Muqarrab Akbar
PhD student, Glasgow School for Business and Society
Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow, UK
Muqarra.akbar@gcu.ac.uk
Drones
 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) system
 Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
 used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR)
 most modern technology with wide range of capability
 areas where American forces cannot operate overtly
 Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan
 First time in 2002 Yemen in 2002 ,Salim Sinan al-Harethi,
 suspected in 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden
 numbers increasing dramatically
 in 2001 almost 50
 in 2002 167
 in 2009 over 250
 in 2011 7,000
 Since summer 2011, expanded in Somalia, Libya and Yemen
 Before September 11, US had criticised and condemned the
Israeli policy of target killing.
FATA and Drone Attacks
 one of the most dangerous and isolated region of Pakistan
 Mountainous
 barren and
 deep valley areas
 Almost 3.3 million population, only 2 percent of Pakistan
 poorest regions of the world
 per capita income about US $250 per year
 60 percent living below poverty line
 code of conduct “Pakhtunwali”
 hospitality, generosity, honour, equality, pride,
 compensation and retaliation
 Sanctuary of Al Qaeda and Taliban
 training camps and recruitment centres
 exploiting the ideological and ethnical affiliations
 Pakistan military launched operations in FATA
 captured & killed many top leaders of Al-Qaeda and Taliban
 peace agreement to pardon local leaders
 US started Drone attacks in 2004
 central element of defence and counter-terrorism strategy
 most appropriate response
 no prospect of negotiation or compromise
 Pakistani forces were not willing or unable to launch an operation
 US forces were prohibited to operate
 first drone on Pakistan’s territory on June 18 2004
 target Nek Mohammad
 an influential member of TTP
 Pakistani military credited itself
 fear of public retaliation
 Initially the covert drone -“personality strikes”
 Bush era
 High value target-senior Al-Qaeda members
 Only eight in 4 years from 2004-2007.
 Success of drone caused the increase its number
 Last era of Bush
 Less signature strikes
 33 in 2008
 Entrance of Obama
 frequency of drone attacks proliferated further
 “signature strikes” based on “pattern of life” analysis.
 43 in first ten month of 2009

Only one vital success -- Baitullah Mehsud
Drone: A Successful Campaign
 more than half of top ranking and high value targets
 without endangering American marines or pilots
 “the only game in town considered to be the most effective tool
and weapon against Al-Qaeda in the war on terror by the
intelligence community particularly in the areas across the
Pakistani borders.”
(Leon Panetta, director of CIA)
 From 2004 to 2010
 60 to 1707 members of Al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliates
groups targeted
 attacks on the ISAF and the United States forces
 a plausible prima facie rationale to counter such
 Drone is effective because
 least obstructive and most precise mean
 greater surveillance capability
 greater precision to hit the target
 avoiding collateral damage
Against Drone attacks
 Drones only work and gather surveillance on the basis of
‘pattern of life’ information
 Their human operators distinguish terrorists from civilians
 accuracy, precision depends widely on human intelligence
 Killing rather the prosecuting the perpetrators
 Exact numbers of militants and innocents killed unknown
 Till June 2011-- 1,500 to 2,500 civilians on unknown killed
 Accidental killings -- collateral damage is increased
 Tarnishing social fabrics of society in FATA
 During Obama regime
 less than 13% of drone killed a militant leaders
 only 2% are militant leaders in all fatalities from drone
 Pakistani sources –in last three years
 about 700 civilian causalities
 @ 2 percent with one militant for every almost 50 civilian
 UK failed to support drone openly
 Germany supports the Pakistani stance
 Never been criticized before its expansion
 causing hostility, resentment across Pakistan
 provoking retaliation against the United States
 Undermining the Pakistan’s territorial integrity
 No transparency and accountability
 call of drones due to high civilian causality
(David Kilcullen, a former counterinsurgency advisor to Gen. David Petraeus)
 Doubt about estimation of civilian causalities
 militants collect and buried the dead and told that all of
them were innocent civilians
Public Response
 Initially no resentment
 Enhanced operation caused anti drone and anti US sentiments
 March 2009 – 61 % (International Republican Institute)
 2010 – 75 %
 2011 – 97 %
(New America Foundation)
(Pew research Center)
 2012
 17 % supports killing of militants by drones
 94 % considers killing innocent civilians
 74% unnecessary to defend Pakistan from extremist organisations
(Pew research Center)
 Opposition within US
 Anne Patterson
(US Ambassador to Pakistan)
 Cameron Munter (US Ambassador to Pakistan)
 Adm. Mullen
 Andrew M. Exum (Center for a New American Security)
 David Kilcullen (former Senior Counterinsurgency Advisor to General Petraeus)
 No empirical evidences on civilian and militant deaths
 Differences in media reports
 Killing of already killed

