APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING | JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
RULE 65
CERTIORARI
ESTRERA VS. CA
GR 154235, 16 AUG 2006
FACTS
Venus Kavoori was employed with the Philippine Postal Corporation as Postman II
and assigned at the Registry Delivery Section of the Cagayan de Oro City Post Office
while Petitioner Alfredo Estrera is the Regional Director of the Philippine Postal
Corporation in Region 10.
In 2001 Bombo Radyo, DXIF, Cagayan de Oro City aired about the alleged pilferage
and/or loss of PVAO checks and foreign mail matters and other alleged anomalies.
Consequently, the Regional Office issued an order creating an investigation team to
look into these allegations.
The investigating team submitted the following recommendations: 1. Kavoori be
administratively charged for dishonesty, gross violation of regulations and/ or
negligence and or laxity in the performance of official functions; 2. Kavoori be
criminally charged for dishonesty and violations of the anti-graft law; and 3.
Kavoori be reassigned/transferred/detailed immediately in a work area not directly
handling mails, preferably at the APDM Office or Administrative and Finance
Division, Philippine Postal Corporation.
Consequently, petitioner filed a formal charge against Kavoori. He also issued an
order reassigning Kavoori from the Cagayan de Oro City Office to the Motor
Transport Section, Mail Distribution Center.
Kavoori filed a motion to quash claiming that the complaint was only signed by
Alfredo Estrera and not the Postmaster General. Petitioner denied the same. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but was likewise denied by the petitioner.
Feeling no more other recourse, Kavoori came filed a petition before the RTC for
prohibition, injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order and damages. The lower court ruled in favor of Kavoori and
enjoined the hearing and prosecuting officers from proceeding with the hearing on
the ground that the complaint was not subscribed and sworn to by complainant and
petitioner Alfredo Estrera. The proceedings initially had were invalidated including
the creation of the fact-finding committee and the designation of the members
thereof and their report as well as the evaluation report of the Chief Legal Staff
relative to the findings of the fact finding committee and the designation of the
hearing officer and prosecuting officers. The lower court ruled that Estrera may
however, refile again the formal charge.
Petitioner no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing RTC
Order and proceeded to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
dismissed the petition on January 10, 2002 on the ground that petitioner failed to
attach or incorporate the authority of Alfredo O. Estrera who signed the Verification
1|PAGE
& Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to sign for and in behalf of petitioner Lilia F.
Eduarte in violation of Sec. 3, par. 3, of Rule 46.
Petitioner did not to file a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing
Resolution and instead filed another petition for certiorari with the CA on
February 8, 2002. The petition was again dismissed on the ground that it appears
to be exactly the same petition that has already been dismissed, without any
motion for reconsideration having been filed, so that it cannot be revived as an
entirely new petition. The CA emphasized that a motion for reconsideration is a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner then filed his Manifestation/Explanation and his Motion for
Reconsideration explaining that his failure to disclose the previous petition for
certiorari was through sheer inadvertence or oversight and the belief that since the
previous petition had already been dismissed, there is no longer any similar case
pending with the court. The MR was denied.
Petitioner filed the petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the resolution
of the CA dismissing his petition for Certiorari
ISSUE:
W/N the filing of the petition for certiorari the proper remedy?
RULING:
No. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the jurisdiction
of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a special
civil action for certiorari.
In the case at hand, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment,
questioning the correctness of the CA’s rulings. Hence, since the issues involved do
not affect the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari cannot be availed of by
petitioner. Moreover, the CA acted properly in dismissing Estrera’s petition for
failure to comply with the requirements provided by the Rules of Court.
BUGARIN V. PALISOC
G.R. NO. 157985, DECEMBER 2 2005
FACTS:
A complaint for ejectment was filed before the MeTC by Palisoc et al. (“Palisoc”)
against Bugarin et al. (“Bugarin). The MeTC declared Palisoc as the rightful
possessors and ordered Bugarin to vacate the premises and pay Palisoc et al. the
rentals.
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2|PAGE
Bugarin appealed to the RTC while Palisoc moved for execution pending appeal.
The RTC denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC decision. Bugarin filed a MR
with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. The RTC denied the MR
and granted Palisoc’s motion for execution for failure of Bugarin to post a
supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals. This decision was received by Bugarin
on March 12, 2003. A writ of execution pending appeal was issued.
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the
pendency of the appeal.
Bugarin filed a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Writ of Execution. Palisoc
filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order of Demolition since Bugarin refused to vacate
the premises. The RTC deferred action on the motions to allow Bugarin to exhaust
legal remedies available to them. Bugarin filed a Supplement to the Motion to Defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Opposition to Motion to Issue Special
Order of Demolition, contending that Section 28 of RA 72791 was not complied with.
However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for review. Bugarin received on
March 12, 2003 the RTC decision denying their MR. They had until March 27, 2003
to file a petition for review before the CA. Instead, they filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on April 10, 2003.
Palisoc filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion for Issuance of Special Order of
Demolition. The RTC declared the decision denying Bugarin’s appeal final
and executory, and remanded the records of the case to the MeTC without acting
on the motions. Bugarin filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before
the CA on April 10, 2003. Bugarin contended that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in affirming the MeTC decision and insisted that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
The MeTC eventually issued the Special Order of Demolition.
ISSUE:
W/N the MeTC properly ordered the demolition.
Bugarin’s position:
(1) The MeTC’s orders violated the mandatory requirements of RA 7279 since there
was no 30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or demolition and there had been
no consultation on the matter of resettlement.
(2) There was neither relocation nor financial assistance given.
(3) The orders are patently unreasonable, impossible and in violation of the law.
Palisoc’s position:
(1) RA 7279 is not applicable. There was no proof that Bugarin et al. are registered
as eligible socialized housing program beneficiaries.
(2) Even if RA 7279 was applicable, the required notices under the law had already
been complied with. Bugarin were already notified on March 7, 2003 of an
impending demolition, when the writ of execution was served.
RULING:
YES, the MeTC orders were properly issued.
A judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory to avoid further injustice
to a lawful possessor, and the court’s duty to order the execution is practically
ministerial. The defendant (Bugarin) may stay it only by: (1) perfecting an appeal;
(2) filing a supersedeas bond; and (3) making a periodic deposit of the rental or
Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such decision is immediately executory,
without prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review, before the Court of Appeals
or Supreme Court.
DOCTRINE! The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the
merits in the instant case is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the
court rendering the judgment is: (1) its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) the exercise of power in excess thereof; (3) or GADLEJ. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the certiorari is that “there should be no appeal.”
Bugarin’s petition for certiorari before the CA was filed as a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an
appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or
negligence. Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC
decision from becoming final and executory.
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the case to the MeTC. The MeTC cannot
be faulted for issuing the order to enforce the RTC judgment. The orders also did
not violate RA 7279. Under the said law, eviction or demolition may be allowed
when there is a court order for eviction and demolition, as in the case at bar.
Moreover, nothing is shown on record that Bugarin et al. are underprivileged and
homeless citizens as defined in RA 7279. The procedure for the execution of the
eviction or demolition order under RA 7279 is not applicable.
Lastly, the order of demolition had already been executed. Bugarin had already
vacated the area and Palisoc now possess the properties free from all occupants, as
evidenced by the sheriff’s turn-over of possession. Thus, the instant case before us
has indeed become moot and academic.
MANACOP v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
G.R. Nos. 162814-17, August 25, 2005
FACTS:
Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing (Lavine) insured its building & supplies against
fire w/ PhilFire, Rizal Suret, TICO, First Lepanto, Equitable Insurance & Reliance
Insurance. Except for the policy issued by First Lepanto, all the policies provide
that: “Loss, if any, under this policy is payable to Equitable Banking CorporationGreenhills Branch, as their interest may appear subject to the terms, conditions,
clauses and warranties under this policy.”
1
An Act to Provide for a Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Development and Housing
Program, Establish the Mechanism for its Implementation, and for other purposes.
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A fire gutted Lavine’s buildings & their contents, thus claims were made against the
policies. The insurance proceeds payable to Lavine amounted to about P112M. The
insurance companies expressed their willingness to pay the insurance proceeds, but
only to the rightful claimant. (Lavine was indebted to Equitable Bank, and there was
a dispute as to whether the insurance proceeds should be paid directly to Equitable
Bank, or to Lavine first who would then pay Equitable Bank.)
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners & ordered the insurance companies to pay
Lavine, as well as Equitable Bank to refund Lavine. First Lepanto, PhilFire, Rizal
Surety, and Equitable Bank filed a Notice of Appeal. Meanwhile, petitioners filed a
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. Judge Lavina granted the Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal & issued a Writ of Execution.
