IN THE SUPREME COURT
FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
No. _______________, M.D. Misc. Docket 2016
Docket No. below: 14-CR-550, Lackawanna County, Criminal Division
Stephanie Tarapchak, Incarcerated Person
Joseph Pilchesky, as Stephanie Tarapchak’s “Next Friend”
Petitioners
v.
Kathleen Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania,
Respondent
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION TO DISQUALITY JUDGE
JOHN L. BRAXTON FROM THE MATTER OF COM. V. TARAPCHAK, 14-CR-550,
AND REMOVE COUNSEL, ATTY. JAMES ELLIOTT
______________________________________________________________________________
Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate
Joseph Pilchesky, “Next Friend”
Lackawanna County Prison
819 Sunset St.
1371 N. Washington Ave.
Scranton, PA 18509
Scranton, PA 18509
570-591-4300
joe.pilchesky@gmail.com
1
APPLICATION FOR EXTRAORDINARY JURISDICTION TO DISQUAULITY JUDGE
JOHN L. BRAXTON FROM THE MATTER OF COM. V. TARAPCHAK, 12-CR-550,
AND REMOVE COUNSEL, ATTY. JAMES ELLIOTT
__________________________________________________________________
To the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:
Stephanie Tarapchak, an incarcerated person, who has been the subject of criminal
proceedings in Lackawanna County since her arrest on January 2, 2014, by and through her
“Next Friend”, Joseph Pilchesky, asks this court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to end
the severely prejudicial treatment, dispositions and decisions of the Honorable Judge John L.
Braxton, S.J., who has refused to recuse himself, either sua sponte or by Petition to Disqualify,
when he has been named by Stephanie Tarapchak as a defendant in a voluminous Federal
Complaint filed at 3:15-CV-02078, as both a judge and an individual, predicated upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985, relating to willful and intentional participation in a conspiracy to deprive a person of
their civil rights, and § 1986, relating to failure to act to prevent the deprivation of a person’s
civil rights when one had the authority to do so. Pursuant to the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§
502, 721 & 726, Section 1 of the Schedule to the Judicial Article of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, and Rules of Appellate Procedure, 3307 & 3309, this Court may assume plenary
jurisdiction; and, for the reasons outlined below, it should assume jurisdiction because the
constitutionally protected rights to due process applies to people charged with crimes who
become subject to extreme prejudice, deprivation of due process and liberty rights and abuse of
discretion that could forever change the course of their lives. In a matter that plainly meets this
Court’s test of manifest injustice, this application seeks to restore the constitutional rights of
Stephanie Tarapchak to be subjected to criminal proceedings by a fair and impartial judge.
2
Stephanie Tarapchak further asks this court to remove Atty. James Elliott as court-appointed
counsel, notwithstanding the fact that she formally discharged him on February 16, 2016 via
certified mail. He received the letter on February 17, 2016. He is nonetheless adamant to stay in
the case against her notice of discharge. She is at the sentencing stage of the proceedings after a
two week trial that was held last September, in which she was charged with various medicalrelated crimes. She is a doctor of osteopathic medicine. She faces up to eighty years
imprisonment at the discretion of the presiding judge, Judge Braxton. As more fully discussed
below, she is in very serious conflict with Atty. Elliott on several critical issues. Atty. Elliott sees
no conflict whatsoever with Judge Braxton sentencing her and considering her omnibus motions,
notwithstanding that he is a named defendant in a Federal Complaint that alleges that he took
part in a conspiracy to deprive her of her constitutional rights to rig her trial. The Federal
Complaint has twelve defendants, mostly judicial officers, which speaks for itself. Judge Braxton
will likely certainly be a witness at trial, whether or not he’s excused by immunity.
Atty. Elliott was just assigned to her criminal matter by Judge Braxton on January 29, 2016.
On February 10, 2016, Judge Braxton issued an order setting the sentencing date on February 22,
2016, which provides a mere three weeks for Atty. Elliott to review a two week trial transcript,
eleven (11) pre-trial transcripts and a record that is so voluminous that the clerks deem it the
largest they’ve ever had to manage, so large, that it occupies its own room in the Clerk’s Office,
and he has to prepare post-trial motions. Yet, he believes can absorb all that information, process
every detail hinting at relief and submit post-trial motions that will preserve all of her issues.
With there being an over-abundance of facts on the record to support a Motion for Mistrial
predicated upon both prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, he shows no spirit to pursue it to the
obvious very substantial benefits to Tarapchak’s liberty.
3
INTRODUCTION
APPLICANTS ARE ASSERTING A CLAIM THAT HAS BEEN SETTLED AS A
MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR CENTURIES
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution each contain a due
process clause. Due process deals with the administration of justice and thus the due process
clause acts as a safeguard from arbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property by the Government
outside the sanction of law.[1] The Supreme Court of the United States interprets the clauses more
broadly because these clauses provide four protections: procedural due process (in civil and
criminal proceedings), substantive due process, a prohibition against vague laws, and as the
vehicle for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Due process ensures the rights and equality of
all citizens.
The Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The clause, which took effect in 1868, provides that no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction "the equal protection of the laws".
Procedural due process
This protection extends to all government proceedings that can result in an individual's
deprivation, whether civil or criminal in nature, from parole violation hearings to administrative
hearings regarding government benefits and entitlements to full-blown criminal trials. The article
"Some Kind of Hearing" written by Judge Henry Friendly created a list of basic due process
rights "that remains highly influential, as to both content and relative priority."[16] These rights,
which apply equally to civil due process and criminal due process, are:[16]
4
1. An unbiased tribunal.
2. Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it.
3. Opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action should not be taken.
4. The right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses.
5. The right to know opposing evidence.
6. The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
7. A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.
8. Opportunity to be represented by counsel.
9. Requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented.
10. Requirement that the tribunal prepare written findings of fact and reasons for its decision.
In Com. v. Hammer, 494 A. 2d 1054 - Pa: Supreme Court (1985), the Court wrote as follows:
In the courtroom, the judge is the foremost authority, second to none and no governor of the
judge's conduct resides in the courtroom save the judge. As stated in Commonwealth v. Myma,
278 Pa. 505, 123 A. 486 (1924):
The judge occupies an exalted and dignified position; he is the one person to whom the jury,
with rare exceptions, looks for guidance, and from whom the litigants expect absolute
impartiality. . . . To depart from the clear line of duty through questions, expressions or conduct,
contravenes the orderly administration of justice.
Id., 278 Pa. at 508, 123 A. at 487. The duty therefore lies with the judge to insure that his
conduct is "above reproach," Schlesinger v. Musmanno, 367 Pa. 476, 482, 81 A.2d 316, 319
(1951), or, minimally, is not prejudicial. We therefore question the continued validity of the
5
waiver doctrine as applied to improprieties of the trial judge for 97*97 when the position of
power and authority enjoyed by the judge is considered, the strict enforcement of the waiver
doctrine becomes inadvisable.
The notion that the judge is the foremost regulator of his own conduct is amply recognized by
the Code of Judicial Conduct, adopted by this Court in 1973, effective January 1, 1984:
A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should himself
observe, high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved.
