T
A. Interpretation:
Less than 10% is insubstantial – this is the lowest percentage we could
find in a monetary context
Mickels 8 (Alissa, JD Candidate – Hastings College of Law, “Summary of Existing US Law
Affecting Fourth Sector Organizations”, 7-17,
http://www.fourthsector.net/attachments/7/original/Summary_of_US_Law_Affecting_
FS.pdf?1229493187)
Substantial v. insubstantial: Modern courts consider competition with commercial firms as “strong evidence of a
substantial nonexempt purpose.” Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. 710, 713 (1990). Although the tax court has held that
the definition of insubstantial is fact specific, it has found that less than ten percent of a
charity’s total efforts is “insubstantial”, World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 921 (1982), where as unrelated
business activity generating one-third of an organizations revenue does not qualify for tax-exempt status. Orange County
Agric. Soc’y, Inc. v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. 1602, 1604 (1988), aff’d 893 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1990). However, this may be changing
after an increasing emphasis on commensurate test.
B. Violation: The aff is insubstantial
The TSA’s budget is just over 7 billion dollars – this isn’t even the
entirety of the US’ domestic surveillance budget
HBC 13 (House Budget Committee, “The Transportation Security Administration and the
Aviation-Security Fee”, 12/10/2013, House.gov,
http://budget.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=364049, DJE)
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001 to “protect the nation’s transportation systems to
ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.” Although TSA has security
responsibilities in all forms of transportation, its main focus is aviation security. TSA has
just over 55,600 full-time equivalents (FTE), the vast majority of which are passenger and
baggage screeners in the Aviation Security program. (By contrast, fewer than 700 FTEs are
involved in Surface Transportation Security.) In recent years, TSA has received around $5.7
billion in mandatory and discretionary appropriations, which—together with spending
authority from offsetting collections—gives the agency an annual budget of more than $7
billion. Aviation Security takes the lion’s share of this budget, and its funding is used for
passenger- and baggage-screening operations, screener salaries and benefits, and contracts
with private screeners, among other activities.
TSA’s SPOT program only costs around $200 million annually. That’s
barely more than 2% of the agency’s budget. There is no way this can be
considered substantial.
GAO 13 (Government Accountability Office, “TSA Should Limit Future Funding for
Behavior Detection Activities”, November 2013,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658923.pdf, DJE)
In October 2003, TSA began testing its primary behavior detection activity, the SPOT
program, and during fiscal year 2007, TSA deployed Page Behavior Detection Activities the
program to 42 TSA regulated airports. By fiscal year 2012, about 3,000 BDOs were deployed
to 176 of the more than 450 TSA regulated airports in the United States. From fiscal years
2011 through 2012, an estimated 1.3 billion people passed through checkpoints at the 176
SPOT airports. TSA has expended approximately $200 million annually for the SPOT
program since fiscal year 2010, and a total of approximately $900 million since 2007. BDOs
represent one of TSA’s layers of security. In addition to BDOs, other layers of security
include travel document checkers, who examine tickets, passports, and other forms of
identification; transportation security officers (TSO), who are responsible for screening
passengers and their carry-on baggage at passenger checkpoints using X-ray equipment,
magnetometers, advanced imaging technology, and other devices; as well as for screening
checked baggage; and random employee screening, among others.
C. Topicality is a voter for limits – they massively under-limit the
topic by allowing for reduction in surveillance of individuals,
minor alterations in texts surveillance laws, or even miniscule
budget cuts. This massively skews the debate in the aff’s favor.
DA
Obama can hold off a veto now – but his political capital is key
Walsh and Barrett 7/16 (Deirdre, Senior Congressional Producer for CNN, Ted, senior
congressional producer for CNN Politics, “WH dispatches Joe Biden to lock down Iran deal
on Capitol Hill,” CNN, 7/16/2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/15/politics/iran-dealwhite-house-democrats-congress/)//duncan
Two days after the Iran deal was unveiled, the Obama administration's sales job is in full
swing.¶ Vice President Joe Biden traveled to Capitol Hill on Wednesday to convince House
Democrats to support the deal, while a small group of senators were invited to the White House to get their
questions answered directly from officials who sat across from the Iranians at the negotiating table. Biden meets with Senate
Democrats of the Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday. ¶ House lawmakers said Biden was candid about the strengths
and weaknesses of the compromise deal. One described his behind closed doors pitch.¶ "I'm going to put aside my notes and
talk to you from my heart because I've been in this business for 45 years," Biden said in his opening comments, according to
Rep. Bill Pascrell, D-New Jersey, who attended the session.¶ "I'm not going to BS you. I'm going to tell you exactly what I think,"
the vice president reportedly said.¶ Obama
got a boost from the leader of his party in the chamber
when Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi formally announced Thursday that she was backing the deal.¶ SInce
Republicans in the House and Senate are firmly against the Iran nuclear deal -- announced by President
Barack Obama on Tuesday -- the administration is cranking up its campaign to sway concerned
Democrats to back the agreement.¶ Under legislation that allows Congress to review the agreement, the
White House needs to secure enough votes from members of his own party to sustain the
President's promised veto on an resolution of disapproval -- 145 in the House and 34 in the Senate.¶ After the
session with Biden, several House Democrats stressed that while the process is just beginning, right
now the administration likely has the votes to sustain the President's veto on a
resolution to block the deal.¶ "I'm confident they will like it when they understand it all," the vice president told
reporters on his way into the session, beginning what will be a two month campaign culminating in a vote, expected in
September.¶ Democrats, both for and against the deal, praised Biden's presentation.¶ "Joe Biden was
as good as I've seen him," Rep. John Larson, D-Connecticut, told CNN. "I thought he did an excellent job."¶ Texas Democratic
Rep. Henry Cuellar
said Biden is a "master of detail" and helped clarify some concerns he had about the
verification provisions in the deal, but he still planned to carefully study it and said he was undecided.¶ Pascrell also
cited the verification issue as a potential sticking point but said he is leaning 'yes' on the agreement. ¶ "On our side of the aisle
there is concern and skepticism shared by a number of members but an openness to
be persuaded if the facts take them that way," Rep. Gerry Connolly of Virginia said. "I think (Biden) made
some real progress on behalf of the administration today."¶ But Democratic Rep. Steve Israel of New York, a former member of
Democratic leadership, told reporters he wasn't sold yet. ¶ "For me, I still have some very significant questions with respect to
lifting of the embargo on conventional arms. And missiles. The (International Atomic Energy Agency) verification process for
me is not any time anywhere, I think there are some very significant delays built into that," Israel said. ¶ Larson noted that both
Biden's presentation, along with Hillary Clinton's a day earlier, who he said spoke favorably about the deal, helped
lay the groundwork for most Democrats to back the White House.¶ At the same time on Wednesday
that the President held a news conference trying to persuade the public he had brokered an strong and effective deal with Iran,
Sen. Joe Manchin, a Democrat from West Virginia, and a handful of other senators, were in a separate part of the White House
meeting with some of the President's top negotiators, who had just returned from Vienna. ¶ "I was very satisfied with an awful
lot of the answers we received," Manchin told CNN.¶ The
intimate meeting for senators was another
example of the White House's effort to shore up support in the Senate where leaders
believe as many as 15 Democrats could oppose the deal. If they did, it could provide Senate
Republicans the votes needed to override a veto of the disapproval resolution and scuttle
the deal.¶ But Manchin, a centrist who has close relations with senators on both sides of the
aisle, said at this point he has not detected major blowback from Senate Democrats to the
deal.¶ "At caucus yesterday I didn't get a reading there is hard, hard opposition. I did not," he said.¶ In fact, Manchin said he
thought Republicans actually might struggle getting the 60 votes they will need to pass the disapproval resolution, much less
the dozen or so votes that might be needed to sustain a veto. ¶ One key senator
whose position will be closely
monitored by the White House and his colleagues from both parties on the Hill, is Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York,
the third-ranking Democrats who is poised to become the Democratic leader in the next Congress. Schumer has many
Jewish voters in his state who are wary of the impact of the Iran agreement on the security
of Israel. Schumer said he is skeptical of the deal and won't decide whether to support it before doing his
homework.¶ "I will sit down, I will read the agreement thoroughly and then I'm gonna speak with officials -- administration
officials, people all over on all different sides," he said when asked about his decision-making process. "Look, this is a decision
that shouldn't be made lightly and I am gonna just study this agreement and talk to people before I do anything else." ¶ Sen.
