Presented By CA Swatantra Singh, B.Com , FCA, MBA Email ID: singh.swatantra@gmail.com New Delhi , 9811322785, www.caindelhiindia.com, www.carajput.com 1 Section I The Need for Corporate Governance Responsibility to Stakeholders Predictability Transparency Accountability Easier access to capital (FII, VCF) Efficiency (at the firm level) and Global Competitiveness (IPRs) 2 Section II Conceptualizing Corporate Governance Narrow Definition - A set of relationships between the company and shareholders, directors and management. Broad Definition - Going beyond and looking to the implicit and explicit relationships of the company with employees, creditors, consumers, distributors, local communities. 3 Conceptualizing Corporate Governance (Contd.) OECD Definition – System by which corporations are directed and controlled. – Spells out the rules / procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. – Provide the structure through which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance – Specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as, the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders World Bank Definition – Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency and accountability 4 Conceptualizing Corporate Governance (Contd.) What constitutes shareholders’ profitability versus profitability Need for external regulation interest? sustainable – FOR: » Conflict of interest b/w Management/Promoters and other constituencies » To protect small investors » To account for Externalities – AGAINST: » Risk of excessive policing (time & cost of compliance) » Increase costs » Check the box approach 5 Section III Evolution of Systems of Accountability: Indian Initiatives In December 1995, CII set up a task force to design a voluntary code of corporate governance In April 1998, the Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code, was released SEBI set up the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee in 1999 to design a mandatory-cum-recommendatory code for listed companies (Clause 49) DCA set up the Naresh Chandra Committee Report in 2002. The key recommendation related to financial and non-financial disclosures and independent auditing and board oversight of management (Draft Companies Bill) The Narayana Murthy Committee was set up by SEBI in 2002 to review clause 49 and suggest measures to improve corporate governance standards (Proposed Clause 49) 6 Developments in the U.S ENRON – Bankruptcy filing in 2001 (largest in US history) – Accounting techniques involving unconsolidated partnerships and “special purpose entities” to hide losses from financial statements & conceal indebtedness. – Issues regarding independence of auditors, provision of non audit services & conflict of interest – Independence of directors SARBANES OXLEY ACT, 2002 (SOX) – Signed into law July 30, 2002 – Enhances reporting obligations of public companies to prevent securities fraud & other abuses 7 SOX Applicable to: – Companies listed or traded in the U.S (including non U.S Companies) – Subsidiaries of U.S Companies in India (provided they have a business connection in the U.S) – Foreign accounting firms that prepare or furnish audit report for an issuer – Sometimes compliance expected by U.S Companies from business partners in India (implications for BPO sector) 8 SOX-Brief Overview CEO & CFO certification in SEC Reports (Ss 302 & 906) – Compliance with Securities Exchange Act, 1934 – Financial statements represent the true financial condition of the Company operations – Financial results contain no untrue statement /omission of material fact – Company has complied with Disclosure norms – Management have disclosed significant deficiencies, changes, fraud to auditors & audit committee Ban on loans to executive officers and directors Accelerated filings of periodic reports Filing of change of beneficial ownership within 2 days 9 SOX-Brief Overview (Contd.) Reimbursement by CEO/CFO upon restatement of financial statements due to misconduct – Bonus/other incentive based compensation – Profits from sale of securities Independence of Board of Directors/ Committees Enhanced Criminal Penalties (upto $5 million fine for individuals, $25 million for entities, prison terms upto 20 years) Strict Reporting of illegal or unethical behavior 10 SOX-Brief Overview (Contd.) Audit Committee – – – – Independent Financial Literacy of members At least one financial expert Responsible for appointment, compensation & oversight of auditor & approval of audit/non audit services – Create compliant mechanism regarding accounting and auditing – Approve all related party transactions Implementation of a ‘Whistleblower’ policy 11 SOX-Brief Overview (Contd.) Additional Disclosures – Off Balance Sheet Items & transactions that may have material current/future effect on financial condition/results of operations – Pro forma Information must conform to financials prepared under GAAP - No untruth/omission – All fees billed by auditors in annual report – Audit Partner Rotation – Registration with Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (including foreign audit firms that audit Issuers) 12 Major Areas of Debate Directors Independent Directors Audit Committees Auditors 13 Section IV Director: The Fiduciary “If directors act within their powers, if they act with such care as is reasonably to be expected from them, having regard to their knowledge and experience, and if they act honestly for the benefit