HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
***PORT AFF SUPP-WAVE 1***
***PORT AFF SUPP-WAVE 1*** ............................................................................................................................................1
Solvency-More Staff ....................................................................................................................................................................2
Solvency-Screening 50% .............................................................................................................................................................2
Solvency-Fund Coast Card ..........................................................................................................................................................3
Sovency-New Tech/MDA ...........................................................................................................................................................4
Terrorism Advantage-Uniqueness ...............................................................................................................................................5
Terrorism Advantage-Ports Key ..................................................................................................................................................6
Terrorism Advantage-Econ Impact ..............................................................................................................................................7
Competitiveness Advantage-1AC .............................................................................................................................................. 10
Competitiveness Advantage-Uniqueness ................................................................................................................................... 19
Competitiveness Advantage-Ports Internal ................................................................................................................................ 21
Competitiveness-Econ Internal .................................................................................................................................................. 25
Competitiveness Advantage-Solvency....................................................................................................................................... 26
Competitiveness Advantage-Trade Impact ................................................................................................................................ 27
Competitiveness Advantage-Terrorism Impact ......................................................................................................................... 31
Navy Advantage-1AC ................................................................................................................................................................ 32
Navy Advantage-Uniqueness ..................................................................................................................................................... 39
Navy Advantage-Commercial Ports Internal ............................................................................................................................. 40
Environment Advantage-Internal ............................................................................................................................................... 41
Bioweapon Add-On ................................................................................................................................................................... 42
A2: Politics-Turn ....................................................................................................................................................................... 43
A2: States CP-Feds Key............................................................................................................................................................. 44
1
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Solvency-More Staff
More staff needed to solve efficiency and security
Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz 2006. Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost
The true limiting factor at the ports is not physical capacity but human capacity—labor to run the cranes and to move goods
and containers in and out of the yards. If a portion of the facilities were closed, labor shortages in other yards handling the
extra traffic could be made up of crews brought in from the closed facilities or even from other port facilities on the West
Coast, from emergency aid from the Coast Guard or other military organizations, and eventually by new crews trained over
the course of the succeeding weeks. At the same time, a certain amount of shipping could easily be funneled through other
West Coast ports with excess physical capacity. In the longer term, shipping could be rerouted to East Coast ports and to
refitted West Coast facilities not currently able to handle modern containerized shipping. In short, although the cost of
importing products would surely rise as a result of the logistical difficulties created, there is no reason to believe that trade
would be substantially interrupted. For those industries that rely on imports to run their business, there would be extra costs
in the short run. The longer the disruption the less these costs will be, as better solutions are found.
In our view, the true threat to the ports is not the physical damage to facilities, given the excess capacity in the system that
could be used in the event of a true emergency. Rather, the true limitation is the unwillingness of labor to work under
potentially hazardous conditions. The most dangerous scenario might occur as follows: A single conventional bomb goes off
in a containerized shipment, killing or injuring a number of port personnel. The attack is followed by a threat that a number
of other similarly rigged containers are on their way into U.S. ports or perhaps have already been offloaded and are awaiting
transfer. One result might be that work crews understandably would refuse to work until the government could assure some
degree of safety. In another scenario, the ports could be closed not by labor but by the government. If the attack on the World
Trade Center was an indication of what might happen in the wake of a serious attack, then the government itself might shut
down U.S. ports while deciding how to handle the new crisis. This would imply that the government would have to put some
sort of screening process into place rapidly by which safe containers could be separated from potentially dangerous ones,
with a second physical screening to detect potential explosives in this latter category.
And boosted screening capacity is key
John W. Schoen. Ships and Ports are Terrorism’s New Frontier msnbc.com 6/21/ 2004
The result is that only 2 percent of containerized cargo entering the country is physically inspected. And while advanced
technology scanners have helped speed those inspections, just tracking the 200 million containers that move among the
world’s top seaports each year is a major undertaking. Flynn cited one major shipper with over 300,000 containers in its
inventory. “It doesn’t know where 40 percent of them are at any given time,” he said. “It takes one of their customers saying,
‘Hey I’ve got one of your boxes if you want it back.' “Those boxes are a potentially potent weapon for terrorists – whether for
use smuggling weapons, explosive materials or terrorists themselves, or as a huge chemical, biological or "dirty" bomb
spreading radioactive waste. At present, though, many ports are ill-prepared to deal with that threat. The accidental explosion
of a container on the dock of the Port of Los Angeles on April 28 underscored the problem. Gasoline fumes from a pickup
truck inside the container were apparently ignited by a spark from a battery, blowing the locked steel doors open and spilling
the contents, which included 900 bottles of LPG butane gas, according to Michael Mitre, Coast Port Security director at the
International Longshore and Warehouse Union. “There was virtually no response,” Mitre told a House panel on maritime
security last week. “There was no evacuation. There was no shutdown of work … It could have been something that was a
biological or chemical release; it could be a radioactive release. No one knew. But at the time, the terminal was absolutely not
prepared.” Mitre said the explosion also highlights a major deficiency in container inspection. “Export cargo is not treated the
same way as import cargo,” he said. “We have cargo coming in through the gates that is not having to show what the contents
are." As a result, terrorists inside the U.S. would have a much easier time loading a container on an outbound shipment, he
said.
Solvency-Screening 50%
Screening at least 50% of containers is key
Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz 2006. Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost
How to defend? No one measure, procedure, or technology will provide a very high (90%-plus) probability of spotting a
WMD carefully concealed in one of the 10 million containers arriving in the United States; 100 percent is pure fantasy.
Furthermore, defense is a game not against nature but against smart and resourceful antagonists. New defensive measures
will generate innovative attack countermeasures, and so on, as it has evolved throughout the history of combat, not to
mention crime. A decisive, preemptive, military strike (as in “take them out before they can strike us”) for this new war with
multinational, loosely networked terrorists would be a temptingly cathartic but an inappropriate and unreliable strategy; an
advance tip-off through intelligence, however, would be of enormous value but too uncertain to count on. The strategy that
2
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
appears best is to create layers of security through which containers must pass, each layer different, in what it can do, how it
does it, and what it depends on for success. Each one alone may be woefully unreliable, adding, say, a 33 percent chance of
spotting a weapon, but if the container must pass through four such systems, the odds climb to 81 percent. A similar series of
50-percent-reliable “WMD spotting steps” pushes the chances of finding a weapon up to 94 percent. But the real world
imposes severe constraints on this popular model of simple cumulative probability. The security system must operate in a
context of rapid, high-volume movements and very minimal delays. So, for example, an inspection technology that is 50
percent likely to spot a weapon has an altogether different value if it includes a 20 percent probability of a “false positive.”
Almost any known inspection system will yield false positives. But a false positive is not at all the same as a false negative or
an omission. A false negative will go right on through, most likely without consequence, possibly with disastrous result. To
be effective, the system must be able to review false positives quickly through non-intrusive means. In the post–September
11 flurry of well- meant efforts to “do something,” various legislators have proposed new security measures; some even
proposed legislation that would call for hand inspection of each container.37 A container is roughly the size of a moving van,
40 feet long and fully packed; the labor time involved in unpacking, inspecting, and repacking it dockside would bring the
entire system to a halt or at best to an economically ruinous crawl, inflicting, by ourselves on ourselves, the terrorists’
ambition.
Solvency-Fund Coast Card
Increasing funding for the Coast Guards at the ports would boost security capacity
Carafano 2006 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. “Increase Coast Guard
Modernization Funding”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/01/countdown-to-9-11-five-fixes-for-homeland-security-by-the-fifthanniversary-of-the-attacks
Appropriators on Capitol Hill have doggedly held to the belief that giving money to ports across the U.S. bolsters maritime
security. This is incorrect. If deadly cargo such as a nuclear bomb or a biological agent reaches American shores, it will be
too late. Maritime security means preventing dangerous cargo from ever entering a U.S. port, and this is the domain of the
U.S. Coast Guard. Yet the Coast Guard's modernization program is seriously underfunded. To make matters worse, since
9/11, increased activities are wearing out Coast Guard equipment much faster than anticipated. The Coast Guard needs at
least $1.5 billion per year for modernization.
The single best way to increase port security is to increase Coast Guard funding
Carafano and Kochems 2005, James. Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/02/making-the-sea-safer-a-national-agenda-for-maritime-security-andcounterterrorism
Increase Coast Guard Funding for the Deepwater Program to $1.5 Billion.Getting the "biggest bang for the buck" is a
worthwhile criterion for guiding spending decisions. In the realm of maritime security that translates to fully funding the
needs of the Coast Guard, whose range of missions touch virtually every aspect of protecting the maritime domain against
terrorist attacks. The current funding level for Coast Guard modernization is totally inadequate. Doubling the annual budget
for Deepwater-the service's primary acquisition program-would not only establish more quickly the capabilities needed for a
long-term security system, but would also garner significant savings in lower procurement costs.
The key to maritime security is providing the Coast Guard with the necessary resources
Carafano and Kochems 2005 James. Making the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and
Counterterrorism http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/02/making-the-sea-safer-a-national-agenda-for-maritimesecurity-and-counterterrorism
The challenges for maritime security are complex and growing. Addressing vulnerabilities, ensuring access to the maritime
domain, and maintaining economic competitiveness while protecting U.S. interests from sea-based attacks will be no easy
task. The strategic nature of the challenge requires a strategic response. The next steps in that response must include drafting
a strategy, providing adequate resources to the Coast Guard, building a companion capability in the Department of Defense,
and engaging the private sector and the developing world.
Increasing Coast Guard Funding to increase maritime security.
Carafano and Anderson 2006 James and Martin. “Trade Security at Sea: Setting National Priorities for Safeguarding
America's Economic Lifeline”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/04/trade-security-at-sea-setting-national-priorities-for-safeguarding-americaseconomic-lifeline
3
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
Establish a national MDA budget and make the Coast Guard the executive agent for MDA for maritime security. The Office
of Management and Budget should identify all federal spending in the national MDA budget. The Commandant of the Coast
Guard should submit an annual assessment of all federal spending and proposed expenditures on MDA to the President and
the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and Transportation. The Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and
Transportation, with the Coast Guard and Navy as executive agents, should be responsible for establishing the architecture
for MDA with the Coast Guard as the lead agency.
Expanding coast guard capabilities will increase port security AND EFFICIENCY
Carafano and Kochems 2006 James Carafano has a PhD and both him and Alane are writers for the heritage
foundation. “Complete Cargo Inspection and Port Security Grants Do Not Promote Homeland Security”
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/04/complete-cargo-inspection-and-port-security-grants-do-not-promotehomeland-security
A Better Way. To safeguard the flow of global maritime commerce, the United States needs to expand Coast Guard
capabilities, improve the sharing and use of commercial information, and enhance international cooperation. Specifically,
Congress should: Expand the Coast Guard's International Port Assistance Program. Focus on specific shipments that indicate
a reason for suspicion by cultivating better information sharing between the public and private sectors. This approach would
allow more efficient allocation of resources and effort by pinpointing suspect shipments rather than trying to screen all
containers, most of which pose no threat. Separate the intelligence and compliance functions of Customs and Border
Protection and combine intelligence and data collection into a single, focused authority at a high level elsewhere in the
Department of Homeland Security. Require the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to sponsor joint operations
and intelligence fusion centers. Aggressively fund and implement the Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater System to accelerate completion to within 10 years to 15 years.
Restructure U.S. assistance programs. Congress should begin to address this issue by requiring the Government
Accountability Office to inventory and assess the effectiveness of the various U.S. programs and their international
counterparts.
Sovency-New Tech/MDA
We can stick all this stuff on ports to solve
Robert B. Watts Commander, United States Coast Guard, March 2006 (“IMPLEMENTING MARITIME DOMAIN
AWARENESS,” NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL)
JHOCs possess several unique capabilities that contribute significantly to tactical MDA. As command and control centers for
ports and their immediate vicinity, JHOCs have inherent surveillance capability that can contribute to a COP. Using the San
Diego JHOC as an example, these systems these include:
--USCG Coastal Radar
--USN Port control/offshore radar system
--Automated Identification System processors
--San Diego port control camera system (civilian)
--Navy waterside security system
--Border patrol camera/thermal imagery system
JHOCs can serve as the critical fusion point for various intelligence data bases of agencies participating in the JHOC.
These data bases currently include the Coast Guard’s Maritime Information Safety and Law Enforcement system, the
Automated Regional Justice Information System (Naval Criminal Investigative Service), and intelligence from the local Joint
Terrorism Task Force.37 Through the use of inter-agency sensors and local inter-agency liaison, the JHOC effectively
collects, fuses, and disseminates information that is critical for achieving tactical MDA .
4
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Terrorism Advantage-Uniqueness
Congress will not act to improve port security now
Stamford Advocate, May 9, 2012, “Maritime Industry Awaits Action in Congress”
The maritime businesses should not expect any industry-related legislation soon from Congress as the Republican-controlled
House and Democratic-controlled Senate continue to do battle. Joan M. Bondareff, an attorney with the Washington, D.C.,
office of Blank Rome LLP, told more than 150 participants at the Tugs & Barges Marine Log Conference & Expo on
Tuesday at the Stamford Marriott that the impasse will continue until after the presidential and congressional elections in
November."This Congress is in considerable gridlock, and nothing much will happen until after election," said Bondareff,
who focuses on marine transportation and environmental issues. Much of proposed transportation funding that is tied up in
the 2013 federal budget pertains to maritime programs, including port security and improvements, said Bondareff, who
encouraged the audience to contact their senators and representatives to urge action on maritime-related legislation.
Current port security programs have proven to be flawed--only 3% of containers are scanned for
illicit cargo
McLeary 2010 (Paul McLeary, April 2010, “U.S. Port Security is a Global Issue”
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/dti/2010/04/01/DT_04_01_2010_p2
3-212822.xml)
SFI is operational at five of these seaports, and while the program increases the U.S. government’s ability to have containers
scanned for nuclear and radiolodical material while overseas, the program hasn’t been as successful as Homeland Security
officials had wanted. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported in December that the feasibility of scanning all
U.S.-bound cargo at foreign ports “remain largely unproven.” But even here, it’s a mixed bag. The GAO says that CBP has
been successful in critical technological aspects like “integrating images of scanned containers onto a single computer screen
that can be reviewed remotely from the U.S.” It has used technologies like mobile radiation scanners successfully at these
ports, though the level of participation at test ports remains a problem. There are also troubling numbers. The GAO found
that the 54-86% of U.S.-bound cargo containers that were scanned at three ports together account for less than 3% of
container shipments to the U.S., and that CBP “has not been able to achieve sustained scanning rates above 5%” at two larger
ports that handle much more U.S.-bound cargo.
5
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Terrorism Advantage-Ports Key
Intelligence gathered from Abbottabad indicates domestic ports remain a high value target to
Terrorist groups – an attack is imminent
Port Strategy 2011 (Portstrategy.com, September 2011, “Can US port security stand up to the cuts?”
http://www.portstrategy.com/news101/americas/can-us-port-security-stand-up-to-the-cuts)
The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) points out that in the decade since the World Trade Centre attack
there have been substantial security gains. However, among the materials Navy SEALS found in Osama Bin Laden’s
Pakistan hideout were plans showing the maritime industry is still a key Al-Qaida target. Kurt Nagle, AAPA president and
CEO said, “Clearly, , America’s ports have become much more secure since 9/11. In addition to guarding against cargo theft,
drug smuggling, human trafficking and stowaways, ports and their law enforcement partners have added the protection of
people and facilities from terrorism to their security plate.” Mr. Nagle added, “There’s no question that more investment in
security equipment, infrastructure, technology, personnel and training will be needed.” Given ongoing threats such as these,
the seaport industry is asking US congress and administration make port security a top funding priority in current and future
appropriations rather than considering it for funding cuts. Mr. Nagle said, “Regrettably, the more than 50% funding level cut
recommended for FEMA’s State and Local Program grants, which includes the Port Security Grant Program, could impact
the current security capabilities of many US ports as well as hamper their ability to carry out their five-year port protection
plans.”
Experts agree ports are the new primary targets for terrorists
John W. Schoen. Ships and Ports are Terrorism’s New Frontier msnbc.com 6/21/ 2004
Welcome to the new front in the war on terrorism. Despite the billions of dollars spent since the Sept. 11 terror attacks to
secure commercial aviation, security experts say that effort has created a new vulnerability: the thousands of ports around the
world, many of which have only recently turned their attention to thwarting terrorism. Danger spots and "choke points" on
the world's oceans “Terrorists not only understand the vulnerability of seaports and shipping but have readjusted their target
folder for the greater difficulty in attacking aviation,” said Kim Petersen, executive director of the trade group, Maritime
Security Council. “And the presumption is that maritime is going to be a more significant target in the future."The Ashdod
attack emphasized the concern security experts have about cargo containers being used as terrorist Trojan Horses. And, they
say, that's just one of threats faced by the 361 U.S. ports -– vital arteries to the U.S. economy.
Terrorists seek to attack ports-targets with the most econ gain and least loss
Jonathan Medalia Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. CRS Report for Congress
December 7, 2004
Potential Targets. Terrorists could be expected to target a port that handled a large volume of oil and other goods and that had
a densely-populated area that tankers passed on their way through a harbor to an unloading terminal. Various cities
worldwide meet these criteria. If terrorists sought major economic damage while minimizing loss of life, they might try to
target the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, or LOOP, the only U.S. deepwater oil port that can handle fully loaded supertankers.
LOOP, 18 miles off the Louisiana coast, currently handles about 10% of U.S. crude oil imports. The Panama Canal might be
another potential economic target.
Terrorist attacks via shipping containers extremely likely
Konkel 2005, Todd. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University “Container Security:
Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe”
http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/004/5372.pdf
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the U.S. government passed a significant number of
measures to improve aviation security – an area with a high level of public visibility. This nation faces a potentially greater
threat, however, from a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) making its way into the U.S. in oneof the thousands of cargo
containers that enter this country every day. In June 2004, the House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation issued a memoreflecting this view: “Despite the importance of seaport security, perhaps no other modeof
transportation is currently more vulnerable to future attacks than our Nation’s Marine Transportation System.”Although a
future attack involving a chemical or biological WMD could have tragic consequences, a nuclear weapon, which could cause
hundreds of thousands of deaths in an instant, presents the most concerning threat. In Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate
Preventable Catastrophe, Harvard professor Graham Allison shares a brief but revealing excerpt from a private conversation
that took place with former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge in February 2004. When asked what worried him
most, Secretary Ridge replied with a single word: “nuclear.” Later in his book, Allison states that a nuclear weapon used by
terrorists in an attack on the United States “is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.”