John McCain, R-Arizona, a leading critic of the agreement with Iran, said "the
pressure will be enormous
from the administration," as it tries to keep Democrats from defecting. As chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, McCain said he intends to hold hearings to demonstrate what he calls the "fatal flaws" in the deal. ¶
House conservatives speaking at a forum sponsored by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, one after
another ripped the Iran deal. But they conceded
that ultimately they may not be able to block it.¶
"The game is rigged in favor of getting this done" Ohio Rep. Jim Jordan said.
Despite TSA misconduct, Dems still strongly support airport securityplan costs Obama his political capital
Maya Rhodan, 11-22-2010, "Partisan Divide Greets New Report on Airport Screener
Misconduct," TIME, http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/03/partisan-divide-greets-newreport-on-airport-screener-misconduct/
Federal airport security screeners were investigated for misconduct 9,622 times from 2010 to 2012, after an array incidents,
from screeners falling asleep on the job to letting relatives go around screening lines to inappropriately touching airplane
passengers. Depending on whom you ask on Capitol Hill, this is either an alarming crisis or an expected footnote for a huge
workforce with an enormous task. “These findings are especially hard to stomach since so many Americans today are sick of
being groped, interrogated, and treated like criminals when passing through checkpoints,” said Republican Rep. Jeff Duncan of
South Carolina, at a hearing on the Transportation Security Agency July 31. “If ‘Integrity’ is truly a core value, then, TSA, prove
it.” “TSA employee misconduct is on the rise — and this is intolerable,” Democratic Rep. Ron Barber said in a statement
to TIME. “TSA’s first and foremost responsibility is to ensure the safety and security of travelers in a professional manner —
and it is simply unacceptable to allow a single bag or a single person go unscreened.” Some
Democrats at the hearing, however, sided with the TSA officers, who many said were not to be judged by the actions of a few
“bad apples.” Bennie Thompson, a ranking Democratic
member of the committee, from Mississippi said,
“The vast majority of TSOs are hardworking, dedicated, diligent federal employees.” The TSA
employs about 56,000 security personnel who work at 450 airports across the country. In a July 30 report, the Government
Accountability Office found there has been a 26 percent increase in cases of misconduct over the past three years. According to
the report, the majority of the cases fell under two categories of misconduct, “attendance and leave” and “screening and
security.” Unexcused absences, tardiness, and failure to follow leave procedure accounted for 32 %, or 3,117, of the total
misconduct cases. Failure to follow screening procedure, bypassing screening, and sleeping on duty made up 20 percent, or
1,936 total cases according to the report. In one instance in the report, an officer was seen neglecting to stop the conveyor belt
after every piece of luggage to review the x-ray images of what’s inside; in another an officer left his or her security checkpoint
to assist a family member with a bag, a bag the officer later walked through the security checkpoint without screening and
handed to the relative. The bag was found to have contained prohibited items, though the items are not specified in the GAO
report. In a statement, David Cox, the president of the American Federation of Government Employees, the union that
represents the TSA, said the report has misrepresented the conduct of TSA employees. “TSA critics
on Capitol Hill
seize every opportunity to give the agency and its dedicated workforce a black eye, even
when the facts to not support their arm-waving displays of false outrage,” Cox said in a statement.
“They want to drag us back, as a nation, to the pre-9/11 practice of using poorly trained,
minimum wage rent-a-cops to protect the flying public from terrorists.” The agency has also tried to
defend itself, blaming a handful of bad apples. “Every time we have one knucklehead that decides he’s going to do something
bad it tarnishes the image of our organization, TSA Deputy Administrator John Halinski said at the hearing. “I have my people
on the line 365 days of the year and they know if they fail someone can die.” Nearly half of the reported cases of misconduct
resulted in letters of reprimand that describe the conduct and why it is subject to disciplinary action. Thirty-one percent
resulted in definite suspension, and 17% led to termination, according to the GAO. The rest were subject to a multitude of
outcomes, including indefinite suspension. “I think this report shows something very positive,” says Rick Mathews, the
director of the National Center for Security and Preparedness at the University at Albany. “It shows that the TSA is looking for
these things and when people are doing wrong they’re being punished.” “The frequency of these actions is so low that it more
than likely dissuades bad people from even trying to breach security,” he added.
Failure will spur prolif and war with Iran – the plan tanks Obama’s
ability to hold off Congress
Beauchamp 14 (Zack – B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University
and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, former editor
of TP Ideas and a reporter for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew
Sullivan’s The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and
Tablet magazines, now writes for Vox , “How the new GOP majority could destroy Obama's
nuclear deal with Iran,” http://www.vox.com/2014/11/6/7164283/iran-nuclear-dealcongress,)
There is one foreign policy issue on which the GOP's takeover of the Senate could have huge ramifications, and beyond just the
US: Republicans
are likely to try to torpedo President Obama's ongoing efforts to reach a
nuclear deal with Iran. And they just might pull it off. November 24 is the latest deadline for a final agreement
between the United States and Iran over the latter's nuclear program. That'll likely be extended, but it's a reminder that the
negotiations could soon come to a head. Throughout his
presidency, Obama has prioritized these
negotiations; he likely doesn't want to leave office without having made a deal. But if Congress doesn't like the
deal, or just wants to see Obama lose, it has the power to torpedo it by imposing new
sanctions on Iran. Previously, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid used procedural powers to stop this from happening
and save the nuclear talks. But Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell may not be so kind, and he may have the
votes to destroy an Iran deal. If he tries, we could see one of the most important
legislative fights of Obama's presidency. Why Congress can bully Obama on Iran sanctions At their most
basic level, the international negotiations over Iran's nuclear program (they include several other nations, but the US is the
biggest player) are a tit-for-tat deal. If Iran agrees to place a series of verifiable limits on its nuclear development, then the
United States and the world will relax their painful economic and diplomatic sanctions on Tehran. "The regime of economic
sanctions against Iran is arguably the most complex the United States and the international community have ever imposed on
a rogue state," the Congressional Research Service's Dianne Rennack writes. To underscore the point, Rennack's four-page
report is accompanied by a list of every US sanction on Iran that goes on for 23 full pages. The US's sanctions are a joint
Congressional-executive production. Congress puts strict limits on Iran's ability to export oil and do business with American
companies, but it gives the president the power to waive sanctions if he thinks it's in the American national interest. "In the
collection of laws that are the statutory basis for the U.S. economic sanctions regime on Iran," Rennack writes, "the President
retains, in varying degrees, the authority to tighten and relax restrictions." The
key point here is that Congress
gave Obama that power — which means they can take it back. "You could see a bill in place
that makes it harder for the administration to suspend sanctions," Ken Sofer, the Associate
Director for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress
(where I worked for a little under two years, though not with Sofer directly), says. "You could also see a bill that says the
president can't agree to a deal unless it includes the following things or [a bill] forcing a congressional vote on any deal."
Imposing new sanctions on Iran wouldn't just stifle Obama's ability to remove existing
sanctions, it would undermine Obama's authority to negotiate with Iran at all, sending the
message to Tehran that Obama is not worth dealing with because he can't control his own
foreign policy. So if Obama wants to make a deal with Iran, he needs Congress to play
ball. But it's not clear that Mitch McConnell's Senate wants to. Congress could easily use its authority to kill an Iran deal To
understand why the new Senate is such a big deal for congressional action on sanctions, we have to jump back a year. In
November 2013, the Obama administration struck an interim deal with Iran called the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA). As part of
the JPOA, the US agreed to limited, temporary sanctions relief in exchange for Iran limiting nuclear program components like
uranium production. Congressional Republicans, by and large, hate the JPOA deal. Arguing that the deal didn't place
sufficiently serious limits on Iran's nuclear growth, the House passed new sanctions on Iran in December. (There is also a line
of argument, though often less explicit, that the Iranian government cannot be trusted with any deal at all, and that US policy
should focus on coercing Iran into submission or unseating the Iranian government entirely.) Senate Republicans, joined by
more hawkish Democrats, had the votes to pass a similar bill. But in February, Senate Majority leader Harry Reid killed new
Iran sanctions, using the Majority Leader's power to block consideration of the sanctions legislation to prevent a vote.