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 (emphasis supplied).
A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Id., Canon 2, Section A (emphasis supplied).
A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . .
Id., Canon 3, Section C(1)(a) (emphasis supplied). Thus, an officer of the judiciary in this
Commonwealth is charged with a self-regulating function and is deemed the foremost arbiter of
his own personal bias or prejudice and hence his competence to preside over a matter.
6
Avoidance of a conflict of interest regarding financial matters requires that a judge should
inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort
to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing
in his household.
Id., Canon 3, Section C (2) (emphasis supplied). It would indeed be a contemptible system
which required counsel in a civil case to ferret out the potential conflicts of interest 98*98
residing, for example, in a judge's financial interests in order to obtain the judge's
disqualification. That duty resides expressly with the judge. So, too, would it be unacceptable to
permit the inherent injustice of judicial impropriety to go without remedy in a criminal case for
want of censure by objection of counsel. In a criminal prosecution, "[i]t is the judge, not counsel,
who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial. `[T]he judge is not
a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct
and of determining questions of law.'" Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-342, 98 S.Ct.
1091, 1096, 55 L.Ed.2d 319, 326-327 (1978) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
(end of Hammer citation)
In In Interest of McFall, 617 A. 2d 707 - Pa: Supreme Court (1992), the Court wrote as follows:
"A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct [her]self at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." Code
of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2(A). "A judge should not allow [her] family, social, or other
relationships to influence [her] judicial conduct or judgment." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
2(B). Recusal is required wherever there is substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside
7
impartially. Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. at 21, 459 A.2d at 731; Commonwealth v. Boyle,
498 Pa. 486, 490, 447 A.2d 250, 252 (1982); Commonwealth v. Knighton, 490 Pa. 16, 23, 415
A.2d 9, 13 (1980). A jurist's impartiality is called into question whenever there are factors or
circumstances that may reasonably question the jurist's impartiality in the matter. Commonwealth
v. Darush, 501 Pa. at 21, 459 A.2d at 731; Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. at 490 n. 4, 447
A.2d at 252 n. 4.
A tribunal is either fair or unfair. There is no need to find actual prejudice, but rather, the
appearance of prejudice is sufficient to warrant the grant of new proceedings. A trial judge
should not only avoid impropriety but must also avoid the appearance of impropriety. In re
Cunningham, 517 Pa. at 430, 538 A.2d at 480; Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 524, 364
A.2d 312, 317 (1976)
"[A]ny tribunal permitted by law to try cases and controversies must not only be unbiased but
must avoid even the appearance of bias." Horn v. Township of Hilltown, 461 Pa. 745, 747, 337
A.2d 858, 859-60 (1975) (quoting Gardner v. Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 129, 252 A.2d 704, 706
(1969) (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 150,
89 S.Ct. 337, 340, 21 L.Ed.2d 301, 305 (1968))).
(end of McFall citation)
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
In Com. v. Albert, 758 A. 2d 1149 - Pa: Supreme Court (2000), the Court wrote as follows:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
8
§ 1. Likewise, Article 1, Section 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[n]either the
Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of
any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right." Pa. Const.
art. 1, Section 26.
This Court has held that "the equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution
are analyzed ... under the same standards used by the United States Supreme Court when
reviewing equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution." McCusker v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board, 536 Pa. 380, 639 A.2d 776,
777 (1994), quoting Love v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 528 Pa. 320, 597 A.2d 1137, 1139 (1991).
In Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995), this Court set forth an extensive analysis
regarding the concept of equal protection, its applicability and the level of scrutiny needed
when examining a particular legislative enactment. We stated:
The essence of the constitutional principle of equal protection under the law is that like
persons in like circumstances will be treated similarly. Laudenberger v. Port Authority of
Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981). However, it does not require that all persons
under all circumstances enjoy identical protection under the law. James v. SEPTA, 505 Pa. 137,
477 A.2d 1302 (1984). The right to equal protection under the law does not absolutely prohibit
the Commonwealth from classifying individuals for the purpose of receiving different treatment,
Robson v. Penn Hills School District, 63 Pa. Commw. 250, 437 A.2d 1273 (1981), and does not
require equal treatment of people having different needs. Houtz v. Commonwealth, Department
of Public Welfare, 42 Pa.Commw. 406, 401 A.2d 388 (1979). The prohibition against treating
people differently under the law does not preclude the Commonwealth from resorting to
9
legislative classifications, Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 43 S.Ct. 83, 67 L.Ed.
237 (1922), provided that those classifications are reasonable rather than arbitrary and bear a
reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation. Commonwealth v. Parker White Metal
Co., 512 Pa. 74, 515 A.2d 1358 (1986). In other words, a classification must rest upon some
ground of difference which justifies the classification and have a fair and substantial relationship
to the object of the legislation. Id. Judicial review must determine whether any classification is
founded on a real and genuine distinction rather than an artificial one. Equitable Credit and
Discount Company v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941). A classification, though
discriminatory, is not arbitrary or in violation of the equal protection clause if any state of facts
reasonably 1152*1152 can be conceived to sustain that classification. Federal Communications
Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211
(1993); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). In
undertaking its analysis, the reviewing court is free to hypothesize reasons the legislature might
have had for the classification. Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications,
Inc.; Martin v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983). If the
court determines that the classifications are genuine, it cannot declare the classification void even
if it might question the soundness or wisdom of the distinction. Equitable Credit and Discount
Company v. Geier.
(end of Albert citation)
Consistent with the Fifth Amendment, Stephanie Tarapchak (Tarapchak) had and has a
constitutional right to due process at all stages of criminal proceedings. She also has a
constitutional right to equal protection under the law to enjoy the same privileges and immunities
as all citizens.
10
Despite these clear constitutional and statutory mandates, Tarapchak has been subjected to
repeated and torturous deprivations of her due process rights and now suffers from being
subjected to a tragically denied right to a fair and impartial judge at a very critical stage of her
proceedings, which is sentencing, with equally critical motions, to include a motion for a mistrial
that involves the prosecutorial and judicial conduct of those named in her Federal Complaint at
3:15-CV-02078, appended hereto as Exhibit “A”, which includes Judge John L. Braxton, S.J..1
Tarapchak’s motions at sentencing should be decided by a fair and impartial judge, and certainly
not by a judge who not only took part in an eighteen-month conspiracy to deprive her of her due
process rights, but took no action to prevent it from escalating.
The Federal Complaint is a twenty-five (25) count enunciation of what three judges, two
defense attorneys, a prosecutor, a prison warden and a house arrest director did to retaliate
against Tarapchak for her participation in exposing rampant corruption in Lackawanna County’s
Family Court. It will be appended to Tarapchak’s brief in support of her Motion for Mistrial,
which motion Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. will hear and dispose of if he is not properly removed
by this Court. He has an obvious interest in the outcome of a Federal Complaint that will support
the basis of Tarapchak’s Motion for Mistrial.
This is how Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. was assigned to preside over Tarapchak’s trial,
which supports that a conspiracy took place between defense counsel, the prosecutor and
the court do deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial
1
A complaint has been filed with the Judicial Conduct Board. In addition, a request for criminal prosecution was
filed with the Department of Justice, which reviewed the matter and referred Tarapchak to the Office of the United
States Attorney.
