APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING
RULE 37
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION
LAUREL v. CUI
GR L-50087, 30 JUNE 30 1980
FACTS:
Manuel & Lilia Laurel (the Laurels) bought a Toyota Tamaraw from Delta Motor
Sales Corp. (Delta). The Laurels executed a chattel mortgage over the vehicle &
signed a promissory note (PN) in favour of Delta for P17,881. Delta assigned the PN
to BA Finance Corp. (BA Finance).
The Laurels allegedly defaulted in the payment of their monthly instalments, thus
BA Finance filed a case for replevin, or if that’s not possible, for the payment of the
unpaid balance of P15,591 & interest, plus attorney’s fees & liquidated damages.
The case was raffled to Branch 25 presided by Judge Cui.
Summons were served on the Laurels on Feb. 15, 1978 requiring them to answer
the complaint w/in 15 days. As of May 5, they still had not answered. BA Finance
filed a motion to have them declared in default & to be allowed to present its
evidence ex-parte, & this was granted by Judge Cui. Judge Cui issued a decision
ordering the Laurels to pay BA Finance the P15,591, legal interest, attorney’s fees &
liquidated damages.
ISSUE:
W/N the Laurels were properly declared in default.
RULING:
NO. The decision states that summons were served on the Laurels on Feb. 1, 1980,
when in fact the sheriff’s return gave the date as Feb. 15, 1980. Moreover, the
decision BEARS NO DATE.
A notice of the decision, dated Aug. 23, 1978, was issued by the branch clerk of
court & the Laurels claim they received it on Sept. 6, 1978. On Sept. 7, the Laurels
filed their “Answer w/ Counterclaim.” BA Finance moved that it be stricken from the
records because it was filed out of time when the Laurels already lost their standing
in court. This was granted by Judge Cui on Sept. 26.
In a motion dated Sept. 24, the Laurels asked for an extension of 15 days to file a
motion for new trial. BA Finance opposed the motion for new trial but the Laurels
still filed the motion. In their verified motion for new trial dated Oct., 1978, the
Laurels alleged that they made remittances to BA Finance totalling P12,300 w/c BA
Finance maliciously & unjustly didn’t tell the Court, so the remaining balance was
only P3,291 & not P15,591 (w/c was the amount awarded in the decision of Judge
Cui). (NOTE: During the hearing of the case before the SC, counsel for BA Finance
admitted that payments had been made by the Laurels so that their balance was
less than that w/c had been awarded by Judge Cui.) Moroever, by way of “affidavit
of merit” the Laurels also alleged that BA Finance maliciously deceived them into
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
not answering the complaint because BA Finance’s Mananger promised to withdraw
the complaint, provided that their account be updated, w/c they did.
Judge Cui curtly denied the motion in his order of Nov. 13, 1978. An MR was filed
by the Laurels w/c was denied in a similar fashion. It was when BA Finance was
poised to execute the judgment awarded in its favor that the Laurels went to the SC
on certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Cui in not
granting their motion for new trial.
It could be that in strict law the motion for new trial was improper. For as stated
in Tan vs. Dimayuga, a defendant who has been declared in default loses his
standing in court as a party litigant and his remedy is a petition for relief under Rule
38 of the Rules of Court, filed w/in 60 days after he learned of the order & not more
than 6 months after such order was entered. But if Judge Cui leaned more on equity
than on strict legalism he could & should have treated the motion for new trial as a
petition for relief under Sec. 2 of Rule 38, for although it was denominated as a
motion for new trial in substance it could be considered as a petition for relief which
had been filed w/in the reglementary period. Moreover, denial of relief from
judgment would have caused overpayment to BA Finance resulting in unjust
enrichment.
The order of default & the decision as well as all the orders issued by Judge Cui
subsequent thereto are hereby set aside; & he is ordered to allow the Laurels to
answer the complaint of BA Finance w/in 15 days from their receipt of this decision.
MARCELO v. PCIB
GR 182735, 4 DECEMBER 2009
CASE:
Sps. Marcelo filed a PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI before the SC under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated 31 Jan. 2007 & the
Resolution2 dated 29 Aug. 2007 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 82424, upholding the
validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings initiated by Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB) & the subsequent public auction sale
conducted against their properties.
FACTS:
Sps. Marcelo obtained from PCIB several loans in staggered amounts w/in the
period 1996-1997. In turn, they executed promissory notes in favor of PCIB. To
secure the payment of their loans, Sps. Marcelo executed an REM over 6 parcels of
land all situated in Baliuag, Bulacan.
