CHAPTER TWO
Preparing for an Imperfect World:
Strategy in Conflict Management Environments
Villiam Krüger-Klausen and Liselotte Odgaard
This chapter develops an original approach to strategy intended to produce fresh insights into
strategy formulation and implementation processes regarding conflict management. In this effort,
we combine insights from the traditions of international relations and strategic studies. The debate
on strategy in the international relations literature does not entail thorough discussions of the
concept of strategy since the analysts usually assume that strategy is conflated with theoretical
concepts such as balancing, coercive diplomacy, regimes, etc. The advantage is that strategic
analysis is based on simple conceptual models with solidly tested theoretical dynamics from
international relations. The disadvantage is that the levels and issues dealt with in different settings
involved in strategic planning are not taken fully into account and a process is not identified. By
contrast, the debate on strategy among defense academies often contains detailed conceptual
analyses of strategy. This literature identifies and systematizes the complexity of actors and issues
involved in strategic planning. However, because it is situated within a military planning context,
these analyses are often marked by detail rather than a broader perspective. They describe the total
agenda of strategy formulation and implementation without deducing key elements that are crucial
to meet political visions.
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This chapter attempts to combine the awareness of key variables and dynamics in the
international relations literature with the conceptualization of strategic processes that has been
carried out in a strategic studies setting. The purpose is to identify key elements of strategic
processes that are essential to realize the visions of political leaders. We use the levels of grand,
security and theatre strategy to describe the process of strategy formulation and implementation. We
use the variables of time, position, legitimacy, implementation structure and capabilities to describe
the substance of strategic analysis. The levels and variables together constitute a concept of strategy
useful for identifying problems of strategic processes and how these problems can be mended.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, we outline our concept of strategy,
describing the grand, security and theater strategic levels of planning processes. Second, we outline
the five strategic key variables. Third, we conclude by discussing the advantages and limitations of
our strategic concept.
The concept of strategy: The strategic levels
We propose to take the three levels of grand strategy, security strategy and theater strategy as a
starting point for identifying key processes of strategy formulation and implementation. In
combination, the different tasks, skills and purpose at these three levels of strategic planning
describe the structure of the process. We retain some of the hierarchical thinking of these concepts
in the sense that we recognize that decision-making power remains at the upper politicaladministrative grand strategic levels of the state. However, influence on strategic planning also
comes from commanders and their staff at the theater level or from specialists working in the
security strategic sector.
Beyond the level of strategic planning in states and in intergovernmental organizations
such as the NATO alliance, a political level devises the visions or policies that guide the strategy
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formulation process. In most states, there is an elected body of parliamentarians, an elected
president or a dictatorship that formulates the vision that will guide the formulation of strategy.1 In
NATO, we have the North Atlantic Council which brings together high-level representatives of
each member country to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. The
process that characterizes decision-making at this very general political level is that of persuasion
and bargaining between groups of people whose values or interests are initially usually divergent.
Political visions are not the object of analysis. Due to their predominantly ideological character,
political visions do not form inherent parts of the strategic planning processes. Instead, political
visions define the context of strategic planning.
Strategy is concerned with attaining end-states by applying the instruments available
on the basis of an analytical process. Our definition of strategy at the most general level is:
Strategy is a process which translates political visions into attainable objectives by
applying available resources within a defined space for action.
In the chapter, we describe different types of strategy. These are not just mentioned at
random or described according to the sectors in which they are used. Instead, we distinguish
between them according to their purpose and processes rather than differences in substance. This
chapter is written on the basis of the precondition that three types of strategy are used in the modern
state and in intergovernmental organizations such as the NATO alliance: grand, security and theater
strategy. These well-known concepts are defined with a view to clarifying our contribution to
developing the concept of strategy.
Grand strategy
In the U.S. defense establishment, grand strategy has been defined as “an overarching strategy
summarizing the national vision for developing, applying and coordinating all the instruments of
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national power in order to accomplish the grand strategic objectives of: preserving national security;
bolstering national economic prosperity; and promoting national values.”2 This definition of grand
strategy is very broad. It encompasses all the instruments of national power to be applied and
coordinated in order to accomplish the grand strategic objectives. It is not intuitively clear where the
vision ends and where the grand strategy begins. Nor is there a marked distinction between the
focus or scope of the national vision and the grand strategy.
