terr***Backdoor Case Neg***
Notes
Problem Areas

CALEA exception to secure data act
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo

Mandates ==/ circumvention

No way to patch up current backdoors  cards
Off case positions

Links hard to Bubble DA, terrorism DA

Dark web DA
Miscellaneous

Most ST advantages can be answered by the cards in the KQ
advantages


http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/tech-sanity-check/sanitycheck-is-the-us-losing-its-role-as-the-world-leader-ininformation-technology/


https://medium.com/homeland-security/cyber-geopoliticsa45fc698a3a1


https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44101.pdf


Fix cites for last two cards

Fix link
Case
KQ Cybersecurity/ST Critical Infrustructure
1NC

Banning backdoors would result in an increase in cybercrime. The
chance that a backdoor would create vulnerability is outweighed
by the creation of an online zone that protects all types of
criminals.
Cordero 04/20/15 (Carrie Cordero is a former counsel in the Justice Department’s nationalsecurity division an attorney in private practice and the director of national-security studies at
Georgetown Law, 20 April 2015, “Should Law Enforcement Have the Ability to Access Encrypted
Communications? – Wall Street Journal”
http://lawnews.harvardbusinesslawreview.com/should-law-enforcement-have-the-ability-toaccess-encrypted-communications-wall-street-journal/)
We can’t fight terrorism and violent crime in the dark. But that is where we’re headed if lawenforcement and intelligence officials are denied the legal access they need.¶ The fact is, communications
companies often hold information that law-enforcement and national-security agencies require to pursue criminal investigations and forestall potential
threats. Up until recently, agents of the government could generally file requests for court orders that, if approved, compel the companies to provide
the requested information. Congress in the 1990s passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or Calea, to facilitate private-sector
cooperation with law enforcement. This act required telecommunications companies to configure their systems in a way that would enable them to
effectively respond to court orders.¶ But Calea predated email, cloud storage and social-media platforms. Officials now have to cope with situations
and technologies that the law did not anticipate. Moreover, recent
congressional proposals, such as the Secure Data
Act, threaten to prohibit the government from requiring that companies design or modify
communications systems or products to facilitate government requests for data.¶ Justice denied?¶ Driven by increased
concerns about government surveillance and consumer privacy, the technology industry has
accelerated the deployment of advanced encryption technology for consumers and businesses. Apple Chief
Executive Tim Cook has said that his company won’t even be able to comply with court subpoenas involving its iMessage service because the
encryption is undecipherable by Apple itself. ¶ Therein
lies the problem. If companies can’t decode messages or
retain a means to unlock devices of their customers, court orders requiring the companies to
hand over messages, passwords or keys will be meaningless. An alternative suggested by some that courts compel
suspects to hand over their devices and passwords is not realistic, considering the types of crimes and threats the U.S. government is most worried
about. As
a result, a violent crime may go unsolved; a terrorist attack may not be thwarted; a
victim may not see justice.¶ It’s true that encryption wasn’t on the table when Calea was passed in 1994. But it wasn’t widely available
to consumers then. Today, with some companies installing unbreakable codes on their devices by default, a way for law enforcement to gain access
must be on the table.¶ Weighing the risks¶ To
resolve this stalemate, society will need to weigh two risks: the
potential risk of having some degree of vulnerability in the design of modern communications, and the danger
of failing to provide citizens with basic levels of protection and security.¶ Critics point out that
the existence of some kind of a key entails a risk that the key will be exploited. Is that truly worse than the
risk of creating a virtual law-enforcement-free zone that protects criminal activity? The Supreme
Court has said that a search warrant is “an important working part of our machinery of
government.”

Cyber terror is hyped up by the government agencies and
reporters for publicity and personal gain – don’t take their
authors seriously.
Lee and Rid November 2014 (Robert M. Lee, active-duty US Air Force cyber-warfare
operations officer, and Thomas Rid, professor of security studies at King’s College London,
November 2014, “OMG CYBER! THIRTEEN REASONS WHY HYPE MAKES FOR BAD POLICY”,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071847.2014.969932)
Cyber is piping hot – and now¶ more so than ever, with several scary precedents being set over the
course of the last year. In late 2013,¶ a massive security breach at Target, a¶ major American
retailer, compromised¶ the credit-card data of as many as¶ 40 million customers. A few months¶ later, in
May 2014, eBay suffered an¶ even bigger breach that affected 145¶ million accounts. In September, intruders¶ stole 56 million
customer credit-card¶ numbers from Home Depot,aUS home improvement chain.
Also in 2014, in another first, the US
Department of Justice indicted five serving members of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
for stealing industrial secrets from¶ several companies based in the Western¶ District of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile,¶
Eastern European criminal syndicates¶ are busier than ever; ‘Cybercrime¶ is anonymous, sophisticated, and¶ international – and
Russian’, says Lee¶ Miles, deputy head of the UK’s National¶ Cyber Crime Unit.1¶ In 2014, the market¶ for information-security
spending topped¶ $70 billion.2¶ In September, NATO agreed¶ that a cyber-attack could trigger a military¶ response.¶ In
the US,
all of this nurtures hype; and the Washington Beltway forms the ideal Petri dish in which to
cultivate the alarmism – several parties think that overstating ‘cyber’ is in their own best
interest. Security firms like a clearly stated threat in order to sell their security products. Contractors
capitalise on fear¶ to get funding from the executive branch.¶ The Pentagon finds a bit of hype useful to keep the
money coming in. The armed¶ services each eye a larger slice of the¶ budget pie. The White House loves some
good cyber-angst to nudge law-makers into action. Fear of Chinese cyber-attack makes it easier
for members of Congress to relate to voters. Reporting cyber-war means that journalists sell
more copy. Academics get quotations and attention¶ from the buzz. Hype up cyber, and everybody wins.
However, the real question is whether ramping up the threat of cyberattack is really in
everybody’s interest.¶ There are downsides to this dynamic.¶ This article argues that cyber is ‘hyped¶ out’.
Overstating the threat does not just¶ have benefits (for some): it also comes with significant costs. The benefits
are¶ short-lived and easy to spot, whereas¶ the costs are long-term and harder to¶ understand – and they are piling up fast¶ and
high. Indeed, they are so high that¶ the debate inches towards a turning point¶ for all parties involved. Here are thirteen¶ reasons
why a more nuanced debate is¶ needed.

No risk of a blackout on grids because of a cyberattack
Perera 9/10/14 (David Perera is a cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO Pro, 9/10/14, “U.S. grid safe from large-scale attack,
experts say” http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/power-grid-safety-110815.html#ixzz3gTzSBgeP)
The specter of a large-scale, destructive attack on the U.S. power grid is at the center of much
strategic thinking about Cybersecurity. For years, Americans have been warned by a bevy of would-be Cassandras in
Congress, the administration and the press that hackers are poised to shut it down.¶ But in fact, the half-dozen security
experts interviewed for this article agreed it’s virtually impossible for an online-only attack to
cause a widespread or prolonged outage of the North American power grid. Even laying the
groundwork for such a cyber operation could qualify as an act of war against the U.S. — a line that
few nation-state-backed hacker crews would wish to cross. None denied that determined hackers could
penetrate the networks of bulk power providers. But there’s a huge gap between that and causing a civilization-ending sustained
outage of the grid.¶ Electrical-grid
hacking scenarios mostly overlook the engineering expertise
necessary to intentionally cause harm to the grid, say experts knowledgeable about the power generators and
high voltage transmission entities that constitute the backbone of the grid — what’s called the bulk power system.¶ There’s also
the enormity of the grid and diversity of its equipment to consider. “The grid is designed to lose
utilities all the time,” said Patrick Miller, founder and director of the Energy Sector Security
Consortium. “I’m not trying to trivialize the situation, but you’re not really able to cause this
nationwide cascading failure for any extended duration of time,” he added.¶ “It’s just not possible.”¶ ICS
security in a nutshell¶ Controlling the boilers, fans, valves and switches and other mechanical devices that turn raw inputs and highvoltage transmission into flip-of-a-switch electricity is a class of computers known as industrial control systems. Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition Systems, or SCADA, is a type of ICS.¶ ICSs aren’t general purpose computers like desktops.
At the level of
direct control over electromechanical processes — via a device often classified as a Programmable Logic Controller —
programming is mainly done in specialized languages on obscure operating systems. Even just
accessing a PLC requires particular software. Hiding malware in field devices is difficult to impossible. Many of
the devices “aren’t running multi-thread, multi-tasking operations like our laptops,” noted Chris Blask, chair of the Industrial Control
System Information Sharing and Analysis Center.¶ And
penetration is just a starting point. “Just hacking into
the system, and even taking complete control of a computer or crashing a bunch of computers, won’t necessarily bring
down the bulk electric system,” said Dale Peterson, founder of Digital Bond, an industrial control system cybersecurity
consultancy.¶ For example, hackers could cause a SCADA system to crash, causing grid operators to lose system visibility —
decidedly not a good thing. But the grid doesn’t need the SCADA system to continue operating. “There has
to be an
understanding that simply taking out the cyber assets doesn’t cause a blackout,” Peterson said.

Too many alt causes on the nuclear exchange impact for them to
ever solve. This is their author.
Fritz 9 (Jason, Master in International Relations from Bond, BS from St. Cloud), “Hacking
Nuclear Command and Control,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament, 2009, pnnd.org)
Computers which
operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as
privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and
hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who
have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This
All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control.
virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on
the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on
computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch
options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is
There is evidence to suggest
multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio
frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines.
impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task.
Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to
establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had
decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through
computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system.

Nuclear weapon systems are air-gapped to prevent hacking
Weimann 04 (Gabriel Weimann is a Full Professor of Communication at the Department of Communication at Haifa University, 2004 “Cyberterrorism How Real Is
the Threat?” http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf)
Many computer security experts do not believe that it is possible to use the Internet¶ to inflict
death on a large scale. Some pointed out that the resilience of computer systems¶ to attack is
the result of significant investments of time, money, and expertise. As Green¶ describes, nuclear
weapons systems are protected by “air-gapping”: they are not connected to¶ the Internet or to
any open computer network and thus they cannot be accessed by intruders, terrorists, or
hackers. Thus, for example, the Defense Department protects sensitive systems by isolating
them from the Internet and even from the Pentagon’s own internal network. The CIA’s classified
computers are also air-gapped, as is the FBI’s entire computer system.¶ The 9/11 events and the
subsequent growing awareness of cyberterror highlighted other¶ potential targets for such
attacks. In 2002, Senator Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) described “the¶ absolute havoc and
devastation that would result if cyberterrorists suddenly shut down our air¶ traffic control
system, with thousands of planes in mid-flight.” However, argues Green, “cybersecurity¶ experts
give some of their highest marks to the Federal Aviation Authority, which reasonably¶ separates
its administrative and air traffic control systems and strictly air-gaps the latter.”¶ ‘

Majority of hackers would either not have self-interest to hack in
or not have the capability too.
Weimann 04 (Gabriel Weimann is a Full Professor of Communication at the Department of Communication at Haifa University, 2004 “Cyberterrorism How Real Is
the Threat?” http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr119.pdf)
To assess the potential threat of cyberterrorism, experts such as Denning suggest that two
questions be asked: Are there targets that are vulnerable to cyberattacks? And are there actors
with the capability and motivation to carry out such attacks? The answer to¶ the first question is yes:
critical infrastructure systems are complex and therefore bound¶ to contain weaknesses that
might be exploited, and even systems that seem “hardened”¶ to outside manipulation might be accessed by insiders, acting
alone or in concert with¶ terrorists, to cause considerable harm. But what of the second question?¶ According to
Green, “few besides a company’s own employees possess the specific¶ technical know-how
required to run a specialized SCADA system.” There is, of course, the¶ possibility of terrorists recruiting employees or ex-employees
of targeted companies or systems.¶ In April 2002, an Australian man attempted to use the Internet to release a million¶ gallons of
raw sewage along Queensland’s Sunshine Coast. The police discovered that he¶ had worked for the company that designed the
sewage treatment plant’s control software.¶ It is possible, of course, that such disgruntled employees might be recruited by
terrorist¶ groups, but even if the terrorists did enlist inside help, the degree of damage they could¶ cause would still be limited. As
Green argues, the employees of companies that handle¶ power grids, oil and gas utilities, and
communications are well rehearsed in dealing with the¶ fallout from hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and
other natural disasters. They are also equally¶ adept at containing and remedying problems that
stem from human action.¶ Denning draws our attention to a report, “Cyberterror: Prospects and
Implications,”¶ published in August 1999 by the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare¶ at the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) in Monterey, California. The report, explains Denning,¶ shows that terrorists generally lack the wherewithal and human
capital needed to¶ mount attacks that involve more than annoying but relatively harmless hacks. The study¶ examined five types of
terrorist groups: religious, New Age, ethnonationalist separatist,¶ revolutionary, and far-right extremist. Of these, only the religious
groups were adjudged¶ likely to seek the capacity to inflict massive damage. Hacker
groups, the study determined,
are psychologically and organizationally ill suited to cyberterrorism, and any massive¶ disruption
of the information infrastructure would run counter to their self-interest.¶ A year later, in October 2000,
the NPS group issued a second report, this one examining¶ the decision-making process by which substate groups engaged in armed
resistance develop¶ new operational methods, including cyberterrorism. This report also shows that while substate¶ groups may
find cyberterror attractive as a nonlethal weapon, terrorists have not yet¶ integrated information technology into their strategy and
tactics and that significant barriers¶ between hackers and terrorists may prevent their integration into one group.¶ Another
illustration of the limited likelihood of terrorists launching a highly damaging¶ cyberattack comes
from a simulation sponsored by the U.S. Naval War College. The college¶ contracted with a research group to simulate a
massive cyberattack on the nation’s¶ information infrastructure. Government hackers and security analysts met in
July 2002¶ in Newport, R.I., and conducted a joint war game dubbed “Digital Pearl Harbor.” The¶ results
were far from devastating: the hackers failed to crash the Internet, although they¶ did cause
sporadic damage. According to a CNet.com report on the exercise published in¶ August 2002, officials concluded that
terrorists hoping to stage such an attack “would¶ require a syndicate with significant resources, including $200 million, country-level
intelligence¶ and five years of preparation time.”
.
Extensions of Air-Gapping Solves

Air gaps completely disconnected from the internet
Peterson 11 (Dale G Peterson, 19 July 2011, “Air Gaps Dead, Network Isolation Making a
Comeback” http://www.digitalbond.com/blog/2011/07/19/air-gaps-dead-network-isolationmaking-a-comeback/)
Old-school air gaps are still used routinely, in very sensitive installations, in classified government
installations, and in very cautious installations. For example, the water sector still uses air gaps routinely, and many sectors
use true air gaps to isolate safety systems. The benefits of true air gaps are clear – absolute
protection from certain classes of network-based threats. If you have a true air gap – complete
disconnection of some or all of your control network from any external network – then that system is invulnerable to
distributed denial of service attacks, remote control attacks, worms and any other networkbased attack originating on an external network, including the Internet.
Extensions of Turns Case

Turns case – not allowing vulnerabilities in data for decryption
results in harmful infringements to solving of general crimes,
terrorism, and increases chance of other nation-states’ hackers
exploiting our cyber-defenses.
Comey 07/08/15 (James B. Comey, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jul 8, 2015,
“Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety and Privacy”,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-encryption-technology-and-the-balancesbetween-public-safety-and-privacy)
In recent years, new methods of electronic communication have transformed our society, most
visibly by enabling ubiquitous digital communications and facilitating broad e-commerce. As such, it is important for our
global economy and our national security to have strong encryption standards. The development and
robust adoption of strong encryption is a key tool to secure commerce and trade, safeguard private information, promote free
expression and association, and strengthen cyber security. The
Department is on the frontlines of the fight
against cyber crime, and we know first-hand the damage that can be caused by those who
exploit vulnerable and insecure systems. We support and encourage the use of secure networks to prevent cyber threats
to our critical national infrastructure, our intellectual property, and our data so as to promote our overall safety. American
citizens care deeply about privacy, and rightly so. Many companies have been responding to a market demand for
products and services that protect the privacy and security of their customers. This has generated positive innovation that has been
crucial to the digital economy. We, too,
care about these important principles. Indeed, it is our obligation to
have always respected the fundamental right of people
to engage in private communications, regardless of the medium or technology. Whether it is instant
uphold civil liberties, including the right to privacy. We
messages, texts, or old-fashioned letters, citizens have the right to communicate with one another in private without unauthorized
government surveillance—not simply because the Constitution demands it, but because the free flow of information is vital to a
thriving democracy. The
benefits of our increasingly digital lives, however, have been accompanied by
new dangers, and we have been forced to consider how criminals and terrorists might use
advances in technology to their advantage. For example, malicious actors can take advantage of
the Internet to covertly plot violent robberies, murders, and kidnappings; sex offenders can establish
virtual communities to buy, sell, and encourage the creation of new depictions of horrific sexual abuse of children; and individuals,
organized criminal networks, and
nation-states can exploit weaknesses in our cyber-defenses to steal
our sensitive, personal information. Investigating and prosecuting these offenders is a core responsibility and priority of
the Department of Justice. As national security and criminal threats continue to evolve, the Department
has worked hard to stay ahead of changing threats and changing technology. We must ensure both the
fundamental right of people to engage in private communications as well as the protection of the public. One of the bedrock
principles upon which we rely to guide us is the principle of judicial authorization: that if an independent judge finds reason to
believe that certain private communications contain evidence of a crime, then the government can conduct a limited search for that
evidence. For example, by having a neutral arbiter—the judge—evaluate whether the government’s evidence satisfies the
appropriate standard, we have been able to protect the public and safeguard citizens’ Constitutional rights. The Department of
Justice has been and will always be committed to protecting the liberty and security of those whom we serve. In
recent
months, however, we have on a new scale seen mainstream products and services designed in a way that gives users
sole control over access to their data. As a result, law enforcement is sometimes unable to recover
the content of electronic communications from the technology provider even in response to a
court order or duly-authorized warrant issued by a federal judge. For example, many communications
services now encrypt certain communications by default, with the key necessary to decrypt the communications solely in the hands
of the end user. This applies both when the data is “in motion” over electronic networks, or “at rest” on an electronic device. If the
communications provider is served with a warrant seeking those communications, the provider cannot provide the data because it
has designed the technology such that it cannot be accessed by any third party. Threats¶ The
more we as a society rely
on electronic devices to communicate and store information, the more likely it is that information that
was once found in filing cabinets, letters, and photo albums will now be stored only in electronic form.
We have seen case after case—from homicides and kidnappings, to drug trafficking, financial
fraud, and child exploitation—where critical evidence came from smart phones, computers, and online
communications.¶ When changes in technology hinder law enforcement’s ability to exercise
investigative tools and follow critical leads, we may not be able to identify and stop terrorists who are
using social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack in our country. We may not be able to
root out the child predators hiding in the shadows of the Internet, or find and arrest violent criminals who
are targeting our neighborhoods. We may not be able to recover critical information from a device that belongs to a
victim who cannot provide us with the password, especially when time is of the essence.¶ These are not just theoretical
concerns. We continue to identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters
traveling in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, commonly known as ISIL, and also homegrown violent extremists
who may aspire to attack the United States from within. These threats remain among the highest priorities for the Department of
Justice, including the FBI, and the United States government as a whole.¶ Of course, encryption is not the only technology terrorists
and criminals use to further their ends. Terrorist groups, such as ISIL, use the Internet to great effect. With the
widespread horizontal distribution of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize vulnerable individuals of all ages
in the United States either to travel or to conduct a homeland attack. As a result, foreign terrorist organizations now have direct
access into the United States like never before. For
example, in recent arrests, a group of individuals was
contacted by a known ISIL supporter who had already successfully traveled to Syria and encouraged them to do the
same. Some of these conversations occur in publicly accessed social networking sites, but others
take place via private messaging platforms. These encrypted direct messaging platforms are
tremendously problematic when used by terrorist plotters.
Extensions of All Hype

Cybersecurity discourse based upon overexagerration.
Stanley 04/26/12 (Jay Stanley, APRIL 26, 2012, Senior Policy Analyst, ACLU Speech, Privacy &
Technology Project, “Cybersecurity Myths: Beware the Hype”
https://www.aclu.org/blog/cybersecurity-myths-beware-hype)
Much current cybersecurity discourse is inspired by a vivid and compelling image: terrorists
remotely taking over dams, nuclear power plants or other critical infrastructure in order to wreak
havoc and kill large numbers of Americans. In one revealing incident, congressional staffers pushing for new
government powers argued that their legislation was needed to prevent cyber attackers from
accessing a system that could “cause the floodgates to come open at the Hoover Dam and kill
thousands of people.” There’s only one problem: officials at the Dam told reporters that “Hoover
Dam and important facilities like it are not connected to the internet.” The incident shows that
threat inflation combined with the power of a vivid image or narrative can override facts and
drive policy. Congress should be aware of the facts before charging forward with privacy-busting
legislation like the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act. Alarming cybersecurity stories continue to
appear in the media. Even an attentive reader of the news over the past half-decade could be forgiven
for believing that hackers have infiltrated the U.S. electricity grid, caused blackouts, and vandalized a local
U.S. utility. When examined closely, however, none of those incidents holds up as an example of
the dangers of cybersecurity vulnerabilities:¶ •In repeated statements – mostly vague hints and claims by unnamed
security agency officials – government agents have suggested that power grids have been targeted by spies , and that two U.S.
blackouts were caused by hackers. Some cybersecurity officials reportedly claimed that the massive 2003 blackout that cut power
across 8 U.S. states had been traced to China. But, a detailed 228-page investigation by the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation pointed to numerous sources of the problem, a list that did not include hackers.¶ •The CIA and President Obama have
claimed that cyberattacks caused a blackout overseas, apparently in Brazil. However, Brazilian government experts who investigated
the blackout for a year concluded that online attacks had nothing to do with the outage (the real cause was negligent maintenance
by a power company) – and that the control systems for Brazil’s grid are (smartly) not even directly connected to the internet.
KQ Tech Leadership
1NC

Alt Cause – CALEA and future reforms of it will kill tech innovation
EFF 13( EFF is a leading nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world,
2013-05-28, “FAQ on the CALEA Expansion by the FCC” https://www.eff.org/pages/calea-faq#9)
In recent years, the FCC has been committed to lowering government barriers to innovation and
the deployment of new services. However, the broad understanding of what it means to be a substantial
replacement of the local telephone exchange — and therefore subject to CALEA — means that
industry would be constantly under the threat of CALEA compliance costs. VoIP and broadband
Internet access may be under the gun now, but a host of technologies — online gaming, instant messaging
services, video conferencing systems and others — face the threat that law enforcement will look to them in
the next petition.¶ Thus, rather than industry driving innovation, government would be dictating
functionality. U.S. leadership in technological innovation would slip because time to market for
new U.S. products would lengthen to accommodate surveillance technologies. Moreover, U.S.
products would be less attractive outside the country because international customers won't want
technology designed to facilitate U.S. surveillance. America's global competitiveness will be further eroded by
overseas companies who will surely develop technology to circumvent CALEA surveillance capability.

