Executive Issues Seminar Series
1998
Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas
Sam Houston State University
PATROL
RESEARCH
Dr. Larry Hoover
Police Research Center
Sam Houston State University
Last Year’s Program:
Why the Drop in Crime?
• Social-demographic
Trends
• Economic Conditions
• Drug Use Prevalence
• Incarceration Rates
• Police Programs.
STATEWIDE UCR RATE
8000
7500
Rate
7000
6500
6000
5500
5000
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Year
1995
1996
1997
Myth: The Police Make No
Difference
• Borne first of the lack of clear
relationship between staffing levels
and crime rates
• Reinforced by the Kansas City
Preventive Patrol Experiment and the
Rand Criminal Investigation Study.
Crime-Specific Policing
•
•
•
•
•
Clearly defined intervention strategies
Targeted at particular offenses
Committed by particular offenders
At specific places
At specific times.
Crime-Specific Policing is
NOT:
Unfocused Strategies
• Non-Directed Patrol
• Simple Saturation
Patrol
Change in Style
• New York City
COMSTAT
Program
• Houston Proactive
Effort in 1992
However, Crime-Specific
Policing is Not Necessarily:
•
•
•
•
Focused upon only a single offense
Conducted solely by Patrol
Always a direct field based intervention
Antithetical to Community Oriented
Approaches
We Will Examine:
• Neighborhood Centered
• Targeted Enforcement
• Youth & Gang
Programs
• Problem-Oriented
Strategies
• Proactive Investigative
Techniques
The 25 Year Research
Legacy on Patrol
A Brief Synopsis
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (1973)
San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment (1975)
Directed Patrol in New Haven and Pontiac (1976)
Split Force Patrol in Wilmington (1976)
Newark and Flint Foot Patrol (1981)
Minneapolis Repeat Call Address (Recap) (1988)
Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment (1993)
Other Research
(examined later)
• Problem Oriented Policing in Newport
News
• Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment
and Its Replications
• Investigative Effectiveness Research
Preventive Patrol
Experiment
South Patrol District
Fifteen Beats
Reactive Beats
(5)
Proactive Beats
(5)
Control Beats
(5)
Preventive Patrol Experiment Beat Configuration
R
P
C
C
P
R
C
R
C
P
P
P
R
C
R
Generalizing the Results
Results
• No effect on crime
• No effect on citizen
perceptions
• No effect on traffic
accidents
However
• Routine Preventive
Patrol is Non-directive
• Activity varies by
Dept./Shift/Officer
• Only about 2 hours of
an 8 hour shift
• Results apply only to
beat level perceptions
San Diego Field
Interrogation
Three Areas
Time
• Control
• Specially Trained
Officers
• “No” Field
Interrogations
• Pre - 7 months
• Experimental - 9 months
• Post - 5 months
Measured Suppressible
Street Crime
• Part I offenses of robbery, burglary,
auto theft, street rape, street theft
• Other offenses included other sex
crimes, vandalism, and disorderly
conduct.
Effect on Crime in
Experimental Areas
120
104
100
83
80
81
75
63
63
60
40
20
0
PRE-EXP.
EXPER.
POST-EXP
Other Results
• No change in control or specially trained
areas
• About one month lag time in effect
• No effect on community relations
• In San Diego, 17% of all arrests attributed
to FIs, but less than 2% of FIs result in an
arrest
• About 3% of all citizen complaints result
from field interrogations.
Directed Patrol in New
Haven & Pontiac
• Use of crime analysis to
direct non-committed patrol
time to problem locations
• Direction by dispatchers
proved problematic
• Reduction in criminal
incidents (but lacked control
areas)
Wilmington Split-Force Concept
• Bifurcated patrol, 70% in
Basic, 30% in Structured
• Structured concentrated on
problem areas and follow-up
• Patrol’s arrest rate up 4%,
clearances up 105% however, detective division
clearances down 61%,
department as a whole down
by 28%
• Abandoned after one year.
Newark & Flint Foot Patrol
• No impact on crime in Newark, 9% reduction in
Flint
• Decreases in fear of crime in both cities
• Significantly improved satisfaction with police
services in both - 33% of Flint residents knew
officer by name, 50% of remainder could
recognize the beat officer
• Newark research beget the “Broken Windows”
perspective
• Flint research beget the community oriented
perspective.
Minneapolis Recap Experiment
• 3% of 115,000 addresses
accounted for 50% of CFS
• 5% of addresses generated
64% of all CFS
• Special unit of 5 officers
assigned 125 residential &
125 commercial addresses
• After 6 months, target
addresses had 15% fewer
CFS, but erased after one
year.
Kansas City Gun Reduction
Experiment
• July 92 to Jan 93 two extra patrol units in Beat 144 during
evening
• Beat 144 is an 8 x 10 block area with homicide rate of
177/100,000 - 20 times national average
• Beat is 92% nonwhite, but 66% home ownership
• Gun seizures increased by 65%, gun crimes declined by
40%. No change in Control Beat, no displacement
• Drive by shootings & homicides dropped significantly
• Saturation generated 29 more guns seized, 83 fewer gun
crimes, 55 patrol hours invested per gun crime prevented,
traffic stops most productive - one gun seized for every 28
stops.
Efficacy of Crime-Specific
Approaches
• San Diego Field Interrogation
Experiment
• Problem Oriented Policing in
Newport News
• Flint Foot Patrol
• Minneapolis Recap
• Kansas City Gun Reduction
Crime-Specific Policing
•
•
•
•
•
Clearly defined intervention strategies
Targeted at particular offenses
Committed by particular offenders
At specific places
At specific times.
A Final Note
• In 25 years we have
learned a great deal
• However, we still
know relatively little
about what works in
policing.
TIME FOR THE
RECEPTION