In our view, grand strategy is concerned with translating political visions into
strategies. These strategies are adjusted so that they correspond to the fundamental ideas and values
of the state or alliance and its constituency and international partners. This effort may involve
changing the scope or definition of key ideas and values at the national or international level or
formulating the strategy in such a way that it encompasses existing principles of behavior. This is
central to ensure that the courses of action devised by the strategy are in line with the principles of
behavior that are considered non-negotiable by central actors in the national and international
environment. This is also the level where coordination instruments allow for monitoring of the
extent to which strategic objectives are met by other agencies participating in the planning process
and by those implementing the strategy in theaters.3 Grand strategy
translates the state vision into attainable objectives by influencing and adapting to the
national and international context and by coordinating the strategic activities of
administrative and implementing agencies
This level encompasses a process of influence and adaptation which involves conducting the
analyses that transform idealistic objectives into strategies. At the grand strategy level, the
normative and interest-based visions are translated into coherent strategies for implementation.4 In
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addition, assessments are made of the resources needed to implement the strategy and the feasibility
of using various instruments of power, such as diplomacy and economic and military resources.
The grand strategy level entails close interaction with policy makers. It devises the
norms and interests that the state or the intergovernmental organization wishes to implement to
fulfill the visions from the political level. Grand strategy needs to be sensitive to public perceptions
of morality at home and at the international level since the objectives are by nature based on the
central values and interests of the state or intergovernmental organization. As such, grand strategy is
shaped by perceptions in key audiences at the national and international level. As a consequence,
one of the key functions of grand strategy is to identify the key themes in the strategic
communication of the grand strategy. This communication is to promote the viability of the
objectives of the grand strategy by means of persuasion and information to a domestic and
international audience.
Grand strategy planning is long term and the focus is on translating the objectives
formulated at the higher echelons of government into long-term normative interest-based objectives.
If a desired future position is considered incompatible with predominant perceptions of acceptable
behavior, then the planning process must be able to devise methods of change or, alternatively,
influence the norms which are defining legitimate national and international conduct. Changes of
these norms require actions which are inherently diplomatic and often long-term because it entails
persuasion that a change of legitimate behavior is to the advantage of the majority of other actors.
As a consequence, diplomacy is an integrated part of strategic planning at the grand strategic level.
Continuous monitoring of the implementation process is meant to ensure that the
grand strategic objectives correspond to implementation processes. Feedback from implementing
agencies that includes an assessment of the usefulness of alternative instruments of implementation
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other than those used is to ensure correspondence between objectives and implementation. The
findings are assessed in the context of the overall strategic context at the national and international
level.
In addition, the grand strategic level ideally ensures that there is correspondence
between the strategic planning that takes place at all strategic levels including the security and
theater strategy levels and the political level. For example, if visions at the political level change, or
if implementation within a theater involves a replacement of current strategic objectives with new
ones that do not correspond to the vision, the grand strategy level ensures that the strategy is
adjusted according to the change in circumstances at all levels.
Security strategy
The strategies devised at the grand strategy level are translated into security strategies through
processes of adjusting them to the specialized objectives and instruments of different functional
sectors. We focus on the sectors which contribute to developing and maintaining security strategies.
In U.S. defense circles, security strategy is usually defined as located one level below that of grand
strategy. In this environment, security strategy can be defined as “the art and science of developing,
applying and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military and
informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.”5 Hence, security strategy
concerns formulated functional objectives.
In our view, the development, application and allocation of resources are sectorspecific efforts requiring out-of-the-box thinking based on specialized knowledge which gives the
security strategy level a central location in the process of strategic planning. It is impossible to
make a complete list of the various sectors involved in making security strategies since it depends
on the issue or problem which a specific strategy is meant to address. However, within the security
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field important sectors include defense, foreign affairs, financial affairs, economic development and
strategic information. These sectors tend to operate with a high degree of autonomy. Finance affairs
play a particularly central role since economic resources are imperative for taking action in all the
other security-related sectors. Functional sectors are governmental or NATO departments and their
agencies.