Increase in innovation turns international public trust in tech
companies.
Ward 01/20/15 (Jill Ward, an economy reporter at Bloomberg, and Michael J Moore,
reporter at Bloomberg, January 20, 2015, “Trust in Tech Takes a Hit as Public Links Innovation
With Greed” http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-20/trust-in-tech-takes-a-hitas-public-links-innovation-with-greed)
(Bloomberg) -- Public
trust in the technology industry is in decline while more people link innovation
to excess, according to a survey of 27 countries published as policy makers and executives gather at the World Economic
Forum in Davos.¶ When polled about the incentive for innovation, 30 percent said it’s intended to
improve people’s lives, while 54 percent of respondents answered greed, according to the 2015 Trust
Barometer, published by Edelman. It’s the first time in 15 years that the public-relations firm has recorded a
decline in faith in technology, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Richard Edelman said in a phone interview from New York.¶
“People are afraid of the pace of change,” Edelman said. “Whether it’s fracking or GM foods, or ewallet, it’s scary -- because it’s causing job dislocation, it’s causing people to change their habits,
and they don’t necessarily feel that they understand it.”¶ While technology companies still
topped the ranking of most-trusted industries, their decline from last year is significant since
tech drives innovation in other sectors, Edelman said. Banks and the media are the least trusted, according to the report.¶ Trust
of CEOs is at 43 percent, a decline of 3 percentage points, staying above the 38 percent that have faith in government officials, according to the online
survey. An academic or “industry expert” remains the most-trusted category, at 70 percent.¶ The firm polled thousands of individuals in countries
ranging from China to the U.S., with household income in the top quartile for their age and country. The ages of those surveyed ranged from 25 to 64.

Alt cause - US main problem with tech innovation is budgeting out
research money
Adam Segal 4 (Adam Segal, director of the Program on Digital and Cyberspace Policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), An expert on security issues, technology development,
November/December 2004 Issue, “Is America Losing Its Edge,”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-11-01/america-losing-its-edge)
At the moment, it would be premature to declare a crisis in the United States' scientific or
technological competitiveness. The United States is still the envy of the world for reasons
ranging from its ability to fund basic scientific research to the speed with which its companies
commercialize new breakthroughs.¶ This year, total U.S. expenditures on R&D are expected to
top $290 billion-more than twice the total for Japan, the next biggest spender. In 2002, the U.S. R&D total
exceeded that of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom combined (although the United States trailed Finland, Iceland, Japan,
South Korea, and Sweden in the ratio of R&D to GDP). And
although scholars from other parts of the world may
write relatively more science and engineering papers than Americans do, U.S. research
continues to be cited the most.¶ The United States also leads the major global technology
markets, holding commanding market shares in aerospace, scientific instruments, computers
and office machinery, and communications instruments. U.S. information and communications technology producers
lead almost every sector. And for the last two decades, U.S. firms have been the top providers of high-technology services, accounting for about onethird of the world's total.¶ These
strengths, however, should not obscure the existence of new threats to
the long-term health of science and innovation in the United States. A record $422 billion
budget deficit, for example, may undermine future government support for R&D. Recent shifts in
federal spending will leave basic research-that driven by scientific curiosity rather than specific
commercial applications-underfunded, depriving the economy of the building blocks of future
innovation. Although federal expenditures on R&D are expected to reach $132 billion in fiscal year 2005 and $137.5 billion in 2009, new spending
will be concentrated in the fields of defense, homeland security, and the space program. Funding for all other R&D programs, meanwhile, will remain
flat this year and decline in real terms over the next five years. ¶ In July, Congress approved a record-breaking $70.3 billion for R&D for the Defense
Department in 2005, a 7.1 percent increase from last year and more than the Pentagon had asked for (in fact, the department's top brass had asked to
cut R&D spending). Such largesse makes it likely that the Pentagon will be able to continue innovation in the near term. Its longer-term prospects,
however, are more worrying. According
to five-year projections by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science, the Defense Department will focus more and more on weapons
development while neglecting basic and applied research.¶ Privately funded industrial R&D,
meanwhile-which accounts for over 60 percent of the U.S. total-is also starting to slip as a result
of the current economic slowdown. Private industry cut R&D spending by 1.7 percent in 2001, 4.5 percent in 2002, and 0.7 percent
in 2003. This year, R&D spending is expected to increase-but by less than one percent, which is less than the inflation rate. Furthermore, with less than
10 percent of its R&D spending dedicated to basic research, industry will not be able to fill in the gaps created by the government's shift of funding to
defense and homeland security-related research.¶ These
funding decreases may be exacerbated by a coming labor
shortage. The number of Americans pursuing advanced degrees in the sciences and engineering
is declining, and university science and engineering programs are growing more dependent on
foreign-born talent. Thirty-eight percent of the nation's scientists and engineers with doctorates were born outside the country. And of the
Ph.D.'s in science and engineering awarded to foreign students in the United States from 1985 to 2000, more than half went to students from China,
India, South Korea, and Taiwan.¶ Such dependence on foreign talent could become a critical weakness for the United States in the future, especially as
foreign applications to U.S. science and engineering graduate programs decline. With booming economies and improving educational opportunities in
their countries, staying at home is an increasingly attractive option for Chinese and Indian scientists. In addition, visa restrictions put in place after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have created new barriers for foreign students trying to enter the United States. Surveys conducted by the
Association of American Universities, the American Council on Education, and other education groups have blamed repetitive security checks,
inefficient visa-renewal processes, and a lack of transparency for significant drops in applications to U.S. graduate programs this year.

Americans place security above issues of privacy
Keller 06/12/13 (JARED KELLER, JUN 12, 2013, “Why Don’t Americans Seem to Care About
Government Surveillance? “ http://www.psmag.com/politics-and-law/why-dont-americanscare-about-government-surveillance-60011)
It’s been less than a week since former National Security Agency systems administrator Edward Snowden, through the reporting of The Guardian and
The Washington Post, lifted the curtain on the United States government’s vast surveillance apparatus. Snowden,
who shed light on
how the NSA monitors the cell phone activity, credit card data, and Internet browsings of millions of Americans,
is responsible for one of the biggest national security leaks in U.S. political history. And the
American people don’t really seem to care.¶ More than half (56 percent) of the 1,004 adult
respondents to a national survey conducted June 6-9 by the Pew Research Center and The Washington
Post said that the NSA program tracking telephone records is “an acceptable way for the
government to investigate terrorism.” Forty-one percent felt the practice was unacceptable.¶ The American public is
somewhat more divided on the NSA’s Internet monitoring programs, with 45 percent of respondents
agreeing that the government should be able to “monitor everyone’s email and other online
activities if officials say this might prevent future terrorist attacks” and 52 percent disagreeing. Despite the
Prism revelations, this isn’t a drastic shift from how Americans felt back in July 2002, when a Pew
survey found that 45 percent of Americans were OK with the government monitoring Internet activity in order to prevent future attacks (47 percent
said it should not). Pew’s
researchers conclude from the latest survey that there are “no indications
that last week’s revelations of the government’s collection of phone records and Internet data have
altered fundamental public views about the tradeoff between investigating possible terrorism and protecting personal privacy.Ӧ In
a poll conducted shortly after the manhunt for the Boston Marathon bombing suspects, 78
percent of respondents agreed with the increased used of surveillance cameras in public places.¶
Despite days of headlines about the American surveillance state and government invasions of privacy (and a huge
spike in sales of George Orwell’s 1984 on Amazon), Americans seem to have accepted the scope and reach of the
post-9/11 surveillance state into their lives as necessary.¶ Pew notes that 62 percent of
Americans believe the federal government should investigate possible terrorist threats, even if that
means intruding on personal privacy, while just 34 percent say it is more important for the government not to intrude on personal
privacy, even if that limits its ability to investigate possible terrorist threats.

US tech leader for next 20 years
Steve Minter 14, 3-17-2014, “US Positioned as Technology Leader for The Next 20 Years,”
Industry Week, http://www.industryweek.com/trade/us-positioned-technology-export-leadernext-20-years
The U.S. is expected to retain its position as a leading technology goods exporter for the next
two decades, according to trade research conducted by international bank HSBC. Optimism
about trade generally among U.S. business leaders is at its highest level since the bank began
conducting its semiannual trade survey. The U.S. HSBC Trade Confidence Index rose to 115
from 114 six months ago and was higher than the global average of 113. The index surveys
small and middle-market businesses, including 250 in the U.S. HSBC forecasts that U.S. trade
will grow 6% annually from 2014 to 2016. The bank expects global trade to grow 8% annually
to 2030. U.S. exports set a record in 2013, reaching $2.3 trillion. In 2013, the United States had
a trade surplus in services of $229 billion and a goods deficit of $703.9 billion for a total trade
deficit of $474.9 billion. That was nearly at $59.8 billion improvement from 2012.
Extension of Alt Causes

Fostering new generations to go into tech development is also
necessary to solve for tech leadership.
Geoff Colvin, Fortune senior editor-at-large, July 16 2007, “Turning our backs on tech”
(Fortune Magazine) -- In the global battle for infotech supremacy, is America surrendering? Recent
evidence suggests that the U.S. is at least thinking about giving up. I'm talking not just about
America's ability to produce the fastest chip or most popular software but also about something
potentially even more serious: the ability of all businesses to be world-class users of information
technology.¶ "As a nation we need scientists and engineers if we're going to be successful," says
Microsoft research chief Rick Rashid. "All the new businesses are built around that." The trouble is
that U.S. companies haven't developed nearly enough qualified chief information officers. And at
the talent pipeline's beginning, America's kids have concluded that infotech is a dead-end field for nerd
losers, and they're avoiding it like last month's ringtone.¶ Both problems are immediate. The CIO shortage is harder to spot
because companies always have people holding that title; they're often just not the right people. The field's top professional group,
the Society for Information Management (SIM), has just published a report ("Grooming the 2010 CIO") concluding that U.S.
companies have far fewer good CIOs than they need, maybe less than half as many. The reason is that in a world where IT is central
to strategy, today's CIO needs substantial business acumen, relationship abilities, and leadership skills - but most don't have those
traits because most companies are lousy at developing future CIOs.¶ The more worrisome problem is what's happening with the
kids. Moving herdlike, as usual, they've decided that IT is excruciatingly uncool. Of course it was the
coolest thing on the planet just seven years ago, when interest in computer science as an undergraduate major hit a 20-year high.
But then a lot of things happened. The dot-com boom went bust at just the time companies stopped hiring staff to fix Y2K problems.
More important, the pop culture image of infotech workers flipped from dot-com billionaires in Gulfstreams to Dilbertesque drones
writing code in cubicles and Third World masses working for pennies an hour.¶ The
number of undergraduates in
computer science and related majors plunged. Though nationwide data aren't available, "some schools saw
enrollment drop to 25% of what it had been," says Kate Kaiser, an associate professor of infotech at Marquette
University in Milwaukee. "The press over-inflated outsourcing. The impact was not nearly as great as parents and guidance
counselors suggested."
KQ Circumvention
1NC

The plan bans mandates but does nothing for governmental
“suggestions” to companies about backdoors.
Rasch 12/04/14 (Mark Rasch, an attorney and author, working in the areas of corporate and
government cybersecurity, privacy and incident response. He is currently the Vice President,
Deputy General Counsel, and Chief Privacy and Data Security Officer for SAIC, December 5, 2014
, “Sen. Wyden's Plan to Close Backdoors May Backfire”
http://www.securitycurrent.com/en/news/ac_news/sen-wydens-plan-to-close-backdoors-maybackfire)
Senator Ron Wyden (D. Or.) announced on December 4 the introduction of the “Secure Data Act” which
would prohibit federal agencies from mandating the deployment of vulnerabilities in data
security technologies. The bill, if passed and signed, would state that “no agency [except as required by CALEA – a law that
mandates Telco’s assist law enforcement in wiretaps] may mandate that a manufacturer, developer, or seller of covered products
design or alter the security functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or service, or to
allow the physical search of such product, by any agency.Ӧ OK.
I am now confident that there are not going to
be any more back doors. Aren’t you? ¶ Except for that little word “mandates.” “Oh,” says the NSA.
“CISCO doesn’t HAVE to make its router accessible to use, but it would be a shame should
anything happen to your nice government contract over here.” Not a mandate – just a suggestion. Or what if it is
a requirement in a government contract? You don’t HAVE to do it – just don’t bid on the contract. Oh, and that FCC license
approval? “Fuggeddaboutit.” Remember Quest Communications CEO testifying that his company was threatened with loss of
contracts and revenue if they didn’t do what the NSA demanded? But
it’s not a mandate. It’s just a very strong
“suggestion.”¶ The proposed law has few if any teeth. It has no criminal enforcement, nobody
goes to jail if it is violated. And even if there is a compulsion, the facts related to it are likely to
be classified for national security purposes. So, if a law enforcement and/or intelligence agency compels you to
install a back door, in the worlds of Peter Venkman, “who you gonna call?”¶ Plus there are times when we really DO want a back
door. Take Stuxnet. Whether it was the U.S. or not, it was still super cool, and set back the Iranian nuclear program by either a
couple of decades or a couple of hours. Hard to say. But cool anyway.¶ And
the law only applies to installed back
doors. It wouldn’t apply for example to an inherent vulnerability that the NSA tells the company
not to fix. Or one that the NSA doesn’t tell the company about. Lots of ways around this one.¶ So if you are
worried about the NSA installing back doors on hardware or software, I’m afraid that Sen.
Wyden’s bill probably won’t help much. If you are worried about the NSA beaming waves into your skull, may I
suggest a lovely aluminum foil hat? Oh, and always wear it shiny side out. It doesn’t work the other way. I know. I have tried it.

Secure Data Act can’t stop the altering of CALEA to create more
backdoors that Comey is pushing for in the status quo.
Cushing 12/05/14 (Tim Cushing, author at techdirt, 12/05/14 “Ron Wyden Introduces
Legislation Aimed At Preventing FBI-Mandated Backdoors In Cellphones And Computers”
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141204/16220529333/ron-wyden-introduces-legislationaimed-preventing-fbi-mandated-backdoors-cellphones-computers.shtml)
Here's the actual wording of the backdoor ban [pdf link], which has a couple of loopholes in it.¶
(a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subsection (b), no agency may mandate that a manufacturer, developer, or seller of covered
products design or alter the security functions in its product or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or
service, or to allow the physical search of such product, by any agency.¶ Subsection (b)
presents the first loophole,
naming the very act that Comey is pursuing to have amended in his agency's favor.¶ (b)
EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) shall not apply to mandates authorized under the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (47 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.). Comey wants to alter CALEA or, failing that, get a few
legislators to run some sort of encryption-targeting legislation up the Congressional flagpole for him. Wyden's bill won't
thwart these efforts and it does leave the NSA free to continue with its pre-existing
homebrewed backdoor efforts -- the kind that don't require mandates because they're
performed off-site without the manufacturer's knowledge. This still in early draft form and will likely be
finessed as it heads towards becoming a finished product, hopefully addressing a few of these issues on the way. If nothing else, it
sends yet another message to James Comey and like-minded law enforcement officials that there's a whole bunch of legislators
waiting to thwart their pushes for instant, permanent access to the American public's cellphones.

CALEA expanded to the VOIP creates vulnerabilities within the
power grid
Landau 05 (Susan, an American mathematician and engineer, and Professor of Social Science and Policy Studies
at Worcester Polytechnic Institute.[2] She previously worked as a Senior Staff Privacy Analyst at Google.[3] She was a
Guggenheim Fellow[4] and a Visiting Scholar at the Computer Science Department, Harvard University in 2012.[5]¶ In
2010–2011, she was a Fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard, where she investigated issues
involving security of government systems, and their privacy and policy implications.[6]¶ From 1999 until 2010, she
specialized in internet security at Sun Microsystems.[7]Security, Wiretapping, and the
Internet,http://privacyink.org/pdf/SWatI.pdf, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY)
The Internet has proved a boon to many industries, and the
last decade has seen a massive shift to it as the preferred form of conducting business. But the Internet is
What does all of this have to do with computer security?
insecure. The network was originally designed to share resources, and neither security nor wiretapping were considerations in its initial
design. Security
is a serious concern for Internet users, which include many private industries that
form part of critical infrastructure: energy companies and the electric-power grid, banking and
finance, and health care. That’s why applying CALEA to VoIP is a mistake: the insecurities that will
result are likely to extend well past VoIP to other aspects of the Internet, and the end result will be
greater insecurity
Extensions of Bribery

The act would not get rid of NSA from bribing tech companies
Kayyali 12/09/14 (NADIA KAYYALI, is a member of EFF’s activism team and currently serves
on the board of the National Lawyers Guild S.F. Bay Area chapter, DECEMBER 9, 2014, “Security
Backdoors are Bad News—But Some Lawmakers Are Taking Action to Close Them”
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/security-backdoors-are-bad-news-some-lawmakersare-taking-action-close-them)
The Secure Data Act starts to address the problem of backdoors by prohibiting any agency from
“mandate[ing] that a manufacturer, developer, or seller of covered products design or alter the security functions in its product
or service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or service, or to allow the physical search of such product, by any
agency.” Representative Lofgren has introduced a companion bill in the House, co-sponsored by 4 Republicans and 5 Democrats.¶
The legislation isn’t comprehensive, of course. As some have pointed out, it only prohibits agencies
from requiring a company to build a backdoor. The NSA can still do its best to convince
companies to do so voluntarily. And sometimes, the NSA’s “best convincing” is a $10 million
contract with a security firm like RSA.¶ The legislation also doesn’t change the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA.) CALEA, passed in 1994, is a law that forced telephone companies to
redesign their network architectures to make it easier for law enforcement to wiretap telephone calls. In 2006,
the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC's reinterpretation of CALEA to also include facilities-based
broadband Internet access and VoIP service, although it doesn't apply to cell phone
manufacturers.

RSA incident proves NSA uses bribes to install backdoors
Menn 13 (JOSEPH MENN, projects reporter at Reuters, Fri Dec 20, 2013, “Exclusive: Secret
contract tied NSA and security industry pioneer”
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/21/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131221)
As a key part of a campaign to embed encryption software that it could crack into widely used computer
products, the U.S. National Security Agency arranged a secret $10 million contract with RSA, one of the most
influential firms in the computer security industry, Reuters has learned. ¶ Documents leaked by former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden show that the NSA created and promulgated a flawed formula for generating random
numbers to create a "back door" in encryption products, the New York Times reported in September. Reuters later reported
that RSA became the most important distributor of that formula by rolling it into a software tool called Bsafe that is used to enhance security in
personal computers and many other products. ¶ Undisclosed
until now was that RSA received $10 million in a deal
that set the NSA formula as the preferred, or default, method for number generation in the BSafe
software, according to two sources familiar with the contract. Although that sum might seem paltry, it represented more than a third of the revenue
that the relevant division at RSA had taken in during the entire previous year, securities filings show.¶ The
earlier disclosures of RSA's
entanglement with the NSA already had shocked some in the close-knit world of computer
security experts. The company had a long history of championing privacy and security, and it played a
leading role in blocking a 1990s effort by the NSA to require a special chip to enable spying on a wide range of computer and communications products.
Extensions of CALEA

Future CALEA usage will be to build backdoors. Continuation of
CALEA erodes public trust.
Geller 07/10/15 (Eric Geller is the deputy morning director for the Daily Dot, Jul 10, 2015,
“The rise of the new Crypto War” http://www.dailydot.com/politics/encryption-crypto-warjames-comey-fbi-privacy)
It is not as if these companies weren’t concerned in the 1990s. Rather, the early CALEA debate
simply exempted them, allowing them to stay on the sidelines and avoid angering the U.S.
government.¶ “The Microsofts of the world were not going to be worried about it” in the 1990s, Tien said. “Now they have to be.”¶ Two
things have changed since the first Crypto Wars: The government is now targeting Internet
services instead of phone companies, and the Snowden leaks have convinced more Americans
to care about personal security and encryption.¶ “When you were talking about the first CALEA,
it was a handful of telephone companies,” said Guliani. “Now, when you’re talking about potentially
applying a front door or backdoor … onto a lot of different Internet-based companies, the
potential to kill innovation and … stifle smaller companies is substantial in this circumstance.”¶
Just as important as the threat to innovation is the threat to user trust. Snowden’s documents, which exposed
the breadth and depth of U.S. surveillance, sent a wakeup call to Americans who hadn’t been paying much attention to their privacy. Suddenly,
companies faced enormous pressure to resist things like backdoors—and to prove that they
weren’t secretly holding doors open for the government while protesting in public.
ST Economy
1NC

Turns case – Encryption harms FBI’s ability to solve the crimes
they point out
Comey 07/08/15 (James B. Comey, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jul 8, 2015,
“Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety and Privacy”,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-encryption-technology-and-the-balancesbetween-public-safety-and-privacy)
Outside of the terrorism arena we
see countless examples of the impact changing technology is having
on our ability to affect our court authorized investigative tools. For example, last December a long-haul
trucker kidnapped his girlfriend, held her in his truck, drove her from state to state and repeatedly sexually assaulted
her. She eventually escaped and pressed charges for sexual assault and kidnapping. The trucker claimed that the
woman he had kidnapped engaged in consensual sex. The trucker in this case happened to record his assault on
video using a smartphone, and law enforcement was able to access the content stored on that phone pursuant to
a search warrant, retrieving video that revealed that the sex was not consensual. A jury subsequently
convicted the trucker.¶ In a world where users have sole control over access to their devices and
communications, and so can easily block all lawfully authorized access to their data, the jury would not
have been able to consider that evidence, unless the truck driver, against his own interest, provided the data. And
the theoretical availability of other types of evidence, irrelevant to the case, would have made
no difference. In that world, the grim likelihood that he would go free is a cost that we must
forthrightly acknowledge and consider.¶ We are seeing more and more cases where we believe
significant evidence resides on a phone, a tablet, or a laptop—evidence that may be the difference between
an offender being convicted or acquitted. If we cannot access this evidence, it will have ongoing, significant
impacts on our ability to identify, stop, and prosecute these offenders.