11
Tarapchak’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 21, 2016, with Judge Michael
Barrasse presiding. He’d been her judge since March 25, 2015. Tarapchak increasingly beacme
extremely upset with her counsel, Atty. Bernard Brown, for his grossly ineffective preparation,
which included failing to give the court-appointed private investigator any assignments, failing
to call any of the witnesses she had provided to him, failing to review any of the medical records
and files she had stored at her home for the purpose of using them at trial, failing to have any
productive discussions with her regarding her defense and, among other things, failing to provide
her with a copy of the Grand Jury testimony, which he had in his possession as the result of a
deal that was made to by–pass her preliminary hearing, all of which caused Tarapchak to file a
Motion to Supplement Counsel (Motion) on September 15, 2015, supported by a voluminous
brief. Judge Barrasse took no action on Tarapchak’s Motion in terms of holding a hearing, so on
September 18, 2015, a Friday, Tarapchak then filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael
Barrasse and had him personally served that day. On Monday morning, at 9:00 am, September
21, 2015, the first day of trial, she served him with a voluminous brief in support of her Motion
to Disqualify, which specifically, with facts from the record, outlined his role in a conspiracy
with Atty. Brown and the prosecutor to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig the
trial. Judge Barrasse took the bench and read off a few pre-trial orders, to include an order that
denied her Motion to Supplement Counsel. He got up, left the courtroom and never returned. He
gave no explanation on the record for his departure. At that point, Judge John L. Braxton
immediately assumed presiding over the start of the trial and it started. Judge Braxton made no
attempt to address that Atty. Brown was accused of participating in the conspiracy.
This is what Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., knew at the start of the trial regaring her claims
that Atty. Brown should be removed as counsel for his role in a conspiracy to deprive her
12
of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial, because these facts are in the Motion
to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel and the Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael
Barrasse
1. That Tarapchak’s first appointed counsel, Joseph P. Kalinowski, (Kalinowski) knew she
had been arrested on October 23, 2014, on an alleged bail violation, but she never had a
mandatory hearing before a judicial officer within (72) hours as required under Rule 536
(A) (1) (b) and Pa. Code 234 § 150 (A) (5), (a) and (b). Pursuant to Pa. Code 234 § 150
(A) (7), the bench warrant expired after seventy-hours of the Tarapchak’s incarceration,
which required her release. Instead, a county employee from house Arrest and a prison
guard held an uncounseled bail violation hearing on her alleged bail violation in a prison
hallway absent notice to Tarapchak, absent her presence and decided she violated bail and
they had her incarcerated indefinitely, and she stayed incarcerated for nearly one year
until trial. Tarapchak was never provided the results of the blatantly illegal jailhouse
hearing or that she was going to be detained indefinitely, however, the judge at the time,
Judge Vito Geroulo, and the prosecutor were both given written notice of the same, and
the stayed silent.2,3 In addition, the record is silent. Kalinowski took no action to get relief
for Tarapchak from her illegal and unconstitutional arrest and jailhouse hearing absent
counsel and incarceration, when she should have been released three days after not getting
her bail violation before a judicial officer. Kalinowski was removed as counsel on January
23, 2015 on a motion to remove him filed by Tarapchak.
2. That Tarapchak’s second appointed counsel, Atty. Brown (Brown), who got on board on
March 23, 2015, also knew that she was illegally arrested, subjected to an illegal jailhouse
hearing in a hallway regarding her alleged bail violation that was presided over by a
county employee and a prison guard, who incarcerated indefinitely. Brown also knew
Tarapchak was not served with any written notice that a county employee and a prison
guard were the people who deemed that she violated bail and incarcerated her indefinitely.
2
See Exhibit “A” at pages 76 – 86, Count X, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Kalinowski, ¶¶ 235 – 340.
See Exhibits “B” and “D” of Exhibit “A”, the written notices to a county judge and the prosecutor from a county
employee informing him that he and a jail guard held a bail violation hearing in a prison hallway on Tarapchak’s
alleged bail violation and have incarcerated her indefintiely.
3
13
Brown also knew Kalinowski filed no habeas action to challenge the illegal jailhouse bail
violation hearing to get Tarapchak released. Brown filed no habeas action to get
Tarapchak released, so she could participate in the preparation of her defense against
twelve medical-related charges,4 to include gathering a pool of defense witnesses and
organizing medical files in her defense.
3. That Tarapchak had filed a Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as counsel with a
voluminous brief in support thereof on September 15, 2015, alleging that Brown had
conspired with Judge Barrasse and the prosecutor, Robert LeBar, to repeatedly violate her
due process and liberty rights as to keep her illegally incarcerated and alienate her from
participating in the preparation of her trial, as well as to defeat her emotionally, as to rig
her trial.5
4. That Tarapchak had filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael Barrasse on September
18, 2015,
6
and served him that same day, and then filed a voluminous brief in support
thereof on September 21, 2015,7 and served him that morning, the day the trial was
scheduled to begin, alleging that the judge had participated in a six-month long conspiracy
with Brown and the prosecutor, Robert LeBar, to repeatedly violate Tarapchak’s due
process and liberty rights as to keep her illegally incarcerated and alienated from
participating in the preparation of her trial, as well as to defeat her emotionally, as to rig
her trial.
5. That Judge Barrasse had, without explanation on the record, recused himself on the
morning of the first day of trial after being served with a Motion to Disqualify and a
voluminous brief in support thereof.
6. That Tarapchak did not want Brown representing her based upon his participation in a
conspiracy with Judge Barrasse and the prosecutor, Robert LeBar, to repeatedly violate
her due process and liberty rights as to keep her illegally incarcerated and alienate her
from participating in the preparation of her trial, as well as to defeat her emotionally, as to
rig her trial.
4
See Exhibit “A” at pages 13 – 26, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶¶ 89 (a) – (cc), 96, 97.
See Exhibits “F” and “G” of Exhibit “A”, the Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as counsel and the brief in support
thereof.
6
See Exhibit “H” of Exhibit “A”, the Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael Barrasse.
7
See Exhibit “J” of Exhibit “A”, the brief in support of Motion to Disqualify Judge Michael Barrasse.
5
14
7. That Brown knew that Tarapchak was never provided with a copy of the Grand Jury
testimony, which she was supposed have been provided by Kalinowski in exchange for
by-passing her preliminary hearing, and he had withheld it from her up to the start of trial
so she could not participate in the preparation of her trial.8 Actually, Brown withheld it
during the trial and until after the trial was over.
8. That Brown had argued in opposition to Tarapchak’s civilly filed petition for habeas
corpus relief that was filed at 15-CV-4207 on July 6, 2015,9 which she had to file pro see
because he wouldn’t file it for her.