Without filing an MR from the decision of the RTC, and even before the RTC could
rule on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, Equitable Bank filed a Petition for
Certiorari. Its Petition for Certiorari assailed the RTC decision (and NOT the order
granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal & the Writ of Execution).
On the other hand, First Lepanto & Philfire filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the
RTC’s order granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal & the Writ of
Execution.
ISSUE:
(a) W/N the Petition for Certiorari assailing the RTC judgment was proper.
(b) W/N the Petition for Certiorari assailing the order granting the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal & the Writ of Execution was proper.
RULING:
(a) NO. Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 cannot be allowed since 1 remedy would necessarily
cancel out the other. The existence & availability of the right of appeal proscribes
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for availment of the latter is
precisely that there should be no appeal. It is elementary that for certiorari to
prosper, it is not enough that the trial court committed GADLJEC; the requirement
that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law must likewise be satisfied.
It is well-settled that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment
on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or 1 of the errors, ascribed to
the trial court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in
the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. Thus, while it may be true that
a final order or judgment was rendered under circumstances that would otherwise
justify resort to a special civil action under Rule 65, the latter would nonetheless be
unavailing if there is an appeal or any other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
(b) YES. An appeal from a judgment does NOT bar a certiorari petition against the
order granting execution pending appeal & the issuance of the writ of execution.
3|PAGE
Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the same is
not founded upon good reasons.2 The fact that the losing party had also appealed
from the judgment does NOT bar the certiorari proceedings, as the appeal could not
be an adequate remedy from such premature execution. Additionally, there is no
forum-shopping where in 1 petition a party questions the order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal & at the same time questions the decision on the
merits in a regular appeal before the appellate court. After all, the merits of the
main case are not to be determined in a petition questioning execution pending
appeal & vice versa.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general
rule, the existence of good reasons is essential. In the case at bar, petitioners insist
that execution pending appeal is justified because the insurance companies
admitted their liabilities under the insurance contracts and thus have no reason to
withhold payment. We are not persuaded. The fact that the insurance companies
admit their liabilities is not a compelling or superior circumstance that would
warrant execution pending appeal. On the contrary, admission of their liabilities &
willingness to deliver the proceeds to the proper party militate against execution
pending appeal since there is little or no danger that the judgment will become
illusory.
There is likewise no merit in petitioners’ contention that the appeals are merely
dilatory because, while the insurance companies admitted their liabilities, the matter
of how much is owing from each of them & who is entitled to the same remain
unsettled. Besides, that the appeal is merely dilatory is not a good reason for
granting execution pending appeal.
Lastly, petitioners assert that Lavine’s financial distress is sufficient reason to order
execution pending appeal. Citing Borja v. CA, they claim that execution pending
appeal may be granted if the prevailing party is already of advanced age & in
danger of extinction.
Borja is not applicable to the case at bar because its factual milieu is different.
In Borja, the prevailing party was a natural person who, at 76 years of age, “may
no longer enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he finally passes away.” Lavine, on
the other hand, is a juridical entity whose existence cannot be likened to a natural
person. Its precarious financial condition is not by itself a compelling circumstance
warranting immediate execution & does not outweigh the long standing general
policy of enforcing only final and executory judgments
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION V CA |CORONA
GR 185220, JULY 27, 2009 | 594 SCRA 139
FACTS:
2
Discretionary execution of appealed judgments may be allowed under Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39
upon concurrence of the ff requisites: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party w/
notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
ABARQUEZ | CALANOY | CALIDA | FLORES | LIPANA | LIZARONDO | MANIGBAS | MORALES | PATINO | PINON | QUE | SAGAYADAN
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING | JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
Aries Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra (PRs) filed a illegal dismissal case against
Laguna Metts Corp (LMC). LA decided in their favor but the NLRC reversed the LA
decision. PRs filed an MR but it was denied.
PRs’ counsel received the denial on MAY 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008 (the last day
of the 60-D filing period of a petition for certiorari), PRs’ counsel filed a motion for
extension to file the petition praying for an extension of 15 days.
CA granted a non-extendible 15D period. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution claiming that under the current Sec 4 of Rule 65 as amended by AM
07-7-12 dated Dec. 4 2007, extension of time to file a petition for certiorari is no
longer allowed.
CA denied LMC’s motion and said that the new rule only discouraged the filing of
unwarranted motions for extension of time but did not strip the CA of its
discretionary power to grant extensions in exceptional cases, in the interest of
justice. Aggrieved, LMC now files this petition for certiorari in the SC claiming
GADALEJ of the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari is still allowed?
RULING:
NO MORE. The amended rules explicitly deleted the last paragraph of Section 4 of
Rule 65 allowing for an extension of the period for not longer than 15 days due to
compelling reasons.3
As a rule an amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an
intention to change its meaning. If the Court intended to retain the authority of the
proper courts to grant extensions under Sec 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing
such authority would have been preserved. The removal only meant that an
extension is no longer allowed.
The rationale for the amendment is to essentially prevent the use (or abuse) of the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of
justice.
When the CA granted the extension, it arrogated unto itself the power it did not
posses, a power only the SC may exercise. Even assuming, the CA retained the
discretion to grant extension, the reasons (see footnote 3 of the case: lack of
material time due to voluminous pleadings that have to be written and numerous
court appearances to be undertaken; lack of funds) of PRs’ counsel and PR did not
qualify as compelling.
While technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly
procedure is essential to the success of that quest which all courts are devoted.
Petition granted. CA decision was reversed and set aside. The petition of PR
in the CA case is ordered dismissed for having been filed out of time.
3
Deleted portion says: No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for
compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days.
4|PAGE
MARAWI MARANTAO GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. VS. CA
349 SCRA 321 (2001)
FACTS
Private Respondents Marawi-Marantao General Hospital, Inc. and Atty. Macapanton
K. Mangondato filed complaint against the petitioner Social Security System, with
the RTC of Lanao del Sur, for specific performance with damages. The respondents
allege that the parties executed a deed of conditional sale where petitioner
transferred and conveyed unto private respondent Mangondato, the disputed
property, covered by a TCT under the name of respondent hospital, but that
respondent Mangondato’s repurchase thereof having been consummated, the
petitioner refused to execute a deed of absolute sale. Later on, petitioner declared
the said deed of conditional sale a nullity. Private respondents then prayed for the
execution of an absolute deed of sale.
The Court ordered for the execution of an absolute deed of sale. Private
respondents filed a motion for partial execution, serving a copy of said motion on
petitioner. However, petitioner failed to appear, considering that as of said date, he
had not as yet been served with a copy of the Decision and a copy of private
respondent’s motion. Nevertheless, the court issued an order granting the motion
for execution. A writ of execution was issued, and a notice of garnishment served.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration and immediate stay of
execution, which was denied. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal, however failing to
indicate when it received a copy of the decision of the court. It also filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, which court also nullified the order and writ of execution
issued by the lower court. Petitioner thereafter filed an amended notice of appeal,
quoting only the first item in the decision of the lower court, placing ellipses in lieu
of the other items.
A manifestation was filed to the effect that the petitioner, having perfected its
appeal from the decision of the lower court, the latter had no more jurisdiction to
grant relief to the private respondent on their motion for execution. It subsequently
filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Also, Private Respondents contend that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is
an indispensable requirement before a petition for certiorari of an order of a
regional trial court may be filed with the Court of appeals. Considering that the SSS
did not file a motion for reconsideration with the RTC before it filed a pettion for
certiorari, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright.
ISSUE:
(a) W/N the trial court has JD to order the partial execution of its judgment insofar
as the second, third, fourth and fifth subparagraphs thereof are concerned.
(b) W/N a Motion for Reconsideration is required before certiorari with the CA.
RULING:
1) In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court losses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to
appeal of other parites. In such case, prior to the transmittal of the original record
or record on appeal, the court may only issue orders for the protection and
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preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by
the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of rule 39, and allow
withdrawal of the appeal. Considering that SSS had appealed the entirety of the
decision to the CA and that the period of appeal had already expired, the RTC has
already lost jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when it issued the
dispute orders.
SSS did not file a motion for reconsideration with the RTC before it filed its petition
for certiorari with the CA. Generally, the special civil action for certiorari will not lie
unless the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy ad adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration, so as to
allow the lower court to correct the alleged error. However, there are several
exceptions where the special civil action for action for certiorari will lie even without
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, namely:
1) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court has no
jurisdiction;
2) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;
3) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable
4) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
5) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;
6) Where, in a criminal case, relief form an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
7) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a mullity for lack of due
process;
8) Where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity ot object; and
9) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
In the present case, considering that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction to issue the
questioned orders, the first exception is applicable. Consequently, the CA cannot be
faulted to fiving due course to the petition for certiorari filed by the SSS despite its
failure to file a motion for reconsideration. CA decision is affirmed and the petition is
denied.