McConnell blasted Reid's move. "There is no excuse for muzzling the Congress on an issue of this importance to our own
national security," he said. So now that McConnell holds the majority leader's gavel, it will remove that procedural roadblock
that stood between Obama and new Iran sanctions. To be clear, it's far from guaranteed that Obama will be able to reach a deal
with Iran at all; negotiations could fall apart long before they reach the point of congressional involvement. But if he does
reach a deal, and Congress doesn't like the terms, then they'll be able to kill it by passing new sanctions legislation, or
preventing Obama from temporarily waiving the ones on the books. And make
no mistake — imposing new
sanctions or limiting Obama's authority to waive the current ones would kill any deal. If
Iran can't expect Obama to follow through on his promises to relax sanctions, it has zero
incentive to limit its nuclear program. "If Congress adopts sanctions," Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif
told Time last December, "the entire deal is dead." Moreover, it could fracture the international movement to
sanction Iran. The United States is far from Iran's biggest trading partner, so it depends on
international cooperation in order to ensure the sanctions bite. If it looks like the US won't
abide by the terms of a deal, the broad-based international sanctions regime could
collapse. Europe, particularly, might decide that going along with the sanctions is no longer worthwhile. "Our ability to
coerce Iran is largely based on whether or not the international community thinks that we are the ones that are being
constructive and [Iranians] are the ones that being obstructive," Sofer says. "If they don't believe that, then the international
sanctions regime falls apart." This could be one of the biggest fights of Obama's last term It's
true that Obama could
veto any Congressional efforts to blow up an Iran deal with sanctions. But a two-thirds vote
could override any veto — and, according to Sofer, an override is entirely within the realm of
possibility. "There are plenty of Democrats that will probably side with Republicans if they try to push a harder line on
Iran," Sofer says. For a variety of reasons, including deep skepticism of Iran's intentions and strong Democratic
support for Israel, whose government opposes the negotiations, Congressional Democrats are not as open to
making a deal with Iran as Obama is. Many will likely defect to the GOP side out of principle.
The real fight, Sofer says, will be among the Democrats — those who are willing to take the
administration's side in theory, but don't necessarily think a deal with Iran is legislative
priority number one, and maybe don't want to open themselves up to the political risk.
These Democrats "can make it harder: you can filibuster, if you're Obama you can veto — you
can make it impossible for a full bill to be passed out of Congress on Iran," Sofer says. But it'd be a really tough
battle, one that would consume a lot of energy and lobbying effort that Democrats
might prefer to spend pushing on other issues. "I'm not really sure they're going to be willing to take on
a fight about an Iran sanctions bill," Sofer concludes. "I'm not really sure that the Democrats who support [a deal] are really
fully behind it enough that they'll be willing to give up leverage on, you know, unemployment insurance or immigration status
— these bigger issues for most Democrats." So if
the new Republican Senate prioritizes destroying an
Iran deal, Obama will have to fight very hard to keep it — without necessarily being able
to count on his own party for support. And the stakes are enormous: if Iran's nuclear
program isn't stopped peacefully, then the most likely outcomes are either Iran going
nuclear, or war with Iran. The administration believes a deal with Iran is their only way to
avoid this horrible choice. That's why it's been one of the administration's top priorities
since day one. It's also why this could become one of the biggest legislative fights of Obama's last two years.
Nuke war
Stevens 13 (Philip Stevens, associate editor and chief political commentator for the
Financial Times, Nov 14 2013, “The four big truths that are shaping the Iran talks,”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/af170df6-4d1c-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html)
six-power negotiations with Tehran to
curb Iran’s nuclear programme may yet succeed or fail. But wrangling between the US and France on the terms of an
The who-said-what game about last weekend’s talks in Geneva has become a distraction. The
acceptable deal should not allow the trees to obscure the forest. The organising facts shaping the negotiations have not changed.¶ The first of these is that
Tehran’s acquisition of a bomb would be more than dangerous for the Middle East and for wider international
security. It would most likely set off a nuclear arms race that would see Saudi Arabia, Turkey
and Egypt signing up to the nuclear club. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty would be
shattered. A future regional conflict could draw Israel into launching a pre-emptive nuclear
strike. This is not a region obviously susceptible to cold war disciplines of deterrence.¶ The second
ineluctable reality is that Iran has mastered the nuclear cycle. How far it is from building a bomb remains a subject
of debate. Different intelligence agencies give different answers. These depend in part on what the spooks actually know and in part on what their political masters want
others to hear. The progress of an Iranian warhead programme is one of the known unknowns that have often wreaked havoc in this part of the world.¶ Israel points to
an imminent threat. European agencies are more relaxed, suggesting Tehran is still two years or so away from a weapon. Western diplomats broadly agree that
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has not taken a definitive decision to step over the line. What Iran has been seeking is what diplomats call a breakout capability – the capacity to
dash to a bomb before the international community could effectively mobilise against it.¶ The third fact – and this one is hard for many to swallow – is that neither a
negotiated settlement nor the air strikes long favoured by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, can offer the rest of the world a watertight insurance policy.¶ It
should be possible to construct a deal that acts as a plausible restraint – and extends the timeframe for any breakout – but no amount of restrictions or intrusive
bombing Iran’s nuclear sites could
delay the programme, perhaps for a couple of years. But, assuming that even the hawkish Mr Netanyahu is not proposing permanent war
against Iran, air strikes would not end it.¶ You cannot bomb knowledge and technical expertise.
To try would be to empower those in Tehran who say the regime will be safe only when, like North
Korea, it has a weapon. So when Barack Obama says the US will never allow Iran to get the bomb he is indulging in, albeit understandable, wishful
thinking.¶ The best the international community can hope for is that, in return for a relaxation
of sanctions, Iran will make a judgment that it is better off sticking with a threshold
capability. To put this another way, if Tehran does step back from the nuclear brink it will be because of
its own calculation of the balance of advantage.¶ The fourth element in this dynamic is that Iran now has a
leadership that, faced with the severe and growing pain inflicted by sanctions, is prepared to talk.
monitoring can offer a certain guarantee against Tehran’s future intentions.¶ By the same token,
certainly
There is nothing to say that Hassan Rouhani, the president, is any less hard-headed than previous Iranian leaders, but he does seem ready to weigh the options.
DA
SPOT is key to checking air transportation terrorist threats.
Cotton 15—Brent A Cotton, transportation security specialist, 2015 ("Strategic
Improvements to TSA Spot Program," March, Available online at
https://www.hdiac.org/islandora/object/hdiac%3A329047, Accessed on 8/2/15)
On December 14, 1999, an Islamic terrorist named Ahmed Ressem attempted to enter the
United States from the Canadian border with a trunk full of explosives. The explosive
materials were intended for a terrorist attack against the Los Angeles International Airport
(LAX), but the attack would never occur. While crossing over from Victoria British Columbia
to Port Angeles, Washington, a UnitedStates (U.S.) immigration inspector noticed that
Ressem’s response to his standard questions did not make sense. He stated he was going to
Seattle for a 2-day business trip. The response was peculiar for two reasons, 1) the
inspector had not asked him why he was going to Seattle, and 2) it would not make sense
for a non-tourist to take this route to Seattle. Something was not right. Wants and warrants
returned nothing, Ressem’s baggage was cleared, and he was sent on his way. At the arrival
end of the ferry, Ressem was again subject to routine interaction with another U.S.
