Blue Team Clients in terms of “the role of groups” (Picard, Lecture note) “how bureaucracies stop solving other people’s problems and start generating their own. (Branch, 1976, p. 157)” Golden oldies Literary map Synthesis ◦ Morris ◦ Kotz ◦ Taylor Branch How the bureaucratic culture can twist the foreign policy into unintended and often harmful positions The peculiarly “insular culture of their bureaucracy”; a parochial view of the national interest; cliency makes diplomats align their interests with those of their hosts. Cliency has become a major occupational disease in modern American diplomacy; has taken a heavy toll on government in honesty and objectivity Cliency influences much of what the United States does—from it failure to speak out against genocide in Africa to the tragedies of Vietnam Blurring boundary between US national interest and the bureaucratic or private interests of American officials abroad The answer to the many problems of cliency starts with the opening of the foreign policy process. A sophisticated cliency—as a sensitive appreciation of other societies The answer to the many problems of cliency starts with the opening of the foreign policy process Investigative reporting in the 1960s resulted in the raising of consciousness of the problem of hunger in the United States Had been no comprehensive governmental accounting of the hungry in America Perception that hunger often caused by individual negligence by the poor; no public intervention could change this ◦ “The poor spend all of their money on coke and potato chips” (qtd. In 119) Government officials saw existing Department of Agriculture programs as effective Role of expertise, information in moving an issue onto the public agenda Introductory taxonomy of the bureaucratic way of life, proposing such theories as DETMAHOG (“Deliver the Mail/Holy Grail” ) and LICTBOSS (“Life-Cycle Theory of Bureaucratic Ossification”). Discussing when and how bureaucracies “stop solving other people’s problems and start generating their own. (p. 157)” Idler Gears: a term that describes the Executive branch of the federal machine. The theory ◦ Life-Cycle Theory of Bureaucratic Ossification (LICTBOSS): the proportion of idler-gears increases with the age of the organization; Similar to the Parkinson’s Law; LICBOSS predicts 80 percent of the government’s multi-headed independent agencies are useless. ◦ Short Public Responsibility Theory (SPURT): “the maturing process of a bureaucracy involves movement away from service to publicly stated goals and toward service to the organization itself (p. 165)”; SPURT has happened to the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Office of Economic Opportunity. The theory (Continued) ◦ Soft-Hard theory of product identification (SOHA): “Any hard bureaucracy can be expected to have fewer idler-gears spinning than a comparable soft one (p. 165)”; “A hard bureaucracy is one which produces a tangible product”, whereas a soft bureaucracy produces intangibles (p. 166)” ◦ Deliver the Mail/Holy Grail dichotomous theory of problem protection (DETMAHOG): problem solving agencies have an inherent propensity toward wheel-spinning ; “a Holy Grail bureaucracy cannot persist over time without acquiring large numbers of idler-gears-either by solving its problem and not going away or by not solving the problem (p. 166)” Clients and Political Process Culture of Bureaucracy Bureaucratic Reform Heady Peters Morris Greene Branch Orwell Barzelay Johnson Hummel Kotz Smith Development Management Community Development Corruption and Dysfunction Agenda Setting Clients: “the role of groups,” “iron triangle,” “the iron triangle and revolving door (Picard, Lecture note)” Culture: language, communication, ritual, routine Political control of bureaucracy Main point: understanding bureaucracies and client behavior and demands is complicated ◦ Myriad spheres of influence, power play and networks ◦ Special consideration regarding developing states, bureaucracies. Cooptation Interests articulation: revolving door, lobby of interests groups Clients and democracy “[I]n and around bureaucracies [language] separates people from one another” (156) Upon closer examination… ◦ Language of bureaucracy has a certain logic, but this is different than how an individual versus a bureaucracy perceives the world E.g., speech is contextless and one-directional (versus contextual and reciprocal) E.g., thought is analogizing, general, referential to abstract model (versus concrete, particular, immersed in experience) ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Top-down language Ambivalent and ambiguous: used as a management tool Jargon Acronyms (e.g., Challenger disaster) All bureaucratic organizations “tend, because of their inner logic, to become detached from the boundary with outer reality” (162) Constraints: “policies and programs predefine what can become real for bureaucracy” ◦ “It is the program that must always be obeyed. It becomes the referent point for what is authorized to happen” (158). Take away: bureaucratic speech is different to understand because it is different than ordinary speech; “technical acts and language” translated into meaning by “practical people”; if we want to control bureaucratic behavior, should keep this in mind and allow it to stay in place (184-185) Officials should see themselves as “Possibilists” and ask themselves, “What is to be done” Follow six principles for managing staff agencies 1. Spread responsibility for economizing and compliance 2. Conceptualize work as providing services 3. Identify customers with care 4. Be accountable to customers 5. Reorganize to separate service from control 6. Let the customer fund the providers Building off of Peters’ critique of the way comparative administrationists approached research questions, IV’s suggested to explain the DV of public official behavior in administrative positions ◦ Relationship with clients ◦ Management: i.e., relationships between subordinates and superiors in the formal structure ◦ Implementation ◦ Corruption ◦ Policy-making