RULE 38
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS & OTHER PROCEEDINGS
PURCON JR. VS. MRM PHIL
GR 182718, 26 SEPT 2008
FACTS:
5|PAGE
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for reimbursement of
medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent disability benefits with prayer
for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on January 28, 2002,
respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired him as a seaman on board the vessel M/T
SARABELLE 2. He signed a contract for 3 months with a monthly salary of
$584.00. According to petitioner, his work involved a day-to-day activity that
required exertion of strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to the
pressure of his work. His contract was extended for another 3 months. On the
second week of June 2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After
being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was diagnosed with hernia.
On June 26, 2002, he was repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioner's return to the Philippines, he was examined by Dr. Alegre, the
company physician, who prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr.
Alegre declared that he was fit to resume work. When he reported to MRM
Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that there
was no vacancy for him.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since petitioner's ailment, hernia,
is not work-related, he is not entitled to disability benefit and related claims. In
fact, he was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the companydesignated physician. Respondents likewise argued that his ailment is not to be
considered a permanent disability as this is easily correctable by simple
surgery. The fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean that he was
suffering from disability. In short, the real reason was not his disability but
because there was no more vacancy. More importantly, petitioner signed a
Quitclaim and Release which was notarized. The Labor Arbiter sided with the
respondents and dismissed the complaint for utter lack of merit, on Mar. 31, 2005.
On May 5, 2005, petitioner filed a memorandum of appeal with the NLRC Third
Division which was also dismissed. On December 20, 2005, the motion for
reconsideration was dismissed for lack of merit. On January 27, 2006, the NLRC
resolution became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.
On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court with the CA. However, on June 7, 2006, the CA dismissed
the case due to formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution became final and executory.
On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the June 7, 2006 and
September 5, 2006 Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari.
In a Resolution dated July 16, 2007, SC denied the petition for the following
reasons: (1) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days fixed in Section 2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time docket and other fees and
deposit for costs in violation of Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(c) of Rule
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56; and (3) insufficient or defective verification under Section 4, Rule 7. SC likewise
held that petitioner failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible
error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise of this Court's
discretionary appellate jurisdiction. He was not able to convince this Court why the
actions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, which have passed upon the
same issue, should be reversed. Consequently, on October 9, 2007, an Entry of
Judgment was issued.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment
before the SC interposing the following grounds:
1. Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he based his decision on
the fit to work certification issued by the company-designated physician
and on the Quitclaim and Release executed by the complainant and in
adopting irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the respondents and by adopting
it in his decision
2. The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC Third Division, are
not based on substantial evidence and that their decisions are contrary to
the applicable law and jurisprudence; and
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner can avail of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 from
an SC resolution denying his petition for review?
RULING:
NO. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the SC.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is
entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any
court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in
harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the original cases cognizable by the
Supreme Court4 and a petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of
Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court. Moreover, according to
jurisprudence,
A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court explained that under the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order
or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with
affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
relied upon, and the facts constituting petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it
should be filed with the same court which rendered the decision. (Dela
Cruz v. Andres, reiterating Mesina v. Meer)
6|PAGE
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts. As revised, Rule 38 radically
departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or MTC which
decided the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief. Under the old
rule, a petition for relief from the judgment or final order of Municipal Trial Courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court. The procedural change in Rule 38 is in
line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial
Courts and designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
Third, the procedure in the CA and the SC are governed by separate provisions of
the Rules of Court. It may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars. As it stands,
neither the Rules of Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the
remedy of petition for relief in the CA. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55,
with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the SC, identifies the remedies
available before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or
resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule
53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38 mentioned.
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA,
with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the SC. This Court
entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, which are beyond the concerns of
this Court.
Nevertheless, even if the merits of the petition are considered, the same
must still be dismissed. The late filing of the petition for review does not
amount to excusable negligence. Petitioner's lack of devotion in discharging his
duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
cannot be a basis for judicial relief. For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to
prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause must be shown.
The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was
due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
otherwise the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal
which has already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence or due to a
mistake of procedure by counsel.
The exception to the above-mentioned rule is when the mistake of counsel is so
palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, in which case a party may be afforded
a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the
instant case, especially since petitioner has squandered the various opportunities
available to him at the different stages of this case.
GOMEZ V. MONTALBAN
G.R. NO. 174414, MARCH 14, 2008
4
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. - Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and
attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed
originally in the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and payment
of attorney’s fees against respondent. The Complaint alleged, among other things,
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that: on or about 26 August 1998, respondent obtained a loan from petitioner in the
sum of P40,000.00 with a voluntary proposal on her part to pay 15% interest per
month; upon receipt of the proceeds of the loan, respondent issued in favor of
petitioner, as security, Capitol Bank Check No. 0215632, postdated 26 October
1998, in the sum of P46,000.00, covering the P40,000.00 principal loan amount
and P6,000.00 interest charges for one month; when the check became due,
respondent failed to pay the loan despite several demands; thus, petitioner filed the
Complaint praying for the payment of P238,000.00, representing the principal loan
and interest charges, plus 25% of the amount to be awarded as attorney’s fees, as
well as the cost of suit.
Summons was served, but despite her receipt thereof, respondent failed to file her
Answer. Consequently, she was declared in default and upon motion, petitioner was
allowed to present evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner.
On May 28, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging that
there was no effective service of summons upon her since there was no personal
service of the same. The summons was received by one Mrs. Alicia dela Torre, who
was not authorized to receive summons or other legal pleadings or documents on
respondent’s behalf. Respondent attributes her failure to file an Answer to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence. After petitioner filed his Answer to the
Petition for Relief from Judgment and respondent her Reply, the said Petition was
set for hearing.
After several dates were set and called for hearing, respondent, thru counsel, failed
to appear despite being duly notified; hence, her Petition for Relief was dismissed
for her apparent lack of interest to pursue the petition.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of her Petition for
Relief, stating that her counsel’s failure to appear was not intentional, but due to
human shortcomings or frailties, constituting honest mistake or excusable
negligence. On 18 November 2005, the RTC granted respondent’s motion for
reconsideration On 20 June 2006, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Relief
from Judgment and set aside its Decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred when it granted the respondent’s Petition for Relief
from Judgment.
RULING:
YES. First of all, a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only
available against a final and executory judgment. Since respondent allegedly
received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May 2004 on 14 May 2004, and she filed
the Petition for Relief from Judgment on 28 May 2004, judgment had not attained
finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal had not
yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a petition for relief from judgment under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was premature and inappropriate.
Second, based on respondent’s allegations in her Petition for Relief before the RTC,
she had no cause of action for relief from judgment. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from judgment only “[w]hen a judgment
or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken against a party in any
7|PAGE
court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence x x x.” In her
Petition for Relief from Judgment before the RTC, respondent contended that
judgment was entered against her through “mistake or fraud,” because she was not
duly served with summons as it was received by a Mrs. Alicia dela Torre who was
not authorized to receive summons or other legal processes on her behalf.
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, “mistake” refers to mistake of
fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word “mistake,” which grants relief
from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error
which the court might have committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by
means of an appeal.This does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has
in no wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.
“Fraud,” on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which
prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the
court,or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the
controversy.This is not present in the case at hand as respondent was not
prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her
case.
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence
could not have guarded against. Under Section 1, the “negligence” must be
excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the
counsel, it is binding on the client. To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to
disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and
subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the
aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring
counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court’s ruling.
Third, the certificate of service of the process server of the court a quo is prima
facie evidence of the facts as set out therein. According to the Sheriff’s Return of
Service, summons was issued and served on respondent thru one Mrs. Alicia dela
Torre.
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the RTC had no jurisdiction over respondent
on account of the non-service upon her of the summons and complaint, the remedy
of the respondent was to file a motion for the reconsideration of the 4 May 2004
Decision by default or a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt of notice
thereof. This is also without prejudice to respondent’s right to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the order of
default of the court a quo and the proceedings thereafter held including the
decision, the writ of execution, and the writ of garnishment issued by the RTC, on
the ground that it acted without jurisdiction. Unfortunately, however, respondent
opted to file a Petition for Relief from the Judgment of the RTC, which, as the Court
earlier determined, was the wrong remedy.
In Tuason v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief
from judgment:
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed
only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate
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remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which
may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion
or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his
own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to
revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.[
In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence
that would have prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for reconsideration
or a petition for review on certiorari of the 4 May 2004 Decision of the RTC, her
resort to a Petition for Relief from Judgment was unwarranted.