9. That Brown had knowingly lied to the court on August 5, 2015, when, during argument
on Tarapchak’s civilly filed petition for habeas corpus relief, he falsely stated on the
record that he had raised the same issues in an omnibus motion under her criminal
docket.10
10. That Brown had not given the court-appointed private investigator any assignments.11
11. That Brown remained silent during pre-trial hearings when the prosecutor, Robert LeBar,
and Judge Barrasse were verbalizing that the issues raised in Tarapchak’s civil habeas
action relating to illegal bail violation by a non-judicial officer and subsequent
incarceration were already raised and disposed of in the criminal matter, when Brown,
more than anyone else, as Tarapchak’s counsel, knew that was not true.12
12. That Brown withheld from Tarapchak responsive documents that were wrongly mailed to
him, which were filed in her civil habeas matter by the prosecutor, which prejudiced her at
said hearing from getting the habeas relief she was seeking.13
13. That Brown withheld from Tarapchak the Court’s order advising her of the date and time
of argument on her civil habeas matter as to further severely prejudice her at said
hearing.14
8
See Exhibit “A” at page 16, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (b).
See Exhibit “A” at page 16, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (e).
10
See Exhibit “A” at page 16, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (f).
11
See Exhibit “A” at page 17, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (g).
9
12
See Exhibit “A” at page 17, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (i).
See Exhibit “A” at page 17, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (j).
14
See Exhibit “A” at page 18, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (k).
13
15
14. That Brown had not obtained or reviewed any of the hundreds of medical files and office
documents that Tarapchak had personally cherry-picked to use in developing her
defense.15
15. That Brown had concealed from Tarapchak that he had close personal and political ties
with a political enemy of her paramour, Joseph Pilchesky.16
16. That Brown did NOT file an answer to Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Brown as
Counsel, nor dispute the allegations contained therein in open court when he had ample
opportunity to do so.17
17. That Brown never had meaningful pre-trial discussions at the prison with Tarapchak to get
any assistance or information from her in the preparation of her defense.18
18. That Brown did not share the medical reports with her from her own court-appointed
medical expert, and that he had hired a medical expert absent the proper qualifications.19
19. That Brown had not solicited from Tarapchak the names of her longtime friends and
patients to be witnesses in support of her defense or to impeach prosecution witnesses,
and when she gave him a list as trial neared, he ignored it and never made contact with
any of them.20
20. That when Brown was served with the prosecutor’s response to Tarapchak’s Motion to
Supplement Atty. Brown as counsel, he withheld it from Tarapchak to prejudice her at the
time of hearing.21
21. That Brown knowingly lied to the court on April 10, 2015, when he stated that he did not
know that Tarapchak did not get a bail violation hearing before a judicial officer within
(72) hours when he knew she was arrested on a bail violation, convicted by a county
employee and jail guard and incarcerated by their actions.22
22. That on April 10, 2015, Brown advised Tarapchak to plead guilty to an alleged bail
violation that had occurred on October 23, 2014, whereupon Judge Barrasse then ruled
15
See Exhibit “A” at page 19, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (m).
See Exhibit “A” at page 20, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (p).
17
See Exhibit “A” at page 20, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (q).
18
See Exhibit “A” at page 20, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (s).
19
See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (t).
20
See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (u).
16
21
22
See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (v).
See Exhibit “A” at page 21, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (w).
16
that since she pleaded guilty to the bail violation, then she waived her right to a hearing
before a judicial officer, when Brown knew she had a constitutional right to be released
on October 27, 2014, for failure of the Court to give her a mandatory bail violation
hearing with (72) hours of being arrested on October 23, 2014.23
23. That Brown appeared at the prison after she filed her Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown
as Counsel on the Saturday before trial was set to begin and threatened that if she didn’t
withdraw the motion she’d have to represent herself at trial.24
24. That Brown appeared at the prison after she filed her Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown
as Counsel on the Saturday before trial was set to begin and threatened that if she didn’t
withdraw the motion she’d have to represent herself at trial.25
All that known to Judge John L. Braxton about Brown’s disturbingly contemptuous,
biased and prejudicial representation of Tarapchak pre-trial and he allowed him to stay on
as counsel in a trial where, if convicted, she faced life in prison, and Judge Braxton refuses
to recuse himself from sentencing her and ruling on post-trial motions
Everything highlighted above in paragraphs (1) through (24), and more, was included in
Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel and Motion to Disqualify Judge
Michael Barrasse that were filed prior to the start of trial. Tarapchak did not get a hearing on the
Motion to Supplement Counsel and Judge Braxton knew it, yet he did nothing to cure it for her.
Instead, he simply threw her to the wolves and watched them gobble her up. Judge John L.
Braxton knew there was a very threatening problem with Tarapchak’s defense regarding a
conspiracy to deprive Tarapchak of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial. He knew
that Tarapchak had filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge Barrasse and voluminous brief in support
thereof on the eve of the start of trial alleging said conspiracy with Brown and the prosecutor to
23
See Exhibit “A” at page 22, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (x).
See Exhibit “A” at page 23, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (bb).
25
See Exhibit “A” at page 23, Count I, relating to conspiracy claims vs. Atty. Brown, ¶ 89 (cc).
24
17
rig her trial, which resulted in Judge Barrasse recusing himself, which was how Judge Braxton
was assigned to preside over the trial. Judge Braxton knew that Judge Barrasse did not hold an
evidentiary hearing on Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel. Yet, he did
nothing that a constitutionally conscious man would do to right a plethora of wrongs to restore
her rights. In addition, what judge would have allowed the trial to start absent being familiar
with any aspect of the case? He took no time whatsoever to get familiar with the case.
The fact that Judge Barrasse had denied Tarapchak’s Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as
Counsel without a due process hearing to protect her rights, and denied her any opportunity to
argue on behalf of it should have triggered immediate and appropriate action by Judge Braxton
to, at minimum, direct that a hearing shall be held on her Motion before the trial begins, yet he
did nothing. A hearing would have elicited testimony from Brown that he knew upon
appointment on March 23, 2015, that Tarapchak, who was incarcerated at the time of his
appointment, was arrested on October 23, 2014, on an alleged bail violation and never had a
mandatory bench warrant or bail violation hearing within (72) hours before a judicial officer, and
knew that she had a right at law to be immediately released, and he not only failed to file a
habeas action to get her released, but he argued in opposition to her own civil habeas action that
she had to file when her refused to do so, which certainly would have supported that Brown was
on board with the prosecutor to rig the trial. Why else would Brown have kept Tarapchak, a
doctor, and his best private investigator, in prison pre-trial other than to prevent her from
participating in the preparation of her own defense in terms of gathering her own pertinent
medical files and office documents to introduce at trial, and getting her own witnesses lined up to
support her defense and/or to impeach prosecution witnesses? That’s conspiracy at play.
18
Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., knowingly, willfully and intentionally, and with deliberate
indifference to Tarapchak’s rights, ignored his duty to protect those rights to the benefit of
the goals of the conspiracy
Judge John L. Braxton’s duty to protect Tarapchak’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, as
well as the dignity and esteem of the Court, was sewn from the seeds of his pledge to obey the
State and Federal constitutional each time he took his oath of office. The purpose of Judge John
Braxton taking the oath of office was to guarantee that the people, all of the people, can at all
times rely upon his dignity and integrity to be a man beyond reproach and outside the reach of
dishonest and unethical conduct by evil-minded practitioners of conspiracies, but he faltered
when he closed his mind to duty and ignored his oath of office, and instead, opened the court up
to the business of corruption and conspiracy to protect conspirators and their lowly interests in
stacking the scale of justice with insidious prejudice to secure Tarapchak’s demise.
