entirely. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 117 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: T – Presence PMCs are part of US military presence Lam 09 Jenny, J.D., University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall), 2008; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2008; B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2002., “Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute”, October, Lexis With the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ongoing fight against global terrorism, the American military has increasingly relied on private entities to perform functions traditionally reserved for militaries. These private military contractors ("PMCs") n1 provide a wide array of services, including support for weapons and communications systems, infrastructure reconstruction, detainee interrogation, police training, and demining and destruction of explosives. Beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been a tremendous expansion in the use of PMCs for peacekeeping and other functions commonly performed by state militaries. n2 The estimated annual value of PMC [*1460] contracts already runs into the hundreds of billions of dollars, n3 and according to one estimate, "the United States and Great Britain account for over 70% of the world's market for their services." n4 Considerable room for debate exists over their advantages and disadvantages, n5 but PMCs are now a fact of modern warfare. n6 Given the industry's size and PMCs' critical role in sensitive operations, close scrutiny is in order. n7 Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 118 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: T – Presence/Substantial PMC’s make up 57% of our force in Afghanistan Glanz, ’09 (James Glanz, Writer for the New York Times, “Contractors Outnumber U.S. Troops in Afghanistan,” September 2nd 2009 ) As of March this year, contractors made up 57 percent of the Pentagon's force in Afghanistan, and if the figure is averaged over the past two years, it is 65 percent, according to the report by the Congressional Research Service. The contractors -many of them Afghans -- handle a variety of jobs, including cooking for the troops, serving as interpreters and even providing security, the report says. The report says the reliance on contractors has grown steadily, with just a small percentage of contractors serving the Pentagon in World War I, but then growing to nearly a third of the total force in the Korean War and about half in the Balkans and Iraq. The change, the report says, has gradually forced the American military to adapt to a far less regimented and, in many ways, less accountable force. The growing dependence on contractors is partly because the military has lost some of its logistics and support capacity, especially since the end of the cold war, according to the report. Some of the contractors have skills in critical areas like languages and digital technologies that the military needs. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 119 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Withdraw Not Possible And we can pull PMC’s out of combat operations HRF, ’08 (Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch Group based in D.C., “How to End Impunity for Private Security and Other Contractors: Blueprint for the Next Administration,” December 2008 ) By the end of his first year in office, President-elect Obama should have substantial long-range efforts well underway to strengthen the nation’s commitment to contractor accountability and humane treatment, and to invest in strengthening the U.S. government’s intelligence gathering capabilities, thus developing a more effective counterterrorism strategy. We propose that President-elect Obama: Direct the Secretary of Defense to: • Develop force structure options that would allow the U.S. government to reduce its reliance on private security and other contractors in future conflicts, and to ensure that contractors it does use can be effectively managed and controlled. The U.S. government’s extraordinary reliance on private contractors in Afghanistan and especially Iraq since September 11, 2001, has been driven in large part by necessity, because of U.S. military force structure decisions made and implemented during the 1990s. Concern also has been expressed in many quarters—including by Secretary Gates and other senior Defense Department officials 25 —that the U.S. government’s use of private security contractors has itself undermined retention of highly skilled U.S. military personnel, as well as military morale. President-elect Obama should direct the Secretary of Defense to assess, by the end of his first year in office, the impact on military retention and morale of the U.S. government’s increased reliance on private security and other contractors, and to develop viable military force structure options that would: Allow the United States to avoid or at least substantially reduce its dependence on private contractors in future conflicts, in areas including the performance of security missions by armed private contractors in areas of combat operations; in circumstances creating an unwarranted risk of drawing them into direct participation in combat; and in the direct participation of private contractors in the interrogation of detainees. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 120 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: PMC Good The government’s use of contractor’s is unjustified – they have no strategic value Chesterman, ’09 (Simon Chesterman, Director of the New York University School of Law Singapore, “Blackwater and the Limits to Outsourcing Security,” November 12th 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/opinion/13iht-edchesterman.html?_r=1 ) But the Blackwater assassination scandal suggests the need for this to be complemented by a prohibition on outsourcing certain public functions entirely. In fact, U.S. law forbids the outsourcing of ‘inherently governmental’ functions, though a definition of what that covers is maddeningly hard to find. This is partly because the U.S. attitude to privatization is radically different from the European understanding. In Europe, there is a debate over whether public functions should be transferred to private actors. In the United States, the question is framed as whether certain functions should be public in the first place. In the United States, then, the ‘inherently governmental’ label operates not as a protected area of public interest so much as an increasingly narrow exception to the presumption that all aspects of government should be considered for privatization. This has undermined accountability and justified some terrible policies. There are two basic reasons why certain functions should never be outsourced. First, it would make effective accountability impossible — as in the case where a program operates in secret and has the potential for abusive conduct. Second, if the public interest would require oversight by a governmental (and therefore politically accountable) actor. Both situations would apply to many of the programs considered here — leaving aside the question of whether assassinations and waterboarding should be allowed at all. The first is really a legal argument for the possibility of accountability. Allowing the delegation of covert action to private actors undermines even the limited checks on intelligence operations. That may, of course, be the point: It is clear that no one intended the assassination program to be made public until Leon Panetta, President Obama’s director of the C.I.A., was briefed on it four months into his tenure. He sensibly terminated the program, briefed Congress, and successfully blamed the whole thing on his predecessors. The second argument is a political one. It accepts that even in a democracy it is sometimes necessary to push at the limits of law to deal with threats. But such actions can only be justified if they are linked to the democratic structures they are intended to protect. A workable definition of “inherently governmental” would cover the exercise of discretion in actions that significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons. Such a definition would prohibit the Blackwater assassination program and severely restrict the role of contractors in interrogations. Unfortunately, debates about the U.S. reliance on contractors tend to focus on questions of cost and periodic outrage at corruption. Last year a consensus appeared to be emerging that contractors should not be in charge of “enhanced” interrogation, but this seemed to be driven by the fact that each of the alleged torturers cost the U.S. taxpayer about double the salary of a Federal employee. Even the assassination program failed to start a meaningful debate on what should and what should not be outsourced. At the very least, the responsibility to determine what is and is not ‘inherently governmental’ should itself be an inherently governmental task. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 121 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Neoliberalism The neo-liberal objectives of the US government have allowed PMC to run a covert war plagued by atrocities and injustices Sheehy and Maogoto 08 Benedict and Jackson,Benedict Sheehy: B.Th., M.A., LL.B., M.A., LL.M. Senior Lecturer in Law, RMIT University (Australia); Jackson N. Maogoto: LL.B, LL.M., PhD, LLM, GCertPPT, Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Manchester, “THE PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY--UNRAVELLING THE THEORETICAL, LEGAL & REGULATORY MOSAIC”, ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, Lexis One of the most significant challenges to the privatization agenda is maintaining control and accountability. The basic challenge of control and accountability of violent public services is exacerbated when a State privatizes the delivery of those services. Given the nature of defense services and the consequent need for vast sums of money, secrecy, and power, the importance of control and accountability as well as the risks associated with privatization are exponentially greater. In the context of the privatization of defense, as will be shown, the situation is different, making the accountability of PMCs a matter of urgent concern particularly in relation to regulation. When public militaries and governments interact, the interactions have not always been peaceful. Drawing from the history of such interactions, one should certainly conclude that a public military does not always act in the public interest. History is replete with instances in which a military has seized control and been unwilling to give up power. n112 Nevertheless, public militaries often can and do surrender to public will, particularly when the basis for their legitimacy rests on some notion of public accountability and maintenance of the Rule of