A2 Circumvention DA Updates
--a2 circumvention – generic
No circumvention – prefer empirics and authoritative independent review
Bora 14 (Kukil Bora, International Business Times, “NSA Internet Surveillance Is Legal, A Presidential Privacy Board
Concludes,” 7-2-2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-internet-surveillance-legal-presidential-privacy-board-concludes-1617270)
The NSA's current spying activities function under a provision known as Section 702, which has its roots in the Terrorist Surveillance Program implemented after
the 9/11 attacks. It was added in 2008 to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow the agency to collect and track electronic communications
initiated by foreigners living outside the U.S. when their telephone calls, emails, web chats and text messages enter the country. Section 702 also covers the
divisive PRISM program, which allows NSA to collect foreign communication data from technology companies, such as Google Inc. (NASDAQ:GOOGL),
Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB), Microsoft Corporation (NASDAQ:MSFT) and Apple Inc. (NASDAQ:AAPL). The NSA is accused of also spying on communications
made by Americans, in its effort to glean information on terrorist activities and foreign intelligence. After the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents by
former NSA systems administrator Edward Snowden, many people expressed concerns, and criticized as unconstitutional, the practice of secretly collecting
troves of data about Americans' communications over the Internet without their approval. However, the board, which consists of a Democratic federal
judge, two privacy experts and two former Republican justice department officials, found that the NSA surveillance is legal and
realistic. “Overall, the board finds that the protections contained in the Section 702 minimization procedures are reasonably designed and implemented to ward
against the exploitation of information acquired under the program for illegitimate purposes,” the board said in the report. “The board has seen no trace
of any such illegitimate activity associated with the program, or any attempt to intentionally circumvent legal limits .” The report also
offered recommendations to help the government push NSA programs “into the sphere of reasonableness” to ensure that the agency can perform its duties while
operating within Constitutional limits. However, according to Associated Press, exactly how the government would utilize the information obtained through
Section 702, and the extent to which the information would help authorities investigate domestic law enforcement cases, remains unclear.
--a2 circumvention – intel-sharing
Foreign partners won’t circumvent
Shane 13 (Scott Shane, New York Times, “Ex-Contractor Is Charged in Leaks on N.S.A. Surveillance,” 6-21-2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/us/snowden-espionage-act.html?_r=0)
In the latest installment of the Snowden disclosures on Friday, The Guardian reported that the N.S.A.’s British counterpart has tapped into hundreds of fiber-optic
communications lines and is sharing a vast quantity of e-mail and Internet traffic with American intelligence. Under a program called Tempora, the British agency,
known as G.C.H.Q., has been able to tap into 200 of the approximately 1,600 high-capacity fiber cables in and out of Britain and aspires to be able to tap 400
lines at once, harvesting a staggering amount of information, the British newspaper reported. The documents said that G.C.H.Q., which has worked very closely
with the N.S.A. for decades, may store the content of the communications flowing over the cables for three days and the so-called metadata — information about
who is contacting whom at what time — for 30 days. During that time, analysts from both G.C.H.Q. and the N.S.A. are able to search the stored data for
information of interest. The disclosures of the G.C.H.Q. initiative, called “Mastering the Internet,” immediately raised a question among privacy advocates:
whether the N.S.A. might be able to obtain information about Americans from G.C.H.Q. that it is prohibited by law or regulations from collecting itself. An N.S.A.
spokeswoman, Judith Emmel, said the agency does not use foreign partners to evade American restrictions. “Any allegation that N.S.A.
relies on its foreign partners to circumvent U.S. law is absolutely false,” she said. “N.S.A. does not ask its foreign partners to
undertake any intelligence activity that the U.S. government would be legally prohibited from undertaking itself.” Ms. Emmel said the
N.S.A. “is unwavering in its respect for U.S. laws and policies” and has “a rigorous internal compliance program” as well as
oversight from Congress and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. One document released by Mr. Snowden lent some support for the
Obama administration’s insistence that the N.S.A. is tightly controlled. In a confidential briefing, The Guardian reported, a G.C.H.Q. legal adviser
declared: “We have a light oversight regime compared with the U.S.”