of the company they represent, they discharge both their equitable as well as their legal duty to the company” 14 WHO DO DIRECTORS OWE A DUTY TO? SHAREHOLDERS COMPANY EMPLOYEES PUBLIC CREDITORS 15 General Duties of Directors Duty of care and skill Duty of loyalty & disclosure Duty of disgorging profit in relation to corporate opportunity 16 Duty of Care and Skill A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform his functions in good faith, and in a manner that he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, and with a care that an ordinary prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances 17 Duty of Care and Skill (Contd.) Courts in UK and USA have held that directors in banks and financial institutions owe a higher degree of care – The banking industry is involved in regular receipt of public cash and property and is thus more vulnerable than other businesses and therefore a greater care is required; – A director of a company (a bank) that has a large amount of liquid assets carries with him higher risks and temptation to which such assets give rise; – There are more legislative and regulatory monitoring and liability provisions pertaining to banking companies than any other company and such provisions may also extend to the director of the bank or financial institution. 18 Duty of Care and Skill (Contd.) Exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence Continuing knowledge of company’s business Reliance on Co-directors and Power to delegate with supervision Bona fide and good faith intention 19 Duty of Loyalty & Disclosure Section 299, Companies Act, 1956 principal is based on the rudiments of law that the same person cannot act for himself/herself and at the same time, with respect to the same matter, act with another whose interests are conflicting Effect of disclosure Disclosure to whom How extensive should the disclosure be 20 Duty in Relation to Corporate Opportunity By occupying a position of trust, a director must not make a profit which he can acquire only by use of his position and, if he does, he must account for the profit so made. 21 Corporate Opportunity Any profit made by a Director through holding the office of such director must be accounted for. Therefore, a Director would be held accountable for personal profits made from: – The sale of goods, materials or services earlier dealt with by Company for its business – Forestalling the company’s business opportunity unless the company has rejected such opportunity – Requesting the customer to place orders for goods, materials and services with another company in which he has some interest – Receiving Commission from another company, which has sold goods to the company 22 Liabilities of Directors Derivative Action Statutory Liability Contractual Liability Tortuous Liability 23 Derivative Action Resolutions by directors for transferring the controlling interest of the company wherein there is a complete changeover of the structure to the detriment of the company Sale of land to oneself at a discounted value Directors passing an ordinary resolution where the act in question would require a special resolution 24 Statutory Liability Companies Act, 1956: Officers in default Banking Regulation Act, 1949 Insurance Act, 1948 Pollution Laws Income Tax Act, 1961 25 Director:Legal Provisions Restrictions on loans to directors or other specified entities (s. 295) – Interest rate shall not be less than 4% above prevailing bank rate – Quantum of loan to not exceed 25 times the gross salary – No default on public deposit by the company Boards sanction for contracts in which directors are interested (s. 297) – – – – Consent by way of board resolution Prior to the contract or within three months Except contract between two public companies Prior approval of the central government for a contract where the company has paid up share capital of not less than Rs 1 crore 26 Director: Legal Provisions (Contd.) Disclosure of interest by directors (s. 299) – Default ground for vacation under s. 283. Interested directors not to participate or vote in board proceedings (s. 300) – Applicable only to public companies Maintenance of records of contracts, companies, firms in which directors are interested (s. 301) – to be signed by all the directors present in the next board meeting – kept at registered office and available for inspection Restriction on directors from holding office of profit (s. 314) – Company can give consent by special resolution – Does not apply to managing directors 27 Issues for Consideration Should the directors be educated on the risk profile of the company and their duties as a director? – Narayana Murthy Committee Report Should there be codified duties and responsibilities? Should the liability of the non-executive directors mirror the liability of the executive directors? 