Law . The privatized defense industry, however, has no such constraints, and indeed, history is replete with examples of PMCs running amok, uninhibited by any allegiance or claim to public legitimacy and constitutionalism. No surprise then that in the case of controlling privatized defense capabilities and ensuring accountability, the record is appalling. There have been a shocking number of serious abuses by PMCs of their de facto powers. These include fraud, corruption, and deceit, including failing to warn a government it has been hired to protect, but in fact, participating in the overthrow of that government in favor of a preferred government. n113 Other incidents are related to exploitative compensation demands including mineral rights put to cashstrapped governments. n114 As the Iraq experience demonstrates, there have been few, if any, lessons learned when dealing with [*171] PMCs. Companies that have murdered civilians have escaped legal sanction, and far from being penalized, have either been awarded additional contracts or continued to enjoy benefits of existing contacts. n115 Perhaps the greatest challenge of accountability has to do with violent actions undertaken by a PMC extraterritorially in the name of a nation without corollary accountability to the people of that nation. Unlike other privatized services, which may be provided extraterritorially, PMC services may well include intentional death, injury, and challenge to the sovereignty of citizenry. Services of this nature and potential consequences require a distinctly higher level of accountability to a nation's people than to the provision of privatized transport services. Indeed, Rachel Weber, in her detailed study of the defense industry, argues for a thorough revision of governments' approach to defense industry contractors; in essence, removing industry participants from the strictly private sphere based on the nature of their work, subsidies received, and the level of importance to the nation. n116 In South America, consider the early 1980s example of United States sponsored PMCs supporting the Contras' attacks on the democratically elected government of El Salvador. n117 That debacle, which was finally brought to an end by public scrutiny and disclosure of what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair, left El Salvador in shambles with gangs and paramilitaries running rampant. n118 No corporate actors were held accountable. n119 In a sign that this was not a one-off incident, in the early 1990s, the crumbling of Yugoslavia not only turned the Balkans into a war zone dripping with blood, but another opportunity for PMCs to "assist" in restoring order through provision of logistical and training support. n120 However, in the process, employees of one of the leading PMCs in this theatre, DynCorp, were implicated in serious human rights violations; the trafficking of women and running a prostitution ring. n121 Lesser known are events such as those of Spearhead Ltd.'s training of Colombian drug enforcers whose "non-holds" barred approach had its list of victims including mayors, provincial governors, judges, presidential candidates, and civilians massacred. n122 The activities of [*172] some PMCs, which have left whole regions in ruins, have touched all corners of the earth--the latest and most publicized being in the Middle East. The PMC's record in Iraq includes torture, random killings, and massacres, again without accountability. One thing that has been a constant in all noted human rights and humanitarian norm breaches (the raison de etre this Article) has been the impunity enjoyed by implicated PMCs--neither their employees, directors or other allied actors have been called to account. These events form the impetus and drive the necessity to evaluate the issue of accountability of PMCs. Accountability requires identification, analysis, and evaluation as to whether: 1) the defense services offered by the PMC are legal and the objectives appropriate whether cast as contract specifications or broader policy objectives;2) the services are performed within the bounds of the law; 3) the activities undertaken are fully and truthfully reported; and4) all breaches of obligations create appropriate avenues of liability and compensation. n123 Singer sets out the nub of the problem thus: "With PMCs, clear tensions always exist between the security goals of clients and the firms' desire for profit maximization. For governments, the public good and the good of the private companies are not identical." n124 Singer identifies the three main obstacles to effective control of PMCs,which are set out in the next three paragraphs. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 122 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 123 PMC Affirmative GDS 2010 Dan, Abhik, Mercy, Ryan, Hriday A2: Neoliberalism First, among the obstacles to accountability, Singer identifies the problem of monitoring. n125 From the contract drafting and tendering process, to the implementation, evaluation, and renewal process, contracting is complex and hence, difficult to monitor. n126 Complexity may be part of any contract monitoring, and transparency poses a particular quagmire for governmental contracting with the PMC. n127 PMC contracts may be pre-determined or in a highly specialized niche market that precludes actual competition; therefore, avoiding market scrutiny and monitoring of its terms or in award. n128 Contracts with PMCs often take place in highly secret contexts, such as in the course of war. n129 In any case, PMCs as private actors dealing with private contracts and having access to military secrets, are well shielded from public scrutiny. n130 The public [*173] is, thus, not privy to either private commercial transactions or to military secrets. Such being the case, it is obvious thatPMC contracts may well go unobserved by public authorities. n131 Monitoring is further challenged in the field when the chain of command is not clear-a complaint made by military officials--leaving it unclear to where the PMC is accountable and for what. n132 The question of accountability becomes even more difficult when parties' accountabilities are in conflict. The conflict of profit and security is not a minor matter as was illustrated in a recent incident when the airport in Baghdad was shut down by the firm engaged to guard it over a pay dispute. n133 A second concern Singer identifies is the profit motive. Whereas one of the government's neo-liberal objectives of the use of privatized defense service is the reduced expenditure, the PMCs objective is the opposite. Although the government seeks to control costs of violent action, the PMC seeks to increase profits and correlative costs. What particularly distinguishes the PMC-government relationship from a business-to-business relationship, however, is that the nature of the services provided puts the government in a vulnerable position in two senses . First, where a government has privatized its defense services, it is no longer in position to substitute its own resources in the event of PMC failure. Accordingly, it is in a very weak bargaining position, particularly vis-a-vis an entrenched PMC providing service in a niche market. Second, services as opposed to goods, are harder to measure and monitor, and indeed, are easier to supply at less than agreed levels than goods, and again, particularly so in the supply of military services. n134 Unsurprisingly, PMCs have encouraged outrageous and notorious cost overruns, including over-charging, billing for ghost employees, encouraging unwitting military officers whose focus is on strategy rather than expenditures to take more expensive alternatives, and even outright fraud. n135 The outrages have occurred to such an extent in Iraq that a Senate Hearing, "Combating War Profiteering: Are We Doing Enough to Investigate and Prosecute Contracting Fraud and Abuse in Iraq?" was organized. Senator Leahy reported "untold billions [were] unaccounted for" n136 and the Office of the Inspector General was only able to report that $ 9.8 million had been repaid in [*174] restitution. n137 Thus, on a cost-benefit calculus, the profit motive far outweighs any penalties, real or potential, encouraging PMCs to avoid controlling and accounting for costs (financial) and activities (domestic and international humanitarian violations). Singer identifies the third issue for the PMC as "Why fight hard?" n138 He notes the incentives to prolong contracts, protect one's weapons, and employees. n139 Other concerns include the firm's potential reluctance to fight on the basis of protecting its own commercial interests in certain areas, preferring to protect its land-based assets over the government's strategic needs and objectives, or divided loyalties where its employees wish to avoid engaging in combat against former comrades working for PMCs on the other side of a conflict, as appears to have happened in Ethiopia. n140 While Singer notes these negative examples, PMCs have engaged in firefights, apparently, beyond contractual obligations in certain instances in Iraq. n141 The ability to control and call PMCs to account by legal means such as court-martial is non-existent. n142 It means that accountability and control in the military chain of command arising from legal sanction is gone. The issues above have a bearing on the efficiency claim supporting the neo-liberal privatization policy agenda. A study by U.S. scholar, Markusen indicates that the predicted efficiencies have not been realized. n143 She wrote: "No one has been able to evaluate fully the long-term costs and consequences of extensive privatization of national defense, and the sheer inability to do so should give pause to advocates of outsourcing anything other than the most routine functions." n144 Indeed, while standing armies are expensive, the less accountable and corporately shielded PMCs will almost certainly prove to be more so, n145 even without counting the costs to democracy and its institutions. This serves only to add impetus to achieving PMC accountability to the Nation-State and may well require some radical re-thinking of traditional approaches [*175] to control PMCs, as well as reform to corporate and contract law and regulation. The foregoing discussion of the complexities of accountability and control associated with the privatization of defense sets the stage for a fresh analysis of the Nation-State--the corporate PMC relationship and potential for the de facto and de jure control of the PMC to which we turn next. It should be noted that in terms of the accountability for violence inflicted extraterritorially, one cannot be but pessimistic. Laws and courts have been remarkably otiose in constraining governments in their foreign adventures. Given such, control of PMCs in that context by legal means is not likely to produce much result. Last printed 3/22/2016 6:16:00 PM Georgetown Debate Seminar 124