6
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Nuclear materials are easy to acquire
Konkel 2005, Todd. Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University “Container Security:
Preventing a Nuclear Catastrophe”
Given the availability and relative insecurity of nuclear materials, policymakers must address the very real risk that
sophisticated terrorists might succeed in obtaining such materials. The story of David Hahn, a nuclear-savvy Michigan
teenager, should serve as ample warning. Over the course of three years beginning in 1991, Hahn collected and purified
enough radioactive material in his mother’s potting shed to put forty thousand nearby residents at risk due to the dangers
posed by the release of radioactive dust and radiation A terrorist organization with sufficient determination and financial
resources would no doubt pose a much greater threat.
Terrorists WMD through ports likely and would cost US billions
Nadler 2012, Jerrold. “Cargo, the Terrorists’ Trojan Horse” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/opinion/the-dangerousdelay-on-port-security.html
MILLIONS of cargo containers are unloaded from ships each year at American seaports, providing countless opportunities
for terrorists to smuggle and unleash a nuclear bomb or weapon of mass destruction on our shores. To counter this threat,
Congress passed a law five years ago mandating that by July 2012, all maritime cargo bound for the United States must be
scanned before it is loaded on ships. But the Obama administration will miss this deadline, and it is not clear to us, as the
authors of the law, whether it ever plans to comply with the law. Over the years, terrorists have shown themselves to be
frighteningly inventive. They have hidden explosives in printer cartridges transported by air and embedded explosives in the
shoes and underwear of airline passengers. The cargo containers arriving on ships from foreign ports offer terrorists a Trojan
horse for a devastating attack on the United States. As the Harvard political scientist Graham T. Allison has put it, a nuclear
attack is “far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.” But for the past five years,
the Department of Homeland Security has done little to counter this threat and instead has wasted precious time arguing that
it would be too expensive and too difficult, logistically and diplomatically, to comply with the law. This is unacceptable. An
attack on an American port could cause tens of thousands of deaths and cripple global trade, with losses ranging from $45
billion to more than $1 trillion, according to estimates by the RAND Corporation and the Congressional Research Service.
Anyone who doubts these estimates should recall the labor strike that shut down the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach
for 11 days in 2002. Economic losses were put at $6.3 billion or more. Homeland Security says it would cost $16 billion or
more to meet the mandate, but that projection assumes that the department would pay to acquire, maintain and operate
scanning equipment and related operations, without any offsetting fees from companies in the global supply chain. In
contrast, Stephen E. Flynn, an expert in terrorism and port security at Northeastern University, has said a scanning system
could be implemented in every major container port in the world at a cost of $1.5 billion, and that the costs could largely be
absorbed by companies doing business at the ports. Homeland Security says it uses a “layered, risk-based approach” to cargo
scanning, which, instead of comprehensive scanning, targets specific cargo thought to be high-risk. But this approach is
inadequate. Recent advances in screening technologies have undermined Homeland Security’s contention that the technology
is not available to scan all cargo containers without disrupting commerce. An effective high-volume container screening
system was installed in the Port of Hong Kong in 2005. Trials of new, American-made technology have demonstrated that
scanning all containers would be feasible at many ports. The world’s largest marine terminal operators have offered to work
with the department to put the law into effect. Cost and technology have never been the primary obstacles to meeting this
mandate. What is missing is a sense of urgency and determination. We recognized that the scanning of 100 percent of all
cargo containers in five years could be a challenging deadline to meet. That is why we included the authority to extend the
deadline in cases in which Homeland Security certified that there are at least two major obstacles relating to the availability
and accuracy of the technology, the logistics of its deployment and use, or impacts to trade. Now Homeland Security is using
this authority to simply exempt itself from any meaningful compliance with the law we wrote to close a dangerous loophole
in United States security. We have urged the department over the last five years to make the law a reality, to no avail. Our
nation can no longer risk such delays.
Terrorism Advantage-Econ Impact
Terrorist attack at a port would trigger a self-imposed trade embargo bringing world trade to an
end within three weeks while destroying the global economy
Flynn 2003 (Stephen Flynn, 2003, Natl Sec Studies, “The Fragile state of container security,” testimony before the senate,
March 20 http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5730)
A year later I joined with former senators Warren Rudman and Gary Hart in preparing our report, “America: Still
Unprepared—Still In Danger.” We observed that “nineteen men wielding box-cutters forced the United States to do to itself
what no adversary could ever accomplish: a successful blockade of the U.S. economy. If a surprise terrorist attack were to
7
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
happen tomorrow involving the sea, rail, or truck, transportation systems that carry millions of tons of trade to the United
States each day, the response would likely be the same – a self imposed global embargo. .” Based on that analysis, we
identified as second of the six critical mandates that deserve the nation’s immediate attention: “Make trade security a global
priority; the system for moving goods affordably and reliably around the world is ripe for exploitation and vulnerable to mass
disruption by terrorists.” This is why the topic of today’s hearing is so important. The stakes are enormous. U.S. prosperity—
and much of its power—relies on its ready access to global markets. Both the scale and pace at which goods move between
markets has exploded in recent years thanks in no small part to the invention and proliferation of the intermodal container.
These ubiquitous boxes—most come in the 40’x8’x8’ size—have transformed the transfer of cargo from a truck, train, and
ship into the transportation equivalent of connecting Lego blocks. The result has been to increasingly diminish the role of
distance for a supplier or a consumer as a constraint in the world marketplace. Ninety percent of the world’s freight now
moves in a container. Companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors move up to 30 tons of merchandise or parts across the
vast Pacific Ocean from Asia to the West Coast for about $1600. The transatlantic trip runs just over a $1000—which makes
the postage stamp seem a bit overpriced. But the system that underpins the incredibly efficient, reliable, and affordable
movement of global freight has one glaring shortcoming in the post-9-11 world—it was built without credible safeguards to
prevent it from being exploited or targeted by terrorists and criminals. Prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the
world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to their home or
workplace. They then could load it with tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were,
“seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city and town in the United States. The job of transportation
providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s
contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement. The responsibility for
making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing
jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo
stayed flat or even declined among most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five
agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. Last year nearly 20
million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, and truck. Frontline agencies had only enough
inspectors and equipment to examine between 1-2 percent of that cargo. Thus, for would-be terrorists, the global intermodal
container system that is responsible for moving the overwhelming majority of the world’s freight satisfies the age-old criteria
of opportunity and motive. “Opportunity” flows from (1) the almost complete absence of any security oversight in the
loading and transporting of a box from its point of origin to its final destination, and (2) the fact that growing volume and
velocity at which containers move around the planet create a daunting “needle-in-the-haystack” problem for inspectors.
“Motive” is derived from the role that the container now plays in underpinning global supply chains and the likely response
by the U.S. government to an attack involving a container. Based on statements by the key officials at U.S. Customs, the
Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of Transportation, should a container be
used as a “poor man’s missile,” the shipment of all containerized cargo into our ports and across our borders would be halted.
As a consequence, a modest investment by a terrorist could yield billions of dollars in losses to the U.S. economy by shutting
down – even temporarily – the system that moves “just-in-time” shipments of parts and goods. Given the current state of
container security, it is hard to imagine how a post-event lock-down on container shipments could be either prevented or
short-lived. One thing we should have learned from the 9-11 attacks involving passenger airliners, the follow-on anthrax
attacks, and even last fall Washington sniper spree is that terrorist incidents pose a special challenge for public officials. In
the case of most disasters, the reaction by the general public is almost always to assume the event is an isolated one. Even if
the post-mortem provides evidence of a systemic vulnerability, it often takes a good deal of effort to mobilize a public policy
response to redress it. But just the opposite happens in the event of a terrorist attack—especially one involving catastrophic
consequences. When these attacks take place, the assumption by the general public is almost always to presume a general
vulnerability unless there is proof to the contrary. Government officials have to confront head-on this loss of public
confidence by marshalling evidence that they have a credible means to manage the risk highlighted by the terrorist incident.
In the interim as recent events have shown, people will refuse to fly, open their mail, or even leave their homes.If a terrorist
were to use a container as a weapon-delivery devise, the easiest choice would be high-explosives such as those used in the
attack on the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. Some form of chemical weapon, perhaps even involving hazardous
materials, is another likely scenario. A bio-weapon is a less attractive choice for a terrorist because of the challenge of
dispersing the agent in a sufficiently concentrated form beyond the area where the explosive devise goes off. A “dirty bomb”
is the more likely threat vs. a nuclear weapon, but all these scenarios are conceivable since the choice of a weapon would not
be constrained by any security measures currently in place in our seaports or within the intermodal transportation industry.
This is why a terrorist attack involving a cargo container could cause such profound economic disruption. An incident
triggered by even a conventional weapon going off in a box could result in a substantial loss of life. In the immediate
aftermath, the general public will want reassurance that one of the many other thousands of containers arriving on any given
day will not pose a similar risk. The President of the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other keys
officials responsible for the security of the nation would have to stand before a traumatized and likely skeptical American
people and outline the measures they have in place to prevent another such attack. In the absence of a convincing security
framework to manage the risk of another incident, the public would likely insist that all containerized cargo be stopped until
8
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
adequate safeguards are in place. Even with the most focused effort, constructing that framework from scratch could take
months—even years. Yet, within three weeks, the entire worldwide intermodal transportation industry would effectively be
brought to its knees – as would much of the freight movements that
9
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness Advantage-1AC
Decline is inevitable:
First centralization—trade is being centralized in a few large players—leads to market volatility
Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University, New York, USA, and Dr. Theo Notteboom, President of ITMMA, University
of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, 2012 (“Port regionalization: improving port competitiveness by reaching beyond the port
perimeter,” Port Focus iss. 52 February 2012)
The second driver of change that directly affects the role of ports is the development of global supply chains. These
chains link strongly dispersed production and sourcing sites to more geographically concentrated consumption
regions. What matters from the point of view of shippers and customers is the performance of the supply chain in
terms of price, service quality and reliability. This focus on the chain as a whole is reflected in efforts of the players in
various segments to consolidate, vertically integrate or otherwise enter into long-term contracts, in order to drive costs down
but also to increase the level of coordination and synchronization. Such concentration and restructuring carries a risk of
generating excessive market power for some of the actors in the chain. It has also increased volatility, meaning that small
deviations from expected or planned processes have large consequences for system performance. Volatility increases
uncertainty and induces logistics providers to build in redundancy by using more than one of a set of routing options, so as to
mitigate route risk. This trend further weakens the shipper or customer’s reliance on a specific port. The increase in
levels of concentration, along several dimensions, is quite spectacular. In 1980 the top 20 of the world’s shipping lines
controlled 26% of TEU-slot capacity; by 2007 their share had increased to 81% (Notteboom, 2008).3 Many of these top 20
further concentrate effort by engaging in alliances. Shipping lines also vertically integrate, in some cases working towards
“extended gates” where shipping lines take control of inland transport and inland terminals and depots. At the level of port
terminal operations, the market share in terms of throughput of the top 10 players rose from 42% in 2001 to 55% in 2005.
This raises concerns over increasing market concentration. Some terminal operators have extended vertically in the
direction of “terminal operator haulage”. With respect to vertical integration, the current picture is one of widespread
experimentation with ways of organizing the supply chain (see Notteboom, 2008, for an overview), and while it is not
clear exactly which models will persist, the emerging picture is one of market dominance by a handful of large players at
each segment of the supply chain, combined with fringe firms specialising in profitable niche markets. Despite the small
number of players, competition in and for the market (within and between ports) is strong, and may be strong enough
to alleviate concerns about market power in the supply chain in many circumstances. Concerns were expressed by
participants that the market power of integrated, global transport and logistics companies is a concern for ports themselves.
Finally, geographical concentration of flows is increasing as well. For example, the North-South imbalance among
ports in Europe is growing larger, and this is largely because of more favourable hinterland transport conditions in
the North. It is noteworthy that many actors along the supply chain are involved in attempts to vertically integrate, but that
ports as such have not strongly engaged in this trend. In combination with the technological trends discussed earlier, this
further weakens ports’ market and bargaining power.
That increases inter-port competition, the current passive policy framework cements congestion
Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University, New York, USA, and Dr. Theo Notteboom, President of ITMMA,
University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, 2012 (“Port regionalization: improving port competitiveness by reaching beyond
the port perimeter,” Port Focus iss. 52 February 2012)
Containerization was a major technological innovation that revolutionized the nature of maritime-based freight
transport of manufactured goods. It caused a substantial degree of standardization of port services, implying that ports
cannot rely on specialization to maintain market share and generate revenues as much as they used to. With
containerization, ports in the same region become closer substitutes, and hence are more exposed to competition from
other ports and other routes. This tendency is reinforced by two other factors. First, the use of ever larger container
vessels1 implies that fewer port calls are required for the same freight volume. This move to larger ships reduces
shipping lines’ dependence on particular ports and intensifies competition among ports for the remaining calls (assuming
each port can handle the larger vessels2). Second, the emergence of intermodal rail and barge corridors has extended
gateway ports’ geographical reach. The extension of hinterlands leads to more overlap among ports’ hinterlands and hence
to stronger competition. These technological factors imply that the exposure of ports to competition has increased. At the
same time, there has been widespread adoption by governments of new public management principles and the ensuing
devolution of port management has resulted in a more commercial approach to the management of port operations
(Brooks and Cullinane, 2007); this has led to intensified port competition as well. This is not to say that all ports behave
like private firms as, in many cases, they pursue a mix of private and public objectives and there is considerable public sector
10
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
involvement in infrastructure supply. The change in port behavior has been facilitated by a rather passive policy
context ; in section 3, the question to be tackled is: is a more active public policy towards port and supply chain
developments now required? Port competition is intense, but ports are not “perfect substitutes”, i.e. they are not
interchangeable perfectly or without cost. First, gateway ports still have a strong position in at least some of their service
area, as hinterlands do not overlap completely. Second, the intensifying effect of containerization on port competition
may be muted by congestion in ports or in their hinterland transport networks. When a port or its hinterland facilities
are more strongly congested than is the case for competing ports, the quality of that port’s service may be lower in that it
takes more time to access and egress the port and the reliability of service declines, and this weakens its competitive
position. The interaction between port competition and congestion is discussed in more detail later in this section.
Third, switching ports is costly, although more from a terminal operator’s point of view than from the perspectives of
shipping lines or manufacturer-controlled supply chains. There is no consensus in the literature on the degree of inertia in
port choice from shipping lines’ point of view. It is widely accepted that supply chains are increasingly footloose, but it is
less clear which elements of inertia remain.
Second is Panama—growth in foreign economies drives is leading the global economy to
outperform the US sustaining port volume is key to stay in the race after the Panama canal
expansion
Jared Sullivan and William Kruse, CBRE-EA & TransSystems, October 31, 2011 (“IS THE WIDENING OF THE
PANAMA CANAL THE NEXT Y2K...LOTS OF HYPE WITH LITTLE REAL IMPACT?” CBRE Volume 12, Number
42)
During the recent recession, both exports and imports plummeted worldwide as demand evaporated for most traded goods.
As the global recession ended, other economies—particularly larger emerging economies including Brazil, China, and
India—have led the world in terms of economic growth, allowing the global economy to outperform that of the United
States. This foreign growth has allowed export trade to rebound faster than the economy in general, with U.S. exports now
at record levels. Meanwhile, imports are still slightly below their pre-recession levels, though they are recovering
significantly. Naturally, the nation's ports have seen their volumes recover as trade has rebounded, and are now almost back
to their pre-recession levels . Much of the trade growth in both imports and exports has come from emerging economies—
specifically those in East Asia, including China. U.S. trade with this region is growing faster than with any other region,
largely driven by growth in China, which is now the U.S.'s second-largest trading partner after Canada. Because of its
geographical location on the West Coast, the nation's largest port district, L.A., handles much of the import and export traffic
for the Far East region. With strong trade growth—especially from emerging economies in the Far East— port-driven
markets have been among the best-performing and most stable industrial markets during the recession and recovery .
Industrial investors have and continue to develop strategies that target port markets, taking advantage of the trend toward
increasing globalization, which in turn, through steady growth in trade volumes, drives demand for space. At the same time,
because port markets are generally mature and border a major body of water, they are often more spaceconstrained, which
makes new construction more difficult and costly. One view that has become pervasive among the real estate and
logistics/supply chain communities is that, with the widening of the Panama Canal—scheduled to be completed by early
2015—West Coast ports face significant additional losses of share of Far East traffic. The widening of the Canal will allow
for transit of container ships that have more than twice the maximum capacity permissible today. The bigger ships, when
fully utilized, also have the potential to significantly reduce unit transport cost. It is argued that this combination of greater
capacity and lower unit cost will divert a large amount of additional cargo from discharge at West Coast ports to East Coast
ports, and, to some extent, Gulf Coast ports.
We’ll isolate two internal links:
Congestion destroys economic activity and reduces international competitiveness—increased
turnaround times and fees slow the system and in the US specifically it causes an exodus of
workers from the industry which dooms the national supply line
Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd, London, UK & Ingmar Loges, Head of Global Shipping, HVB Group,
Hamburg, Germany, 2005 (“Global port congestion: No quick fix,”
http://www.rajaeeportandroadtraffic.com/RelatedDocs/Global%20port%20congestion-No%20quick%20fix.pdf)
Congestion slows economic activity and reduces a country’s overall competitiveness in international markets . Quite
simply, if there is a delay getting the container moved away from the port (or to the port if an export load) then the
11
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
whole distribution network or logistical system put in place is negatively impacted – this will ultimately lead to a form
of gridlock. Congestion surcharges Shippers are often penalised as a result of ocean carriers imposing congestion
surcharges on cargo moved through the congested ports. These vary according to the length of delays and the overall
response of the port authority/terminal operating company to deal with the problem. Consequently, the Trans-Atlantic
Conference Agreement imposed a congestion surcharge of US$400/200 per feu/teu on cargo routed through Los Angeles and
Long Beach in the latter part of 2004. Within Europe, members of the Portugal and Vigo Conference introduced an
accessorial charge of Euro 50/teu during the summer months of 2004 on cargo moved through the ECT-controlled
facilities in Rotterdam. This was to recover costs associated with the rising levels of congestion at the facility. Even if
special surcharges are not imposed, the increased costs associated with congestion are clawed back, wherever possible, in
increased freight rates. Significantly, members of the Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement, the Far Eastern Freight
Conference and the Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement have all cited congestion as influencing their 2005 rate recovery
programmes, with cost recovery factors driving the planned increases. Longer increase in turnaround times At the height
of the problems in southern California, more than 90 ships were either at the berth or at anchorage awaiting a berth.