28 Independent Directors No mention in the Companies Act Clause 49 - Optimum combination of executive and non-executive directors - Not less that fifty per cent being non-executive - If non executive chairman, at least one third of the board should comprise of independent directors - If executive chairman, at least half of the board should comprise of independent directors Clause 63, Draft Companies Bill – Every public company of prescribed paid up capital or turnover to have at least seven directors of which at least three or fifty percent, whichever is higher, to be independent directors » Would include unlisted public companies also 29 Who is an Independent Director? Independence of judgement No material relationship No pecuniary relationship 30 What is Independence? The Cadbury Report defines independence as: Apart from their directors’ fees and shareholdings, they should be independent of management and free from any business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their independent judgement. Clause 49 ‘Independent’ defined as those directors who, apart from receiving director’s remuneration do not have any other material pecuniary relationship or transactions with the company, its promoters, management or subsidiaries, which in the view of the board may affect independence of judgment 31 What is Independence? (Contd.) Clause 2(45), Draft Companies Bill “Independent Director” means a non-executive director of a company who apart from receiving director’s remuneration, does not have any material pecuniary relationship or transactions of such amount as may be prescribed, with the company , its promoters, managing director, whole time director, other directors, manager or its holding company and its subsidiaries apart from possessing such attributes for being treated as Independent director as may be prescribed by the Central Government from time to time. Excessively restrictive? 32 Independent Directors External expert Independent director: watchdog? 33 Audit Committee Clause 49, Listing Agreement – Minimum three members, all non-executive directors – Majority independent, chairman independent – At least one director having financial and accounting knowledge – Must have at least three meetings per year 34 Audit Committee (Contd.) Section 292A, Companies Act – public companies – minimum three directors – two thirds other than managing or whole time directors » no other qualifications prescribed – recommendations relating to financial management binding » reasons for not accepting any recommendation – Auditors required to attend the meetings Clause 62, Draft Companies Bill – not less than two independent directors » no other qualifications prescribed 35 Audit Committee (Contd.) Proposed Clause 49 (pursuant to N.M. Report) – At least one member having financial and accounting expertise – All members to be financially literate – Expanded role- independent judgment – Focusing on » Quality of accounting policies » Alternate accounting policies » Internal control deficiencies – Implementation of ‘whistleblower’ policy 36 Audit Committee (Contd.) Audit committees- Efficacy? – Chairman of Enron’s audit committee was a Stanford professor with 30 years experience in auditing and accounts – Should the members of audit committee be financially literate? – Should the scope of audit committee be decided by the Board of Directors? – Is remuneration of members an issue? 37 Section V Auditors: The Watchful Eye Appointment regulated by the Companies Act (s.224) – Maximum number of companies prescribed (20) Qualifications & Disqualifications (s. 226) – Person holding any security of that company (2000 Amendment) Requirement to report on specific matters (s. 227) ICAI Code of Conduct 38 Section V Auditors: The Watchful Eye Duties of Auditor – Duty of Care (Re Kingston Cotton Mills Co.) » Reasonable care and skill – Auditor is the servant of the shareholder and whose duty is to examine the affairs of the company on their behalf at the end of a year and to report to them what he has found. – The auditor is like a trustee for shareholders. – Watchdog and not a bloodhound 39 Auditor’s Liability Basis of Liability – Contractual and Fiduciary » Company » Shareholders as a body – Tortuous » “Holding out” 40 Auditor’s Liability (Contd.) Stage I (Upto 1963) – Candler v. Crane » Privity doctrine: a third party not in privity with the auditor cannot recover damages for negligence » Justice Denning gave a dissenting judgment it must be known to the advise41r that the advice would be communicated to the plaintiff in order to induce him to adopt a particular course of action the advice must be relied upon for the purpose of the particular transaction for which it was known to the advisers that the advice was required. Stage II (1964-1990) – Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners » Liability for a negligent misstatement made by one person to another, even in the absence of any contractual or fiduciary relationship causing financial loss 41 Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman Stage III (Post 1990) – Watered down in Caparo Industries case » The three criteria for the imposition of a duty of care are foreseeability of damage proximity of relationship the reasonableness or otherwise of imposing a duty » The auditor of a public company's accounts owed no duty of care to a member of the public at large, who relied on the accounts to buy shares in the company. An auditor owed no duty of care to an individual shareholder in the company who wished to buy more shares in the company The purpose for which accounts are prepared and audited is to enable the shareholders as a body to exercise informed control of the company 42 Caparo Industries Plc v. Dickman Cadbury Committee on Caparo Industries – the case exposed two widely held misconceptions: » audit report is a guarantee to the accuracy of the accounts, and perhaps even as to the soundness of the company » that anyone (including investors and creditors) can rely on the audit, not only in a general sense but also very specifically by being able to sue the auditors if they are negligent In light of Enron is there a need to re-examine the issue of auditor’s liability as set out in the Caparo Industries case? 43 Issues for Consideration Should statute set out the liability? – Should ‘breach of care’ be extended to any other group? Whether rules for auditors liability need to be codified and made stricter? – Recommendations of Naresh Chandra Committee Report Should Audit committees evaluate independence of auditors? 