EBI Roadshow 2003 - BYU Computer Science

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Advanced Persistent Threat
&
Effective Counter Actions
By
Dave Whipple, CISSP, CISA, NSA-IAM/IEM
Briefing to Secretary of Defense
Meeting Agenda
Introduction
Who am I?
Advanced Persistent Threat
How did they do that?
Case Study
My experience in the wild...
Effective Counter Measures
What has 30 years taught me…
4
Now lets look at a few problems…
How’s your Calculus?
5
My Background
Know the Enemy…
He who knows the enemy and himself will never in
a hundred battles be at risk; He who does not know
the enemy but knows himself will sometimes win
and sometimes lose; He who knows neither the
enemy nor himself will be at risk in every battle.
-Sun-Tzu
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
MI5 says the Chinese government “represents
one of the most significant espionage threats”
What is it?
Mandiant defines the APT as a group of
sophisticated, determined and coordinated
attackers that have been systematically
compromising U.S. Government and
Commercial networks for years. The vast
majority of APT activity observed by Mandiant
has been linked to China.
APT is a term coined by the U.S. Air Force in
2006
Advanced Persistent Threat
 Advanced means the adversary can operate in the full spectrum of
computer intrusion. They can use the most pedestrian publicly available
exploit against a well-known vulnerability, or they can elevate their
game to research new vulnerabilities and develop custom exploits,
depending on the target’s posture.
 Persistent means the adversary is formally tasked to accomplish a
mission. They are not opportunistic intruders. Like an intelligence unit
they receive directives and work to satisfy their masters. Persistent
does not necessarily mean they need to constantly execute malicious
code on victim computers. Rather, they maintain the level of interaction
needed to execute their objectives.
 Threat means the adversary is not a piece of mindless code. This point
is crucial. Some people throw around the term “threat” with reference to
malware. If malware had no human attached to it (someone to control
the victim, read the stolen data, etc.), then most malware would be of
little worry (as long as it didn’t degrade or deny data). Rather, the
adversary here is a threat because it is organized and funded and
motivated. Some people speak of multiple “groups” consisting of
dedicated “crews” with various missions.
Richard Bejtlich’s Blog
Threat Landscape
Targeting and Exploitation Cycle
Step 1
• Reconnaissance
Step 2
• Initial Intrusion into the Network
Step 3
• Establish a Backdoor into the Network
Step 4
• Obtain User Credentials
Step 5
• Install Various Utilities
Step 6
• Privilege Escalation / Lateral Movement / Data Exfiltration
Step 7
• Maintain Persistence
Example
APT’s Objectives
 Political
 Includes suppression of their own population for stability
 Economic
 Theft of IP, to gain competitive advantage
 Technical
 Obtain source code for further exploit development
 Military
 Identifying weaknesses that allow inferior military forces
to defeat superior military forces
Recon / Intelligence
 Systems, resources, connections
 (Easier to attack a trusted partner?)
• (E.g., target’s ISP, legal firm, contractor?)
 Individuals of interest
 (Good targets for spear phishing?)
 Possible access methods
 (Attacks on systems, partners, people)
Initial Intrusion
 Spear phishing is pretty common
 (Because it seems to work well enough because we are so
weak. )
 Email to one or more targeted individuals
• Spoofed follow-up to conference, meeting, etc.
• Or email “follow-up” to customer complaint …
 Malware payload
• Zip file typical (harder to scan for malware)
• Different people may get different attacks
 If even one attack works – they’re in 
Looks Real Doesn't it?
What about this one?
What about my dream Job?
There is no safe Porn site!!!
Consolidation
 Install additional malware
 Multiple copies (various locations)
 Different kinds & configurations
 Crack & exfiltrate credentials
 For re-login from outside (unusual)
 Provide for malware updates
Credentials
 (To look like a local user/admin)
 Identify local usernames
 Active Directory
 Local machine user database
 Attack local authentication data
 Password guessing (Nvidia CUDA GPU)
 Brute force decryption
NVIDIA CUDA GPU
Tools
 Backdoor install
 Password dump
 Get email
 List processes
 (Normal, useful stuff  )
 (Doesn’t trip AV alarms)
Exfiltration
 Disguise via RAR, CAB, encryption
 (Make it difficult to see what’s leaving)
 Multiple hops to final destination
 (Harder to ID where data is going)
 Outgoing connections only, IP tunnel, etc.
 Expect discovery of more tricks
 Piggyback on other traffic? Slow torrent?
Command / Control
 Outgoing connections preferred
 Firewall less of an issue (mistake)
 Imitates “normal” traffic
 Looks like (but isn’t) Windows Update
 Looks like chat, actually C/C rendevous
 C/C in web comments & image headers
 Scan-signatures more difficult to find
 Random content, multiple encryption
APT Maintenance
 Tries to keep your system infected
 Multiple copies
 “Seeds” to re-infect
 Multiple small custom programs
 Leverage existing system components
 Updates, to change AV signatures
• (Only 20% trip AV alarms – so change ‘em)
APT Case Study
Night Dragon – Oil Companies
APT Case Study
 Major Defense Contractor – Electronic Systems
 Attacks consistent with US-CERT CIIN-07-332-01
 Attackers been in almost a year before noticed
 Attacks came from Shandong Providence
 Exfiltrated 20 GB/360 GB staged and encrypted
 8 known variants of malware
 Corporate PII from HR taken as well
APT Case Study - Methodology
 Poison Ivy
 Remote Admin
 Keystroke logger
 Mine Trojan
 Full Remote Admin
 Capture user credentials
 Exfiltrates Data
 MS Gina
 Password sniffer
 Remote RDP
Case Study – Process of Attack
 This Information is on a Master Target List
 Search unclassified information using Google operands
 Use Maltego To target individual – Facebook /Linkedin
 Get HR Records – Target HR Boss
 Send SE email to VP he had access to everything
 Harvest user credentials – Move latterly… Harvest
 Access Servers – establish test connection Port 53/443
 Access Data – Compress/Encrypt
 Pass out port 53 or 443
 done
SE - Email
 Use Maltego/Facebook/Linkedin– find the weak-
link someone who is possibly underappreciated
/underpaid. Find the person who has porn issue
(eastern block owns this), gambling (mostly US
organized crime), or is searching for a new job
(someone who is frustrated).
 Email target and appeal to their pride! “We have
conducted an exhaustive nationwide search for
someone with these skills and you are in the top 3
of your peers” “We are willing to fly you and your
spouse to our Corporate Headquarters for an
interview”
What should we do?
 End “Default Permit” mentality – sandbox everything coming in
 Enable “White Lists” for corporate user groups – kill all default
permit!
 Don’t allow “corporate users (n00bs)”
to install their favorite software – take them
out of local Admin Group on local box
 Learn how to operate Back-Track 4
– become proficient in Linux
Dave and Muts (Mati Aharoni)
 Don’t trust anyone…everyone on the inside of the network is a
hacker
 Know what “normal” looks like – data coming in, data going
out.
What has 30 years taught me?
 You want a good job – Then look like you want a good
job.
 Polish your social skills for interviews
 Customers and Employers like
certifications – Get over it.
 Don’t be afraid in an interview “What
educational opportunities do you give your
employees?”
 Always keep in mind your continuing
education – you don’t want to be working
for a young snot-nose boss when your 55
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