Security strategy deals with the more general security issues such as the future need of
security-related capacities such as fighter aircraft or the development of a missile defense. In
addition, security strategy is concerned with decisions concerning warfare and the use of war as an
instrument. Based on the strategies developed at the grand strategy level, security strategy focuses
on ways in which security objectives can be translated into strategies within specific sector agencies
within for example national defense, the diplomatic corps, or the ministry of finance. The
contribution of the security strategy level can be summed up as follows:
The development, application and allocation of methods, instruments and resources
within sectors to achieve security-specific objectives
At security strategic level, strategy is meant to ensure correspondence between the opportunities
and risks emerging from the external environment and the possibilities of states or
intergovernmental organizations for making these opportunities and risks work to their advantage.
Security strategies are action-oriented compared to those formulated at grand strategy level. The
functional security strategies developed within different functional sectors are related to each other
in the sense that ideally they all contribute to fulfilling the vision.
Theater strategy
Theater strategy is concerned with the deployment and employment of instruments. We use the
concept of theater strategy about the part of strategic planning which involves the state’s
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deployment of instruments within a defined geographical or functional area with the purpose of
meeting objectives specified at grand strategy and security strategy level. In the U.S. defense
establishment, theater strategy has been defined as “the art and science of developing integrated
strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and
alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or
operations not involving the use of force within a theater.”6 The traditional definition exaggerates
the extent to which actors and decisions at this level are meant to influence the strategy that ends up
being implemented, even if in practice theater strategy sometimes derails grand strategy objectives
and contributes to transforming security strategies. The contribution of theater strategy resembles
that of experienced craftsmen much more than a form of art. In the theater, the strategic objectives
of other levels are implemented by means of the methods and instruments available without many
possibilities for changing these methods and instruments. This requires considerable management
skills, experience and a flexible mindset that can administer the dynamic and complex nature of the
realities on the ground.
Theater strategy is concerned with the deployment of instruments from different
agencies such as military forces, political advisory boards and development consultancies. For
example, military leaders on the ground within a geographical theater develop theater strategies. At
theater level, one objective is that deployment on the ground is coordinated and synchronized in line
with strategic planning at grand strategy and at security strategy level. The allocation of resources
available on the ground, the distribution of responsibility and tasks between agencies on the ground,
coordinating and communicating the plans for implementation of the strategy, and cooperation with
agencies from coalition and partner states are some of the functions that takes place at theater
strategy level. Theater strategy
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coordinates and synchronizes the application of methods and instruments within a
defined geographical area in order to best achieve the strategic objectives
Theater strategy is not necessarily subordinate to the other strategic levels. However, theater
strategy depends on the possibilities and limitations which are determined by the grand strategy and
security strategy levels. The starting point of theater strategy is the specific objectives within a
given geographical or functional area devised by top political and administrative decision-makers
and by functional specialists.
At theater strategy level, strategy consists of integrated actions or plans that will
achieve strategic objectives through identifying the appropriate and most cost effective ways in
which to obtain objectives. Theater strategy is responsible for assessing the extent to which the
actors on the ground are able to implement strategic objectives from the other strategic levels. Also,
at theater strategy level actors identify deficiencies in the methods and instruments available during
the course of implementation. For example, the theater level reports back to grand strategy level if
objectives from grand or security strategy level cannot be met due to insufficient or inappropriate
capabilities on the ground.
Grand, security and theater strategy compared
Grand, security and theater strategy describe the structure of strategic planning. Grand strategy is
about manipulating the environment and coordinating the functional sectors and the theaters. The
grand strategic level is responsible for continuously ensuring that strategy implementation
corresponds to strategy formulation and that the strategic objectives are adjusted to changes in the
national and international context. The security strategy level works creatively with the security
objectives that can be achieved, thinking out of the box within a specific field of expertise to ensure
correspondence between the conditions applicable in a sector-specific environment and the
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objectives that the state or intergovernmental organization in question wishes to achieve. The
theater strategy level is responsible for implementation and determines how the instruments and
methods appropriate at a particular strategic level are coordinated and synchronized for purposes of
implementation on the ground. Any inconsistencies between objectives and instruments and
methods available are reported back to the grand strategy level. In table 1.1, the central
characteristics of the three different levels of strategy are listed.
