Bihar REGS:
Preliminary Findings from the 2009
Baseline Survey and Next Steps
Puja Vasudeva Dutta, Soumya Kapoor, Rinku
Murgai, Manasa Putman, Martin Ravallion and
Dominique van de Walle
India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme
NREGS is the largest antipoverty policy in India’s
history (and the developing world’s)
– Objectives:
• Primary: Employment generation + poverty reduction
• Secondary: Asset creation
• Other: Strengthening grassroots democratic processes
India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme
•
Phasing in:
– Introduced in February 2006 in 200 most backward districts
– Expanded to additional 130 districts in 2007
– Now covers all 600+ districts in country
• Centre-state financing shares:
– Center pays for: (a) wage costs; (b) 75% of material costs; (c)
administrative costs (subject to a maximum limit)
– States pay for: (a) 25% of material costs; (b) other administrative
costs; (c) unemployment allowance
NREGS in theory
• 100 days of unskilled manual work per year
guaranteed on demand to all rural households
• Apply to GP for jobcard; apply for work
• Wage: state statutory min wage (daily/piece rate)
• Wages paid weekly through post office account
• Unemployment allowance if work not provided
• Machines & contractors not allowed
• Projects chosen by gram sabha to reflect village
priorities
NREGS in theory
• Mandated worksite facilities:
– Safe drinking water
– Shade
– First aid kit
– Creche (5+ children below age 6)
• Gender equity
– Equal wages for men & women
– No gender discrimination of any kind
– Priority for women: 33% should be women
The BREGS Study:
what is the reality?
The BREGS Study
“Gender equality”?
What’s that?
Background
• Bihar is one of the poorest states of India
• Yet NREGS participation in Bihar is one of
the lowest in India
• Why? No demand for BREGS? Or unfulfilled
demand, and why?
• How might coverage be increased in a costeffective way?
Data
1. Baseline survey
• 3,000 randomly sampled households in 150
villages of rural Bihar surveyed in April-July
2009
• 5,200 adult individuals, one male and one
female from each household
2. Trial pilots to improve coverage/performance
3. Follow-up survey: same villages/households in
April-July 2010
Preliminary Findings from the
Baseline Survey*
* These figures are not final and may well change
Three groups
BREGS Demanders (who want BREGS work):
1. Participants in BREGS
2. Non-participants: those who say they would
like to work on BREGS but did not obtain
work
The rest:
3. Those who do not want to participate in
BREGS
Participation is low…
1. Participants:
• 24% of households worked in BREGS
• 15% of adults worked in BREGS
– 26% of men
– 6% of women
• 90% of participants wanted more work
…but demand for work is high
2. Non-participating demanders:
Many wanted work but did not get it
• 41% of households wanted BREGS work but did
not participate
• 36% of adults (43% of men; 30% of women)
3. The rest : 35% did not want BREGS work
Does BREGS guarantee employment?
Not yet
• Huge excess demand by men and women
• Signs of rationing
– People not issued job cards
– People turned away from worksites
– Worksites not opened
• Women who want BREGS work are less
likely to get it than men
– 17% of female demanders actually participated
– 39% of male demanders actually participated
Are there differences between who gets
work and who does not?
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
%HH by main characteristics
70
43
67
24 26
13 13
Pucca roof
53
41 37
25
22 21
59
11 7
2
Pucca floor
Owns land
Participants
23
7
Mahadalit
2
SC (other)
Non-participant demanders
OBC
12
General
Rest
%HH by main income source
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
73
51
36
7
16
Ag. self-emp
6 7
16
Non-ag. selfemp
32 27
8
Ag. casual
51 49
40
10
3 8
19
Non-ag. casual Remittances
Never migrate
for work
Are there differences between
who gets work and who does not?
%
Demanders
Participants
Nonparticipants
BPL
44
52
No ration card
15
16
Muslim
3
10
Illiterate head
71
58
Class 8 +
7
19
The
rest
29
27
16
42
37
In many respects participants
and excess demanders are similar
• Targeting of demand for BREGS is good
when compared to non-participants:
– participants are more likely to be lowest caste,
landless, casual laborers, illiterate or poorly
educated, poor housing conditions etc.