Moreover, when respondent was declared in default for her failure to file an Answer
to the Complaint, she did not immediately avail herself of any of the remedies
provided by law to a party declared in default. To wit:
a.
b.
c.
d.
The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before
judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on
the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense (Sec. 3, Rule 18
[now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]);
If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the
default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a
motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule 37;
If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final
and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section 1]
of Rule 38; and
He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to
the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default
has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).
In addition, a petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is
also available if the trial court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the
trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion attended
such declaration.
SY BANG vs SY
G.R. No. 179955, April 24, 2009
FACTS:
Sy Bang died intestate, leaving numerous properties and businesses. The heirs of
Sy Bang from his second marriage filed a Complaint for Partition before the RTC
against the petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, as well as the other
heirs of Sy Bang. A notice of lis pendens was then annotated on several certificates
of title covering properties involved in the case. RTC decided in favor of petitioners
8|PAGE
declaring all properties, businesses, assets, etc in their names. The said decision
was appealed to the CA. CA affirmed RTC decision.
To forestall respondents’ attempts to interfere with their property rights, petitioners
filed a Petition for Quieting of Titles with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of
Prohibition. Petitioners claimed therein that they were the absolute owners of the
parcels of land (subject lots) which were all acquired through their individual efforts
and with the use of their personal resources.
Thereafter, complying with the order of the RTC, respondents filed their Answer to
the Petition. However, before the case was heard, petitioner Jose Sy Bang died. The
RTC ordered Atty. Eduardo Santos, counsel for petitioners, to submit within ten
days an authority from the heirs of Jose Sy Bang for them to be substituted, as well
as to secure the conformity of the other heirs who were yet to be impleaded or
substituted to be continuously represented by Atty. Eduardo Santos. Without
complying with the above orders, Atty. Santos manifested in open court that he
intended to file a Motion to Withdraw the Petition for Quieting of Titles. The next
day, Atty. Santos filed a Manifestation, signed only by himself, stating that
petitioner and children decided to move for the dismissal of the Petition to quiet
title. On even date, the RTC issued an Order, treating the Manifestation filed by
Atty. Santos as a motion to dismiss the quieting of title case and granted the same.
Petitioners, now represented by a new counsel, filed a Petition for Relief from the
Order of the RTC in dismissing the Petition for quieting of title. Petitioners averred
that contrary to the claim of Atty. Santos, petitioners Iluminada Tan and the other
heirs of Jose Sy Bang were never consulted or informed of the manifestation that
sought the dismissal of their Petition for Quieting of Titles. Atty. Santos was
allegedly able to secure the signature of petitioner Robert Sy Bang in the second
Manifestation by misrepresenting to the latter that the relief being sought in said
case had been satisfactorily granted by the Court of Appeals and the LRA, and that
the only thing left to be litigated was the amount of damages, which might as well
be waived by signing the said Manifestation. Atty. Santos was also said to have
collected full payment of his fees by misrepresenting to petitioner Carmelo Sy Bang
that petitioners had already won the case, and that there was no more need to
litigate the same on the merits.
Petitioners further claimed that Atty. Santos continued misinforming them about
their case. Atty. Santos wrote petitioner Iluminada Tan a letter assuring her that the
Decision of the Court of Appeals which recognized that the lots in question were the
fruits of her family’s labor, could not be legally questioned anymore as entry of
judgment was already made in said case. Atty. Santos further stated in his letter to
petitioner Iluminada Tan that he had also served petitioners’ interests well in the
Petition for Quieting of Titles, given the declaration by the appellate court that the
subject lots were the gains from petitioners’ labor, which foreclosed any future claim
of a third party.
RTC granted petition for relief. On appeal, CA reversed. Hence this petition for
review.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner’s petition for relief should be granted on the ground of extrinsic
fraud?
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RULING:
YES. Section 1 of Rule 38 provides that when a judgment or final order is entered,
or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set
aside.
Where fraud is the ground, the fraud must be extrinsic or collateral. The extrinsic or
collateral fraud that invalidates a final judgment must be such that it prevented the
unsuccessful party from fully and fairly presenting his case or defense and the
losing party from having an adversarial trial of the issue. There is extrinsic fraud
when a party is prevented from fully presenting his case to the court as when the
lawyer connives to defeat or corruptly sells out his client's interest. Extrinsic fraud
can be committed by a counsel against his client when the latter is prevented from
presenting his case to the court.
Petitioners base their Petition for Relief on the alleged extrinsic fraud committed by
Atty. Eduardo Santos who, without petitioners’ knowledge and consent, filed the
Manifestation that induced the RTC to dismiss, in petitioners’ Petition for Quieting of
Titles, thus, outrightly depriving petitioners of their day in court.
9|PAGE
interest in the disputed properties by the dismissal of the Petition for Quieting of
Titles, and their conformity to such a move could not be merely assumed, but
should be established by competent evidence.
In petitioners’ favor is the fact that, within two months from finding out about the
RTC Order dismissing their Petition for Quieting of Titles, petitioners secured the
services of another counsel and filed a Petition for Relief to seek remedy for the
unfortunate situation they found themselves in. Said circumstances show that
petitioners were not at all neglectful in the pursuit of their case as respondents
would have this Court believe.
Petitioners were able to establish, by a preponderance of evidence, that Atty.
Eduardo Santos committed extrinsic fraud against them. By virtue of his
Manifestation without petitioners’ knowledge and consent, thus inducing the RTC to
dismiss the Petition for Quieting of Titles, Atty. Eduardo Santos deprived petitioners
of the opportunity to fully and fairly present their case in court. Such is the very
definition of extrinsic fraud, which entitles the petitioners to the grant of their
Petition for Relief .
SAMONTE v. S.F. NAGUIAT, INC.
GR 165544, 2 OCT 2009
In his Manifestation, Atty. Eduardo Santos insisted that he consulted and discussed
in detail his move, together with three of the petitioners -- the petitioners Sy Bang
brothers, Jose Sy Bang, Jr., Robert Sy Bang, and Carmelo Sy Bang – to have the
Petition for Quieting of Titles dismissed. Respondents point out that the said
Manifestation was not opposed or rebutted by the petitioners; hence, it sufficiently
negated petitioners’ claim of fraud committed by their own counsel.
FACTS:
Romeo Samonte is the President & General Manager of SB Traders, a corporation
engaged in the business of retailing motor oils & lubricants. It purchases Mobil
products on credit basis from one of Mobil Oil Philippines' authorized dealers in
Bulacan, herein S.F. Naguiat, Inc., with an express agreement to pay within a
period of 60 days from date of delivery.
The Court is not convinced. Atty. Eduardo Santos’ Manifestation only stated that
after petitioners Sy Bang brothers found out that the bank records, which could
have proven that their father Jose Sy Bang borrowed money to buy the disputed
properties, could no longer be found, Atty. Eduardo Santos advised the petitioners
Sy Bang brothers that their only alternative was to have the Petition for Quieting of
Titles dismissed. Atty. Eduardo Santos even explicitly admitted in said Manifestation
his belief that the ruling of the LRA in Consulta and the judgment of the Court of
Appeals were already adequate protection against any challenge to petitioners’ titles
to the properties in question. Nowhere, however, in the Manifestation could the
Court find a clear and categorical statement that petitioners Sy Bang brothers, in
fact, agreed to adopt the advice of Atty. Eduardo Santos to have the Petition for
Quieting of Titles dismissed. Neither can it be gleaned from said Manifestation
whether petitioners Sy Bang brothers were aware of and amenable to the filing of
the first Manifestation, which Atty. Eduardo Santos signed by himself and filed with
the RTC seeking the dismissal of the Petition for Quieting of Titles.
Naguiat filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against the petitioners with
the RTC. The Naguiat alleged that SB Traders incurred an obligation to pay the total
sum of P1,105,143.27 arising from the sale of Mobil Oil products. It further averred
that SB Traders was merely an alter ego of the petitioner and that it was operating
for his sole benefit.. Therefore, the petitioner and SB Traders must be held solidarily
liable for the subject amount.
Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court concedes that the petitioners Sy Bang
brothers indeed gave their consent to Atty. Eduardo Santos to move for the
dismissal of the Petition for Quieting of Titles, there was utter lack of evidence to
prove that said three petitioners were authorized by the other 12 petitioners to act
on their behalf, so that the consent of the petitioners Sy Bang brothers would have
bound the other petitioners. The other 12 petitioners stand to lose substantial
Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground that RTC made
serious and prejudicial mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented. He argued
that a corporation had a personality separate and distinct from that of its officers
and therefore, he cannot be held solidarily liable for obligations contracted by
corporation.
The petitioner filed an answer denying all the material averments of the complaint.