[INSERT TABLE 1.1. HERE]
The concept of strategy: Five essential variables
Another central issue is the key contents of strategic planning processes in states and in
intergovernmental organizations such as NATO. When such entities perform strategic planning, the
standard description of the contents is made by referring to ends, ways and means developed for
purposes of strategic planning in the U.S. armed forces.7 Ends are the objectives of or desired
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outcomes of a given strategy. Ways are the methods and process executed to achieve the ends.
Means are the resources required to execute the way. The heart of strategy is to ensure that the ends,
ways and means are balanced and entails little risk. This is similar to conventional definitions of
grand strategy, security strategy and theater strategy in the sense that it is a sequential way of
working with strategy which contains no clues about the contents but only about the different stages
involved in the process of strategy making. Instead, we propose five key variables defining the
contents of processes of strategy making in states and intergovernmental organizations.
[INSERT TABLE 1.2. HERE]
The five variables of time, position, legitimacy, implementation structure and
capabilities are essential to any strategy making process. The basis for strategic thinking at all three
strategic levels are national and international considerations on, first, the time available to realize
objectives, second, the position of the state in terms of interests and values that define the substance
of strategy, third, the legitimacy of objectives and the instruments used for purposes of
implementation, fourth, implementation structures such as the U.S. alliance system, the UN system
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or a party apparatus available as channels of implementation at the national or international levels,
and fifth, the capabilities available to realize objectives.8
Time affects the strategies available to decision-makers.9 The apex of realizing a
particular objective may be near or distant, and the trajectory of realizing the objective may be steep
or shallow. At grand strategy level, time horizons tend to be long, with the apex of realizing a
particular objective being distant and the trajectory of realizing the objective being shallow. At this
level we are adopting a long term perspective, such as the rise and fall of great powers. At security
strategy level, time horizons are intermediate. At this level, issues with an intermediate time horizon
such as nation-building and changing the basic organization of political systems are considered. At
theater strategy level, time horizons tend to be short. The apex of realizing a particular objective is
near and the trajectory of realizing the goal is steep. This means that issues such as the planning of a
particular campaign or decisions to finance the building of schools in a particular theater are in
focus.
The position of the state concerns the interests and values of the state or
intergovernmental organization. These are essential to define the substance in a state’s or
intergovernmental organization’s relative influence compared to other actors. This variable
concerns the definition of the present and future identity of the state or intergovernmental
organization. Essential to this definition is its physical, political and popular identity. The physical
identity is about its geographical position. The political identity is about the character of the
political system, for example if it is a liberal democracy or a communist authoritarian regime. The
popular identity concerns nationalisms such as multicultural versus assimilationist identities. At the
grand strategy level, position is about very general interests and values such as ambitions to become
a continental or a maritime power or to advance beyond the level of small, secondary or great
power. At the security strategy level, position is about more functionally oriented interests and
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values such as position on the status of the International Court of Justice or the Law of the Sea, or
position on the UN Security Council on the acceptability of Chapter VII interventions without
consent from target regimes. At the theater level, position mainly concerns the instruments used for
particular purposes. For example, it could concern decisions to prioritize military versus civilian
instruments for creating security in a specific theater, or it could concern decisions to prioritize
different instruments from the same toolbox. In the case of the military toolbox, it could concern
decisions of whether to use naval blockades or bombing to promote particular objectives.
The legitimacy of a particular objective depends on the collectivity of states and
parliamentarians and ministers’ assessment of the righteousness of the strategic goals promoted by a
state or intergovernmental organization. Legitimacy also depends on public diplomacy and strategic
communications efforts used to sell the objective and make it seem feasible. Influence is a function
not only of a country’s and government’s stature, but also of its connections.10 In other words, allies
and partners are a necessity to exercise influence and to realize objectives in the international and
national realm. No actor is so powerful that it can enforce its own interests without taking into
account the views and demands of allies and partners.11 Even the most powerful state needs to
convince its partners that its policy is responsible and feasible in order to avoid the eclipse of
common interests due to differences of opinion.12 If the other players do not endorse its suggestions,
there is no reason to spend time formulating these objectives.
