Individuals who are caught and sanctioned by the criminal justice system will be less likely to re-offend
◦ Does prison reduce recidivism?
◦ Do “deterrence based” programs reduce recidivism?
BOOT CAMPS
INTENSIVE PROBATION
1
Nature of Boot Camp (BC)
Relation to Deterrence Theory
◦ Other vague theories tied into (BC)
Evidence
◦ Over 35 experiments of reasonable quality conducted
◦ Most find no difference, the few that find differences go both ways
◦ Some evidence that BC with strong rehab component and good “aftercare” reduces crime
2
Intensive Supervision
Probation
The nature of ISP
◦ Make probation meaner
Tie to deterrence
◦ Pain + Reduced opportunity to offend
RAND experiment
◦ 10 sites across country with random assignment
◦ No difference in arrest for new crimes
◦ ISP groups much more likely to get technical violations
3
Randomly assign d.v. strategies to police officers
◦ Arrest, Counsel, or Separate for 8 hours
◦ Arrest as painful “deterrent”
Findings:
Arrest = 10% re-arrested after 3 months
Counseling = 19%
Separate = 24%
BUT: Replications not supportive
◦ May work better with people who are tied to community
Minneapolis domestic violence study (Larry Sherman)
4
5
University of Arizona
◦ Money from Joe to see whether his jails reduced crime
Comparison of cohorts of inmates pre-Joe and during-Joe
◦ There was no difference in recidivism rates
6
Weak empirical support
◦ If anything, the certainty of punishment may have marginal effects on crime
Clearance rate, focused deterrence, etc.
WHY SO WEAK?
◦ Based on “weak” theory—weak assumptions
◦ Limits of deterrence in a democratic society
◦ MARGINAL vs. ABSOLUTE
Conclusions Regarding Empirical
Support
7
Policy Implications of Deterrence
Policy Implication = If the theory is correct, what can be done to reduce crime?
Rehabilitation, (unless painful) won’t work, and may
“send the wrong message”
Raising the certainty, swiftness or severity of criminal penalties will work
If system cannot be swift, severe and certain enough, then reduce opportunities for offending
◦ Incapacitation
8
A thug in prison can’t shoot your sister
◦ Easy (thought expensive) to do—we have the technology
◦ Common sense/logic dictates that some crime reduction will be achieved
9
How well does it work?
◦ Comparing states to each other
◦ Projecting crime savings from surveys of people entering jails
◦ Examining states that are forced to release inmates
Works best for high rate offenses
(burglary, robbery, theft)—not at all for homicide
Doubling prison population from 400K to 800K reduced robbery by 18%
10
Downsides
◦ Least effective for crimes that most scare
Americans (rape, homicide)
◦ EXPENSIVE
Marginal effects—the more you do it the less it works.
Fighting the “age crime curve”
◦ May be counter productive over long term
(nothing positive happening in prison)
11
Fear of Informal Sanctions is not
“Deterrence theory.”
◦ Informal social control theory (Hirschi, others)
However, formal sanctions may “kick in” informal sanctions.
◦ Arrest may disappoint parents
◦ Prison may alienate family/friends
What About Informal Sanctions?
12
Rational Choice Theory
Routine Activities Theory
Situational Crime Prevention
Economics (language, theory)
◦ “Expected Utility” = calculation of all risks and rewards
◦ This is much broader than deterrence
Includes risks not associated with criminal justice
Same core assumption as deterrence theory
◦ Human nature = rational, calculating, hedonistic
◦ This is because “economic theory” (supply/demand, rational consumers) has the same “classical school” roots
How “RATIONAL” is the offender?
◦ PURE RATIONALITY = only expected utility
(rational calculation of risk/reward) matters
Few theories, if any, take this position
◦ LIMITED RATIONALITY
Information/time limited (quick, “rough” decisions)
Other “things” matters
◦ CORNISH AND CLARKE good example
Crime as a Rational Choice
◦ Criminal Involvement: the decision to engage in crime (versus other activity)
◦ Criminal Event: factors that influence the decision to commit a specific crime
Choices to become involved in crime, to continue in crime, and to desist from crime
◦ Each (involvement, continuance, desistence) need separate explanation
◦ Involvement decisions are “multistage and multifactor,” extending over long time periods
MOST PEOPLE WANT MONEY/STUFF, WHY DO
SOME CHOOSE TO BURGAL (RATHER THAN
WORK) TO GET IT?
Background Factors
◦ temperament, intelligence, cognitive style, sex, class, education, neighborhood, broken home…
Previous experience
◦ Direct and vicarious learning, moral attitudes, self-perception, foresight and planning
Solutions evaluated
◦ Degree of effort, amount/immediacy of reward, likelihood and severity of punishment, moral costs
What happened to our “rational” offender guided by “free will?”
◦ In their models, rational thinking and free will are very constrained/limited
◦ Not much different from other theories of crime
Borrow liberally from learning theory, psychology, social control theory…
◦ At what point does their theory cease to be a
“rational choice” model and start to become a learning, social control, IQ theory of crime?