--a2 circumvention – privates
Private sector won’t circumvent
Tim Worstall, 13, "NSA's PRISM Sounds Like A Darn Good Idea To Me: This Is What Governments Are For," Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/06/07/nsas-prism-sounds-like-a-darn-good-idea-to-me-this-is-what-governmentsare-for/
There’s been a joint investigation by the Washington Post and The Guardian into an NSA program called PRISM. The allegation is that the National
Security Agency (NSA) has backdoor access to the systems and data of the major internet firms, Microsoft MSFT -0.77%,
Google GOOG -0.68%, Apple AAPL -0.56%, Facebook FB +0.03% and so on, and they routinely use this to monitor what people
are saying and doing. With one caveat this is in fact what governments are supposed to do so I’m at something of a loss in understanding why people seem
to be getting so outraged about it. The WaPo piece is here, a couple from The Guardian here and here. It’s worth pointing out that the companies
themselves are vehemently denying that the NSA has such backdoor access to the data. However, senior executives from the
internet companies expressed surprise and shock and insisted that no direct access to servers had been offered to any
government agency. The top-secret NSA briefing presentation set out details of the PRISM program, which it said granted access to records such as emails,
chat conversations, voice calls, documents and more. The presentation the listed dates when document collection began for each company, and said PRISM
enabled “direct access from the servers of these US service providers: Microsoft, Yahoo YHOO -2.43%, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL AOL +0.06%, Skype,
YouTube, Apple”. Senior officials with knowledge of the situation within the tech giants admitted to being confused by the NSA revelations, and said if such data
collection was taking place, it was without companies’ knowledge. An Apple spokesman said: “We have never heard of PRISM. We do not provide any
government agency with direct access to our servers and any agency requesting customer data must get a court order,” he said. Whether the claim of direct
access is true or not is one thing. But the much larger point is that this sort of behaviour is not something that we should be shouting about government doing. It’s
something that we should be shouting about government not doing.
A2 Terrorism DA Updates
IMPACT DEFENSE
2ac
No impact to terror- even the government has conceded it’s not an existential risk
Mueller and Stewart 15, (Mueller, leading expert on terrorism, Stewart, member of the Australian Legislative Assembly of
Queensland, “Terrorism poses no existential threat to America. We must stop pretending otherwise”,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/24/terrorism-poses-no-existential-threat-to-america 2/15/15, John and
Mark, The Guardian, p.1)
One of the most unchallenged, zany assertions during the war on terror has been that terrorists present an existential threat to the
United States, the modern state and civilization itself. This is important because the overwrought expression, if accepted as valid,
could close off evaluation of security efforts. For example, no defense of civil liberties is likely to be terribly effective if people
believe the threat from terrorism to be existential. At long last, President Barack Obama and other top officials are beginning to
back away from this absurd position. This much overdue development may not last, however. Extravagant alarmism about the pathological but selfdestructive Islamic State (Isis) in areas of Syria and Iraq may cause us to backslide. The notion that international terrorism presents an existential
threat was spawned by the traumatized in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Rudy Giuliani, mayor of New York at the time, recalls that all
security experts” expected “dozens and dozens and multiyears of attacks like this” and, in her book The Dark Side, Jane Mayer observed that “the only certainty
shared by virtually the entire American intelligence community” was that “a second wave of even more devastating terrorist attacks on America was imminent”.
Duly terrified, US intelligence services were soon imaginatively calculating the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States to be between 2,000
and 5,000. Also compelling was the extrapolation that, because the 9/11 terrorists were successful with box-cutters, they might well be able to turn out nuclear
weapons. soon it was being authoritatively proclaimed that atomic terrorists could “destroy civilization as we know it” and that it was
likely that a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States would transpire by 2014. No atomic terrorists have yet appeared (al-Qaida’s entire
budget in 2001 for research on all weapons of mass destruction totaled less than $4,000), and intelligence has been far better at counting al-Qaida operatives in
the country than at finding them. But the notion that terrorism presents an existential threat has played on. By 2008, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff declared it to be a “significant existential” one - carefully differentiating it, apparently, from all those insignificant existential threats Americans have faced
in the past. The bizarre formulation survived into the Obama years. In October 2009, Bruce Riedel, an advisor to the new administration, publicly maintained the
al-Qaida threat to the country to be existential. In 2014, however, things began to change. In a speech at Harvard in October, Vice
President Joseph Biden offered the thought that “we face no existential threat – none – to our way of life or our ultimate security.”