Legitimacy at grand strategy level focuses on identifying the allies and enemies that
may help or prevent the realization of the general objectives. For example, Denmark will have
difficulties realizing its visions without backing from or at least no resistance from major NATO
states. Legitimacy at security strategy level is about identifying the partners and opponents that may
help achieve or hinder objectives within a specific sector. For example, the African Union and the
ministry of defense’s Africa strategy may be a help as well as a hindrance to realizing the foreign
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ministry’s Africa strategy. Legitimacy at the theater strategy level is about identifying the partners
and opponents that may help achieve or hinder the realization of objectives within a specific theater.
For example, clan leaders in Somalia and Chinese destroyers employed in the Gulf of Aden may be
a help or a hindrance to realizing the objectives of the multinational anti-piracy operations.
Implementation structures are the channels available to implement a particular
strategy. They are the machinery through which plans can be distributed, actions coordinated and
strategies unfolded at international and at national level. Implementation structures assist a state or
intergovernmental organization in translating goals into joint action in cooperation with its partners
and allies. At the grand strategy level, implementation structures are about the very general
objectives and whether to implement these through the UN system, the global financial system, or
the U.S. alliance system, or at the national level through the bureaucracy, the media, etc.13 At the
security strategy level, implementation structures are more hands-on and include decisions to use
the UN Disarmament Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency at the international
level, and NGOs working with anti-nuclear weapons campaigns if the issue is nuclear disarmament
issues. At the theater level, it may include decisions to activate particular clan structures and media
within the Somali political system and civil society, winning hearts and minds to ensure back-up for
anti-piracy operations.14
The capabilities available to realize a particular objective may be a combination of
military, economic, financial or knowledge resources.15 Military capabilities are essential so long as
violent conflict threatens survival or vital interests, and whoever offers protection against violence
can exercise power over other non-military matters. Economic and financial capabilities are
essential to have access to land, labor, goods, capital, technology and credit. Knowledge capabilities
are essential to keep at the forefront in the sectors of technology, research and development, and
education. Capabilities affect the type of objectives, norms and instruments available to the state. A
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state such as Germany who compared to other European countries has considerable economic and
financial capabilities is likely to prioritize objectives and instruments such as economic great power
status, preferential status for socio-economic individual rights and check-book diplomacy. By
contrast, France who compared to other European countries has considerable military capabilities is
more likely to prioritize objectives and instruments such as military great power status, preferential
status for nuclear powers and coercive diplomacy.16 Capabilities are essential for a state’s or
intergovernmental organization’s decision to act. If no resources are available, there is no space for
action and no point in formulating objectives.
Capabilities at the grand strategy level usually focus on general resources assessments,
for example determining if a strategy predominantly draws on military or non-military resources or,
if focusing on military resources, if the inventory of fighter aircraft is sufficient or needs to be
expanded to adequately contribute to fulfilling the grand strategic objectives. Capabilities
considerations at security strategy level are usually about distributing the available resources in a
way that indicates which objectives are prioritized. Some sectors such as diplomacy rely heavily on
knowledge and network resources rather than economic resources. Other functional sectors such as
ministries for private sector business often control funds for distribution between actors that argue
that they contribute to the vision and the objectives defined in line with the vision at the security
strategic level. Capabilities considerations at theater level are about deciding how to make use of
the inventory available. For example, how many combat units or formations are to be deployed in a
particular theater considering our needs in other theaters?
Advantages and limitations of the concept of strategy
The chapter has devised a concept for how to analyze processes of strategic planning with the
purpose of clarifying the elements involved in strategy formulation and implementation. It is an
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ideal-typical concept which cannot be found in its pure form when looking at empirical processes of
strategy formulation. Hence, it is an analytical concept rather than a reflection of concrete processes
of strategy planning. We have described processes of strategy-making in terms of three strategic
levels, the grand strategy, the security strategy and the theater strategy level. The grand strategy
level is the place where the sectors are coordinated and where consistency between objectives,
methods and instruments of the strategic visions received from the political level are ensured on
condition that the national and international context is conducive to these. The security strategy
level is the place where the substantive objectives, methods and instruments are identified and
implemented on the basis of the specialized sector-specific knowledge at this level. The theater
strategic level is the place where assets are put on the ground to implement strategies and meet the
strategic objectives. The strategic processes are guided by the five strategic variables of time,
position, legitimacy, implementation structure and capabilities describing the substance of strategy.