Sps. Marcelo defaulted on the payment of their outstanding loans, prompting PCIB
to make repeated demands for its payment. PCIB filed a Petition for Extra-judicial
Foreclosure over the mortgaged properties before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. A
Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan. The said
Notice was posted on the Meralco posts w/in the vicinities of Baliuag Roman Catholic
Church, Baliuag Public Market & the chapel of Sabang, Baliuag, Bulacan as
evidenced by the Affidavit of Posting executed by Sheriff Ipac. The Notice was also
sent by registered mail to PCIB & spouses Marcelo, but the latter denied receiving
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the same. The Notice of the Sheriff’s Sale was, likewise, published in The Times
Newsweekly, a newspaper of general circulation as evidenced by the Affidavit of
Publication & copies of publications. Consequently, a public auction sale was held &
the 6 parcels of land were sold to PCIB. The Certificate of Sale was issued to & was
then annotated on the TCTs of the subject lands on 10 Nov. 1998.
Shortly before the expiration of the redemption period, Sps. Marcelo filed a
Complaint before RTC Bulacan on 26 Oct. 1999, alleging (1) PCIB’s violations of the
terms & conditions of the REM contract & the Promissory Notes by demanding
exorbitant interest rates & unnecessary bank charges w/o them being notified; &
(2) irregularities in the foreclosure proceedings for failure to comply w/ the posting
& publication requirements as mandated by Act No. 3135. Sps. Marcelo prayed for
the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings & the issuance of a TRO against PCIB
to prevent the latter from taking possession of the foreclosed properties.
The TC denied the application for a TRO for want of merit & ruled that the
publication of the Notice of Sale in The Times Newsweekly necessarily connoted that
said publication was duly accredited by the TC, having been allowed by the ExOfficio Sheriff. The TC declared that the lack of personal notice to the mortgagors is
not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. PCIB, in its Motion to Dismiss,
contended that the Complaint filed was empty rhetoric designed to delay its right to
take possession of the foreclosed property even during the redemption period of
one year. It added that the matters are now fait accompli, for it had already
foreclosed the properties & the one-year redemption period had already lapsed. The
spouses Marcelo opposed the above Motion by emphasizing the need for a fullblown trial.
In its Decision, the TC ruled for PCIB, sustaining the legal presumption of regularity
in the performance of Sheriff Ipac’s official duty in the foreclosure proceedings. It
also affirmed PCIB’s allegation of laches against Sps. Marcelo, stating that the
action was but a much-delayed afterthought following Sps. Marcelo’s neglect to seek
an accurate accounting of their loan obligation & their omission to redeem their
properties w/in the period prescribed by law.
Sps. Marcelo filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The TC then reversed itself &
rendering the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings null & void for being violative of
Act No. 3135. According to the TC, the provision of law requiring the posting of the
notices of sale of a property subject of extra-judicial foreclosure have not been
faithfully complied w/ in the proceedings. Aggrieved, PCIB appealed to CA.
The CA in its Decision dated 31 Jan. 2007, overturned the appealed Order. It held
that the publication of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale at The Times Newsweekly, as
recognized by the Executive Judge of the TC, was in compliance w. the publication
requirement for the foreclosure sale.
The CA, in its Resolution dated 29 Aug. 2007, denied the Sps. Marcelo’s Motion for
Extension of Time to file MR of its 31 Jan. 2007 Decision, on the ground that the
time for filing the same was non-extendible; Sps. Marcelo’s MR was denied for being
filed 11 days late on 12 Mar. 2007. On 31 Oct. 2007, the CA resolved to deny the
Sps. Marcelo’s MR filed on 19 Sept. 2007 for being a 2nd MR that was proscribed
under Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court.
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
ISSUE:
W/N a Motion for Extension of Time to file MR is non-extendible?
RULING:
YES. Revisiting the records of this case would reveal that the case attained its
finality as of 26 Sept. 2007, & the same has already been recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgment. This Court, in a long line of cases, has maintained that once
the judgment has become final & executory, it can no longer be disturbed, altered
or modified.57 Except for clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the
parties are deemed resolved & laid to rest.58
Furthermore, this Court provides in Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court that an MR
of a judgment or a final order should be filed w/in the period for appeal, w/c is w/in
15 days after notice to the appellant of the judgment or final order appealed from.
The 2002 Internal Rules of the CA also states that unless an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed w/in the 15-day reglementary period, the CA’s
decision becomes final.62 Hence, the general rule is that no motion for extension of
time to file a MR is allowed. An exception, however, is provided in the case of
Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Maximo M. Japson, where the SC ruled that the rule
shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion
for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the MeTCs MTCs, RTCs, &
the IAC. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending w/ the SC as the
court of last resort, w/c may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested
Accordingly, motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed only in connection w/ cases pending before the SC, w/c
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. No such
motion may be filed before any lower courts.64 In opting for the liberal application of
the rules in the interest of equity & justice, we cannot look w/ favor on a course of
action w/c would place the administration of justice in a straight jacket for then the
result would be a poor kind of justice if there would be justice at all.
HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES VS. JUDGE JAPSON, RTC
142 SCRA 208 (1986)
FACTS:
Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) of the Decision of the 2nd
Division of the sc promulgated on Aug. 5, 1985 w/c granted the petition for
certiorari & prohibition & set aside the order of Judge Japson granting private
respondents' motion for new trial.
ISSUE:
W/N the 15-day period w/in w/c a party may file an MR of a final order or ruling of
the RTC may be extended.
RULING:
No. Sec. 39 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act reduced the period for appeal from
final orders or judgments of the RTC from 30 to 15 days & provides a uniform
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JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
period of 15 days for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court counted from notice thereof, except in habeas corpus cases
where the period for appeal remains at 48 hours. To expedite appeals, only a notice
of appeal is required & a record on appeal is no longer required except in appeals in
special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court & in other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed. Sec. 19 of the Interim Rules provides that in these
exceptional cases, the period for appeal is 30 days since a record on appeal is
required. Moreover Sec. 18 of the Interim Rules provides that no appeal bond shall
be required for an appeal, & Sec. 4 thereof disallows a 2nd MR of a final order or
judgment.
- Sps. Balanoba offered for sale a parcel of land to him.
- He accepted the offer & made a partial payment in the amount of P200K
through Abraham de Sagun, broker & brother of Elisa Balanoba.
- It was agreed upon that the remaining balance was to be paid w/in a period
of 16 months.
- He paid to Sps. Balanoba the amount of US$600 but before the lapse of the
period, Sps. Balanoba, w/o his knowledge, sold the same lot to Aguilon.
- He offered to settle the remaining balance over the lot but Sps. Balanoba
refused to convey the property.
- Despite his demands, Sps. Balanoba failed to reimburse him.
However, the law & the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment. The interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in the original
decision1 were applied prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that
it would be unfair to deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they
availed themselves of a procedure w/c was not expressly prohibited or allowed by
the law or the Rules. On the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on
certiorari, & since the purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite
the final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is
in order.
Upon Sps. Balanoba’s failure to file their answer, the TC declared them in default &
Madriaga was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Hence, for the guidance of Bench & Bar, the Court restates & clarifies the rules on
this point, as follows:
1.) Beginning 1 month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed w/ the MeTCs, MTCs, RTCs, & the IAC. Such a motion
may be filed only in cases pending w/ the SC as the court of last resort, w/c may in
its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court & in other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to file
the record on appeal may be filed w/in the reglementary period of 30 days. If the
court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken w/in the original
period inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal. The TC
may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for appeal provided it was
filed w/in the original period.
BALANOBA V. MADRIAGA
G.R. NO. 160109; NOVEMBER 22, 2005
FACTS:
Manuel D. Madriaga filed an action for collection of a sum of money w/ damages
alleging that:
1
Original Ruling: The 15 day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration
cannot be extended. Even under the existing Rules of Court, the thirty-day period cannot be
extended
Madriaga filed his Motion for Issuance of a Notice of Garnishment, praying that a
Notice of Garnishment be issued by the TC directing the garnishee Bandila Maritime
Services, Inc., German Balanoba’s employer to deliver goods, effects, interests,
money shares or other personal property belonging to German Balanoba sufficient
to satisfy the amount of the judgment.
Sps. Balanoba filed their Opposition praying that the motion be denied on the
ground that the money judgment is part of the community property of Madriaga &
his spouse, 1 of the petitioners, Rebecca Madriaga.
The TC denied Madriaga’s Motion for Issuance of a Notice of Garnishment on the
ground that the litigated motion does not comply w/ Sec. 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court; that the motion does not indicate the balance of the judgment w/c has not
yet been satisfied; the TC does not issue a notice of garnishment but the Branch
Sheriff implementing the writ of execution.
Madriaga filed his Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The TC denied such on
the ground that the same was not filed by his counsel of record, & that the amount
paid per Annex ‘A’ of the motion does not tally w/ the partial returns of the Sheriff
in respect to the execution partially satisfied.
Madriaga filed his 2nd MR alleging that he has caused the rectification of the
discrepancy in the amounts collected & the remaining balance payable w/c showed
that less the amount already collected as per garnishment previously issued, the
outstanding balance of Sps. Balanoba. The TC denied Madriaga’s 2nd MR for the
reason that the life of the original writ has already expired. The TC, however,
admonished Madriaga to move, instead, for the issuance of an alias writ w/ a notice
to Sps. Balanoba.