This compared with a daily norm of between 35 and 50 ships. Such a situation led to significantly longer vessel
turnaround times. In the September/October period, ships were at anchorage/in port for between 8 and 10 days compared
with an average 2/3 days in normal circumstances. Such delays prove very costly. A 6,000 teu ship, for instance, costs as
much as US$45,000 per day to operate and so another 6/8 days of non-productive time in port was a direct cost to the
operator of US$360,000. In addition, ocean carriers were forced to sail ships at full service speed to try and make up
the lost time. For a 6,600 teu class vessel this meant burning an additional seven to eight tonnes of fuel a day, equivalent, at
the time, to increased operating costs of between US$1,300 and US$1,500 a day. Another alternative is to seek a different
gateway – but trade almost eventually finds the best route to take and changing this will result in a combination of
greater time or cost – or a combination of both – and this is irrespective of the area in question. Building more capacity
Building new ports or adding capacity is a solution, but not a short-term way of solving the problem. Construction is an
expensive and time-consuming option, even once environmental and funding issues have been resolved. Additional capacity
further increases the pressure on the inland infrastructure and any congestion issues or bottlenecks in the transport system
soon become apparent. It is also not always possible to build more capacity in the tradition sense – at Los Angeles in
Southern California there is no land available, so a massive landfill project, which is time-consuming and expensive, was
undertaken to complete Pier 300 and Pier 400. This is often a global problem and Los Angeles should not be looked at in
isolation. Ports need to consider fully maximising the capacity available through more efficient use of machinery and
working practices first before simply contemplating construction alternatives. Feeder activity and short-sea shipping In
Europe, 2004 saw increased feeder activity, with CMA CGM, Mediterranean Shipping Company and OOCL all opting to
relay more of the UK’s import/export cargo via northern European ports. Although the moves were partly related to
congestion at the ports of Southampton and Felixstowe, they were also attributable to landside capacity issues and driver
shortages. Despite the importance of feeder services in the liner shipping industry, the growing levels of port congestion have
often resulted in these carriers being moved off the berth or forced to wait for gaps in the mainline operators’ schedules. This
played havoc with their service structures and significantly raised their operating costs. In particular, operators of barge
services up and down the Rhine waterway system encountered serious delays, with two/three days the norm in securing
berthing space at both Rotterdam and Antwerp during the height of the crisis in July/August. This compared with average
delays of 24/36 hours for linehaul tonnage. The growth potential in the intra-European short sea shipping market slowed in
2004 as a result of port congestion. Indeed, delays in the ports meant that all-water services lost out to overland trailer
services in several corridors. Longer-term, the prospects for short sea shipping services remain good with EU initiatives, such
as Marco Polo and ‘Motorways of the Sea’ programmes, encouraging this form of transport. Elsewhere, the Indian
Government dealt with rising levels of congestion at Jawaharlal Nehru port by temporarily relaxing its cabotage law, thereby
allowing foreign carriers to relay international cargo between Indian ports. In addition, tariffs were lowered at the
neighbouring port of Mumbai and feeder vessels of 180m in length or less were encouraged to use this port. Supply chain
Truckers across the world have faced delays and their productivity (trips per day) has reduced markedly. Given the
exceptionally poor fiscal returns from container drayage work in the US, the exodus from the industry , which started
more than a decade ago, has accelerated in recent years and the serious congestion last year resulted in more
withdrawals. In the US, since 2000 an estimated 30% of truckers engaged in the container drayage (to/from the ports)
business have left the industry. Potentially, this is very damaging for the ports/terminal industry as a shortage of
drivers inevitably affects cargo discharging/loading activities at the berth. Interruptions in the supply chain have
raised serious questions about the integrity of some companies’ overall sourcing and distribution strategies. In some
instances, due consideration is being given to more local sourcing, thereby avoiding the maritime sector altogether. Such a
strategy seems more pronounced in Europe, where the Baltic States, eastern Europe and Turkey are considered as attractive,
and possible supplements to China and India, for some manufacturing ventures. Nonetheless, some corporations in the US
and Canada have been/are reassessing the potential of sourcing goods from factories in Central America and Mexico.
In the latter case, the main interest is in the south of the country, including the Yucatan peninsula, where land and labour
costs are more competitive. In the northern area and especially the Maquiladora belt of Baja California, wages are thought to
12
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
be four/ five times higher than in China. The thinking of importers/exporters is that a shorter supply chain ought to prove
more manageable and robust. Any significant shift of manufacturing capacity back to locations closer to the end consumer
would deal the liner shipping industry a massive blow as a major part of current investment and strategic thinking is geared to
continuing strong growth in exports out of China and the deployment of super-generation post-Panamax vessels on the
transpacific and Europe/Far East/Europe trades. An alternative scenario and one that had to be regularly adopted during 2004
was the need for shippers/consignees to build additional time into their schedules and to hold more inventory at local
warehouses/distribution centres- the so-called safety valve approach.
AND, infrastructure drives market integration
OECD 12 ( OECD's work is based on continued monitoring of events in member countries as well as outside OECD area,
and includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and
analyses data, after which committees discuss policy regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and then
governments implement recommendations, “Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030,” February 27,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/49/49094448.pdf)
Quality infrastructure is a key pillar of international competitiveness. Infrastructure networks reduce the effect of
distance, help integrate national markets, and provide the necessary connections to international markets. Quality
infrastructure is trade enhancing – especially for exports – and has positive impacts on economic growth. Not
surprisingly, therefore, most of those countries with high-quality infrastructure also rank high in the world index for
overall competitiveness. Infrastructure investment needs Globally, future investment needs over the period to 2030 will
depend in part on the infrastructure currently in place, the growth in demand expected over that period, and the additional
capacity required in the different locations. The Infrastructure to 2030 report (OECD, 2006-07) concluded that global
infrastructure investment needs across the land transport (road, rail), telecoms, electricity and water sectors would amount to
around USD 53 trillion over 2010-30. Annual investment requirements for these sectors amount to some 2.5% of world
GDP, which would rise to 3.5% of GDP if electricity generation and other energy-related infrastructure investments
in oil, gas and coal are included. The new assessments undertaken in this Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030
report conclude that global infrastructure investment needs for airports, ports, rail, and oil and gas (transport and distribution)
alone could amount to over USD 11 trillion over 2009-30. Infrastructure investment needs could be a higher percentage
of GDP in fast-growing developing economies, reflecting the extensive new infrastructure they will require and the
increased maintenance needs that can be expected beginning around ten years after the initial investment in that
infrastructure. Strategic transport infrastructure The importance of gateways, hubs and inland infrastructure International
gateways and trade corridors deliver services important to national and regional competitiveness , productivity,
employment, quality of life and a sustainable environment. The future growth in passenger and freight demand will
lead to rapidly increasing volumes that will likely be concentrated along the major inter-regional passenger and trade
routes – with increasing shares carried by extra-large aircraft and container vessels able to carry high volumes at lowest cost.
And the major international gateway airports and ports will have both the high-volume capacity and the special
facilities needed for these extra-large aircraft and shipping liners – and are therefore likely to benefit from both the
increasing growth and a continuing concentration of demand. Increases in volumes can also be expected along inland
connections from gateways to the cities and industrial areas in their hinterlands. For these reasons, each country‟s key
international gateways and inland trade corridor infrastructure will become even more important to their national economies
in future.
Specifically, effective maritime transport is key to holding on to foreign investors and maintaining
our export strength
Rick Calhoun, Chairman, Waterways Council, Nov. 8-11 2011 (“Dredging for Prosperity,”
http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/sb/ml0811/index.php?startid=7#/8)
At press time, the debate over raising our nation's debt ceiling, cutting taxes, and seeking solutions to our economic hardships
rages on in Washington, D.C. And while most of us agree that we must find a way to stabilize our current fiscal crisis, we
should not "throw the baby out with the bath water." Just like the nation itself, our maritime industry is facing a
multitude of challenges like flooding in the Midwest, silting of our major shipping arteries, and the need for recapitalization
for our lock and dam infrastructure, to name a few. But these challenges and the solutions to them must be viewed as
investments in the future of our nation itself because without a strong, reliable marine transportation industry, we
simply cannot competitively sell our export products in the world marketplace . Those countries that buy from
America do so because we are a dependable supplier of products at a competitive price, thanks in no small part to the
existence of our enviable transportation system. If that system becomes compromised , those foreign buyers will
simply shop elsewhere and that will further impact the United States' precarious economic recovery . Witness the
dredging situation on the Lower Mississippi River. This year, we have seen unprecedented levels of high water on the
13
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
Mississippi River carrying millions of tons of silt and debris to the mouth of the River. This silting has resulted in restrictions
being imposed for ships and vessels that rely on this passageway to export products to the world market, as well as import
goods competitively, via ports in south Louisiana. In the past the Corps of Engineers has been able to manage silting issues
with funding for dredging that sometimes required the reprogramming of funds to be sure shortfalls did not occur. This year
the Corps has said it can no longer reprogram funds and that a funding shortfall indeed exists on this vital part of the system.
Throughout this country's great history, the federal government's role is in part to ensure that the inland navigation system,
including the Mississippi River, remains open to transport products such as grain, coal, steel, petroleum and aggregate
materials. The federal government now needs to take necessary steps to provide funding for our national
transportation asset and to allow the Lower Mississippi River to remain fully open for commerce. We urge the White
House to immediately submit an emergency request for supplemental funds to Congress, and we ask that Congress
expeditiously process that request for Emergency Supplemental Appropriations funding. All of us who are responsible
for managing money have faced times when cutting costs have become necessary, yet those who are successful rarely focus
on reducing costs if it results in an even greater loss in the revenue stream. Again, dredging this critical artery should be
viewed as an investment, not a cost, in the future of our inland waterways transportation system. I said in a recent statement
that, "the President has announced his intention to double exports in the next five years, but without a viable Mississippi
River there will be no possible way to reach that goal." Commerce to and from 38 states moves throughout the port complex
in south Louisiana. Coal from West Virginia, corn from Iowa, fertilizer from Florida, petroleum products from Texas, and
aggregate materials from Arkansas are transported through these ports. More than 6,000 ocean-going vessels and more than
450 million tons of cargo move through the mouth of the Mississippi River annually. As our nation continues to struggle to
return to economic prosperity, we simply cannot ignore the necessity of our ports and waterways in keeping America strong
and keep her moving.
Next the impacts:
An international economic imbalance leads to multipolarity and great power war
Khalilzad 2011 — Zalmay Khalilzad, Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served as the
United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush, served as
the director of policy planning at the Defense Department during the Presidency of George H.W. Bush, holds a Ph.D. from
the University of Chicago, 2011 (“The Economy and National Security,” National Review, February 8th, Available Online at
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/259024, Accessed 02-08-2011)
Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global
leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers
are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a
multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers . The
current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be
protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S.
economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles,
particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose
to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an
unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster
economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous
proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the
defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic
growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S.
debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis
that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would
reshape the international order . It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the
rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they
lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under
Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to
retrench , reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge
while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and
Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours,
and this could alter the global distribution of power . These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar
world . If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a
14
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
new international order will emerge . The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify
geopolitical competition among major powers , increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one
another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.
The stakes are high . In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S.
leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable , with their competitive dynamics resulting in
frequent crises and major wars among the great powers . Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both
world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences . Without an American security blanket,
regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a
heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict . Alternatively, in
seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United
States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise,
Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic
military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite
capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around
China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative
statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan,
India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and
aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking
and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the
U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing
enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S.
demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of
higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to
quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way
through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance economic growth and employment while
cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican
members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt
commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic
spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering
individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders
of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed
actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In
garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic
consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house
in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic
challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While
China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The
Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can
be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these
opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery —
particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies
and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a
coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace
Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw
supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable
economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can
no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in
combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems.
Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity .
And trade vitality is key to the economy—the success of global supply chains is prevents
centralization and business protectionism
Carlo Altomonte et al, Filippo Di Mauro, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Armando Rungi and Vincent Vicard 2012 (“GLOBAL
VALUE CHAINS DURING THE GREAT TRADE COLLAPSE A BULLWHIP EFFECT?”
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1412.pdf)
15
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
The “Great Trade Collapse” has been one of the most striking features of the recent global …nancial crisis, with the
ongoing recovery still driving a wedge between output and trade. Apart from its magnitude, the fall in trade during the
crisis has also been quite homogeneous across all countries: more than 90% of OECD countries have exhibited
simultaneously a decline in exports and imports exceeding 10%. The fall has also been very fast, with trade virtually
grinding to a halt in the last quarter of 2008. All these …ndings have led to qualifying the drop in trade during the crisis
as “severe, sudden and synchronized” (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). A number of transmission mechanisms (Baldwin,
2009) have been proposed which could account for such peculiarities, making the latest generalized trade drop quite unique
among the many episodes of trade decline after a …nancial crisis (Abiad, Misha and Topalova, 2010). Among those
mechanisms, a particular role has been attributed to the emergence of global supply chains over the last decade, and to
the di¤erent compositional e¤ects of the demand shock on trade and GDP. A role has also been acknowledged for the
credit crunch su¤ered by internationalized …rms (Bricongne et al., 2011). Considering the transmission mechanism of
global value chains, a …rst argument is that the magnitude of the trade drop is due to a problem of multiple
accounting. In a world increasingly characterized by vertical specialisation, i.e. with goods produced sequentially in stages
across di¤erent countries, the same component of a …nal good is exchanged (and thus recorded at gross value as trade)
several times before the …nal product reaches the consumer. As a result, for a given reduction in income, trade should
decline “not only by the value of the …nished product, but also by the value of all the intermediate trade ‡ows that
went into creating it” (Yi, 2009; but also previously Bergoeing et al., 2004). A second channel that relates the magnitude
and the synchronization of the latest trade drop to the emergence of global value chains is the inherent adjustment in
inventories after a demand shock that the existence of inter-…rm linkages implies. The wider ‡uctuations in terms of trade
elasticities are in this case an overreaction due to adjustments in the stocks of intermediate inputs by …rms involved in
complex supply chains (Stadtler, 2008; Escaith et al., 2010; Freund, 2009). According to this argument known as the
"bullwhip e¤ect" (Forrester, 1961), each participant to a supply chain had a greater observed variation in demand
during the crisis and the initial negative shock propagated up the value chain. The logic is as follows. When …nal
demand is subject to volatility, businesses typically face forecast errors against which they try to shelter by building
safety stocks of inventories. Upstream participants to a supply chain face greater demand volatility than downstream
ones, so the need for such stocks rises moving up the value chain. The result is that variations in …nal demand are
ampli…ed as one moves away from the …nal customer. When applied to the current context, the foregoing logic implies
that, with falling demand, orders decreased more than proportionally because …rms were able to draw on inventories
after expectations of lower future demand. Firms involved in value chains reduced their stocks more than proportionally
while the shock propagated up the value chain. Alessandria et al. (2011) successfully tested this argument for the US.
Independently, economic crisis collapses hege and causes multiple scenarios for nuclear war
Friedberg & Schoenfeld 2008 [Aaron, professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's
Woodrow Wilson School, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, The Dangers of a Diminished America, WSJ,
10/21, Proquest]
Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes,
calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a
prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential
collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center
of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us
to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe
haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from
al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose
paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's
seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a
dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our
position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a
scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies
failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster
exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear
toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our
principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has
demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global
slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to
foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where
political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of
these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.
16
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
And trade solves war-multiple reasons
Edward D. Mansfield & Brian M. Pollins, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania and Ohio State
University, 2003, Interdependence and Conflict, A Conceptual and Empirical Overview,
http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/bpollins/book/Mansfield_and_Pollins.pdf.
Central to much of the literature on interdependence and conflict is the longstanding claim that open international markets
and heightened economic exchange inhibit interstate hostilities. Liberals have been the most forceful advocates of this thesis
and have stressed a variety of different causal mechanisms in developing it.
One argument cast primarily at the level of the nation-state is that economic exchange and military conquest are substitute
means of acquiring the resources needed to promote political security and economic growth (e.g., Staley 1939). As trade and
foreign investment increase, there are fewer incentives to meet these needs through territorial expansion, imperialism, and
foreign conquest (Rosecrance 1986). Conversely, barriers to international economic activity stimulate conflicts of interest
that can contribute to political-military discord (Viner 1951, 259). Another liberal argument cast largely at the level of the
country-pair, or dyad is that economic intercourse increases contact and promotes communication between private actors in
different countries, as well as between governments. Rising contact and communication, in turn, are expected to foster
cooperative political relations (Doyle 1997, chap. 8; Hirschman 1977, 61; Stein 1993; Viner 1951, 261). For an overview of
the various strands of this argument, see Doyle (1997), Keohane (1990), and Stein (1993). Still another theme stressed by
many liberals is that commercial openness generates efficiency gains that, in turn, render private traders and consumers
dependent on foreign markets. Because political antagonism risks disrupting economic relations among participants and
jeopardizing the gains from trade, these actors have reason to press public officials to avoid military conflicts. For their part,
public officials who rely on societal actors for political support and have an interest in bolstering their country’s economic
performance have reason to attend to such demands. This argument, which is addressed at length in the following chapters,
has been a centerpiece of liberal views on war for centuries. Montesquieu, for example, claimed that the natural effect of
commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade together become mutually dependent: if one has an interest in buying,
the other has an interest in selling; and all unions are based on mutual needs (quoted in Hirschman 1977, 80). Whereas
Montesquieu’s claim centers on bilateral relations, the argument that heightened economic dependence inhibits belligerence
has also been cast at the systemic level of analysis. As Barry Buzan (1984, 598) mentions, a core element of the liberal
position is that a liberal economic order makes a substantial and positive contribution to the maintenance of international
security.