When should it have been clear to Judge John Braxton that if Judge Barrasse was intending to
disqualify himself, then Judge Barrasse should not have entertained Tarapchak’s Motion to
Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel, within which it was alleged that Judge Barrasse was a part
of a conspiracy to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial. When did his
black robe fall off? What judicial rocket had to go off in Judge Braxton’s mind to bring his spirit
to a boil over a conspiracy getting as far as it did, as it sat in his courtroom waiting to proceed,
sufficient for him to confront it and slay it? Apparently, no rocket went off, because the trial
went off, rigged as planned, with no intervention from the only man in the courtroom with the
power to prevent it from proceeding beyond picking the jury. When a conspiracy between
defense counsel, the prosecutor and the previous presiding judge to deprive a defendant of her
19
constitutional rights to due process and liberty shows its ugly head before the succeeding
presiding judge the challenge is on the table for one of two things to happen for one side or the
other. Both sides can’t win in the high stakes games of judicial conspiracies planned and
executed to execute an innocent person, because if the person were not innocent, no conspiracy
need planning and execution to assent to conviction. When Judge John L. Braxton took over as
presiding judge in Tarapchak’s case, the conspiracy needed no appearance by Sherlock Holmes
to be revealed to him. Tarapchak had put it on display with the filing of her Motion to
Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel and Motion to Disqualify Judge Barrasse, both of which
sounded in claims for relief from a conspiracy to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights
to rig her trial, and neither one was disputed on the record, or off it, for that matter. That’s all
Tarapchak was asking for was a fair trial before a fair tribunal, as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. That relief was denied by Judge John L. Braxton through his silence,
through his failure to give her a hearing on her Motion to Supplement Atty. Brown as Counsel,
and through is loyalty to the conspiracy. This Court should not allow Judge Braxton’s loyalty to
the conspiracy take another step towards advancing harm upon Stephanie Tarapchak’s
constitutional rights by removing him from her case, as well as her current counsel, Atty. Elliott.
Federal judges will ultimately decide Judge John L. Braxton’s level of responsibility for
Tarapchak’s constitutional sufferings as the Federal Complaint moves forward. The Office of the
United States Attorney will decide if he has criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242.
Tarapchak also filed a complaint with the Judicial Board of the Supreme Court against Judge
John L. Braxton, S.J. on November 4, 2015, regarding his unethical conduct in Com. v.
Tarapchak. Meanwhile, he absolutely should not be presiding over any matters involving
Stephanie Tarapchak and should be removed.
20
In addition to the Federal Complaint filed at 3:15-CV-02078, which includes 42 U.S.C. §
1985 and § 1986 conspiracy claims against Atty. Brown, Tarapchak also filed a state civil action
against him for malpractice at 1255-CV-2016 in relation to his starring role in the conspiracy to
deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial. See Exhibit “B”. In the state
civil action, Atty. Brown has been joined by co-defendants Warden Robert McMillan and House
Arrest Director, Patrick Lynn (Lynn), relating to her arrest by Lynn, a non-law enforcement
officer with absolutely no judicial authority, on an alleged bail violation, Lynn’s appearance at
the Lackawanna County Prison to hold a blatantly unconstitutional hearing with a prison guard in
a prison hallway on whether or not Tarapchak violated bail conditions, Lynn’s decision that she
did violate bail conditions, Lynn’s incarceration of her for one year, and Lynn’s actions to
conceal his jailhouse misconduct from Tarapchak and the public record, all of which was done as
Warden McMillan looked the other way. And, Warden McMillan looked the other way many
hundreds of times, because in Lackawanna County, it’s Patrick Lynn who decides who violated
bail and who goes to jail, not the judges, in the name of judicial and government economy.
Tarapchak filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., which he denied, but
not on its merits
(The backdrop)
1. On October 27, 2015, Atty. Brown filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel at the behest of
Tarapchak, which he did not serve upon Tarapchak. See Exhibit “C”
2. A hearing was scheduled for November 5, 2015, on Brown’s Motion to Withdraw. When
Tarapchak was notified that morning by prison staff that she was going to be attending
said hearing, she contacted Joseph Pilchesky, who had to rush to the courthouse to get a
21
copy of the motion in order to file an answer thereto on her behalf as her “Next Friend”.
See Exhibit “D”, Tarapchak’s answer to Brown’s Motion to Withdraw, which is ripe with
assertions that the reasons she demanded his withdrawal were his participation in a
conspiracy with Judge Barrasse and the prosecutor to deprive her of her due process and
liberty rights to rig her trial.
3. The hearing was presided over by Judge John L. Braxton, who, from the bench, granted
the Motion to Withdraw26 and reaffirmed Tarapchak’s indigent status to qualify for new
appointed counsel, and he told her that Brown was no longer in the case.27 See Exhibit
“E”, the transcript dated November 5, 2015.
4. Judge Braxton also told Tarapchak he was going to get her competent counsel outside of
Lackawanna County.28
5. On November 4, 2015, Tarapchak filed her federal complaint at 3:15-CV-02078. See
Exhibit “A”.
6. The summonses were issued by the Federal Clerk of Court on November 23, 2015, and
Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., was served accordingly on December 2, 2015. See Exhibit
“F”, the Return of Service.
7. On December 2, 2015, upon belief that Judge Braxton had granted Atty. Brown’s Motion
to Withdraw, and not having been served with any order from the Court that new counsel
had been appointed, Tarapchak, by and through Joseph Pilchesky, as her “Next Friend”,
filed a Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., which only cited that he was
named in the federal complaint. See Exhibit “G”.
26
See Exhibit “E”, the transcript at page (3), lines 20 – 23, and page (18), lines 21 – 24.
See the transcript at page (21), lines 1 -2.
28
See the transcript at page (21), lines 20 – 25.
27
22
8. On December 8, 2015, again through Joseph Pilchesky as “Next Friend”, Tarapchak filed
an Amended Motion to Disqualify Judge Braxton, S.J., but she enhanced it with
allegations of the prejudice he’d demonstrated toward her relating to allowing Brown to
remain as counsel for trial. See Exhibit “H”. On the same day, a brief in support of
Disqualifying Judge Braxton was filed. See Exhibit “I”
9. Entered into the docket was an order dated December 2, 2015, that granted the withdrawal
of Atty. Brown, notwithstanding that Judge Braxton had granted his Motion to Withdraw
on the record on November 5, 2015, as discussed above in paragraph (3). See Exhibit “J”
10. With Tarapchak’s sentencing set for December 10, 2015, and not having any word from
Judge Braxton that he had assigned counsel, Tarapchak, again by and through Joseph
Pilchesky as “Next Friend”, filed a Motion to Stay Sentencing, citing that she was still
unrepresented. See Exhibit “K”
11. December 10, 2015, came and went for an anxiety-ridden Tarapchak. Judge Braxton had
not issued an order directing that sentencing was continued indefinitely.
