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Strengthening aviation safety oversight through technical cooperation
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The overall level of compliance with ICAO standards remains unsatisfactory
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It is the responsibility of the international aviation community to assist those States which are unable to discharge their safety obligations
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Particular attention should be given to States with unresolved ‘Significant Safety Concerns’ (SSC)
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The pooling of resources through regional organisations can constitute an efficient means of strengthening safety
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The coordinating role of ICAO is of paramount importance
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The newly developed ICAO policy on regional governance is particularly welcome
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Strengthening aviation safety oversight through enhanced transparency
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Transparency in safety performance is fundamental to a safe air transport system. It is also an essential pre-requisite for a sound mutual recognition system
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Progress in the promotion of transparency was achieved through the procedure of disclosing the USOAP information to the public
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In Europe, transparency is further pursued through a procedure for establishing a list of unsafe airlines
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The listing of unsafe airlines has proved to be effective in correcting significant safety deficiencies and serves as a strong incentive to worldwide air carriers and civil aviation authorities to continuously improve safety
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Relationship between transparency and enforcement
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It is also the responsibility of the international community to take action in cases of persistent disregard for aviation safety
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Action needs to be taken to minimize the continuing aviation safety risk to the travelling public
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Europe also calls for the disclosure of unresolved SSCs not only on the ICAO secure website but also in the public domain, while ensuring that passengers are informed of an increased safety risk
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It is also proposed that no new airline designator codes should be issued by ICAO to airlines under the responsibility of a State with an unresolved SSC
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The criteria for the application of the SSC procedure are worthy reviewing
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Call upon the contracting CSs, regional organisations, donors and ICAO to more actively coordinate their technical cooperation efforts giving particular priority to regional cooperation projects
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Call upon ICAO to convene a series of meetings to identify support for States with unresolved SSCs
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Invite CSs to agree to make public unresolved
SSCs and to call upon ICAO to bring to the attention of CSs and Regional Organisations all significant-safety infractions of the Convention
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Call upon ICAO to give urgent consideration to communicating to the traveling public information about the way States are discharging their safety obligations
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Recommend ICAO procedures are developed not to issue airline designator codes to airlines under the responsibility of a CS subject to an unresolved
SSC
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Call upon ICAO and CSs to review SSC criteria in view of USOAP findings, their severity, the level of effective implementation of SARPs and relevant differences filed against ICAO SARPs
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There is a need to document more clearly the various safety tasks which lie with States by bringing them in a new Annex to the Chicago Convention
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“State Safety Management”
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SSP Framework: ICAO Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14.
Consistency and clarity would be better served if these provisions were not scattered in such way
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The new Annex offers an opportunity to resolve current terminological inconsistencies and to clarify the SSP concept and its relationship to the industry mandated SMS provisions and the “critical elements” of a State Safety
Oversight System
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State Safety Programme provisions and its relationship to the 8 critical elements of a State Safety
Oversight System
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High-level Safety Management System requirements.
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Industry-specific SMS mandates should remain in their respective Annexes
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Measures in Chapter 8 of Annex 13 concerning accident prevention
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Specific provisions dealing with investigation activity should remain in Annex 13 to give visibility as well as reflect the independence of the safety investigation process
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For the next Assembly, recommend that ICAO
Council, taking into account its cost-effectiveness, studies the opportunity of creating a new Annex to the Chicago Convention entitled “State Safety
Management”
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Following recent accidents French BEA established a Flight
Data Recovery Working Group to look into new technology
 to safeguard flight data
 to facilitate the location and recovery of on-board recorders
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Items of reference were to:
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Propose solutions to enhance the recovery of flight data after an accident
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Asses the technical feasibility of each solution
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Present the advantages and disadvantages of each solution
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Present the degree of “maturity” as well as the cost of each solution
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The Flight Data Recovery Working Group did not cover legal aspects
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Within the framework of the AF447 investigation, the BEA issued safety recommendations based on the work done by the Working Group, settled on three areas for significant improvements in safety:
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Increasing the transmission time and range of the
ULB beacons
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The sending of data on initialisation
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The installation of deployable recorders
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AIG2008 agreed to recommend the implementation of Paragraph 5.12 and associated Attachment E
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Recommend ICAO to evaluate changes in flight data recording and protection and propose changes in the appropriate
Annexes
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It could be done by the FLIRECP panel, transformed to also address data protection and other topics raised by
AIG2008
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Loss of AF447 highlighted that nonpermanent communication may adversely impact on
 the timely launching of search and rescue phases
 aircraft wreckage recovery
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Potential of improved surveillance and route conformance monitoring
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Enhance flight safety and efficiency
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Call on ICAO to:
 undertake a comprehensive review of potential short term enhancements to flight tracking and route conformance monitoring capabilities
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ADS-C and CPDLC capabilities through satellite communications.
 review means and procedures which mitigate HF communication reliability issues over the high seas
 review the use of modern communication technologies in case of emergency
 explore longer term solutions to those issues, taking account existing regional initiatives
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OPTIMI
 report by the Council to the 37 th Assembly
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Information from many sources provides evidence of breakdown in flight deck activities leading to serious events or unsafe situations
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Despite the interventions, based on applied human factor research (i.e. SOPs, CRM), to the design of flight deck activities, proper and effective checklist and SOP design continues to be an industry concern
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The application of safety management principles to flight deck activities has a promising potential to protect against safety vulnerabilities during high workload phases of flight operations
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Application of safety management principles should encompass two aspects
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Flight crew training:
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Need for broad implementation of Threat and Error Management
(TEM) training
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Flight deck activities design and standardization:
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Checklist design
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Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for checklist execution, including flight crew briefings
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Flight deck procedures and their relationship to the external flight environment
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The design criteria for certification of warning systems (i.e.
TOWS, LWS)
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Flight crew training addressing the essential role checklists play and the need for strict adherence to the procedures established to support their execution
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Propose that ICAO addresses and supports the need for broad implementation of the principles of TEM training for flight crews and;
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With the support of a group of experts from States and industry stakeholders, ICAO:
 studies the application of safety management principles and methodologies for the design and implementation of checklists and flight deck procedures, as well as for the certification criteria of warning systems, with a particular emphasis to the critical phases of flight operations
 develops guidelines applicable to such an application
 develops as necessary standards and recommended practices on the subject
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The EASA International Training Conference identified the following concerns about current pilot training:
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Good organisational safety culture needs to be encouraged
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Growing body of evidence that over-reliance on automatics can lead to dependency, complacency and confusion
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Highly automated aeroplanes mean:
 fewer opportunities for manual flying skills to be used
 positive impacts on: safety, operational and fuel efficiency and reduction of emissions
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The ability to recover from unusual aircraft attitudes should be optimized
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Other topics addressed:
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Training methods;
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Prescriptive training=> competency and evidencebased training
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Pilot selection
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Instructor training
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Analysis of incidents and accidents to identify training needs
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“Negative” training should be better understood and clear guidance made available
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Lack of detailed quantitative data
 to better understand the part played by pilot training in accidents and incidents
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To continue with analyses that may help identify other courses of action that will prove to have safety benefits
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The exchange of relevant safety information plays an important role
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Multi-crew Pilot Licence (MPL) implementation has been poor and its review is needed
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Threat and Error Management (TEM) training should be encouraged
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Recommend to ICAO the establishment of a working group to: a) Seek a global consensus on the approach for future pilot training, reviewing i.
Rules for MPL ii.
Work done in evidence-based and competencybased b)
Review requirements to guard against the loss of manual flying skills c) Support the need for broad implementation of
Threat and Error Management training for pilots
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