Ilyas Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011
Pak- US Drift
 From 2004 to 2007 , Pakistan denied US involvement
 Shamsi Air Base was provided
 Wiki leaks cables revealed Pakistani tacit support
 Bilateral relations affected by
 Raymond Davis episode (January 27, 2011 )
 Drone strike at Datta Khel ( 38 civilian deaths, March 17, 2011 )
 Salala Check post attack on Pak Army
 US agreed to notify Pakistan if targeting more than 20 people.
 Pentagon and State department favour restrictions
 CIA wants to continue
Drone strikes as counter productive
 Suicide attack – retaliatory measure and revenge
 Emergence of “accidental guerrilla” Phenomenon
 survivors converting into suicide bombers (opinion of local people)
 Blowback to US forces NATO and ISAF in Afghanistan
 Suicide bombing by al-Balawi in Khost
 Attempt to explode in Times Square by Faisal Shahzad
 Pakistani civilians, army targeted
 Attacks on Naval base, military headquarters and Air base
 No empirical data only anecdotal evidence
Drone Strikes and Suicide Attacks
Deaths from Drone and Suicide Attacks
Drone attacks and International Law
 procedure, operations, criteria of target choosing secret
 “the worst kept secret in the history of U.S. foreign policy”
(Micah Zenko, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow)
 legal and moral status under US domestic and international law
 Executive order 12333 prohibits the engaging in assassination
 No specific International Law describe about drones
 Drone similar as other weapons
 American government justifies attacks to eliminate threat to US
security.
 Violation of Article 2(4) of the United Nations
 No use of force against political independence or territorial
integrity of any state
 Two exemptions
 State give consent to use force on her territory or

Presently not with Pakistan’s consent as objected repeatedly
 Host state unwilling to target the threat to attacking state

Launched operation in Swat, Wana and FATA
 Even if Pakistan consented
 Illegal to kill suspected and innocents without prosecution
 Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and
International Human Rights Law (IHRL)
 No threat to US from these people
 On domestic legal perspective
 Violation of Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)

these elements are not involved in September 11
 “whether killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in
response to [events] in 2001.”
(Christof Heyns, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)
 “they undermine the essential foundations of human rights law”.
( Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions)
Conclusion
 Letter of 26 congressmen to Obama regarding drone
 Drones are
 Strategically important
 technical sound
 wisdom of using in the area not approachable easily
 Collateral damage of drones is
 Accelerating violence
 Instability in the region
 Creating more enemies than eliminating
 Emergence of Islamic Pashtunistan
 Complicating US policy of withdrawal
 Fragile relationship between US and Pakistan
 Both partners must be eloquent on the issue
 Effective use
 Minimising the civilian or suspected deaths
 Trust building
References
 Ian Henderson, “Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use
of Armed Drones.” In Yearbook of International
Humanitarian Law 13, edited by M.N. Schmitt, Louise
Arimatsu and T.McCormack, 134-136. Hague:Springer, 2010.
 Michael J. Boyle, “Do counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency go together?”, International Affairs 86,
no.2 (2010):342.
 Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens and Matt Flannes, “Drone
Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of War”,
Middle East Policy XVIII, no. 3(2011):123.
 Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the
CIA’s Covert Drone Program? New Yorker, 2009, October
26: 5;
References cntd....
 Avery Plaw and Matthew S. Fricker, “Tracking the Predators:

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Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan”,
International Studies Perspectives (2012):1–22.
M. E. O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A
Case Study of Pakistan,” Notre Dame Legal Studies Research
Paper 43, no. 9 (2009): 2-26.
Brian Williams, “The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in
Pakistan, 2004–10.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33: 871–
892.
New America Foundation.
International Republican Institute
Pew Research Center
QUESTIONS ??