The US’ port capacity deficit triggers a chain reaction that destroys the global supply chain—plan
is key
Chang Qian Guan, Doctorate student at NJIT, May, 2009 (“ANALYSIS OF MARINE CONTAINER TERMINAL GATE
CONGESTION, TRUCK WAITING COST, AND SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION,”
http://archives.njit.edu/vol01/etd/2000s/2009/njit-etd2009-046/njit-etd2009-046.pdf)
North America has a growing port capacity problem, leading to congestion that is detrimental to global supply chain
efficiency. Such port congestion problem triggers a chain reaction . It increases ocean carriers' cost due to in-transit schedule
adjustments, higher fuel and labor costs . Carriers in turn will pass these costs onto shippers. Port congestion also causes
unpredictable shipment delays , leading to increaseed inventory levels. As a result, the supply chain productivity is reduced
(Maloni and Jackson, 2005b). On the other hand, increasing vessel size will put additional pressure on port capacity; 8, 000
TEU Super Post Panamax ships are already serving the West Coast ports and 10, 000 TEU ships are already being built
(Mongelluzo, 2005). Port capacity becomes a critical issue ; some even argued that the nation's port industry is facing a
capacity crisis and congestion could crush U.S. ports by 2010 (Mongelluzo, 2005a and 2006). In a port capacity study, actual
port volume growth based on historical data is much greater than forecast; the gap is in the range of 7 million TEUs. This is a
clear indication that ports are reaching their capacity limits a lot faster. Among the ten important factors that affect port
capacity, MCT gate capacity is one of them (Maloni and Jackson, 2005b). A marine container terminal (MCT) serves as a
critical node in the global supply chain. It performs many functions: ship-shore container transfer, container storage, cargo
receiving and delivery. In addition, it is a focal point where cargo information is exchanged, container equipment is
interchanged, and liability transfer takes place. Therefore, for every container coming in or out of the MCT, a business
transaction takes place that requires proper procedures to ensure transaction security, transfer of liability, and smooth
monetary transfer. The harbor trucker is the party that provides services for local container pickup and delivery. When
truckers come to the MCT to pick up and drop off containers, they have to wait in line in front of the gate complex for
security clearance and cargo/equipment information processing. As container volume grows rapidly, waiting time outside the
MCT becomes a serious issue. This problem arises for two significant reasons: one, is that container terminals in the US are
open only five days a week (Monday through Friday) with ten to twelve operating hours per day; two, is the limited number
of gate lanes at each terminal. Therefore, the gate processing capacity is critical to accommodate the growing container
17
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
volume . As a result, as container volume continues to grow, long truck waiting lines are usually formed at the terminal gate
complex.
18
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness Advantage-Uniqueness
In the squo suppliers are limiting their shipment strategies—finance is an acute issue will make or
break maritime transportation financially
Jean-Paul Rodrigue Dept. of Global Studies & Geography Hofstra University, 2010 (“Maritime Transportation: Drivers
for the Shipping and Port Industries,” January,
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/Proceedings/Genoa2010/Rodrigue.pdf)
Both for ports and maritime shipping, the short and medium terms underline a process of rationalization. The
exploitation of comparative advantages, which have been a driving force of globalization, is yielding lower
productivity gains and many suppliers are reconsidering their outsourcing strategies. It can be expected that
containerization will reach a phase of maturity, at least in advanced economies, that that future growth potential will be
more limited to niche markets , such as commodities. Hinterland access regimes15 are developing as important port
competition factors, particularly in light of the footloose transshipment function. Since the maritime sector is highly capital
intensive, port for ships and ports, finance will be a particularly acute issue in the coming years . While in the last decade
finance was relatively easy to secure because of high traffic growth expectations, an overcapacity exists, which will take
years to absorb. Returns on investments (ROI) are likely to be less significant than expected, implying that maritime
transportation will be a less attractive venue for financial firms. The bankruptcy of some maritime shipping
companies and terminal operators is possible.
Increased focus on supply lines saps power from ports, increasing port capacity is key to reassert
ports’ importance
Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University, New York, USA, and Dr. Theo Notteboom, President of ITMMA,
University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, 2012 (“Port regionalization: improving port competitiveness by reaching beyond
the port perimeter,” Port Focus iss. 52 February 2012)
One consequence of the three drivers of change in the organization of supply chains is that gateway ports have in many
cases become a replaceable element of the chain, with relatively weak bargaining power. A port that provides service of
a given quality at the lowest price does not necessarily gain market share, as other factors – that are not under the
port’s control – also affect port choice. The focus shifts from port performance to supply chain performance. Among
the other factors, hinterland transport costs have become relatively important, as the cost per kilogram per km on the
hinterland is 5 to 30 times as high (depending on the hinterland transport mode) as the maritime shipping cost (Notteboom,
2008). Routing choices, and to some extent port choices, are strongly dependent on hinterland transport conditions
and reliability of the total route has become increasingly important to those in the supply chain making the routing
decisions. This is not to say that port price and “internal performance” are irrelevant. For example, Blonigen and Wilson
(2006) find that port efficiency affects port choice. Also, efforts to improve the reliability of port services can have a
substantial payoff and, consequently, reduce the incentives for shipping lines to acquire dedicated terminal capacity.
Ports can increase their attractiveness by exploiting complementarities with other parts of the supply chain, for
example through closer ties with inland distribution centers, as well as by making efficient use of capacity in the port and the
hinterland where they can (De Langen, 2008). One way of increasing effective port capacity is through technological and
operational innovations within the port. Rodrigue (2008) claims that improvements are available to double the
throughput of existing terminal facilities .4 A second way to effectively increase port capacity is to move some functions
into the hinterland. For example, ports’ distribution function is being decentralized by the creation of truck based inland
distribution centers in the nearby hinterland (“port regionalization”, Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2005), so relieving pressure on
port capacity. In sum, it seems that port capacity is not a major constraining factor in determining a port’s
attractiveness, as no excessive levels of congestion should systematically arise there. This assessment is reinforced by the
observation that capacity use in ports is organized in a more coordinated way than in general purpose transport networks (as
usage patterns are less fragmented), leading to better (though not necessarily optimal) congestion management.
Our international infrastructure ratings are falling
Building America's Future, August 16, 2011 (“A 21st-Century Economy Requires a 21st-Century Transportation
Infrastructure,” http://www.gmanet.com/FactFile.aspx?CNID=63770)
A new report from the bipartisan group Building America's Future (BAF) advocates the need for the U.S. to move
beyond it's 20th-century infrastructure in order to create a 21st-century economic foundation. The report explains how
international economic competitors are sprinting ahead of the U.S. and outlines the case for creating a blueprint to transition
to a high-tech transportation network for the 21st century. The report also contains many sobering statistics detailing how
19
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
the U.S. is falling behind including: U.S. infrastructure has fallen from first place in the World Economic Forum’s
2005 economic competitiveness ranking to number 15 today. Freight bottlenecks and other forms of congestion cost
about $200 billion, or 1.6% of U.S. GDP, a year. A study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently found that our
transportation system is underperforming to a degree that we effectively leaving $1 trillion of GDP on the table. In 2009,
American wasted 4.8 billion hours and 3.9 billion gallons of fuel sitting in traffic, at a cost of $115 billion. Canada spends 4%
of its GDP on transportation investment and maintenance, and China spends 9%. The U.S. spends only 1.7%. China now
boasts six of the world’s top ten ports – and none of the top ten are located in the U.S. The Shanghai port now
moves more container traffic a year than the top seven U.S. ports combined. The World Economic Forum now ranks the
U.S. 22nd in the world in terms of the quality of our port infrastructure. The U.S. has the world’s worst air traffic
congestion—a quarter of flights in the U.S. arrive more than 15 minutes late, and the national average for all delayed
flights in the U.S. (about 56 minutes) is twice that of Europe’s average. U.S.air traffic control is managed by the same
ground-based radar system developed in the 1950s. There are more than 15,000 miles of true high‐ speed rail in operation
around the world–essentially none of which is in the U.S–while U.S. passenger trains run at slower speeds than they did a
half a century ago. The U.S. is one of the only leading nations without a national plan for public‐ private partnerships for
infrastructure projects or a National Infrastructure Bank to finance large‐ scale projects and leverage private capital.
20
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness Advantage-Ports Internal
Ports have to be able to compete—key to viability
Ki-Tae Yeo, Assistant Professor Department of Distribution and Trade Woosuk University, and Dong-Wook Song
Assistant Professor Department of Shipping and Transport Logistics The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, October, 2003
(“AN EVALUATION OF CONTAINER PORTS IN CHINA AND KOREA WITH THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY
PROCESS,” Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, Vol.5,
http://www.easts.info/2003journal/papers/0726.pdf)
Generally, when referring to competition, it usually means our strenuous efforts exerting to overtake our competitors.
Ports competition refers to the development and application of differentiated strategic alternatives so as to lure more
customers over other ports (Yeo and Lee, 1999). In such situation, it is essential for a competitive port to have the power to
defeat other ports. This can be what is meant by the definition of port competition (Heaver, 1995). Following are some
reviews of previous studies on the port competition factors and the considering factors used when shipping lines and
shippers select ports. Murphy et al. (1992) focused on port detention, port size, port accessibility, and calling frequency;
French (1979) suggested terminal facilities, tariffs, port congestion, service level, connectivity, and port operators as internal
components, while considering the economy of hinterland, the economic status of the nation, trade policy, and the world
economic trend as external components. Peters (1990) put emphasis on the service level, available facility capacity, status of
the facility, and port operation policy, calling them internal factors. As external factors he took the examples of
international politics, change of social environment, trade market, economic factors, features of competitive ports,
functional changes of transportation, and materials handling. Calling frequency, tariffs , accessibility to the port, port
congestion , and inter-linked transportation network were considered affecting factors by Slack (1985). Willingale
(1981) surveyed the selection standards of port as well as the decision making process of the calling port, for the 20 liners in
1982. His study reveals that the selecting process consists of the following stages: the available port locating stage,
judgment and examination stage, approach, visit and evaluation stage, preliminary discussion stage, negotiation stage,
and selection stage. In the process of selecting a particular port, shipping lines consider the location factor, technical factor,
operational factor, fiscal factor, and manpower factor. Kim(1993) analyzed the decision factors of port selection for Korean
shippers, consignees, and liners. Distance between origin and destination, annual cargo handling volume, loading hours,
average detention hours at port, goods value per tonnage, and inland trucking cost per kilometre affect exporting
from higher to lower influencing order. Meanwhile, sea transportation distance, number of liners for calling-in, annual
volume by import, inland transportation charges/km are the major factors for import port selection. In Jeon's study in 1993,
important decision factors of port selection contained navigation facilities and equipment holding status, port productivity,
price competition, and port service quality.
Congestion at one node snowballs to the level of the entire supply chain
Chang Qian Guan, Doctorate student at NJIT, May, 2009 (“ANALYSIS OF MARINE CONTAINER TERMINAL GATE
CONGESTION, TRUCK WAITING COST, AND SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION,”
http://archives.njit.edu/vol01/etd/2000s/2009/njit-etd2009-046/njit-etd2009-046.pdf)
The growth of the container volume and the increasing size of containership have presented numerous challenges to the port
industry. In the past decade, stakeholders in the supply chain are sensitive to the issue of congestion in the intermodal
transportation network. Congestion developed at one place of the network will have a snowball effect on the entire
network . As the majority of international trade is carried by water transport, seaports are indispensable nodes in the global
supply chain. They provide the crucial interface between water transport and land transport. In addition, they perform
many vital functions to facilitate freight movement. In general, port efficiency is an important indicator of regional
economic competitiveness (Yahalom et al. 2001). Therefore, port authorities and terminal operators are under pressure to
improve efficiency and performance (Tongzon, 1995). Ultimately, port capacity and efficiency usually determine the
economic and growth potential of the region it serves (Frankel, 1987).
Congestion screws up supply chains
Chang Qian Guan, Doctorate student at NJIT, May, 2009 (“ANALYSIS OF MARINE CONTAINER TERMINAL GATE
CONGESTION, TRUCK WAITING COST, AND SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION,”
http://archives.njit.edu/vol01/etd/2000s/2009/njit-etd2009-046/njit-etd2009-046.pdf)
The development in container trade and the container shipping industry has a direct impact on port development as
well as on the regional transportation network, especially on highways and intermodal connectors. Freight infrastructure
such as access channel, terminal facilities, cargo handling capacity, intermodal network and connectors are under
21
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
increasing pressure to keep up with the ever growing container volume. On the other hand, the supply chain industry
requires a high level of service from intermodal carriers in terms of service reliability and predictability. The general
trend for retailers and manufacturers is to use more frequent shipment, substituting for costly and high level
inventory and outsourcing production to overseas low cost countries. In a "just-intime" logistics environment,
manufacturers and retailers basically use their carriers as moving warehouses — warehousing in motion. For a manufacturer,
parts from oversea may be delivered by a truck within hours or even minutes before they are used in an assembly line
(Frittelli, 2003). During the last few years, the freight community has experienced significant delays due to inadequate
intermodal transportation infrastructure, either in marine terminals, or highways, or railroads, or intermodal
facilities (Rooney, 2006). Furthermore, the increasing container truck volume has led to serious congestions; truckers
have to wait for a long time at port facilities. Congestion reduces travel time reliability for both commuters and
truckers, which is a significant concern for large and small businesses. The delay caused by congestion could
drastically increase the costs of freight movements. The extra time spent in congestion causes service providers to
make fewer calls per day, resulting in higher prices for consumers. For trucking, congestion has two significant
impacts: one is the increase travel time that will add direct costs; and two is the reduction in reliability that will
decrease predictability, adding more costs, a problem for truckers who must meet "just-in-time" delivery schedules set by
shippers (FHWA, 2004). Such congestion problems reduce the efficiency of freight flow, worsen environmental quality,
and eventually increase the costs of doing business, a detriment to truckers' economic well-being and regional
economic competitiveness. Although, freight flow is a private sector business activity, the public sector is becoming more
and more aware of the impact of growing container traffic and delays at port facilities. This dissertation will analyze marine
container terminal (MCT) operations, investigate truck congestion problem at the MCT gate, model the congestion problem
and quantify truck congestion costs, and evaluate congestion mitigation alternatives.
Gateways key to competitiveness—laundry list
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2012 ( OECD's work is based on continued
monitoring of events in member countries as well as outside OECD area, and includes regular projections of short and
medium-term economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and analyses data, after which committees discuss
policy regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and then governments implement recommendations,
“Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030,” February 27, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/49/49094448.pdf)
Over the long term, world GDP is expected to grow strongly and could possibly double over the period to 2030.
On this basis:
port handing of maritime
containers worldwide could quadruple by 2030. Quality infrastructure is a key pillar of international competitiveness.
It is trade-enhancing – especially for exports – and has positive impacts on economic growth. Major international
gateway and corridor infrastructures are crucially important to the exports and imports of all the products and
resources that the economies of all countries need. In the future, they will become even more important.
There
needs to be a new “strategic” infrastructure category that includes the major international gateways and their key
inland connections. Current gateway and inland transport infrastructure capacity will not be adequate to meet 2030
demand.
current gateway and corridor infrastructure could not handle a 50% increase, let alone a
doubling of passengers in 15 years or a tripling of freight in 20 years. Despite the recent financial crisis and recession, which
has increased deficits, debt and unemployment:
linked to assured funding are continuing to successfully build the strategic infrastructure they need. In the future, since
funding of gateway and inland transport infrastructure from traditional sources will “dry up”:
in many countries to ensure funding security and levels consistent with the development of the strategic infrastructure
required to meet future needs.
built.
In many countries, there needs to be greater project certainty and funding assurance, because:
Plans without assured
funding can create a credibility gap, weaken stakeholder interest, and damage future gateway performance.
Given the risks to future infrastructure funding in countries with an over-reliance on budget sources:
Infrastructure
funds like the ones being used successfully in a number of countries could be central to the more secure government
funding of strategic infrastructure needed in other countries in future. In many countries, private sector financing has
been important in helping deliver the equity and debt financing needed to make infrastructure projects operational.
-pays/self-financing investments.
privatizations may increase efficiency as well as reduce public funding requirements. Private funds invested directly in listed
and unlisted infrastructure assets are already active in many infrastructure markets. Pension funds are well-resourced and
potentially larger investors in transport infrastructure. However:
Access is needed to better-quality projects that have
risk-reward balances consistent with fund contributors‟ interests. Strategic transport infrastructure could be
attractive in this regard. In the future, given expected limitations on public funds:
investment in strategic transport infrastructure will be essential. There is increasing support for green growth and a
22
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
“greening” of transport. Important contributions can be made during infrastructure planning and development stages. Once
developed, good management and use of innovative and energy-efficient technologies can significantly increase those
contributions.
Quality infrastructure key to competitiveness—gateways specifically
OECD 2012 ( OECD's work is based on continued monitoring of events in member countries as well as outside OECD
area, and includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and
analyses data, after which committees discuss policy regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and then
governments implement recommendations, “Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030,” February 27,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/49/49094448.pdf)
Quality infrastructure is a key pillar of international competitiveness. Infrastructure networks reduce the effect of distance,
help integrate national markets, and provide the necessary connections to international markets. Quality infrastructure is
trade enhancing – especially for exports – and has positive impacts on economic growth. Not surprisingly, therefore,
most of those countries with high-quality infrastructure also rank high in the world index for overall competitiveness.
