1ac gbw sg- hss
contention 1 is democracy
The plan sends the signal of credibility on democracy—domestic surveillance is both
sufficient and necessary
Katulis 9 - Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress who served on the State Department’s policy planning staff in the last years of
the Clinton administration after living and working on the ground for the National Democratic Institute in Egypt and the Palestinian territories. (“Democracy
Promotion in the Middle East and the Obama Administration,” https://www.tcf.org/assets/downloads/tcf-Katulis.pdf 2009) STRYKER
the United States should take steps to
bring wiretap surveillance efforts back into the
framework of the rule of law in the United States. Sending the signal that the United States is cleaning
up its act on these fronts is a necessary step for reviving U.S. credibility on democracy promotion in
the Middle East. Without some progress on these measures, anything else that the new administration
tries to do on democracy promotion
will likely yield few
results because of the substantial credibility gap. The new administration needs to send a clear
message that the United States intends to practice what it preaches by adhering to the legal obligations
it assumed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
More broadly,
restore habeas corpus and
—whether it is political party building or civil society support, or any of the other traditional programs in the U.S. toolbox—
, the Convention against Torture, and other human rights treaties. Strengthening the legal
framework for rule of law will require not only action on the part of the Obama administration but also engagement by leaders in the U.S. Congress. How the United States reintroduces itself to the world—keeping its national security policy in line with the highest human rights
standards—will set the framework for how U.S. actions on the democracy promotion front are perceived throughout the Middle East.
Only domestic policy changes can make democracy promotion effective
Al-Rodhan 14 - Nayef Al-Rodhan is director of the Centre for the Geopolitics of Globalization and Transnational Security at the Geneva Centre for
Security Policy. (“Reforming Democracy and the Future of History: To
spread Democracy, democratic nations must look inward
first.” http://www.theglobalist.com/reforming-democracy-and-the-future-of-history/ 6/14/2014) STRYKER
In 1975
The Crisis of Democracy, signaled the pessimism and defeatism prevailing in
Western democracies at the time about the future and sustainability of democracy
Four decades later, democracy is again in a
state of crisis. This comes as somewhat of a surprise, given that successive waves of democratization
have touched every region of the world
What is becoming evident now is that an opposite trend
has emerged Democracy has in fact been in retreat for years, as many repressive governments became
even more repressive, civil liberties were dropped and the military was empowered
Democracies
guarantee political freedom, the rule of law, human rights and a platform for citizens to engage in the
political process. Yet, in practice, democracies feature numerous inadequacies
, a report prepared by the Trilateral Commission,
. The report reflected a deep economic downturn, as well as
social and political turmoil. This crisis of democracy was tightly connected with concerns about “monopoly capitalism,” rampant materialism and corruption.
over the past 40 years.
.
in many countries. The state of democracy today In the
early 1990’s, the end of the Cold War had brought the revalidation of democracy with great vigour as the most representative form of government. Yet this exuberance has been counterbalanced with criticism of its failings and shortcomings.
. Inequality, economic disparity, disempowerment, lack of opportunity,
infringements of civil liberties, ethnic, social and cultural discrimination, corruption and opaque honor titles systems are all present, and apparently not antagonistic to democracies. Globally, democracies have also acted in ways that suggest an outright renunciation of their principles at
Irresponsible conduct, including unwarranted invasions
have characterized the foreign conduct of major democratic states at
some point
Western democracies
traditionally considered “advanced
democracies
home.
, toleration of brutality, genocide, misuse of the UN veto system at the expense of global harmony and peace, as well
geopolitical machinations or meddling in the affairs of weaker states — these are all traits that
. Inequality alienates
like the United States, United Kingdom or France —
” — experience acute inequalities, and even cases of abject poverty. In 2009, a U.S. government report pointed to the dramatic increase in hunger and food insecurity. About 50 million people were identified as having suffered food insecurity at some
point during the previous year. One in five people in the United Kingdom are also identified as falling below the poverty lin e. Growing inequality is at times reinforced by, and an enabler of, shrinking opportunity. This fuels disillusionment and low political participation. As Joseph Stiglitz
has noted, “The rich don’t need to rely on government for parks or education or medical care or personal security — they can buy all these things for themselves. In the process, they become more distant from ordinary people, losing whatever empathy they may once have had.”
Corporate financing of political campaigns have reinforced this, hijacking the democratic process. It further alienates voters who feel they are excluded from a process that is beyond their control. The role of money in politics is worth singling out as a major problem with democratic
governance. Its effects are truly worrisome, especially when there is little transparency and regulatory mechanisms to limit the distorting role of money in politics. A check is worth a thousand words The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in the “Citizens United” case openly enshrined
the right of unlimited campaign spending, giving corporations, associations and billionaire donors the freedom to heavily and undemocratically influence government, perversely as an expression of their free speech. The “super PACs” have blurred the line between the personal and the
political. They reinforce and perpetuate the rotation of policymakers in the U.S. Congress and the executive branch, many of whom are already part of the wealthiest 1% (and, under any circumstance, remain kept in office by money from the top 1%). Wha tever constraints existed to this
practice, they were expunged earlier in 2014 when the Supreme Court opened the door to even more money in politics by striking down the aggregate contribution limits for campaigns. The decision means, in very practical terms, that one single donor can contribute millions of dollars to
the sense of disillusionment with democracy in its
current form has been reinforced with disclosures of large-scale government surveillance, violations of
privacy and civil liberties The claim of sweeping authority over the right to collect personal data is
harmful to core liberties. Overseeing the overseers and keeping states’ need to know in balance with the
safeguard of privacy and civil liberties remains a challenge
Opinion polls across many continents
reflect this current dissatisfaction with democracy. These forms of disillusionment indicate the need to
political candidates or campaigns and thereby dim the prospect of new entrants, ideas or challengers to the political arena. Finally,
.
. Reforming democracy
embrace a paradigm that goes beyond political freedom and addresses the basic human need for dignity
.
Democracy guarantees political freedom and rights. Yet it is not incompatible with marginalization, exclusion, poverty, disempowerment or disrespect. The triumph of a liberal democratic order as a final destination of history and historical ideas, as once predicted by the “end of history”,
A greater emphasis on human dignity and a governance model that places dignity at the
center can halt the current disenchantment with democracy
needs a serious re-evaluation.
. A more feasible paradigm is an approach I call Sustainable History. It focuses on dignity rather than just freedom. And
it allows for reconciling accountable governance with various political cultures.
Global democracy consolidation checks inevitable extinction.
Diamond ‘95 (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the
stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common
Nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears
increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by
the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion
do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify
their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much
less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They
do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable,
open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally
responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets
cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones.
to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely
because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights,
and
the rule of law, democracies are
the only reliable
foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.
The US needs to alter domestic practices to beat out authoritarianism in Africa
Joseph 14 - Richard Joseph is John Evans Professor of International History and Politics at Northwestern University. He is the author of Democracy and
Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (1987; reissued 2014). He is writing books on post-1975 Nigerian politics and society; and on governance, development, and the state in
Africa. (“Growth, Security, and Democracy in Africa,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 4, pp. 60-72, Project Muse, October 2014) STRYKER
Today
democracy in many places must battle unfriendly circumstances while experiencing a
global slippage. In line with this trend, democracy in Africa has been on the retreat
swings in civil-liberties and political-rights scores have been more pronounced in sub-Saharan
Africa than in any other world region
, as is often observed,
. As Freedom House has charted in its annual Freedom in
the World reports,
. Two years ago, I noted that media accounts presented Africa’s story as a hopeful tale accompanied by impressive economic-growth statistics. There has also been a disaster narrative of
corruption, bogus elections, rights abuses, epidemics, and violent conflicts. Readers have been left to resolve the antinomies.1 I suggested a third account called “prismatic” because, just as a [End Page 61] prism separates the various colors that comprise a beam of light, this account
explores the complex interplay of local, regional, and global factors that affect Africa.2 Security is now high on the African agenda, and so are accelerated growth and development as well as democracy. Discoveries of major oil, natural gas, and coal deposits are making the continent more
significant in meeting global energy needs. Abundant and underused land will steadily contribute to global food supplies. And expanding economies will continue to provide increased opportunities for investors. It is the physical-security side of the African ledger, however, that poses the
The “complex interplay” of forces in
contemporary Africa is one that prevailing paradigms are unable to explain
greatest challenge, as dramatized recently by violent insurgencies and disease outbreaks in West Africa. How this challenge is tackled will greatly affect progress in other spheres.
. The present reflections, like the ones I offered in these pages almost a quarter-
century ago regarding the original democratic abertura, are provisional.3 Now as then, events are moving swiftly and on a broad front. The stalling of democratization globally is taking place amid other major developments, especially terrorism, warfare, and the rise of a phenomenon
referred to as authoritarian modernization. Authoritarian modernization is curious because, scarcely two decades ago, the very term would have seemed an oxymoron. Commenting on the revolutions of 1989, Marc Plattner recently wrote that a “key reason for the resurgence of
The Western model of liberal-democratic development
is losing ground to an authoritarian alternative
Wooldridge
suggest that the liberal
democracies need a “fourth revolution” in governance and affairs of state
if they are to avoid falling permanently behind their autocratic rivals. “A global race is on
to devise the best kind of state and the best system of government.” The dysfunctions of liberal
democracy can be contrasted, they contend, with “the impressive track records” of “modernizing
authoritarianism pursued by Asian countries such as Singapore and China
Ignatieff agrees that “the liberal state is in crisis
It is “difficult to defend liberal democracy with much enthusiasm abroad if it
democracy undoubtedly lay in the increasingly manifest failings of its autocratic rivals.”4 Today, that assessment is often reversed.