Focus on predictors of specific crimes, look at immediate (situational) factors
◦ GIVEN THAT SOMEONE IS OK WITH BURGLING,
WHAT LEADS THEM TO BURGAL A SPECIFIC HOUSE
IN A SPECIFIC NEIGHBHOOD?
Area
◦ Easily accessible, few police patrols, low security
Home
◦ anyone home?, especially wealthy, detached, bushes/other cover, dog, security system...
Interviews with Federal Inmates involved in drug smuggling
How “rational” are they?
◦ Shipping Insurance
◦ Methods for evading detection (high end electronics, study of interdiction methods/patterns, etc.)
Still…
◦ Tendency to overestimate rewards and minimize thinking about risks.
The Criminal Event in Drug
Smuggling
Empirical Support?
Criminal Involvement
▪ Ethnographic research suggests limited (if any) rational reasoning or weighing of costs/benefits.
Criminal Event
▪ Ethnographic research somewhat supportive, but many crimes suggest limited/crude appraisals.
▪ Attempt to evade detection
Parsimony and Scope?
Policy Implication?
Crime as the
Convergence in Time and Space of Three
Factors
◦ 1. Motivated Offenders
◦ 2. Suitable Targets
◦ 3. Lack of Capable
Guardianship
Scope: “Direct-Contact
Predatory Crimes”
◦ Felson in 1990s extended to white collar crime, drug crime
Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson)
Assumption is that they are always present
◦ Criticized for this (really a theory of crime?)
Mostly explains “victimization” or the
“criminal event”
◦ Similar to Cornish and Clarke in that respect
Motivated offenders taken for granted
Value ($, ability to fence)
◦ Some universal ($) some dependent upon offenders environment
Visibility (sights and sounds)
Inertia (why autos are victimized, high tech movement)
Access (cul-de-sac vs open-ended street, garage parking vs. street parking)
Protection from police??
◦ Less emphasis in this over time
Informal social control
◦ “…not usually someone who brandishes a gun or threatens an offender with quick punishment, but rather someone whose mere presence serves as a gentle reminder that someone is looking.”
Strength in numbers
Time spent at home
Social indicators better, poverty declines….
Changes in “Routine Activities”
◦ Time spent away from home increases
(Guardianship and suitability)
Women in workforce and college
More vacation, national park visits increase,
◦ Cheaper, lighter goods (suitability)
Televisions in 1960s averaged 38 pounds, down to
15 pounds in 1970
Why did crime increase in the post
WWII era?
Empirical Support
◦ WHY DOES PROPERTY CRIME INCREASE
DURING ECONOMIC PROSPERTIY?
◦ Household activity ratio related to crime
◦ Criminal “Hotspots” within high crime areas
◦ Prison Studies (% time outside of cell)
◦ Victimization Studies
Criticism? Confirming common sense.
Evaluating Routine Activities
Theory
In deterrence theory, if the CJS (e.g., threat of arrest/imprisonment) is not effective, the only other option is incapacitation (removing offender from society).
◦ This has been the preferred U.S. strategy
Rational Choice and Routine Activities Theory suggest that we can remove or limit the opportunity to offend by changing the environment.
◦ This has been the preferred strategy in the UK
◦ Benefit of this approach over incapacitation??
Technique
Increase the effort for crime
Harden targets
Examples
Control access to facilities
Steering column locks, tamperproof packaging
Electronic access to garages
Control tools/weapons Smart guns, plastic beer glasses in taverns
Street lighting, defensible space
Utilize place managers Two clerks in convenience stores
Strengthen formal surveillance Burglar alarms, security guards
Technique
Reduce Reward
Remove targets
Examples
Identify property
Removable car radios, women’s refuges
Property marking, cattle branding
Reduce Provocations
Reduce emotional arousal
Control drugs/alcohol
Controls on violent pornography
Avoid disputes
Remove Excuses for Crime
Set rules
Fixed cab fares, reduce crowding in
Breathalyzers in bars, alcohol-free events
Study of police crackdowns and
“catchment areas”
◦ Crime displacement may be less prevalent than expected
◦ There may be some diffusion of benefits from crime prevention efforts
Does crime just go around the corner?
Roots in classical school (1750-1850)
◦ Commonality = humans as rational calculators
◦ Renewed interest 1970s-present
Fit with conservative ideology
Main Flavors
◦ Deterrence
◦ Rational Choice
◦ Routine Activities
Review of Neoclassical Approach
Formal punishment
◦ Swift, Certain, Severe
Types
◦ Specific vs. General
◦ Absolute vs. Marginal
◦ Focused deterrence
Evidence converges on importance of certainty over severity
Much broader than deterrence
◦ What factors to humans consider when choosing whether or not to commit crime?
Criminal event vs. Criminal Involvement
Most RCT integrate concepts from other theories
◦ Common criticism: lots of things in the theory
(sex, impulsivity, moral values) that limit free will
Very similar to “criminal event” decisions in rational choice theory
◦ What immediate factors influence whether a criminal event will occur?
Target Suitability
Guardianship
◦ Policy implication = situational crime prevention