Plan can’t solve for inconsistent frameworks on digital goods
around the world
CCIA 12 (international not-for-profit membership organization dedicated to innovation and
enhancing society’s access to information and communications)
(Promoting Cross‐Border Data Flows Priorities for the Business Community,
http://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/library/PromotingCrossBorderDataFlows.pdf)
The movement of electronic information across borders is critical to businesses around the world, but the¶
international rules governing flows of digital goods, services, data and infrastructure are incomplete. The global
trading system does not spell out a consistent, transparent framework for the treatment of cross
border flows of digital goods, services or information, leaving businesses and individuals to deal with a
patchwork of national, bilateral and global arrangements covering significant issues such as the storage,¶ transfer, disclosure, retention and
protection of personal, commercial and financial data. Dealing with these issues is becoming even more important as a new
generation of networked technologies enables greater cross‐border collaboration over the
Internet, which has the potential to stimulate economic development and job growth. ¶ Despite the
widespread benefits of cross‐border data flows to innovation and economic growth, and due in¶ large part to gaps
in global rules and inadequate enforcement of existing commitments, digital ¶ protectionism is a growing threat around the world. A number of countries have already enacted or are¶ pursuing restrictive policies
governing the provision of digital commercial and financial services, technology ¶ products, or the treatment of information to favor domestic interests over international competition. Even ¶ where policies are
designed to support legitimate public interests such as national security or law ¶ enforcement, businesses can suffer when those rules are unclear, arbitrary, unevenly applied or more ¶ trade‐restrictive than
Whats more, multiple governments may assert jurisdiction over the same
information, which may leave businesses subject to inconsistent or conflicting rules.
necessary to achieve the underlying objective.

No impact to economic collapse—statistics prove
Drezner 12 – Daniel is a professor in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts. (“The Irony
of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked”, October 2012,
http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Ironyof-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf)
The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple
analysts
asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for
staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms
races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in
conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data
suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global
Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The
average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38
Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great
Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold
War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data
suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels,
primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment,
and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable.
One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis
the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome
variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is
Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession
since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42
,
Extensions to No Impact

No war from economic collapse
Barnett ’09
(Thomas P.M. Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett is an American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at
Wikistrat, 24 Aug 2009, “ The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis”,
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4213/the-new-rules-security-remains-stable-amid-financialcrisis) SRK
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was
ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict
and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global
economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the
talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how
globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever
on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing
conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession.
Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates
the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the
last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the
latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last
August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics
was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden
spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking
over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil
conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent
Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v.
Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated
to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our
involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military
exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: *No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember
the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); *The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); *Not a single state-on-state war directly
caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); *No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that
diplomacy); *A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and *No serious efforts by any rising great power to
challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United
States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the
previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on
such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis?
Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts
across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World
Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If
it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic
times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major
economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's
primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America
and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I
don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that
this global financial crisis
has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade
order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon?
Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

Reject internet doomsaying – no chance of collapse or a ton of
other stuff would cause it
Bernal 14 (Lecturer in Information Technology, Intellectual Property and Media Law at the University
of East Anglia Law School)
(Paul, So who’s breaking the internet this time?, November 11, 2014,
http://paulbernal.wordpress.com/2014/11/11/so-whos-breaking-the-internet-this-time/)
I’m not sure how many times I’ve been told that the internet is under dire threat over the last few years.
It sometimes seems as though there’s an apocalypse just around the corner pretty much all the time.
Something’s going to ‘break’ the internet unless we do something about it right away. These last few
weeks there seem to have been a particularly rich crop of apocalyptic warnings – Obama’s proposal about
net neutrality yesterday being the most recent. The internet as we know it seems as though it’s always
about to end.¶ Net neutrality will destroy us all…¶ If we are to believe the US cable companies, Obama’s proposals
will pretty much break the internet, putting development back 20 years. How many of us remember what the internet was like in
1994? Conversely, many have been saying that if we don’t have net neutrality – and Obama’s proposals are pretty close to what
most people I know would understand by net neutrality – then the cable companies will break the internet. It’s apocalypse one way,
and apocalypse the other: no half measures here.¶ The cable companies are raising the spectre of government control of the net,
something that has been a terror of internet freedom activists for a very long time – in our internet law courses we start by looking
at John Perry Barlow’s 1996 ‘Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, with its memorable opening:¶ “Governments of the
Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.” ¶ Another recent
incarnation of this terror has been the formerly much hyped fear that the
UN, through the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) was about to take over the internet, crushing our freedom and
ending the Internet as we know it. Anyone with real experience of the way that UN bodies work would
have realised this particular apocalypse had next-to-no chance of every coming into fruition, and last week that must have
become clear to most of even the more paranoid of internet freedom fighters, as the ITU effectively resolved not to even try… Not
that apocalypse, at least not now.¶ More dire warnings and apocalyptic worries have been circling about the notorious ‘right
to
be forgotten’ – either in its data protection reform version or in the Google Spain ruling back in May. The right to be forgotten,
we were told, is the biggest threat to freedom of speech in the coming decade, and will change the internet as we know it. Another
thing that’s going to break the internet. And yet, even though it’s now effectively in force in one particular way, there’s not much
deep, dark, disturbing web…¶ At times we’re also told that a lack of
privacy will break the net – or that privacy itself will break the net. Online behavioural advertisers have said
sign that the internet is broken yet…¶ The
that if they’re not allowed to track us, we’ll break the economic model that sustains the net, so the net itself will break. We need to
let ourselves be tracked, profiled and targeted or the net itself will collapse. The authorities seem to have a similar view – recent
pronouncements by Metropolitan Police Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe and new head of GCHQ Robert Hannigan are decidedly
apocalyptic, trying to terrify us with the nightmares of what they seemingly interchangeably call the ‘dark’ web or the ‘deep’ web.
Dark or deep, it’s designed to disturb and frighten us – and warn us that if we keep on using encryption, claiming anonymity or
pseudonymity or, in practice, any kind of privacy, we’ll turn the internet into a paradise only for paedophiles, murderers, terrorists
and criminals. It’s the end of the internet as we know it, once more.¶ And of course there’s the converse view – that mass
surveillance and intrusion by the NSA, GCHQ etc, as revealed by Edward Snowden – is itself destroying the internet as we know it.¶
Money, money, money¶ Mind you, there are also dire threats from other directions. Internet freedom fighters have fought against
things like SOPA, PIPA and ACTA – ways in which the ‘copyright lobby’ sought to gain even more control over the internet. Again, the
arguments go both ways. The content industry suggest that uncontrolled piracy is breaking the net – while those who fought against
SOPA etc think that the iron fist of copyright enforcement is doing the same. And for those that have read Zittrain’s ‘The Future of
the Internet and How to Stop It’, it’s something else that’s breaking the net – ‘appliancization’ and ‘tethering’. To outrageously
oversimplify, it’s the iPhone that’s breaking the net, turning it from a place of freedom and creativity into a place for consumerist
sheep.¶ It’s the end of the internet as we know it…..…or as we think we know it. We all have different visions of the internet, some
historical, some pretty much entirely imaginary, mowith elements of history and elements of wishful thinking. It’s easy to become
nostalgic about what we imagine was some golden age, and fearful about the future, without taking a step back and wondering
whether we’re really right. The
internet was never a ‘wild west’ – and even the ‘wild west’ itself was mostly
mythical – and ‘freedom of speech’ has never been as absolute as its most ardent advocates seem
to believe. We’ve always had some control and some freedom – but the thing about the internet is
that, in reality, it’s pretty robust. We, as an internet community, are stronger and more wilful than some
of those who wish to control it might think. Attempts to rein it in often fail – either they’re opposed or
they’re side-stepped, or they’re just absorbed into the new shape of the internet, because the
internet is always changing, and we need to understand that. The internet as we know it is always ending
– and the internet as we don’t know it is always beginning.
ST Internet Freedom
1NC

A fully encrypted world that the 1ac advocates for would only hurt
impacts like human rights
Wittes 07/12/15 (Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in
Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, July 12, 2015, “Thoughts on Encryption and
Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits” http://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughtsencryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debate-merits)
Consider the conceptual question first. Would it be a good idea to have a world-wide
communications infrastructure that is, as Bruce Schneier has aptly put it, secure from all attackers? That
is, if we could snap our fingers and make all device-to-device communications perfectly secure
against interception from the Chinese, from hackers, from the FSB but also from the FBI even
wielding lawful process, would that be desirable? Or, in the alternative, do we want to create an
internet as secure as possible from everyone except government investigators exercising their
legal authorities with the understanding that other countries may do the same?¶ Conceptually speaking, I am with
Comey on this question—and the matter does not seem to me an especially close call. The belief in principle in
creating a giant world-wide network on which surveillance is technically impossible is really an
argument for the creation of the world's largest ungoverned space. I understand why techno-anarchists
find this idea so appealing. I can't imagine for moment, however, why anyone else would.¶ Consider the comparable
argument in physical space: the creation of a city in which authorities are entirely dependent on
citizen reporting of bad conduct but have no direct visibility onto what happens on the streets and no ability
to conduct search warrants (even with court orders) or to patrol parks or street corners. Would you want to live in that
city? The idea that ungoverned spaces really suck is not controversial when you're talking about
Yemen or Somalia. I see nothing more attractive about the creation of a worldwide architecture
in which it is technically impossible to intercept and read ISIS communications with followers or to
follow child predators into chatrooms where they go after kids.

Democratic Countries go to war more often than non-democratic
countries
Mueller ’04 (Harald Mueller, Director at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Co-chair of the Working Group on Peace and
Conflict Research of the German Foreign Office; vice-president of the EU Consortium for Non-Proliferation; professor at the Goethe
University Frankfurt, 2004, The Antinomy of Democratic Peace)
Research on the ‘democratic peace’ has neglected the fact that democracies fight wars that no
one else would, particularly to preserve international law and to prevent human disasters and
large-scale violations of human rights. What is more, data on average probabilities of
democratic war involvement have obscured that there have been vast differences in
democracies’ use of military force. This article demonstrates that the causal mechanisms of
established approaches to the democratic peace do not preclude democracies’ involvement in
war. Most importantly, the ambivalence of the Kantian tradition allows for two competing logics
of appropriateness that can be used to construct two ideal types: whereas, militant democracies
conceive of their entire relation to non-democracies as antagonistic, and frequently fight wars
to de-throne dictators, pacifist democracies believe in a modus vivendi with autocracies and try
to assist their transformation into democracies. International Politics(2004)41,494–520.
doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800089 The still prevailing opinion on ‘democratic peace’ has
endorsed the ‘double finding’: that democracies keep peace with each other while being as
warlike as any other kind of state. Growing evidence, however, indicates more peaceful
behaviour by democracies (Rousseauet al., 1996; Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997, 295; Geis,
2001;Russett and Oneal, 2001; Schultz, 2001, 137; Huth and Allee, 2002b; MacMillan,2003;
Hasenclever, 2003). Still, scarce attention has been devoted to the fact that democracies,
notably after the end of the great geopolitical contest with the ‘evil empire’, have tended to
initiate and fight wars no one else would — either to preserve international law and the national
sovereignty of states with which they are not allied against aggression, as in the Gulf war of
1991;1to bring food to people against the armed resistance of warlords, as in Somalia in 1993; to terminate massive
breaches of human rights as in Bosnia 1995 or Kosovo 1999; to prop up failed states as in Sierra Leone in
2002; or to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, democratize forcefully an erstwhile dictatorship, and reshape
the strategic face of a region torn by repressive regimes and continuing violence as in Iraq in 2003.
Democratic peace
theory has to account for this inclination to fight ‘democratic wars’. Once the focus is on this
issue, another, extremely important fact comes to light that has been concealed by the data
showing average probabilities of democratic war involvement: that the military engagement of
democracies in armed conflict is distributed very unevenly. The bifurcation of democratic policies towards war
and peace is most tangible in the high variation of democracies’ propensity to participate in violent disputes. Figure 1 shows the
descriptive statistics for the militarized disputes involving the use of force of those 22 states between 1950 and 2001 that have been
consistently democratic at a level of 7 and higher on the combined autocracy/democracy scale of Polity IV.2The
data show an
extremely unequal distribution of involvement in militarized disputes that has been obscured
almost completely in the majority of statistical studies on democracy and war. Of the
283discrete involvements by these stable democracies, 75.6% of these were carried out by just
four countries (19% of the whole group): Israel, the United States, India, and the United
Kingdom. The argument that smaller states have little chance to get involved cannot be taken
seriously in the age of coalition warfare which makes military involvement particularly easy for
democracies with close security relationships, even without power projection capacities of their
own. Since World War II at the latest, major armed conflicts have been fought by at times large
coalition
ST Innovation
1NC

They will still have access- government can still influence
companies
Newman 14
Lily Hay Newman, 12-5-2014, "Senator Proposes Bill to Prohibit Government-Mandated
Backdoors in Smartphones," Slate Magazine,
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2014/12/05/senator_wyden_proposes_secure_data
_act_to_keep_government_agencies_from.html//SRawal
It's worth noting, though, that the Secure Data Act doesn't actually prohibit backdoors—it just
prohibits agencies from mandating them. There are a lot of other types of pressure government
groups could still use to influence the creation of backdoors, even if they couldn't flat-out
demand them. Here's the wording in the bill: "No agency may mandate that a manufacturer,
developer, or seller of covered products design or alter the security functions in its product or
service to allow the surveillance of any user of such product or service, or to allow the physical
search of such product, by any agency."

Innovation makes energy conservation and the effects of global
warming worse – turns innovation
Olsen 13 (Morten Olsen, assistant professor of economics at Harvard, January 11, 2013,“Will
Innovation Save the Planet? How the principles of successful innovation could slow global
warming.” http://www.europeanbusinessreview.com/?p=2086)
Let’s start with the first principle: the ‘how.’ This principle of innovation states that most
innovation is primarily directed at making a product either cheaper or more attractive to the consumer.¶ That is a good
thing, you may say, pointing to a long and growing list of green innovation designed to improve our lives and world: hybrid cars, lighter, better and more efficient airplanes,
increasingly efficient electricity production, virtual online meetings and so on. Surely with all these improvements, the energy consumption of the average human is bound to
decrease and with it, harmful emissions. This sounds like a compelling argument. Unfortunately, it is likely to be wrong.¶ First,
part of the savings from
higher energy efficiency is lost to higher consumption. Consider aviation: in recent decades, huge improvements have been
achieved not just in fuel efficiency, but also in comfort, speed and, above all, price – all of which increases the attractiveness, demand and thus incidence of flying. A higher
consumption of fuel then follows these increases in flights. So while fuel consumption per passenger mile dropped more than 30% between 1975 and 2000 in the United States,
Furthermore, the rise of a
new global middle class eager for energy intensive consumption, suggests an uphill battle in energy
efficiency improving enough to keep global warming in check.¶ Paradoxically, not only do increases in
energy efficiency encourage higher usage, they may also promote a migration towards less environmentally
friendly products. Take cars for example. According to the Ford Motor Company, the Ford Model T introduced in 1908 boasted a fuel mileage of up to 21 miles a
the total miles traveled far outstripped those gains, leading to a more than doubling of fuel consumption during the same period.
gallon (11 l/100 km.) While engine efficiency technology has improved substantially over the last century, much of that technological improvement has resulted in larger, heavier
cars and not better mileage, epitomized by the popularity of SUVs in the U.S. which even almost a century later can rarely match the Model T in fuel efficiency. It is true that the
range of car options have grown considerably since the Model T to include models that are considerably more fuel-efficient, but this great variety of choices further increases
the desirability of a car such that many households today have two or more.¶ While engine efficiency technology has improved substantially over the last century, much of that
Successful innovation
that leads to increased energy efficiency ultimately makes usage cheaper, which increases
consumption and in turn reduces and may even reverse those original gains from higher
efficiency. Unfortunately, there is little reason to expect this counter-balancing effect to abate in the future. Such insight dates back to the young British economist
technological improvement has resulted in larger, heavier cars and not better mileage, epitomized by the popularity of SUVs in the U.S.¶
William Stanley Jevons of the late 19th century who observed that “[i]t is wholly a confusion of ideas to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished
consumption. The very contrary is the truth,” referring to the folly of the common presumption that increasing the efficiency of coal would reduce British coal use3. Jevons was
largely right in his observation and the increased efficiency of British machinery only succeeded in making the use of energy cheaper and easier, encouraging further
consumption. The effect was originally known as the “Jevons Paradox,” though in its modern incarnation it is known as the “Rebound effect.” Given its potential to paradoxically
overturn the positive effects of energy efficiency, the Rebound Effect continues to be a source of great debate and research.¶ As there is little doubt to the intellectual validity of
this argument, researchers have sought to uncover its empirical validity4. In principle, all that is needed to assess the size of the rebound effect is to demand change from lower
prices, i.e. the price elasticity. It is easy to see the empirical challenges: in the short run, more efficient air conditioners may lead to an increased use of AC, in the medium term
this may result in additional consumer purchase and utilization, and in the long-run, perhaps even migrations of people to areas that were previously almost uninhabitable prior
to the invention of AC systems. It is difficult to imagine the current modern day migration toward southern U.S. states without the convenience of air-conditioned houses,
offices, cars and supermarkets. Though reasonable estimates in the short run imply a loss of 10-30 per cent of the original efficiency gains, it is practically impossible to estimate
the (larger) long-run effects, which are likely sizeable5. The use of AC is just a case in point. Today the U.S. uses as much electricity to cool buildings as it did for all purposes in
19556.¶ Second, even if innovation were to reduce energy consumption from the usage of existing products, innovation does more than just improve the efficiency of existing
From the advent of AC to the Internet of the present and possibly space tourism in the future, a stream of new
highly energy-¶ intensive products is constantly being introduced, along with new versions of existing products, such as the
products.
Tata Nano – the cheapest car in the world – targeted at a new global middle class in India. Although such products improve the lives of millions of people around the world, they
raise an even higher bar on the necessary reduction of energy for the use of already existing products.¶ Third, successful innovation is not limited to consumer products. Deepwater drilling, liquid natural gas transport over long distances and shale gas extraction are examples of successful innovation that increases available energy. (The ability to drill
for oil in deep water, transport liquid natural gas over long distances, and extract shale gas all make more energy available to us.) Though a global shift towards cleaner burning
natural gas might reduce emissions on a per unit of energy basis, huge global reserves of shale gas will continue to provide access to vast amounts of fossil fuel.¶ The Jevons
paradox need not imply that innovation is worthless, but rather that the anticipated environmental benefits of innovation may be limited. On the contrary; because innovation
has allowed us to use energy and other resources far more efficiently, we have been able to improve our livelihoods. However, although the power of private innovation
continues to amaze us all, there is no reason to suspect that this process will reduce our overall emissions.

Concept of end-to-end no longer applies for the modern internet
Clarke 11 (David D Clark, is a¶ Senior Research Scientist at the MIT Computer¶ Science, 2011 “The
end-to-end argument and application design: the role of trust”
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/People/DDC/E2E-07-Prepub-6.pdf
Applications and services on the Internet today do not just¶ reside at the “end points”; they have
become more complex,¶ with intermediate servers and services provided by third¶ parties interposed between the
communicating end-points.¶ Some applications such as email have exploited intermediate¶ servers from
their first design. Email is not delivered in one¶ transfer from original sender to ultimate receiver. It is sent¶ first to a server
associated with the sender, then to a server¶ associated with the receiver, and then finally to the receiver.¶ This reality has
caused some observers to claim that the end-to-end¶ argument is dead. By one interpretation, all of
these¶ intermediate agents seem totally at odds with the idea that¶ function should be moved
out of the network and off to the¶ end-points. In fact, the end-to-end argument, as described in¶ the original paper, admits of
interpretations that are¶ diametrically opposed. When we consider applications that are¶ constructed using intermediate servers,
we can view these¶ servers in two ways. An Internet purist might say that the¶ “communications subsystem” of the Internet is the
set of¶ connected routers. Servers are not routers, they are just¶ connected to them. As such, they are outside the¶
“communications subsystem,” and by this reasoning, it is¶ compatible with the end-to-end argument to place servers¶ anywhere in
“the rest” of the system. On the other hand, these¶
servers do not seem like “ends,” and thus they seem to
violate¶ the idea of moving functions to the ends.

Emissions falling now—every indicator proves
Romm 15 (Joe Romm, Ph.D in Physics from MIT, worked at the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography, Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, former
Acting Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, awarded an American Physical
Society Congressional Science Fellowship, executive director of Center for Energy and Climate
Solutions, former researcher at the Rocky Mountain Institute, former Special Assistant for
International Security at the Rockefeller Foundation, taught at Columbia University's School of
International and Public Affairs, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, “Record
First: Global CO2 Emissions Went Flat In 2014 While The Economy Grew,” 3/13/15)
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/03/13/3633362/iea-co2-emissions-decouple-growth/
Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions flatlined globally in 2014, while the world economy grew. The
International Energy Agency reports that this marks “the first time in 40 years in which there was a halt or reduction in emissions of the greenhouse gas
that was not tied to an economic downturn.” The IEA attributes this remarkable occurrence to “changing patterns of energy consumption in China and
OECD countries.” As we reported last month, China cut its coal consumption 2.9 percent in 2014, the first drop this century. China is aggressively
embracing energy efficiency, expanding clean energy, and shuttering the dirtiest power plants to meet its planned 2020 (or sooner) peak in coal use. As
a result, Chinese CO2 emissions dropped 1 percent in 2014 even as their economy grew by 7.4 percent. At the same time, the Financial Times points
out “In the past five years, OECD countries’ economies grew nearly 7 percent while their emissions fell 4 percent, the IEA has found.” A
big part
of that is the United States, where fuel economy standards have reversed oil consumption
trends — and renewable energy, efficiency, and natural gas have cut U.S. coal consumption. All
this “provides much-needed momentum to negotiators preparing to forge a global climate deal
in Paris in December,” explained IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol, who was just named the next IEA Executive Director. “ For the first time,
greenhouse gas emissions are decoupling from economic growth.” CO2vsGDP CREDIT: IEA, FINANCIAL TIMES The
IEA notes that in 40 years of CO2 data collection, the three previous times emissions have flatlined or dropped from the prior year “all were associated
with global economic weakness: the early 1980’s [due to the oil shock and U.S. recession]; 1992 and 2009.” Remember the pre-Paris pledges we
already have: China to peak in CO2 emission by 2030 (or, likely, sooner), EU to cut total emissions 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030, and U.S. “to
cut net greenhouse gas emissions 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025.” That means there is a very real prospect for a game-changing global deal
coming out of Paris this year. Such a deal would not will “not get us onto the 2°C pathway,” as Christiana Figueres, the top UN climate official, and
others have explained. But it would get us off the catastrophic 6°C path and lead to a permanent decoupling of GDP and CO2. And that would give the
next generation a realistic chance at coming close to a 2°C path in the 2020s and 2030s. That’s when stronger action will become more viable as it
becomes harder to deny the painful reality of just how dire our situation is — and as the sped-up deployment of clean energy required for countries to
meet Paris commitments make achieving 2°C even more super-cheap.
Extensions to Newman 14

Newman 14 talks about how there are multiple types of pressure
that government groups could use to influence the creation of
backdoors without flat-out demanding them. The plan doesn’t
prohibit backdoors, it just prohibits agencies from mandating
them. This means that innovation still gets cut because internet
flow is still centralized.