Sps. Balanoba filed their Comment &/or Opposition on the ground that, under Sec.
5, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, no party shall be allowed a 2nd MR.
Madriaga filed a Motion for Reconsideration w/ Prayer for the Issuance of
Alias Writ of Execution.
On Nov. 15, 2000, the TC, for the purpose of determining accurately the unpaid
balance of the judgment rendered order directing Madriaga & the Branch Sheriff to
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APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING
submit to the said court a computation under oath of how much has been satisfied
out of the judgment.
Madriaga filed a Compliance asserting that, after conference w/ the implementing
Sheriff, a total of P148,790 of the judgment debt was satisfied by Sps. Balanoba,
leaving the amount of P236,696 as balance & collectible amount from Sps. Balanoba
as of Nov. 27, 2000.
On Dec. 15, 2000, the TC issued an order ruling that the Compliance submitted by
counsel for Sps. Balanoba was not in accordance w/ the Order of Nov. 15, 2000, &
directing Madriaga & the Branch Sheriff to comply strictly w/ the said Order.
Madriaga filed his Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated Dec. 15, 2000,
praying that the Order of Dec. 15, 2000 be reconsidered.
The TC ordered the issuance of an alias writ to enforce the unpaid balance
(w/c in effect granted respondent’s series of motions).
On appeal, the CA sustained the TC’s grant of Madriaga’s series of Motions. The CA,
in construing Sec. 5 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 1, 2, 3 & 4 of
the same Rule, held that the prohibition on “2nd MR” applied only to an aggrieved
party, not to a winning litigant like Madriaga; & also only to judgments & final
orders.
ISSUE:
W/IN Sec. 5, Par. 2 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure refers only to
the aggrieved party & not likewise to the winning party?
RULING:
NO. The aforementioned provision states: “No party shall be allowed a 2nd MR of a
judgment or final order.” Plainly, this statement means that any party -- whether
the winning or the losing litigant -- is prohibited from filing a 2nd MR. Accordingly,
winning litigants may also move for reconsideration of a part or parts of a decision
or a final order. In the event that the motion is denied, an attempt at a 2nd MR
would be prohibited under the afore-quoted provision.
However, the CA did not err in n sustaining the TC’s actions allowing Madriaga’s
Motions, w/c were aimed at the execution of the judgment in his favor since what is
proscribed under Sec. 5 of Rule 37 is a 2nd MR of a “judgment or final order.” In the
instant case, the decision of the TC was already final & executory; yet, Madriaga
has obtained only a partial execution of his money judgment. It was precisely to
effect a full execution that he filed on Aug. 9, 2000, a “Motion for Issuance of a
Notice of Garnishment.”
The series of “Motions for Reconsideration” he
subsequently filed referred to matters attendant to a complete execution of the
Decision in his favor. Those Motions were not for the reconsideration of the final
judgment.
PHILGREEN TRADING CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. CA
G.R. NO. 120408, 18 APRIL 1997
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
FACTS: (Take note of the dates)
In a foreclosure proceeding instituted by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Philgreen Trading Construction Corp. (Philgreen) was the highest bidder. Philgreen
only made partial payment w/ the agreement to pay the balance w/in 90 days.
Philgreen & UCPB also agreed in a Contract to Sell that Philgreen was to take
possession of the property but title shall remain with UCPB until full payment of the
purchase price. Philgreen thereafter took possession of the property & later
allegedly discovered that the lot was sequestered by the PCGG as ill-gotten wealth
of Edna Camcam & was actually the subject before the Sandiganbayan.
Philgreen instituted against UCPB before the RTC Br. 57 Makati City, (1st Case) for
specific performance & rescission of contract w/ damages. The complaint sought to
compel UCPB to clear the property from sequestration before full payment of the
purchase price.
On the other hand, later, UCPB, filed against Philgreen a complaint for ejectment
before the MTC, Makati City, on the ground of failure to pay the balance of the
purchase price under their Contract to Sell. MTC rendered a decision ordering
Philgreen to vacate the property, restore possession to UCPB. UCPB filed a motion
for execution of the decision pending appeal. The MeTC, however, did not act on the
motion but instead forwarded the records of the case to the RTC upon appeal by
Philgreen.
The appeal was assigned to respondent RTC, Br 150, Makati (2nd case). Before Br.
150, Philgreen moved to consolidate the appeal w/ the other civil case then pending
before Branch 57, or, in the alternative, to suspend proceedings in the appeal until
resolution of the 1st case. On June 4, 1993, Br 150 issued an order denying
consolidation of the cases. The court, however, found that the 1st case "is
unavoidably determinative of W/N the cause for ejectment should proceed w/ the
risk that herein defendant-movant is ousted from the premises while in the
meantime the rights & obligations of the parties are still in litigation.", hence,
ordered the suspension of the proceedings in the 2nd case pending determination of
the issues in the 1st case.