44 Similarities between US position & Indian Proposals SOX CEO/CFO Certification Reimbursement for misstatement Ban on loans to directors Code of Conduct/Ethics Independent Board/ Committee Disclosure of Off Balance Sheet/transactions that may have future impact Narayana Murthy Committee CEO/CFO Certification Reimbursement for misstatement Restriction on loan to directors Written/Public Code of Conduct Independent Board of Directors More limited disclosuresbut left open for consideration 45 Comparison between US & Indian Position SOX Audit Partner Rotation Audit Committee • • • • Financial Literacy One financial expert Oversee auditor Approve related party transactions • Whistleblowers policy Narayana Murthy Committee Audit Partner Rotation Audit Committee • • • • Financial Literacy One financial expert Oversee auditor Approve related party transactions • Whistleblowers policy 46 Proposed Amendments Proposed amendments to clause 49 and Draft Companies Bill address major issues – Appointment of a Chief Accounting Officer by a Company – Definition of related party transactions expanded and specific approval requirements introduced – Disclosure of all contingent liabilities – Timely communication of Risk Management activities – CEO/ CFO certification requirements 47 Section VI Reinventing Corporate Governance in India Super regulator v. Multiple regulators? - Efficiency - Cost of Compliance Transparency by the regulators? - Late trading and market timing investigations Enforcement by stock exchanges? 48 Reinventing Corporate Governance in India (Contd.) Disclosure of voting agreements which impact governance of companies? Pro-active role by institutional investors? Mandatory Corporate Governance Ratings? - Will it lead to better corporate governance? 49 Reinventing Corporate Governance in India (Contd.) How can whistle blowers be encouraged? - Narayana Murthy Report - Immunity for whistleblowers? Directors & officers liability insurance? 50 Conclusion Good corporate governance – means to the end of sustainable wealth creation The positive side of adherence to most rigorous standards in governance for corporations: - Increased importance of corporate governance as an investment criteria among large investors - Improved Equity Price Performance - Higher Valuations - Access to global markets - Increased investor goodwill & confidence Balance between ‘enterprise’ and ‘constraints’ 51 Internal Audit • • • • CARO Requirement As per Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 Clause 49 of Listing Agreement SAS 70 Report 52 Internal Audit • CARO Requirement Requirement of CARO – Auditor’s comment on internal audit • Clause 49 of Listing Agreement - Applicable to listed companies in Indian Stock Exchange. • SAS 70 Report - Use of Service Organizations like payroll - Hewitt, MF accounting – Syntel Outsourcing, etc 53 Internal Audit Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 • Applies to all companies listed in SEC • US based company and its subsidiaries, foreign companies like Patni, TATA Motors ADR listed in NYSC. • Sec 404 – Internal control on Financial Reporting • Certification by CEO/CFO on quarterly basis. 54 Internal Audit Sarbanes Oxley Act, 2002 Senator Paul Sarbanes Mike Oxley 55 End in Mind… a statement acknowledging your responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate “internal control over financial reporting“ a statement identifying the internal control framework you used to conduct your evaluation of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting an assessment of the effectiveness of your company's internal control over financial reporting as of the end of your most recent fiscal year. – Assertion: a statement as to whether or not your company's internal control over financial reporting is effective disclosure of any “material weaknesses“ in your company's internal control over financial reporting. – If there are any disclosed material weaknesses, then you are not permitted to conclude that your internal control over financial reporting is effective a statement that your independent auditors have issued a report on your assessment of internal control over financial reporting 56 How to be there.., Financial Controls must be suitably designed using established criteria (COSO) · Control objectives and related financial controls are appropriately documented · Documentation is auditable · Key financial controls are identified (Assertions) · Management perform the own tests of: • the design of controls over financial reporting • the effectiveness based on key financial controls · Deficiencies are documented, disclosed and addressed. 