After a decent interval of three months, President Barack Obama reiterated this point at a press conference, and then expanded
in an interview a few weeks later, adding that the US should not “provide a victory to these terrorist networks by over-inflating
their importance and suggesting in some fashion that they are an existential threat to the United States or the world order.” Later,
his national security advisor, Susan Rice, echoed the point in a formal speech. It is astounding that these utterances – “blindingly
obvious” as security specialist Bruce Schneier puts it – appear to mark the first time any officials in the United States have had
the notion and the courage to say so in public. Whether that development, at once remarkable and absurdly belated, will have some consequence, or
even continue, remains to be seen. Senators John McCain and Lindsay Graham have insisted for months that Isis presents an existential threat to the United
States. An alarmed David Brooks reported that financial analysts have convinced themselves that the group has the potential to generate a worldwide “economic
cataclysm.” And General Michael Flynn, recently retired as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, has been insisting that the terrorist enemy is “committed to
the destruction of freedom and the American way of life” while seeking “world domination, achieved through violence and bloodshed.” It was reported that his
remarks provoked nods of approval, cheers and “ultimately a standing ovation” from the audience. Thus even the most modest imaginable effort to rein in the war
on terror hyperbole may fail to gel.
1ar
Terrorism not a threat- exaggeration made by governments as excuse for illegal surveillance and
for money
Walt 15 (STEPHEN M, Stephen Martin Walt is an American professor of international affairs at Harvard University's John F.
Kennedy School of Government. After attaining his B.A., Walt began graduate work at UC Berkeley, graduating with a M.A in
Political Science in 1978, and a Ph.D. in Political Science in 1983. “Think Before You March” Why mass rallies and photo ops are
the wrong response to attacks like “Charlie Hebdo.””http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/16/think-before-you-march-charlie-hebdoislamist-terrorism/ January 16)
How should one respond to the recent attacks in Paris? Whether you are a political leader, a prominent pundit, or just an ordinary citizen, what is the
most constructive way to react when a handful of people are singled out and brutally killed? Being outraged by these senseless deaths is easy, but it’s not
especially effective or illuminating. What really matters is how societies facing the danger of terrorism deal with it, and I worry that the reflexive responses we
have seen over the past week are unintentionally aiding the terrorists’ broader purpose. For example, was that inspiring mass march in Paris on Jan. 11 really the
best response? To be sure, it is gratifying to see the outpouring of support for the victims and the vocal defiance directed toward the terrorists, along with
eloquent defenses of the broad principle of free expression. It is equally encouraging to see these attacks condemned by a diverse array of political and religious
leaders, including prominent representatives of the Arab and Islamic worlds. But these dramatic gestures also magnify the importance of a heinous act committed
by some otherwise marginal individuals, and they reinforce the perception that such people present a large, growing, insidious, and existential threat to our
civilization’s future and our own personal safety. A shocking event such as this one requires more from us than just expressions of sympathy and defiance,
however appropriate those emotional reactions may be. It also requires us to think calmly and rationally about what has happened, why it has happened, and
what the most effective responses would be. If we let anger, emotion, or political opportunism dictate our reaction, we are likely to lash out at the wrong targets,
take actions that merely confirm the terrorists’ own self-justifying narrative, and make it easier for them to recruit new followers. Any one of these things will make
this problem worse instead of better. Let’s begin by recognizing what these murderers sought to achieve by targeting Charlie Hebdo and a kosher market.
Apart from a simple desire for revenge (more below about that), part of their aim was to provoke precisely the sort of overreaction that
would bolster their narratives about the West’s “war on Islam” and make them appear to be the staunchest defenders of an
oppressed religion. As Juan Cole noted here, fueling a broad civilizational conflict between Islam and the West is precisely what these groups want, because
it would aid their recruiting efforts and make them look like heroes instead of criminals. Like other extremists in Iraq, the Balkans, and elsewhere, they know that
violence is intensely polarizing and frequently leads governments to react foolishly. Just look at the U.S. response to the 9/11 attacks: Instead of focusing its
attention solely on al Qaeda, George W. Bush’s administration chose to invade Iraq, a senseless and unnecessary diversion that eventually helped spawn the
Islamic State. Today, more than 10 years after 9/11 and more than 20 years after the World Trade Center bombing, we need most of all to keep the
terrorist threat in perspective . It is clearly a problem — especially given the number of people still flocking to the Islamic State’s banner — but the
actual danger from terrorism remains modest. According to the Global Terrorism Index, there were roughly 18,000 worldwide deaths from terrorism in
2013. That sounds like a big number until one realizes that the vast majority of these deaths occurred in places where active insurgencies are operating (Nigeria,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria, etc.). Deaths or injuries resulting from terrorism in the rest of the world — including the United States, France, and the rest
of Europe — remain quite low, especially when compared with other risks (highway fatalities, household accidents, preventable disease, or ordinary murders).