UCPB moved for reconsideration of the order w/c the Br 150 denied on Aug. 23,
1993. On Nov. 17, 1993, UCPB filed a "Motion to Reopen Case with Motion to
Resolve Motion for Execution Pending Appeal." On Feb. 8, 1994, Br 150 denied the
Motion declaring that the motion to reopen was a second motion for reconsideration
of the June 4, 1993 order & that the motion for execution pending appeal was not
before it but before the MeTC.
On Apr. 26, 1994, private respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
questioning the orders of the Br 150. Petitioner questions the timeliness of the filing
of petition for certiorari.
(Note: A petition for certiorari should be filed w/in a reasonable period of three
months from notice of the decision or order.)
Petitioner claims that since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited then
the period to file a petition for certiorari should be counted from receipt of the order
denying the first motion for reconsideration, w/c was the order of Aug. 23, 1993.
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APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
Private respondent received a copy of the Aug. 23, 1993 order on Aug. 31, 1993 &
filed its petition with the Court of Appeals on Apr. 26, 1994 — seven (7) months &
26 days thereafter.
As an incentive to complete the construction, MARINA allowed H.L. CARLOS to
purchase a condominium unit (Unit B-121). Thus, the parties entered into a
Contract to Purchase & to Sell covering Unit B-121 for 3.6M.
ISSUE:
Whether the reckoning point in counting the period for filing a petition for certiorari
should start to run on the day UCPB received the notice of the order of Aug. 23,
1993 (ruling on the 1st MR) or of Feb. 8, 1994 (ruling on the Motion to Reopen w/c
was treated as a 2nd MR).
After paying more than half of the contract price, H.L. CARLOS demanded for the
delivery of the unit, but MARINA refused. This prompted H.L. CARLOS to file w/ the
RTC a complaint for damages.
RULING:
FEB 8, 1994. The rule that a 2nd MR is prohibited by the Rules applies to final
judgments & orders, not interlocutory orders. This is clear from the Interim or
Transitional Rules Relative to the Implementation of BP 129. Sec. 4 of the Interim
Rules provides that "no party shall be allowed a 2nd MR of a final order or
judgment." A 2nd MR attacking an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground
that it is a "rehash" or mere reiteration of grounds & arguments already passed
upon & resolved by the court; it, however, cannot be rejected on the ground that a
2nd MR of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law.
The order of June 4, 1993 suspending the decision in the ejectment case is an
interlocutory order. An interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of
the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. The TC did not rule nor did it dismiss the appeal in the
ejectment case but merely suspended ruling thereon until the specific performance
case shall have been decided. The order of June 4, 1993 being interlocutory, the TC
therefore should not have dismissed the Motion to Reopen Case on the ground that
it was prohibited by the Rules.
Moreover, the Motion to Reopen was not the only pleading filed. It included a Motion
to Resolve Motion for Execution Pending Appeal w/c the MeTC forwarded to Br 150
as appellate court. This was the 1st time UCPB moved for resolution of its Motion for
Execution. Since the Motion to Reopen is not a prohibited pleading, then the order
denying the same should be the reckoning point in counting the period for filing a
petition for certiorari. The period to file a petition for certiorari started to run on
Mar. 1, 1994, the day private respondent received notice of the order of Feb. 8,
1994. The petition for certiorari was filed before the CA on Apr. 26, 1994, almost 2
months thereafter, hence, it was filed w/in a reasonable period of time.
MARINA PROPERTIES CORPORATION VS. CA
294 SCRA 273 (1998)
FACTS:
Marina Properties Corp (MARINA) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of real estate development. Among its projects is a condominium complex project,
known as the “MARINA BAYHOMES CONDOMINIUM PROJECT”
H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. (H.L. CARLOS) was the principal contractor,
particularly of Phase III.
Meanwhile, MARINA wrote H.L. CARLOS that it was exercising its option under their
Contract to take over the completion of the project due to its (H.L. CARLOS’)
abandonment of the construction. MARINA also informed them that it was cancelling
the Contract to Purchase & Sell due to H.L. CARLOS’ abandonment & its filing of
baseless & harassment suits against MARINA.
H.L. CARLOS filed the instant complaint for specific performance w/ damages
against MARINA w/ the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), alleging
that it has substantially complied w/ the terms & conditions of the Contract to
Purchase & Sell, having paid more than 50% of the contract price of the
condominium unit; & that MARINA’s act of cancelling the contract was done w/
malice & bad faith.