immigration inspector. This time the inspector noticed him fidgeting, acting jittery, and
sweating during routine questioning. This inspector also knew something was not right, and
ultimately, searched the car and found explosives intended for the attack on
LAX. While several attacks have been thwarted through investigations, this one stands
out as being thwarted in progress using existing countermeasures. While intelligence and
investigating has provided the greatest anti-terrorism success, it can fall short in the area of
homegrown violent extremists or sympathizers not directly affiliated with a known
terrorist group. The shift of the terrorist landscape to more one-off attacks or plots reminds
everyone of the importance of real-time countermeasures. The countermeasure in this case
was a routine passenger engagement by inspectors, who have been trained to detect
unusual behaviors in the context of their post. Both inspectors noticed the unusual behavior
of Ressem, such as his inability to provide consistent explanations for his travel, his
nervousness, twitching, and sweating; behaviors that can be linked to a “fear of discovery”
by criminals or terrorists. Their suspicion led to additional screening and the discovery of
the explosives that ultimately thwarted the planned attack on LAX. Real time threat
assessment by the officers (using principles of behavior detection) is responsible for the
only terrorist attack thwarted in progress by a U.S. government countermeasure. Ressem
attempted to cover all his bases, including a cover story, and fake ID that did not arouse
suspicion; however, he was not able to suppress his fear of discovery. A. PROBLEM
STATEMENT The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT) programwas established to create a threat agnostic, nontechnology based countermeasure capable of identifying a malicious person rather than a
specific type of threat item, such as an improvised explosive device (IED), a gun, or other
threat object. Being able to identify terrorists by their pre-event behavior, regardless of the
threat type or event planned, breaks the cycle of traditional, reactive game theoretic
responses. Without threat agnostic layers, the TSA would solely rely on technology-based
layers that are only effective against a specific type of threat. For example, red team
(adversary) attempts to use a shoe IED against an aircraft, blue team (TSA) X-rays all shoes
or red team uses IEDs concealed on a person, blue team purchases and implements body
scanners. This reactive cycle typically keeps the blue team guessing, and at risk of a new
style of attack. SPOTwas implemented to give the TSA a real-time, threat-agnostic layer
capable of identifying persons with malintent, regardless of what type of threat—explosive
or contraband—they may be carrying. Game theorists would call it “disruptive technology”
and operates outside the parameters of the “game.” With the exception of the important
intelligence-based layers (which are not necessarily real time), the TSA layers listed in
Figure 1 include mainly countermeasures designed to detect things versus terrorists.
An airplane terror attack would cause a sudden recession – 9/11 proves
Nanto 05 (Dick K. Nanto, Specialist in Industry and Trade, “9/11 Terrorism: Global
Economic Costs”, 10/5/2005, CRS Report for Congress,
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7725/m1/1/high_res_d/RS21937_2004
Oct05.pdf, DJE)
Following the terrorist attacks, the already weak international economy was weakened
further. The aftershocks of 9/11 were felt immediately in foreign equity markets, in tourism
and travel, in consumer attitudes, and in temporary capital flight from the United States.
Central banking authorities worldwide reacted by injecting liquidity into their financial
systems. Still, the downturn in business conditions became more generalized and most of
the world dropped into a synchronous recession — from 4.1% world economic growth in
2000 to 1.4% in 2001 (a growth rate of less than 2% for the world is considered to be
recessionary). By late 2002, aggressive reflationary fiscal and monetary policy in the United
States and a booming Chinese economy led the recovery. As shown in Figure 2, the 2001
recession turned into a weak economic recovery with world growth of 1.9% in 2002 and
2.7% in 2003 — still anemic when compared with the growth rate of 2.3% in 1998 during
the worst of the Asian financial crisis. For 2004, the recovery picked up speed and its
strength broadened with growth at 4%, even though by mid-2004, the world was hit with
petroleum prices exceeding $40 per barrel of which $6 to $10 was a “security premium”
caused primarily by instability and uncertainty in the Middle East. Still, in most markets,
there appeared to be a general dissipation of geopolitical concerns and a steady decline in
post-9/11 terrorism fears. How much did 9/11 bring down world growth rates? Prior to
9/11, a major econometric forecasting firm expected real GDP for the world (185 countries)
to grow at 2.8% in 2001 and 3.1% in 2002. After 9/11, world GDP actually grew by 1.4% in
2001 and 1.9% in 2002. In the aftermath of 9/11, therefore, actual growth came in at
approximately 1 percentage point below expectations. Not all of this, of course, can be
attributed to 9/11, but a 1 percentage point decline in global GDP amounted to about $300
billion less in world production and income in 2002. Subsequent terrorist attacks also have
affected economic growth abroad. An Australian study pointed out the negative
macroeconomic consequences of terrorism for developing nations because of reduced
trade, investments, and tourism. The 2002 Bali bombings reduced Indonesia’s growth rate
by an estimated 1 percentage point.
Economic decline causes war, multiple warrants and studies
Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, Economic
Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and
Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)
periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of
Less intuitive is how
economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered
at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081
advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the
global
economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the
often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous
shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to
even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined
with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major,
medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic
conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade
expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable
in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He
argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade
so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the
expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items
such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be
inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the
uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively,
trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent
states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Mom
berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during
The linkage, between internal and external conflict
and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to
spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the
presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and
external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic
decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism
(Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead
to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a
sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally
around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting
periods of economic downturn. They write.
evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and
Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states
than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from
periods of weak
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential
popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary,
recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an
increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science
scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic
and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured
office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that
prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.
Case
Curtailing SPOT does not solve for racial TSA security check pat downs –
the two are different
Hugh Handeyside, 3-19-2015, "Be careful with your face at airports (Opinion)," CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/19/opinions/handeyside-tsa-spot-program/
Through a program called Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT, the TSA employs thousands of
"behavior detection officers" who scrutinize travelers to look for signs of "mal-intent" in
airport screening areas. The officers typically spend less than 30 seconds scanning an average passenger for over 90
behaviors the TSA associates with stress, fear or deception. When the officers perceive clusters of such behaviors in any given
individual, they refer that person for secondary inspection and questioning. The SPOT
program relies on theories
about "micro-expressions," involuntary facial expressions that supposedly appear for
milliseconds despite one's efforts to conceal them. Behavior detection officers look for such microexpressions while scanning passengers' faces or engaging in casual conversation with them. It's as
nutty as it sounds. Setting aside that the officers' perception of these behaviors is inherently subjective, there's just no
evidence that deception or "mal-intent" can reliably be detected through observation, especially in an unstructured setting like
an airport screening area. The fact that many people find such settings inherently stressful only compounds the problem. If
TSA's behavior detection officers look for stress in a stressful environment, they're going to find it, along with plenty of false
positives. Just about everyone outside the TSA who has reviewed the SPOT program has decided that it's unscientific and a
waste of money. An exhaustive review by the Government Accountability Office found the SPOT program lacked a scientific
basis, that the behavioral indicators it relied on were subjective, and that the TSA had no effective means to test its
effectiveness. In no uncertain terms, the GAO recommended that Congress curtail funding for the program. An independent
scientific advisory group that reviewed the SPOT program also concluded that "no scientific evidence exists to support the
detection or inference of future behavior, including intent." And during a congressional hearing on the program, Republican
Rep. Richard Hudson of North Carolina observed, "To my knowledge, there has not been a single instance where a behavior
detection officer has referred someone to a law enforcement officer and that individual turned out to be a terrorist." Rep.
Michael McCaul of Texas, the Republican chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, stated, "I am concerned that
TSA will continue to spin its wheels with this program instead of developing a more effective and efficient approach." Despite
this withering criticism, SPOT remains in place and has cost taxpayers well over $1 billion (that's with a b) since its inception
in 2007. Repeat: over a billion dollars on a misguided program that doesn't work. Equally troubling is that SPOT has given rise
to persistent allegations of racial and ethnic profiling -- an unfortunately inevitable result when law enforcement or border
agents single people out based on hasty, gut-level judgments about them. Allegations of profiling by behavior detection officers
have come not only from travelers, but also from numerous other officers. Over 30 behavior detection officers at Boston Logan
International Airport said that profiling was rampant there. One of the officers told reporters, "They just pull aside anyone
who they don't like the way they look -- if they are black and have expensive clothes or jewelry, or if they are Hispanic."
Another officer submitted an anonymous complaint saying, "The behavior detection program is no longer a behavior-based
program, but it is a racial profiling program." The TSA has not revealed what, if any, steps it has taken to ensure that unlawful
profiling does not occur in airport screening. Nor has TSA explained why -- despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary -SPOT contributes meaningfully to aviation security. That's why the ACLU submitted an FOIA request to TSA seeking
information on its use of behavior detection. We've received no response, so we're taking the TSA to court to get the
information the public needs to fully evaluate it. People expect that when they travel, they will be screened for weapons or
explosives that could bring down an airplane. They don't expect -- nor should they -- that officers will make probing judgments
about their intentions based on little more than their facial expressions, or that they will be stopped, questioned and perhaps
even searched because of their race or ethnicity. It's time for TSA to explain and justify the SPOT program. Or better yet, listen
to those who say it's a waste of money and scrap it entirely.