Not counting suicides, about 30 Americans are shot dead every day. By comparison, the risk that an American or European will be killed or harmed by terrorists
overstating the risk of terrorism
can be just as bad as ignoring it. In the present context, overstating the risk fuels Islamophobia, and growing anti-Muslim sentiment will inevitably
remains (fortunately) vanishingly small. point is not to trivialize what happened last week in Paris, but to emphasize that
encourage a few more Muslims to embrace the jihadi cause. It leads governments around the world to devote excessive resources to counterterrorist activities.
Exaggerated fears of terrorism led many Americans to support Bush’s misbegotten invasion of Iraq, and similar fears led President Barack Obama to
escalate and prolong U.S. involvement in Afghanistan to little purpose. Shamefully, it led the United States (and some of its allies) to engage in acts of
torture and illegal surveillance, thereby threatening America’s core political values. A few months from now, inflated fears of terrorism could
propel even France’s National Front into office, a step that would reinforce nationalist tendencies within Europe and put the future of the European Union in
doubt. To be honest, I don’t fully understand why it is so hard for most societies to calibrate the actual danger from terrorism properly. Although the evidence
clearly shows that the danger individuals face from terrorist violence is vastly smaller than many other risks, you wouldn’t know it by looking at how Western
democracies have reacted over the past decade or more. Some commentators say this is because terrorist violence seems “random” or unpredictable, but that’s
equally true of other dangers (such as highway accidents) that don’t generate the same hype or the same frantic public response. Others scholars suggest the
problem lies in the nature of terrorist violence itself: Because human beings are hard-wired to react to dramatic or vivid events, then events like the Paris attacks
exert undue weight on our perceptions of how the world works. Even when such events are very rare and the consequences are limited, people believe attacks
are more likely and more lethal than they really are. Governments will also exaggerate the danger if they focus primarily on what terrorists say they want to do
instead of focusing on what they are actually able to do. Terrorist organizations threaten horrific things in order to scare others and to keep their members
motivated, but terrorism itself remains a weapon of the weak. If the Islamic State, al Qaeda, or other groups had lots of precision-guided weapons, supersonic
planes, drones, ballistic missiles, warships, and other sophisticated power-projection capabilities, they could do enormous damage and put tens of thousands of
lives at risk. But because they lack these abilities, they have to rely on clandestine plots that usually fail or on small-scale operations that attract a lot of attention
but whose destructive effects are inherently limited. I suspect the real reason we exaggerate these threats has more to do with domestic politics than with the
true level of danger. Whenever a terrorist incident occurs, politicians are quick to accuse incumbents of failing to do enough to prevent such actions. The fear of
such accusations, of course, encourages officials to overreact so that they aren’t vulnerable to the charge of insufficient vigilance. The ever-growing coterie
of terrorism experts and counterterrorism consultants is equally quick to hype the danger and prescribe responses because that is what
keeps all that money flowing into their coffers. With a few exceptions, the official national security establishment isn’t about to downplay the danger
either, because threat inflation is its lifeblood too. And the media has every reason to join the chorus of doom and gloom: Even a small terrorist
incident gets lots of people watching, listening, or reading online, especially when it occurs in Paris, London, or some other Western city.
1ar- media hype
Terrorism is no threat; feds exaggerate and media is compliant with the lies
Smith, 2013 (Patrick L. has been a correspondent, commentator, editor, and critic for more than 30 year. Smith has won two Overseas Press Club Awards as well as other honors and prizes. His
reportage, commentary, essays, and reviews have appeared in The New York Times, Business Week, TIME, The Washington Quarterly, World Policy Journal, The Globalist, The Nation, and numerous other
publications“"Chatter" from "affiliates" causes a "crisis," while media reports nonsense generated to justify NSA surveillance”
http://www.salon.com/2013/08/09/there_is_no_terrorist_threat_the_feds_want_you_to_think_there_is_compliant_media_goes_along/ August 9.