. John Micklethwait and Adrian
capture this trend and
(to follow the revolutions of state sovereignty, individual rights, and moderate
welfarism)
,” write these two British
journalists, “
.” The key concern is performance—namely, “which innovations in governing yield the
best results.”5 Michael
without freedom.”6 Ignatieff’s conclusion is widely shared:
.” Authoritarian modernization now forms “an alternate route to modern development: growth without democracy and progress
works so poorly at home
Brooks
sees “an
ideological war” being
waged “between centralized authoritarian capitalism and decentralized
liberal democratic capitalism.” This “battle of regimes is playing out with special force in Africa
.”7 Plattner is hopeful that the “apparent vigor” today of modernizing autocracy as compared to liberal democracy will “prove to be temporary.”8 David
is not sure. He
[End Page 62]
.” While democracy is
experiencing “a crisis of morale,” autocracies “are feeling confident and on the rise.”9
US action is key—illiberal acts have given African leaders justification
Gyimah-Boadi 15 - E. Gyimah-Boadi is executive director of both the Ghana Center for Democratic Development and the Afrobarometer, and
professor of political science at the University of Ghana, Legon. (“Africa’s Waning Democratic Commitment,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 26, Number 1, p. 100111, Project Muse, January 2015) STRYKER
the illiberal acts of the United States
in the post-9/11 global “war on terror” have given
Africa’s elected autocrats easy justification for their own retreat from the principles and practices of
democratic accountability. African political elites opportunistically cite U.S. actions
to justify their own privileging of national-security interests over citizens’ rights
Africa’s
elected autocrats are finding great comfort in the resurgence of authoritarian and illiberal role models
provided by China, Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and others
Finally,
and other Western democratic nations
such as the rendition or waterboarding of suspected
terrorists as examples
. Similarly,
.
African democracy is crucial to stability
Ohlson and Söderberg 2 - Thomas Ohlson is an Associate Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University. Mimmi
Söderberg is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Peace and Conflict at Uppsala University. (“From Intra-State War To Democratic Peace in Weak States,”
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/18/18593_UPRP_No_5.pdf 2002) STRYKER
Disorder
in many African states
should not be viewed merely as a state of failure or neglect, but should also
be seen as a condition that offers opportunities for those who know how to play the system. The failure
of the state to be emancipated from society may have limited the scope for good government and
sustainable economic growth the weakness and inefficiency of the state has
been profitable to
political elites
The instrumentalisation of the prevailing political disorder may thus
function as a disincentive to the establishment of a more properly institutionalised state on the
Weberian model as well as to the implementation of a democratic political system
these structures pose
problems for durable peace, legitimacy and for addressing the so-called national question for the
processes of state formation and nation-building
To understand politics in the weak state context, Chabal and Daloz argue, one must consider the ways in which individuals, groups and communities seek to instrumentals the resources that they command within the context of political and economic disorder.
, for example,
, but
nevertheless
and probably even more so to European and North American economic actors. The clientelist networks within the formal political apparatus have allowed the elite to raise the resources necessary for providing their constituencies with protection
and services in exchange for the recognition of their political and social status.
. “Why should the African political elites dismantle a political
system which serves them so well?” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, p. 14). In our view, the important merit of the above arguments is that they point to the highly negative potential of patrimonial structures. Undeniably,
, that is,
. However, we caution against seeing this as a zero-sum game: either the holders of state power pursue a genuine national interest in the Weberian
sense or they completely succumb to the structures of private, sectarian interests. Such is not the case. Rather, we argue that every state, weak or strong, has both Weberian and patrimonial structures. This, too, is a continuum and the balance between the two types of structure 13
when legitimacy is
really low, even minor improvements in degrees of rule of law and good governance may generate
major improvements in terms of closing the legitimacy gap
should be understood as a variable, not a constant. Neither enlightened leadership nor popular pressure from below should be underestimated. Many weak states have made considerable moves towards greater legitimacy. In addition,
.
African war goes nuclear
DEUTSCH 2002 (Jeffrey, Political Risk Consultant and Ph.D in Economics, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol 2,
No 9, Nov 18, http://list.webengr.com/pipermail/picoipo/2002-November/000208.html)
The Rabid Tiger Project believes that
a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa
. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in
Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders t hat cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than
Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular
power
Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states
there than in Europe
or Asia
an African
war can attract outside involvement very quickly
an African nuclear
risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range.
. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb.
, say,
where the political lines have long since been drawn,
where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus,
. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But
strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight.
first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
Certainly, such a strike would in the
contention 2 is india
The US can alter India’s surveillance practices, but only if they’re less hypocritical
Wong ’13 Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong
worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the
organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy
& Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the
technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she
contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York
University School of Law – “ Surveillance and the Corrosion of Internet Freedom” - July 30, 2013 - Published in: The Huffington Post and also available at the HRW
website at this address: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/30/surveillance-and-corrosion-internet-freedom
Defenders of US surveillance programs argue
metadata is not as problematic
This is misleading.
The revelations have
contradictions about the US Internet freedom agenda.
the widening rift between US
values and actions has real, unintended
consequences.
in 2005 we
learned that Yahoo! uncritically turned user account information over to the Chinese government
The US government forcefully objected to the Chinese government’s actions
that incident catalyzed a set of new human rights standards that pushed companies to
improve safeguards for user privacy in the face of government demands for data. US support was critical
back then but it is hard to imagine
having the same
credibility now. mass surveillance has
damaged the US
’s ability to press for better corporate practices as technology companies expand
globally. It will be more difficult for companies to resist overbroad surveillance mandates if they are
seen as complicit in US infringements on privacy. Other governments will feel more entitled to ask for
the same cooperation US receives.
there is reason to worry about
precedent the US set.
India began
a centralized system to monitor all phone and Internet communications in the
country without much clarity on safeguards to protect rights.
Turkish officials have condemned social media
Now the
government is preparing new regulations that would make it easier to get
individual
users online. Obama
could have been in a strong position to push back in India and Turkey
Instead, the US has provided these governments with a roadmap for
mass surveillance and
conscripting the help of the private sector.
and UK
that collecting
reading emails.
as “listening to the content of people’s phone calls” or
Technologists have long recognized that metadata can reveal incredibly sensitive information, especially if it is collected at large scale over long periods of time, since digitized data can be easily combined and analyzed.
also exposed glaring
This has emboldened the Chinese state media, for
example, to cynically denounce US hypocrisy, even as the Chinese government continues to censor the Internet, infringe on privacy rights, and curb anonymity online. Though there is hypocrisy on both sides,
human rights
For the human rights movement, the Internet’s impact on rights crystalized
after
, leading to a 10-
year prison sentence for the journalist Shi Tao.
and urged the tech industry to
act responsibly. In the end,
some
,
the government
influence or
The
scandal
government
also
mass
that the
and Russia are now debating. While comparisons to the Chinese government are overstated,
scandal broke,
We can also expect governments around the world to pressure companies to store user data locally or maintain a local presence so that governments can more easily access it, as Brazil
the broader
has
Just months before the NSA
rolling out
,
This development is chilling, considering the government’s problematic use of sedition and Internet laws in recent
arrests. Over the last few weeks,
as a key tool for Gezi Park protesters. Twitter has drawn particular ire.
data from Internet companies and identify
The
administration and US companies
.
conducting secret,
India Models US surveillance practices
North ’13 (not Kimye’s child, but Andrew North – who is a South Asia correspondent for BBC News. This evidence is internally quoting Sunil Abraham, who
is the Executive Director of the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit
research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR
reform, and openness. Sunil Abraham also founded Mahiti in 1998, a company committed to creating high impact technology and communications solutions. Sunil
was elected an Ashoka fellow in 1999 to 'explore the democratic potential of the Internet' and was also granted a Sarai FLOSS fellowship in 2003. Between June
2004 and June 2007, Sunil also managed the International Open Source Network, a project of United Nations Development Programme's Asia-Pacific Development
Information Programme serving 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Between September 2007 and June 2008, he managed ENRAP an electronic network of
International Fund for Agricultural Development projects in the Asia-Pacific facilitated and co-funded by International Development Research Centre, Canada. From
the article: “NSA leaks helping India become 'Big Brother' state?” – BBC News – October 31st - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-24753696)
other countries are learning lessons from
Snowden's leaks
developing the same kind of mass-surveillance. India is one of those
the Indian government is
stepping up efforts to build its own mass-surveillance system
says Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society, an Indian
While the US and Britain fend off accusations of Big Brother-style spying,
and
, critics say,
cyber-snooping, including a plan to move internet traffic inside its borders and banning officials from using Gmail and other external email services. Simultaneously, campaigners say
snooping by its own spies. It is also
programmes revealed by Mr Snowden. This is the downside of Mr Snowden's leaks,
fugitive ex-US intelligence contractor Edward
in the frame. Its authorities are bringing in new measures against foreign
loosening controls on electronic
, which critics have dubbed "India's PRISM" - a reference to one of the US spy
advocacy group. Governments like India are now cherry-picking the worst practices, in a race for the
bottom in terms of human rights".