MARINA claimed that its cancellation of the Contract to Purchase & Sell is justified
since H.L. CARLOS has failed to pay its monthly instalment for a period of almost 2
years & abandoned its work on the project.
The HLURB rendered a decision declaring the cancellation of the subject Contract to
Sell null & void.
MARINA filed its MR on the last day of its period to appeal. However, the MR was
found by the Office of the President to be pro forma as “the issues of litis pendentia,
forum-shopping & splitting of a cause of action as well as the issue of unliquidated,
speculative & unreasonable damages raised therein were basically the same issues
raised & discussed extensively in the Appeal Memorandum & w/c were already
weighed, discussed & considered by this Office in its Order dated Mar. 15, 1995.” As
a consequence, the Office of the President declared its decision final & executory.
MARINA filed a petition for review w/ the CA ascribing errors to the Office of the
President. One of w/c was the error in declaring the MR filed by MARINA "proforma" & depriving it of the right of appeal;
ISSUE:
W/N the MR filed by MARINA was pro forma.
RULING:
NO. Under our rules of procedure, a party adversely affected by a decision of a TC
may move for reconsideration thereof on the following grounds: (a) the damages
awarded are excessive; (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision; or (c)
the decision is contrary to law. An MR interrupts the running of the period to appeal,
unless the motion is pro forma.
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An MR based on the foregoing grounds is deemed pro forma if the same does not
specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment w/c are not supported by the
evidence or contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or
legal provisions. It is settled that although a MR may merely reiterate issues already
passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma & is immaterial
because what is essential is compliance w/ the requisites of the Rules.
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader
to merely delay the proceedings, & his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present
additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts
should be slow to declare the same outright as pro forma. The doctrine relating to
pro forma motions has a direct bearing upon the movant’s valuable right to appeal.
It would be in the interest of justice to accord the appellate court the opportunity to
review the decision of the TC on the merits than to abort the appeal by declaring
the motion pro forma, such that the period to appeal was not interrupted & had
consequently lapsed.
We are thus unable to hold that MARINA’s MR was merely pro forma. Our review of
the records reveals that said MR adequately pointed out the conclusions MARINA
regarded as erroneous & contrary to law, & even referred to findings not supported
by evidence as well as jurisprudence to sustain MARINA’s claims. As to the
justification proffered by the Office of the President that it had already passed upon
the issues raised by MARINA in its motion, plainly, the authorities cited above
readily refute such a position.
YAP V. JUDGE TAÑADA & GOULDS PUMPS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
GR L-32917, 18 JULY 1988
FACTS:
Goulds Pumps International (GOULDS) installed a water pump in the Yap spouses
(YAPS) house in Cebu. GOULDS filed a complaint against the YAPS for the recovery
of the balance of the price & installation cost of the water pump. When the case was
called for trial, the YAPS did not appear despite service of notice. GOULDS’ counsel
presented its evidence ex-parte. The CITY COURT ruled in favor of GOULDS &
ordered the YAPS to pay the balance.
The YAPS appealed to the CFI & the case was assigned to the sala of Judge Tañada
(“TAÑADA”). When the case was called for pre-trial, the YAPS did not appear
despite notice. At the latest possible time, YAPS’ counsel filed an ex-parte motion
for postponement (“11th hour motion”). GOULDS opposed since the 11th Hour
motion was not filed in accordance with the Rules of Court. TAÑADA declared the
YAPS in default. The next day, TAÑADA rendered a decision requiring the YAPS to
pay GOULDS.
The YAPS filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (MR) on these grounds:
(1) Their 11th hour motion should have been granted since they were exploring the
possibility of an amicable settlement
(2) They should be allowed to present evidence in support of their defenses as to
the discrepancy in the price & breach of warranty
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
The MR was NOT verified or accompanied by any separate affidavit. GOULDS
opposed the MR. They averred that the YAPS had repeatedly sought for
postponements through 11th hour motions. TAÑADA denied the MR.
TAÑADA issued an order granting GOULDS' Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.
The YAPS filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of Order" contending that the
judgment had not yet become final since their MR was not pro forma for lack of an
affidavit of merit. The YAPS alleged that this was not required under the Rules of
Court.
GOULDS opposed YAPS’ motion on two grounds:
(1) YAPS’ MR claimed to have a valid defense to the action (discrepancy as to price
& breach of seller’s warranty). In effect, that there was fraud on the part of
GOULDS. Hence, the MR should have been supported by an affidavit of merit
respecting said defenses. Without the affidavit of merit, the MR was fatally
defective. Hence, it did not interrupt the running of the period of appeal.