There is no terrorist threat: The feds want you to think there is, compliant media goes along . Summertime, and the chicanery is easy. The
Obama administration’s latest rendering of our invisible but eternal “terrorist threat,” I mean. After a week of ghost stories about an imminent but vaporous plot on
the part of an al-Qaida “affiliate” — this is the big new word — it is hard to decide which is more disheartening: 1) The White House’s blithe if clumsy deployment
of factoids, 2) the supine complicity of the media (and this, frankly, is my choice), or 3) the willingness of honorable liberals and capital-D Democrats to go along
with the show simply because Obama is maestro and one stays with Obama no matter what he does. Nothing can be said for certain as to what prompted the
State Department to close more than 20 embassies and consulates in the Middle East and North Africa last Sunday, and this is by design. But it is no excuse not
to raise the possibility that Americans are eating a summer salad of nonsense served to justify objectionable surveillance practices
now coming in for scrutiny. This prospect seems so self-evident that one feels almost silly raising it, except that so few have. Let us insert it into the
conversation. To me, the silence among our newspapers and broadcasters on this point confirms only how dangerously circumscribed
American political discourse has become. It is all text and subtext now, and the subtext, by definition, is known but never allowed to pierce the surface
of silence. Washington has been erecting a quite warped worldview atop the terror narrative since 2001, if there is anyone left who has not noticed. Our oncepromising president has signed on, and plenty of people seem intent on not noticing this. But flinching is of no use. It is imperative that this nation come to
clear, proper terms with the question of terror. Reversion to the paranoid style, a habit that dates to America’s founding, is already producing damaging
consequences.
UNIQUENESS
2ac
Terrorism declining- cause is free political space
Chapman 13 (,Steve. “The Decline of Terrorism, ”
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/04/18/the_decline_of_terrorism_118011.html Steve Chapman is a columnist and
editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune. His twice-a-week column on national and international affairs, distributed by Creators
Syndicate, appears in some 50 papers across the country. He attended Harvard University, where he was on the staff of The
Harvard Crimson, and graduated with honors in 1976. He has been a fellow at the American Academy in Berlin and the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University, and has served on the Visiting Committee of the University of Chicago Law School, April 18)
Our era is known as the Age of Terror, and no wonder. Twelve years ago, the United States suffered its worst terrorist attack ever, and since then, we have lived
under the shadow of atrocities designed to frighten as well as kill. The bombs that went off in Boston put to rest the hope that with al-Qaida largely demolished,
we could rest easy. This episode was a gruesome reminder of the toxicity of political extremism and our vulnerability to it. There are people out there who want to
kill innocent Americans, and there is no reliable way to stop them all. The question looking back is: Who did it? The question looking forward is: What's next? But
horrifying though the Boston attack was, we don't really live in an age of terror. In relative terms, believe it or not, it's really an age of peace and
safety. We are not immune to radical violence. But we have far less of it than we used to. Back in 1993, al-Qaida operatives set off a truck bomb in the
basement of New York's World Trade Center, killing six and injuring more than 1,000. Two years later, Timothy McVeigh detonated explosives at the federal
building in Oklahoma City, leaving 168 people dead. Those were preludes to the horror of 9/11. But since then, terrorism has not proliferated -- just the
opposite. From 1991 through 2000, reports the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of
Maryland, the United States had an average of 41 terrorist attacks per year. From 2002 through 2010, the number was just 16 per year.