The Government will go through loopholes in the bill to attain
backdoors
EFF, 14
(Electronic Freedom Foundation, “Security Backdoors are Bad News—But Some Lawmakers Are
Taking Action to Close Them,” 12-9-14, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/12/securitybackdoors-are-bad-news-some-lawmakers-are-taking-action-close-them, BC)
The legislation isn’t comprehensive, of course. As some have pointed out, it only prohibits agencies from
requiring a company to build a backdoor. The NSA can still do its best to convince companies to
do so voluntarily. And sometimes, the NSA’s “best convincing” is a $10 million contract with a
security firm like RSA.∂ The legislation also doesn’t change the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA.) CALEA, passed in 1994, is a law that forced telephone companies to redesign
their network architectures to make it easier for law enforcement to wiretap telephone calls. In 2006, the D.C.
Circuit upheld the FCC's reinterpretation of CALEA to also include facilities-based broadband Internet access and VoIP service,
although it doesn't apply to cell phone manufacturers.
Extensions to Environment Turn

Innovation makes energy conservation and climate change worse.
The Olsen 13 from the 1NC talks about how increases in efficiency
encourage higher usage, and since innovation makes usage
cheaper, consumption increases. Olsen cites the Ford Model T of
1908 that boasted a low fuel mileage, but essentially the
technological improvement has resulted in larger, heavier cars,
epitomized by the popularity of SUVs in the US.
Extensions to Enviro Defense

The Romm 15 from the 1NC discusses how greenhouse gas
emissions are finally decoupling from economic growth mostly
because fuel economy standards have reversed oil consumption
trends, and renewable energy, efficiency, and natural gas have cut
US coal consumption.

Innovation logic stifles climate change solutions – ensures
economic inequality and escalates environmental issues – turns
their global warming impact.
Parr 15
Adrian Parr, Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology & School of Architecture
and Interior Design at the University of Cincinnati, “The Wrath of Capital: Neoliberalism and
Climate Change Politics – Reflections,” June 2015, Geoforum, Vol. 62, p. 70-2, fwang
In retrospect I wonder if I should have opened The Wrath of Capital with my closing remarks: ‘I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be
If the human race
continues on its current course, then the earth could very well become an
inhospitable place for a great many species, people included
over.’ (Parr, 2013: 147). The emphasis here is on maybe. A future world of rising oceans, extreme weather events, species extinction, pollution, and increasing inequity is not inevitable.
. To change course though, humanity needs to begin with a healthy dose of
critical realism and an optimistic understanding of the political opportunities climate change presents. ¶ Using a neoliberal framework to craft solutions to climate change produces a vicious circle that reinstates the selfsame social organization and
broader sociocultural and economic structures that have led to global climate change. The Wrath of Capital shows that climate change is not just an economic, cultural, or technological challenge. It is a political dilemma. Rigorous thinking and broadening
our understanding of flourishing and emancipatory politics are important resources we can use to counter the narrow-minded view that the free market will solve the challenges climate change poses. ¶ The central focus of The Wrath of Capital is how
‘opportunity’ is put to work in climate change politics. Is it a moralizing or political operation? The conclusion I draw is that thus far the neoliberal framework of climate change politics has turned it into a moralizing discourse. For as I show th e
discourse exposes a racist, sexist, privileged political subject
and an inefficient and ineffectual
public sphere that should hand
resources over to the private sector
who points the finger of blame in the direction of underdeveloped
countries overpopulating the earth, the Chinese polluting the atmosphere, ‘primitive societies’ in need of ‘modernizing’ their economies and governments,
the ownership and management of common pool
. All
are moralizing arguments presented under the umbrella of climate change solutions. It is therefore important we recognize these are not political arguments. Arguments of this kind do not view the ‘o pportunity’ in question as a platform for transforming
otherwise oppressive, exploitative, and coercive power relations. ¶ To briefly restate the argument I develop. I start with a now well known and oft cited fact that the scientific consensus is human activities are changing global climate. If this situation
simply catastrophic
given the prevailing economic and political influence neoliberalism currently
has, solutions to the question of what to do about climate change have used a
neoliberal point of reference
¶
continues predictions for the future of all life on earth are far from good, and by some accounts these are quite
. Obviously we need to change course but the lingering question is how to do this?
Unsurprisingly,
. The principles of the free market, privatization, individualism, consumerism, and competition all shape the current direction of climate change politics.
In the book I
describe how the logic of the free market has resulted in a new brand of capitalism – climate capitalism – that has led to the creation of a market in pollution (cap and trade, or emissions trading) which has placed the limits climate change poses for
capitalism back in the service of capital accumulation. Vast tracts of land have accordingly been turned into green energy farms (solar panels or wind farms), which in theory is a fabulous idea, but when practiced unchecked leads to land grabbing.
Another form of land appropriation taking place under the guise of climate change solutions is the greening of cities. Green urbanism, as it is commonly called, refers to modifying cities so as to make them more environmentally friendly. This involves the
creation of bike paths, green roofs, public transportation, green spaces, pedestrian friendly cities, efficient land use policies, and energy efficient buildings; all fabulous initiatives that potentially could improve the lives of all city dwellers. I show how
green urbanism trumps equitable urbanism. Green urbanism in Chicago has also been used to justify demolishing public housing in a city where land values are growing and the poor are turned out on to the rental market with vouchers in hand designed
to offset the higher rental costs. David Harvey fittingly calls this ‘accumulation by dispossession’, when public wealth is privatized and the poor are displaced (Harvey, 2003). ¶ The global population is expected to peak at just over 9 billion people in 2050.
The argument is that more people will place the ecological balance of life on earth under serious strain, and along with more people comes more greenhouse gas emissions. Focusing on population numbers means that the population debate, as it figures
within climate change political discourse, fails to acknowledge qualitative differences. For instance, not everyone impacts the climate equally. Not everyone has a dangerously high ecological footprint. The more well to do citizens of the world produce the
greatest ecological burdens. Similarly the fear over China’s growing national emissions typically points to a growing Chinese middle class of eager consumers. However, comparing national greenhouse gas emissions does not honestly represent national
if we consider how much dirty
manufacturing high-income nations outsource to China then we come to realize that
high-income nations are in large part responsible for China’s growing emissions ¶
emissions. One can easily be fooled into thinking China poses the greatest threat to achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. However,
.
In addition,
there are serious theoretical shortcomings to how per capita emissions statistics figure within climate change discourse. Rates of consumption rely upon the individual subject being the primary unit of analysis, at the expense of analyses that produce a
nuanced examination of how different collective scenarios, such as household size and whether a person is an urban or rural dweller, also impact patterns of consumption. More importantly the per capita analysis of reproduction does not account for
how inequity works within the larger discourse of reproductive rights. I ask: ‘Are the poor women from low-and middle-income countries having fewer babies so that the affluent can continue to consume a steady line of cheap commodities that are made
by the cheap labor of these selfsame women?’ (Parr, 2013: 50). I use the example of women working at the plastic-recycling center in the Dharavi slum in Mumbai to explain that women being ‘liberated’ from the reproductive role traditionally assigned to
them does not necessarily lead to emancipation. Indeed the women I met were working around the clock in filthy conditions with no workers rights returning to a tiny shack and a long list of domestic chores that had them working well into the night and
rising before the sun came up. In this context the population debate fails to tackle the feminist problem of how women’s bodies are coded, and the location of female bodies in a matrix of power that is oppressive and exploitative. Tangentially related to
the population debate is the growing concern over the diminishing quality and quantity of potable water. For example, the United Nations ‘predicts that by 2025 two out of three people will be living in conditions of water stress, and 1.8 billion people will
be living in regions of absolute water scarcity’ (Parr, 2013: 53). If we also consider how climate change is changing the hydrologic cycle it is unsurprising that competition over water resources is mounting. This situation has spurred on a burgeoning
water market, resulting in the privatization of water resources and unlikely marriages between the public and private sector to form. Water scarcity, when combined with extreme weather events and changing seasonal patterns also impacts food
production. The solution to this has been the widespread industrialization of food production which I explain has led to a growing market in patenting indigenous ecological knowledge, seeds, and the violent exploitation of animal reproductive systems
and immigrant labor.¶ Using the logic of neoliberalism to ‘solve’ the crisis climate change poses is not a solution it is a displacement activity. And as the final chapter argues, this displacement activity is an act of violence that conceals a deeper structural
violence, or what Zizek would call the ‘objective violence’, of global capitalism (Zizek, 2010) such that the political weight of the problem is no longer felt. Critically engaging with this structure of objective violence is a necessary first step in creating
emancipatory solutions and engaging new political subjectivities. ¶ Some reviewers have disputed the book for lacking concrete solutions (Stoekl, 2013; Pearse, 2014). Others regard my conclusions as pessimistic (Cuomo and Schueneman, 2013: 699),
stating the message I leave a reader with is one of general futility (Miller, 2013: 1). I understand the criticism but I would disagree adding that I tackle the nihilistic condition of climate change politics describing how it empties the political promise of
futurity out of climate change discourse. What is nihilistic, in my view, is presenting a neoliberal worldview as a universal instead of appreciating it is merely a construction and as such it is refutable. Recognizing this, describing how it works, and
understanding its contingent character is for me a political strategy. ¶ Allan Stoekl asks ‘If we are to do away with consumerist individualism’ then, ‘what, in practice, will replace it?’ (Stoekl, 2013: 4). I am coming at this issue from a slightly different
vantage point. Instead of hoping to eliminate consumerist individualism, I am more interested in the machinic problem of how consumerist individualism works. This point is indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of desire as social. As I see it, we
need to first recognize that individualism as expressed through consumption is just one kind of investment human energies and affects can take. This point is at the core of my analysis of sustainability culture in Hijacking Sustainability (Parr, 2009). The
observation has concrete political consequences for it means energies and affects can be re-directed away from individual consumption and find investment in more emancipatory outcomes. Consumerist individualism is therefore not inevitable; it can be
countered, but only if we first grasp how it works.¶ Stoekl goes on to inquire what kind of government, ‘elected by whom, and with what (and whose) money’ could successfully realize a sustainable project (Stoekl, 2013: 4). His query echoes a similar
question raised by Rebecca Pearse who writes, ‘How to turn a sense of humanity’s complicity with violence of capital into political practice is less clear.’ (Pearse, 2014: 133). Likewise Ryder W. Miller recognizes the book’s call to ‘carry on’, yet without
presenting ‘many new options or ideas’ (Miller (2013): 1). I do outline an alternative approach to governance, recognizing that often this issue is presented as havi ng either a vertical orientation (State or corporate governance) or one that is constituted
as a horizontal mass movement (grassroots organization, local initiatives). I suggest a more collaborative and equitable governance structure might emerge from a transversal operation, whereby the horizontal and vertical dialectically engage each
other.¶ Whilst I acknowledge the importance of presenting concrete solutions that governments, people, and entrepreneurs can implement, the point I make is that if politics remains at the level of neoliberal outcomes this presumes solutions to the
problems climate change poses are properly the province of capital accumulation. In my view, this is not a solution it is an act of bad faith. Under such circumstances climate change politics is neutralized and is even reduced to a mere banality, because it
is stripped of its transformative potential. Solving the climate change puzzle cannot be achieved under the rubric of neoliberalism because this occurs at the expense of an emancipatory project. Life will never be sustainable if the structural violence of
capital accumulation continues unchecked. This distinction is ultimately an intellectual problem concerning understanding. ¶ What I set out to do is expand the reader’s understanding of how neoliberalism has become the standard against which all
social, economic, cultural, and political responses to climate change are measured. Solutions are constructions and currently these primarily take place within a neoliberal frame. In my view this is lazy thinking and it has produced a narrow, even ignorant
view of what opportunity consists of. The opportunity climate change presents is primarily valued as an instrument of privatization, individualism, consumption, commodification, and capital accumulation. The Wrath of Capital critiques this kind of
reductive thinking explaining it arises when the practices of climate change politics are disaggregated from gender, racism, class relations, speciesism, and sexuality. If we widen the lens of climate change analysis to include the forces of exploitation,
oppression, and inequity then we allow deeper ontological problems to surface. Thinking about these issues within the context of climate change discourse is a political strategy because it shifts the priorities away from capital accumulation and onto
advancing the social good.¶ All in all The Wrath of Capital identifies the myriad ways in which climate change politics has gained traction, however, I go on to consider how the logic of neoliberalism infects the potential political opportunity climate
change presents. As neoliberalism enters the arenas of climate change discourse, policy, debate, and solutions – economic growth, population growth, food and water scarcity, spectacle – the transformative political opportunity is hollowed out. So yes, I
do end with a desperate plea announcing all roads currently lead us through the gates of capitalist heaven. However, this is only true if our politics ignores the emancipatory promise of political change and continues on its current neoliberal trajectory.
Under this schema the opportunity in question merely constructs passive subjectivities that are circumscribed by the inevitability of a neoliberal future. I maintain this is only inevitable as long as the neoliberal inscription of all spaces for all times remain
closed to critique. ¶ By outlining the central features and shortcomings of climate change political discourse and praxis I hope to strategically position the reader at a conjuncture: between paralyzing catastrophe and innovative change. I view
conjunctures of this kind as the basis of a collective choice. People are faced with a very real choice – to either give into the ‘catastrophic imagination’ that climate change discourse currently espouses to borrow from Brad Evans and Julian Reid (Evans
and Reid, 2014), or revitalize and reinvigorate the political imagination. The recognition that it could be over if we do not begin to act and think differently implies it can be otherwise. It was in this sense that I see the closing statement of the book as
optimistic.¶ With the realization that humanity has a choice comes the possibility of denying that our futures necessarily coalesce in one all encompassing neoliberal future. This would be a future where everything in the world, all social and ecological
relations is captured by the oppressive forces of capital accumulation, competition, consumption, and privatization. Leaving climate change up to the market to solve is a cop out. Part of the solution comes from understanding we cannot afford to let
ourselves off the hook so easily. Neoliberal thinking forecloses the future off to its inherent unpredictability and creativity; this is not ‘thinking’ it is ignorance. Understanding we have a choice to do otherwise is, in my view, an important part of any
solution to climate change. The opportunities climate change presents are a matter of potential lives. What kind of future lives would we like to create? Or, what would we like to become? When answering these questions we do not have to view the
future through the matrices of neoliberalism and capital accumulation. Developing a broader understanding of how neoliberal thinking has hijacked climate change politics opens the doors onto the next task at hand: how we might see ourselves and our
future differently
ST Cyber-crime
1NC

Backdoors in commercial software key to the ability to prevent
multiple cyber-crimes.
Comey 07/08/15 (James B. Comey, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jul 8, 2015,
“Going Dark: Encryption, Technology, and the Balances Between Public Safety and Privacy”,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/going-dark-encryption-technology-and-the-balancesbetween-public-safety-and-privacy)
In recent years, new methods of electronic communication have transformed our society, most
visibly by enabling ubiquitous digital communications and facilitating broad e-commerce. As such, it is important for our
global economy and our national security to have strong encryption standards. The development and
robust adoption of strong encryption is a key tool to secure commerce and trade, safeguard private information, promote free
expression and association, and strengthen cyber security. The
Department is on the frontlines of the fight
against cyber crime, and we know first-hand the damage that can be caused by those who
exploit vulnerable and insecure systems. We support and encourage the use of secure networks to prevent cyber threats
to our critical national infrastructure, our intellectual property, and our data so as to promote our overall safety. American
citizens care deeply about privacy, and rightly so. Many companies have been responding to a market demand for
products and services that protect the privacy and security of their customers. This has generated positive innovation that has been
crucial to the digital economy. We, too,
care about these important principles. Indeed, it is our obligation to
uphold civil liberties, including the right to privacy. We have always respected the fundamental right of people
to engage in private communications, regardless of the medium or technology. Whether it is instant
messages, texts, or old-fashioned letters, citizens have the right to communicate with one another in private without unauthorized
government surveillance—not simply because the Constitution demands it, but because the free flow of information is vital to a
thriving democracy. The
benefits of our increasingly digital lives, however, have been accompanied by
new dangers, and we have been forced to consider how criminals and terrorists might use
advances in technology to their advantage. For example, malicious actors can take advantage of
the Internet to covertly plot violent robberies, murders, and kidnappings; sex offenders can establish
virtual communities to buy, sell, and encourage the creation of new depictions of horrific sexual abuse of children; and individuals,
organized criminal networks, and
nation-states can exploit weaknesses in our cyber-defenses to steal
our sensitive, personal information. Investigating and prosecuting these offenders is a core responsibility and priority of
the Department of Justice. As national security and criminal threats continue to evolve, the Department
has worked hard to stay ahead of changing threats and changing technology. We must ensure both the
fundamental right of people to engage in private communications as well as the protection of the public. One of the bedrock
principles upon which we rely to guide us is the principle of judicial authorization: that if an independent judge finds reason to
believe that certain private communications contain evidence of a crime, then the government can conduct a limited search for that
evidence. For example, by having a neutral arbiter—the judge—evaluate whether the government’s evidence satisfies the
appropriate standard, we have been able to protect the public and safeguard citizens’ Constitutional rights. The Department of
Justice has been and will always be committed to protecting the liberty and security of those whom we serve. In
recent
months, however, we have on a new scale seen mainstream products and services designed in a way that gives users
sole control over access to their data. As a result, law enforcement is sometimes unable to recover
the content of electronic communications from the technology provider even in response to a
court order or duly-authorized warrant issued by a federal judge. For example, many communications
services now encrypt certain communications by default, with the key necessary to decrypt the communications solely in the hands
of the end user. This applies both when the data is “in motion” over electronic networks, or “at rest” on an electronic device. If the
communications provider is served with a warrant seeking those communications, the provider cannot provide the data because it
has designed the technology such that it cannot be accessed by any third party. Threats¶ The
more we as a society rely
on electronic devices to communicate and store information, the more likely it is that information that
was once found in filing cabinets, letters, and photo albums will now be stored only in electronic form.
We have seen case after case—from homicides and kidnappings, to drug trafficking, financial
fraud, and child exploitation—where critical evidence came from smart phones, computers, and online
communications.¶ When changes in technology hinder law enforcement’s ability to exercise
investigative tools and follow critical leads, we may not be able to identify and stop terrorists who are
using social media to recruit, plan, and execute an attack in our country. We may not be able to
root out the child predators hiding in the shadows of the Internet, or find and arrest violent criminals who
are targeting our neighborhoods. We may not be able to recover critical information from a device that belongs to a
victim who cannot provide us with the password, especially when time is of the essence.¶ These are not just theoretical
concerns. We continue to identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters
traveling in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, commonly known as ISIL, and also homegrown violent extremists
who may aspire to attack the United States from within. These threats remain among the highest priorities for the Department of
Justice, including the FBI, and the United States government as a whole.¶ Of course, encryption is not the only technology terrorists
and criminals use to further their ends. Terrorist groups, such as ISIL, use the Internet to great effect. With the
widespread horizontal distribution of social media, terrorists can spot, assess, recruit, and radicalize vulnerable individuals of all ages
in the United States either to travel or to conduct a homeland attack. As a result, foreign terrorist organizations now have direct
access into the United States like never before. For
example, in recent arrests, a group of individuals was
contacted by a known ISIL supporter who had already successfully traveled to Syria and encouraged them to do the
same. Some of these conversations occur in publicly accessed social networking sites, but others
take place via private messaging platforms. These encrypted direct messaging platforms are
tremendously problematic when used by terrorist plotters.

Alt causes to DDos attacks
Caudle 07/27/15 (Rodney Caudle is director of information security at NIC Inc., Jul 27, 2015,
How to minimize the impact from DDoS attacks, http://gcn.com/articles/2015/07/27/ddosattack-mitigation.aspx)
In early 2000, one of the first known distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks shut Yahoo down for three hours when an attacker
repurposed a university’s computers to flood the Internet portal’s traffic. Such synchronized
attacks from multiple
sources against a sole target characterize DDoS attacks, a relatively new phenomenon as compared to
“traditional” denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, which originate from a single source.¶ Thanks in part to the increased
number of devices on the Internet and the availability of high-speed Internet access for the average user, there’s a
larger pool of possible sources for all kinds of technological attacks. In the early 2000s, DDoS attacks
reached a speed of approximately 4 gigabit/sec. Now, they average between 10 and 60 Gbps per second – or even faster. A DDoS
incident this past February peaked at almost 400 Gbps. And the average DDoS attack now lasts 17 hours.¶ Three
types of
DDoS attacks have appeared in recent years:¶ Resource consumption. A common instantiation resource
consumption attack is a SYN flood. Attackers initiate a large number of bogus connection requests to
a single destination. The targeted server acknowledges the requests, but the attackers fail to send
the final pieces of information to complete the “three-way handshake” required to establish a connection between two
computers. While the server waits for the expected response, new connection requests continue
pouring in until all available connections are consumed, preventing communication with legitimate users.
Attackers also may launch a resource consumption attack by attempting to exhaust the target server’s disk space or another finite
resource by using legitimate traffic to force the server into creating large numbers of log files.¶ Bandwidth
consumption.
Attackers consume all available bandwidth on the networks leading to the targeted server by sending bogus network
traffic in quick succession. The resulting surge – which doesn’t have to come from legitimate traffic or even traffic the server
usually recognizes as legitimate –
renders the targeted server unavailable. Its impact is greater still because it also
can take down other servers on the same immediate network.¶ Keeping connections open. Attackers complete
numerous three-way handshakes to establish legitimate connections, but then use Slowloris
software to delay the process by designing each connection to instruct the target that it is “busy.” It’s similar to
answering a phone call and then being placed on hold for an hour while the person who called
takes care of something else. Allowing for the possibility that these users are operating on slow
or unreliable networks, the target server waits. The attackers can keep numerous connections open for extended
periods by sending a data fragment to each connection every few minutes, thus tying up the server so it can’t respond to legitimate
traffic.