Despite due notice, the petitioner and his counsel failed to appear at the scheduled
pre-trial conference. Hence, trial ensued where the an ex parte presentation of
evidence was allowed.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Naguiat. Petitioner failed to appeal the said
decision. Thereafter, on motion by the Naguiat, the RTC ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution.
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RTC issued the first assailed order denying the petitioner's petition for relief from
judgment for lack of merit. The petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said
order but the same was denied on the grounds that the motion failed to comply with
the mandatory requirements of sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the RoC and that it
failed to raise an issue which would warrant a modification or reversal of the order.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. CA however dismissed the petition. The
CA found that the records showed that petitioner failed to file a MR or an appeal
from the RTC Decision causing the said decision to become final and executory; that
when petitioner filed the petition for relief from judgment, petitioner did not offer
any reason for his failure to appeal; there was no assertion that the RTC decision
was entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
Petitioner filed a MR but it was also denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA did erred in ruling that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by
the RTC in dismissing the petition for relief?
RULING:
NO. Relief from judgment under Rule 38 is a remedy provided by law to any person
against whom a decision or order is entered into through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence. The relief provided for is of equitable character, allowed only
in exceptional cases as where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When
a party has another remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new
trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the lower court, and he was not
prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided in Rule
38. The rule is that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence or a mistaken mode of procedure, otherwise the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either
because of inexcusable negligence or due to a mistake in the mode of procedure by
counsel.
In his Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the RTC, petitioner alleged that
the petition was filed on the ground that the RTC made serious and prejudicial
mistakes in appreciating the evidence presented. He then proceeded to discuss the
errors of judgment committed by the RTC in rendering its decision.
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to
mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which
grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a
judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such error may be
corrected by means of an appeal.
The arguments raised by petitioner in his petition for relief from judgment, i.e., he
cannot be held civilly liable for obligations he, as corporate president thereof, has
incurred in behalf of the corporation which is vested with a personality separate and
distinct from its officers and stockholders; and that he cannot be held jointly and
10 | P A G E
solidarily liable for the obligations, are proper issues which petitioner could have
raised in a motion for reconsideration which he did not. Hence, the RTC denied the
petition for relief.
In fact, the alleged errors committed by the RTC could also be corrected by means
of an appeal from the RTC decision. Petitioner did not also file an appeal causing the
RTC decision to become final and executory and the subsequent issuance of a writ
of execution. Notably, petitioner never made any allegation in his petition for relief
from judgment that the RTC decision was entered against him through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The petition for relief did not also show
any reason for petitioner's failure to file an appeal after the receipt of the RTC
decision which the CA correctly observed in its assailed decision.
Petitioner’s claim that Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court does not require that
petitioner should state the reason why he did not avail of the remedy of appeal
deserves scant consideration. His failure to avail of the remedy of appeal within the
reglementary period despite receipt of the RTC decision rendered the same final and
executory. He cannot be allowed to assail the RTC decision which had become final
in a petition for relief from judgment when there was noallegations of fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence which prevented him from interposing an
appeal. Such appeal could have corrected what he believed to be an erroneous
judicial decision. To reiterate, petition for relief is an equitable remedy that is
allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate
remedy which is not present in petitioner’s case. Thus, petitioner's resort to a
petition for relief under Rule 38 was not proper and the CA correctly ruled that the
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for relief from
judgment.
ROMAGO V. SBTI
GR 181969, 2 OCT 2009
FACTS:
On December 3, 1999, ROMAGO entered into an Equipment Supply Sub-Contract
Agreement (ESSA) with SBTI. For the contract price of P100,000,000.00, SBTI
undertook to deliver the needed electrical equipment for the project. SBTI made
deliveries, but ROMAGO failed to pay in full. This prompted SBTI to withhold further
deliveries of equipment to the jobsite. Consequently, ROMAGO took over all the
contractual activities of SBTI. Later, however, SBTI resumed its deliveries under the
ESSA. As of July 25, 2001, it had already delivered 99.81% of all the necessary
equipment. ROMAGO, however, refused to pay for the deliveries which, by then,
already amounted to P16M, unless SBTI compensates ROMAGO for the total
expenses it allegedly incurred in taking over SBTI’s contractual obligations.
Demands to pay were made but were not heeded. The parties submitted their
dispute to an Arbitration Proceeding before the Philippine Dispute Resolution Center,
Inc. (PDRCI). After due proceedings, the PDRCI ruled in favor of SBTI. SBTI filed a
petition for confirmation of the Arbitrator’s decision RTC of Makati which granted the
petition.
ROMAGO and Atty. Barrios were served copies of the RTC Order on July 3,
2006. Despite receipt of the Order, ROMAGO did not interpose an appeal. On August
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22, 2006, Atty. Barrios withdrew his appearance as counsel for ROMAGO. The Law
Office of Mutia Trinidad Venadas & Verzosa thereafter entered its appearance as
ROMAGO’s new counsel, and filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment. ROMAGO
claimed that Atty. Barrios failed to interpose an appeal from the June 22, 2006
Order of the RTC, because he was taking a three-week rest after being diagnosed
with severe hypertension. Atty. Barrios became aware of the June 22, 2006 Order
only on July 20, 2006, upon his return. By then, the period to appeal had already
lapsed. ROMAGO asserted that it should not be bound or prejudiced by the
negligence of its previous counsel. ROMAGO, therefore, prayed for the setting aside
of the Arbitrator’s decision and of the June 22, 2006 Order. In the alternative, it
prayed that it be allowed to file a Notice of Appeal. SBTI opposed the petition,
arguing that ROMAGO’s failure to appeal was far from excusable, and prayed for its
denial. It argued that to allow the petition to prosper would put a premium on the
negligence of ROMAGO’s former counsel and would encourage the non-termination
of the case. SBTI added that ROMAGO could not invoke the alleged negligence of its
counsel as a ground for the setting aside of the Arbitrator’s decision, because the
negligence took place only after the judgment was rendered. On December 12,
2006, the RTC denied ROMAGO’s petition for relief from judgment. ROMAGO’s MR
was also denied.
ROMAGO then filed a petition for certiorari with application for TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction with the CA. It sought the annulment and reversal of the RTC
Order dated June 22, 2006. The CA sustained the denial of ROMAGO’s petition for
relief from judgment. It applied the well-settled rule that the negligence of counsel
binds the client, and further held that Atty. Barrios’ negligence in checking his mails
during his three-week rest could hardly be characterized as excusable.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Barrios’ negligence is excusable.
HELD:
A petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a
final and executory judgment. If ROMAGO indeed believed that the PDRCI had no
jurisdiction over the suit in the first instance, then all the proceedings therein,
including the decision, are null and void. Hence, it would not have filed a petition for
relief from judgment. In so doing, ROMAGO recognized that the PDRCI had
jurisdiction over the dispute. Certainly, the Arbitrator’s decision, which was
confirmed by the RTC, had attained finality when ROMAGO failed to interpose an
appeal to the CA. Hence, the decision may now be executed.
A petition for relief from judgment, being an equitable remedy, is allowed only in
exceptional cases, as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. Under
Rule 38 of the Rules, it may be availed of only after a judgment, final order or
other proceedings were taken against petitioner in any court through fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
Thus, a party is not entitled to relief under Rule 38, Section 2, of the Rules if he was
not prevented from filing his notice of appeal by fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Such relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of the judgment, when the loss of the remedy at law was
due to his own negligence or to a mistaken mode of procedure for that matter;
11 | P A G E
otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal,
which has already been lost either due to inexcusable negligence or due to a
mistake of procedure by counsel.
ROMAGO ascribes its failure to appeal to the negligence of its previous counsel,
Atty. Barrios. It claims that the receipt of the June 22, 2006 Order was not brought
to Atty. Barrios’ attention, because the latter was then at his ancestral house taking
a three-week rest after being diagnosed with severe hypertension. According to
ROMAGO, this is a clear case of excusable negligence on the part of its counsel,
warranting a relief from judgment.
To reverse the CA Decision denying petitioner's petition for relief from judgment
would put a premium on the negligence of petitioner's former counsel and
encourage endless litigation. If the negligence of counsel is generally admitted as a
justification for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as a
new counsel can be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.
FRANCISCO VS. PUNO
108 SCRA 427 (1981)
FACTS:
Private respondent filed with respondent judge a complaint for reconveyance of a
parcel of land and damages alleging inter alia that respondent's father caused the
land in question titled in his name alone as "widower", after her mother's death, in
spite of the property being conjugal, and then sold it to the predecessor in interest
of petitioners from whom they bought the same. After the petitioners had filed their
answer, wherein they alleged lack of personality of plaintiff to sue, prescription and
that they are buyers in good faith, the case was set for pre-trial, but petitioners
failed to appear thereat. Taking advantage of such absence, private respondent's
counsel move that they be declared in default and that private respondent, with the
assistance of her counsel, Atty. Pacifico M. Monje, be allowed to present their
evidence. The motion was granted and after presenting her evidence, counsel
rested her case. Respondent judge rendered judgment finding the evidence
insufficient to sustain the cause of action alleged and therefore dismissing the
complaint. On February 15, 1980, respondent's counsel was served with copy of the
decision.