Even the 1990s were nothing compared to the 1960s and 1970s, when homegrown terrorism reached epidemic levels. The violence came from both the right
and the left. The Ku Klux Klan assassinated civil rights leader Medgar Evers and killed four black girls by blowing up a church in Birmingham, Ala. Anti-Castro
militants committed dozens of bombings in Miami. The Weather Underground mounted its own campaign of bombings, including blasts at the U.S. Capitol, the
Pentagon and the State Department. In 1970, antiwar radicals destroyed a University of Wisconsin science lab and killed a postdoctoral researcher. "Bombing
has reached gigantic proportions," New York City's police commissioner told Congress. The New York Times reported, "From January 1969 to April 7, 1970, the
country suffered 4,330 bombings" that caused 43 deaths. Not all leftist radicals joined in. "Sniping," noted The Times, "appears to be the preferred style of
violence for black militants." The volume of mayhem is hard to imagine in our more peaceful age. The trend over the past few decades has been
away from the use of physically destructive means to achieve ideological ends. How come? It's not because we have more police
or better crime-fighting technology, though those help. It's a reflection of an often polarized but essentially healthy political culture. Murderous
movements simply don't flourish in modern America. A soil that is ideal for robust and often vitriolic debate offers little sustenance to the
weeds of violent extremism. In the weeks after 9/11, it was widely assumed that terrorist attacks and suicide bombings would
proliferate within our borders. But al-Qaida didn't inspire a legion of followers and imitators any more than McVeigh did. The uprisings
they hoped to produce never ignited. American Muslims almost unanimously rejected the call to religious war, even after the U.S.
invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. A big reason for the ebbing of violence is that American society has come so far. In the 1960s, blacks suffered
severe discrimination and had little political power. During the Vietnam War, 18-year-olds were forced to risk death for a cause many rejected. The second-class
status of women fueled political alienation. Protests often evoked brutal responses from police. Those festering social ills have vanished or subsided. America
is a freer and more open place for people of all kinds. Even Muslims are not less satisfied with the direction of the country than their neighbors:
They are more satisfied . Our political rhetoric is sometimes irresponsible. But the safety valve of untrammeled free speech seems to keep it from turning
into actual violence. Fire-eaters can engage in political theater without proceeding to incendiary action. Those who resort to killing innocents achieve nothing but
the defeat of their own cause. Americans have
no sympathy for political violence. And that's a pretty good inoculation against it.
SURVEILLANCE DEFENSE
2ac
Bulk collection can’t stop terrorism
Nakashima 14, National Security Reporter for the Washington Post. Degree in Humanities from UC Berkley.
(Ellen, “NSA phone record collection does little to prevent terrorist attacks, group says” Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-phone-record-collection-does-little-to-prevent-terrorist-attacks-groupsays/2014/01/12/8aa860aa-77dd-11e3-8963-b4b654bcc9b2_story.html, 1-24-14)
An analysis of 225 terrorism cases inside the United States since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has concluded that the bulk collection of
phone records by the National Security Agency “has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of
terrorism.” In the majority of cases, traditional law enforcement and investigative methods provided the tip or evidence to initiate the
case, according to the study by the New America Foundation, a Washington-based nonprofit group. The study, to be released Monday, corroborates the
findings of a White House-appointed review group, which said last month that the NSA counterterrorism program “was not
essential to preventing attacks” and that much of the evidence it did turn up “could readily have been obtained in
a timely manner using conventional [court] orders.” Under the program, the NSA amasses the metadata — records of phone numbers
dialed and call lengths and times — of virtually every American. Analysts may search the data only with reasonable suspicion that a number is linked to a terrorist
group. The content of calls is not collected. The new study comes as President Obama is deliberating over the future of the NSA’s bulk collection program. Since
it was disclosed in June, the program has prompted intense debate over its legality, utility and privacy impact. Senior administration officials have defended the
program as one tool that complements others in building a more complete picture of a terrorist plot or network. And they say it has been valuable in knocking
down rumors of a plot and in determining that potential threats against the United States are nonexistent. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr.
calls that the “peace of mind” metric. In an opinion piece published after the release of the review group’s report, Michael Morell, a former acting CIA director and
a member of the panel, said the program “needs to be successful only once to be invaluable.” The researchers at the New America Foundation found that the
program provided evidence to initiate only one case, involving a San Diego cabdriver, Basaaly Moalin, who was convicted of
sending money to a terrorist group in Somalia. Three co-conspirators were also convicted. The cases involved no threat of attack
against the United States. “The overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism officials is not that they need vaster amounts of
information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently understand or widely share the information they
already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and intelligence techniques,” said the report, whose principal
author is Peter Bergen, director of the foundation’s National Security Program and an expert on terrorism. In at least 48 instances, traditional surveillance
warrants obtained from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court were used to obtain evidence through intercepts of phone calls and e-mails, said the
researchers, whose results are in an online database. More than half of the cases were initiated as a result of traditional investigative tools.