"
Documents released by Mr Snowden to journalist Glenn Greenwald showed America's National Security Agency (NSA) was hoovering up billions of chunks of Indian data, making the country its
fifth most important target worldwide. 'Not actually snooping' But unlike other states that have discovered the US is siphoning off their secrets, India has conspicuously avoided joining the chorus of criticism. That may be because it doesn't want to draw attention to its own activities. Its
foreign minister Salman Khurshid even appeared to excuse American monitoring, saying it "was not actually snooping". When the German chancellor Angela Merkel erupted over reports the NSA had been bugging her mobile phone, the Indian prime minister's office was untroubled by
the possibility he too had been targeted. "There are no concerns", a spokesman for Manmohan Singh told the BBC, because "he does not use a mobile phone or Gmail". Many Indian officials do. But from this December the government is planning to bar them from using their private
email accounts for any official business - in direct response to evidence of US prying. Instead, they will have to use government email. The latest reports of even deeper NSA penetration of Google is likely to further spur such moves. It won't be an easy change to make though, judging
from the BBC's own experiences dealing with Indian officials. Many prefer to use Gmail or Yahoo rather than their official accounts because the government email system so often crashes. More ambitious still is a plan to bring all internal Indian internet traffic inside its bor ders. Currently,
an email sent from say Delhi to Calcutta is more likely to travel via the US or Europe, partly because of the way the internet is designed but also because of a lack of Indian capacity. But at a summer meeting to assess Mr Snowden's leaks, one of India's security chiefs called for "100%" of
emails and files sent between Indians to stay in the country to limit snooping by "foreign elements". As other governments take similar measures, these changes may not just mean a tougher job for spies but also a more fragmented internet under tighter state control. Critics say India
was already on the road to creating a Big Brother state, long before anyone had heard of Edward Snowden. Their biggest concern is a secret mass-surveillance project the government has reportedly been building for the past few years. The Central Monitoring System (CMS) is supposed to
give security agencies the ability to listen or record all communications nationwide and track individuals, in real time - like some of the US programmes that have been revealed. If the few details that have emerged are correct, Indian cyber-spies would have even more freedom, bypassing
internet and telecom companies and tapping straight into the cables and servers carrying the traffic. Mirroring America's defence of its spying programmes, the government says the monitoring system is to protect against terrorists and other national security threats. But a lack of
India's intelligence
concrete information has only heightened fears about its intentions. A draft privacy bill which was supposed to allay some concerns has been watered down in the light of Mr Snowden's revelations. According to Sunil Abraham, "
agencies argued: Look at what the US can do. Why curtail what we can do?"
India’s Surveillance Policies are reversible
Kaul ’13 Mahima Kaul, heads the Cyber and Media Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and is also the editor of its monthly Cyber
Monitor. The Initiative provides a vibrant platform for all stakeholders to discuss internet-related issues in India. It also runs India's biggest internet policy platform:
Cyfy: The India Conference on Cyber Security and Cyber Governance, which brings governments, business, academia and civil society participation from over 12
countries to New Delhi, every October. She is Member, India Project Advisory Committee Member for Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and the
European Union's project "Advancing Internet Freedoms" which looks at internet freedom in India, Pakistan and Malaysia. The author holds an M.A. Communication
Policy, University of Westminster, and a B. A. Political Science & History, McGill University. “India’s Plan to Monitor Web Raises Concerns Over Privacy” - From the
publication: Cyfy - May 21, 2013 - http://cyfy.org/indias-plan-to-monitor-web-raises-concerns-over-privacy/
There’s also another pressing question to consider when examining the CMS: who will oversee the body to ensure that there are
checks and balances? Intelligence agencies don’t come under parliamentary oversight as of yet in India. A bill entitled Intelligence Services (Powers and Regulation) Bill, introduced in parliament in 2011
has been shelved by the Prime Minister, with the promise that a law would be formulated soon. What seems to be a plausible way forward, given that India
is building online surveillance mechanisms, is a valid legal framework for bodies like the CMS. The
challenge is to ensure the citizen’s right to privacy as enshrined by the constitution is not trampled upon, and that accountability is
built into these systems from the start.
India’s indiscriminate, bulk collection becomes a “honeypot” for cyber-targeting.
Trivedi ’13 Anjani Trivedi. The author holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a Bachelor’s Degree in Mathematics from
MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York Times and CNN International. This piece internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia
director for Human Rights Watch; Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society.
“In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the Radar” – Time Magazine – 6-30-13 - http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slipsunder-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB
CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text
communications. That means 900 million
users
messages,
among other
landline and cell-phone
social-media
engagement
and phone
calls on landlines and cell phones,
and 125 million Internet users. The project, which is being implemented by the government’s Centre for Development of
Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national law-enforcement agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications’ annual report. This has been in the works since 2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to
an older report. The government set aside approximately $150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively “hush-hush” topic,
a project official unauthorized to speak to the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of India. The system
Civil-liberties groups concede that states often need to
undertake targeted-monitoring operations. However, the
requirements included “live listening, recording, storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing” and voice recognition.
move toward extensive “surveillance capabilities enabled by digital communications,” suggests that governments are now
“casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives,” according to Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are “out of the realm of judicial authorization and allow
unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability on the part of the state,” a recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring — tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and banned. India ranked second only to the
U.S. on Google’s list of user-data requests with 4,750 queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting period. While these were largely made through police or court orders, the new system will not require
such a legal process. In recent times, India’s democratically elected government has barred access to certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested citizens for liking Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically
too, censorship has been India’s preferred means of policing social unrest. “Freedom of expression, while broadly available in theory,” Ganguly tells TIME, “is endangered by abuse of various India laws.” There is a growing discrepancy and power imbalance between citizens and the state,
says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where “no checks and balances [are] in place,” that is troubling. The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing enormously. Currently, India’s laws relevant to interception
“disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard individuals’ constitutional rights,” a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticea ble at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gang-rape incident in December, when the government shut down
public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the government’s worries too are on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to 330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. “As
[governments] around the world grapple with the power of social media that can enable spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,” Ganguly explains. India’s junior minister for telecommunications attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a
recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that “most people may not be aware of” because it’s “slightly technical.” A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he did not feel safe. The minister, though, insisted that it
would “safeguard your privacy” and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS, he noted that telecom companies would no longer be part of the government’s surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring.
The new
surveillance system is not only an
“abuse of privacy and security-agency overreach
but also counterproductive in terms of security.
In the process of collecting data to monitor criminal activity, the data itself may become a target for
criminals a “honeypot,” according to Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet
and Society. Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping undermines financial markets, Abraham says by
compromising confidentiality
and intellectual property
Whether the nation’s patchy infrastructure will be able to handle complex surveillance
is what attackers will target.
system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for monitoring communication in the “interest of public safety.” The
rights
,” critics say,
terrorists and
—
,
, trade secrets
. What’s more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a system.
a
Abraham contends,
web of
and networks, no one can say. That,
A hack on the CMS will eventually succeed. That escalates to mass de-stabilization of
India.
Dilipraj ’13
Mr E. Dilipraj is a Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is also pursuing his PhD at the Centre for Latin American Studies from JNU, New Delhi. This evidence is internally
quoting Sunil Abraham, who is the Executive Director of the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy
issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness. Sunil Abraham also founded Mahiti in 1998, a company committed to creating high
impact technology and communications solutions. Sunil was elected an Ashoka fellow in 1999 to 'explore the democratic potential of the Internet' and was also granted a Sarai FLOSS fellowship in 2003. Between June 2004 and
June 2007, Sunil also managed the International Open Source Network, a project of United Nations Development Programme's Asia-Pacific Development Information Programme serving 42 countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
Between September 2007 and June 2008, he managed ENRAP an electronic network of International Fund for Agricultural Development projects in the Asia-Pacific facilitated and co-funded by International Development Research
Centre, Canada. Also internally quoting Mr. Sachin Pilot, India’s Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology. Modified for potentially objectionable language. “CYBER WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY” -
AIR POWER Journal Vol. 8 No. 3, MONSOON 2013 (July-September) – available at: http://www.academia.edu/7534559/CYBER_WARFARE_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY__AN_ANALYSIS_OF_INCIDENTS_BETWEEN_INDIA_AND_PAKISTAN
security providers for the cyber space have always been lacking in
vigilance to provide security to their country’s cyber
infrastructures. Sunil Abraham
said during an interview to ‘Al Jazeera,’ “The Indian government has a very low level of cyber
awareness and cyber security. We don’t take cyber security as seriously as the rest of the world”.
hacking groups would not be a big problem if it stopped with the
defacing of websites. But,
in reality, it moves on to the next stage . The same people who carry out hacking and website defacing
jobs may get involved in cyber espionage and data mining
These people may also volunteer their
services to terror organizations
According to a cyber security professional
working with one of India’s intelligence agencies
We found thousands of systems
compromised. All were government systems,
The infection ranges from small Viruses to
that of Stuxnet malwares which can hamper the total operations of the network connected to the
compromised computer.