On February 16, 1980, private respondent filed, thru a new counsel, Atty.
Bienvenido A. Mapaye, a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration alleging that
the insufficiency of her evidence was due to the fault of her counsel who presented
the same without her being fully prepared. It is relevant to note that said motion
was signed and sworn to by private respondent herself together with her
counsel.Respondent judge denied the same for having been filed out of time.
On May 7, 1980, private respondent filed, thru another new counsel, Atty. Ricardo
Rosales, Jr., a petition for relief under Rule 38.Answering the petition for relief,
petitioners maintained that aside from the fact that no excusable negligence has
been alleged, for, on the contrary, there was an evident effort oil respondent's part
to take advantage of the absence and default of petitioners when respondent
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presented her evidence, the petition for relief was filed out of time in the light of
Section 3 of Rule 38, which provides that such a petition should be " filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order or proceeding to
be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or order was
entered or such proceeding was taken."
Respondent judge ruled that it is the date when plaintiff actually learned of the
decision from which she seeks relief that should be considered in computing the
period of 60 days prescribed under Sec. 3, Rule 38. The private respondent stated
that she did not actually learn of the decision of January 8, until she received a copy
thereof on March 17, 1980 and that she was not informed of the contents of the
motion for new trial and/or reconsideration on February 15, 1980 when she was
made to sign it.
ISSUE:
W/N respondent judge acted beyond his jurisdiction in taking cognizance of private
respondent's petition for relief.
RULING:
Yes. The relief provided for by this rule is not regarded with favor and the judgment
would not be avoided where the party complaining "has, or by exercising proper
diligence would have had, an adequate remedy at law, or by proceedings in the
original action, by motion, petition, or the like to open, vacate, modify or otherwise
obtain relief against, the judgment." Where, as in this case, another remedy is
available, as, in fact, private respondent had filed a motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration alleging practically the same main ground of the petition for relief
under discussion, which was denied, what respondent should have done was to take
to a higher court such denial. A party who has filed a timely motion for new trial
cannot file a petition for relief after his motion has been denied. These two remedies
are exclusive of each other. It is only in appropriate cases where a party aggrieved
by a judgment has not been able to file a motion for new trial that a petition for
relief can be filed.
Second, it is beyond doubt that the petition for relief of private respondent was filed
out of time. We cannot sanction respondent court's view that the period should be
computed only from March 17, 1980 when she claims self-servingly that she first
knew of the judgment because, as stated above, she signed and even swore to the
truth of the allegations in her motion for new trial filed by Atty. Mapaye on February
16, 1980 or a month earlier. To give way to her accusations of incompetence
against the lawyer who handled her case at the pre-trial, which resulted in a
decision adverse to her despite the absence of petitioners, and charge again later
that her new counsel did not inform her properly of the import of her motion for
new trial and/or reconsideration is to strain the quality of mercy beyond the
breaking point and could be an unwarranted slur on the members of the bar. That,
however, Atty. Mapaye could not pursue the proper course after his motion for new
trial was denied is, of course, unfortunate, but We are unaware of the
circumstances of such failure and how much of it could be attributed to respondent
herself, hence We cannot say definitely that it was counsel's fault.
12 | P A G E
by a counsel of record, is not valid is applicable here in the reverse for the very
same reason that it is the lawyer who is supposed to know the next procedural
steps or what ought to be done in law henceforth for the protection of the rights of
the client, and not the latter.
ESCUETA V. LIM
GR 137162, 24 JAN 2007
VICTORY LINER V. MALINIAS
GR 151170, 29 MAY 2007
FACTS:
A Victory Liner Bus and the truck of Malinias collided. A complaint for sum of money
was filed against the petitioner. When the respondent finished presenting his
evidence, the original counsel of the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
but this was denied. Hence, when the case was called for petitioner to present his
evidence, no appearance was made. The case was therefore deemed submitted for
decision and the MTC ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioner’s new counsel filed
a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The MR was denied by the MTC because it did
not conform with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 5 Rule 15 (Notice of Hearing).
The MTC likewise declared that its earlier decision is now final and executory since
the MR was a mere scrap of paper which did not suspend the period to appeal.
Petitioner then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment but this was denied by the
MTC because it was filed out of time. The MTC explained that the petition for relief
from judgment must have been filed either within sixty (60) days from the date
petitioner’s new counsel learned of the judgment, or sixty (60) days after learning
that the Motion for Reconsideration had been denied for having been filed out of
time. Neither circumstance was met by petitioner. Subsequently, the MTC likewise
denied a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N the petition was filed out of time.
HELD: (RULE 38)
Section 3 of Rule 38 requires that said petition must be filed within sixty (60) days
after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was
entered. Neither benchmark was met by the petitioner, since the petition was filed
only on 25 October 1999, or some sixteen (16) months after the rendition of the
judgment sought to be set aside, and around fourteen (14) months after such
judgment was declared final and executory. Petitioner had opportunely learned of
both the rendition of the judgment and the Order refusing to give cognizance to the
motion for reconsideration. Had it simply consulted the rulebook, it should have
realized that a petition for relief from judgment was a remedy available to it, and
certainly one more appropriate than the Notice of Appeal it ultimately resorted to.
In any event, notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the party for purposes of
Section 3 of Rule 38. The principle that notice to the party, when he is represented
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RULE 47
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
REPUBLIC v. TECH. ADVOCATES FOR AGRO-FOREST PROGRAMS ASSOC.
GR 165333, 9 FEB 2010
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA decision which denied the
petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by the Republic of the Philippines,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Respondent Technological Advocates for Agro-Forest Programs Assiociation, Inc.
(TAFPA) and DENR entered into a contract for community organizing activities,
social investigation, and information education campaign at the San Isidro Tinago
Reforestation Sub-Project in Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent submitted to the
Office of the RED its Accomplishment Reports and Requests for Billing. After
evaluation and validation by the Composite Inspection Committee (CIC), it
recommended the payment of the sum of Php802,350.64 to respondent. However,
in a letter, RED Antonio M. Mendoza informed respondent that by reason of the
latter’s delay in the submission of its reports, it owed the DENR Php1,192,611.00 as
penalty for delay, deductible from its collectibles of Php802,350.64. Thus,
respondent was still liable to the DENR for the balance.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the position of RED Mendoza, which was
referred to the Legal Division of DENR for legal interpretation of the provisions of
the contract entered into. The Division’s lawyer clarified that the “delay”
contemplated in the contract that would warrant the imposition of the stipulated
penalty referred to the “failure to undertake the primary community organizing
activities such as community planning workshops, assemblies, meetings/seminars,
social development, and technical trainings, consultations with community members
and leader and not to the non-submission of reports.” Instead of paying, the matter
was referred to the Program Director (NFDO), DENR, seeking its position on
whether to impose the penalty. The Director stated that the regional office of the
DENR was correct in the imposition of the penalty, saying that the only recourse of
the respondent would be to petition the proper court for the equitable reduction of
the penalty imposed by the contract.
Respondet filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a special civil action for Mandamus
with Prayer for Damages, praying that after notice and hearing, a writ be issued
commanding the RED of the DENR to par respondent Php802,350.64, respresenting
the latter’s unpaid claims, as well as moral damages and attorney’s fees and legal
interest. The RTC subsequently treated the case as one for specific performance
rather than an action for mandamus, since the allegations in the complaint clearly
reflected that respondent’s cause of action was based on a contract.
The case was set for pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The DENR filed no opposition. The motion was granted. The DENR did not
seek reconsideration. The RTC thus rendered a decision, favoring the respondent
and ordering petitioner to pay the unpaid claims under the contract. It opined that
the language of the contract entered into by the parties was clear that the penalty
13 | P A G E
cause applied only to delay in the full completion of the contracted services, and not
to non-submission or delayed submission of the corresponding report. Petitioner
filed an MR, but was denied. The RTC made an Entry of Final Judgment, stating that
the
decision had become final and executory. Afterwhich, the OSG filed a
Manifestation and Motion asking the RTC to set aside the decision on the ground of
lack of due process. Such was denied. The OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC
disapproved the appeal, stating that the decision had already become final and
executory, and that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which allows the filing
of a pleading for the dismissal of the case after judgment has become final and
executory and for which a writ of execution has been issued.