Infrastructure investment needs Globally, future investment needs over the period to 2030 will depend in part on the
infrastructure currently in place, the growth in demand expected over that period, and the additional capacity required in the
different locations. The Infrastructure to 2030 report (OECD, 2006-07) concluded that global infrastructure investment needs
across the land transport (road, rail), telecoms, electricity and water sectors would amount to around USD 53 trillion over
2010-30 . Annual investment requirements for these sectors amount to some 2.5% of world GDP, which would rise to
3.5% of GDP if electricity generation and other energy-related infrastructure investments in oil, gas and coal are
included. The new assessments undertaken in this Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030 report conclude that
global infrastructure investment needs for airports, ports, rail, and oil and gas (transport and distribution) alone could amount
to over USD 11 trillion over 2009-30. Infrastructure investment needs could be a higher percentage of GDP in fastgrowing developing economies, reflecting the extensive new infrastructure they will require and the increased maintenance
needs that can be expected beginning around ten years after the initial investment in that infrastructure. Strategic transport
infrastructure The importance of gateways, hubs and inland infrastructure International gateways and trade corridors
deliver services important to national and regional competitiveness, productivity, employment, quality of life and a
sustainable environment. The future growth in passenger and freight demand will lead to rapidly increasing volumes that
will likely be concentrated along the major inter-regional passenger and trade routes – with increasing shares carried by
extra-large aircraft and container vessels able to carry high volumes at lowest cost. And the major international gateway
airports and ports will have both the high-volume capacity and the special facilities needed for these extra-large
aircraft and shipping liners – and are therefore likely to benefit from both the increasing growth and a continuing
concentration of demand. Increases in volumes can also be expected along inland connections from gateways to the cities
and industrial areas in their hinterlands. For these reasons, each country‟s key international gateways and inland trade
corridor infrastructure will become even more important to their national economies in future.
Exports play a significant role in economic growth
Khachatryan and Casavant 2011 (THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN U.S. TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31733.pdf)
Investigation of infrastructure investment effects on net welfare changes is particularly important to the U.S. in the aftermath
of the recent economic recession. In particular, infrastructure improvements are essential for export competitiveness in
agricultural commodities trade, an export-oriented industry that heavily relies on timely and efficient transportation of crops
from production regions to processing and/or transshipment locations and exporting ports. Further, understanding the extent
to which the improved transport infrastructure may contribute to the country’s export competitiveness is particularly essential
in light of the grain export- competitor countries’ (e.g., Brazil) recent investments in new and efficient transportation capacity
and infrastructure (Cost et al. 2007). Increasing U.S. international trade has recently been prioritized by the National Export
Initiative and National Supply Chain Infrastructure Competitiveness Initiative (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010). As the
recent Presidential executive order states “...a critical component of stimulating economic growth in the United States is
ensuring that U.S. businesses can actively participate in international markets by increasing their exports of goods, services,
and agricultural products. Improved export performance will, in turn, create good high-paying jobs” (The White House,
2010). The path to export growth critically depends on capacity improvement of the complex, interconnected transportation
networks, which include highway networks, railroad, intermodal terminals, inland waterways and seaports.
To better implement proposed export promotion plans at the state and national levels, policymakers need to understand how
investments in different areas of the aging U.S. transportation infrastructure will contribute to the country’s international
trade flows and producer revenues through an overall increased economic activity. Increasing exports and staying highly
competitive in world markets, requires maintaining reasonable transportation costs, which can be achieved by preserving and
developing efficient transport infrastructure. To facilitate the decision making at the policy-level, the main goal of this study
23
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
is to highlight the potential impact of infrastructural improvements in the U.S. transportation networks on the country’s
export competitiveness. Current issues of freight transportation, including waterways lock improvement projects, port-rail
connectivity, volume and capacity are discussed to emphasize the need for improvements the national transportation
infrastructure system.
The United States needs to promote and gain funds for port infrastructure to continue its
maritime and trading values
Journal of Commerce 2012,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=5&did=2616544811&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&
RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1341604470&clientId=5140)
The United States is a maritime and trading nation, but sometimes we act as if we're an inland nation that has no need for
seaports, port infrastructure or a transportation system equal to the best in the world rather than a second-rate system.
The U.S. ranks 23rd -- behind Namibia -- when it comes to funding for port infrastructure, according to an Oct. 21, 2011,
report on infrastructure in The Washington Post. Ports are admittedly a combination of public and private infrastructure, but
surely we can do better than this. Funding for ports comes from a variety of sources, a variety of congressional committees
and a variety of agencies. Could this be part of the problem? The Obama administration in January proposed a reorganization
of six trade and small business agencies into one new department to promote business and exports. Maybe it's time to
establish a port component within the new department, assuming Congress gives the president the necessary reorganization
authority. The new port agency would centralize all funding for ports, including infrastructure, dredging channels, port
security and trading with foreign partners. Congress is struggling to pass a surface transportation reauthorization bill, which
could include not only a maritime title, but also a title on freight policy. At the end of the first session of the 112th Congress,
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported, in a bipartisan manner, a two-year, $109 billion surface
transportation reauthorization bill. The Senate bill includes a new title establishing a National Freight Program, which makes
freight rail and maritime projects eligible for up to 10 percent of a state's apportioned highway funds. Now that the House has
its own five-year, $260 billion reauthorization bill, we expect it to turn its attention to the reauthorization of the Water
Resources Development Act. If East and Gulf Coast ports are to accommodate the depth of the new post-Panamax vessels,
they will have to be dredged to at least 50 feet. Here again, Congress, with its self-imposed earmark ban, can't decide whether
allocating funding for dredging at a particular port or ports is an earmark or not. Until this issue is resolved, it's hard to
imagine passage of a WRDA bill. Two other opportunities for port funding are the ever-popular TIGER grants and port
security grants. Congress appropriated $500 million for TIGER IV for fiscal 2012. Unfortunately, this is half the funds that
used to be appropriated for TIGER grants. Ports can compete for TIGER grants -- and have been somewhat successful in
doing so -- but they're up against all other surface transportation projects, including high-speed rail that has been favored with
a $100 million set-aside. TIGER has proved to be a popular and successful program that should enable ports to develop
significant intermodal infrastructure projects. These projects also have the benefit of increasing jobs, which should be a goal
of both political parties. But where is the commitment to funding TIGER at a level commensurate with its success? Finally,
post-September 11, ports are required to develop and implement port security programs. Grants to assist ports to implement
these plans are authorized, and have been funded in the past, at $400 million a year. However, the funds were reduced to
$235 million in fiscal 2011 and could be further reduced in fiscal 2012. In funding the Department of Homeland Security for
fiscal 2012, Congress decided to merge all state and local homeland security grants into a single $1.35 billion block grant,
which will include funding for port security. This leaves it to the discretion of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and other
officials to decide how to allocate these funds. We expect an announcement on the grants shortly. Napolitano also warned
recently that homeland security grants would be reduced again in the fiscal 2013 budget. As a maritime community, we need
to make our voices heard to support these programs and even consider the option of a new port agency. Our balance of trade,
and lifeline to the rest of the world, depend on it.
24
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness-Econ Internal
Increased trade capacity is key to sustaining the economy
Grant Monson et al., Research Assistant Washington State University School of Economic Sciences, Eric L. Jessup
Assistant Professor WSU, School of Economic Sciences, and Ken Casavant Professor WSU, School of Economic Sciences,
2007 (“SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS: PORT SECURITY MEASURES AND CATASTROPHIC EVENTS,”
http://www.trforum.org/forum/downloads/2007_6A_PortSecurity_paper.pdf)
International trade is a large and integral component to the sustainability of both the Washington State and the U. S.
economy. Global marine transportation and the U.S. Maritime Transportation System (MTS) are responsible for the
majority of U.S. trade movements, thus making marine transportation a crucial asset to trade. Over the past decade,
increased containerization, growth of foreign economies and globalization has dramatically increased trade to record levels.
In 2004, U.S. trade exports grew 13.2 percent and imports 16.9 percent and this continued high growth is expected in the
future. Today, containerized trade accounts for 90 percent of all cargo movements. As of 2005, approximately 18
million containers made 200 million trips (1). Over the past decade, trade in the Pacific Rim has become the heart of U.S.
trade. Asian trade volumes have been increasing by double digits, with import volumes nearly doubling export volumes.
China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong formulate the northeast region of Asia for trade. In 2004, 9.3 million twentyfoot equivalent units (TEU) were imported to the U.S. from the northeast region, which is the largest importing region
for the U.S. Northeast Asia is also the largest market for U.S. exports. China is the number one receiver of U.S. exports,
receiving about 42 percent, and Japan receives approximately 25 percent of the northeast region’s trade. U.S exports to
China have grown significantly compared to their share of 24 percent at the turn of the century (2). The evolution of
just-in-time inventory systems and industry outsourcing has increased efficiency and productivity for U.S companies.
From 1980 to 2000, one study estimated that business logistics costs dropped from 16.1 percent of U.S. GDP to 10.1 percent
(3). These logistics savings are not without cost; they have increased risk by creating almost complete dependence on an
uninterrupted supply chain for many U.S. companies
Capacity is key to reverse the perception of market maturity—enables the creation of economies
of scale
Jean-Paul Rodrigue Dept. of Global Studies & Geography Hofstra University, 2010 (“Maritime Transportation: Drivers
for the Shipping and Port Industries,” January,
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/Proceedings/Genoa2010/Rodrigue.pdf)
Figure 11 underlines potential container port throughput scenarios for the near future (2015). The shape for the growth
curve incites to assume that future throughput would follow the reference scenario, which expects traffic to double
between 2005 and 2015. Such as perspective prevailed within the industry up to late 2008. If the maturity scenario is
considered, throughput would be leveling off by 2015. It assumes that the process of globalization slows down and that
most comparative advantages in manufacturing have been exploited. However, the financial crisis that began to unfold in
2008 is indicative of a global recession impacting international trade and consequently container flows. Under such
circumstances container throughput in 2015 could be at a level similar than 2008 throughput figures. Several
converging factors underline that further economies of scale in maritime shipping are unlikely to unfold within the
foreseeable future, which is linked with the maturity of containerization. The more economies of scale are applied to
maritime shipping, the lower the number of ports able to handle such ships, which limits commercial options and
accessibility. Economies of scale involve higher costs for inland operations as a large quantity of containers arrive at
once and must be handled effectively to maintain a level of service. In all the dimensions it involves, economies of scale
require capital intensiveness in infrastructure and equipment (ships, portainers, terminal facilities) that is prone to risk. The
maturity of containerization is likely to trigger a reallocation of ship assets along shipping routes to more closely
reflect optimality in terms of capacity and level of service. Although this took place as containerization developed, it was
often a safe bet to introduce larger containerships across the board since demand was consistently growing. There was a
“trickle down” effect as larger containerships were introduced first on main long distance shipping routes since it was
on those routes that the new economies of scale they offered could be the best utilized. The “outclassed” ships were
redeployed on secondary routes, such as feeder services. With the introduction of the 12,500 TEU class in 2006, such
services could only call very large port terminals having enough volume to use the capacity of those ships. The market
potential of such ships has thus some limitations. If issues linked with the number of port call options, capacity, frequency
and transshipment speed are jointly considered, ships of 8,000 TEU appear to be a suitable load size for most pendulum
routes.
25
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness Advantage-Solvency
Investment is key—there is prima fascia empirical evidence that congestion harms port growth
and stagnates the supply chain. This has a larger effect that constrains overall economic growth
Dr. Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Hofstra University, New York, USA, and Dr. Theo Notteboom, President of ITMMA,
University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium, 2012 (“Port regionalization: improving port competitiveness by reaching beyond
the port perimeter,” Port Focus iss. 52 February 2012)
The interaction between competing ports’ pricing and investment strategies is studied in recent economic literature on
competition between congestible facilities (De Borger et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008). A basic insight is that congestion in the
port or in its hinterland increases costs and hence weakens a ports’ competitive position. The hinterland congestion
problem is particularly relevant. Figures for the Los Angeles/Long Beach ports presented in Zhang (2008) provide prima
facie evidence that port growth and market shares suffer where congestion levels are high, and a survey of port
managers by Maloni and Jackson (2005) highlights that their concerns on capacity expansion are mainly related to the
hinterland, not the port. Hinterland congestion of course is not a pure port problem, as the networks serve a
heterogeneous set of users and the share of port traffic often is fairly small. In fact, from the port and supply chain
perspective, reliability – which is correlated with but different from congestion – may matter more than congestion
itself. It is clear that concerns about port and hinterland congestion are stronger when ports compete. Hence, calls for more
capacity in the port or its hinterland to alleviate congestion are stronger in a competitive setting, and this may result in
investment levels exceeding those where ports face less intense competition (Zhang, 2008). Whether these investments are
closer in line with socially desirable levels is less clear, although the answer is likely to be yes. In general one would expect
private ports to invest more when there is competition than when the port is a pure monopoly, with oligipolistic
market structures falling between those polar cases. However, since decisions in investments in port capacity frequently
are at least partly made by public authorities, insights about private port behaviour provide little guidance. In this regard, De
Borger et al. (2008) find that privately owned competing ports invest less in port capacity than ports that set
commercial prices but whose capacity is publicly financed, because the public investor has broader objectives than
just port profits. Port and hinterland congestion may be expected to affect the degree of ports’ market share Specifically,
one might assume that growth in traffic and rising congestion in the hinterlands of large gateway ports would lead to an
increase in the market share of smaller and less congested ports in the same port range. The evidence, however, shows that
this has not so far been the case. To the contrary, prevailing patterns of concentration prevail or are strengthened. For
example, the share of traffic handled by the large ports within the Northern European range is stable between 1975 and 2007
(but large upstream ports gain at the expense of large coastal ports; Notteboom 2008), and the Northern range has gained
market share on the Mediterranean ports. Similarly, traffic on the US West coast remains strongly concentrated in the
Los Angeles – Long Beach ports, with a reasonably constant 70% share of west coast container traffic over the last
two decades. This is not to say that congestion has no impact on routing, and switching major container flows to smaller
ports could have a large impact on local congestion. While up to now it appears that the benefits from further concentration
still outweigh the decision-makers’ costs, in some cases congestion does intensify the search for alternative routings. The US
west coast is an example, where possibilities to substitute these routes with services via Panama and Suez to serve nonlocal markets are under consideration. Environmental constraints on capacity expansion nevertheless appear a more
critical factor for growth in the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The geographical concentration of flows reflects the
concentration patterns in supply chains just mentioned, and suggests that the costs of hinterland congestion generally do
not outweigh supply chain benefits from increased concentration (internal returns to scale, or external sources such as
agglomeration economies), at least from a supply chain operators’ point of view. Whether the cost-benefit analysis is the
same when broader social benefits (including congestion and other adverse effects incurred by non-port activities) are
taken into account is a different question, to which the answer is unclear. On the one hand, concentration and
centralization may be more amenable to managing congestion (and air emissions to the extent they are increased by
congestion) than fragmentation of the supply chain but, on the other hand, the spatial concentration of the negative
impacts of supply chain activity may excessively affect local communities. Irrespective of whether the local impacts are
excessive or not, the concentration of negative impacts provokes strong resistance in communities adjacent to mega-gateway
ports, and this may effectively constrain further growth. The benefits of concentration and scale need to be weighed
against both the concentration of local environmental impacts and the potential costs of abuse of market power.
26
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness Advantage-Trade Impact
Trade is the number one factor that contributes to peace
Gerald P O’Driscoll jr is senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Sara Fitzgerald is a trade policy analyst at the Heritage
Foundation. Orange County Register, Feb. 11, 2003
A report by the World Bank says that 2 billion people -- most of them in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the former
Soviet Union -- "live in countries that are being left behind." These countries have failed to integrate with the world
economy, failed to knock down barriers to trade and investment flows, failed to establish property rights and, as a result,
failed to grow into modern economies.And, according to research by Edward Mansfield of the University of Pennsylvania
and Jon Pevehouse of the University of Wisconsin, that's a recipe for trouble. Mansfield and Pevehouse have demonstrated
that trade between nations makes them less likely to wage war on each other -- and keeps internecine spats from spiraling out
of control. They also found these trends are more pronounced among democratic countries with a strong tradition of respect
for the rule of law.Countries that trade with each other are far less likely to confront each other on the battlefield than are
countries with no trade relationship. And the size of the economies involved doesn't affect this relationship, which means
small, weak countries can enhance their defense capabilities simply by increasing trade with the world's economic
giants.Experts, including Mansfield and Pevehouse, say intensive trade integration, perhaps more than any other factor, has
led to an unprecedented five decades of peace in Western Europe.
The alternative is nuclear war
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, December 1, 1999, pg. LEXIS (BLUEOC1650)
For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of
nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's
meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just
to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of
a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to
be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're specialinterest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the
demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher
Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together
rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting
down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations
are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage
war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the
rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of
hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global
trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial
complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs
for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom
overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods
without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for
everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are
learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace
shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.
A new wave of protectionism would erupt into nuclear conflict
Spicer, The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, 1996, p. 121
The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting
head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out
markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the
second approach is not simply that it won't hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that he consumers will begin to
demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a
fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply
troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the
converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would
manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction of world stability.
With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.
27
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Lack of economic interdependence eliminates monetary diplomacy from a countries arsenal
forcing them to rely on force- the Suez canal emp proves our argument
AScribe Newswire 12-7-2001
A country on the verge of hostilities with another country already knows the monetary value of its trade with that other
country. Therefore, the researchers
say, the risk factor in terms of trade is not an unknown. However, what each country doesn't know is how strongly the other
country is willing to fight over some other issue beside trade: a slice of territory coveted by both countries, a military buildup perceived as a threat, the exposure of a spy network or the mistreatment of an ethnic or religious minority, they note.
"Interdependent countries are in a better position to test the resolve of economic partners because they can more effectively
exert non-violent [i.e.economic] pressure, and then observe the consequences," Li notes. "By taking commercial measures
that represent both a clear and credible threat, a state can signal to economic partners that it is prepared to make considerable
sacrifices. If, however, these sacrifices are too critical, the country could lose bargaining power in future conflicts. " "In the
event of a serious dispute, countries that are autarkic or economically isolated are most at risk of war, because they have no
financial bargaining chips. All they can do is fall back on bluff and 'cheap talk.' Should that fail, their only option is to fight,"
says Li. The Suez crisis of 1956 is an example of how economic interdependence allows countries to compete financially
rather than through force. On July 26 of that year, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal,
prompting protests from Great Britain and France. When negotiations failed to resolve the crisis, British and French forces
invaded Egypt on Oct. 31. Despite a U.N. General Assembly resolution ordering a cease-fire and vocal opposition from the
United States, Britain and France persisted in their attempts to occupy the canal and overthrow Nasser.
TRADE PROMOTES PEACE: 4 WAYS
Patrick McDonald, Department of Government, University of Texas, 2004, “Peace through trade or free trade?”