Alt cause to racial profiling – plan does not solve TSA pat downs and
“anomalies” on scanners
Drew Mackenzie, 7-22-2015, "Racial Profiling Charges Leveled over TSA Hair PatDowns," Newsmax, http://www.newsmax.com/US/TSA-pat-downs-hair-AfricanAmericans/2015/04/01/id/635817/
Racial Profiling Charges Leveled over TSA Hair Pat-Downs By Drew MacKenzie | Wednesday, 01 Apr 2015 01:20 PM Short
URL| Email Article| Comment| Contact| Print| A A The Transportation Security Administration is studying its policy on hair
pat-downs after receiving complaints that African-American women are being targeted at airports. The
TSA launched an investigation after being contacted by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and now the agency has
reached an informal agreement with the advocacy group "to enhance officer training" on the pat-downs, according to The Hill.
"Racial profiling is not tolerated by TSA," the agency said in a statement. "Not only is racial profiling prohibited under DHS
(Department of Homeland Security) and agency policy, but it is also an ineffective security tactic." The ACLU office in northern
California had filed a complaint on behalf of Malaika Singleton, who claimed she was improperly singled out for searches in
2013 at airports in Los Angeles and Minneapolis. The civil rights organization alleged that Singleton, a California resident, was
targeted for extra airport screening by TSA officials because of her hairstyle, The Hill reported. "The
humiliating
experience of countless black women who are routinely targeted for hair pat-downs
because their hair is 'different' is not only wrong, but also a great misuse of TSA agents' time
and resources," said Novella Coleman, an ACLU attorney in California. TSA officials usually conduct patdowns, including possibly the probing of a woman's hair, when airport screeners identify
"anomalies" on X-ray scanners. But the ACLU said that rule left open the potential for racial profiling against
African-American women, The Hill noted. "When TSA agents are faced with ambiguous evidence or forced to apply subjective
rules, it is more likely that they will unconsciously interpret the circumstances in a way that is consistent with racial
stereotypes," the civil liberties group said. "Both the United States and California Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches
and selective enforcement of the law based on race. And although the law has carved out exceptions for airport screening, a
search must still be tailored to detect threats to security. "That legal requirement cannot be satisfied when there is no clear
policy for detecting threats to security. In this case, TSA agents were unable to provide a uniform reason to justify these
searches when asked to articulate such a policy." Read Latest Breaking News from Newsmax.com
http://www.newsmax.com/US/TSA-pat-downs-hair-African-Americans/2015/04/01/id/635817/#ixzz3gfKYrXei Urgent:
Rate Obama on His Job Performance. Vote Here Now!
Plan does not solve racial profiling programs such as NSEERS, OFL, and
TSA screening
Wade J. Henderson, Esq., President and CEO, The Leadership Conference on Civil and
Human Rights, March 2011, "Restoring a National Consensus: The Need to End Racial
Profiling in America" The Leadership Conference,
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/racialprofiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Arabs from Muslim countries. In
response to the attacks, the federal government immediately engaged in a sweeping
counterterrorism campaign focused on Arabs and Muslims, and in some cases on persons who were
perceived to be, but in fact were not, Arabs or Muslims, such as Sikhs and other South Asians. That focus continues to
this day. The federal government claims that its anti-terrorism efforts do not amount to racial
profiling, but the singling out for questioning and detention of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, as well as
selective application of the immigration laws to nationals of Arab and Muslim countries,
belie this claim.¶ A prime example of a federal program that encourages racial profiling is the National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), implemented in 2002.44 NSEERS requires certain individuals from
predominantly Muslim countries to register with the federal government, as well as to be
fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated. A report issued in 2009 by the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) and the Rights Working Group had this to say about NSEERS: ¶ More than seven years after its implementation,
NSEERS continues to impact the lives of those individuals and communities subjected to it. It has led to the prevention of
naturalization and to the deportation of individuals who failed to register, either because they were unaware of the
registration requirement or because they were afraid to register after hearing stories of interrogations, detentions and
deportations of friends, family and community members. As a result, well-intentioned individuals who failed to comply with
NSEERS due to a lack of knowledge or fear have been denied "adjustment of status" (green cards), and in some cases have
been placed in removal proceedings for willfully" failing to register."45¶ Despite
NSEERS' near explicit profiling
based on religion and national origin, federal courts have held that the program does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and that those forced to participate in the program have not
suffered violations of their rights under the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which protect against
unreasonable search and seizure and guarantee due process, respectively.46¶ Another example of a federal program
that involves racial profiling is Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47 which was instituted just prior to
the November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt terror operations."48 OFL is a covert program, the
existence of which was discovered through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee and the Yale Law School National Litigation Project.49 ¶ According to the 2009 ACLU/Rights
Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department of Homeland Security show that: ¶ an
astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from Muslim
majority countries. Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted
than similarly situated individuals from other countries. Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from
the interviews conducted under this program. What did result, however, was
an intense chilling effect on
the free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities
targeted in advance of an already contentious presidential election.50¶ Lists of individuals who registered under NSEERS were
apparently used to select candidates for investigation in OFL.51 Inasmuch as the overwhelming majority of those selected
were Muslims, OFL is a clear example of a federal program that involves racial profiling. Moreover, because OFL has resulted
in no terror-related convictions, the program is also a clear example of how racial profiling uses up valuable law enforcement
resources yet fails to make our nation safer.52¶ Although Arabs and Muslims, and those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims
based on their appearance, have since 9/11 been targeted by law enforcement authorities in their homes, at work, and while
driving or walking,53 airports and border crossings have become especially daunting. One reason for this is a wide-ranging
and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that states, "in the course of a border search, and
absent individualized suspicion, officers can review and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to
enter …. the United States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the standard to copy documents belonging to a person seeking to
enter the U.S. was lowered from a "probable cause" to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.55 Operating under such a broad and
subjective guidance, border agents frequently stop Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians for extensive questioning about their
families, faith, political opinions, and other private matters, and subject them to intrusive searches. Often, their cell phones,
laptops, personal papers and books are taken and reviewed.¶ The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of
every person who, according to the U.S. government, has "any nexus" to terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e.,
mistaking non-listed persons for listed persons) and over-classification (i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that
makes them appear dangerous when they are not), this defective "watch-list" causes many problems for Muslims, Arabs, and
South Asians seeking to enter the United States, including those who are U.S. citizens. ¶ The case of Zabaria Reed, a U.S. citizen,
Gulf War veteran, 20-year member of the National Guard, and firefighter, illustrates the problem. Trying to reenter the U.S.
from Canada where he travels to visit family, Reed is frequently detained, searched, and interrogated about his friends,
politics, and reasons for converting to Islam. Officials have handcuffed Reed in front of his children, pointed weapons at him,
and denied him counsel.57¶ In 2005, a lawsuit—Rahman v. Chertoff—was filed in federal district court in Illinois by nine U.S.