12. On December 16, 2015, Judge Braxton issued two orders. The first was an order that
denied Tarapchak’s Amended Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, Exhibit “L”,
and the second denied the Motion to Stay Sentencing, Exhibit “M”. Both orders cited that
since Tarapchak was represented by counsel, Joseph Pilchesky had no right to file the
Motion to Disqualify Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., or the Motion to Stay Sentencing on
behalf of Tarapchak as her “Next Friend”, as that was hybrid representation. Nothing
prevented Judge Braxton from ruling on the merits of the Motion to Disqualify Judge
John L. Braxton, S.J.
23
Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., permitted Atty. Brown to Withdraw as Counsel because
he’s named in the Federal Complaint, but he won’t recuse himself
See Exhibit “E”, which is the transcript for the hearing on Atty. Brown’s Motion to
Withdraw on the grounds that Tarapchak named him in the Federal Complaint at 3:15-CV02078. At page (19), lines 13 – 22, Judge Braxton stated that Atty. Brown has been sued by
Tarapchak in Federal Court and there is no reason to ask him to work when he himself has
become the source or in a recognized adversarial position.
At lines 23 – 24, Prosecutor Robert LeBar stated: “I agree wholeheartedly, your honor,…”
Judge Braxton advocated for the withdrawal of Atty. Brown because he’s named in the
Federal Complaint, and the prosecutor supports said advocacy, yet Judge John Braxton
adamantly refuses to recognize that he is in the exact same adversarial position as Atty.
Brown was in. Atty. Brown recognized his duty to withdraw. Judge John Braxton refuses to
recognize it to the severe bias and prejudice of Stephanie Tarapchak.
Judge John L. Braxton’s integrity and credibility is a serious issue. He was removed from
the ballot in a 2009 election for election fraud for lying on his Statement of Financial
Interests, as was well publicized. Once confronted with a challenge to his nomination petition,
he didn’t withdraw in that matter, either; instead a judge had to remove him. His poor
decision-making and judgment has a very stubborn side to it.
Judge John L. Braxton’s slight of hand relating to appointing counsel
13. When Tarapchak received the orders mentions above, she contacted Joseph Pilchesky and
advised that Judge Braxton indicated in both orders that she was represented by counsel,
24
so she requested that he check the docket, which he did. He found an order dated
November 30, 2015, which had appointed Atty. Francis X. O’Connor as counsel, who was
from outside of Lackawanna County. Tarapchak was not served with the order upon issue.
See Exhibit “N”
14. A review of the orders appended at exhibit “J”, “K”, “L” and “M” show they are different
than the order appended at Exhibit “N”, the order that appointed Atty. O’Connor as
counsel, as the former indicates that the parties have all been “CC’d” in on the order,
while the later indicates that no one was “CC’d”. Translated, for whatever reason,
Tarapchak was not notified that Atty. O’Connor was appointed new counsel, which rings
with suspicion, since he’s a custody and estates lawyer with some DUI experience, but no
criminal trial experience, hardly qualified to pick up Tarapchak’s appellate challenges.
15. Standing alone, no conspiracy at play, the failure to notify Tarapchak that Atty. O’Connor
was appointed counsel on November 30, 2015, may appear innocuous, but how did Atty.
O’Connor know he had been appointed? He didn’t enter an appearance on the record. See
Exhibit “O”, the docket entry for 14-CR-550, Com. v. Tarapchak.
16. Furthermore, Atty. O’Connor never made contact with Tarapchak between November 30,
2015 and January 29, 2016, when he was removed as counsel. Prison records can support
that he never appeared there and he never spoke on the phone with Tarapchak.
17. On February 6, 2016, Tarapchak sent Atty. O’Connor a terse letter demanding an
explanation for his conduct in failing to enter an appearance and making contact with her.
See Exhibit “Q”. Atty. O’Connor never responded.
18. Furthermore, on January 29, 2016, Judge Braxton issued an order directing that Atty.
O’Connor’s Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel was granted, but there is no
25
Motion for Leave to Withdraw filed on the record. In addition, at the hearing held that day
on the issue, Atty. O’Connor did not appear. In the January 29, 2016, order, Atty.
O’Connor was replaced by Atty. James Elliott. See Exhibit “P”
19. On February 10, 2016, knowing that Atty. O’Connor did no work for Tarapchak in
preparation for post-trial motions over a span of two months, Judge John Braxton issued a
new sentencing order, setting the sentencing of Tarapchak for February 22, 2016. See
Exhibit “R”. That provided Atty. Elliott with less than thirty (30) days to review the trial
transcript of a two-week trial on complicated medical-related charges, which required
medical expertise to assist in evaluating, eleven (11) pre-trial transcripts, and the entire
record, which staff at the Clerk’s Office often referred to as the largest file it has ever
held, so large that it has its own room, and effectively prepare all of Tarapchak’s post-trial
motions with no chance of failing to preserve any of a number of issues that could
determine success or failure under appeal. And, Atty. Elliott wants nothing to do with
filing a Motion for Mistrial with glaring support for one at his fingertips.
20. To Atty. Elliot’s some credit, he immediately appeared at the prison to visit with
Tarapchak and he gave her some encouragement that he was going to give her adequate
and effective counsel on appeal. She apprised him of at least some of the suffering she had
endured under previous counsel and all of judges. She also requested that he provide her
with a copy of the trial transcript so she could assist in the preparation of post-trial
motions, since she didn’t have a copy, because Atty. Brown had refused to provide her
with a copy and Atty. O’Connor never engaged in representation.
The quick exposure of Atty. Elliott as anti-Tarapchak
26
21. Tarapchak relied upon Pilchesky to memorialize communications with Atty. Elliott via
email, who was open to communicating with him. On February 3, 2016, at the request of
Tarapchak, Pilchesky sent an email to Atty. Elliott and addressed the issues of filing a
Motion to Disqualify Judge Braxton and a Motion for Mistrial. See Exhibit “S”, the email
dated February 3, 2016.
22. A Motion for Mistrial predicated upon prosecutorial and judicial misconduct would be
Tarapchak’s “Get out of Jail” card, and stay out. Of course, she’d be excited about it being
filed. Atty. Elliott, however, responded with signs of reluctance.
23. The email included three attachments, which were the previously filed two Motions to
Disqualify Judge Braxton, S.J., and a full copy of the Federal Complaint wherein Judge
Braxton is a named defendant, which Complaint elaborately sets forth all of the judicial
and prosecutorial misconduct that Tarapchak suffered. See Exhibit “S”, the email dated
February 3, 2016.
24. Atty. Elliott could have simply filed a Motion for Mistrial, copied and pasted the contents
of the Federal Complaint within it, appended a copy thereto as support, asked for a
hearing, called all of the named defendants in the Complaint to testify and hammered
them on their participation in the conspiracy against Tarapchak, but he has not shown any
constitutional spirit to get Tarapchak justice.
25. On February 11, 2016, Pilchesky sent another email to Atty. Elliott. In this email,
Pilchesky advised him that Tarapchak was impatiently waiting for the trial transcript, and
she wants to know what his intentions are relating to filing the Motion to Disqualify Judge
Braxton and the Motion for Mistrial. See Exhibit “T”, the February 11, 2016, email.