The strategic concept addresses the issue that political and normative considerations
from the grand strategy level are not easily transformed into means and instruments at lower levels
where strategy is transformed into practices and consolidated as part of the routine set of standard
operating procedures. The concept proposed in this chapter tries to address this problem by
emphasizing the need for coordination between the grand strategy level and the other levels. In
addition, we address this issue by proposing a common concept of strategy that enhances the
systematic element of strategy-making processes at grand strategy level and simplifies strategymaking processes at security and theater strategy level.
We have set out to describe the contours of how strategic planning structures and
processes could ideally be designed. The three strategic levels define the requirements for the
process and the five strategic variables define the requirements for the substance of strategy.
Together these constitute an explanatory typology that fulfills two purposes. First, the typology can
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be used to measure the extent to which strategic planning processes in a particular geographical and
historical setting are successful in fulfilling the visions devised at the political level. Second, the
typology can be used as a check list for the assessment of strategy formulation and implementation
processes in the administrations of states and intergovernmental organizations. We do not propose
to have solved all problems of strategy-making with the concept outlined in this chapter. However,
we do hope that we have highlighted some of the central aspects of strategy at politicaladministrative levels and how these aspects correspond to the strategies developed in functional
sectors and geographical theaters.
Endnotes
1
On the distinction between policy and strategy, see Harry R. Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional:
Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 2008), 9.
2
Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional, 21.
3
On problems of transparency and accountability associated with the broadening security agenda that decouples the
strategic levels from political visions, see Arnold Wolfers, ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’, Political
Science Quarterly 67/4 (1952), 481-502; Bowman H. Miller, ‘Soldiers, Scholars, and Spies: Combining Smarts and
Secrets’, Armed Forces & Society 36/4 (July 2010), 695-715.
4
As argued by Robert H. Dorff, at grand strategy level the integration of various elements of power is essential because
the objectives are so broad. Cf. Robert H. Dorff, ‘Understanding and Teaching Strategy at the U.S. Army War College’,
Militært Tidsskrift (Military Journal) 140/4 (December 2011), 281-91.
5
Yarger, Strategy and the National Security Professional, 21. He uses the term national security strategy, but since we
deal with multinational organizations in our exposition of this type of strategy, instead we use the term security strategy.
6
Ibid.
7
The origins of the ends, ways, means considerations in the works of Clausewitz and Liddell Hart can be read in B.H.
Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London: Faber and Faber 1967).
8
The definition of time is derived from David Edelstein, ‘The Missing Dimension: Time and Rising Great Powers’,
paper, prepared for workshop on Assessing China’s Rise: Power and Influence in the 21 st Century (Cambridge, MA:
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology 27-28 February 2009). The definitions of these variables, except for time, are
based on Liselotte Odgaard, ‘Civilian power ideals in China’s Post-Cold War UNSC policies: The cases of Iran, Sudan
and Myanmar’, paper, prepared for workshop on Assessing China’s Rise: Power and Influence in the 21 st Century
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 27-28 February 2009) and on Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance
of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US-China policies on regional order (London: Routledge 2007).
9
The considerations on time and strategic planning in this paper are inspired by Edelstein, ‘The Missing Dimension’.
10
C.A.W. Manning, The Nature of International Society (London: MacMillan 1975), 190-1.
11
David Little, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: A Theoretical Approach’, in Joseph I. Coffey and Charles T. Mathewes
(eds.), Religion, Law, and the Role of Force: A Study on their Influence on Conflict and on Conflict Resolution (New
York: Transnational Publishers 2002).
12
Martin Wight, Power Politics (Leicester: Leicester University Press 1978), 30-40.
13
In contemporary conflicts, multilateral implementation structures have undoubtedly become more important. See for
example Kimberely A. Hudson, Justice, Intervention and Force in International Relations: Reassessing just war theory
for the 21st century (London: Routledge 2009).
14
This aspect is by many considered vital to win in modern warfare. Cf. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of
War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane/Penguin 2005).
15
These capabilities are derived from Susan Strange, who calls them the four facets of power: security, production and
credit, and knowledge, beliefs and ideas, cf. Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter 1994, 2nd ed.), 25-32.
16
For a detailed analysis of French and German security priorities, see Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany, and the
Western Alliance (Boulder: Westview Press 1995).
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