Also examines utility maximization Logical Critique Economic Model ◦ Often based on economic assumptions such as Niskanen’s maximizing bureaucrat ◦ Calls into question preceding model ◦ Points to examples such as Cohen, March and Olsen’s “garbage can” ◦ Through examples of budget and personnel decisions ◦ Empirical looking at, for example, changes in civil service pay in the United States from 1971-1984 and changes in salary levels, 1970-1984; also examines federal civilian employment, 19501984 Main point: calls into question various above models; need to work as scholars to develop better, more realistic and feasible ones Role of the political party as an institution Often common in developing countries Polyarchal competitive systems ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ Political competition Well-organized political groupings competing for power Shift in power relations without disruption the system Do not need to have Western-style parties Bureaucracy may become a focus for competition Here, external controls sometimes lead to unintended consequences—that is, bureaucracies cannot meet demands From 1949 to 1954, Japanese forged the institutions of their high-growth system MITI’s high-growth system derived from the government’ selection of industries for “nurturing” (199) Tools of bureaucrats: ◦ Control over foreign exchange; imports of technology ◦ Ability to dispense preferential financing; tax breaks; protection from foreign competition ◦ Authority to order the creation of cartels and bank-based industrial conglomerates New apparatus for export promotion: Supreme Export Council; EPA (Economic Planning Agency); Japan External Trade Organization (231) Japan’s “miracle” was based on “improved institutional arrangements” (Chandler 1980) ◦ Institutional arrangement: formal and informal, explicit and implicit social structures “developed to coordinate activities within large formal organizations such as corporations, government bodies, and universities and to link those organizations to another” Improved institutional arrangements: twotiered banking system, FILP (Fiscal Investment and Loan Plan), MITI ◦ Total control of foreign exchange, total screening of foreign capital, and a tax system that made Japan a “businessman’s paradise” (240). ◦ MITI Most important “improved institutional arrangement” Roleas “pilot agency” or “economic general staff” Ironically, effectiveness was improved by the loss of its absolute power of state control (240) After the expiration of the Temporary Materials Supply and Demand Control Law, MITI had to learn to employ indirect, market-conforming methods of intervention (240) A story of Maurice Castle ◦ Bureaucrat in the British secret service ◦ Married to an African woman ◦ Help the Communists who had helped his wife’s escape Individuals in the context of the Cold War; impact of international affairs on the lives of individuals Communist/imperialist/Apartheid/romantic love/death/ loyalty “For a while I half believed in God, like I half believed in Carson’s. Perhaps I was born to be a half believer” (140). “When you talk about Prague and Budapest and how you can’t find a human face in Communism. I’ve seen-once-the human face…I don’t have any trust in Marx or Lenin any more than I have in Saint Paul, but haven’t I the right to be grateful?” (141). “[H]e might find a permanent home, in a city where he could be accepted as a citizen, as a citizen without any pledge of faith, not the City of God or Marx, but the city called Peace of Mind” (141). Description of lives in poverty in Paris and London; tour of the underworld Describes the tramp’s life in London looking for a paid job “ My story ends here…I have definitely learned by being hard up. I shall never again think that all tramps are drunken scoundrels, nor expect a beggar to be grateful when I gave him a penny, nor be surprised if men out of work lack energy, nor enjoy a meal at a smart restaurant. That is the beginning” (213). Background: in January 1970, Indonesian student’s organizations’ protests against government’s corruption; Commission on corruption investigation in Indonesia Causes of corruption: historical factors, cultural factors, and economic factors Key variables identified by Indonesian bureaucrats ◦ Structural variables: a highly centralized governmental structure make corruption possible ◦ Political party factors: new political parties have financing needs; beyond election needs, there are day-to-day routine expenses On the whole, corruption in Indonesia seems to present more of a recurring political problem than an economic one ◦ Undermines legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the young, educated elite and most civil servants Barzelay, Michael , Breaking Through Bureaucracy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) Greene, Graham, The Human Factor (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979 or New York: Pocket Books, 1988). Guy, Peters, B., Comparing Public Bureaucracies: Problems of Theory and Method (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988) Heady, Ferrel, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective 6th Edition (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1994) Hummel, Ralph P., The Bureaucratic Experience (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987) Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) Kotz, Nick, "Jamie Whitten, Permanent Secretary of Agriculture" in Nick Katz, Let Them Eat Promises: The Politics of Hunger in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969) Morris, Roger, "Rooting for the Other Team" in Charles Peters and James Fallows, eds., Inside the System (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 171-181. Orwell, George, Down and Out in Paris and London (New York: Harvest, 1961). Smith, Theodore M., “Corruption, Tradition and Change in Indonesia, in Arnold Heidenheimer, Michael Johnston and Victor T. LeVine, eds. Political Corruption: A Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ.:Transaction Publishers, 1990).