Petitioner sought recourse before the CA via a petition for Annulment of Judgment
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the decision of the
RTC, based on the following grounds: (1) That the action lies within the jurisdiction
of the [Commission on Audit] COA and not before the courts; (2) That private
respondent did not exhaust administrative remedies against petitioner, hence, no
cause of action against petitioner; and (3) Respondent is not entitled to be paid its
money claim against petitioner. The CA denied the petition. It said that the RTC
acquired jurisdiction over respondent’s cause of action. The CA added that the rule
on due process was not violated as petitioner was given all the opportunity to
participate in the proceedings before the RTC, which it in fact did, and was duly
notified of all court processes, orders, and decision. As for petitioner’s claim of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, the CA concluded that the DENR was
estopped from raising the defense, considering that when the DENR denied
respondent’s claim, it informed the latter that its only recourse was to petition the
proper court for it to equitably reduce the penalty based on the contract. The CA
also affirmed the RTC’s conclusion that prior resort to the COA is directed only when
the money claim is against government funds that have not yet been appropriated
by law.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment on the ground that notice to the deputized counsel was notice to the OSG.
Petitioner maintains that the lawyer deputized and designated as "special attorneyOSG" is a mere representative of the OSG, and the latter retains supervision and
control over the deputized counsel. The OSG continues to be the principal counsel
and, as such, the Solicitor General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of the
orders, notices, and decisions. The deputized attorney has no legal authority to
decide whether or not an appeal should be made. As a consequence, copies of
orders and decisions served on the deputized counsel, acting as agent or
representative of the Solicitor General, are not binding until they are actually
received by the latter.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA should have granted the petition to annul the judgment of the lower
court.
RULING:
The petition is devoid of merit. CA decision is affirmed. An action to annul a final
judgment is an extraordinary remedy, a recourse equitable in character and allowed
only in exceptional cases. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
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jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. It is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not
have taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In a petition for annulment of judgment based
on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional
discretion, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. In the present case, the CA has put
to rest the issue of whether the RTC had jurisdiction over respondent’s cause of
action. The CA was correct when it concluded that the action was one for
mandamus and the RTC exercised original jurisdiction over such. The court after
evaluating the allegations in the initiatory pleading concluded that the action is one
for specific performance and proceeded to hear it as such. In doing so, the said
court retained jurisdiction. The same law grants the Regional Trial Courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over all cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation and all cases in which the demand exceeds P100,000.00, to
which the action a quo belongs.
NUDO V. CAGUIOA
GR 176906, 4 AUG 2009
FACTS:
Private respondents, spouses Petronilo and Marcela Nudo, filed a complaint for
partition and damages against the Petitioners, spouses, Gumersindo and Zosima
Nudo. Petronilo and Gumersindo are brothers and pro-indiviso co-owners of a parcel
of land, with an area of 425 square meters, located at Regidor Street, Pacdal,
Baguio City. Since 1990, Petronilo had requested Gumersindo to accede to the
partition of the property, but the latter refused, thus forcing him to initiate the said
complaint.
During the pendency of the case, Gumersindo [Petitioner-husband] died.
No substitution was effected by the court.
On July, 24, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered the
parties to partition the property among themselves in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and to submit to this Court their
partition agreement within sixty (60) days after their partition.
Petitioners’ counsel brought the case to the CA but the same was dismissed
for failure to file appellants’ brief. The dismissal was dated November 21,
2002.
Zosima Nudo [Petitioner-wife] died.
In 2004, private respondents filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the
court. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of Court. The Sheriff
returned the writ unenforced on the ground that Susana Nudo, daughter of
Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo, promised to settle with private respondents and
offer the purchase of their share in the subject property.
14 | P A G E
In 2005, private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of an Alias
Writ of Execution, which the court granted. The same was again returned
unenforced. The return stated that the petitioners’ house, which was being occupied
by petitioners’ heirs, still encroached approximately 82 sq m of the portion allotted
to the private respondents, and that Susana Nudo refused to accept private
respondents’ proposed partition.
Petitioner, Andrew B. Nudo, son of Gumersindo and Zosima Nudo, filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment, seeking to annul the RTC Decision in
the partition case. Petitioner alleged therein that neither he nor the other heirs
were substituted in place of their parents in the proceedings for partition before the
trial court. This allegedly rendered the proceedings null and void. Petitioner further
alleged that he only found out about the case sometime in March 2006 when
respondents, Sheriffs Romeo R. Florendo and Ruben L. Atijera, went to the office of
Susana Nudo and showed her a blueprint of a subdivision plan.
The CA issued a Resolution dismissing outright the petition for annulment
of judgment. According to the CA, annulment of judgment could not be
availed of since petitioner’s predecessors-in-interest had availed
themselves of the remedy of appeal. Petitioner’s recourse should have
been against the CA Resolution dated November 21, 2002, which dismissed
the appeal.
Petitioner filed an MR which was also denied.
Petitioner filed this petition, raising the issue of whether the judgment in
Civil Case No. 3493-R dated November 21, 2002 could be annulled on the
ground that he was not substituted for his deceased parents in the said
case.
ISSUE:
Should the judgment dated November 21, 2002 be annulled on the ground that
petitioner was not substituted for his deceased parents?
RULING:
No. An action to annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to
be granted indiscriminately by the Court. It is a recourse equitable in character
allowed only in exceptional cases. The reason for the restriction is to prevent this
extraordinary action from being used by a losing party to make a complete farce of
a duly promulgated decision that has long become final and executory. Under
Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the only grounds for annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction as a ground
for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.
Non-substitution of the heirs of a deceased party is not jurisdictional. The rule on
substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate. It is only when there is a denial of due process, as
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when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the
court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.
In the case at hand, both parents of the petitioner were defendants in the case for
partition. Hence, even after Gumersindo died, Zosima remained a party. And both
defendants continued to be represented by counsel as, in fact, a notice of appeal
was filed by their counsel before the CA. petitioner gives the impression that his
mother, Zosima Nudo, died while the appeal was still pending before the CA. The
records, however, show that Zosima died on June 22, 2003, after the CA’s
resolution dismissing the appeal became final and executory. Therefore, at no time
were the petitioner’s parents deprived of any representative in the partition case,
until the judgment therein became final and executory.
Petitioner cannot therefore claim now that the judgment in the partition case is null
and void for failure of the court to implead him, as the judgment became final and
executory prior to the death of his mother. The judgment in the partition case is
now enforceable against Gumersindo and Zosima’s successor-in-interest, including
herein petitioner
MANDY COMMODITIES INC. V. INTL COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA
G.R. NO. 166734, JULY 3 2009
FACTS:
Mandy Commodities Inc., (“Mandy Corp.”) obtained a total of P20 million loan from
International Commercial Bank of China (“Bank”). The loan was secured by two
deeds of chattel mortgage in favor of the Bank over 25 units of 2-storey buildings in
Binondo. On the day of the execution of the first deed, Mandy Corp. and the Bank
entered into an agreement whereby they specifically stipulated to consider the
buildings “as chattels, and as such, they can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage
under the law.” The deeds and the agreement were registered with the Chattel
Mortgage Registry of Manila.
When Mandy Corp. defaulted in the payment of its obligation, the Bank applied
before a notary public for the notarial sale of the mortgaged buildings pursuant to a
provision in the agreements which practically gave the Bank (mortgagee) full and
irrevocable power as attorney-in-fact to sell and dispose of the mortgaged
properties in a public or private sale should Mandy Corp. (mortgagor) default in the
payment of its obligation. At the sale, the Bank placed the highest bid, and so the
notary public issued a Certificate of Sale in its name with the notation that the sale
was “subject to petitioner’s right of redemption.”
The controversy arose when the Bank filed with the RTC an Ex Parte Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession Pending Redemption. In said petition, the Bank
stated that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage proceeded from the
provisions of The Real Estate Mortgage Law which entitles it to take possession of
the subject properties pending redemption upon approval of the bond. The trial
court granted the petition, approved the Bank’s bond of P600K and directed the
issuance of a writ of possession.
15 | P A G E
Mandy Corp. immediately filed a MR in which it pointed out that: (1) In accordance
with its agreement, the buildings covered by the mortgage were in fact chattels and
not real properties. Hence, the governing law is the Chattel Mortgage Law and not
the Real Estate Mortgage Law. (2) The foreclosure sale was null and void as it did
not follow the specific procedure laid down by the Chattel Mortgage Law, particularly
the requirement of a 10-day personal notice to the mortgagor of the date and time
of the sale. The MR was denied.