Though Stuxnet reached the networks of these infrastructures, thankfully, it did not activate itself on
them. In other words, India was only a few flawed lines of code away from having its power and oil
sectors (destroyed).
their abilities to operate cyber weapons
are incredible
Assuming hacker groups get access
the situation would
be
the security equivalent to terrorists getting access to nuclear weapons.
,
Mr. Sachin Pilot Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology said: entire
economies of some countries have been (destroyed)
by viruses from across the border. We have to
make ourselves more resilient.
defence
are on top of our agenda. careful study of
hacking groups of India and Pakistan reveal
that something which started as a
small act of hate has now taken
the form of revenge economic profit ,
and
propaganda.
While aggression is the only tactic followed by the hacker groups in both countries, on the contrary, the
networks and
, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based
Centre for Internet and Society,
The problem of
cyber attacks by the
hacking and
s
against their enemies.
expert
the
ist
in return for money and other forms of remuneration.
, We once sat down to check the Delhi [internet] Backbone.
Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence... we don’t realise how much damage has already happened. The lack of awareness and
the lethargic approach in monitoring and providing security to the cyber networks by India led to thousands of compromised computers across the country.
, Botnets
level
It has been observed that out of the 10,000 Stuxnet infected Indian computers, 15 were located at critical infrastructure facilities. These included the Gujarat and Haryana Electricity Boards and an ONGC offshore oil rig.
crippled
The list of new malwares goes on – Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, etc – and many more are in the process of coding;
and, at the same time, unbearable, if not protected against properly.
come extremely dangerous for
national
as
that the
such malwares, then
as it is
While talking about the same
,
The
paralysed
Power, telecom,
, these areas
another’s websites and networks by the private
would
on a much different shape in
national
A
the series of hacking on one
a basic fact
personal
,
s a race to show off technical supremacy,
anti-
This was very much evident from one unwanted event that disturbed the internal security of India in August 2012. The Indian government was alerted by the exodus after thousands of people from the northeast gathered at railway stations in
various cities all over the country after being threatened by the rounds of SMS and violent morphed pictures that were being circulated on more than 100 websites. The SMS threatened the northeastern people living in various cities in India of a targeted attack on them, asking them to go
back to their homeland, whereas the pictures circulated on the internet were images of some violent bloodshed. Out of the various SMS that were in circulation, one said: It is a request to everyone to call back their relatives, sons and daughters in Bangalore as soon as possible. Last night,
. The reports say that from August 20, marking
Ramzan, after 2 pm, they are going to attack every northeastern person. The riot started because of the
situation in Assam
four northeastern guys were killed by Muslims in Bangalore (two Manipuri, two Nepali). Two Nepali girls were kidnapped from Brigade Road
.32 Another SMS said: Many northeast students staying in Pune were beaten up by miscreants believed to be Muslims following the Assam riots. Heard that it is happening in Muslim areas like Mumbai, Andhra Prades h, Bangalore. At
Neelasandra, two boys were killed and one near passport office.33 The Government of India reacted soon on this matter and a 43-page report was prepared by intelligence agencies along with the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and India Co mputer Emergency Response
Team (CERT-IN) which traced several doctored images to Pakistan. The origins of these morphed images were later traced back in specific to Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistani cities by the Indian intelligence agencies. "From all available forensic evidence, we are fairly convinced that
Another senior official who has been involved in India's Pakistan watch for
several years said,
This is a very effective way of destabilising us. They don't need
to send
explosives to create mayhem. Internet has been a very effective platform for instigating
communal divisions in India. They have a multiplier effect first resulting in
riots and many
taking to terrorism
eventually
a
huge crisis in the country.
all those postings came from Pakistan," said an official of NTRO.
It has been happening for several months now.
low cost,
terrorists and
also
,
anger and hatred, then
. This act of unnecessary involvement by Pakistan-based elements is seen as cyber terrorism and cyber psychological warfare against India to cause internal security disturbance and
This incident which created major turmoil in the internal security of the country is the biggest example of the adverse effects of wrong use of cyber technology.
, finally,
to create
Instability in India sparks nuclear war with Pakistan
Busch ‘4
please note that an updated edition of this book was re-released in Feb of 2015, but the original date was placed in the citation. Dr. Nathan Busch, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for
American Studies at Christopher Newport University. The author holds a Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Toronto and an MA in Political Science from Michigan State University. The author previously held the
position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting Faculty, National Security Office, Los Alamos National
Laboratory. This piece of evidence internally quotes George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It also internally quotes François Heisbourg. He chairs the Geneva Centre for Security
Policy and the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. His career has included positions in government (member of the French mission to the UN, international security adviser to the Minister of Defence), in the
defense industry (vice-president of Thomson-CSF; senior vice president for strategy at Matra Défense Espace) and in academia (professor of world politics at Sciences-Po Paris, director of the IISS). He is also a member of the
International Commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and has sat on a number of national and international blue-ribbon bodies. From the book:
No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of
Nuclear Proliferation - p. 202-209
because the Indian military has little experience handling nuclear weapons risks of accidental
use could be very high during a crisis
In addition,
currently
, the
situation, at least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's nuclear weapons for possible use, the military (perhaps in conjunction with India's nuclear scientists)
would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to the deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for launch. All these procedures require training and precision, and,
given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements, it is not at all clear that the Indian military would be able to carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these dangers would be
India would need to engage in a great deal
of additional research into safety mechanisms to prevent such an accidental launch, and it is simply not
known how much effort India is devoting, or will devote, to this area.
the risks of accidental
launches
increase significantly
during a crisis
lessened, but more serious dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed missiles.
195 Because the Prithvi and the two-stage Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it
would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of either missile to allow for a rapid response. This significantly r educes the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during normal circumstances, though
would probably
if they were fueled
situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight tests of the Agni and Agni-II missiles. Because these
missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose such a deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to which India integrates use-control devices into its weapons
to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196 Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such use-control devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it
still might be tempted to mate warheads on its missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to b e seen what type of deployment option it would choose. According to a statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep
its weapons on a "hair-trigger alert," though he did suggest that these weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch would be relatively small during normal
circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate the warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce risks of accidental use during
peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon
deployment. It appears that if India were to adopt a rapid-response option, Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear weapons as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions)
withour the warheads mated, concerns about survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is unlikely that Pakistan currently
Just as in India, it is also unlikely that Pakistan's nuclear devices are
designed to minimize risks of accidents. Because Pakistan's warheads are based on an early Chinese
warhead design, they probably do not contain one-point safety designs or fire-resistant pits. If Pakistan
were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an accidental detonation
of its nuclear weapons.
current risks of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India
are relatively small
But
factors that could increase risks of
unauthorized use in the future.
nuclear controls
appear to be based on guards, gates, and guns
while the "3 G's" might be sufficient during normal circumstances they are particularly
vulnerable during economic, and social upheaval
domestic upheavals can
weaken
security for nuclear weapons.
upheavals can undermine the loyalty of
guards
especially if the state collapses economically and can no longer afford to pay those
employees.
Because Indian
nuclear controls rely
on the "3 G's"
there could be a significant risk of thefts of nuclear weapons during
severe upheavals.
has the technical capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs.
201
, IHE,
Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its missiles, either because it chose to establish a rapid-response capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar concerns would exist about accidental
launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The
and Pakistan
because they have a very small number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments.
probably
there are a number of
Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, and are both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear
to contain sophisticated use-control devices to prevent unauthorized use. Instead, the
in both countries
. As we
have seen in the Russian and Chinese cases,
,
political,
and
s. The Russian case has demonstrated that severe
the infrastructures that previously maintained the
undermine central controls
In particular, such
and workers at nuclear facilities,
Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to prevent such weaknesses from arising in their nuclear controls.
and Pakistani
while reportedly lacking personnel reliability programs,
The Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite
unstable for the next several years.202 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion, ma ssive economic
disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant cause for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term political and economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a collapse in its nuclear controls. Were
such an event to occur, there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the ha nds of Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September 11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan,
there were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence community with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the
tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001, President Musharraf took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless continued
to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an emergency redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advis e Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear
One cannot rule out
especially if domestic instability were
stockpile. ' If the U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more extreme elements in his country.
terrorists might choose to target nuclear facilities in India
to increase.
that
and Pakistan,
also
the possibility
Both India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208 These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and Pakistani
if defenses at the
facilities
were weakened by domestic upheavals, the risks of successful terrorist attacks for
theft or
sabotage could increase significantly.
because India
lacks
resilient communication channels, there would still be a fairly high
risk of
use arising from confusion or miscommunication during a crisis.
nuclear weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the physical protection systems at other nuclear facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover,
then
—
the
most sensitive
—either
purposes of
But even if such extreme events did not occur, the tightly controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially
allow unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these weapons.212 Moreover,
probably still
clearly defined, detailed operational procedures and established,
unauthorized
These concerns will probably remain for some time to come, though the
specific risks could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is currently under military rule, and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better
coordination of nuclear decision-making and command-and-control systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use doctrine, combined with inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use
during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in time to be of use in a
rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The risks or unauthorized use would increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the
survivability of the nuclear forces would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These systems would significantly increase difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control
devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely to adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As the number of people authorized to launch nuclear weapons increases, so does
The greatest concerns have been raised about
inadvertent use of
nuclear weapons in South Asia.