27
26. On February 14, 2016, Atty. Elliott visited Tarapchak at the prison. He did not have a
copy of the trial transcript with him, advising her that he only just got a copy. On the
evening of February 14, 2016, Pilchesky sent an email to the appropriate Court Reporter,
Cathene Nardozzi, within which he inquired if the trial transcript for Tarapchak has been
available electronically. On February 16, 2016, she responded in the affirmative. See
Exhibit “U”, the email.
27. Tarapchak’s hopes that Atty. Elliott was of the ethical backbone to fight the right fight for
her rights turned to dire and fear-immersed suspicion that he was either lacking in the
backbone department or his appointment was to merely bring the conspiracy to the desired
closure, or both, but either would be fatal to her future.
28. It was Judge John Braxton, who, when he released Atty. Brown, said on the record that he
was adamant to find an “out-of-county” attorney.29
29. It was Judge John Braxton who found an “out of county” attorney in Atty. O’Connor, but
then released him on a ghost Motion for Leave to Withdraw, and appointed Atty. James
Elliott, a member of a well-entrenched local political family, whose brother, David Elliott,
was formerly the longtime Chief of Police for the City of Scranton, and whom, Joseph
Pilchesky used as daily political target practice for years on his political website,
dohertydeceit.com, constantly slamming him for his grossly inadequate administrative and
leadership skills.
30. At the November 5, 2015, hearing on Atty. Brown’s Motion to Withdraw at the request of
Tarapchak, Judge john Braxton also told her, “So once you tell the attorney you want him
to withdraw as counsel, he has no choice.”30
29
30
See Exhibit “E”, the transcript at page (18), lines 3 – 25, and page (19), lines 1 – 9.
See Exhibit ”E”, the transcript at page (3), lines 11 – 13.
28
Atty. James Elliott was formally discharged as counsel on February 16, 2016.
31. With Tarapchak having serious conflicts with Atty. Elliott regarding her constitutional
rights and best interests, and with sentencing looming in the immediate future, and having
deep suspicions of his true intentions to protect her rights and liberty, she opted to protect
herself and she instructed Pilchesky to send him formal notice that he has been
discharged, effective immediately. All things considered as things developed with Atty.
Elliott, the risk of trusting him fell to fear of his intentions. See Exhibit “V”, the letter
dated February 16, 2016, sent certified.
32. On February 17, 2016, after Pilchesky verified through USPS tracking that the certified
letter dated February 16, 2016, had not yet been received by Atty. Elliott, Pilchesky sent
him an email advising him that the letter was sent certified on February 16, 2016, a copy
of which was attached to the email. See Exhibit “W”, the email dated February 17, 2016.
33. On February 17, 2016, at 10:00 pm, Atty. Elliott sent a responsive email to Pilchesky
advising him that he refuses to withdraw as counsel. Pilchesky’s response, on Tarapchak’s
behalf, is included in the same email. See Exhibit “X”, the email dated February 17, 2016.
34. The trust is permanently broken in Atty. Elliott.
35. The communications with Atty. Elliott have been broken.
Implication of the Federal Complaint filed at 3:15-CV-2015
In review of the Federal Complaint, appended as Exhibit “A”, the Court will discover that it
is predicated solely upon facts from the record. All of the exhibits have been provided. The
parties to the Complaint are as follows:
29
PARTIES
1. The Plaintiffs are Dr. Stephanie Tarapchak, a pre-trial incarcerated person, currently
incarcerated in the Lackawanna County Prison, with an address of 1371 N. Washington
Ave., Scranton, PA 18509, and shall hereafter be referred to as Dr. Tarapchak; and
Joseph Pilchesky, also as Dr. Tarapchak’s legal “Next Friend”, with an address of 819
Sunset St., Scranton, PA 18509 and shall hereafter be referred to Pilchesky.
2. The Defendant is Lackawanna County, a body politic and corporation created under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, with an office located at 200 Adams Ave.,
Scranton, PA, and shall hereafter be referred to as the County.
3. The Defendant is Joseph P. Kalinowski, Esq., First Public Defender of the Office of the
Public Defender, with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave., Scranton, PA and
shall hereafter be referred to as Atty. Kalinowski.
4. The Defendant is Kathleen Kane, Esq., a Lackawanna County lifelong resident, duly
elected Attorney General of Pennsylvania, with an office located at Strawberry Square,
16th Floor, Harrisburg, PA, 17120, and shall hereafter be referred to as Attorney General
Kane.
5. The Defendant is Atty. Robert LeBar; a duly appointed Senior Attorney General of
Pennsylvania, with an office located at 1000 Madison Ave., Suite 310, Norristown, PA,
19403, and shall hereafter be referred to as Atty. LeBar.
6. The Defendant is Lackawanna County Judge Michael Barrasse; a duly elected and
retained judge of Lackawanna County, with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave.,
Scranton, PA, 18503, and shall hereafter be referred to as Judge Barrasse.
7. The Defendant is Lackawanna County Judge Vito Geroulo; a duly elected and retained
judge of Lackawanna County, with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave.,
Scranton, PA, 18503, and shall hereafter be referred to as Judge Geroulo.
8. The Defendant is Senior Judge John Braxton; a duly retained and appointed senior judge
of the Court of Common Pleas with an office located at 200 N. Washington Ave.,
Scranton, PA, 18503 and shall hereafter be referred to as Judge Braxton.
9. The Defendant is United States Magistrate Judge Joseph F. Saporito, with an office
located at 197 S. Main St., Wilkes Barre, PA and shall be referred to as Judge Saporito.
30
10. The Defendant is Robert McMillan; a duly appointed Warden of the Lackawanna County
Prison, with an office located at 1371 N. Washington Ave., Scranton, PA, 18509, and
shall hereafter be referred to as Warden McMillan.
11. The Defendant is Patrick Lynn; a duly appointed Director of the Lackawanna County
Prison Home Detention Program (House Arrest), with an office located at 621 Spruce St.,
Scranton, PA, 18503, and shall hereafter be referred to as Director Lynn.
12. The Defendant is Bernard Brown, Esq., the duly appointed defense counsel for Dr.
Tarapchak with an address located at 58 8th Ave., #60, Carbondale, PA, 18407, and shall
hereafter be referred to as Atty. Brown.
13. The Defendant is Nicholas Kravitz, Esq., with an office located at 425 Spruce St.,
Scranton, PA 18503 and shall hereafter be referred to as Atty. Kravitz.
The Complaint has twenty-five (25) counts, many of which are 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1986
claims, relating to conspiring to deprive a person of their civil rights and failing to prevent said
deprivation when required to do so. Other claims are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims relating to
Tarapchak illegal arrest and intentional pre-trial incarceration.
The claims against Judge John L. Braxton relate only to § 1985 and § 1986 claims. See Count
VIII at pages 68 – 73, the claims for conspiring to deprive Tarapchak of her due process and
liberty rights. Those claims can be amended based upon his conduct during and after trial, and
will likely be amended once Tarapchak gets the trial transcript. See Count IX at pages 73 0 76,
the claims for failing to prevent the conspiracy from continuing into the trial.