Encyrption being good should not be assumed
Wittes 07/12/15 (Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in
Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, July 12, 2015, “Thoughts on Encryption and
Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits” http://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughtsencryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debate-merits
There's a final, non-legal factor that may push companies to work this problem as energetically as
they are now moving toward end-to-end encryption: politics. We are at very particular moment in the
cryptography debate, a moment in which law enforcement sees a major problem as having arrived but
the tech companies see that problem as part of the solution to the problems the Snowden revelations created
for them. That is, we have an end-to-end encryption issue, in significant part, because companies
are trying to assure customers worldwide that they have their backs privacy-wise and are not simply
tools of NSA. I think those politics are likely to change. If Comey is right and we start seeing law
enforcement and intelligence agencies blind in investigating and preventing horrible crimes and significant
threats, the pressure on the companies is going to shift. And it may shift fast and hard. Whereas the
companies now feel intense pressure to assure customers that their data is safe from NSA, the
kidnapped kid with the encrypted iPhone is going to generate a very different sort of political
response. In extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary access may well seem reasonable. And people will wonder why
it doesn't exist.¶ Which of these approaches is the right way to go? I would pursue several of them
simultaneously. At least for now, I would hold off on any kind of regulatory mandate, there being just
too much doubt at this stage concerning what's doable. I would, however, take a hard look at the role that civil liability
might play. I think the government, if it's serious about creating an extraordinary access scheme, needs to generate some
public research establishing proof of concept. We should watch very carefully how the companies respond to the mandates
they will receive from governments that will approach this problem in a less nuanced fashion than ours will. And
Comey should keep up the political pressure. The combination of these forces may well produce a more
workable approach to the problem than anyone can currently envision.
Extensions to Newman 14 on Cyber-Crime

Cross-apply the Newman 14 from the innovation flow, cybercrime still happens because governments are still able to coerce
companies into providing backdoors.
ST Circumvention
1NC

Reforms fail – the NSA will circumvent
Greenwald 14 (Glenn, lawyer, journalist and author – he founded the Intercept and has
contributed to Salon and the Guardian, named by Foreign Policy as one of the Top 100 Global
Thinkers of 2013, “CONGRESS IS IRRELEVANT ON MASS SURVEILLANCE. HERE’S WHAT MATTERS
INSTEAD”, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/19/irrelevance-u-s-congress-stoppingnsas-mass-surveillance/)
All of that illustrates what is, to me, the most important point from all of this: the last place one
should look to impose limits on the powers of the U.S. government is . . . the U.S. government.
Governments don’t walk around trying to figure out how to limit their own power, and that’s
particularly true of empires. The entire system in D.C. is designed at its core to prevent real
reform. This Congress is not going to enact anything resembling fundamental limits on the
NSA’s powers of mass surveillance. Even if it somehow did, this White House would never sign
it. Even if all that miraculously happened, the fact that the U.S. intelligence community and
National Security State operates with no limits and no oversight means they’d easily co-opt
the entire reform process. That’s what happened after the eavesdropping scandals of the mid1970s led to the establishment of congressional intelligence committees and a special FISA
“oversight” court—the committees were instantly captured by putting in charge supreme
servants of the intelligence community like Senators Dianne Feinstein and Chambliss, and
Congressmen Mike Rogers and “Dutch” Ruppersberger, while the court quickly became a
rubber stamp with subservient judges who operate in total secrecy. Ever since the Snowden
reporting began and public opinion (in both the U.S. and globally) began radically changing, the
White House’s strategy has been obvious. It’s vintage Obama: Enact something that is called
“reform”—so that he can give a pretty speech telling the world that he heard and responded to
their concerns—but that in actuality changes almost nothing, thus strengthening the very
system he can pretend he “changed.” That’s the same tactic as Silicon Valley, which also
supported this bill: Be able to point to something called “reform” so they can trick hundreds of
millions of current and future users around the world into believing that their communications
are now safe if they use Facebook, Google, Skype and the rest. In pretty much every interview
I’ve done over the last year, I’ve been asked why there haven’t been significant changes from all
the disclosures. I vehemently disagree with the premise of the question, which equates “U.S.
legislative changes” with “meaningful changes.” But it has been clear from the start that U.S.
legislation is not going to impose meaningful limitations on the NSA’s powers of mass
surveillance, at least not fundamentally.

Government officials will continue surveillance regardless—
agency shifts
Bernstein, 2015
(Leandra is an author for a world renowned news organization called Sputnik. The article cites a former FBI agent disclosure.
“Former FBI agent: Government Likely to Continue Domestic Surveillance”
http://sputniknews.com/us/20150703/1024143850.html#ixzz3fsjk9IPBhttp://sputniknews.com/us/20150703/1024143850.htmlFor
mer Date Accessed- 7/14/15. Anshul Nanda.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Coleen Rowley claims that the US government will likely
continue its pattern of domestic surveillance.¶ WASHINGTON (Sputnik), Leandra Bernstein — The US government
will likely continue its pattern of domestic surveillance following the Monday court ruling to temporarily extend bulk data collection,
whistleblower and former Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Coleen Rowley told Sputnik.¶ “I think, if
the past is any
predictor of the future, that US government officials will find yet another way around any legal
restrictions to continue their ‘Total Information Awareness’ project,” Rowley said.¶ On Monday, the Foreign
Information Surveillance Act (FISA) Court issued a ruling upholding the National Security
Agency (NSA) to continue bulk collection of metadata, a program that was supposed to be ended with the
passage of the USA Freedom Act in May 2015.¶ The ruling was based on a motion filed by civil libertarian groups demanding an
immediate end to the metadata collection program, which was deemed unconstitutional by a US federal appeals court in May
2015.¶ Asked what the Monday ruling means for the future of government surveillance reform, Rowley stated, “I think the Judge
[Michael Mosman] probably answered this in his ‘Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose’ [the more things change, the more they
stay the same] quote.”¶ The new portion of the classified files published by The Intercept now reveals how easily it can be done: “as
easy as typing a few words in Google.”¶ © FLICKR/ DON HANKINS¶ NSA Spies Can Hack Any Computer in 'A Few Mouse Clicks'¶ The
FISA decision to take advantage of the five-month period to continue mass surveillance did not come as a surprise “based on the
past record of illegal government spying,” Rowley explained.¶ The FISA Court authorizes surveillance carried out by the US
intelligence community. The Court is permitted to operate in secret, due to the classified activity it oversees.¶ Following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the George W. Bush administration proposed the implementation of a massive data-mining
program called the Total Information Awareness.¶ The program
was developed by the Department of Defense
research agency to be capable of analyzing private communications, commercial transactions
and other data domestically and abroad in order to identify and classify potential terrorist
threats.¶ While the program was never officially implemented, multiple programs across the intelligence
community accomplished a similar effect, as was revealed in classified documents leaked by NSA whistleblower
Edward Snowden in 2013.¶

No checks on executive abuses
Glennon ’14, Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University. (1/11/14, Michael J. Glennon, Harvard National Security Journal,
http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Glennon-Final.pdf, vol.5)
National security policy in the United States has remained largely constant from the Bush Administration to the Obama
Administration. This continuity can be explained by the
“double government” theory of 19th-century scholar of the English
suggests that U.S. national security
policy is defined by the network of executive officials who manage the departments and
agencies responsible for protecting U.S. national security and who, responding to structural
incentives embedded in the U.S. political system, operate largely removed from public view and
from constitutional constraints. The public believes that the constitutionally-established institutions control national
security policy, but that view is mistaken. Judicial review is negligible; congressional oversight is
dysfunctional; and presidential control is nominal. Absent a more informed and engaged electorate, little
Constitution Walter Bagehot. As applied to the United States, Bagehot’s theory
possibility exists for restoring accountability in the formulation and execution of national security policy.
Extensions of NSA Circumvent

The NSA operates with no limits and no oversight, means that they
would easily coopt the reform process of the plan. Even with the
establishment of congressional intelligence committees and FISC
in the 1970’s, the NSA continued doing whatever it wanted, that’s
Greenwald 14.
Extensions of Agency Shifts
Snowden revealed in 2013 that there were about 15 other
agencies other than the FBI or NSA that did the same jobs. The
only thing we know about these agencies is that they exist, so
there is no way to prevent agencies from shifting. Government
officials will continue surveillance regardless, that’s Bernstein 15.
Extensions of Executive Abuse

In the past, executive officials like Bush mandated backdoors
despite the passing of a plan that would potentially block them
and the existence of the FISC. There are no checks on executive
abuses and it’s fairly easy for an official to circumvent the plan,
that’s Glennon 14
Obama circumvents all the time- 7 specific times
Amy Payne 2014 (“7 Times Obama Ignored the Law to Impose His Executive Will, February 14, 2014,
http://dailysignal.com/2014/02/14/7-times-obama-ignored-law-impose-executive-will/, Accessed 7/15/15, EHS MKS)
President Obama—the imperial President, the “I’ve got a pen and I’ve got a phone” President who can’t wait to show us his “year of action”—once
vowed to do exactly the opposite. The biggest problems that we’re facing right now have to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more power
into the executive branch and not go through Congress at all. And that’s what I intend to reverse when I’m President of the United States of America.
That was candidate Obama back in 2008. This comment somehow slipped under the radar for the past few years and resurfaced this week. Proving the
absurdity of this campaign promise, Heritage’s legal experts have put together a list of seven illegal actions the Obama Administration has taken in the
President’s unilateral drive for executive power. If
it seems like there should be more than seven, you’re on to
something. It’s more complicated than you think to tell what’s illegal or unconstitutional when it comes to presidential power. Heritage’s
Elizabeth Slattery and Andrew Kloster explain: While it might not be possible to define in all instances precisely when an action crosses the line and falls
outside the scope of the President’s statutory or constitutional authority, what follows is a list of unilateral actions taken by the Obama Administration
that we think do cross that line. 1.
Delaying Obamacare’s employer mandate The Administration
announced that Obamacare won’t be implemented as it was passed, so employers with 50 or
more employees don’t have to provide the mandated health coverage for at least another
year (and longer if they play their cards right). Slattery and Kloster observe that “The law does not authorize the President to push back the employer
mandate’s effective date.” 2. Giving Congress and their staffs special taxpayer-funded subsidies for
Obamacare It was uncomfortable for Members of Congress when they realized that, through Obamacare, they had kicked themselves and their
staffs out of the taxpayer-funded subsidies they were enjoying for health coverage. But the Administration said no problem and gave them new
subsidies. In this case, “the Administration opted to stretch the law to save Obamacare—at the taxpayers’ expense.” 3. Trying
to fulfill the
“If you like your plan, you can keep it” promise—after it was broken When Americans started getting
cancellation notices from their insurance companies because Obamacare’s new rules were kicking in, the President’s broken promise was exposed. He
tried to fix things by telling insurance companies to go back to old plans that don’t comply with Obamacare—just for one year. Slattery and Kloster note
that “The letter announcing this non-enforcement has no basis in law.” 4.
Preventing layoff notices from going out just
days before the 2012 election There’s a law that says large employers have to give employees 60 days’ notice before mass layoffs.
And layoffs were looming due to federal budget cuts in 2012. But the Obama Administration told employers to go against the law and not issue those
notices—which would have hit mailboxes just days before the presidential election. The Administration “also offered to reimburse those employers at
the taxpayers’ expense if challenged for failure to give that notice.” 5.
Gutting the work requirement from welfare
reform The welfare reform that President Bill Clinton signed into law in 1996 required that welfare recipients in the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program work or prepare for work to receive the aid. The Obama Administration essentially took out that requirement by offering
waivers to states, even though the law expressly states that waivers of the work requirement are not allowed. “Despite [the law’s] unambiguous
language, the Obama Administration continues to flout the law with its ‘revisionist’ interpretation,” write Slattery and Kloster. 6.
Stonewalling
an application for storing nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain This was another case where the Administration simply
refused to do what was required by law. An application was submitted for nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain, but “Despite the legal
requirement, the Obama Administration refused to consider the application.” 7.
Making “recess” appointments that were
not really recess appointments Slattery and Kloster explain that “In January 2012, President Obama made four ‘recess’
appointments to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, claiming that, since the Senate was conducting
only periodic pro forma sessions, it was not available to confirm those appointees.” The catch: The Senate wasn’t in recess at the time. Courts have
since struck down the appointments, but the illegitimate appointees already moved forward some harmful policies.
ST Plan Text

Aff hasn’t clarified what “making public” means, so “making
public” that we will assist in encryption doesn’t mean that the
government will assist – Snowden proves that the NSA will do
anything to continue surveillance and helping encrypt software
goes directly against that value. Prefer our warrants; empirics and
congressional records prove that the NSA does whatever it wants
no matter how public they go
AT Congressional Oversight
They said congressional oversight could work

Congressional oversight fails – the government has never been
able to police itself
Vladeck ‘6/1, professor of law at the American University Washington College of Law.
(6/1/15, Stephen Vladeck, Foreign Policy, “Forget the Patriot Act – Here Are the Privacy
Violations You Should Be Worried About”, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/01/section215-patriot-act-expires-surveillance-continues-fisa-court-metadata/)
The government’s defense, as we’ve come to learn, is flawed in two vital respects: First, as several since-disclosed opinions from the FISA Court have made clear, the
government’s minimization requirements under the 2008 statute were often too skimpy, allowing the retention and use of information that both the statute and the
Fourth Amendment prohibit. Second — and perhaps more importantly — even where the minimization rules were legally sufficient, there have been numerous
instances in which government officials violated them, with the FISA Court only discovering the abuses after they were voluntarily reported by Justice Department
lawyers. As a result, the government collected and retained a large volume of communications by U.S. citizens that neither Congress nor the Constitution allowed it to
, there isn’t any similar judicial review (or
meaningful congressional oversight), which means that it has entirely been up to the
government to police itself. As State Department whistleblower John Napier Tye explained last summer, there is every reason
to doubt that such internal accountability has provided a sufficient check. In his words, “Executive Order
acquire. More alarmingly, with regard to collection under Executive Order 12333
12333 contains nothing to prevent the NSA from collecting and storing all … communications … provided that such collection occurs outside the United States in the
course of a lawful foreign intelligence investigation.” To put the matter bluntly, whereas the Section 215 debate has addressed whether the government can collect our
phone records, Executive Order 12333 and the 2008 FISA Amendments Act allow the government to collect a lot of what we’re actually saying, whether on the phone, in
our emails, or even to our search engines. There is no question that from a privacy perspective, these programs are far more pernicious than what’s been pegged to
Section 215.There is also no question that such collection raises even graver constitutional questions than the phone records program. Whereas there is an open debate
over our expectation of privacy in the metadata we voluntarily provide to our phone companies, there’s no doubt that we have an expectation of privacy in the content of
our private communications. Why, then, has all the fuss been around Section 215 and the phone records program, while the far more troubling surveillance authorities
provided by Executive Order 12333 and the 2008 FISA Amendments Act have flown under the radar? Part of it may be because of the complexities described above.
After all, it’s easy for people on the street to understand what it means when the government is collecting our phone records; it’s not nearly as obvious why we should be
bothered by violations of minimization requirements. Part of it may also have to do with the government’s perceived intent. Maybe it seems more troubling when the
government is intentionally collecting our phone records, as opposed to “incidentally” (albeit knowingly) collecting the contents of our communications. And technology
may play a role, too; how many senders of emails know where the server is located on which the message is ultimately stored? If we don’t realize how easily our
communications might get bundled with those of non-citizens outside the United States, we might not be worried about surveillance targeted at them. But whatever the
reason for our myopic focus on Section 215, it has not only obscured the larger privacy concerns raised by these other authorities, but also the deeper lessons we should
government surveillance
programs, it is all-but-inevitable that those programs will be stretched to — and beyond — their legal limits. That’s why it’s
have taken away from Snowden’s revelations. However much we might tolerate, or even embrace, the need for secret
important not only to place substantive limits upon the government’s surveillance authorities, but also to ensure that they are subject to meaningful external oversight
and accountability as well. And that’s why the denouement of Section 215 debate has been so disappointing. This should have been a conversation not just about the full
range of government surveillance powers, including Executive Order 12333 and the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, but also about the role of the FISA Court and of
congressional oversight in supervising those authorities. Instead, it devolved into an over-heated debate over an over-emphasized program. Congress has tended to a
paper cut, while it ignored the internal bleeding. Not only does the expiration of Section 215 have no effect on the substance of other surveillance authorities, it also has
no effect on their oversight and accountability

Congress has no idea what to do in terms of surveillance, written
in 2013 by Alan Grayson in an article titled: Congressional
oversight of the NSA is a joke. I should know, I’m in Congress
Grayson ’13, the United States Representative for Florida's 9th congressional district,
10/25/13, Alan Grayson, “Congressional oversight of the NSA is a joke. I should know,
I'm in Congress”, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/nsa-nocongress-oversight
Pike's investigation initiated one of the first congressional oversight debates for the vast and hidden collective of espionage
agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Security
Agency (NSA). Before the Pike Commission, Congress
was kept in the dark about them – a tactic designed to
thwart congressional deterrence of the sometimes illegal and often shocking activities
carried out by the "intelligence community". Today, we are seeing a repeat of this professional voyeurism by
our nation's spies, on an unprecedented and pervasive scale. Recently, the US House of Representatives voted on an
amendment – offered by Representatives Justin Amash and John Conyers – that would have curbed the NSA's omnipresent and
inescapable tactics. Despite furious lobbying by the intelligence industrial complex and its allies, and four hours of frantic and
overwrought briefings by the NSA's General Keith Alexander, 205 of 422 Representatives voted for the amendment. Though
the amendment barely failed, the vote signaled a clear message to the NSA: we do not trust you. The vote also conveyed
another, more subtle message: members
of Congress do not trust that the House Intelligence
Committee is providing the necessary oversight. On the contrary, "oversight" has become
"overlook". Despite being a member of Congress possessing security clearance, I've learned far more about
government spying on me and my fellow citizens from reading media reports than I have
from "intelligence" briefings. If the vote on the Amash-Conyers amendment is any indication, my colleagues feel the
same way. In fact, one long-serving conservative Republican told me that he doesn't attend such briefings anymore, because,
"they always
lie". Many of us worry that Congressional Intelligence Committees are more loyal to
the "intelligence community" that they are tasked with policing, than to the Constitution. And
the House Intelligence Committee isn't doing anything to assuage our concerns. I've requested classified information, and
further meetings with NSA officials. The House Intelligence Committee has refused to provide either. Supporters of the NSA's
vast ubiquitous domestic spying operation assure the public that members of Congress can be briefed on these activities
whenever they want. Senator Saxby Chambliss says all a member of Congress needs to do is ask for information, and he'll get
it. Well I did ask, and the House Intelligence Committee said "no", repeatedly. And virtually every other member not on the
Intelligence Committee gets the same treatment. Recently, a member of the House Intelligence Committee was asked at a town
hall meeting, by his constituents, why my requests for more information about these programs were being denied. This
member argued that I don't have the necessary level of clearance to obtain access for classified information. That doesn't make
any sense; every member is given the same level of clearance. There is no legal justification for imparting secret knowledge
about the NSA's domestic surveillance activities only to the 20 members of the House Intelligence Committee. Moreover, how
can the remaining 415 of us do our job properly, when we're kept in the dark – or worse, misinformed?
Offcase
Security Links

Supposed cyber-attacks are an integral part to America’s
securitization
Gomez 14 (Rodrigo NIETO GOMEZ, is a assistant professor at the department of National
Security Affairs and the Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2014, “Cyber-geopolitics.
Geopolitical rivalries behind the cyber-threat narratives in the United States.”
https://medium.com/homeland-security/cyber-geopolitics-a45fc698a3a1)
Cyber attacks play an important role in the construction of vulnerability narratives by security
and defense practitioners and scholars in the United States. The idea of hackers producing
catastrophic damage is so fundamental to current threat assessments, that the Department of
Defense created in 2009 a sub-unified Command to respond to these challenges. General Keith
Alexander became its first commander, occupying a “dual-hatted position” as he simultaneously directed the National Security
Agency (NSA) and the US Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). He described the challenges behind the creation of this
new command in the following way:¶ “We will do this as we do it in the traditional military
domains of land, sea, air and space. But cyberspace is unique. It is a man-made domain. It is also an
increasingly contested domain. That makes everything even tougher. Our job in U.S. Cyber Command is to assure
the right information gets to the right user at the right time at the right level of protection.Ӧ
This quote contains most of the units of cultural transmission (what Richard Dawkins called memes) of
cybersecurity imperatives: It begins by framing the definition of cyberspace as a geospatial
environment or a fifth military domain (the other four being land, sea, air and space are all geospatial in nature) where military
forces can operate and maneuver. The speech-act then places the accent on the technological nature of
this “man-made territory”, while reinforcing at the same time the idea of a besieged domain by
nefarious actors. The citation concludes this securitization move by explaining how the mission of the CYBERCOM is to provide
Information Assurance (IA) to cyberspace, so data flows are limited by rules (levels of protection), time and users. The creation of
CYBERCOM is a step towards the “militarization of the Internet.”¶ The
key assumptions are that information
sharing must occur only within limited environments (in technology terms these environments are often
described with the spatial metaphor of “walled gardens”) and that this predictability should define all flows.
Hacking can then be defined in opposition to this frame: It is what happens when the system is
tampered in a deliberate way so it behaves outside those intended rules. When that occurs, information
sharing does not follow predesigned paths and the core mission of CYBERCOM is to prevent hackers from sharing data with the
“wrong” users at the “wrong” time and more importantly, without following those pre-established rules.
Neoliberalism Links