• But in many respects the non-participating
demanders are essentially no worse off than
participants.
NREG awareness seems generally
low (less so for participants)
% who answered
correctly
Max no. days? (100/90)
When can work be
demanded?
Men & women?
Non-BPL?
Unemployment
allowance?
Wage rate?
Contractors allowed?
Participants
Rest
44
74
Nonparticipating
demanders
24
56
63
65
20
50
39
21
35
24
13
40
26
16
16
8
13
13
29
Awareness is very low for women
% who answered
correctly
Max no. days?
(100/90)
When can work be
demanded?
Men & women?
Non-BPL?
Unemployment
allowance?
Wage?
Contractors?
Participants
Nonparticipating
demanders
M
W
33
13
M
52
W
14
77
64
67
62
59
58
64
56
45
23
42
29
10
31
14
28
23
23
Rest
M
33
W
5
46
43
31
52
44
37
19
31
19
13
9
8
33
19
24
5
3
8
Perceptions about BREGS
% who answered
“yes”
Can get BREG work
when wanted
BREG has increased
work opportunities
BREG has reduced
migration
BREG work will be
here next year
Participants
Nonparticipating
demanders
M
W
M
W
27
18
10
54
34
36
33
Rest
M
W
13
11
10
23
26
17
15
27
16
22
12
10
13
24
28
18
10
Process: Implementing NREG
Planning
Registration
Work
provision
Payment of
wages
• Participatory planning of works
• HH issued a “job card” on application
• Adult HH member provided work on demand (s.t. 100
day HH max. limit)
• Unemployment allowance paid if work not provided
• Specified worksite facilities to be provided
• Work measurement
• Wages paid on piece-rate basis as per Schedule of
Rates
• Payment in cash through bank or post office
accounts
Process issues: jobcards
%
Households
Have jobcard
Of those without :
 don’t need
 did not try
 tried
 in process
Why did not try?
 Don’t know how
No success as don’t
know officials
Officials will not give
to my family
Participants
Rest
77
Nonparticipating
demanders
28
0
4
22
73
4
11
45
35
62
9
11
11
91
37
73
55
42
58
52
31
29
11
Process issues: wages
• Wage type:
– 65% daily wages; 31% based on work
measurement
• Mode of wage payment:
– 45% in own post office accounts
– Cash from mates (23%) + contractors (11%)
• Only about half the time were job card entries
& signatures done at time of payment
Process issues: worksite
characteristics
• Facilities available
– Drinking water (64%), Shade for rest (33%), Firstaid kit (16%), Child care facility (6%)
• Use of machines (37%)
• Contractor involved (52%)
• Worksites where work disrupted (54%)
– Main reasons: Natural causes (59%), stopped by
officers (13%), dispute by laborers, farmers, other
(25%)
Field observations
• Critical role of Mukhiya in program; in practice
Mukhiya often chooses projects and workers
• Pressing need for revisions to the Schedule of
Rates – through time and motion studies
across regions and groups
• Weakness of transparency mechanisms given
high levels of illiteracy
• Possible sources of leakage
• Participation of women often conditional on
participation of male HH members
Next Steps: Pilots to Test
Actions to Improve BREGS
Is greater awareness the key to
expanding coverage, esp. for women?
• Two key findings from baseline survey:
large unmet demand + low awareness.
– Awareness is a gender issue.
=> Pilot an “awareness intervention”
– Video on NREGA; incl. Govt. videos but
adapted to Bihar
– Q&A sessions after
– All in random subset of the 150 baseline
villages
Would greater monitoring and
auditing help?
• NREGA guidelines are not being followed
–
–
–
–
Unmet demand
Low wages
Contractors galore!
Low participation in project selection
=> Pilot a “monitoring and auditing” (M&A)
intervention
– Random sample of GPs get extra M&A
– Bihar RD letter sent down announcing M&A
Or are both demand and supply
side efforts needed?
• Overlapping the M&A with the awareness
intervention
=> Three groups
1: Awareness intervention only
2: M&A intervention only
3: Both
Photos of film showing during
awareness intervention