citizens and one lawful permanent resident, none of whom had any connection to terrorist activity.58 The plaintiffs—all of
whom are of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent— alleged that they were repeatedly detained, interrogated, and
humiliated when attempting to re-enter the U.S. because their names were wrongly on the watch-list, despite the fact that they
were law abiding citizens who were always cleared for re-entry into the U.S. after these recurring and punitive detentions.59 ¶
In May 2010, the court dismissed the case, finding that almost all of the disputed detentions were "routine," meaning that
border guards needed no suspicion at all to undertake various intrusions such as pat-down frisks and handcuffing for a brief
time.60 Further, the court held that where the stops were not routine, the detentions, frisks, and handcuffings were justified
by the placement of the individuals on the TSC's database—even when the listing may have been a mistake.61¶
Notwithstanding the adverse decision in the Rahman case, and the continuation of these practices on a national level, it is
important to note that there have been certain positive changes in government policy since 2005. Specifically, a standard of
"reasonable suspicion" is now used before a name can be added to the TSC’s database, which marks a sharp departure from
the essentially "standardless" policy previously in effect.62¶ Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim head coverings are
also profiled for higher scrutiny at airports. In response to criticism from Sikh organizations, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) recently revised its operating procedure for screening head coverings at airports. The current
procedure provides that:¶ All members of the traveling public are permitted to wear head coverings (whether religious or not)
through the security checkpoints. The new standard procedures subject all
persons wearing head
coverings to the possibility of additional security screening, which may include a patdown
search of the head covering. Individuals may be referred for additional screening if the security officer cannot
reasonably determine that the head area is free of a detectable threat item. If the issue cannot be resolved through a pat-down
search, the individual will be offered the opportunity to remove the head covering in a private screening area.63 ¶ Despite this
new procedure, and TSA's assurance that in implementing it "TSA does not conduct ethnic or religious profiling, and employs
multiple checks and balances to ensure profiling does not happen,"64 Sikh
travelers report that they continue
to be profiled and subject to abuse at airports.65¶ Amardeep Singh, director of programs for the Sikh
Coalition and a second-generation American, recounted the following experience in his June 2010 testimony before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee: ¶ Two months ago, my
family and I were coming back to the United States from a family vacation in Playa Del Carmen, Mexico. At Fort Lauderdale
Airport, not only was I subjected to extra screening, but so was [my 18 month-old son Azaad]. I was sadly forced to take my
son, Azaad, into the infamous glass box so that he could [be] patted down. He cried while I held him. He did not know who that
stranger was who was patting him down. His bag was also thoroughly searched. His Elmo book number one was searched. His
Elmo book number two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The time spent waiting for me to grab him was wasted
time. The time spent going through his baby books was wasted time. I am not sure what I am going to tell him when he is old
enough and asks why his father and grandfather and soon him—Americans all three—are constantly stopped by the TSA
100% of the time at some airports.66
TURN, stopping the TSA means an alternative which involves even more
federal surveillance and racial profiling elsewhere – those with Muslim
backgrounds would be detained more than others
Josh Gerstein, 11-24-2010, "Alternative to TSA pat-downs: More background checks,"
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1110/45559.html
If Americans don’t want the government touching their “junk” to improve air security, the
alternative may well be greater scrutiny of passengers’ travel histories and personal
backgrounds, security experts say. The public backlash against the aggressive pat-downs the
federal government rolled out this month could put more pressure on the government to introduce
security measures previously rejected on privacy grounds, including in-depth
interrogations of travelers at airports, government scrutiny of passengers’ airline
information, and even creation of a secure, standardized national ID card. “The question is,
which kind of privacy do you want to have?” said Stewart Baker, a top Department of Homeland Security
official during the Bush administration. “This has been a pretty searing experience for DHS. Obviously, we’re not going to do
more in this area [of physical checks] and it would be welcome if we could do less…. The
alternative is to look for
terrorists in advance.” That approach to security, Baker said, calls for singling out suspicious
passengers and subjecting them to intense questioning. “We’re going to gather information
about people we’re going to encounter hours before they arrive. We’ll compare names and
travel partners to lists of people, not just no-fly lists, but anyone who’s suspect one way or
another,” Baker said. “One hundred and ninety-nine people spend 30 seconds in primary [screening] getting an ID check
and moved on, but one person in 200 gets an hour of screening, reviewing their personal effects, and an interrogation that’s
very free ranging.” This kind of system might do away with some of the more jarring images at airport security checkpoints –
uniformed Transportation Security Administration officers thoroughly frisking nuns and young children. “Grandma from
Dubuque is probably not going to get identified as a risk,” Baker said. “She spends 30 seconds and gets waved through.” “With
a little more information on all passengers, and more careful screening of those who raise red flags, the TSA shakedown of
pregnant women, small children and nuns in habit could be made less necessary, or at least less intrusive,” Shannen Coffin, a
former legal counsel to Vice President Dick Cheney, wrote at National Review Online. While there have been complaints about
other TSA security rules, including a requirement to remove shoes and strict limits on liquids and gels in carry-on luggage, no
TSA procedure has generated as much blowback as the newly adopted procedures, including high-tech body scanners that can
penetrate clothing and searches some passengers have compared to sexual molestation. The use of the scanners, which
produce detailed images, produced some protest from privacy advocates and Muslim groups who object on modesty grounds.
But those protests didn’t receive as much attention as the more assertive pat-downs. Fran Townsend, who was one of Bush’s
security advisers, said the American psyche and culture views the laying on of hands by anyone in authority as far more
serious invasion of privacy than investigating a passenger’s background, submitting him or her to X-rays or searching their
belongings. “We associate in this country, because of our Constitution, the physical touching of people by government or law
enforcement as a thing we do only to criminals,” Townsend said. “All of sudden grandma goes through and she’s getting
groped. She’s resentful because it’s not what she thinks of as her country…I think Americans want to be supportive of
counterterror measures but they need to be persuaded that what is being asked of them is fair, reasonable and effective.”
Gauging public reaction to the pat-downs and body-scans has been tricky: An ABC News/Washington Post poll out Monday
found roughly a 50-50 split on whether the pat-downs were a good idea, with about two-thirds supporting use of the body
scanners. A USA Today/Gallup poll of Americans who travel at least twice a year found 71 percent thought use of the
combined technology was “worth it,” but 57 percent said they were either angry or bothered by the new pat-downs. The
Obama administration’s decision not to publicize the new pat-downs in advance may also have hurt support for the
technology. Gallup found travelers nearly evenly split, 48 percent to 47 percent, on whether pat-downs would or would not
help find potential terrorists like the Nigerian who allegedly boarded a Detroit-bound jetliner last Christmas Day and tried to
detonate explosives hidden in his underwear. Some don’t like to be touched, but others are troubled by the idea of a security
officer in a separate room examining an image of their body. Others don’t mind those intrusions, but draw the line at
authorities scrutinizing their travel history, travel partners or interrogating them about where they’re going and why. In 2003,
privacy advocates, fearing “big brother” intrusions, convinced Congress to block TSA access to itineraries and related
information on domestic air travelers, though the government does review information for international flights. A new version
of the domestic program gives TSA more limited information, including the names, birth dates and gender information of
passengers. One terrorism expert said the public reaction to the new pat-downs is not surprising, but privacy advocates
cannot fairly object to every technique that could be used to improve air security. “If you walk up to somebody in your office
and do [a pat-down], you will be arrested. There’s something peculiar about lots of people lining up to be sexually assaulted,”
noted Ben Wittes of the Brookings Institution. However, “you can’t take the position that there should be no profiling, no
intrusive searches, and it’s ridiculous to treat old ladies the same as young men. Those three ideas will not go together,” Wittes
said. “At some point, you have to make honest choices about what kind of intrusions you’re more or less worried about, or you
have to be open and honest about saying, ‘I’m willing to lose this number of airplanes a year.’…This does have a quality about it
of people flatly refusing to make serious choices.” Wittes also said the overall judgment on what privacy invasions are
acceptable have to be made by society and not individual travelers. Otherwise, terrorists will “choose the one most conducive
to they’re getting through,” he said. Chris Calabrese of the American Civil Liberties Union said his group supports traditional
police work to keep planes safe. “What we’ve never said no to is focusing on individual criminals and individual dangers, going
back to good old-fashioned law-enforcement techniques to arrest [suspects] before they even get to the airport,” he said. The
ACLU and other groups objected to the collection of airline itinerary information because it amounted to assembling a vast
database on lawful unthreatening travelers in what would likely be an unsuccessful effort to find a few suspected terrorists
intent on doing harm. “A lot of our concern was around mass surveillance – this idea that if you collect all this information on
everybody and apply some computer algorithm to it, data mine it, and suddenly signs of a terrorist are going to pop out,”
Calabrese said. “There’s no science to back that up.” He added that grand jury subpoenas are available to seek itinerary data on
suspects in legitimate criminal investigations. The ACLU, which had for decades opposed all airport security checkpoints as
unconstitutional suspicionless searches, dropped that stance after September 11, Calabrese said. The new battle over patdowns and scans has allied some conservatives and civil libertarians – up to a point. “The federal fondling is an
unconstitutional search and seizure…. We have lost a level of our freedom in order to retain a level of our freedom and that
ought to outrage every American whether you fly on an airplane or not,” former Gov. Mike Huckabee (R-Ark.) told Fox News
Tuesday. “Do we really think that we're going to be safer because a 5-year-old boy has his genitals looked at?” However,
conservatives are again calling for profiling as an alternative to the enhanced checks. “What we've got to do, whether we like it
or not, is to discern who is likely to be a person with an intent,” Huckabee said. “We'd profile everybody but we would quit
selling or buying machines.” But Calabrese and others warn that an identity-based
system that relies on racial
or religious profiles would be ineffective and violate travelers’ rights. “Terrorists are smart,” he said.
“They identify and work around the profiling,”. Moving to a system that looks more at travelers’ backgrounds and less at what
they may be wearing or carrying would also require another important change: greater certainty that a passenger actually is
whom he or she claims to be. Baker noted that Congress’s effort to move to a more secure system based on state-issued
driver’s licenses, Real ID, was repeatedly rolled back by Congress and the Bush and Obama administrations. “As long as it’s
possible to get a fake driver’s license, an identity-based security system doesn’t work,” he said.