The encouragement of innovation is only a cover-up for capitalist
consumption
Leary 07/11/15 (JOHN PATRICK LEARY is Assistant Professor of English at Wayne State
University, JULY 11, 2015, “Innovators are killing us: Instead of reinventing housing or transit,
they bring us companies like Airbnb and Uber”
http://www.salon.com/2015/07/11/innovators_are_killing_us_instead_of_reinventing_housing
_or_transit_they_bring_us_companies_like_airbnb_and_uber/)
The innovator has always been part savior, part confidence man. “In a multitude of men there are many
who, supposing themselves wiser than others, endeavour to innovate, and divers Innovators innovate divers wayes, which is a meer
distraction, and civill ware,” Thomas Hobbes wrote in 1651. In 1837, a Catholic priest in Vermont devoted 320 pages to denouncing a
Protestant cleric he referred to scornfully throughout as “the Innovator.” At the turn of the last century, a Denver processed cheese
executive told a reporter: “If you don’t innovate every day and have a great understanding of your customers, then you don’t grow.”
Meanwhile, a 21st-century scholar delivering a post-mortem on a shuttered college said that universities’ main task now is not to
teach or to research — these are so last century — but to create “space to innovate.” (Innovate what, and for whom? Don’t ask.)¶
What links the priest, the philosopher of power, and these 21st-century shillers of discount cheese and higher education? On the
surface, not much. But the strange phrase “innovate every day,” without an object, like an epiphany, retains the magic of the
visionary. What
was once a pejorative for heresy and malicious self-interest — Hobbes used “innovator” as
a synonym for “plotter” and “charlatan” — is now our finest modern virtue, a term that unites the solitary,
prickly creativity we’ve learned to associate with artists with a basically benevolent understanding
of the profit motive. “Innovate” has long been used in business contexts to refer to a discrete embellishment of a product,
but conventionally it required an object; you innovated on something else. “Innovation” is most popular today as a
stand-alone concept, a kind of managerial spirit that permeates nearly every institutional
setting, from nonprofits and newspapers to schools and summer camps. This meaning began to appear commonly in the 1970s
and exploded in the 1990s. (The adjective “innovative,” on the other hand, barely existed 30 years ago.) Now we “innovate,”
or we “foster innovation,” an open-ended usage with a utopian ring: As a starry-eyed astronomer told the
New Yorker in 1970, “The long-term challenge for innovation lies off this planet. We’ll be off the solar system in less than a thousand
years. I think curiosity will become overwhelming. Would you like to see our computer?Ӧ (Its early conquest of mainstream culture
can perhaps be measured by innovation’s appearance in Reader’s Digest, which in 1976 advised that a healthy marriage needs
“regular infusions” of innovation. Again, don’t ask.)¶ What
the popularity of innovation mostly reflects today is
both fear of perpetual crisis and faith in the private sector as its only solution. The cults of
personality sustained around corporate leaders, especially in the tech world, show how “innovation” has
never lost its association with prophecy — and indeed, with hucksterism. Only the scriptures
have changed. The Apple CEO Steve Jobs, writes his biographer, “stands as the ultimate icon of
inventiveness, imagination, and sustained innovation” — three different words, it would seem,
for the same thing, an alliterative redundancy that disguises the hollowness of the core concept.
And most would-be prophets gain an audience from the ranks of the hopeless and desperate. So it is with us: A veritable army of
“brand strategists” and consultants stand at the ready to counsel anxious employees and nervous graduates how to “be more
innovative.” If “disruption” offers an apocalyptic view of historical change, as Jill Lepore has argued, innovation is its sunnier, though
no less anxious, counterpart. With its inward-looking moralism, innovation also appeals to an evangelical strain in American culture,
in which the country is both chosen by Providence and perpetually backsliding. In 1980, an author in Newsweek lamented what he
saw as the widespread fear among his compatriots “that it’s all over for us, that the age of innovation has ended.” Or as one of the
mightiest idols in the Innovator pantheon, Peter Thiel, said more recently: “innovation in America is somewhere between dire straits
and dead.Ӧ Innovation, therefore,
is a strangely contradictory concept, simultaneously grandiose
and modest, saccharine and pessimistic. The prophetic meaning embedded deep in its
etymology allows “innovation” to stand in for nearly any kind of positive transformation, doing for
the 21st century what “progress” once did for the 19th and 20th. On the other hand, its fetish for technology
signals a retreat from the transformative visions of 19th- to mid-20th century “progress,” in all
their various forms and with all their terrible faults. As scholar Paul Erickson has pointed out, innovation
transforms processes and leaves structures intact. Thus, instead of reinventing housing or
transit, “innovators” mostly develop new processes to monetize the dysfunctional housing and
transit we already have, via companies like Airbnb and Uber. It’s one thing, therefore, to celebrate novelty indiscriminately
— as if meth labs and credit-default swaps are not innovative — but what if the new isn’t even very new at all? When Alec Ross,
Hillary Clinton’s former “Senior Advisor for Innovation,” says that “If Paul Revere were alive today, he wouldn’t have taken a
midnight ride from Boston to Lexington, he would have just used #Twitter,” all this tells me is that Twitter is basically no different
than a fast horse.¶ The
discourse of innovation celebrates creativity, but just as another form of
capital; it aims for the mystery of spiritual life, but summons only its reverence for authority;
and it lionizes collaboration, but only for profit. In other words: Beware false prophets.
Effects-T

A. Interpretation - The affirmative has to reduce surveillance
itself, not just limit the methods of surveillance that could be used
in the future.
1. Surveillance is the process of gathering information not techniques of it
Webster's New World Law 10 Webster's New World Law Dictionary Copyright © 2010
by Wiley Publishing, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey. Used by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. http://www.yourdictionary.com/surveillance
surveillance - Legal Definition n
A legal investigative process entailing a close observing or listening to a person in effort to
gather evidentiary information about the commission of a crime, or lesser improper behavior
(as with surveillance of wayward spouse in domestic relations proceedings). Wiretapping,
eavesdropping, shadowing, tailing, and electronic observation are all examples of this lawenforcement technique.

B. Violation – Limiting federal agencies ability to mandate
vulnerabilities is curtailing a technique of surveillance but not the
process.

C. Prefer our interpretation -

1. Permitting limits on methods of surveillance, but not
surveillance itself, allows the affirmative to avoid the issues of less
surveillance and forces the negative to debate a huge number of
different techniques
Constitution Committee 9
Constitution Committee, House of Lords, Parliament, UK 2009,
Session 2008-09 Publications on the internet, Constitution Committee - Second Report, Surveillance:
Citizens and the State Chapter 2
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/1804.htm
18. The term "surveillance" is used in different ways. A literal definition of surveillance as "watching
over" indicates monitoring the behaviour of persons, objects, or systems. However surveillance is not
only a visual process which involves looking at people and things. Surveillance can be undertaken in
a wide range of ways involving a variety of technologies. The instruments of surveillance
include closed-circuit television (CCTV), the interception of telecommunications ("wiretapping"),
covert activities by human agents, heat-seeking and other sensing devices, body scans,
technology for tracking movement, and many others.

D. Topicality is a voter because the opportunity to prepare
promotes better debating
Split-Key CP

Counter-plan: The United States federal government should
protect backdoors by using split crypto keys.

Split crypto key solves
Crawford 15 (Douglas Crawford, freelance writer quoting NSA Chief Mike Rodgers, 2015, “NSA
suggests ‘split crypto keys’ to protect data” https://www.bestvpn.com/blog/16988/nsasuggests-split-crypto-keys-to-protect-data/)
The stand-off between the US government and its various surveillance and law enforcement agencies
on the one hand, and just about everybody else on the other, over encryption continues to
deepen. The government has become increasingly alarmed at tech companies’ (and in particular Apple’s) push to provide their
customers with strongly encrypted products that are genuinely secure – even against the best efforts of law enforcement and
national security agencies.¶ Such
agencies use the time-worn boogeymen of terrorists and pedophiles
to argue that they must have access everyone’s personal data (I argue in this article that such demands have
nothing to with catching criminals, and everything to do with exerting state control), while privacy advocates, businesses,
and anyone who does not feel the government has an automatic right to paw through their
metaphorical undies drawer disagrees, while also pointing out that encryption with a backdoor is really
no encryption at all.¶ Perhaps even more to the point, US tech companies are still reeling from the damage done (to the tune
of billions of dollars) by Edward Snowden’s revelations about their cooperation with the NSA in spying on their customers, and
desperately need to regain their trust.¶ According
to The Washington Post, NSA chief Mike Rodgers
recently gave a rare hint at what he considers might be a technical solution to the ‘problem’,
suggesting that companies be forced to create a digital crypto key that can be used to decrypt
their customers data, but that this keys be split into different parts that single entity (except presumably
the owner of the data) would have full access to without court orders, subpoenas, warrants etc. This
would require the government and tech companies to work together to access the data.¶ ‘I don’t
want a back door. I want a front door. And I want the front door to have multiple locks. Big locks.’
Extensions

Crypto keys needed to solve crimes
Nakashima 04/10 (Ellen Nakashima, April 10, “As encryption spreads, U.S. grapples with clash
between privacy, security” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/asencryption-spreads-us-worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/04/10/7c1c7518d401-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html)
Recently, the head of the National Security Agency provided a rare hint of what some U.S. officials think
might be a technical solution. Why not, suggested Adm. Michael S. Rogers, require technology
companies to create a digital key that could open any smartphone or other locked device to
obtain text messages or photos, but divide the key into pieces so that no one person or agency
alone could decide to use it?¶ “I don’t want a back door,” Rogers, the director of the nation’s top electronic
spy agency, said during a speech at Princeton University, using a tech industry term for covert measures to bypass device
security. “I want a front door. And I want the front door to have multiple locks. Big locks.” ¶ Law
enforcement and intelligence officials have been warning that the growing use of encryption
could seriously hinder criminal and national security investigations. But the White House, which is
preparing a report for President Obama on the issue, is still weighing a range of options, including whether authorities have other
ways to get the data they need rather than compelling companies through regulatory or legislative action.
Terrorism DA
1NC

Terror threat high now—encryption and radicalization
Investor's Business Daily, 6-23-2015, "Despite Obama's Claim, Our Terror Threat Level Is High,"
http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/062315-758709-diminishing-us-power-has-elevated-our-terror-threat-level.htm
Homeland Security: The president repeatedly claims we're safer than ever. The chairman of the
House Intelligence Committee just warned of the opposite. Apparently we have difficulty
tracking U.S.-based terrorist cells. The attitude of the Obama administration toward terrorism is
summed up by the National Terrorism Advisory System page on the Homeland Security website.
"There are no current alerts," it reports. And "there are no expired alerts." Nearby is the
question, "Was this page helpful?" The answer is no. The five post-9/11 color-coded terrorism
alert levels, abandoned in 2011, were lampooned by comedians for being vague and based on
hidden criteria. With the threat level never dropping below "elevated" (yellow), down to
"guarded" (blue) or "low" (green), the public was ignoring it, it was said. But now, in its place, is
a National Terrorism Advisory System that never issues alerts. In fact, over nearly six and a half
years, President Obama has not once, under either the old or new system, issued an alert. Last
August he promised "things are much less dangerous now than they were 20 years ago, 25 years
ago, or 30 years ago." That contradicted his own Joint Chiefs chairman, secretary of defense,
and even his then-Attorney General Eric Holder, who called potential undetectable explosives
smuggled in from Syria the most frightening thing he had seen while in office. Enter House
Intelligence Committee Chairman Devin Nunes, R-Calif., who told CBS' "Face the Nation" on
Sunday that "we face the highest threat level we have ever faced in this country today . ..
including after 9/11." Because of obstacles such as encrypted Internet chat rooms, "we are
having a tough time tracking terrorist cells," according to Nunes. And "the flow of fighters" from
Western nations who have been radicalized into the Islamic State, but "who have now come
out" and may seek to commit terrorist attacks back home, is another reason the threat is
greater than ever. Nunes noted that the FBI has "cases open in 50 states." Then there is civil war
in Yemen, with the AQAP branch of al-Qaida "everywhere," according to Nunes. Last September,
outlining his noncombat approach against the Islamic State, Obama cited his Yemen policy as
the model. Eleven days later, Iranian-backed Houthi rebels toppled the U.S.-backed government.
Obama is poised to make a nuclear deal with those same Iranians, lifting sanctions and handing
Tehran tens of billions in cash to terrorize even more and gain regional dominance — all before
getting nuclear weapons, which will launch an atomic arms race in the Mideast. Russia's new
aggressiveness counters Obama's claims that the Cold War is ancient history. Iran, the Islamic
State and other terrorists are actually, while lacking Moscow's massive nuclear arsenal, a greater
threat because of the theocratic-based, self-destructive irrationality and instability underlying
their motivations. The Soviets, after all, never murdered thousands of Americans on their own
soil. Far less powerful Islamist fanatics did. Under the old color-coded system, today's level of
alert would be "severe" (red).

Rejection of all mandated vulnerabilities makes it nearly
impossible for the FBI to track down terrorists.
Ybarra 05/26/15 (Maggie Ybarra is a military affairs and Pentagon correspondent for The
Washington Times, May 26, 2015, “FBI pushes to weaken cell phone security, skirt encryption”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/may/26/fbi-push-to-weaken-cell-phonesecurity-skirt-encry/?page=all)
Now, just as new terror threats against the homeland are resurfacing, advocates of encryption
technology are asking President Obama to reject any proposal from the FBI or other administration officials
that deliberately aims to weaken the security of cellphones and other technology products.¶
“Whether you call them ‘front doors’ or ‘back doors,’ introducing intentional vulnerabilities into secure products for the
government’s use will make those products less secure against other attackers,” more than 60 privacy advocates and computer
experts said in a May 19 letter addressed to President Obama. “Every computer security expert that has spoken publicly on this issue
agrees on this point, including the government’s own experts.”¶ The letter went on to read: “We urge you to reject any proposal [in
which] U.S. companies deliberately weaken the security of their products. We request that the White House instead focus on
developing policies that will promote rather than undermine the wide adoption of strong encryption technology. Such policies will in
turn help to promote and protect cybersecurity, economic growth, and human rights, both here and abroad.Ӧ The
renewed
push to block the FBI from skirting around encryption technology walls surfaced less than a
week before the U.S. and Canada had to scramble jets to intercept commercial aircraft after someone
claimed that chemical weapons were on board. The new threat surfaced Memorial Day, when thousands of
Americans were returning from holiday vacations.¶ Federal authorities were eventually able to determine the threat was not
credible, said a law enforcement official familiar with the FBI’s ongoing investigation.¶ Still, if
the threat is credible,
encryption technologies hinder authorities who need to track down a terrorist cell or a lone-wolf
agitator determined to commit a horrific attack, said Ron Hosko, president of Law Enforcement Legal Defense
Fund and the FBI’s former assistant director.¶ The FBI typically operates in “response mode” to the multiple
threats that criminal actors and extremist organizations launch against the homeland, he said.¶ Those
agents need to be able to quickly track potential terrorists and bypass technology roadblocks,
like cellphone encryption software, in order to locate the conspirators involved in trying to kill — or merely rattle —
thousands of Americans.¶ However, if the FBI is allowed to enter an individual’s cellphone through less encryption, a
foreign entity or hacker looking to crack into the device will also have an easier time, civil liberties
advocates warn.¶ “There are a lot of governments and criminal enterprises out there, and they are trying to steal American
information, and there is no way to design a system that allows the FBI in and keeps the Chinese government out,” said Christopher
Soghoian, principal technologist for the American Civil Liberties Union.¶ For
federal agents and other law enforcement
officers, however, that logic poses a serious problem because it would hinder their ability to gather
information about the nefarious activities that America’s adversaries are planning, Mr. Hosko said.¶
“If they cannot collect the dots, then how can they connect the dots?” he said.¶ In a press
conference on cyberissues last week, Mr. Comey said when he read the letter to Mr. Obama, he concluded that the
writers either were incapable of seeing both sides of the issue or simply not fair-minded individuals.¶ “A group of techno companies
and some prominent folks wrote a letter to the president yesterday that I frankly found depressing, because their letter contains no
acknowledgment that there are societal costs for universal encryption,” he said. “Look,
I recognize the challenges facing
our techno companies: competitive challenges, regulatory challenge overseas, all kinds of challenges. I
recognize the method of encryption [has value on those matters]. But I think fair-minded people also
have to recognize the cost associated with that.”
Bioweapons are easily accessible by terrorists and lead to mass deaths
Wilson 13 (Grant, 1/17/13, University of Virginia School of Law, “MINIMIZING GLOBAL
CATASTROPHIC AND EXISTENTIAL RISKS FROM EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL LAW,” professor @ University of Virginia School of Law,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/lawjournals/sites/lawjournals/files/3.%20Wilson%20%20Emerging%20Technologies.pdf, 7/15/15, SM)
ii. Risk of bioterrorism∂ The threat of the malicious release of bioengineered organisms (i.e.,∂ bioterrorism) poses a GCR/ER.75
Bioengineering enables a malicious∂ actor to create an organism that is more deadly to humans,
animals, or∂ plants than anything that exists in the natural world.76 Experts contend∂ that the barriers for a
terrorist to order a DNA sequence for a highly∂ pathogenic virus online or acquire a DNA synthesis machine online are∂
“surmountable.” 77 Alternatively,
bioterrorists could break into∂ laboratories housing dangerous
bioengineered organisms—like the∂ H5N1 virus, for example—and release them. Meanwhile, third
world∂ countries with laxer standards and lower laboratory accountability are∂ rapidly
discovering and using bioengineering, which may give∂ bioterrorists an easier pathway to obtain
deadly bioengineered∂ organisms.78∂ There have already been several occasions in which groups attempted∂ to use or
successfully used biological weapons. One unsophisticated∂ example of bioterrorism occurred when an individual contaminated∂
salads and dressing with salmonella in what apparently was an attempt∂ to decide a local election.79 Another example occurred
in 2001, when∂ bioterrorists sent envelopes containing anthrax spores through the mail, infecting
twenty-two people and killing five of them.∂ 80 While these∂ particular acts of bioterrorism did not cause
widespread death,∂ deploying extremely deadly bioengineered organisms over a large area∂ is a real
possibility: tests by the United States in 1964 demonstrated that∂ a single aircraft can contaminate
five thousand square kilometers of land∂ with a deadly bacterial aerosol.81∂ The recent
engineering of an airborne H5N1 virus demonstrates∂ society’s concern over risks of
bioterrorism arising from∂ bioengineering. Before scientists could publish their results of their∂ bioengineered
airborne H5N1 virus in the widely read journals Nature∂ and Science, the NSABB determined that the danger of releasing the∂
sensitive information outweighed the benefits to society, advising that∂ the findings not be published in their entirety.82 The main
risk is that∂ either a state or non-state actor could synthesize a “weaponized” version∂ of the H5N1 virus to create a disastrous
pandemic.83 There is precedent∂ of outside groups recreating advanced bioengineering experiments, such∂ as when many scientists
immediately synthesized hepatitis C replicons∂ upon publication of its genetic code. 84 However, the NSABB’s∂ recommendation
was nonbinding, and there is nothing to stop other∂ scientists from releasing similar data in the future. Furthermore, while∂ the
NSABB merely asserts that the “blueprints” of the virus should not∂ be printed, other biosecurity experts argue that the virus should
never∂ have been created in the first place because of risks that the viruses∂ would escape or be stolen.85
Link Extensions

Backdoors key to stopping recruitment on social media sites
Ignatious 07/23/15 (David Ignatius, is an American journalist and novelist. He is an associate
editor and columnist for the Washington Post July 23, 2015 “The rise of lone wolf terrorists:
David Ignatius”
http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/07/the_rise_of_lone_wolf_terroris.htm)
FBI Director James Comey was frank this week in Salt Lake City about the "troubled souls" the
online jihadists are trying to mobilize. "Their message is travel to the Caliphate, their so-called Islamic wonder world.
Join us here in Iraq or Syria, and if you can't travel, kill somebody where you are. Kill somebody in uniform, preferably in the military
or law enforcement, but just kill somebody."¶ Comey
isn't exaggerating. On May 24, an Islamic State fighter
calling himself Abu Awlaki tweeted: "I don't understand my ikwa [brothers] in the west. How can
u walk past a police officer without stabbing him?" Last week, a fighter named Sayfullah al-Yemani
posted a call to African-Americans: "I know there are black brothers who are fighting
eliminationism and racism and need help. I urge you to embrace Islam and give Ba'yah [oath of fealty]."
¶ In
these jihadist postings, the brutal call to war is mixed with fantasies that might be drawn from a video game. That's one reason
some U.S. counterterrorism experts such as Michael Leiter, former head of the National Counterterrorism Center, don't often use
the phrase "lone wolves." They prefer "lone offenders," which doesn't play into the jihadists' self-dramatization.¶ What
troubles U.S. officials is the problem Comey has described as "going dark." He says the FBI can't
break the strong encryption that communications and IT companies are offering users. He told
Congress this month that he doesn't want greater surveillance authority, but rather technical
help from IT companies to access encrypted information "to ensure that we can continue to obtain electronic
information ... to keep us safe." This presumably means "back doors" for decryption, which many
companies resist.

Encryption allows terrorists to roam free on social media
Wilber 07/10/15 (Del Quentin Wilber, is an American journalist who writes for Bloomberg
News, July 10, 2015 “US agents foiled July 4 terror plots: FBI director”
http://www.smh.com.au/world/us-agents-foiled-july-4-terror-plots-fbi-director-20150710gi97eq.html#ixzz3glZckySehttp://www.smh.com.au/world/us-agents-foiled-july-4-terror-plotsfbi-director-20150710-gi97eq.html)
Washington: The US disrupted an undisclosed number of terrorist plots tied to the
Independence Day holiday, highlighting the risk of an attack on American soil inspired by Islamic State extremists, FBI Director James
Comey said.¶ Mr Comey said on Thursday that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had arrested at
least 10 people in the past four weeks on suspicion they were linked to Islamic State. Some of those
detained had plans involving the holiday weekend, he said, without providing further details. ¶ "I do believe that our work disrupted efforts to kill
people, likely in connection with July 4th," Mr Comey said. ¶ Mr
Comey's remarks came a day after he warned US
legislators about the growing threat posed by terrorists and other criminals who communicate
over encrypted applications that can't be deciphered. Dozens of Americans were communicating with Islamic State over
such secretive networks, Mr Comey told reporters on Thursday at FBI headquarters, saying that potential
terrorists are "going dark" by using such tools.¶ FBI officials have said that American
sympathisers often follow Islamic State militants on Twitter and send them direct messages
through the social media platform. Militants then direct the Americans to use secure communication tools that can't be accessed by
federal agents. Islamic State has more than 21,000 English-speaking followers on Twitter, federal authorities say. ¶ Law enforcement
officials have expressed growing alarm that Islamic State is successfully using social media to
inspire homegrown extremists in the US and Europe to act on their own, a departure from how other terrorist groups, such as alQaeda, have long operated.

Encryption hurts law enforcements ability to catch terrorists on
social media sites.
(29 March 2015 , Europol chief warns on computer encryption,
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32087919)
Hidden areas of the internet and encrypted communications make
it harder to monitor terror suspects,
warns Europol's Rob Wainwright.¶ Tech firms should consider the impact sophisticated
encryption software has on law enforcement, he said.¶ Mr Wainwright was talking to 5 Live Investigates.¶ A
spokesman for TechUK, the UK's technology trade association, said: "With the right resources and cooperation between the security
agencies and technology companies, alongside a clear legal framework for that cooperation, we can ensure both national security
and economic security are upheld."¶ Mr
Wainwright said that in most current investigations the use of
encrypted communications was found to be central to the way terrorists operated.¶ "It's become
perhaps the biggest problem for the police and the security service authorities in dealing with the threats from
terrorism," he explained.¶ "It's changed the very nature of counter-terrorist work from one that has been traditionally reliant on
having good monitoring capability of communications to one that essentially doesn't provide that any more."¶ Mr
Wainwright,
whose organisation supports police forces in Europe, said terrorists were exploiting the "dark net", where
users can go online anonymously, away from the gaze of police and security services. But he is also
concerned at moves by companies such as Apple to allow customers to encrypt data on their smartphones.¶ And the
development of heavily encrypted instant messaging apps is another cause for concern, he said.
This meant people could send text and voice messages which police found very difficult or
impossible to access, he said.¶ "We are disappointed by the position taken by these tech firms and it only adds to our
problems in getting to the communications of the most dangerous people that are abusing the internet.¶ "[Tech firms] are doing it, I
suppose, because of a commercial imperative driven by what they perceive to be consumer demand for greater privacy of their
communications." Mr Wainwright acknowledged this was a result of the revelations by former National Security Agency contractor
Edward Snowden, who exposed how security services were conducting widespread surveillance of emails and messages.¶ He said
security agencies now had to work to rebuild trust between technology firms and the authorities.¶ The TechUK spokesman told the
programme: "From huge volumes of financial transactions to personal details held on devices, the security of digital communications
fundamentally underpins the UK economy.¶ "Encryption is an essential component of the modern world and ensures the UK retains
its position as one of the world's leading economies.¶ "Tech companies take their security responsibilities incredibly seriously, and in
the ongoing course of counter-terrorism and other investigations engage with law enforcement and security agencies."¶ The
programme also found evidence that supporters of the Islamic State (IS) are using encrypted
sites to radicalise or groom new recruits. On one blogging website, a 17-year-old girl who wants
to become a "jihadi bride" is told that if she needs to speak securely she should use an encrypted
messaging app.¶ The family of 15-year-old Yusra Hussein from Bristol, who went to Syria last year, also believe she was
groomed in this way.¶ Twitter terrorism¶ The extent of the challenge faced by security services is shown in
the scale of social media use by IS.¶ Mr Wainwright revealed that IS is believed to have up to
50,000 different Twitter accounts tweeting up to 100,000 messages a day.¶ Europol is now setting up a
European Internet Referral Unit to identify and remove sites being used by terrorist organisations. ¶ Mr Wainwright also says current
laws are "deficient" and should be reviewed to ensure security agencies are able to monitor all areas of the online world.¶ "There
is a significant capability gap that has to change if we're serious about ensuring the internet isn't
abused and effectively enhancing the terrorist threat.¶ "We have to make sure we reach the right balance by
ensuring the fundamental principles of privacy are upheld so there's a lot of work for legislators and tech firms to do."