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 4, August 2004 547-572,
http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/48/4/547
An extensive base of empirical tests across a number of research designs—including differences in the operationalization of
the independent and dependent variables, the temporal domain under study, and the unit of analysis—support the conclusion
that international commerce promotes peace among states (e.g., Polachek 1980; Domke 1988; Mansfield 1994; Oneal and
Russett 1997, 1999; Russett and Oneal 2001; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; for an exception, see Barbieri 2002). The
contemporary debate has traditionally relied on four variants of the broader hypothesis that trade promotes peace. The first
has been labeled the opportunity cost or deterrence model. Because conflict or even the threat of it tends to disrupt normal
trading patterns, potentially large economic costs will deter dependent states from using military force to solve their political
conflicts (Polachek 1980). A second mechanism that I call here the “efficiency argument” compares the relative costs of
acquiring productive resources. As commerce grows, the incentives for plunder or conquest decrease simply because it is a
more costly means of generating economic growth (Rosecrance 1986). Third, a sociological hypothesis concentrates on how
trade helps to increase contact and communication across societies. By building a broader cosmopolitan identity across
societies, trade displaces national loyalties and competitive relations between governments that generate military conflict
(e.g., Deutsch et al. 1957). Fourth, drawing on bargaining models, some scholars argue that international commerce provides
an important signaling mechanism that can help states achieve a negotiated compromise short of war during a crisis (e.g.,
Morrow 1999; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001).
More ev-trade improves political contacts which solves war with diplomacy
Min Ye, Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, 2001, Comparative
Kantian Peace Theory: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict at a Group Level Analysis,
http://www.cla.sc.edu/poli/psrw/MinYe1026.pdf.
Although research advances have been limited, the effects of economic interdependence on international politics have been
studied decades. Theoretically, these studies can be divided into three categories according to their different arguments
regarding trade functionality in international relations. The first category, from an “interest groups” perspective, argues that
trade has a pacifying effect. Ruth Arad and Seev Hirsch (1981) observe that trade can enhance peace between former
belligerents by capturing the impact of trade on the states' welfare with respect to consumers, producers, exporters and
importers. Solomon Polachek (1992, 1997), Polachek and McDonald (1992) note that trade and investment serve as media
for communicating interests, preferences, and needs on a broad range of matters among trading partners. However, this
perspective fails to account for conflict over the division of costs and of gains, assumption of new risks, and relation of new
vested interests. Thus the effect of these vested interests on domestic support for peace is indeterminate unless the
government compensates the losers in economic transactions. The second category focuses on the overall social welfare gains
from trade (Polachek 1980, 60-62 and 1992). According to this model, each trading nation gains social welfare benefits and
therefore has a strong interest in maintaining peaceful relations. Polachek (1980) has argued that the greater the welfare loss,
28
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
the greater the costs of conflict, and thus the smaller the incentive for conflict. However, this national-gains perspective fails
to account for some anomalies in world politics caused by the sensitivity and vulnerability of interdependence (Keohane and
Nye 1989).
TRADE REDUCES WAR BY INCREASING COSTS
Dr. Stephen Horowitz 2003, Free trade and the climb out of poverty,
http://www.totse.com/en/politics/economic_documents/164121.html
One further benefit of free trade is that it promotes international peace. Countries who trade with one another create mutual
interdependence, which raises the cost of armed conflict. If one country depends on another for cheap goods and services,
what gain is there to a military invasion or the like? Where interdependence is the nature of the relationship, fates are tied and
war makes little sense. International conflict flows out of the sort of nationalism that results from restrictions on free trade.
Just as democracies do not go to war with other democracies, so it is that countries with open trading relationships do not go
to war. Peace and free trade have a long and storied history, and the very same thinkers who have argued for free trade, and
have been excoriated for it by the anti-militarist left, did so because they believed it would promote international harmony
and peace.The critics of free trade need to re-read both economic history and the history of ideas and realize that their
opposition to free trade is likely to increase international military activity, not reduce it.
TRADE AND HIGH LEVELS OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE REMOVE
INCENTIVES FOR WAR
Dale C. Copeland, Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, Spring
1996, “Economic interdependence and war: a theory of trade expectations”, International Security, Vol. 24, no. 4,
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/copeland.htm
Richard Rosecrance provides the most extensive update of the Cobden-Angell thesis to the nuclear era. States must choose
between being "trading states," concerned with promoting wealth through commerce, and "territorial states," obsessed with
military expansion. Modern conditions push states towards a predominantly trading mode: wars are not only too costly; but
with the peaceful trading option, "the benefits that one nation gains from trade can also be realized by others." When the
system is highly interdependent, therefore, the "incentive to wage war is absent," since "trading states recognize that they can
do better through internal economic development sustained by a worldwide market for their goods and services than by trying
to conquer and assimilate large tracts of land."(6) Rosecrance thus neatly summarizes the liberal view that high
interdependence fosters peace by making trading more profitable than invading.(7)
TRADE PROMOTES PEACE – INCREASED TIES INCREASE COOPERATION &
INCREASES COSTS OF CONFLICT
Patrick McDonald, Department of Government, University of Texas, 2004, “Peace through trade or free trade?”
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 48 No. 4, August 2004 547-572,
http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/48/4/547
The debate over whether and how international commerce alters the foreign policy of states, and in particular the decision for
war, has gained renewed prominence in the fields of international security and international political economy. Despite
substantial empirical support for the proposition that increasing levels of cross-border economic flows—defined either in
terms of trade or capital movements—decrease the probability of conflict, scholars have yet to approach a consensus
concerning the precise nature of this link. A number of explanations have been proposed. Trade promotes peace through
communication and transnational ties that increase understanding among societies and the potential for cooperation. While
expanding an international web of commerce through specialization, trade makes war less likely by increasing the costs of
severing such economic links. Interdependence makes conflict less likely because of its efficiency over conquest in acquiring
resources necessary for growth and prosperity.
Trade creates a forum for peaceful dispute settlement
Dr. Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., is former Director of, and Sara J. Fitzgerald is a Trade Policy Analyst in, the Center for
International Trade and Economics at The Heritage Foundation. December 18,
2002 http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1617.cfm Accessed on 7-29-03
Countries that trade with each other are less likely to engage in actions that would disrupt economic opportunity. Many trade
agreements create a forum for the settlement of disputes, thereby reducing tension among the parties to the agreement. While
the benefits of engaging in trade agreements to foster diplomacy between countries are clear, they also extend to reinforcing
existing relationships. The U.S. Trade Representative is currently completing negotiations for an FTA with Singapore and
has recently finished negotiations with Chile. Completing these agreements is an important element of a trade agenda.
29
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
TRADE REDUCES CONFLICT BECAUSE BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS THAT
BENEFIT FROM IT PRESSURE THEIR GOVERNMENT TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
PEACEFULLY
Mark J. C. Crescenzi, University of North Carolina, 2002, Economic Interdependence and Conflict in World Politics,
http://www.unc.edu/~crescenz/exit/crescenzi_9_02.pdf.
Domke argues that the increase in wealth within each country resulting from trade generates a snowballing effect on political
conflict. Those who benefit from this increase in wealth put pressure upon their governments to seek peaceful means of
resolving disputes with other countries. Preserving the flow of economic interaction through peace and diplomacy becomes a
priority that can dwarf more traditional security concerns. Governments become more responsive to their citizens, and these
citizens seek to protect their newfound prosperity by encouraging their governments to cooperate with other nations.
Rosecrance (1986) provides a similar argument, associating increased trade with increased costs of fighting wars. As wars
become more costly, alternative paths to pursuing political objectives become more appealing, but the mechanism by which
trade alters state goals such that conflict becomes an outmoded and inefficient political tool remains unclear. Domke (1988)
also investigates the empirical relationship between interdependence and conflict on the systemic level. He proposes the
hypothesis that greater levels of international trade for a state decreases the likelihood that the state will engage in war, and
finds strong support for the negative relationship between international trade and war in an empirical investigation.
GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION HAVE REDUCED WAR IN
THE POST WORLD WAR II ERA
Soo Yeon Kim, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, 2000, Structure and change in
international trade and militarized conflict, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/dcawcp/Structure%20and%20Change.PDF.
Peace comes not only from interdependence with other economies in the free trade system but also from participation in
economic activity that brings absolute gains to each participant. States in such a system also retain a certain equality that
comes from differentiated functions based on comparative advantage (Rosecrance 1986:24-25), and in this ‘trading world,’
states choose commerce over conquest to attain national objectives. Moreover, high levels of economic interdependence
characterize the separate peace among Liberal states, which are linked through ‘ Liberal representation, Liberal respect, and
transnational interdependence’ (Doyle: 284). The most contemporary and all-encompassing incarnation of this system is
undoubtedly the globalization system of the post-Cold War era, which, spurred on by astonishing advances in the speed of
technology and communications, generates even more economic benefit for those able and willing to participate in the global
economy and introduces individuals to the desirability of McDonald’s hamburgers over war (Friedman 1999:195-198).
30
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Competitiveness Advantage-Terrorism Impact
Economic openness counter-acts authoritarianism and reduces terrorist recruitment
Lindsey, 2003 (Brink, director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies, “The Trade Front Combating
Terrorism with Open Markets, Trade Policy Analysis No. 24, August 5, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-024.pdf)
Muslim countries’ isolation from the global economy is self-imposed: barriers to trade and investment are cripplingly high.
Average tariff rates in excess of 20 percent are common in the Muslim world.11 The Economic Freedom of the World report
for 2001 featured a trade openness index based on tariff rates, the black-market exchange rate premium, restrictions on
capital movements, and the actual size of the trade sector compared to the expected size. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Syria,
Algeria, and Iran all ranked in the bottom quintile; not a single Arab or South Asian country made the top half of the 109country list.12 Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Yemen,
and all the Central Asian republics except Kyrgyzstan have not yet qualified to join the World Trade Organization (which,
with 146 members and counting, is hardly an exclusive club). The interplay between policies and prosperity is subtle and
complex, but the bottom line is simple enough: no country ever got rich by suppressing competition, squelching market
signals, and cutting itself off from the outside world. It should therefore come as no surprise, given the prevalence of antimarket policies, that most Muslim countries are floundering economically. The GDP of all Arab countries, with a combined
population in excess of 280 million, is less than that of Spain.13 Between 1985 and 1998, per capita GDP declined in real
terms in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. By contrast, it rose 30 percent
in Israel, almost 50 percent in Uruguay, and nearly 90 percent in Chile; it more than doubled in Thailand, China, and South
Korea.14 Unemployment rates in the region are commonly in double digits.15 The Muslim world’s economic backwardness
props up autocracy and repression. Elsewhere around the world, in places as diverse as Chile, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Thailand, the economic dynamism unleashed by market-based development has led to democratization and the expansion
of political rights. In most Muslim countries, however, the absence of economic freedom goes hand in hand with an absence
of political freedom. Freedom House publishes an annual index of civil freedom and political rights, according to which
countries are categorized as “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” As of 2001–02, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran,
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen were ranked as not free; Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Djibouti,
Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, and Turkey were classified as partly free. Freedom House found no
free countries in the Muslim world.16 The Arab countries in particular ranked lower in political freedom than any other
region in the world.17 Confronted by the grave threat of Islamist terrorism, the United States has an enormous and urgent
interest in encouraging economic and political liberalization in the Muslim world. In much of the region, violent radicalism is
currently the only available avenue for challenging a clearly unacceptable status quo. The advance of freedom would open
innumerable new avenues—for building businesses, pursuing careers, forming and joining and supporting nonprofit
organizations, expressing viewpoints, and banding together for peaceful political change. The appeal of radicalism— and
with it the number of potential recruits for the terrorist jihad—would wane with the emergence of constructive alternatives.
31
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Navy Advantage-1AC
First note US ports are falling behind-upgrades are necessary to support the Navy and keep
America competitive
Leary 2006 (T.P., Commander, US Coast Guard; MBA, U. of North Florida. “360 Port MDA – A Strategy to Improve
Port Security” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA457226)
Our national security and prosperity depend in part on secure and competitive ports. Effective public and private sector
collaboration is needed in a world with myriad security challenges and fierce global competition. Although steps have been
taken in the years since 9/11 to realize these twin goals much more needs to be done. The current maritime domain
awareness (MDA) paradigm needs to be expanded to provide comprehensive awareness of intermodal operations in our
ports. An effective Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) program that succeeds in leveraging intermodal data is fundamental to
better port-level MDA. Developing effective port level MDA and using it to enhance the security of our ports relies on the
effective organization of public and private sector resources. The joint operations centers called for in the SAFE Port Act,
once broadened to include key intermodal players, provide an excellent organizational model to pursue enhanced port
security.
And Naval power is at a tipping point in the squo—sustaining it is key to making inevitable US
strategic retrenchment peaceful, the alternative is global instability
Commander Brian Clark and Dr. Dan Whiteneck, February 2011 (“Strategic Choices at the Tipping Point,”
Proceedings Magazine Vol. 137/2/1, 296 available online at: http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-02/strategicchoices-tipping-point)
In light of global economic and strategic realities, here’s how the Navy of the future might look. American sea power is
clearly coming to a crossroads. Demand for naval forces is rising as U.S. ground troops withdraw from the Middle East and
maritime competitions heat up in the Western Pacific and Indian oceans. Federal budgets are tightening while the Navy is
becoming increasingly expensive to build and maintain. With this widening gap between resources and demands, the United
States may have to fundamentally change what it expects from sea power. Some missions or platforms may be left behind to
protect the nation’s most vital maritime capabilities. A new national strategy may be needed to sustainably pursue America’s
security interests. The challenge facing national leaders is whether this new direction will result from a series of ad hoc
decisions or be guided by careful assessment of what America will really need from its naval forces. From an international
perspective, 2011 is a good time for just such a discussion. Twenty years after its end, the Cold War’s coiled spring of
superpower tension, alliance competition, and political brinksmanship has finally unwound. Since 1989, dozens of regional
wars boiled over, freed by the removal of superpower rivalry and its threat of nuclear escalation. Transnational terrorists
arose, empowered and enraged by the same economic and social forces that helped dismantle the Soviet Union. And the
United States tried to take advantage of its fleeting “unipolar moment” to remake a part of the world in its own liberal
democratic image. The dust is now clearing from these effects of the Soviet Union’s demise, leaving America with an
opportunity to make choices for the world ahead. The role of sea power is clearly one of those choices. The Center for Naval
Analyses’ (CNA) Tipping Point study provides a framework to consider what the United States might want from sea power
in the future—and the limits on what its Navy will be able to deliver. 1 Since World War I, sea power for America has meant
a global Navy. But federal budgets are flattening, and a legitimate concern is whether the Fleet can continue to be global and
provide needed sea power, or whether the Navy is nearing a tipping point after which it can no longer protect the nation’s
interests. The CNA study explores that concern by considering different naval operating patterns in the context of tomorrow’s
security challenges. It then evaluates how well the projected size and mix of the Navy can meet the demands for ships and
aircraft created by these operating patterns. At its heart, the study asks how we should plan to use the future Fleet. This
question and its answers are not academic. New ships or aircraft take 10–20 years to design and build and will spend up to 50
years in service. America’s choices for sea power today will create constraints or opportunities for future Presidents and
combatant commanders. Sea Power’s Growing Importance—and Risk The ability to protect and control the maritime
commons gives unparalleled influence and underpins global systems of trade and commerce. For a number of reasons, today
we take this freedom for granted—but that is changing. For example, the increasing effectiveness and reach of piracy and
proliferation of long-range and sophisticated antiship weapons show us more emphasis on sea power will be needed to
continue protecting the commons. Meanwhile, sea power is becoming more important to American strategy. Over the next
decade, the United States wants to reduce its footprint ashore in the Middle East while maintaining the ability to attack
terrorists in places like Yemen, deter adversaries such as Iran, and support new partners in Iraq and Afghanistan. And
influencing outcomes in the Pacific and Indian oceans requires a credible naval capability to defend our forces and allies and
project power against aggressors. Events over the past decade, however, didn’t help prepare the Navy for its rising
importance, as U.S. attention and resources were devoted to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During that time annual Navy
budgets grew from $118–$147 billion, but this largesse did not translate into a larger or newer Fleet. 2 It went instead to
32
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
cover rising operating and personnel costs. Spending for operations and maintenance increased by about 20 percent since
2000, in part because of growing global commitments to fight terrorism and support troops in the Middle East. Personnel
costs rose over the past decade, even though the Navy shrank by 15 percent. And while the procurement budget has stayed
steady, the price of each new ship or aircraft is 3 to 10 times more than its predecessor. 3 Today, the Navy cannot afford to
buy 15 or more ships each year, as it did during the Reagan administration when half were large surface combatants or
submarines. 4 It can afford to buy about ten, and half of those are small combatants or support ships. 5 As a result, the Feet is
now at 286 ships, down from 344 in 1998. 6 The demands, though, have not eased. The Navy has maintained a little more
than 100 ships deployed overseas continuously since that time. With a shrinking Fleet, this means each ship works longer and
harder with less-frequent maintenance—a predictable result being today’s much-publicized problems in surface-ship
condition. 7 Another result is that the number of ships under way around the United States for homeland defense and training
dropped from an average of 60 in 1998 to 20 today. There is no more “surge” left in the Fleet. Combatant commander
requests go unanswered more frequently, and each new material problem ripples through the schedules of dozens of ships as
the Fleet scrambles to support the most urgent overseas demands. What Do We Want from a Global Navy? With the U.S.
Navy at its operational limits and its core of destroyers, tactical aircraft, and submarines shrinking, each procurement
decision significantly affects what the future Navy can accomplish. Providing direction to these investment choices requires
an understanding of both what America will need from sea power, and what the country will be able to support. With the long
lead time and multi-decade service lives of ships and aircraft, changing course in Fleet architecture in response to new
demands will be very difficult. This challenge will be exacerbated if options to buy different platforms are foreclosed by a
lack of industrial capacity or procurement funds. To help explore the future demands for American sea power, the CNA study
assumed America would need its Navy to remain globally influential. By analyzing historical “global navies,” the study
translated this need into three main requirements: dominance, readiness, and influence. A dominant naval force must be
compared with its potential adversaries and challengers. For centuries, this meant the capability to exert sea control when and
where needed, to sustain operations in these areas indefinitely, to support and influence operations on land, and to ensure
freedom of movement for the nation’s military forces. A global navy is a ready navy. Both its deployed and surge forces are
trained, manned, and adequately equipped. They are deployed globally so they can be ready to quickly respond to crises.