Passing the plan favors private contractors that would replace the TSA
Dan Tracy, 9-23-2014, "Sanford International Airport to replace TSA with private
security," OrlandoSentinel, http://www.orlandosentinel.com/travel/os-tsa-sanfordprivatize-20140923-story.html
Sanford International Airport to get private security. TSA going out,
private contractor coming in. Private
guards will take over security at Orlando Sanford International Airport early next year — a move
U.S. Rep. John Mica and airport Director Larry Dale predict will result in more passenger-friendly service
and shorter lines. But even with privatization, the people staffing the security checkpoints in Sanford most likely will be
the same ones who are doing it now for the federal Transportation Security Administration. The main difference is
they will be reporting to Trinity Technology Group, the Manassas, Va., company that just won a $24
million, 60-month contract to check passengers before they catch their flights in Sanford. The roughly 200 TSA officers
now working at Sanford must be offered the first shot at Trinity positions, according to federal law. And Trinity is required to
offer roughly equivalent wages and benefits. Mica, a Republican from Winter Park, and Dale maintain that Trinity — and other
private-security companies, for that matter — will save money by having fewer managers as well as having more flexibility in
firing poor performers. "I just believe private industry can do better than the government," said Dale, who predicted Trinity
guards will be more courteous and attentive to passengers, and its management will be more flexible in scheduling workers to
reduce lines during peak travel times. TSA spokeswoman Sari Koshetz would not comment on criticisms by Dale and Mica,
saying only that the agency had five complaints and dozens of compliments last year from the more than 1.8 million
passengers who went through Sanford. The switch, which includes a four-month transition that starts Oct. 1, comes more than
four years after Dale started pushing to replace TSA. TSA's pre-check screening program -- in effect at 118 U.S. airports -- aims
for speedy processing of select passengers who have paid a fee, been fingerprinted and undergone a computer security check.
Trinity already provides security at smaller airports, such as Sioux Falls, S.D.; Santa Rosa, Calif.; and Tupelo, Miss., among
others. The Sanford airport handles nearly 2 million passengers annually. Although long lines at security have rarely been a
problem in Sanford, Dale has often complained that TSA was difficult to deal with and overly bureaucratic. With the change,
the TSA will continue to oversee security at Sanford airport, but Trinity will run the day-to-day operations. Just like TSA, the
Trinity employees will confirm tickets belong to the correct travelers, as well as check passengers for contraband, such as
explosives, and run the scanning machines. Trinity officials would not comment Tuesday to the Orlando Sentinel. TSA officers
who do not sign on with Trinity can apply for other government positions or retire, Koshetz said. With the changeover, 19
airports nationally now have private security; the largest are San Francisco International, Kansas City International and
Greater Rochester International in New York. In Florida, Key West International Airport has a private force, and Sarasota
Bradenton International Airport is moving toward one. The board of Orlando International Airport, which 35 million travelers
passed through last year, has been considering a switch to private security for 18 months. A 10-member panel was supposed
to make a recommendation last fall but has yet to vote on a suggestion for the board. Orlando International spokeswoman
Carolyn Fennell said, "They are still evaluating the information they have gathered." At Orlando, TSA made several changes to
decrease the lines passengers face at the checkpoints after the review was started. As
a result, travelers move
through security more quickly than in years past, according to TSA statistics. TSA usually screens 50,000 travelers
and 38,000 checked bags daily at the airport. TSA was created after the terrorists attacks of 9-11. Private security previously
worked at airports. Leading the charge against TSA has been Mica, who helped draft the legislation that created the agency. He
has been pushing Orlando International to fire TSA, too, arguing it is bloated and top-heavy with management. Mica also was
instrumental in passing a law almost two years ago that made it easier for airports to opt out of TSA. He said he was "pleased"
that Sanford was going private and hopes other airports, including Orlando, follow.
3 Alt Causes to profiling
1. Muslim profiling
Madiha Shahabuddin. 2/16/2015. “The More Muslim You Are, the More Trouble You
Can Be”: 1 How Government Surveillance of Muslim Americans2 Violates First Amendment
Rights.” http://www.chapmanlawreview.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Shahabuddin.pdf (really long book analysis).
And in July 2014,
it was revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) had—at the
minimum—spied on five “politically active” Muslim American leaders, including a past Bush
administration official, a successful attorney, a Rutgers professor, a former California State
University professor, and an executive director of the Council on American-Islamic
Relations (CAIR).46 At the root of these investigations is the tool of profiling, which allows the
NYPD, FBI, or other governmental entity to target certain groups of individuals solely based
upon their religious affiliation and pursue an almost carte blanche “fishing expedition” for
evidence condemning the targeted Muslim of some link to terrorist activity.47 Justification
for this treatment of Muslim American communities has come from the idea that the post9/11 era calls for “urgent” action to thwart mass destruction that can come from a potential
terror attack, and therefore—as the argument goes—constitutional infringements like this
are a “small price to pay for [America’s] safety.” 48
2. Mosque surveillance
Center for Constitutional Rights, 7-7-2014, "Suspicionless Surveillance of Muslim
Communities and the Increased Use and Abuse of Muslim Informants" Center for
Constitutional Rights,
http://www.ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/files/CCR_CERD_ShadowReport_Surv
eillance-20140708.pdf. Page 3.
Since 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has greatly expanded the use of informants who,
at the FBI’s behest, infiltrate communities and spy on the activities of millions of lawabiding Americans. In 2008, the FBI disclosed that it had 15,000 informants on its payroll, the
most the agency has ever had in history.13 The FBI has targeted Arab, Muslim, and South Asian
communities for surveillance and investigation by informants.14 A vast number of the FBI’s
informants are recruited to infiltrate mosques, businesses, and organizations within those
communities and to report back on the activities of innocent individuals.15 The FBI frequently
asks informants to monitor activities within the community without any reasonable suspicion that
there is criminal activity afoot – a practice that is sanctioned by FBI guidelines.16 The FBI aggressively targets
men of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian descent and attempts to get them to become informants
against their own communities. Although a spokesperson for the FBI has stated that its agents are prohibited from
using threats or coercion to recruit informants, 17 the Attorney General’s guidelines regarding the use of
confidential informants do not explicitly ban this practice.18 Many individuals have publicly recounted how FBI
agents threatened them with baseless terrorism charges or deportation in an attempt to coerce them into becoming
informants, or have brought charges against them in retaliation for their refusal to work as informants.19 Organizations that
engage in outreach and provide legal services to individuals within Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities have also
reported to us that the FBI’s practice of using intimidation tactics to recruit informants among Muslim men is widespread.