Encryption prevents federal agencies from tracking terrorists on
the dark web
Thursday July 23, 2015, “Rep. McCaul: Encrypted Dark Web Aids ISIS' 'Call to Arms' in US“
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/mike-mccaul-isis-dark-webencryption/2015/05/13/id/644323/
The Islamic State (ISIS)
is sending out a "call to arms" online to direct people in the United States to
commit acts of terror, Rep. Michael McCaul said Wednesday morning, and many terrorists are using the
Internet's "Dark Web" to hide their movements.¶ "This is a different phenomenon from [Osama]
bin Laden, who operated with couriers," the Texas Republican told CNN's "New Day" program. "We're dealing with an
enemy now, ISIS, that has a very sophisticated social media program."¶ McCaul, the chairman of the
House Committee on Homeland Security, said he's been studying foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq who go through Turkey to
come into Europe and the United States. But the
Internet allows ISIS to activate followers "through a tweet,
which is what we saw in the Texas case of two ISIS followers who were activated to conduct a
terrorist attack there."¶ But ISIS isn't just using Twitter, which anyone can read, said McCaul, but also the
Dark Web, which wired.com describes as a collection of thousands of websites using anonymity tools to hide the IP addresses of
the servers that run them to "protect users from surveillance and censorship."¶ "That place is where they hide,
because of encryption," said McCaul. "We're trying to find needles in the haystack and the needles
are going dark, and it's because of this phenomenon we can't track their movements."¶ The
messages in Garland, Texas, were able to be tracked and relayed to the police department, said McCaul.¶ "But when their
encrypt goes dark, we can't track them here in the United States," McCaul said. "This is sort of a
new phenomenon where they're using the Internet as a weapon."
Turns Case
Multiple shocks on econ after terror attacks—foreign direct investment,
infrastructure, trade
Sandler and Ender 10
(Todd Sandler, Professor of International Relations and Economics at the University of Southern
California, Walter Enders, Bidgood Chair of Economics and Finance at the University of Alabama,
July 2010, http://www.utdallas.edu/~tms063000/website/Econ_Consequences_ms.pdf)
Terrorism can impose costs on a targeted country through a number of avenues. Terrorist
incidents have economic consequences by diverting foreign direct investment (FDI), destroying
infrastructure, redirecting public investment funds to security, or limiting trade. If a developing
country loses enough FDI, which is an important source of savings, then it may also experience
reduced economic growth. Just as capital may take flight from a country plagued by a civil war
(see Collier et al., 2003), a sufficiently intense terrorist campaign may greatly reduce capital
inflows (Enders and Sandler, 1996). Terrorism, like civil conflicts, may cause spillover costs 2
among neighboring countries as a terrorist campaign in a neighbor dissuades capital inflows, or
a regional multiplier causes lost economic activity in the terrorism-ridden country to resonate
throughout the region.1 In some instances, terrorism may impact specific industries as 9/11 did
on airlines and tourism (Drakos, 2004; Ito and Lee, 2004). Another cost is the expensive security
measures that must be instituted following large attacks – e.g., the massive homeland security
outlays since 9/11 (Enders and Sandler, 2006, Chapter 10). Terrorism also raises the costs of
doing business in terms of higher insurance premiums, expensive security precautions, and
larger salaries to at-risk employees.
Domestic terrorism deters foreign direct investment – even small attacks crush
investor confidence
Bandyopadhyay et al 15 -- Subhayu Bandyopadhyay is Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Research
Fellow at IZA, Bonn, Germany. Todd Sandler is Vibhooti Shukla Professor of Economics and Political Economy at the University of Texas at Dallas. Javed
Younasis Associate Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. “The Toll of Terrorism”
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2015/06/bandyopa.htm
Scaring off investors Increased
terrorism in a particular area tends to depress the expected return on capital
invested there, which shifts investment elsewhere. This reduces the stock of productive capital and the
flow of productivity-enhancing technology to the affected nation. For example, from the mid-1970s through 1991, terrorist
incidents reduced net foreign direct investment in Spain by 13.5 percent and in Greece by 11.9 percent (Enders and Sandler, 1996). In fact, the
initial loss of productive resources as a result of terrorism may increase manyfold because
potential foreign investors shift their investments to other, presumably safer, destinations. Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2008) showed that a relatively small increase in the perceived risk of terrorism can cause an outsized
reduction in a country’s net stock of foreign direct investment and inflict significant damage on its economy. We
analyzed 78 developing economies over the period 1984–2008 (Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas, 2014) and found that on average a
relatively small increase in a country’s domestic terrorist incidents per 100,000 persons sharply
reduced net foreign direct investment. There was a similarly large reduction in net investment if
the terrorist incidents originated abroad or involved foreigners or foreign assets in the attacked country. We also found that
greater official aid flows can substantially offset the damage to foreign direct investment—perhaps in part because the increased aid allows recipient
nations to invest in more effective counterterrorism efforts. Most countries that experienced above-average domestic or transnational terrorist
incidents during 1970–2011 received less foreign direct investment or foreign aid than the average among the 122 in the sample (see table). It is
difficult to assess causation, but the table suggests a troubling association between terrorism and depressed aid and foreign direct investment, both of
which are crucial for developing economies. It is generally believed that there are higher risks in trading with a nation afflicted by terrorism, which
cause an increase in transaction costs and tend to reduce trade. For example, after the September 11 attacks on New York City and the Washington,
D.C., area, the U.S. border was temporarily closed, holding up truck traffic between the United States and Canada for an extended time. Nitsch and
Schumacher (2004) analyzed a sample of 200 countries over the period 1960–93 and found that when terrorism incidents in a pair of trading countries
when one of two trading
partners suffers at least one terrorist attack, it reduces trade between them to 91 percent of
what it would be in the absence of terrorism. Blomberg and Hess (2006) estimated that terrorism and other internal and
double in one year, trade between them falls by about 4 percent that same year. They also found that
external conflicts retard trade as much as a 30 percent tariff. More specifically, they found that any trading partner that experienced terrorism
experienced close to a 4 percent reduction in bilateral trade. But Egger and Gassebner (2015) found more modest trade effects. Terrorism had few to
no short-term effects; it was significant over the medium term, which they defined as “more than one and a half years after an attack/incident.”
Abstracting from the impact of transaction costs from terrorism, Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014b) found that terrorism may not necessarily reduce
trade, because resources can be reallocated. If terrorism disproportionately harmed one productive resource (say land) relative to another (say labor),
then resources would flow to the labor-intensive sector. If a country exported labor-intensive goods, such as textiles, terrorism could actually lead to
increased production and exportation. In other words, although terrorism may reduce trade in a particular product because it increases transaction
costs, its ultimate impact may be either to raise or reduce overall trade. These apparently contradictory empirical and theoretical findings present rich
prospects for future study. Of course terrorism has repercussions beyond human and material destruction and the economic effects discussed in this
article. Terrorism also influences immigration and immigration policy. The traditional gains and losses from the international movement of labor may
be magnified by national security considerations rooted in a terrorism response. For example, a recent study by Bandyopadhyay and Sandler (2014a)
focused on a terrorist organization based in a developing country. It showed that the immigration policy of the developed country targeted by the
terrorist group can be critical to containing transnational terrorism. Transnational terrorism targeted at well-protected developed countries tends to be
more skill intensive: it takes a relatively sophisticated terrorist to plan and successfully execute such an attack. Immigration policies that attract highly
skilled people to developed countries can drain the pool of highly skilled terrorist recruits and may cut down on transnational terrorism.
Bubble DA/Turn
1NC

Tech bubble now- burn rates to start ups and high risk
John Cook 14, John Cook is GeekWire's co-founder and editor, a veteran reporter and the
longest-serving journalist on the Pacific Northwest tech startup beat., 9-15-14 "Venture
capitalist Bill Gurley: Tech sector is overheating, and the boom could end," GeekWire,
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/venture-capitalist-bill-gurley-says-things-overheating-techsector-current-boom-cycle-will-end/
All good things must come to an end. And Benchmark’s Bill Gurley — one of the most successful venture capitalists on the
planet — thinks the current tech
boom is starting to show signs of the dot-com boom (and bust).
are rising at startups, and
companies are feeling as if they need to raise huge piles of capital in order to compete. “Every
What worries the backer of Zillow, Uber, NextDoor and Opentable? Burn rates
incremental day that goes past I have this feeling a little bit more,” Gurley tells the Wall Street Journal in a wide-ranging
interview. “I
think that Silicon Valley as a whole or that the venture-capital community or
startup community is taking on an excessive amount of risk right now. Unprecedented since ‘’99. In
some ways less silly than ’99 and in other ways more silly than in ’99.” Gurley goes on to surmise that burn rates — the
amount of money that a company is spending — at venture-backed companies are now at
an all-time high. He also suggests that more people “are working for money-losing
companies than have been in 15 years,” and that many of the entrepreneurs today don’t have the “muscle
memory” of what happened in the late 90s. “So risk just keeps going higher, higher and higher. The problem is that because
you get there slowly the correcting is really hard and catastrophic. Right now, the cost of capital is super low here. If
the
environment were to change dramatically, the types of gymnastics that it would require
companies to readjust their spend is massive. So I worry about it constantly.” Interestingly, when I
interviewed Gurley at last year’s GeekWire Summit, which took place last September, Gurley didn’t sound quite as cautious in
his remarks. At one point, I asked him about Benchmark’s investment in Webvan — perhaps the greatest example of 1990s
dot-com hubris — and he noted that the firm likely would invest in the concept again. “ They got
too ambitious.
They tried to do too much, too fast and then the bubble happened,” he said. “If you have a
high-capital business and you are being overly aggressive and you surf over a financial
reset, you are dead.” Just like Webvan’s crash, Gurley predicts that we’ll see some high-profile failures in the next year
or two, something he says will be healthy for the tech ecosystem as a whole.

Getting rid of backdoors will increase the creation of new startups
by more innovation according to the 1ac evidence
Kohn 14 (Cindy, writer for the Electronic Freedom Foundation, 9-26-14, “Nine Epic Failures of Regulating
Cryptography,” https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/nine-epic-failures-regulating-cryptography, BC)
It will harm innovation. In order to ensure that no "untappable" technology exists,
we'll likely see a technology mandate and a draconian regulatory framework. The
implications of this for America's leadership in innovation are dire. Could Mark
Zuckerberg have built Facebook in his dorm room if he'd had to build in surveillance
capabilities before launch in order to avoid government fines? Would Skype have
ever happened if it had been forced to include an artificial bottleneck to allow
government easy access to all of your peer-to-peer communications? This has
especially serious implications for the open source community and small innovator

New startups are what’s increasing the bubble
Edwards 11/05/14 (Jim Edwards, is the founding editor of Business Insider UK Nov. 5, 2014, “Here's The
Evidence That The Tech Bubble Is About To Burst”http://www.businessinsider.com/evidence-that-tech-bubble-is-at-a-peak2014-10#ixzz3h4MsNwX0)
It is now common for companies with no revenue, or negligible revenue, to be valued in the
billions of dollars. Snapchat. WhatsApp. Instagram. Tumblr. Pinterest. All have been sold or valued at over $1 billion.¶ ¶
None have declared revenues that in any way justify those prices.¶ ¶ They might in the future. But they haven't yet. So if
you're looking for evidence that tech is at the top of a peak, you're in the right place. This is a boom,
and we're at the highest point of it since 2000.¶ ¶ But if you believe this boom is also a bubble — assets with values
literally inflated out of thin air, as they were with web sites in 2000 and real estate in 2007 — then the jury is still out. Parts of the tech
sector do look bubblicious. But we're not seeing an exact repeat of 2000 ...¶ ¶ ... Yet. Behind Snapchat and Tumblr is a new
crop of tech startups with no revenue whatsoever:¶ ¶ Secret, an anonymous gossip app that
keeps the identities of its users hidden, has raised $36 million in investment funding at a valuation of
$100 million.¶ Ello, the social network that has promised it will not show ads, just got $5.5 million
in venture funding even though its founders have promised in writing to never sell ads or user data.
¶

The impact of a tech bubble burst will have large repercussions on
the global economy.
Rifai 07/23/15 (Idriss Al Rifai, Jul 23, 2015, “What The Tech Bubble Means Outside
Silicon Valley” http://techcrunch.com/2015/07/23/what-the-tech-bubble-meansoutside-silicon-valley/)
Should it burst, the tech bubble will have ramifications that ripple around the tech world
like the shockwave from an apocalyptic asteroid. Most tech hubs are not self-sufficient at all;
the fact that they are always referred to as the “Silicon Valley of [insert country]” should be a tipoff that they are merely
branches off the trunk that is Silicon Valley. Even prolific
hubs like Israel, China and India depend on
Silicon Valley to pump capital through their arteries.¶ For us outsiders in the “rest of the world,” the
importance of Silicon Valley is not just its wealth of investors, high-tech companies and talent. The
value is not just the billions of dollars that flow so freely that the writers of HBO’s Silicon Valley, no
matter how many people they asked, couldn’t find a reason why a company like Pied Piper wouldn’t get $10 to $15 million in
funding.¶ No, the real value is faith and trust. Silicon Valley is a broker of credibility. It’s not as if
here, in Dubai, there is any lack of capital. It’s just that no one here would dare to put significant funds into a tech startup early
in the game unless it had Silicon Valley’s stamp of approval.¶ Let me give you a real example of this. Earlier this year, my
company Fetchr received a valuation from U.S. investors that was six times greater than what a top-notch investor in Dubai
had suggested. Raising capital from Dubai-based investors wouldn’t have been worth it.¶ In local business culture, some
investors believe that if a startup needs to bring in capital, the founder must not have the capacity and knowledge to grow the
company. Fundraising is a sign of weakness. I have seen local investors refuse to carve out stock options and insist that new
hires will have to take a cut from the founder’s share pool. ¶ However, after New Enterprise Associates (NEA) and other
American VC firms committed to us in the round, investors in the UAE believed in the potential of the company. The gleam of
Silicon Valley became a beacon for customers and capital on our own turf. The credibility we gained was at least as valuable as
the actual capital.¶ Should it burst,
the tech bubble will have ramifications that ripple around the
tech world like the shockwave from an apocalyptic asteroid.¶ This is what makes the bubble
especially terrifying outside Silicon Valley. Thousands of miles away, across multiple time zones and cultural
fault lines, Silicon Valley’s errors could sweep us away in a tide of doubt as American investors
recoil from foreign tech. Without the flow of outside capital and credibility, Dubai’s fledgling tech community would
be set back 30 years.¶ I don’t mean to downplay the consequences of the bubble in the U.S . — it will be painful — but I do
think innovation will bounce back relatively quickly, just as it did after the Dot-com Bubble. Silicon Valley has a formidable
culture of innovation that will not go away, even if many startups go bust. I n more
fragile economies, the
bubble’s ramifications could be harsher and longer lasting, despite the emergence of local VC
industries.¶ Consider Spain, a country where unemployment is at 23.78 percent across age groups and a staggering 49.30
percent for people under 25 years old. The small but growing tech scene is an area where youth can effectively create their
own jobs, presuming they have access to capital. Indeed, Spain saw more than $300 million worth of IT investments in 2014,
up 30 percent over 2013, according to Venture Watch Research. ¶ Here’s the catch: 32.6 percent of the total investment volume
came from the United States, and another 26.3 percent came from outside the country. Between January and March 2015, 51.3
percent of volume came from the U.S. alone, and just 17.3 percent came from Spain. ¶ How does
a tech community
like Spain’s continue to thrive if the bubble bursts and U.S. investors pull the plug? Joining half of
Spain’s youth in unemployment won’t be an appealing option for the tech-savvy individuals
denied any hope of becoming entrepreneurs on the Iberian Peninsula. ¶ Many will end up clocking in and out at
big European companies where “innovation” is a joke. Many will leave Spain, robbing the country of
talent and future companies that would provide jobs, training, mentorship and sustainable economic
value.¶ Spain’s $300 million in funding is miniscule compared to the $48 billion that venture
firms shelled out on American companies in 2014 (by comparison, the global volume of VC activity was $86
billion). Spain is certainly not the only foreign tech hub that depends on U.S. venture capital.
Consider that in 2014, 239 out of 308 venture funds were based in North America, according to research firm PitchBook. ¶
Which leads to the great unknown: If the bubble cuts off the flow of capital, what would be
the wider impact on emerging tech hubs like Spain, Nigeria and even Greece, where there is already a volatile
cocktail of unemployment and political tension? Would the wounded tech community thrown its support
behind more radicalized political parties? Would “brain drain” from these countries put local tech innovation
into a coma? Would the collapse of tech take down other verticals?¶ Silicon Valley is the center
of innovation because it pumps fresh capital — and fresh credibility — throughout the global tech
ecosystem. A Silicon Valley startup is an everyday, blasé thing; a startup in places like Dubai is outlandish and unsettling,
at least until Silicon Valley investors knight it. I run a startup in Dubai that only became possible through the credibility
bestowed on us by top-tier American VCs.¶ I can’t tell you the exact repercussions of a bubble. But I know as an entrepreneur
who lives somewhere in the “rest of the world,” this is about more than 117 Unicorns and one valley. If
the bubble
bursts, whether it’s caused by hubris, ignorance or unseen forces, the global tech
community will share in the pain.
Link Extensions

Growth in investments are what’s leading to the bubble growing
Cuban 03/04/15 (Mark Cuban, is an American businessman, investor, and owner
of the NBA's Dallas Mavericks, March 4, 2015, “Why This Tech Bubble is Worse Than
the Tech Bubble of 2000” http://blogmaverick.com/2015/03/04/why-this-techbubble-is-worse-than-the-tech-bubble-of2000/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+b
logmaverick%2FtyiP+%28blog+maverick%29
If we thought it was stupid to invest in public internet websites that had no chance of succeeding
back then, it’s worse today.¶ In a bubble there is always someone with a “great” idea pitching
an investor the dream of a billion dollar payout with a comparison to an existing success story. In the tech
bubble it was Broadcast.com, AOL, Netscape, etc. Today its, Uber, Twitter, Facebook, etc. ¶ To the investor, its the
hope of a huge payout. But there is one critical difference. Back then the companies the
general public was investing in were public companies. They may have been horrible companies, but
being public meant that investors had liquidity to sell their stocks. ¶ The bubble today comes from private
investors who are investing in apps and small tech companies.¶ Just like back then there
were always people telling you their idea for a new website or about the public website they invested in,
today people always have what essentially boils down to an app that they want you to
invest in. But unlike back then when the dream of riches was from a public company, now its from a private company. And
there in lies the rub.¶ People we used to call individual or small investors, are now called Angels.
Angels. Why do they call them Angels ? Maybe because they grant wishes ?¶ According to some data I found,
there are 225k Angels in the US. Like the crazy days of the internet boom, I wonder how many realize what they
have gotten into ?¶ But they are not alone.¶ For those who can’t figure out how to be Angels. You can sign up to be part of the
new excitement called Equity Crowd Funding. Equity Crowd Funding allows you to join the masses to chase investments with
as little as 5k dollars. Oh the possibilities !!¶ I
have absolutely not doubt in my mind that most of these
individual Angels and crowd funders are currently under water in their investments.
Absolutely none. I say most. The percentage could be higher
Going Dark DA
1NC

Current NSA has control of deep web by using existing backdoors
to bypass encryption methods.
Franceschi 07/15/15 (LORENZO FRANCESCHI-BICCHIERA is a staffwriter at motherboard,
“The FBI Hacked a Dark Web Child Porn Site to Unmask Its Visitors”
http://motherboard.vice.com/en_uk/read/the-fbi-hacked-a-dark-web-child-porn-site-tounmask-its-visitors)
It’s no secret that the FBI hacks into suspects’ computers during its investigations. But the
bureau is certainly not a fan of publicizing its methods.¶ A recent case involving two frequent
users of an unnamed dark web child pornography site is no different. Last week, two men from
New York were indicted on child pornography charges, and in court documents, the prosecutors
and the FBI were careful not to reveal too many details about the investigation.¶ But a passage in
the court documents, spotted by Stanford computer science and law expert Jonathan Mayer,
reveals that the feds deployed a “Network Investigative Technique” to unmask the two men and
obtain their real IP address.¶ “That's the agency's current euphemism for hacking,” Mayer told
Motherboard in an email. While the court document stops short of explaining exactly what
hacking technique the FBI used, the description seems to point in the direction of a “watering
hole” attack or a “drive-by download,” techniques where hackers hijack a website and subvert it
to deliver malware to all the visitors.¶ On February 20, 2015 the FBI seized the server hosting
what the FBI refers to only as “Website A,” according to court documents. That allowed the
bureau to use a Network Investigative Technique, or NIT, to “monitor the electronic
communications” of all visitors of the site until March 4.¶ The NIT was designed was designed to
trick the computers of the more than 200,000 visitors of the site into sending the FBI a host of
information about the target, such as his or her “actual” IP address, the computer’s operating
system, and its MAC address, a computer’s unique identifier, according to court documents.’¶
Given the way the FBI describes how it unmasked the two suspects, Alex Schreiber and Peter
Ferrell, for Mayer, there’s no other “technical explanation” that this was a case of hacking and
use of malware.