(2) YAPS’ MR did not specify findings or conclusions in the judgment claimed to be
contrary to law or not supported by evidence, making it a pro forma motion also
incapable of stopping the running of the appeal period.
After a series of complicated events with respect to the execution sale & several
more motions from the YAPS,2 TAÑADA finally issued in favor of GOULDS an alias
writ of execution.
The YAPS filed a "Motion to Set Aside Execution Sale & to Quash Alias Writ of
Execution" They argue that the Issuance of the writ is contrary to law, the judgment
sought to be executed not being final & executory.
TAÑADA denied the motion. It was held that YAPS’ motion was in reality one for
NEW TRIAL. Hence, it should allege the grounds for new trial & be supported by
affidavit of merits. If the YAPS sincerely desired for an opportunity to submit to an
amicable settlement, they should have appeared in the pre-trial to achieve the
same purpose.
ISSUE:
W/N the MR (not verified & not accompanied by an affidavit of merits or other
sworn statements) was pro forma & consequently had not interrupted the running of
the period of appeal.
YAPS’ position: Their motion was not pro forma for lack of an affidavit of merits,
such a document not being required by Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
upon w/c his motion was based.
RULING:
YAPS LOSE! Sec. 2, Rule 37 precisely requires that when the motion for new trial is
founded on Sec. 1 (a), it should be accompanied by an affidavit of merit.3 The YAPS
2
You can always read the original. =)
When the motion is made for the causes mentioned in subdivisions (a) & (b) of the preceding
section, it shall be proved in the manner provided for proof of motions. Affidavit or affidavits of
3
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APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING
assert that the MR is grounded on Sec. 1 (a) of Rule 37, (fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence…) & that they were denied to present their evidence
(discrepancy as to price & breach of warranty).
It was a fatal omission to fail to attach to their motion an affidavit of merits (i.e. an
affidavit showing the facts, not conclusions, constituting the valid defense w/c the
movant may prove in case a new trial is granted). The affidavit is essential because
obviously a new trial would be a waste of the court's time if the complaint turns out
to be groundless or the defense ineffective.
The dilatory tactics – seeking postponements of hearings, or failing to appear
therefor despite notice, not only in the CFI but also in the City Court — negate the
YAPS’ sincerity to reach an amicable settlement.
The MR did not therefore interrupt the running of the period of appeal. The time
during w/c it was pending before the court until when notice of the order denying
the motion was received by the movant could not be deducted from the 30-day
period of appeal.
Sept. 1 – YAPS received notice of judgment.
Sept. 16 – YAPS filed their MR (DID NOT INTERRUPT PERIOD OF APPEAL)
Oct. 1 – The 30-day period of appeal expired.
PCIB vs. HON. ORTIZ
GR L-49223, 29 MAY 29 1987
Rogelio Maraviles filed an action against PCIB for the recovery of damages resulting
from the dishonor of 2 of his checks on account of the negligence of employees of
PCIB. During trial, Maraviles presented his evidence, & the trial was reset for the
reception of PCIB's proofs. PCIB’s lawyers failed to appear at the appointed time.
Consequently, the TC considered the case submitted for decision, thereafter
rendering judgment ordering the payment to him by PCIB moral & exemplary
damages & attorney's fees.
PCIB's lawyers filed on Aug 15, 1978 an MR, arguing that the award of damages
was exorbitant, & offering the explanation that the lawyer personally handling the
case suddenly resigned & failed to include the case in the list of his pending cases
w/ their respective status to the firm, thus the present case was not reassigned in
time for another lawyer to attend the hearing.
Maraviles opposed, on the grounds that (1) that judgment had already become
final, notice thereof having been served on PCIB, thru COMMEX (a corporation in
located on the ground floor of the same building as the law firm – w/c was on the
third floor), & the 15-day period to appeal had already lapsed when PCIB's motion
for reconsideration was filed on Aug. 15, 1978; & (2) Mangohig's (the lawyer
handling the case) failure to include the case in his report did not constitute
excusable negligence warranting relief, & clients are bound by their counsel's
mistakes.
merits shall also be attached to a motion for the cause mentioned in subdivision (a) w/c may be
rebutted by counter-affidavits.
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
PCIB responded, arguing that (1) service of the judgment on COMMEX on July 15,
1978 was inefficacious, & the period for appeal should be reckoned only from July
17, 1978 when COMMEX delivered the notice to PCIB's lawyers; & (2) there was
no need to append an affidavit of merits to its motion for reconsideration,
this being required only when the motion for new trial was based on
grounds other than excessive award of damages.
Maraviles pointed out that (1) the notice of the judgment was received on July 15,
1978 by precisely the same person who had received the notice of the Order of June
23, 1978; (2) an affidavit of merits was in fact indispensable because
PCIB's lawyers were invoking excusable negligence as ground to set aside
the Order of June 23, 1978 considering the case submitted for decision.