1. War on terror overseas
Zia Ahmad, 10-1-2014, "War on terror overseas leading to widespread Islamophobia at
home," Australasian Muslim Times, http://www.amust.com.au/2014/10/war-on-terroroverseas-leading-to-widespread-islamophobia-at-home/
War on terror overseas leading to widespread Islamophobia at home. With the so called war
on terror ramping up in the Middle East, and in the wake of the widespread police raids on
Muslim homes in Sydney and Brisbane last month and in Melbourne this week, community tensions seem to be
on the boil. Community leaders have warned that the alarming headlines and beat up stories in the media and vilification
of Muslims by radio shock jocks and on social media is creating an atmosphere of fear and hatred in the
Australian society that may lead to violence and rioting on our suburban streets. There have been a number of Islamophobic
attacks directed specially on Muslim women who are easily identifiable with their Islamic dress code. Since the launching of
the Islamophobia Register Australia, a large number of reports have been received ranging from verbal abuse, to threats and
attacks oIDL threat imagen property as well as assaults on persons. An anonymous threat letter was issued purportedly by
Australian Defence League threatening the bombing of the Lakemba Mosque, the Auburn Mosque and the Grand Mufti of
Australia. Since the incident of stabbing of two Victorian police officers and death of the assailant, Victorian police have
revealed a rise in unreported attacks on Muslim women. The NSW Police Force has urged the community to report all attacks,
no matter how minor or trivial, to the police and has warned that it will not tolerate targeting of individuals on identifiable
characteristics including race, religion, ethnicity etc. On 25 September a 21 year old man was arrested and charged after
walking into Al-Faisal College in Minto armed with a knife asking if it was a “Muslim School.” On 26 September a 66 year old
man was arrested in Logan, South of Brisbane and charged for verbally assaulting a Muslim women wearing a niqab telling her
“you are a Muslim, go back to your country.” To date there are three reports of Mosques being vandalised
in Queensland, the Mareeba Mosque spray painted with anti-Muslim slogans, Logan Mosque in Kingston dumped with antiMuslim flyers and Holland Park Mosque in Brisbane dumped with a dead pig head. There have been attacks on mistaken
identity as well. On 25 September, a young man with a beard, not a Muslim, was allegedly abused and threatened with
beheading by a carload of Anti-Muslim teens at traffic lights on a Gold Coast Street. There have also been reports of false
attacks. A 41 year old naval officer claimed last week that he was assaulted by two Middle Eastern men outside his Bella Visa
home, but the police deemed the report to be false. Islamophobia Register Australia has been launched to help capture all
incidents of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiments in Australia. Submit a report (all information submitted will be kept
strictly confidential) via the Islamic Register Australia Facebook page by sending a private message:
www.fb.com/islamophobiaregisteraustralia or email islamophobiaregister@gmail.com . The register classifies Islamophobia
incidents into the following groups: Assaults or attacks on persons of Muslim background. Attacks on Muslim property or
institutions. Verbal abuse and hate speech/social media abuse. Unwarranted harassment or interrogation at airports by
authorities
Framing
Utilitarianism is good for policy makers – leads to the most benefits over
harms
Manuel Velasquez,, 8-1-2014, "Calculating Consequences: The Utilitarian Approach to
Ethics," Markkula Center For Applied Ethic,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/calculating.html
Calculating Consequences: The Utilitarian Approach to Ethics Developed by Manuel Velasquez, Claire Andre, Thomas Shanks,
S.J., and Michael J. Meyer Imagine that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency gets wind of a plot to set off a dirty bomb in a major
American city. Agents capture a suspect who, they believe, has information about where the bomb is planted. Is it permissible
for them to torture the suspect into revealing the bomb's whereabouts? Can the dignity of one individual be violated in order
to save many others? Greatest Balance of Goods Over Harms If you answered yes, you were probably using a form of moral
reasoning called "utilitarianism." Stripped down to its essentials, utilitarianism
is a moral principle that holds
that the morally right course of action in any situation is the one that produces the greatest
balance of benefits over harms for everyone affected. So long as a course of action produces maximum
benefits for everyone, utilitarianism does not care whether the benefits are produced by lies, manipulation, or coercion. Many
of us use this type of moral reasoning frequently in our daily decisions. When asked to explain why we feel we have a moral
duty to perform some action, we often point to the good that will come from the action or the harm it will prevent. Business
analysts, legislators, and scientists weigh daily the resulting benefits and harms of policies
when deciding, for example, whether to invest resources in a certain public project, whether to approve a new drug, or
whether to ban a certain pesticide. Utilitarianism offers a relatively straightforward method for deciding
the morally right course of action for any particular situation we may find ourselves in. To discover
what we ought to do in any situation, we first identify the various courses of action that we could perform. Second, we
determine all of the foreseeable benefits and harms that would result from each course of action for everyone affected by the
action. And third, we choose the course of action that provides the greatest benefits after the costs have been taken into
account. The principle of utilitarianism can be traced to the writings of Jeremy Bentham, who lived in England during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bentham, a legal reformer, sought an objective basis that would provide a publicly
acceptable norm for determining what kinds of laws England should enact. He believed that the most promising way of
reaching such an agreement was to choose that policy that would bring about the greatest net benefits to society once the
harms had been taken into account. His motto, a familiar one now, was "the greatest good for the greatest number." Over the
years, the principle of utilitarianism has been expanded and refined so that today there are many variations of the principle.
For example, Bentham defined benefits and harms in terms of pleasure and pain. John Stuart Mill, a great 19th century
utilitarian figure, spoke of benefits and harms not in terms of pleasure and pain alone but in terms of the quality or intensity of
such pleasure and pain. Today utilitarians often describe benefits and harms in terms of the satisfaction of personal
preferences or in purely economic terms of monetary benefits over monetary costs. Utilitarians also differ in their views about
the kind of question we ought to ask ourselves when making an ethical decision. Some utilitarians maintain that in making an
ethical decision, we must ask ourselves: "What effect will my doing this act in this situation have on the general balance of
good over evil?" If lying would produce the best consequences in a particular situation, we ought to lie. Others, known as rule
utilitarians, claim that we must choose that act that conforms to the general rule that would have the best consequences. In
other words, we must ask ourselves: "What effect would everyone's doing this kind of action have on the general balance of
good over evil?" So, for example, the rule "to always tell the truth" in general promotes the good of everyone and therefore
should always be followed, even if in a certain situation lying would produce the best consequences. Despite such differences
among utilitarians, however, most hold to the general principle that morality must depend on balancing the
beneficial and harmful consequences of our conduct. - See more at:
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/decision/calculating.html#sthash.7QghnbgB.dpuf
Prefer existential risks—we cognitively underestimate high magnitude
impacts
Bostrom 11 Nick Bostrom, Professor in the Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin
School, Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, and Director of the Programme on the
Impacts of Future Technology at the University of Oxford, recipient of the 2009 Eugene R.
Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, holds a Ph.D. in
Philosophy from the London School of Economics, 2011 “The Concept of Existential Risk,”
Draft of a Paper published on ExistentialRisk.com, Available Online at
http://www.existentialrisk.com/concept.html
Many kinds of cognitive
bias and other psychological phenomena impede efforts at thinking
clearly and dealing effectively with existential risk.[32] For example, use of the availability
heuristic may create a “good-story bias” whereby people evaluate the plausibility of
existential-risk scenarios on the basis of experience, or on how easily the various
possibilities spring to mind. Since nobody has any real experience with existential
catastrophe, expectations may be formed instead on the basis of fictional evidence derived
from movies and novels. Such fictional exposures are systematically biased in favor of scenarios that make for entertaining stories.
Plotlines may feature a small band of human protagonists successfully repelling an alien invasion or a robot army. A story in which humankind
goes extinct suddenly—without warning and without being replaced by some other interesting beings—is less likely to succeed at the box office
(although more likely to happen in reality).
Prefer magnitude to probability—probability can’t be determined
Mark Jablonowski 10, Lecturer in Economics at the University of Hartford, “Implications
of Fuzziness for the Practical Management of High-Stakes Risks,” International Journal of
Computational Intelligence Systems, Vol.3, No. 1 (April, 2010), 1-7
“Danger”
is an inherently fuzzy concept. Considerable knowledge imperfections surround
probability of high-stakes exposures, and the assessment of their acceptability. This is due to the
complex and dynamic nature of risk in the modern world. ¶ Fuzzy thresholds for danger are
most effectively established based on natural risk standards. This means that risk levels are
acceptable only to the degree they blend with natural background levels. This concept reflects an
both the
evolutionary process that has supported life on this planet for thousands of years. By adhering to these levels, we can help
assure ourselves of thousands more. While
the level of such risks is yet to be determined, observation
suggest that the degree of human-made risk we routinely subject ourselves to is several
orders of magnitude higher. ¶ Due to the fuzzy nature of risk, we can not rely on
statistical techniques. The fundamental problem with catastrophe remains, in the long run,
there may be no long run. That is, we can not rely on results “averaging out” over time. With
such risks, only precautionary avoidance (based on the minimax’ing of the largest
possible loss) makes sense. Combined with reasonable natural thresholds, this view allows a very workable
approach to achieving safe progress.
Existential risks are unacceptable—if we win links to our offense, you
should vote neg
Rescher 83 Nicholas, Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, Risk: A
Philosophical Introduction to the theory of risk evaluation, p. 67
In such situations we are dealing with hazards that are just not in the same league. Certain
hazards are simply
unacceptable because they involve a relatively unacceptable threat—things may go
wrong so badly that, relative to the alternatives, it’s just not worthwhile to “run the risk,” even in the
face of a favorable balance of probabilities. The rational man is not willing to trade off against one another by juggling
probabilities such outcomes as the loss of one hair and the loss of his health or his freedom. The imbalance or disparity between risks is just too
great to be restored by probablistic readjustments. They are (probablistically) incommersuable: confronted
with such
“incomparable” hazards, we do not bother to weigh this “balance of probabilities” at all, but
simply dismiss one alternative as involving risks that are, in the circumstances, “unacceptable”.