Backdoors key to solving for encryption on the Internet
Kravets 07/08/15 (David Kravets, July 8, 2015, “FBI chief tells Senate committee we’re doomed
without crypto backdoors” https://www.benton.org/headlines/fbi-chief-tells-senatecommittee-were-doomed-without-crypto-backdoors)
James Comey,
the director of the FBI, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the government
should have the right to lawfully access any device or electronic form of communication with a lawful
court order, even if it is encrypted. Director Comey and Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates briefed the
committee and complained that keys necessary to decrypt communications and electronic devices
often reside "solely in the hands of the end user"-- which they said is emblematic of the so-called
"Going Dark problem." Companies should bake encryption backdoors into their products to allow
lawful access, they said. "We are not asking to expand the government's surveillance authority, but rather we are asking to
ensure that we can continue to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that Congress has
provided to us to keep America safe," read the joint prepared remarks.¶ "Mr.
Chairman, the Department of Justice
believes that the challenges posed by the Going Dark problem are grave, growing, and
extremely complex." To counter this, the duo said the government is actively developing its own decryption tools. The
remarks said, "We should also continue to invest in developing tools, techniques, and capabilities
designed to mitigate the increasing technical challenges associated with the Going Dark
problem. In limited circumstances, this investment may help mitigate the risks posed in high priority national security or criminal
cases, although it will most likely be unable to provide a timely or scalable solution in terms of addressing the full spectrum of public
safety needs.

Deep web is a host of crimes specifically with drug trafficking
Grossman 11/11/13 (Lev Grossman, lead technology writer for the times, Nov. 11, 2013, “The
Secret Web: Where Drugs, Porn and Murder Live Online” http://time.com/630/the-secret-webwhere-drugs-porn-and-murder-live-online/)
On the afternoon of Oct. 1, 2013, a tall, slender, shaggy-haired man left his house on 15th Avenue in
San Francisco. He paid $1,000 a month cash to share it with two housemates who knew him only as a quiet currency trader named
Josh Terrey. His real name was Ross Ulbricht. He was 29 and had no police record. Dressed in jeans and a red T-shirt,
Ulbricht headed to the Glen Park branch of the public library, where he made his way to the science-fiction section and logged on to
his laptop–he was using the free wi-fi. Several FBI agents dressed in plainclothes converged on him, pushed him up against a
window, then escorted him from the building.¶ The
FBI believes Ulbricht is a criminal known online as the
Dread Pirate Roberts, a reference to the book and movie The Princess Bride. The Dread Pirate Roberts was the
owner and administrator of Silk Road, a wildly successful online bazaar where people bought
and sold illegal goods–primarily drugs but also fake IDs, fireworks and hacking software. They could do this without
getting caught because Silk Road was located in a little-known region of the Internet called the Deep Web.¶
Technically the Deep Web refers to the collection of all the websites and databases that search
engines like Google don’t or can’t index, which in terms of the sheer volume of information is many times larger than
the Web as we know it. But more loosely, the Deep Web is a specific branch of the Internet that’s
distinguished by that increasingly rare commodity: complete anonymity. Nothing you do on the Deep Web can be
associated with your real-world identity, unless you choose it to be. Most people never see it, though the software
you need to access it is free and takes less than three minutes to download and install. If there’s a
part of the grid that can be considered off the grid, it’s the Deep Web.¶ The Deep Web has plenty of valid reasons
for existing. It’s a vital tool for intelligence agents, law enforcement, political dissidents and anybody who needs
or wants to conduct their online affairs in private–which is, increasingly, everybody. According to a survey
published in September by the Pew Internet & American Life Project, 86% of Internet users have attempted to delete or conceal
their digital history, and 55% have tried to avoid being observed online by specific parties like their employers or the government.¶
But the Deep Web is also an ideal venue for doing things that are unlawful, especially when it’s
combined, as in the case of Silk Road, with the anonymous, virtually untraceable electronic currency
Bitcoin. “It allows all sorts of criminals who, in bygone eras, had to find open-air drug markets or an alley somewhere
to engage in bad activity to do it openly,” argues Preet Bharara, U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New
York, whose office is bringing a case against Ulbricht and who spoke exclusively to TIME. For 2½ years Silk Road acted as
an Amazon-like clearinghouse for illegal goods, providing almost a million customers worldwide
with $1.2 billion worth of contraband, according to the 39-page federal complaint against Ulbricht. The Dread Pirate
Roberts, the Deep Web’s Jeff Bezos, allegedly collected some $80 million in fees.
Earlier today, FBI Director James Comey implied that a broad coalition of technology companies,
trade associations, civil society groups, and security experts were either uninformed or were not “fairminded” in a letter they sent to the President yesterday urging him to reject any legislative
proposals that would undermine the adoption of strong encryption by US companies. The letter was signed
by dozens of organizations and companies in the latest part of the debate over whether the government should be given built-in
access to encrypted data (see, for example, here, here, here, and here for previous iterations).
The comments were made at the Third Annual Cybersecurity Law Institute held at Georgetown University Law Center. The transcript
of his encryption-related discussion is below (emphasis added).
Increasingly,
communications at rest sitting on a device or in motion are encrypted. The device is
encrypted or the communication is encrypted and therefore unavailable to us even with a court
order. So I make a showing of probable cause to a judge in a criminal case or in an intelligence case to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court judge that the content of a particular defense or a particular communication stream should be collected to our
statutory authority, and the judge approves, increasingly we are finding ourselves unable to read what we find or we’re unable to
open a device. And that is a serious concern.
I am actually — I think encryption is
a good thing. I think there are tremendous societal benefits to encryption. That’s
one of the reasons the FBI tells people not only lock your cars, but you should encrypt things
that are important to you to make it harder for thieves to take them.
But we have a collision going on in this country that’s getting closer and closer to an actual
head-on, which is our important interest in privacy — which I am passionate about — and our important
interest in public safety. The logic of universal encryption is inexorable that our authority under the Fourth Amendment —
an amendment that I think is critical to ordered liberty — with the right predication and the right oversight to obtain information is
going to become increasingly irrelevant. As all of our lives become digital, the logic of encryption is that all of our lives will be
covered by strong encryption, therefore all of our lives — I know there are no criminals here, but including the lives of criminals and
terrorists and spies — will be in a place that is utterly unavailable to court ordered process.
And that, I think, to a democracy should be very, very concerning. I think we need to have a conversation about it. Again, how do we
strike the right balance? Privacy matters tremendously. Public safety, I think, matters tremendously to everybody. I think fairminded people have to recognize that there are tremendous benefits to a society from encryption. There are tremendous costs to a
society from universal strong encryption. And how do we think about that?
A group of tech companies and some prominent folks wrote a letter to the President yesterday that I frankly found depressing.
Because their letter contains no acknowledgment that there are societal costs to universal encryption. Look, I recognize the
challenges facing our tech companies. Competitive challenges, regulatory challenges overseas, all kinds of challenges. I recognize the
benefits of encryption, but I think fair-minded people also have to recognize the costs associated with that. And I read this letter and
I think, “Either these folks don’t see what I see or they’re not fair-minded.” And either one of those things is depressing to me. So
I’ve just got to continue to have the conversation.
I don’t know the answer, but I don’t think a democracy should drift to a place where suddenly law enforcement people say, “Well,
actually we — the Fourth Amendment is an awesome thing, but we actually can’t access any information.”
We’ve got to have a conversation long before the logic of strong encryption takes us to that place. And smart people, reasonable
people will disagree mightily. Technical people will say it’s too hard. My reaction to that is: Really? Too hard? Too hard for the
people we have in this country to figure something out? I’m not that pessimistic. I think we ought to have a conversation.

Turns case - drug trafficking has harsh economic consequences
UN 2012 (United Nation, 26 June 2012, “Thematic Debate of the 66th session of the United
Nations General Assembly on¶ Drugs and Crime as a Threat to Development”
http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/66/Issues/drugs/drugs-crime.shtml )
On the occasion of the UN International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking
In the past decade, there has been significant growth in the illicit trafficking of drugs, people, firearms, and
natural resources. Trafficking in these and other commodities is generally characterized by high levels of
organization and the presence of strong criminal groups and networks. While such activities existed in the past, both the scale
and the geographic scope of the current challenge are unprecedented. In 2009, the value of illicit trade around the globe was estimated at US$1.3 trillion and is increasing. ¶ ¶ Transnational
organized crime and drug trafficking is of growing concern, and particularly illicit trade’s broad
impact on development. Few, if any, countries are exempt. Drug trafficking has particularly severe implications
because of the vast illegal profits it generates: an estimated 322 billion dollars a year. In several
drug production and transit regions, criminal groups undermine state authority and the rule of
law by fuelling corruption, compromising elections, and hurting the legitimate economy. In all cases,
¶
criminal influence and money are having a significant impact on the livelihoods and quality of life of citizens, most particularly the poor, women and children.¶ ¶ The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document
expressed Member States’ “grave concern at the negative effects on development, peace and security and human rights posed by transnational crime, including the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings,
the world narcotic drug problem and the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.” (A/RES/60/1 at 111). The General Assembly has most recently reiterated this concern and noted the increasing vulnerability
of states to such crime in Resolution A/Res/66/181 (Strengthening the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme, in particular its technical cooperation capacity). The Assembly has also
recognized that “despite continuing increased efforts by States, relevant organizations, civil society and non-governmental organizations, the world drug problem…undermines socio-economic and political stability
and sustainable development.” See A/Res/66/183 (International cooperation against the world drug problem). ¶ ¶ A number of international conventions on drug control, and more recently the UN Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and its protocols on human trafficking, migrant smuggling and trafficking of firearms, as well as the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), constitute the key
framework for a strategic response. Such instruments call upon State Parties to take “into account the negative effects of organized crime on society in general, in particular on sustainable development”, and “to
alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to trafficking, such as poverty, underdevelopment and lack of equal opportunity.” See article 30 of the UNTOC and article 9 of
the Trafficking Protocol. See also article 62 of the UNCAC. They also commit parties to respect fundamental human rights in countering organized crime and drug trafficking. ¶ ¶ The Secretary General’s 2005 "In
Larger Freedom” report highlighted that “We will not enjoy development without security, and we will not enjoy security without development". The Secretary-General’s 2010 “Keeping the Promise” report
(A/64/665) recognized that in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, “integrity, accountability and transparency are crucial for managing resources, recovering assets and combating the abuse,
corruption and organized crime that are adversely affecting the poor.” Par. 57.¶ ¶ As we move towards 2015, and take stock of the Millennium Development Goals, there is a growing recognition that organized
As economic development is threatened by transnational
organized crime and illicit drugs, countering crime must form part of the development agenda, and
social and economic development approaches need to form part of our response to organized crime . If we are to ensure that the MDGs are achieved,
we must strengthen strategies to deliver these goals, including stepping up efforts to address issues such as money laundering, corruption and
trafficking in wildlife, people and arms, and drugs. Organized crime and drugs impact every economy, in every country, but
they are particularly devastating in weak and vulnerable countries. Weak and fragile countries are particularly vulnerable to the
effects of transnational organized crime. These countries, some devastated by war, others making the complex journey towards democracy, are preyed upon by crime. As a result,
organized crime flourishes, successes in development are reversed, and opportunities for social
and economic advancement are lost. Corruption, a facilitator of organized crime and drug
trafficking, is a serious impediment to the rule of law and sustainable development. It can be a dominant factor
driving fragile countries towards failure. It is estimated that up to US$40 billion annually is lost through corruption in developing countries.¶ ¶ Drugs and crime undermine
development by eroding social and human capital. This degrades quality of life and can force
skilled workers to leave, while the direct impacts of victimisation, as well as fear of crime, may
impede the development of those that remain. By limiting movement, crime impedes access to possible employment and educational opportunities, and it
discourages the accumulation of assets. Crime is also more “expensive” for poor people in poor countries, and disadvantaged households may struggle to cope with the shock of victimisation. Drugs
crime and illicit drugs are major impediments to their achievement. ¶ ¶
and crime also undermine development by driving away business. Both foreign and domestic
investors see crime as a sign of social instability, and crime drives up the cost of doing business. Tourism is a sector especially sensitive to crime issues.
Drugs and crime, moreover, undermine the ability of the state to promote development by
destroying the trust relationship between the people and the state, and undermining democracy and confidence in the criminal
justice system. When people lose confidence in the criminal justice system, they may engage in
vigilantism, which further undermines the state.
Uniqueness
http://blog.acton.org/archives/71950-deep-dark-web-like-cockroaches-human-traffickersprefer-dark.html

Recent stops of drug trafficking sites prove
Europol 14 ( Europol 7 November 2014, “Global Action Against Dark Markets on Tor Network”
“ https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/global-action-against-dark-markets-tor-network)
On 6 November, law enforcement and judicial agencies around the globe undertook a joint
action against dark markets running as hidden services on Tor* network. 16 European countries,** alongside
counterparts from the United States, brought down several marketplaces as part of a unified
international action from Europol’s operational coordination centre in The Hague.¶ The action aimed to stop the sale,
distribution and promotion of illegal and harmful items, including weapons and drugs, which
were being sold on online ‘dark’ marketplaces. Operation Onymous, coordinated by Europol’s European
Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the FBI, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and
Eurojust, resulted in 17 arrests of vendors and administrators running these online marketplaces and more than 410 hidden services
being taken down. In addition, bitcoins worth approximately USD 1 million, EUR 180 000 euro in cash, drugs, gold and silver were
seized. The dark market Silk Road 2.0 was taken down by the FBI and the U.S. ICE HIS, and the operator was arrested.¶ The Joint
Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT), located at Europol’s headquarters, supported the operation. The J-CAT was created to serve as
a platform for targeted operations against global criminal networks and infrastructure, carried out by EC3 and our colleagues in EU
Member States and beyond. ¶ “Today
we have demonstrated that, together, we are able to efficiently
remove vital criminal infrastructures that are supporting serious organised crime. And we are not 'just'
removing these services from the open Internet; this time we have also hit services on the
Darknet using Tor where, for a long time, criminals have considered themselves beyond reach. We
can now show that they are neither invisible nor untouchable. The criminals can run but they can’t hide. And
our work continues....”, says Troels Oerting, Head of EC3.¶ “Our efforts have disrupted a website that allows
illicit black-market activities to evolve and expand, and provides a safe haven for illegal vices, such
as weapons distribution, drug trafficking and murder-for-hire,” says Kumar Kibble, regional attaché for HSI in Germany. “HSI
will continue to work in partnership with Europol and its law enforcement partners around the world to hold criminals who use
anonymous Internet software for illegal activities accountable for their actions.”¶ “Working
closely with domestic and
international law enforcement, the FBI and our partners have taken action to disrupt several
websites dedicated to the buying and selling of illegal drugs and other unlawful goods. Combating cyber
criminals remains a top priority for the FBI, and we continue to aggressively investigate, disrupt,
and dismantle illicit networks that pose a threat in cyberspace”, says Robert Anderson, FBI Executive
Assistant Director of the of the Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch.
Link

Backdoors key to solving for encryption on the Internet
Kravets 07/08/15 (David Kravets, July 8, 2015, “FBI chief tells Senate committee we’re doomed
without crypto backdoors” https://www.benton.org/headlines/fbi-chief-tells-senatecommittee-were-doomed-without-crypto-backdoors)
James Comey,
the director of the FBI, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the government
should have the right to lawfully access any device or electronic form of communication with a lawful
court order, even if it is encrypted. Director Comey and Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates briefed the
committee and complained that keys necessary to decrypt communications and electronic devices
often reside "solely in the hands of the end user"-- which they said is emblematic of the so-called
"Going Dark problem." Companies should bake encryption backdoors into their products to allow
lawful access, they said. "We are not asking to expand the government's surveillance authority, but rather we are asking to
ensure that we can continue to obtain electronic information and evidence pursuant to the legal authority that Congress has
provided to us to keep America safe," read the joint prepared remarks.¶ "Mr.
Chairman, the Department of Justice
believes that the challenges posed by the Going Dark problem are grave, growing, and
extremely complex." To counter this, the duo said the government is actively developing its own decryption tools. The
remarks said, "We should also continue to invest in developing tools, techniques, and capabilities
designed to mitigate the increasing technical challenges associated with the Going Dark
problem. In limited circumstances, this investment may help mitigate the risks posed in high priority national security or criminal
cases, although it will most likely be unable to provide a timely or scalable solution in terms of addressing the full spectrum of public
safety needs.

Mandates that ban decryption methods hurt FBI’s ability to
navigate sites like the dark web. We should hold off on mandates
to ban decryption methods in the status quo
Wittes 07/12/15 (Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in
Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, July 12, 2015, “Thoughts on Encryption and
Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits” http://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughtsencryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debate-merits)
There's a final, non-legal factor that may push companies to work this problem as energetically
as they are now moving toward end-to-end encryption: politics. We are at very particular
moment in the cryptography debate, a moment in which law enforcement sees a major problem as
having arrived but the tech companies see that problem as part of the solution to the problems the
Snowden revelations created for them. That is, we have an end-to-end encryption issue, in significant part,
because companies are trying to assure customers worldwide that they have their backs privacywise and are not simply tools of NSA. I think those politics are likely to change. If Comey is right and we
start seeing law enforcement and intelligence agencies blind in investigating and preventing horrible crimes
and significant threats, the pressure on the companies is going to shift. And it may shift fast and hard.
Whereas the companies now feel intense pressure to assure customers that their data is safe
from NSA, the kidnapped kid with the encrypted iPhone is going to generate a very different sort of
political response. In extraordinary circumstances, extraordinary access may well seem reasonable. And people will wonder
why it doesn't exist.¶ Which of these approaches is the right way to go? I would pursue several of them
simultaneously. At least for now, I would hold off on any kind of regulatory mandate, there being just too much
doubt at this stage concerning what's doable. I would, however, take a hard look at the role that civil liability
might play. I think the government, if it's serious about creating an extraordinary access scheme, needs to generate some public
research establishing proof of concept. We should watch very carefully how the companies respond to the mandates they will
receive from governments that will approach this problem in a less nuanced fashion than ours will. And Comey
should keep
up the political pressure. The combination of these forces may well produce a more workable
approach to the problem than anyone can currently envision.
Impact
Random

A fully encrypted world would not be a fun one to live in
Wittes 07/12/15 (Benjamin Wittes is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in
Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, July 12, 2015, “Thoughts on Encryption and
Going Dark, Part II: The Debate on the Merits” http://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughtsencryption-and-going-dark-part-ii-debate-merits)
Consider the conceptual question first. Would it be a good idea to have a world-wide
communications infrastructure that is, as Bruce Schneier has aptly put it, secure from all attackers? That
is, if we could snap our fingers and make all device-to-device communications perfectly secure
against interception from the Chinese, from hackers, from the FSB but also from the FBI even
wielding lawful process, would that be desirable? Or, in the alternative, do we want to create an
internet as secure as possible from everyone except government investigators exercising their
legal authorities with the understanding that other countries may do the same?¶ Conceptually speaking, I am with
Comey on this question—and the matter does not seem to me an especially close call. The belief in principle in
creating a giant world-wide network on which surveillance is technically impossible is really an
argument for the creation of the world's largest ungoverned space. I understand why techno-anarchists
find this idea so appealing. I can't imagine for moment, however, why anyone else would.¶ Consider the comparable
argument in physical space: the creation of a city in which authorities are entirely dependent on
citizen reporting of bad conduct but have no direct visibility onto what happens on the streets and no ability
to conduct search warrants (even with court orders) or to patrol parks or street corners. Would you want to live in that
city? The idea that ungoverned spaces really suck is not controversial when you're talking about
Yemen or Somalia. I see nothing more attractive about the creation of a worldwide architecture
in which it is technically impossible to intercept and read ISIS communications with followers or to
follow child predators into chatrooms where they go after kids.
=

FBI on brink of going dark
Davis 07/09/15 (Paul Davis is a contributing editor to Counterterrorism & Homeland Security
Magazine and a contributor to the Philadelphia Inquirer and other publication, THURSDAY, JULY
9, 2015, “FBI: Senate Committees Briefed On Going Dark Impact”
http://www.pauldavisoncrime.com/2015/07/fbi-senate-committees-briefed-on-going.html)
First, before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, Comey—along with U.S. Department of Justice Deputy Attorney
General Sally Quillian Yates—continued the public discourse on the Going Dark issue, which involves the
impact of emerging technologies on the ability of law enforcement to use lawful investigative tools and follow critical leads. “ The benefits of
our increasingly digital lives,” according to Comey, “have been accompanied by new dangers, and we
have been forced to consider how criminals and terrorists might use advances in technology to their
advantage.” He said that the FBI is seeing a growing number of cases—from homicides and
kidnappings to drug trafficking, financial fraud, and child exploitation—where critical evidence is
coming from smartphones, computers, and online communications.¶ Before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, Comey focused specifically on how terrorist groups, including ISIL, use technology such as social media to communicate in order to both
inspire and recruit. While some of these conversations take place on publicly accessed social networking sites, others take place over encrypted private
messaging platforms. And, as Comey explained, these “changing forms of communication are quickly outpacing laws and technology designed to allow
for the lawful intercept of communication content.Ӧ Of the Going Dark issue, Comey and Yates said that the Department of Justice and the FBI must
work with Congress, industry, academics, privacy groups, and others to come up with an approach that addresses multiple and competing legitimate
concerns. “But,” they added, “we can all agree that we will need ongoing honest and informed public debate about how best to protect liberty and
security in both our laws and our technology.” Law
enforcement at all levels has the legal authority to intercept
and access communications and information pursuant to court orders, but it often lacks the
technical ability to carry those orders out because of a fundamental shift in communications services and technologies. This
scenario is often called the “Going Dark” problem. ¶ Law enforcement faces two distinct Going Dark challenges. The
first concerns real-time court-ordered interception of data in motion, such as phone calls, e-mail, text
messages, and chat sessions. The second challenge concerns “data at rest”—court-ordered access to data
stored on devices, like e-mail, text messages, photos, and videos. Both real-time communications and stored data are
increasingly difficult for law enforcement to obtain with a court order or warrant. This is eroding law
enforcement’s ability to quickly obtain valuable information that may be used to identity and
save victims, reveal evidence to convict perpetrators, or exonerate the innocent.¶ Make no mistake, the FBI supports
strong encryption. The Department of Justice, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies are on the front lines
of the fight against cyber crime and as such we know first-hand the damage that can be caused by vulnerable and insecure systems.
The government uses strong encryption to secure its own electronic information, and it
encourages the private sector and members of the public to do the same thing.¶ However, the
challenges faced by law enforcement to lawfully and quickly obtain valuable information are
getting worse. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) was enacted in 1994 and applies only to traditional
telecommunications carriers, providers of interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, and providers of broadband access services.
Today, thousands of companies provide some form of communication service, and most are not required by CALEA to develop lawful intercept
capabilities for law enforcement. As a result, many of today’s communication services are developed and deployed without consideration of law
enforcement’s lawful intercept and evidence collection needs.