According to George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Kargil proved that having nuclear weapons would not deter new conflicts.
Due to continual
mistrust between the two countries, each would be likely to misinterpret
accidental
detonations as an impending attack by the other
During a crisis,
Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma n that it would need to attack rapidly
or lose its ability to retaliate altogether.
Pakistani officials would be extremely suspicious of any
Indian actions that could be interpreted as preparations for an attack.
the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the central authorities.216
a possible
The combined effects of mutual mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe,
especially during crisis situations.
"
It also showed that
unless such conflicts themselves were prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor systems of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217
military movements, missile tests, or
side. The risks of misinterpreting each other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the s hort flight times of the forces
to key targets. For example, because the runways at Pakistani Air Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's nuclear bomber capability.
n acute
,i
For this reason,
Because the flight time of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani leaders
would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own attack.219 These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence systems, which have repeatedly
misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence
failures caused each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we have seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned
at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil war, Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights. These intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either
side were surprised by comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially Pakistan) is confident that an invasion
would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would greatly increase the risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war, however, India has recently made
The dangers of miscalculations and intelligence failures
are increased by the crude early-warning systems employed by both countries, particularly Pakistan.
significant investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by India in the future.221
Several
incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan reported that it had det ected an air force attack on its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might have been circulated in order
to justify their nuclear tests, circulating such a report could have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on
Afghanistan in August 1998. The United States sent a high-level U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however. Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not
only the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's early-warning system "has serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable early-warning systems, India or
Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had reliable early-warning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high. If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward
them, they would have very little time to decide what to do before the aircraft reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking bombers carried conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side (especially
Pakistan could face a "use them or lose them" scenario and be tempted to launch a nuclear attack to
ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed.
)
224 Thus, even if India and Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be
extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to deploy their nuclear weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would become even
worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than five minutes,225 Indian and Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the missiles hit their targets.226 The
According to Francois Heisbourg
strategic situation will
resemble the Cuban missile crisis except
without adequate C3I and with
leadership located less than five minutes from mutual Armageddon."
psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous.
, once theater missiles are deployed in South Asia, the
,
that it "would be permanent rather than tempo-rary, would occur
in place,
political
227
Even a limited nuclear war between India & Pakistan causes extinction – smoke and
yields
Toon ’07 (et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University of Colorado,
Boulder, CO, -- “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism” – Atmospheric Chemistry
& Physics – April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear
weapons
in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight
countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an
We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to
construct, can produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke
as previously
estimated in analyses for full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons
a regional nuclear exchange
could produce direct fatalities comparable
to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers
smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war
would rise into the upper troposphere
and then
might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales We also anticipate substantial perturbations
of global ozone.
The scope and severity of the
hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community.
increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict.
from fires per kt yield
, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single “small” nuclear
detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of
involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange
to all of those worldwide in
World War II, or
. Megacities exposed to atmospheric
fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that
due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating,
.
While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur.
They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the
world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al.,
1983; Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of
the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate changes that
might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At
least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor to weapons construction. Thirty-two other
countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons
to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying
several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local
radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human history
(Robock et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due
to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive
contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties.
realistic scenarios in this analysis
We have attempted to employ
. However, we do not have access to the war plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There
are obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible sc enarios be considered, given the availability
of weapons hardware and the history of regional conflict.
In the present analysis, we
adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two
most
are aware of the potential
a Indian-Pakistani territorial confrontation
newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that
disaster of
an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or
citizens and politicians today
. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the
possible number and combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.
contention 3 is internet freedom
The new Freedom Act won’t solve US image. Protections from the original version are
key
Ries ’14 (
Internally quoting Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights Program. Also internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for
Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch, Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the
organization’s work promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a
multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China
(HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Also internally quoting
Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger – Brian Ries is Mashable’s Real-Time News Editor. Prior to working at Mashable, Brian was Social Media Editor at Newsweek & The Daily Beast, responsible for
using Twitter, Facebook, and Tumblr to cover revolutions, disasters, and presidential elections. During his time at The Daily Beast, he contributed to a team that won two Webby Awards for “Best News Site”. “Critics Slam 'WateredDown' Surveillance Bill That Congress Just Passed” - Mashable - May 22, 2014 – http://mashable.com/2014/05/22/congress-nsa-surveillance-bill/)
many of its initial supporters pulled their support. We supported the original USA Freedom act,
even though it didn’t do much for non-US persons
He
described the original version as “a good step to end bulk collection. However in its current version, it's
not even clear that this bill does that at all,
Congress left a lot of "wiggle room" in the bill
something he said is a real problem.
you can count on the administration to exploit it,"
As a result,
“
,” Zeke Johnson, director of Amnesty International's Security & Human Rights Program told Mashable after Thursday's vote.
”
,
Johnson said. He added that
—
"Where there is vagueness in a law,
Johnson
said. However, Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU Washington Legislative Office, took a more positive view of the bill. "While far from perfect, this bill is an unambiguous statement of congressional intent to rein in the out-of-control NSA," she said in a statement. "While we share the
concerns of many — including members of both parties who rightly believe the bill does not go far enough — without it we would be left with no reform at all, or worse, a House Intelligence Committee bill that would have cemented bulk collection of Americans’ communications into
The ban on bulk collection was deliberately watered down to be
ambiguous and exploitable,
We withdrew support for USA FREEDOM when
the bill morphed into a codification of large-scale, untargeted collection of data about Americans with
no connection to a crime or terrorism.” And Cynthia Wong
at Human Rights Watch, said, This
so-called reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users
around the world. Until Congress
passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet freedom will continue to fade.”
law." The Electronic Frontier Foundation simply called it "a weak attempt at NSA reform." “
” said Center for Democracy and Technology Senior Counsel Harley Geiger. “
, senior Internet researcher
“
in the US and
New Freedom Act fails to restore US’s global credibility on Internet freedom. The
original version solves by closing SST loopholes.
Brinkerhoff ’14 (Internally quoting Cynthia M. Wong is the senior researcher on the Internet and human rights for Human Rights Watch. Before joining Human Rights Watch,
Wong worked as an attorney at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) and as director of their Project on Global Internet Freedom. She conducted much of the organization’s work
promoting global Internet freedom, with a particular focus on international free expression and privacy. She also served as co-chair of the Policy & Learning Committee of the Global Network
Initiative (GNI), a multi-stakeholder organization that advances corporate responsibility and human rights in the technology sector. Prior to joining CDT, Wong was the Robert L. Bernstein
International Human Rights Fellow at Human Rights in China (HRIC). There, she contributed to the organization’s work in the areas of business and human rights and freedom of expression
online. Wong earned her law degree from New York University School of Law. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to
uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Noel Brinkerhoff is a Political reporter and writer covering state and national politics for 15 years. “With Support of Obama
Administration, House NSA Surveillance Reform Bill Includes Gaping Loopholes” – AllGov – May 26th - http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/with-support-of-obama-administration-housensa-surveillance-reform-bill-includes-gaping-loopholes-140526?news=853242)
Lawmakers in the House
claim they have addressed
bulk collection of
data made so famous last year by whistleblower Edward Snowden. But the legislation adopted to end
this controversial practice contains huge loopholes that could allow the NSA to keep vacuuming up large
amounts of Americans’ communications records,
the USA Freedom Act
approved by the House
was criticized for not going far enough to keep data out of the hands of
government.
Cynthia Wong, senior Internet researcher at Human
Rights Watch (HRW), Until Congress passes real reform, U.S. credibility and leadership on Internet
freedom will continue to fade.”
The
core problem is that this only ends ‘bulk’ collection in the sense the intelligence community uses that
term
As long as there’s some kind of target they don’t call that bulk collection even if you’re still
collecting millions of records If they say ‘give us the record of everyone who visited these thousand
websites that’s not bulk collection, because they have targets.” HRW says the bill
contains ambiguous definitions
an earlier version more clearly defined the
scope of what the NSA could grab
Under an earlier version of
the USA Freedom Act, the government would have been required to base a demand for phone
U.S.
of Representatives
the problems of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) notorious
,
all with the blessing of the Obama administration. Dubbed
, the bill overwhelmingly
(303 to 121)
“This so-called reform bill won’t restore the trust of Internet users in the U.S. and around the world,”
said. “
Julian Sanchez, a researcher at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank, warned that the changes could mean the continuation of bulk collection of phone records by another name. “
,” Sanchez told Wired. “
,
,
…
,’
a list of
, which now goes to the Senate for consideration,
about what can and cannot be collected by the agency. For instance,
under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which has formed the legal basis for gathering the metadata of phone calls. “
ny
metadata or other records on a “specific selection term” that “uniquely describe[s] a person
Under the House version, this definition was broadened to mean “a discrete term
This definition is too
ambiguous to prevent the
overbroad collection practices in the past,”
the changes to this definition still allow for massive collection of millions of
Americans’ private information based on very broad selection terms such as a zip code, an area code the
email provider or financial institution or the IP address of a web hosting service that hosts
thousands of web sites.”