Mandy Corp. directly appealed to the SC via Rule 45. It posited that: (1) the
trial court erred in affirming the validity of the foreclosure sale which was conducted
under the provisions of the Real Estate Mortgage Law considering that the parties
had agreed to be bound by the Chattel Mortgage Law; (2) the writ of possession
pending redemption should not have been issued in view of the irregularities that
marked the foreclosure sale. The SC dismissed the petition for violating the
hierarchy of courts.
Mandy Corp. then sought the annulment of the orders of the trial court
through a Rule 47 petition before the CA. It invoked denial of due process when
it was deprived of its properties without the Bank complying with the 10-day notice
requirement in the Chattel Mortgage Law. The CA gave due course to the petition
and issued a TRO to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing the notice to vacate. The CA
after hearing eventually ruled in favor of the Bank. It conceded that the
unmistakable intent of the parties was to consider the buildings as chattels and,
hence, covered by the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. It pointed out that
while the Bank did not comply with the personal notice requirement under the said
law, the petition nevertheless must be dismissed because the remedy of
annulment of order was not the proper remedy. Accordingly, it affirmed the
order of the trial court.
Mandy Corp then filed a petition for review under Rule 65. It insists on the
nullity of the order on the following grounds: (1) nothing in the chattel mortgage
agreement states that it would be enforceable under the Real Estate Mortgage Law;
(2) there is no provision under the Chattel Mortgage Law relating to possession
pending redemption; (3) since the foreclosure sale was null and void, the trial court
was devoid of jurisdiction to act on the petition for a writ of possession and, more
so, issue the said writ; (4) when the CA did not annul the said order and instead
affirmed the same, it likewise abused its discretion which amounted to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on its part.
The Bank was told to comment, but instead, ROP Investments (“ROP”) moved that
it be substituted as the respondent in this case, because it had acquired by
assignment all the rights, titles and interest of the Bank. The Court allowed the
substitution.
ROP posits that: (1) the filing of the petition was a mere after-thought in the hope
of curing the wrong remedy availed of by Mandy Corp. in the first instance, which
resulted in the dismissal of its Rule 45 petition for violation of the rule on hierarchy
of courts; (2) the CA did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition which
was, to begin with, procedurally infirm as the grounds invoked by Mandy Corp. are
not apt for a Rule 47 petition; (3) the issuance of the writ of possession is a
ministerial duty of the trial court under the Real Estate Mortgage Law, and that
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16 | P A G E
since Mandy Corp. did not pursue any of the proper remedies against the orders of
the trial court, then with more reason that the said writ be issued in the case.
the order granting a petition for a writ of possession is a final order from which an
appeal would be the proper and viable remedy.
ISSUE:
W/N resort via Rule 47 is proper.
ISSUE:
What is the proper remedy of a party aggrieved by the decision of the CA in a
petition for annulment under Rule 47.
RULING:
NO, annulment was not the proper remedy to set aside the orders of the
trial court.
The remedy of petition for annulment of judgment, final order or resolution under
Rule 47 is an extraordinary one inasmuch as it is available only where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other remedies can no longer be
availed of through no fault of the petitioner. The relief it affords is equitable in
character as it strikes at the core of finality of such judgments and orders.
The grounds for a petition for annulment are in themselves specific in the same way
that the relief itself is. The Rules restrict the grounds only to lack of jurisdiction and
extrinsic fraud to prevent the remedy from being used by a losing party in making a
complete farce of a duly promulgated decision or a duly issued order or resolution
that has long attained finality.
Lack of jurisdiction (the ground relied upon by Mandy Corp.) is confined only to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the claim. A valid invocation of this ground rests exclusively on absolute
lack of jurisdiction as opposed to a mere abuse of jurisdictional discretion or mere
errors in judgment committed in the exercise of jurisdiction inasmuch as jurisdiction
is distinct from the exercise thereof. Hence, where the facts demonstrate that the
court has validly acquired jurisdiction over the respondent and over the subject
matter of the case, its decision or order cannot be validly voided via a petition for
annulment on the ground of absence or lack of jurisdiction.
Mandy Corp.’s petition for annulment of the assailed order on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction kept alluding to several errors supposedly committed by the trial court
which tend to show that said tribunal had no jurisdiction to issue the orders.
Inasmuch as the petition questioned the manner by which the trial court arrived at
the issuance of its orders, it is unmistakable that Mandy Corp., in effect,
acknowledged that the trial court possessed jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
Bank’s application for a writ of possession.
It is also unmistakable that the trial court (in which jurisdiction over applications for
writs of possession is by law vested) had acquired jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the bank's application merely upon its filing. And since it had so acquired
jurisdiction over the incidents of the application, it was then bound to act on it and
issue the writ prayed for inasmuch as that duty is essentially ministerial. The
purported errors that it may have incidentally committed do not negate the fact that
it had, in the first place, acquired the authority to dispose of the application and
that it had since retained such authority until the assailed orders were issued. Such
errors, if indeed there were, are nevertheless mere errors of judgment which are
correctible by an ordinary appeal before the CA, a remedy that was then available
to Mandy Corp., and not by a petition for annulment under Rule 47. Furthermore,
RULING:
Ordinary appeal under Rule 45.
A party aggrieved by the decision of the CA in a petition filed with it for annulment
of judgment should not file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but rather an
ordinary appeal under Rule 45 where only questions of law may be raised. A petition
for certiorari is a remedy of last resort (just like a petition for annulment) and must
be availed of only when an appeal or any other adequate, plain or speedy remedy
may no longer be pursued in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is said to be
plain, speedy and adequate when it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. To
warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari, the tribunal must be shown to have
capriciously and whimsically exercised its judgment in a way equivalent to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. A bare allegation of grave abuse of discretion is not enough.
Not only was an appeal available to Mandy Corp. as a remedy from the assailed
Decision of the CA, Mandy Corp. also failed to sufficiently show the circumstances
that would otherwise justify such a departure from the rule as to make available to
him the remedy of a petition for certiorari in lieu of an appeal. Be that as it may,
while an appeal would have been the proper remedy under the premises, it is
nevertheless glaring from the records that such remedy was no longer viable.
Mandy Corp. has conceded that, as shown by the records, it received the Resolution
of the CA denying its motion MR on September 21, 2004. An appeal could have
been taken within the prescribed period of fifteen days thereafter, but Mandy Corp.
did not avail of the same. Perhaps realizing that it could no longer make use of that
remedy, it instead filed the instant petition in an effort to secure a favorable ruling.
It can only be surmised that the present recourse is a mere attempt, futile as it is,
to substitute a lost right to appeal.
VICTORY LINER V. MALINIAS
GR 151170, 29 MAY 2007
FACTS:
On 17 July 2001 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari to
Annul Judgment" under the aegis of Rule 47. In explaining the "nature of the
petition," petitioner claimed that it was seeking to annul the judgment and orders of
both the RTC and the MTC, although the issues identified in the petition pertain only
to "serious errors" and "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the RTC. There is a
general allegation that the acts of the RTC in granting the motion for execution even
before petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was acted upon constituted an
extrinsic fraud, but no particular arguments were offered to explain why that was
so. The CA dismissed the petition.
ABARQUEZ | CALANOY | CALIDA | FLORES | LIPANA | LIZARONDO | MANIGBAS | MORALES | PATINO | PINON | QUE | SAGAYADAN
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING | JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
17 | P A G E
ISSUE:
WON the CA was the proper venue for the petition.
HELD:
Section 2 of Rule 47 does disqualify extrinsic fraud as a valid ground "if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for
relief," and such provision would have found incontestable relevance had the clear
object of the petition for annulment been the MTC judgment. But petitioner’s action
for annulment of judgment did not provide clarity in that regard, and in fact does
devote considerable effort in imputing errors on the part of the RTC with the
objective of annulling, in particular, the RTC decision. If that were so, reliance on
Section 2 of Rule 47 would have been misplaced, since the judgment subject of the
petition for relief was different from the decision subject of the action for annulment
of judgment. Still, given the confused nature of the petition for annulment of
judgment, blame could hardly be attributed to the RTC.
All told, even if we were to hold that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the
petition on the perceived defect in the verification and certification requirements,
the appellate court would have been left with an action stigmatized by error upon
error interminably. Most frustratingly, for every procedural misstep committed by
petitioner, there existed a corresponding viable alternative which would have
necessitated a ruling on the merits, and which petitioner could have chosen with
ease. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, it could have instead filed a special civil
action for certiorari or a petition for relief from judgment. Instead of filing the no
longer timely petition for relief from judgment, it could have instead by then filed a
petition for annulment of judgment. When it did file a petition for annulment with
the Court of Appeals, it could have instead filed a more feasible petition for
annulment with the RTC.
ABARQUEZ | CALANOY | CALIDA | FLORES | LIPANA | LIZARONDO | MANIGBAS | MORALES | PATINO | PINON | QUE | SAGAYADAN