57 Applying the COSO Framework Information & Communication Pertinent information identified, captured and communicated in a timely manner. Access to internal and externally generated information. Flow of information that allows for successful control actions from instructions on responsibilities to summary of findings for management action. Monitoring Assessment of a control system’s performance over time. Combination of ongoing and separate evaluation. Management and supervisory activities. Internal audit activities. Control Activities Policies/procedures that ensure management directives are carried out. Range of activities including approvals, authorizations, verifications, recommendations, performance reviews, asset security and segregation of duties. Control Environment Sets tone of organizationinfluencing control consciousness of its people. Factors include integrity, ethical values, competence, authority, responsibility. Foundation for all other components of control. 58 Risk Assessment Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks to achieving the entity’s objectives – forming the basis for determining control activities. Controls Preventative and Detective Controls Manual and Automated Controls Business Performance Review / Monitoring Controls General Computer Controls (IT Level Controls) Application Controls (Transaction Level Controls in Computer System) 59 Control objectives for Transaction Processing Completeness of records (C) - controls over completeness are designed to ensure that: – All transactions are recorded once and only once. – All transactions are recorded in the correct period and in the correct legal entity. Accuracy of records (A) - controls over accuracy are designed to ensure that: – All transactions are accurately recorded in the general ledger, including correct classification to ensure compliance with disclosure requirements. – Assets and liabilities are recorded at an appropriate value. – Changes to standing data are accurately input. Validity of records (V) - controls over validity are designed to ensure that: – Transactions are authorized. – Transactions are genuine and they relate to Company. – Changes to standing data are authorized. Restricted access to assets and records (R) - controls to restricted access are designed to ensure that: – There is appropriate segregation of duties with respect to key controls. – Physical assets (e.g. gold bullion) are appropriately safeguarded. 60 Financial Reporting - Assertions Existence or Occurrence – Assets or liability exist at a given date (FG) – Transaction occurred during a given period (Sales) Completeness – All financial transactions are included for reporting (Purchases) Valuation or Allocation – All amounts represented at appropriate amount (Accounts receivable) Rights and Obligations – Assets and Liabilities represents rights and obligations (Lease capitalized) Presentation & Disclosure – Properly classified and disclosed 61 (Long term liabilities) Documentation standards Management must document the design of controls related to all relevant assertions for all significant financial statement accounts Documentation must encompass the entire process of: – initiating – authorising – recording – processing – reporting individual transactions The required documentation might take various forms: flowcharts, policy manuals, accounting manuals, narrative memoranda, decision tables, procedural write-ups or completed questionnaires Flowcharts, supplemented by narrative descriptions, are frequently the most effective form of control documentation 62 Objectives of a walkthrough Confirms that the documentation prepared by the company reflects its actual processes Confirm that controls described in the documentation are actually those applied “in the field” Confirm that, at least, all key controls have been documented appropriately (completeness of the process documented) Walkthroughs should confirm that the documentation is appropriate to develop the testing plan 63 Gaps in Controls Processes not adequately documented (scope and quality) Controls not implemented Controls poorly designed Controls not working effectively Control-related roles not assigned Non-existence of policies Gaps identified during documentation process – Will be shared on confirmation during walk-through process 64 Scope Process identified for documentation Purchase of Materials and Accounts Payable Production Accounting Stock Accounting Sales Accounting and Accounts Receivables Treasury and Banking Transactions General Accounting Fixed Assets 65 Purchase of Materials and Accounts Payable Master maintenance – BOM & Suppliers Issue of purchase orders Receivables GAR and Inventory Verification Raising debit notes on creditors Accounting for creditors Payment processing 66 Production Accounting Material Issues Production accounting – back flashing Costing and standard updation 67 Stock Accounting Physical Verification Stock valuation 3P Management 68 Sales Accounting to Receivables Master maintenance Receiving and accepting sales orders Dispatching Accounting sales and debtors Provision for debtors 69 Treasury and banking transactions Payment and receipt of money Schedule of authority Banking of receipts Accounting for FOREX conversion and forward covers Export Packing credit management Bank Recos. 70 General Accounting IUT’s Cut offs and period end/ consolidation Journal entries Restructuring provisions 71 Fixed Assets Capital Proposal approval and capital advances accounting Receiving and accounting for capital WIP Additions to FA and deletion from FA Depreciation Accounting Impairment provisions Physical verification 72 Presented By 73 CA Swatantra Singh, B.Com , FCA, MBA Email ID: singh.swatantra@gmail.com New Delhi , 9811322785, www.caindelhiindia.com, www.carajput.com 74