, entity, or account.”
, such as a term specifically identifying a person, entity,
account, address, or device, used by the government to limit the scope” of information sought,” according to Human Rights Watch. “
open-ended and
creative interpretation by intelligence agencies that has been used to justify
sort of
the group claims. The New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute is similarly
disappointed in the final House bill. “Taken together,” the Institute wrote, “
may
,
physical address of a particular
,
The aff outweighs kill switch -privacy advocates are fine with it.
Keen ‘11Andrew Keen, currently a columnist. The author holds a master's degree in political science from the University of
California, Berkeley. After Berkeley, Keen taught modern history and politics at Tufts University, Northeastern University and
the University of Massachusetts Amherst. “The Death Of The Internet Has Been Greatly Exaggerated” - Tech Crunch - Nov 14,
2011 – http://techcrunch.com/2011/11/14/death-internet-exaggerated/
The news, I’m afraid, is dire. The Internet is about to be
The ProtectIP and The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA
Big media is going nuclear
describing SOPA as
a “kill switch”
destroyed by big media. It is about
be killed by two Congressional bills
–
) – that all-powerful big media lobbyists are now pushing through Congress. These bills will censor the Internet, turn it into China, cens or it,
destroy its innovation and value. “
against the DMCA,” thus writes the author and serial entrepreneur Ashkan Karbasfrooshan, arguing that ProtectIP and COPA will “spell the end of the Internet as we know it.”
Techcrunch’s Devin Coldeway,
“possibly unconstitutional” and as
, says it is a “desperate power grab by a diminishing elite”. CNET columnist Molly Wood chimes in that SOPA is “brazen” and
“nightmarish” and warns that it will result in a “copyright police state”. The Obama administration is “busy in bed with Hollywood,” she warns, “cheerfully ceding your rights to the MPAA and RIAA.” Even the VCs are worried. Union Square Ventures’ Fred Wilson , argues that “these bills
were written by the content industry without any input from the technology industry”. The problem, Wilson explains, is that “the content industry is not creating new jobs right now” and thus, by establishing a destructive legal environment for start-ups, SOPA and ProtectIP will
But there’s a problem with all this bad news. It’s wrong. Almost entirely wrong.
the Internet isn’t about to be destroyed by either ProtectIP or SOPA. The technology industry has had
input into the political process. Neither ProtectIP nor SOPA are
“nuclear” options
supposedly “kill the golden goose to protect industries in decline.”
No,
“unconstitutional” or
designed to kill the DMCA. The
administration isn’t in bed, either literally or metaphorically, with big media and the US government isn’t the “villain” in this story. The technology industry – notably Google, who were invited to the Congressional hearings on the legislation – has had significant input into the political
process. Most importantly, this legislation – by fighting the corrosive impact of counterfeiting and piracy on the American marketplace – is designed to make our domestic economy stronger, protect jobs both on and offline and encourage innovation in our digital knowledge economy. So
what, exactly, are ProtectIP and SOPA? Rather than being seen as a replacement for the U.S. Digital Millenium Copyright Act ( DMCA), the genesis of these pieces of legislation – ProtectIP being authored by the Senate and SOPA by the House – is the need for legal tools to fight primarily
online criminals who operate outside of the U.S. jurisdiction and U.S. companies who, often unwittingly, sustain them. Rogue sites legislation exists in parallel to the DMCA and is intended to stop criminal enterprises from accessing US markets online in ways that they would never be able
to do offline. Whatever one might think of some of the details of these bills (no, they aren’t perfect, especially the sometimes sloppily written and occasionally misguided SOPA), they are designed to address a serious problem of the online economy – foreign criminals and companies
which use the Internet to sell or distribute illegal or counterfeit goods to American consumers. These companies extend from those that sell advertising off the back of pirated movies to those selling fake drugs online. It is undeniable that rogue websites – organizations which sell
counterfeit goods or peddle stolen intellectual property – are a significant drain on the US economy. Borrowing numbers from various government and private sector experts, it is estimated by one House committee that intellectual property theft alone costs the US economy over $100
billion per year. And as The Guardian reported in September, in its investigation of the impact of fake drugs sales on the UK marketplace, there are almost 13,000 fake pharmacy websites – “most… facilitated by Chinese or Russian criminal organizations”, according to the UK’s Medicines
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority (MHRA). Not only, therefore, are SOPA and ProtectIP addressing a set of genuinely costly economic issues, but they’ve also – in the best Madisonian tradition of representative democracy – assembled a broad coalition of supporters for these
bills. No, neither SOPA nor ProtectIP reflect the Administration being “in bed with Hollywood.” I talked earlier this week to Steven Tepp, the US Chamber of Commerce’s online piracy and anti-counterfeiting chief, who reminded me that the bipartisan Senate bill had just won its 40th co-
this isn’t just
a legislative initiative supported by corporations 43 Attorney Generals
the AFL-CIO and The
National Consumer League are also in favor.
there “is no contradiction between intellectual property rights protection and
enforcement and ensuring freedom of expression on the Internet.”
sponsor and that 350 organizations – including pharmaceutical giants like Eli Lilly and Johnson & Johnson as well as Nike, Caterpillar and Major League Baseball – signed a September 22 letter to Congress in support of legislation against rogue sites. But
.
State
, the US Conference of Mayors,
And so is US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who early this month, in defense of legislation that seeks to make it impossi ble for American Internet users to access
criminal foreign websites, wrote that
The Internet freedom agenda’s key to the Global Economy- US image is vital.
Kalathil ’10 Shanthi Kalathil - Adjunct Faculty and Adjunct Lecturer in the Communication, Culture, and Technology (CCT) Master of Arts Program at
Georgetown University. Kalathil has extensive experience advising the U.S. government, international organizations and nonprofits on supporting civil society,
independent media, technology, transparency and accountability. Previously a senior Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for International Development and she
has authored or edited numerous policy and scholarly publications, including the edited volume Diplomacy, Development and Security in the Information Age. She
has taught courses on international relations in the information age at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Georgetown University. Kalathil holds
degrees from U.C. Berkeley and the London School of Economics and Political Science – “Internet Freedom: A Background Paper” – October 2010 - Available via:
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/Internet_Freedom_A_Background_Paper_0.pdf
As use of the Internet has grown
around the world so too have concerns about its defining attribute
as a free and open means of communication Around the world, countries
are grappling with
issues of free expression
and trust. With starkly different visions
developing, this era presents
challenges
for those who wish to ensure the Internet remains a backbone of
economic
growth. U.S. officials have made clear their vision for the Internet’s future
the U.S. is committed to promoting new communication tools, “so that people are empowered
in repressive societies
It is
exponentially
,
.
, censorship
—and also opportunities—
, companies and citizens
thorny
for the Internet
liberty and
. President Obama, in a speech before the UN General Assembly, said that
to connect with one
another and,
, to do so with security. We will support a free and open Internet, so individuals have the information to make up their own minds.” His words were reinforced by FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski: “
essential that we preserve open Internet
Indeed, a free
Internet stands at the heart of
global commerce. Internet freedom enables
trade and economic growth
censorship and other blockages stifle
both expression and innovation.
global initiatives
attempt to enshrine norms
that will ensure the Internet remains a space for free expression. At the same time, other norms are
fast arising—particularly those defined by authoritarian countries
Even as
Internet access has expanded around the world, many governments attempt to regulate and censor
the Internet
Such governments have devoted vast resources to shaping the
Internet’s development within their own borders, and they are now seeking to shape the Internet
outside their borders
culminating in a
balkanized Internet with limited interoperability. the next few years present a distinct window of
opportunity to elevate principles
U.S. leadership within this window is
vital
to ensure these norms become standard
.
the
and stand firmly behind the right of all people to connect with one another and to exchange ideas freely and without fear.”1
accessible
both global communication and
, widely
dialogue and direct diplomacy
between people and civilizations, facilitating the exchange of ideas and culture while bolstering
. Conversely,
When arbitrary rules privilege some and not others, the investment climate suffers. Nor can access be expanded if end users have no trust in the network. However, making reality live up to
aspirations for Internet freedom can prove difficult. Numerous
—spearheaded by governments, private sector and civil society—are
ing
the
, principles and standards
public
that wish to splinter the Internet into independently controlled fiefdoms.
are
ing
control,
in all its forms: blogs, mobile communication, social media, etc.
as well. Indeed, Internet experts are worried that national governments of all stripes will increasingly seek to extend their regulatory authority over the global Internet,
Hence,
the
, a global effort is necessary
of the free exchange of ideas, knowledge and commerce on the Internet. While
that
a
part of the Internet’s supporting architecture
Global Econ not resilient – a shock could reverse growth.