The TC denied PCIB's MR, also declaring the judgment already final & executory.
PCIB filed a 2nd MR, &, w/o awaiting service of notice of the resolution, but
expressing the fear that execution of the judgment might render the issues moot, it
instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari praying for the annulment of
the TC’s Orders denying its 1st MR & declaring the judgment final & executory, &
granting execution as well as the anticipated order denying its 2nd MR.
The TC did subsequently deny PCIB's 2nd MR. It said (1) that defendant's counsel
had been receiving orders & notices of hearing from this court, in this case, through
COMMEX, whose authority to do so the defendant is now estopped from denying, &
(2) that even granting arguendo that defendant's 1st "Motion for
Reconsideration" dated Aug. 15, 1978 was filed on time, the same did not
interrupt the period of appeal since it was not accompanied by an affidavit
of merit, as required by the rules, neither does the motion itself although
verified state the good & valid defenses, if any of the defendant w/c as
ruled by this Court in its order dated Aug. 15, 1978, do not exist even in
defendant's answer itself .
ISSUES:
(1) W/N PCIB is estopped from claiming that notice had not been served to them;
(2) W/N there was a need to append an affidavit of merits to its MR.
(1) While it is true that the address of record of PCIB's counsel is entered as the
"3rd Floor, LRT Building," w/c is different from that of COMMEX, w/c is on the
"Ground Floor, LRT Building," it is equally true that notices served on the latter had
been reaching the former & that, in any event, the PCIB lawyers had never
protested such service on them "thru COMMEX." The only single instance of protest
was as regards the particular instance of service of notice of the judgment on
COMMEX on July 15, 1978. PCIB's attorney's had acquiesced to & impliedly adopted
a different address for service of notices to them. They cannot now disown this
adopted address to relieve them from the effects of their negligence, complacency
or inattention. Service, therefore, on July 15, 1978 of the notice of judgment at the
Ground Floor, LRT Building, should be deemed as effective service on PCIB's
attorneys. The failure of the receiving clerk to deliver the notice to them on the
same day, & what is worse, the lawyers omission to inquire of said receiving clerk
exactly when the notice was received, & their blithe assumption that service was
effected on July 17, 1978 since this was the day that the notice was handed over to
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APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING
JUSTICE MAGDANGAL DE LEON
them, is warrant imprudence & cannot in any sense be deemed to constitute that
excusable negligence as would warrant reconsideration under Sec. 1 [a], Rule 37 of
the Rules of Court.
(2) It is true that when fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence is
invoked as ground of a motion for new trial, it should "be proved in the manner
provided for proof of motions," i.e., by "affidavits or depositions" unless the court
should direct that "the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions." It is also required that "affidavits of merits" be attached to the
motion. A motion for new trial grounded on fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence should thus ordinarily be accompanied by two (2) affidavits: one, setting
forth the facts & circumstances alleged to constitute such fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence; & the other, an affidavit of merits, setting forth the
particular facts claimed to constitute the movant's meritorious cause of
action or defense. Where, therefore, a motion for new trial on the ground of
fraud, etc., is unaccompanied by either or both affidavits, the motion is pro forma a
scrap of paper, as it were, & will not interrupt the running of the period of appeal.
But where, as here, the motion for new trial is founded not only on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, but also on the ground of
"award of excessive damages," as to w/c no affidavit of fraud, etc., or of
merits is required, what being required of the movant being to "point out
specifically the findings or conclusions of the judgment" demonstrating the
invoked ground, the motion cannot be denied as pro forma simply because
no affidavit of merits is appended thereto, provided there be a specification
of the findings or conclusions of the judgment alleged to be erroneous
because awarding excessive damages.
Finally, it bears stressing that the filing of a proper motion for new trial interrupts
the running of the period of appeal w/c begins to run again from receipt of notice by
the movant of the order denying his motion. In this situation, the party adversely
affected has only the balance of the period of appeal w/in w/c to perfect his appeal,
the balance being the number of days remaining of the reglementary period after
deducting the time during w/c the motion was pending; i.e., from the date when the
motion was filed to the date when notice of the order of denial was served on the
movant. It is well to also emphasize, in this connection, that the requirement for
the perfection of an appeal w/in the time prescribed is mandatory & jurisdictional,
that the lapse of said period without an appeal being taken operates to divest the
court of all jurisdiction over the case & leaves it with no alternative but to order, on
motion, the execution of the judgement.
It not being possible under the facts to ascribe the commission of an act with grave
abuse of discretion to the TC, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
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