They also have the capacity to call in forces from other global deployments to areas of instability or to serve as a home fleet
that can surge forward for major operations. Deployments by a global navy are routine for shows of force to deter and
reassure or to express interest and resolve. Presence and readiness make global naval forces routine responders to
humanitarian crises and disasters. A global navy is influential . It exerts international leadership in peacetime and in war. It
provides a framework for coalition operations. It is a visible force for reassuring allies and partners that a global navy’s
government is committed to them and that it has resolved to place its military forces in harm’s way in their support. It is a
force flexible enough to exert influence at any point over the range of operations, from a show of force to deter a regional
threat to the imposition of a blockade, or the use of naval power to project force and dominate an adversary. While a global
navy’s multimission ships, aircraft, and people are trained and equipped for major combat operations, most of the time they
exert influence through a range of less stressing activities such as exercises and maritime security operations. A global navy
performs those missions routinely to reassure allies, engage new partners, and tangibly express its nation’s interest. Maritime
forces have advantages over land and air forces in influencing events abroad because of their inherent flexibility, their
visibility without heavy footprints ashore, their self-sustainability, and their routine interactions with other maritime forces. A
global navy is an instrument of a global power interested in political stability and economic activity around the world. The
U.S. Version of a Global Navy For six decades the U.S. Navy has translated the need for maritime dominance, readiness, and
influence into the forward presence and combat credibility of naval forces. Forward presence enhances America’s ability to
promptly influence or respond to events abroad and visibly signals U.S. interests. The capabilities and characteristics of
deployed naval forces provide a wide range of options to U.S. leaders for action in several dimensions of national power, not
just military operations. The combat credibility of U.S. naval forces is a consistent element of maritime strategy as well.
Credibility derives from capabilities such as surface and antisubmarine warfare from ships, submarines, and aircraft;
precision strike from the sea; and sustained amphibious operations. The Navy enhances the credibility of these capabilities
through superior capacity, strategic and tactical mobility, kinetic and non-kinetic options, tailorable force packaging, longterm sustainability, defense in depth, and the ability to command and control across a range of operations and international
partners. Forward presence and combat credibility are set in motion by the U.S. Navy through the ongoing deployment of
aircraft carriers and amphibious forces for influence ashore, surface ships and submarines for sea control, and aircraft and
submarines for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Logistics ships and a network of overseas bases and access
agreements allow these forces to be sustained indefinitely. Just as significant is where these forces are and in what numbers.
Since the 1950s, global U.S. Navy presence has consisted of combat capability in two hubs (the Western Pacific
[WESTPAC] and the Mediterranean throughout the Cold War and WESTPAC and the North Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf since
Desert Storm). Successive presidential administrations saw these areas as home to long-standing U.S. political and economic
interests, allies in need of reassurance, and adversaries and competitors to be deterred. To back up these forward-deployed
forces, the Navy has maintained the capacity and flexibility to surge additional forces from the continental United States and
other parts of the globe to address emerging conflicts and crises. Independent deployers outside the two hubs have been used
for engagement activities and exercises in South America, Africa, and Europe. Since the Korean War, the Navy has ranged
33
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
from more than 1,000 to fewer than 300 ships, but the importance of forward presence and combat credibility to the Navy’s
strategy has been a constant. To be forward is to be ready, and to be combat-credible is to be dominant and able to control
escalation and de-escalation at any level of confrontation. The global reach and ambitions of the Navy also have never
changed—to be absent is to be without influence. How Will We Exert Sea Power in the Future? The deployment patterns of
the CNA study represent ways in which navies have arrayed their fleets in the past and provide a lens through which we can
examine the security needs of the future. For the U.S. Navy, these deployment models should be evaluated in terms of how
well they address American security and national interests, whether they are sustainable economically or politically, and
whether they reflect the expectation future leaders will have about the need for a global navy. The emerging environment
includes a wide range of challenges. Strong states such as China compete with America politically and could challenge the
United States militarily. Regional aggressors such as Iran or North Korea routinely threaten their neighbors and could
become future U.S. adversaries. The war against Islamic radical terrorism will likely continue for years. Poorly governed
areas and weak states will continue to sustain groups that threaten local and regional security. The global air, maritime, and
cyber commons are under threat from capabilities such as proliferating antiship and surface-to-air missiles, precision-guided
mortars and rockets, modern submarines, computer-network attack, and electronic warfare. America will expect the Navy to
exert maritime dominance and influence in the face of these challenges. This will include shows of force to deter regional
challengers, ballistic-missile defense and exercises with allies and partners for reassurance, and maritime security to protect
commerce. The Navy also will be expected to evacuate non-combatants from failing states, counter piracy and terrorism, and
interdict or attack weapon proliferators. Allies will continue to look to the United States for training, partnership, and
leadership of coalition operations, while the U.S. governmental agencies will want the Navy to provide effective platforms
for their initiatives. The Navy’s ability to meet those demands and expectations will be constrained in several ways, but most
important, in the financial dimension. Discretionary federal budgets will have to shrink—unless revenues can substantially
increase—to address growing deficits and non-discretionary social spending. This will limit the options for maintaining Fleet
capacity or adjusting its mix toward the higher end of large surface combatants, fifth-generation fighters, and submarines. Is
There a ‘Tipping Point?’ Obviously there is no exact point at which a navy ceases to be globally influential or at which it can
no longer address the nation’s interests. But if history is any guide, we will know it when we see it. In particular, a global
navy must continue to deter adversaries, stop aggression, and reassure allies—the last requirement possibly being the most
crucial. A global navy also must be able to foster and maintain partnerships with other countries and protect the global
commons from diffuse threats such as piracy or terrorism. These demands require a Fleet with credible combat capability
able to intervene at the locations where these interests intersect. When the U.S. Navy can no longer do so, it will indeed be at
a “tipping point.”
Specifically commercial port upgrades are key to naval war-fighting capacity
Shays 2002 (Christopher, October 2002, General Accounting Office report, “COMBATING TERRORISM: Actions
Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports” )
The military also uses commercial seaports for deployments such as those to operations in the Balkans. The Department of
Defense and Transportation have identified 17 seaports on the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf Coasts (13 commercial ports, 1
military port, and 3 military ammunition ports) as “strategic,” meaning that they are necessary for use by the DOD in the
event of a large scale military deployment. Because the security activities that DOD may conduct outside its installations are
limited, it must work closely with a broad range of federal, state, and local agencies to ensure that adequate force protection
measures exist and are executed during deployments through strategic seaports. Force protection responsibilities for DOD
deployments through commercial seaports are divided among a number of DOD organizations including the U.S.
Transportation Command and its components (particularly the Military Traffic Management Command and the Military
Sealift Command), the U.S. Army Forces Command, and individual deploying units.
They’re necessary for forward power projection
GlobalSecurity 2011 (Dec 8, 2011. “National Port Readiness Network”
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dot/nprn.htm )
The National Port Readiness Network promotes the readiness of three continental U.S. military and 13 commercial strategic
seaports to support deployment of military surge and sustainment cargo. These ports and waterways must continue to provide
the critical infrastructure and services needed to ensure rapid, secure, and effective military mobilization. These strategic
resources include deep-draft harbor channels, modern port facilities, and an extensive network of intermodal links. MARAD
is the permanent chair of the National Port Readiness Network. A Memorandum of Understanding on Port Readiness
establishes the National Port Readiness Network Steering Group (NPRNSG) and a National Port Readiness Network
Working Group (NPRNWG). The organizations provide coordination and cooperation to ensure readiness of commercial
ports to support force deployment during contingencies and other defense emergencies.
And a strong navy is key to global security structures and deterring conflict before it breaks out
34
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Gerson and Whiteneck 2009 (Michael and Daniel, “Detterence and Influence, The Navy’s role in preventing war”
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA497123. March 2009)
If permanent land-based military installations are becoming increasingly untenable in many countries and regions, an
alternative approach is visible U.S. naval presence. When maritime power is used, countries can keep from appearing to have
an overly close relationship with the United States that might spark new, or enflame ongoing, socio-cultural tensions and
violence, while at the same time enjoying the security benefits of U.S. forces in the area vis-a-vis regional adversaries. In
fact, if there is a continuing trend in which countries want completely new U.S. security commitments and/or strengthened
assurances of existing guarantees, but at the same time do not want to host U.S. forces on their soil, maritime power may
increasingly become the primary military instrument used to simultaneously assure allies and deter adversaries. As discussed
in earlier sections of this study, an important way in which maritime forces communicate U.S. interests, commitments, and
resolve is through repeated peacetime (Phase 0 general deterrence) engagement with regional friends and allies, including
exercises, port visits, staff talks, and general forward presence. These activities, if combined with tailored IO campaigns to
publicize that they are taking place, can send signals to potential aggressors about where our interests and commitments are,
and consequently where U.S. resolve to use force is likely to be high. In Phase 1 and 2, maritime forces contribute to
immediate deterrence, compellence, and escalation control by quickly moving combat-credible power to the region. Rapid,
visible power projection in the theater can send important signals in tense crises (Phase 1) and in the opening stages of
conflict (Phase 2) that the United States is both willing and able to use substantial force to protect its interests.
The alternative is wars that go nuclear-naval is projection is key to solve
Robert Kagan, Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior transatlantic fellow at the
German Marshall Fund, August and September 2007 (End of Dreams, Return of History, Policy Review,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.htm)
This is a good thing, and it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively
benign international configuration of power. The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is
unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error,
like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take
on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. Compared to the ideal Kantian international order, in which
all the world 's powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to
international law, the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world,
however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers. It is also comparatively
benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that
Americans and many others value. American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world,
therefore. It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. The choice is not between an Americandominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who
have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and
Washington. The return of great powers and great games If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is
nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human
affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for
status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar
order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful
enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity,
since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large
powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other. National ambition
drives China's foreign policy today, and although it is tempered by prudence and the desire to appear as unthreatening as
possible to the rest of the world, the Chinese are powerfully motivated to return their nation to what they regard as its
traditional position as the preeminent power in East Asia. They do not share a European, postmodern view that power is
passé; hence their now two-decades-long military buildup and modernization. Like the Americans, they believe power,
including military power, is a good thing to have and that it is better to have more of it than less. Perhaps more significant is
the Chinese perception, also shared by Americans, that status and honor, and not just wealth and security, are important for a
nation. Japan, meanwhile, which in the past could have been counted as an aspiring postmodern power -- with its pacifist
constitution and low defense spending -- now appears embarked on a more traditional national course. Partly this is in
reaction to the rising power of China and concerns about North Korea 's nuclear weapons. But it is also driven by Japan's own
national ambition to be a leader in East Asia or at least not to play second fiddle or "little brother" to China. China and Japan
are now in a competitive quest with each trying to augment its own status and power and to prevent the other 's rise to
predominance, and this competition has a military and strategic as well as an economic and political component. Their
competition is such that a nation like South Korea, with a long unhappy history as a pawn between the two powers, is once
again worrying both about a "greater China" and about the return of Japanese nationalism. As Aaron Friedberg commented,
the East Asian future looks more like Europe's past than its present. But it also looks like Asia's past. Russian foreign policy,
35
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
too, looks more like something from the nineteenth century. It is being driven by a typical, and typically Russian, blend of
national resentment and ambition. A postmodern Russia simply seeking integration into the new European order, the Russia
of Andrei Kozyrev, would not be troubled by the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO, would not insist on
predominant influence over its "near abroad," and would not use its natural resources as means of gaining geopolitical
leverage and enhancing Russia 's international status in an attempt to regain the lost glories of the Soviet empire and Peter the
Great. But Russia, like China and Japan, is moved by more traditional great-power considerations, including the pursuit of
those valuable if intangible national interests: honor and respect. Although Russian leaders complain about threats to their
security from NATO and the United States, the Russian sense of insecurity has more to do with resentment and national
identity than with plausible external military threats. 16 Russia's complaint today is not with this or that weapons system. It is
the entire post-Cold War settlement of the 1990s that Russia resents and wants to revise. But that does not make insecurity
less a factor in Russia 's relations with the world; indeed, it makes finding compromise with the Russians all the more
difficult. One could add others to this list of great powers with traditional rather than postmodern aspirations. India 's regional
ambitions are more muted, or are focused most intently on Pakistan, but it is clearly engaged in competition with China for
dominance in the Indian Ocean and sees itself, correctly, as an emerging great power on the world scene. In the Middle East
there is Iran, which mingles religious fervor with a historical sense of superiority and leadership in its region. 17 Its nuclear
program is as much about the desire for regional hegemony as about defending Iranian territory from attack by the United
States. Even the European Union, in its way, expresses a pan-European national ambition to play a significant role in the
world, and it has become the vehicle for channeling German, French, and British ambitions in what Europeans regard as a
safe supranational direction. Europeans seek honor and respect, too, but of a postmodern variety. The honor they seek is to
occupy the moral high ground in the world, to exercise moral authority, to wield political and economic influence as an
antidote to militarism, to be the keeper of the global conscience, and to be recognized and admired by others for playing this
role. Islam is not a nation, but many Muslims express a kind of religious nationalism, and the leaders of radical Islam,
including al Qaeda, do seek to establish a theocratic nation or confederation of nations that would encompass a wide swath of
the Middle East and beyond. Like national movements elsewhere, Islamists have a yearning for respect, including selfrespect, and a desire for honor. Their national identity has been molded in defiance against stronger and often oppressive
outside powers, and also by memories of ancient superiority over those same powers. China had its "century of humiliation."
Islamists have more than a century of humiliation to look back on, a humiliation of which Israel has become the living
symbol, which is partly why even Muslims who are neither radical nor fundamentalist proffer their sympathy and even their
support to violent extremists who can turn the tables on the dominant liberal West, and particularly on a dominant America
which implanted and still feeds the Israeli cancer in their midst. Finally, there is the United States itself. As a matter of
national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative,
Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until
recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and since the end of the
Cold War, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, the United States did not
retract but expanded its influence eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Even as
it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions in these regions with
China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central
Asia, and the Caucasus. The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are
loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as "No. 1" and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having
entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe
they have substantially transformed it in their own image. They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to
be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe. The jostling for status and
influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War
international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power,
influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its
global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest
power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy
and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel
aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars
between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the
role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the
United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home
waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and
trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war,
it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations
would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would
involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major
conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the
goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical
36
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt
secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on
the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous
development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of
world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance
often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American
power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like
would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped
by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since
World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which
the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules
and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order
be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of
enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also
offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional
conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United
States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide
whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible,
as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers,
including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they
are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is
especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on
the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the
United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an
ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it
remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing
and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that
the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and
therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are
possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a
strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near
neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to
imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore”
role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in
keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back
and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel,
which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to
Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic
oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and
on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the
equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at
least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening
dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an
immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not
balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of
American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper
involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful
states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would
voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The
world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of
stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to
American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning
nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it
may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a
retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.
Fortunately MDA solves naval power
37
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
Commander Steven C. Boraz, U.S. Navy, Summer 2009 (“MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS Myths and Realities,”
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 3)
It was not long after the attacks of September 11th that government officials began discussing other avenues that terrorists
might use to attack American citizens, particularly in the maritime domain. In a speech delivered in January 2002, President
George W. Bush noted, “The heart of the Maritime Domain Awareness program is accurate information, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime
boundaries.”1 By November 2002 Congress had passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.2 The National
Security Council and the president continued to explore issues surrounding the safety and security of the U.S. maritime
environs. In December 2004, the president signed National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 13, which established policy guidelines. It also directed the secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense to lead
the federal effort in developing a comprehensive national strategy that would better integrate and synchronize existing
department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efficient implementation. The interagency Maritime Security Policy
Coordinating Committee was established to serve as the primary forum for coordinating government maritime security
policies; it delivered a National Strategy for Maritime Security in September 2005.3 Eight additional plans, including the
National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, buttress the national strategy.4 In response, the departments of
Homeland Security, Transportation, andDefense identified executive agents to lead their efforts toward achieving maritime
domain awareness (MDA): the Coast Guard, theMaritime Administration, and the Navy, respectively. The Coast Guard has
recently established theNationwide Automatic Identification System, a robust command-and-control network designed to
improve maritime safety and security at the nation’s highest-priority ports and coastal zones. Customs and Border Protection,
another Homeland Security agency, has the Container Security Initiative and the Customs-Trade Partnership against
Terrorism (C-TPAT).5 TheMaritime Administration helped develop theMaritime Safety and Security Information System
(MSSIS), participates in the MDA executive steering committee, and is tasked by Congress to be the “Information Advocate
of the Marine Transportation System.”6 The Navy, for its part, has pushed the concept of the “thousand-ship navy”;7 at least
one senior advocate has declared that “it is virtually indisputable that MDA is the enabling mission supporting Sea Strike,
Sea Shield, and Sea Basing, and is a primary focus of what FORCEnet will ultimately do.”8 MDA is a key component in the
Navy’s new maritime strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,which notes, “To be effective, theremust
be a significantly increased commitment to advance maritime domain awareness (MDA). . . . Maritime forces will contribute
to enhance information sharing, underpinning and energizing our capability to neutralize threats to our Nation as far from our
shores as possible.”9 The Secretary of the Navy has deemed MDA important enough to direct the service to develop a “crossfunctional team” from the operational staff and acquisition communities to implement an initial MDA capability in the
Central and Pacific Command areas of responsibility and on the west coast of theUnited States by August 2008; the secretary
committed more than $300 million to doing so.10 There are literally hundreds more public and commercialMDA-related
activities being developed. MDA is also a contemporary debate topic. This journal, for example, has provided ample space to
the maritime strategy andMDA, and it routinely publishes articles regarding maritime security.11 Also, maritime security
figures prominently in literature issued by think tanks.12 Even without such extensive and varied activity, it would be clear
thatMDA is a cornerstone of national security, as more than 80 percent of the world’s trade travels by water.13 Nonetheless,
operators, acquisition professionals, defense contractors, and policy makers still find maritime domain awareness a difficult
idea. This is the case because of widespread misperceptions about what it takes
38
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Navy Advantage-Uniqueness
Commander Steven C. Boraz, U.S. Navy, Summer 2009 (“MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS Myths and Realities,”
Naval War College Review, Vol. 62, No. 3)
The reality is that navies of the world, both ancient and modern, have always gathered data on their maritime environments to
gain situational awareness that their missions required, whether basic navigation or finding an enemy armada and stopping it
before it could attack. Many argue that there has simply been a change in the details; in fact, however, that would be akin to
saying humanity had been “doing” physics before Isaac Newton—the context of theMDA we’ve been “doing” and that of the
MDA we need to achieve are vastly different. This is true for three reasons. First, the scale of “doing” MDA has dramatically
expanded; massive amounts of data on all aspects of maritime activity must be collected, then cross-referenced, “fused”
(generally speaking, correlated across sources), and analyzed, in order to detect anomalies that may indicate threat-related
behavior. 14 The computing power required is inordinately greater than the capacity of the “grey matter” of those keeping
watch. For example, during the ColdWar probably fewer than a thousand ships were tracked globally at any one time. Today,
hundreds of thousands of ships need to be tracked and the links among their cargoes, crews, and financial transactions sorted
out. The November 2008 seaborne attacks on Mumbai represent a vivid case in point. The attackers hijacked an Indian
fishing trawler, the Kuber, which routinely traveled toMumbai from a port in Gujarat State near the India-Pakistan border.
