HUMANS AND
NON-HUMANS
A Spectrum
“Western” paradigm emphasizes gulf
between humans and animals
■ Religious traditions: humans as “the crown of
creation”, e.g. Judaism, Christianity, Islam.
■ Secular traditions: humans as unique
autonomous, rational, moral. technological
language users e.g. Aristotle, Kant.
■ “Evolutionary ethics”: humans as “the crown of
evolution”, e.g. Huxley (but not Darwin!)
Ecological perspective: fate of humans is
bound up with fate of the rest of nature.
■ Midgley: natural human affinity towards other
animals.
■ Norton: scientific perspective implies harmony
with nature.
■ Traditional societies e.g. Maaori: all living
things are related, as descendents of Tane.
■ Animal liberation: we have duties to all animals,
and their interests are (nearly) always equal to
those of Humans. (Singer)
■ Biocentric egalitarianism: we have duties to all
living things. (Taylor)
■ Nonanthropocentric environmental ethics: we
ought to pursue environmental justice because all
species are equal. (Sterba)
■ We have duties to at least some “environmental
objects” (Stone).
■ We have (largely unspecified) duties to “the
land”. (Callicott, Leopold)
■ We have duties to inanimate objects e.g.
buildings, works of art.
Anthropocentrism
■ Concept
All and only human beings have
moral standing; or, the
appropriate criterion of moral
standing is membership in Homo
sapiens.
Applications
■ We have duties concerning animals (as we
do concerning works of art or cars) but not to
animals.
►We may treat animals as we wish, except
where the interests of others are affected, eg dog
owners, recreational hunters, bird watchers
(Baxter)
► We ought not to mistreat animals because if
we do we are likely to become the kind of person
who mistreats humans (Aquinas, Kant).
■ “Weak anthropocentrism” - the human
interest requires a respect for natural
systems (Norton).
►Sustainability - obligations to future
generations.
► Personal spiritual development - Buddhist
monks, Jains, Ghandi.
Sentience Based Ethics
■ Concept
All and only sentient beings have
moral standing.
►Sentience: ability to have
sensations, to experience
pleasure and pain.
Key Philosophical Issues
■ What counts as having a sensation?
► How do we know that an animal is having a
sensation?
► Is “sensation” talk just an inference from
behaviour?
■ Can we talk about anything except
behaviour?
►Is there anything except behaviour?
Applications

Descartes (and/or his followers):
animals are non-sentient “machines”
and so have no moral standing.
►Bentham, Singer: most animals are
sentient, and it is wrong to cause them to
suffer except where that would be the
only way to create the best outcome.
UTILITARIANISM
Singer

Utilitarianism requires that all
interests (or preferences) be taken
equally into account.
►“Speciesism” - ignoring the
interests of a being just because it
belongs to another species - is
wrong, just like racism and sexism.
■ All sentient beings have an equal interest in
avoiding suffering, e.g. farming of animals
inflicts suffering – and also denies food to
starving people.
►We do not need (e.g.) to eat animal products.
► So we ought (e.g.) to become vegetarians.
■ Similar argument against painful use of
animals, e.g.
► research
► product testing
► sport and entertainment.
■ Is the analogy with racism and sexism valid?
■ Are the consequences the ONLY thing that
matters, morally?
■ How do we know that animals suffer?
■ Isn't “sentientism” just as bad a form of
discrimination as speciesism?
Would PAINLESS farming and killing of animals be
wrong?

What difference will MY actions make to animals
- or to starving people?

Is “moral atomism” adequate to deal with
environmental issues?

Sentience Based Ethics
■
Concept:
All and only beings with specific
properties have moral standing.
Applications

Regan: subjects of a life.

MA Warren, Tooley: self-concept.

Huxley: language.
RIGHTS
Regan
■ All beings with certain properties are PERSONS,
regardless of race, sex or species.
■ Many non-humans are persons e.g. gods, aliens
(ET?), some animals - and e.g. irreversibly
comatose humans are not.
■ All persons have inherent value and not mere
instrumental value.
■ All inherently valuable beings have rights:
► independently of consequences
► regardless of how many people recognize
their rights.
■ Rights may not be violated in order to
bring about good consequences.
► (e.g.) Killing animals for food violates their
rights.
■ So we ought (e.g.) to become vegetarians
(etc.).
SOME QUESTIONS FOR REGAN
■ Is the analogy with racism and sexism
valid?
■ Isn't “personism” just as bad a form of
discrimination as speciesism?
■ Why should we accept Regan's account of
personhood?
■ How do we know that animals have the
properties of persons?
■ Is “moral atomism” adequate to deal with
environmental issues?
RIGHTS FOR WHAT?
Humans?
Selected sentient beings?
All sentient beings?
All living beings?
Individual natural objects?
Places?
Works of art?
Corporations?
Cultures, peoples, nations?
Species?
Planets?
The universe?
Everything?