The Rwandan Genocide
JI HYE PARK
JINSUH CHOI
JONATHAN CURRY
Historical Background
Belgian Colonies in Rwanda
Hutu Rebellion
Hutu Rise to Power
President Habyarimana
In 1994, Rwanda’s
population of seven
million was composed of
three ethnic groups:
Hutu (approximately 85%)
Tutsi (14%)
and Twa (1%).
-Tutsi considered
political and
economic elite
-Traditional, no
ethnic disputes
Belgian colonists designate Tutsi as superior,
Hutu as inferior.
-Altered
perceptions
of economic
and political
disparity
-Hutu rebel in
1959, aim to
overthrow
Tutsi rule
-Belgian
forces
withdraw in
1961
Following the UN supervised referendum
in 1961, the Hutu rise to power.
-Remained under
UN trusteeship for
until the nation
became independent
President Habyarimana
-Strong anti-Tutsi
upbringing; instinctual
support for Hutu
superiority
-Faced with heavy
international pressure and
violent civil war
-Planned to share power
with Tutsis/moderate
Hutus to resolve issues
April 6th, 1994
President Habyarimana’s plane is shot down.
Almost immediately, violence breaks out.
The genocide goes into full swing.
International Response
UNAMIR
Arusha
UNAMIR II
UN forces in Rwanda were insufficient
-The UNAMIR was
present, but ill
equipped to handle
a genocide
-Security Council
called for withdrawal
Arusha Peace Agreement
-Signed August 4th, 1993
-Aimed towards the creation
of a broad-based
government and
establishment of peace
-Lacked capacity to address issues
like genocide
UNAMIR II
-Security Council calls for
troop decrease to a force
of about 270
-Remaining troops were to be
used for negotiations and relief
efforts, not military operations
A later revision of
UNAMIR II led to the
deployment of 5,000+
troops, but by the time
they arrived hundreds of
thousands of lives had
already been lost.
Tipping Points & Key Decisions
Ethnic Elitism
Acts of Extremism
Arusha
Implementation of UNAMIR I
Implementation of UNAMIR II
Ethnic Elitism
Post-WWII Belgian colonists
designate Tutsi as “civilized” and
Hutu as inferior.
-Ethnic context altered perceptions
-Was not a catalyst of genocide, though
nevertheless crucial
Acts of Extremism
The threat of losing power political and economic power via
the Arusha Process led Hutu extremists to begin preparing
their ‘final solution.’
-Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique
-Radio Television Libre Mille Collines
-Assassination (?) of the President
UNAMIR I & II
I
-Hesitancy of those who could
provide the most support
shows extremists that they can
“act with impunity.”
-DPKO refuses Dallaire’s
request to disarm militia units
that posed a threat to the
UNAMIR presence.
-Belgian government
withdraws contingent after
Prime Minister is killed.
II
-Resolution 912 led to the
drastic reduction of
UNAMIR forces.
-Resolution 918’s planned
course of action is delayed
beyond the ideal date of
deployment.
Failures of the International Community
Before
•
•
The international communities should have
considered ‘final solution’ as serious matter
Under Chapter VII, UN was able to use military force
in order of peacekeeping and prevent civilian’s security
Failures of the International Community
Before
•
•
Let Hutus extremists be involved in Arusha peace
process
France should have took an action because it knew that
there will be a genocide happening in Rwanda
Failures of the International Community
After
Situations in Rwanda should have conveyed faster to nonpermanent members of the UN
•
•
•
•
Resolution 912 was not supposed to be passed
Should have nominated the situation in Rwanda as
‘genocide’ and expose the condition to media
Security Council should have interpreted the massacre as a
‘threat to the peace’ under Article 39 of UN Charter, and
shift the mandate of UNAMIR
Failures of the International Community
After
•
Boutros Ghali should have expressed stronger with his
opinion about sending additional military force and
broadened understanding of Chapter VII.
•
Take control over radio station of Hutus, so that they
could not give orders to kill people all over.
If The US should have supported with weapons
immediately. Also, it was the president’s responsibility
to move public's moral opinion to help Rwandans.
•
Failures of the International Community
After
•
France could have saved more lives of Rwandan if they
intervened with pure humanitarian motives
•
Rather than criticizing French intervention at the last
minute, other countries should have helped France
•
Every country was only searching for its own benefit,
being apathetic to loss of innocent lives. If they were
more sympathetic, the genocide would not have
happened.
Wheeler Assessment
Supreme Humanitarian Emergency
5/5
Necessity
5/5
Last Resort
3/5
Proportionality
2/5
-----------------------------------------
Positive Humanitarian Outcome
1/5
Humanitarian Justifications
1/5
Legality
4/5
Selectivity
1.5/5
Rwanda, Post-Genocide
International Response
&
Key Players in the Intervention
Justice System
International Response
and Key Players
-President Clinton and
members of his
Administration go on
“pilgrimages of contrition”
-Force Commander
Dallaire: “I cannot find any
solace in saying ‘I did my
best’.”
Justice System
-UN establishes the
International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR)
-Traditional gacaca
courts are repurposed
-Nearly 20 years after
the end of the
genocide, the courts are
still active
Referenced Works
Global Bystander to Genocide: International Society and the Rwandan
Genocide of 1994. Wheeler, Nicholas.
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International Criminal Law
and Transitional Justice. Powers, Shannon E.
Ghosts of Rwanda. Frontline documentary.