Approximately 950 trawlers, carrying eight thousand fishermen, come to Mumbai every year, over an eight-month period
beginning in August.15Making the connections between these trawlers and the terrorists whomay take advantage of such
logistics networks requires much more than “what we’ve always been doing.” Second, the U.S.Navy has let the arts of
understanding regional maritime activity and determining trends therein atrophy. For years, this was a mission assigned to
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Facilities and Centers (FOSIFs and FOSICs). Staffed with naval intelligence
professionals, “operators,” and civilian analysts, they provided in-depth analysis of the activities of the navies (and some air
forces) in all the maritime environs in which the U.S. Navy operated. 16 In the restructuring that resulted from the demise of
the Soviet Union and a new U.S. emphasis on joint structures, the missions that FOSIFs and FOSICs had once met were
transferred to Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs). Whether because themaritime environment has changed so drastically—that
is, no Soviet navy—or because, as some contend, the centers simply ignore maritime issues and focus their intelligence
support on combatant commanders (i.e., of unified, or interservice, regional or functional commands) rather than operational
forces, is immaterial. The result is less support to naval forces. The emerging “Maritime Headquarters with Maritime
Operations Centers” (MHQ/MOC) concept may fill the gap.MHQ/MOC envisions a global network of Navy-maritime
organizations in support of national requirements.17 The initial plan establishes MHQs for each of the “numbered fleets”
(e.g., the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific Ocean, the Sixth Fleet in theMediterranean, etc.). A “concept of operations”
argues: A key element of both homeland defense and maritime security overseas is achieving and maintaining global
maritime intelligence integration (GMII) and maritime domain awareness (MDA), which will require integrating various
local and regional estimates within a global context. Maritime forces are a key element in this layered defense of national
interests, both in the forward regions and in the approaches to the continental United States, where the objective is “to detect,
deter, and, if necessary, defeat threats en route—before they reach the United States.”18 Applied regional MDA expertise,
then, is urgently needed. Imagine, in a war-fighting context, having to determine the intention of a particular merchant ship
for the commander of the Seventh Fleet, or of the entire Pacific Fleet, and “turning on the MDA switch” to do so—only to
find the circuit not connected. When the Soviet navy was at sea, teams kept checklists on its specific activities, past and
present; they knew what each one meant and had a very good idea as to what would follow. Today, in contrast, the U.S.Navy
does not have the intelligence, operational, intellectual, or technical capacity to support MDArelated missions at the
operational level of war. Part of the shortfall is being addressed by new programs, as well as by the reestablishment of the
Advanced Maritime Operational Intelligence Course at the Center forNaval Intelligence in Dam Neck, Virginia, but these
very initiatives are evidence that the gap exists. Third, the way the Navy views commercial merchant traffic (traditionally
color coded as “white”) has changed.White shipping used to be a navigational and watch-keeping problem—something not to
collide with or at which not to directmissiles.Now it is a potential threat as evinced by the al-Qa‘ida attacks on the USS Cole
in 2000 and the crude-oil carrier M/V Limburg in 2002, the Mumbai attacks, and numerous acts of piracy off the Horn of
Africa, in the Malacca Strait, and elsewhere.
39
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Navy Advantage-Commercial Ports Internal
Here's a list of the 14 strategic commercial ports the Navy uses
Department of Transportation 2005 (June 2005, “Report to Congress on the Performance of Ports and the
Intermodel System.” http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Rpt_to_Congress-Perf_Ports_Intermodal_Sys-June2005.pdf )
MARAD chairs the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN) which promotes the readiness of the fourteen commercial
strategic ports and three continental U.S. military ports. The NPRN mission is to support the secure movement of military
forces through U.S. strategic ports. These ports support deployment of military surge and sustainment cargo. In peacetime,
MARAD works closely with DOD and the 14 U.S. strategic commercial ports to ensure the readiness of these ports and their
intermodal infrastructure to accept and process military deployments. DOT, through MARAD, is responsible for ensuring
DOD's priority for use of commercial ports, terminals, and related intermodal facilities during deployments or other defense
emergencies. Pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (DPA), MARAD can require strategic commercial ports to
provide priority use of their facilities and services to DOD ahead of their normal commercial contractual obligations. Based
on DOD deployment requirements, MARAD issues Port Planning Orders (PPOs) to the strategic commercial ports in
accordance with Title 46 CFR, Part 340. These PPOs are non-binding planning arrangements that identify port facilities and
services that may be needed by DOD in the event of a deployment or other defense emergency. The 14 Strategic Ports: New
York/New Jersey, Morehead City, Wilmington-NC, Philadelphia, Norfolk/Newport News, Corpus Christi, Beaumont, San
Diego, Long Beach, Tacoma, Charleston, Savannah, Oakland.
40
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Environment Advantage-Internal
Status quo US ports cause critical environmental damage
NRDC 2003 (Harboring Pollution - The Dirty Truth about U.S. Ports,
http://www.nrdc.org/air/pollution/ports1/overview.asp)
Marine ports in the United States are major hubs of economic activity and major sources of pollution. Enormous ships with
engines running on the dirtiest fuel available, thousands of diesel truck visits per day, mile-long trains with diesel
locomotives hauling cargo, and other polluting equipment and activities at marine ports cause an array of environmental
impacts that can seriously affect local communities and the environment. These impacts range from increased risk of illness,
such as respiratory disease or cancer, to increases in regional smog, contamination of water, and the blight of local
communities and public lands. Most major ports in the United States are undergoing expansions to accommodate even
greater cargo volumes. The growth of international trade has resulted in corresponding rapid growth in the amount of goods
being shipped by sea. Despite the enormous growth within the marine shipping sector, most pollution prevention efforts at
the local, state, and federal levels have focused on other pollution sources, while the environmental impacts of ports have
grown. Marine ports are now among the most poorly regulated sources of pollution in the United States. The result is that
most U.S. ports are heavy polluters, releasing largely unchecked quantities of health-endangering air and water pollution,
causing noise and light pollution that disrupts nearby communities, and harming marine habitats.
41
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
Bioweapon Add-On
Jonathan Warren, 2007 (Strategic plan highlights critical important of ports of entry,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/CustomsToday/2007/dec_jan/strategic_plan.xml)
Ports of entry are America’s gateways to the world, enabling international commerce, immigration and tourism. Each year,
$1.5 trillion of trade and 400 million people legally cross U.S. borders. Within U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Office of Field Operations’ (OFO) role is to secure the flow of people and goods across the borders at the ports of entry. OFO
has more than 24,000 professionals preventing the entry of people and goods that are prohibited or threaten U.S. citizens,
infrastructure, resources and food supply, while efficiently facilitating legitimate trade and travel. At 325 airports, seaports
and designated land border crossings, CBP enforces mission-critical anti-terrorism, trade, immigration and agricultural laws,
regulations and policies. Due to their critical importance, ports of entry into our nation are dramatic symbols of the U.S
government, and attacks against them could have significant social and economic impact. This is of extreme concern since
U.S. intelligence indicates that terrorist, extremist, and criminal groups will employ a diverse group of individuals with the
ability to adapt their travel patterns and techniques, exploit criminal smuggling and use increasingly sophisticated fraudulent
documents to attempt entry. In addition, the potential for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons smuggling will continue
to affect the threats that CBP must intercept at the ports of entry.
42
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
A2: Politics-Turn
Port security bill passed the house 411-9 a few days ago
The Journal of Commerce Online 6/29 (“Congresswoman Hahn’s Port Security Bill Passes the House,”
http://www.joc.com/press-release/congresswoman-hahn%E2%80%99s-port-security-bill-passes-house)
Today, Congresswoman Janice Hahn’s port security legislation passed the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 411
to 9 . H.R. 4005 “Gauging American Port Security Act” or GAPS Act directs the Department of Homeland Security to
conduct a comprehensive classified examination of remaining gaps in port security and prepare a plan to address them . “The
loopholes that continue to exist in port security keeps me up at night,” said Rep. Hahn. “My first question as a member of the
Homeland Security Committee was to Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, on what Congress should be doing
to protect our ports. Mr. Hamilton’s response that Congress wasn’t focused enough on our ports meant we needed to act.”
Ships make 50,000 calls a year on U.S. ports, carrying two billion tons of freight and 134 million passengers. Each day our
ports move both imports and exports totaling some $3.8 billion worth of goods through all 50 states. Additionally, ports move
99.4 percent of overseas cargo volume by weight and generate $3.95 trillion in international trade. “Ports are a huge piece of
our economy and an attack or disruption would have a disastrous impact on American jobs and the economy,” Rep Hahn
explained. “We will be able to better protect our ports and their contributions to our economy if we know where the
weaknesses are and have a plan to address them therefore I’m very pleased this bipartisan and common sense piece of
legislation has passed.” Unfortunately less than 3% of cargo coming into the country is scanned, giving terrorist opportunities
to smuggle themselves or their weapons into the United States with little risk of detection. An attack on the Port of Los
Angeles/Long Beach complex, for example, would cost billions to the regional economy and put thousands of port
employees out of work and cause the demise of hundreds of local businesses. “It’s a tribute to both the importance of the
issue and Representative Hahn's tenacity that Congress passed her legislation a mere four months after she introduced the
bill,” said Geraldine Knatz, Executive Director of the Port of Los Angeles. “Trade gateways, like the Port of Los Angeles, are
critical pieces of our nation's economic infrastructure. Keeping these gateways safe is a national priority .”
43
HDC Workshop
Wave 1
Port Aff Supp
Name
A2: States CP-Feds Key
Stable federal funding is key to sustainable infrastructure
OECD 2012 ( OECD's work is based on continued monitoring of events in member countries as well as outside OECD
area, and includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and
analyses data, after which committees discuss policy regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and then
governments implement recommendations, “Massive infrastructure investment needed to meet future demand, says OECD,”
March 5, http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_49821929_1_1_1_1,00.html)
Governments must act today to ensure that the infrastructure needed in 2020-2030 will be planned, developed and operational
in time, according to a new OECD report. Strategic Transport Infrastructure Needs to 2030 says that air passenger traffic
could double, air freight could triple, and port handing of maritime containers worldwide could quadruple by 2030.
But the report notes that most of the current gateway and corridor infrastructure could not handle even a 50% increase in
demand. The OECD estimates USD 53 trillion of investment, equivalent to an annual 2.5% of global GDP, will be needed to
meet demand over the coming decades. Over USD 11 trillion of that will be required for ports, airports and key rail
routes alone. Increased private-sector investment in strategic transport infrastructure will be essential, says the
report. Upgrading key infrastructure will drive competitiveness, boost trade and promote economic growth. But new ways
of financing are needed as the traditional model of public funding for major projects is likely to dry up. Some
countries have begun linking strategic infrastructure planning to long-term infrastructure funds, as is the case in Canada,
Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. But other countries, including Australia, India and the United States,
should improve financing mechanisms to ensure funding is consistent with strategic infrastructure needs. It is
increasingly likely that the number of privatisations, especially partial privatisations, will continue to increase. This
would increase efficiency as well as reduce public funding requirements.
Coordinated national standards key to solve
Jay Etta Z. Hecker, GAO. PORT SECURITY Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives Successful.
8/2002
One major challenge involves developing a complete set of standards for the level of security that needs to be present in the
nation’s ports. Adequate standards, consistently applied, are important because lax security at even a handful of ports could
make them attractive targets for terrorists interested in smuggling dangerous cargo, damaging port infrastructure, or
otherwise disrupting the flow of goods. In the past, the level of security has largely been a local issue, and practices have
varied greatly. For example, at one port we visited most port facilities were completely open, with few fences and many open
gates. In contrast, another port had completely sealed all entrances to the port, and everyone attempting to gain access to port
property had to show identification and state their port business before access to the port was granted. Practices also vary
greatly among facilities at a single port. At Tampa, for example, a set of state standards applies to petroleum and anhydrous
ammonia tanks on port property; but security levels at similar facilities on private land are left to the discretion of private
companies. Development of a set of national standards that would apply to all ports and all public and private facilities is well
under way. In preparing to assess security conditions at 55 U.S. ports, the Coast Guard’s contractor has been developing a set
of standards since May 2002. The Coast Guard standards being developed cover such things as preventing unauthorized
persons from accessing sensitive areas, detecting and intercepting intrusions, checking backgrounds of those whose jobs
require access to port facilities, and screening travelers and other visitors to port facilities. These standards are performancebased, in that they describe the desired outcome and leave the ports considerable discretion about how to accomplish the task.
For example, the standards call for all employees and passengers to be screened for dangerous items or contraband but do not
specify the method that must be used for these screenings. The Coast Guard believes that using performance standards will
provide ports with the needed flexibility to deal with varying conditions and situations in each location rather than requiring a
“cookie-cutter” approach that may not be as effective in some locations as it would be in others.
Current infrastructure will not keep up with increased demand—a national policy framework and
assured funding are key and will balance out the short term consequences of investment
OECD 2012 ( OECD's work is based on continued monitoring of events in member countries as well as outside OECD
area, and includes regular projections of short and medium-term economic developments. The OECD Secretariat collects and
analyses data, after which committees discuss policy regarding this information, the Council makes decisions, and then
governments implement recommendations, “Massive infrastructure investment needed to meet future demand, says OECD,”
March 5, http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_49821929_1_1_1_1,00.html)
The short answer is “no”. Most of the gateway and corridor infrastructure currently in place could not handle a 50%
increase , let alone a doubling or tripling of passengers and freight in 20 years. Many gateways need greater capacity
to meet the projected rapidly increasing demand from 2010 to 2030. Importantly, greater inland transport capacity is
44
HDC Workshop
Port Aff Supp
Wave 1
Name
needed to match additional gateway capacity. The gateway and corridor infrastructures that actually get built will
depend on broad national objectives and national and gateway policies and plans for handling such increasing
demand. Major infrastructure can take 10-20 years to plan and develop, and the useful life of the infrastructure may be 50
years or more. Countries will need to get two crucial things right at the same time if they are to plan, develop and fund the
infrastructure needed in the locations and at the time required. The two essentials are national policy frameworks and
assured funding. National policy frameworks National policy frameworks must set down how strategic infrastructure
is to be planned, evaluated, developed and financed – as well as provide a solid basis for communication with
stakeholders and the public. Most of the countries in which case studies were undertaken had good national policy
frameworks; nonetheless, there is room for improvement. National frameworks need to highlight the importance of strategic
infrastructure. As the European Commission now recognises, there needs to be a focus on strategic, multimodal “core
networks” that can be funded and will be able to handle the major share of the future growth and transport tasks. A recurrent
concern is that many countries do not assign the same priority accorded gateway ports to the key inland rail, road and
waterway connections required to move freight between the gateway ports and the cities and industrial areas in the
hinterlands they serve. There needs to be a (new) “strategic infrastructure” category that actually includes the major
international gateways and their key inland connections. The inclusion and linking of gateway and inland connection needs in
national policy frameworks will be important for the downstream actions required, including reservation of land for 13
gateway expansion, funding of the new corridors, and increasing capacity on the existing corridors needed for key inland
connections. National policy frameworks are also important for gateway structures and organisation. “Landlord port” models
are widely used, with port terminal infrastructure and freight/logistics services provided on a competitive basis by private
operators. Government-owned corporation structures – such as are used by the Port of Rotterdam – are a possible
next step. In conjunction with user-pays, they create opportunities for ports to become fully self-financing, important
for reducing demands on budget funding. Funding and financing major gateway port and inland transport infrastructure A
well-performing transport network requires substantial resources to maintain the quality and condition of the
infrastructure and to meet future needs. The impacts from any lack of investment are not only tangible but also economic.
The construction-cost inflation associated with deferred investments can be greater than the borrowing and other
financing costs involved in earlier funding – but the losses in economic and societal benefits are likely to be greater
still. National and local governments and their ports mostly retain primary responsibility for gateway port infrastructure
provision and regulation, as well as for inland road and rail transport infrastructure. Major infrastructure is funded directly
from government budgets. In countries with major ports that are dependent on government funding, there are real concerns
that given the post-crisis fiscal situation, future funding of gateway and inland transport infrastructure from traditional
sources could “dry up” – at the same time as infrastructure needs increase quickly. Innovative funding and financing –
possible options Improved funding arrangements will be needed in the future to ensure funding security and funding levels
consistent with strategic infrastructure needs. The case studies uncovered good practice examples of funding and financing
arrangements over five- to ten-year funding for strategic/major projects, supported by
dedicated project-specific organisationa
infrastructure projects for ten years. One example is Danish government approval of a full multimodal land transport
programme to 2020, with its Infrastructure Fund providing the secure funding needed for that period. Another is Swiss
infrastructure funds established for special financing of road traffic (1958) and major railway projects (1998). Also, in 2008,
Switzerland established a new Infrastructure Fund for completion of the motorway network and metropolitan transport (road
options can help balance long-term needs and the economic advantages of investing in infrastructure against short-term
pressures and the costs and consequences of not investing.
45