UNECE ’14 UNECE is the The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. “Global economy is improving, but remains vulnerable to new and old
headwinds that could derail growth”– UNECE Report – Published:20 January 2014 – http://www.unece.org/index.php?id=34621
Global economic growth should increase over the next two years
with continuing signs of improvement, according to the United Nations World Economic Situation and
Prospects 2014 (WESP) report, launched today. The global economy is expected to grow at a pace of 3.0 per cent in 2014 and 3.3 per cent in 2015, compared with an estimated growth of 2.1 per cent for 2013. The world economy experienced subdued growth for a second year in 2013,
but some
improvements in the last quarter have led to the more positive forecast.
UN’s
The euro area has finally ended a protracted recession. Growth in the
United States strengthened somewhat. A few large emerging economies, including China and India, managed to backstop the decel eration they experienced in the past two years and veered upwards moderately. These factors point to increasing global growth. According to WESP,
inflation will remain tame worldwide, but the employment situation will continue to be challenging. While growth in internati onal trade flows is expected to pick up moderately to 4.7 per cent in 2014, the prices of most primary commodities are projected to be flat, although any
unexpected supply-side shocks, including geo-political tensions, could push some of these prices higher. The report warns that international capital flows to emerging eco nomies are expected to become more volatile. “
the context of many uncertainties and risks coming from possible
stymie growth,”
policy
missteps
Our forecast is made in
that could
as well as non-economic factors
said Shamshad Akhtar, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development. Developed economies In the United States, fiscal tightening and a series of political gridlocks over budgetary issues weighed heavily on growth; however,
quantitative monetary easing boosted equity prices. The U.S. labour market and housing sector continued to recover. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the U.S. is expected to increase 2.5 per cent in 2014. Western Europe emerged from recession in 2013, but growth prospects remain
weak, as fiscal austerity will continue and the unemployment rates remain elevated. GDP in Western Europe is expected to grow by 1.5 per cent in 2014. Growth in Japan has been boosted by a set of expansionary policy packages, but the effects of forthcoming structural reforms remain
uncertain and an anticipated increase in Japan’s consumption tax rate is expected to curb growth. GDP is forecast to grow by 1.5 per cent in 2014. Developing countries and economies in transition Growth prospects among large developing countries and economies in transition are
mixed. Growth in Brazil has been hampered by weak external demand, volatility in international capital flows and tightening monetary policy, but grow th is expected to rebound to 3 per cent in 2014. A slowdown in China has been stabilized and growth is expected to maintain at a pace of
about 7.5 per cent in the next few years. India experienced its lowest growth in two decades, along with large current account and government budget deficits plus high inflation, but growth is forecast to improve to above 5 per cent in 2014. In the Russian Federation growth weakened
further in 2013, as industrial output and investment faltered, and is expected to recover modestly to 2.9 per cent in 2014. A mong developing regions, growth prospects in Africa remain relatively robust. After an estimated growth of 4.0 per cent in 2013, GDP is projected to expand by 4.7
per cent in 2014. The report emphasized the dependence of Africa’s growth on investment in infrastructure, trade and investment ties with emerging economies, and improvements in economic governance and management. More detailed regional forecasts from WESP will be released
in January 2014. Risks and uncertainties threaten global economy The report stressed that the risks associated with a possibl e bumpy exit from the quantitative easing programmes by the U.S Federal Reserve (Fed) threaten the global economy. As already seen somewhat during the
summer of 2013, efforts by the Fed to pull out of quantitative easing programmes could lead to a surge in long-term interest rates in developed and developing countries. Tapering could also lead to a sell-off in global equity markets, a sharp decline of capital inflows to emerging
economies and a spike in the risk premium for external financing in emerging economies. These first-round shocks in international financial markets could transmit quickly to developed and developing economies. The report warns that as the Fed is expected to taper and eventually
unwind its quantitative easing programmes, emerging economies will face more external shocks. While economic fundamentals and the policy space in many emerging economies are better than when the Asian financial crisis erupted in 1997, emerging economies with large external
imbalances remain particularly vulnerable. Other uncertainties and risks include the remaining fragility in the banking system and the real economy in the euro area and the continued political wrangling in the U.S. on the debt ceiling and the budget. Beyond the economic domain,
geopolitical tensions in Western Asia and elsewhere remain serious risks. These and other
risk factors unfolding unexpectedly could derail the world economy far
,
,
beyond the report’s projections.
Economic decline causes war
Royal 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense [Jedediah Royal, 2010,
Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political
Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict
. Political science
literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on
rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise
and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the
next exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power
that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation
even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising
power may seek to challenge a declining power
the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycl e theory, finding that
. As such,
19SJ)
(see also Gilpin.
(Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively,
(Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles im pact the likelihood of conflict
among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future
expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that int erdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However,
if the
expectations of future trade decline particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources
the likelihood for conflict increases as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those
resources
others have considered the link
between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level
Hess find a strong
correlation between internal conflict and external conflict particularly during periods of economic
downturn
The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and
mutually reinforcing Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour
the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts
self-reinforce each other
Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the
likelihood of terrorism
). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external
tensions
crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government Diversionary theory"
suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have
increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect
,
,
,
. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third,
. Mom berg and
(2002)
,
. They write.
.
.
Moreover,
(Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9>
(Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004
. Furthermore,
."
. Wang (1996),
DcRoucn (1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards diversionary tactics arc
greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the
economic scholarship positively correlates economic
integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises whereas political science scholarship
links economic decline with external conflict
United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni
,
al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-
security debate and deserves more attention.
That goes nuclear and causes extinction
Bearden 2K (Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, 2000, The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How We Can Solve It, 2000,
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Big- Medicine/message/642)
As the collapse of the Western economies nears,
one may expect catastrophic stress
desperate
nations take desperate actions.
the stress on nations will have increased the intensity
and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of
WMD
, are
almost certain to be released
Bluntly, we foresee these factors - and others { } not covered - converging to a catastrophic collapse of the world economy in about eight years.
on the 160 developing nations as the developed nations are forced to dramatically curtail orders. International Strategic Threat Aspects History bears out that
Prior to the final economic collapse,
weapons of mass destruction (
) now possessed by some 25 nations
. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China - whose
long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States - attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that,
under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is his side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed.
Without effective defense,
strikes
the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive
rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs
The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it
and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed,
arsenals being unleashed .
, with a great percent of the WMD
, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.
plan
The United States federal government should substantially curtail bulk collection by
federal intelligence agencies of domestic phone, internet, email, and-or associated
electronic records in the absence of an individually-tailored warrant obtained via use
of a “specific selector term”.
contention 4 is solvency
The current Freedom Act fails- SST language is key to avoid circumvention
Greene ’15 (et al; David Greene, Senior Staff Attorney and Civil Liberties Director for the Electronic Frontier Foundation. David is also an adjunct professor
at the University of San Francisco School of Law, where he teaches classes in First Amendment and media law and an instructor in the journalism department at San
Francisco State University. David has significant experience litigating First Amendment issues in state and federal trial and appellate courts and is one of the
country's leading advocates for and commentators on freedom of expression in the arts. “ACLU v. Clapper and the Congress: How The Second Circuit’s Decision
Affects the Legislative Landscape” - Electronic Frontier Foundation - May 11, 2015 - https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/aclu-v-clapper-and-congress-howsecond-circuits-decision-affects-legislative)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper has determined that the NSA’s telephone records program went far beyond what Congress authorized when it passed Section 215 of the Patriot Act in 2001. The court unequivocally rejected the government’s secret
reinterpretation of Section 215. Among many important findings, the court found that Section 215’s authorization of the collection of busi ness records that are “relevant to an authorized investigation” could not be read to include the dragnet collection of telephone records. The court
also took issue with the fact that this strained application of the law was accomplished in secret and approved by the secret and one-sided Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court). EFF filed amicus briefs in this case in both the district and circuit courts, and we congratulate our
The Second Circuit’s decision
marks a
change in the context of
legislative debate in Congress.
it is clear that Congress
must do more to rein in dragnet surveillance by the NSA.
Second Circuit’s opinion should
stop the idea of
reauthorization with no reforms of Section 215, which is set to expire June 1.
colleagues at the ACLU on this significant victory. The Second Circuit’s opinion stands as a clear sign that the courts are ready to step in and rule that mass surveillance is illegal. That’s great news.
also
significant
the ongoing
, however,
Above all,
Clean Reauthorization First, the
a "clean reauthorization" (a
)
Last
month, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and Senate Intelligence Chair Richard Burr introduced S. 1035, a bill that would extend the current language of Section 215 through 2020, thereby continuing the mass spying rubber-stamped by the FISA Court. The morning of the Second
Circuit decision, both Senators took to the Senate floor to vehemently defend the bulk collection program and push for a clean reauthorization. But a clean reauthorization is much more complicated now. Congress can’t pretend that the Second Circuit's narrow reading of “relevant to an
authorized investigation” doesn’t exist. It’s likely that if Congress merely does a “clean” reauthorization of Section 215, then the district court in ACLU v. Clapper will enjoin the government from using Section 215 as authorization for the call records dragnet, because the distr ict court is
bound by the Second Circuit decision. However, if a reauthorization made it clear that Congress intended to reject the Second Circuit’s narrow reading of the law, it could cause further confusion and the government could argue that Congress has fully embraced the dragnet. We’re
The USA Freedom Act Must Be
Strengthened
EFF asks Congress to strengthen
the USA Freedom Act.