A Motion for Mistrial will include claims of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct based
upon the claims of conspiracy in the Federal Complaint
Among other things, a Motion for Mistrial will most certainly include claims of prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct, both of which have spanned three judges from the first pre-trial hearing
and into the trial, and Judge John L. Braxton is included in those claims. He cannot possibly
31
preside over a hearing on a Motion for Mistrial when his own conduct will be called into
question to support the motion. His removal from this matter is required to assure that the
Motion for Mistrial is heard by a fair and unbiased court.
Both Judge John L. Braxton and Atty. James Elliott should be removed from the matter of
Com. v. Tarapchak, 14-CR-550, to preserve and protect her constitutional rights to a fair
and unbiased tribunal under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to preclude any
further biased and prejudicial treatment by Judge John L. Braxton, and to preserve and
protect her state constitutional right to effective counsel
The State has no compelling interest in advocating or supporting the presence of bias and
prejudice at any stage of a criminal proceeding. Indeed, sentencing is an extremely critical stage,
as is disposing of post-trial motions. For the valid reasons stated above, Tarapchak has
overwhelmingly demonstrated that both bias and prejudice are present in her criminal matter
with Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., presiding.
Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. has been sued in his judicial and private capacity in a civil rights
violation matter, but not in an ordinary civil rights case claiming damages under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, where immunity almost always relieves liability, but rather, under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and §
1986 claims for conspiracy to deprive a person of their civil rights. It remains to be seen if he
escapes accountability under the cloak of immunity as a judge or individual. Even if he does, he
will still, nonetheless, be a part of the federal trial, because the attorneys involved will not be
allowed to enjoy immunity defenses. One way or another, Judge John L. Braxton is going to
testify at the federal trial and be subjected to deposition.
32
It would be a travesty of justice to Tarapchak if Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., is not removed
from this matter to preclude his involvement in her sentencing and disposition of post-trial
motions, which should include a Motion for Mistrial where his conduct will be subject matter in
support of the motion.
The State has no compelling interest in advocating or supporting the presence of ineffective
counsel, either, where it can be shown to exist and an opportunity presents itself to prevent it.
Atty. Elliott has posited that he his little interest in filing a Motion for Mistrial in spite of a
plethora of factual evidence on the record to support claims of prosecutorial and judicial
misconduct. He has no interest in filing a Motion to Recuse Judge John L. Braxton. In fact, he
told Tarapchak the conflict with him is her own fault for filing the Federal Complaint in the first
place. Atty. Elliot placed no objection on the record to Judge Braxton giving him three weeks to
review a two-week trial transcript, eleven (11) pretrial transcripts and an enormous record, much
of it complicated specialty medical information, in preparation of post-trial motions, which
speaks for itself in terms of him being able to effectively read all that must be read, comprehend
it, process it for appeal and prepare post-trial motions. Atty. Elliott has refused to provide
Tarapchak with a copy of the trial transcript. It was immediately available electronically from the
court reporter, and after being counsel for two weeks, he went to the prison and said he just got
it, but still didn’t give her a copy so she could read it and participate in the preparation of posttrial motions. Judge Braxton appointed an “out-of-county” attorney, then allowed him to
withdraw and appointed Atty. Elliott, a local and politically, well-entrenched attorney.
Tarapchak justifiably fears that if Atty. Elliott is allowed to represent her, notwithstanding
that she has already discharged him, that her state constitutional right to effective counsel will be
jeopardized and perhaps result in unpreserved issues on appeal that could translate into an unjust
33
and lengthy prison sentence. He should be formally removed as counsel by this Court as the right
thing to do with all facts known under the circumstances.
Tarapchak has no adequate remedy at law
Absent intervention by this Court, Tarapchak’s rights to a fair and impartial tribunal with
effective counsel during sentencing proceedings, and relating to the fair disposition of post-trial
claims, will be lost, because Judge John L. Braxton refused to recuse himself where a clear bias
and prejudice can rise from her filing of a Federal Complaint, wherein he is named as a
conspirator to deprive her of her due process and liberty rights to rig her trial; and, Atty. Elliott
has already abundantly demonstrated a clear lack of interest in providing Tarapchak with
effective counsel.
Plenary jurisdiction is necessary because Respondent has disregarded Supreme Court
precedent
As Tarapchak has aptly cited in her Discussion above, this Court has no tolerance for the
imposition of bias and prejudice at any stage of any civil or criminal proceeding. Case law is
abundantly instructive that a judge should recuse himself, not even requiring a motion to recuse,
where any showing of impartiality surfaces. Here, Judge John L. Braxton is a defendant in a
Federal Complaint alleging that he not only participated in a conspiracy to deprive her of her due
process and liberty rights, but took no action to prevent it when he had the absolute authority to
do so. His blatant disregard for Supreme Court precedent on this issue speaks for itself and he
should be removed from the matter of Com v. Tarapchak, 14-CR-550 immediately.
34
Relief Sought
Stephanie Tarapchak most respectfully requests that this court exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction over this matter and remove Judge John L. Braxton, S.J., as judge, and remove Atty.
James Elliott as counsel, because she has a federal constitutional right to a fair and unbiased
tribunal at all stages of proceedings and a state constitutional right to effective counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
_______________________________
Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate
Joseph Pilchesky, as “Next Friend:
1371 N. Washington Ave.
819 Sunset St.
Lackawanna County Prison
Scranton, PA 19509
Scranton, PA 18509
570-591-4300
35
VERIFICATION
This is to verify that the statements made herein are true and correct to the best of my
information, knowledge and belief. I understand that my statements are subject to 18 Pa 4904,
relating to Unsworn Falsification to Authorities.
February 19, 2016
___________________________
_______________________________
Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate
Joseph Pilchesky, as “Next Friend:
1371 N. Washington Ave.
819 Sunset St.
Lackawanna County Prison
Scranton, PA 19509
Scranton, PA 18509
570-591-4300
36
CERTIFICAT OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I, Stephanie Tarapchak, did cause to be served upon the parties below a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Application for Extraordinary Jurisdiction on this 19 th day
of February, 2016, by placing the same into the U.S. Mail, first class prepaid postage, or by
hand-delivery, as indicated:
Honorable Judge John L. Braxton, S.J. – hand delivery
200 Adams Ave.
Annex Building
Scranton, PA 18503
Clerk of Court of Lackawanna County – hand delivery
200 N. Washington Ave.
Scranton, PA 18503
James Elliott, Esq. - mail
142 S. Main St.
Scranton, PA 18504
37
Robert LeBar, Esq., Senior Deputy for the Commonwealth – mail
Office of the Attorney General
1000 Madison Ave., Suite 310
Norristown, PA 19403
___________________________
______________________________
Stephanie Tarapchak, Inmate
Joseph Pilchesky, as “Next Friend:
1371 N. Washington Ave.
819 Sunset St.
Lackawanna County Prison
Scranton, PA 19509
Scranton, PA 18509
570-591-4300
38