We’re urging Congress to roll the draft back to the stronger and meaningful
reforms included in the 2013 version of USA Freedom
the law should expressly
avoid any confusion
about what the key terms
mean,
This task
will ensure that the USA Freedom
Act actually accomplishes its goal of ending bulk collection.
encouraging people to call Congress and tell their lawmakers to reject Senator McConnell's clean reauthorization in order to avoid the risk that Congress might reject the Second Circuit’s decision
In light of the Second Circuit’s decision,
its proposed reform of Section 215,
Pending those
improvements, EFF is withdrawing our support of the bill.
and affirmatively embrace the Second Circuit’s opinion on the limits of Section 215. Most importantly, the Second Circuit’s correct
interpretation of
be
embraced by Congress in order to
going forward
in the statute
especially the terms “relevant” and “investigation.” This recognition could be in the bill itself or, less preferably, in legislative history. The House Judiciary Committee has already included such language in its report to the full House of Representatives, but now the Senate
must include the language in the bill or in its own legislative history.
easy
will make sure that the law is not read as rejecting the Second Circuit’s reading and
help
The House Report on USA Freedom, issued today, takes a step forward by stating that: Congress’ decision to leave in place
the ‘‘relevance’’ standard for Section 501 orders should not be construed as Congress’ intent to ratify the FISA Court’s interpretation of that term. These changes restore meaningful limits to the ‘‘relevance’’ requirement of Section 501, consistent with the opinion of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in ACLU v. Clapper. Ensuring that the Senate doesn't move away from the legislative history should be a top priority as the bill moves forward. But that’s the bare minimum Congress must do. The Second Circuit, and especially Judge Sack’s concurrence,
noted a lack of both transparency and a true adversary in the FISA Court. The 2014 and 2013 USA Freedom Act had stronger FISA Court reforms, particularly around the creation of a special advocate who would argue against the government in the FISA Court. The Second Circuit’s opinion
also emphasizes that typical subpoenas seek only records of "suspects under investigation, or of people or businesses that have contact with such subjects." Under the current USA Freedom Act, the government can collect records of a "second hop,"—the numbers, and associated
metadata, that have been in contact with the numbers collected initially—without any additional authorization. The bill should be changed so that the government must file another application for any further records it wants to collect. Automatically obtaining a "second hop" is
The current Freedom Act is out-of-sync with the narrow view of permissible
collection of records because it lacks a rigorous definition of the "specific selection term" the
government can use to identify the records it wants to collect. This can be addressed by
drawing
upon last year's definition in the Freedom Act
Restoring
Important Parts of 2013’s USA Freedom Act is an opportunity
to address shortcomings
of the new
USA Freedom Act
Congress should put back key provisions that were
dropped along the way
First, the "super minimization" procedures
which were key privacy procedures that mandated the deletion of any information obtained about a
person not connected to the investigation, should be reintroduced Key provisions establishing a higher
legal standard
for use of pen register/trap-and-trace devices
should also be resuscitated.
unacceptable because it sweeps in too many people’s records.
USA
also
court’s
two changes: (1)
USA
; and, (2) closing down potential loopholes like the definition of "address" or the use of a "person" to include a corporate person.
This
ly introduced
also
and a new context for Congress
the
that we previously wrote about.
as well as remove those that were introduced at the behest of the intelligence community.
,
.
and compliance assessment
the
, legal standing to sue the government over surveillance practices, and the original
transparency provisions allowing government and corporate disclosure of surveillance orders
The plan restores language that makes circumvention impossible
Granick ’14 Jennifer Granick is the Director of Civil Liberties at the Stanford Center for Internet and Society. Jennifer was
the Civil Liberties Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Jennifer practices, speaks and writes about computer crime
and security, electronic surveillance, consumer privacy, data protection, copyright, trademark and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act. From 2001 to 2007, Jennifer was Executive Director of CIS and taught Cyberlaw, Computer Crime Law, Internet
intermediary liability, and Internet law and policy. Before teaching at Stanford, Jennifer earned her law degree from University
of California, Hastings College of the Law and her undergraduate degree from the New College of the University of South
Florida. “USA Freedom Act: Oh, Well. Whatever. Nevermind.” – Just Security - May 21, 2014 http://justsecurity.org/10675/usafreedom-act-oh-well-whatever-nevermind/
The initially promising USA Freedom Act could have ended the previously secret government practices of collecting
Americans’ calling records, internet transactional information and who knows what else in bulk. Today’s version would allow
broad collection to continue under the guise of reform. The initial version of the bill would have
reinforced existing statutory language requiring a showing of “relevance to an authorized investigation”
before agents can get an order requiring production of business records, dialing and routing information, and other
data, and would have added other limits to ensure massive collection would stop. It also would have implemented mild
reforms to content surveillance under section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act, stopping “back door” searches for
Americans’ communications. Last week, a Managers’ Amendment watered those provisions down,
substituting new language that would allow agents to use a “specific selection term” as the “basis for production”.
The bill defined “specific selection term” as something that “uniquely describe[s] a person, entity, or
account.” Given the intelligence community’s success at getting FISA judges to reinterpret obvious language—e.g. “relevance”—in counter-intuitive ways,
people wondered what this new language might mean. There’s deep public mistrust for the intelligence community and for the FISA court, which conspired to allow
bulk collection under spurious legal justifications for years. Worse, there’s deep public mistrust for the law itself, since the intelligence community’s “nuanced”
definitions of normal words have made the public realize that they do not understand the meaning of words like “relevance”, “collection”, “bulk”, or “target”.
The NSA is required to abide by Congressional mandate
Buttar 15 — Shahid Buttar, constitutional lawyer and executive director of the Bill of Rights Defense
Committee, 2015 (“Senate Moves to Check Executive Spying Power,” The Progressive, May 27th,
Available Online at http://progressive.org/news/2015/05/188151/senate-moves-check-executivespying-power, Accessed 06-07-2015)
The most obvious losers are the NSA and FBI After 15 years of breaking
already permissive laws
the agencies must finally start complying with constitutional
limits Within the agencies, senior leaders of the intelligence establishment also emerge looking like
clowns Section 215 survived this long only because agency officials
lied under oath to evade oversight The Senate's decision to end a program that senators learned about
from whistleblowers
discredits their legacies.
The political shift indicates a direction for future reform. Who Wins and Who Loses?
.
, yet not congressional blank checks,
.
.
—including Director of National Intelligence James Clapper and former NSA Director Michael Hayden—
.
, instead of those officials, further
Even if they remain above the law by evading the prosecution for perjury sought by multiple members of Congress, their careers
will be defined by congressional and judicial rejection of illegal programs they built in secret. To the extent intelligence officials are clowns, the many congressional leaders from both parties who supported them are stooges. Establishment Democrats and Republicans alike uncritically
accepted lies, deferred to them and went along with the Beltway consensus - in sharp contrast to their populist colleagues who proved willing to uphold their oath of office to "defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic." Several winners also emerged from this
Congressional rejection of mass spying vindicates several principles at once, including transparency,
oversight, checks and balances, the separation of powers and constitutional rights enshrined in the First
and Fourth Amendments
drama.
. Each of those values is cherished across the political continuum, making them especially powerful during a presidential election year. Senator Paul is another clear winner. He demonstrated leadership, surged among
the crowded GOP field of 2016 presidential hopefuls and effectively seized control of the Senate from the majority leader. With its senators leading both the surveillance/secrecy/corruption caucus, as well as the competing constitutional/privacy/accountability caucus, Kentucky could also
claim victory. The US Constitution may be the most important winner. By proxy, "We the People of the United States" actually scored two victories at once. Narrowly, the expiration of Patriot Act Section 215 advances Fourth Amendment privacy interests. Even though mass surveillance
will continue for now under other legal authorities, one program through which our government monitors phone calls and tracks everyone's behavior, regardless of wrongdoing, will end. More br oadly,
this vote begins a long-
overdue process of limiting executive powers
congressional assertiveness supports democracy in a long-running battle to avoid the erosion from
within
, expanded during a period of seeming emergency, which grew entrenched despite proving ineffective as well as constitutionally offensive. In this sense,
foreseen by both Alexis de Tocqueville and President and Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower. What Comes Next? With reformers having triumphed in Congress, the debate over surveillance reform must expand. Further reforms are necessary to enable an
adversarial process and greater transparency at the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and also to limit other legal authorities - like Executive Order 12333 and FISA Section 702 - used to justify unconstitutional domestic surveillance. It's a good thing that a bipartisan measure,
the Surveillance State Repeal Act (HR 1466), is poised to do exactly that. Rep. Mark Pocan (D-Wisconsin) and Rep. Thomas Massie (R-Kentucky) introduced the SSRA to force the agencies to justify the expansion of any powers from a constitutional baseline, rather than one contrived by a
Congress has long abandoned its role of checking and balancing runaway executive power, but
the Senate's recent vote suggests an overdue awakening
decade of executive lies.
. Members should heed the political wind, and embrace bipartisan calls for aggressive limits as the starting point for
comprehensive surveillance reform.