The most common was a community or family tip to the authorities. Other methods included the use of informants, a suspiciousactivity report filed by a business or community member to the FBI, or information turned up in investigations of non-terrorism
cases. But Richard Clarke, a member of the White House review panel and a former White House counterterrorism adviser, said
he thinks the NSA can use traditional methods — such as obtaining a court order — to obtain data as part of counterterrorism
investigations. “Although we might be safer if the government had ready access to a massive storehouse of information about every detail of our lives, the
impact of such a program on the quality of life and on individual freedom would simply be too great,” the group’s report said. Said Clarke: “Even if NSA had
solved every one of the [terrorist] cases based on” the phone collection, “we would still have proposed the changes.” Supporters of the NSA program said it’s
important for the agency to maintain the database of phone records so that analysts can query it quickly. One phone company executive concurred that the
private sector can’t “mine” records the same way as the NSA because their databases aren’t as comprehensive. “So if they call us at 3 o’clock in the morning and
said, ‘We got a big issue and we need something in an hour,’ we couldn’t do that,” said the executive, who was not authorized to speak on the record and spoke
on the condition of anonymity. “But if they say, ‘Give it to us in the next two weeks,’ yes, we could probably do that.” According to the New America Foundation,
after the NSA shared Moalin’s number with the FBI, the bureau waited two months to begin an investigation and wiretap his phone.
1ar
The NSA bulk data collection programs have not been as useful as the NSA says it would be in
stopping terrorist attacks.
Bergen et al 13 researchers for a think tank, the New America Foundation ’14 (Peter, David Sterman, Emily Schneider,
Bailey Cahall, Peter Bergen is a director of national security at the New American Foundation and national security analyst for
CNN, David Sterman and Emily Schneider are research assistants and Bailey Cahall is a research associate. “Do NSA's Bulk
Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorists?“, New America Foundation,
http://pierreghz.legtux.org/streisand/autoblogs/frglobalvoicesonlineorg_0e319138ab63237c2d2aeff84b4cb506d936eab8/media/e
1982452.Bergen_NAF_NSA20Surveillance_1_0.pdf, Pgs. 1-3,)
On June 5, 2013, the Guardian broke the first story in what would become a flood of revelations regarding the extent and nature of the NSA’s surveillance
programs.1 Facing an uproar over the threat such programs posed to privacy, the Obama administration scrambled to defend them as legal and essential to U.S.
national security and counterterrorism. Two weeks after the first leaks by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden were published, President Obama defended
the NSA surveillance programs during a visit to Berlin, saying: “We know of at least 50 threats that have been averted because of this information not just in the
United States, but, in some cases, threats here in Germany. So lives have been saved.” Gen. Keith Alexander, the director of the NSA, testified before Congress
that: “the information gathered from these programs provided the U.S. government with critical leads to help prevent over 50 potential terrorist events in more
than 20 countries around the world.”3 Rep. Mike Rogers (RMich.), chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said on the House floor
the
government’s claims about the role that NSA “bulk” surveillance of phone and email communications records has had
in keeping the United States safe from terrorism shows that these claims are overblown and even misleading. An in-depth
in July that “54 times [the NSA programs] stopped and thwarted terrorist attacks both here and in Europe – saving real lives.” [However, our review of
analysis of 225 individuals recruited by al-Qaeda or a like-minded group or inspired by al-Qaeda’s ideology, and charged in the United States with an act of
terrorism since 9/11, demonstrates that traditional investigative methods, such as the use of informants, tips from local communities, and
targeted intelligence operations, provided the initial impetus for investigations in the majority of cases, while the contribution of
NSA’s bulk surveillance programs to these cases was minimal. Indeed, the controversial bulk collection of American telephone metadata, which
includes the telephone numbers that originate and receive calls, as well as the time and date of those calls but not their content, under Section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act, appears to have played an identifiable role in, at most, 1.8 percent of these cases. NSA programs involving the surveillance of non-
U.S. persons outside of the United States under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act played a role in 4.4 percent of the
terrorism cases we examined, and NSA surveillance under an unidentified authority played a role in 1.3 percent of the cases we
examined.] Regular FISA warrants not issued in connection with Section 215 or Section 702, which are the traditional means for investigating foreign persons,
were used in at least 48 (21 percent) of the cases we looked at, although it’s unclear whether these warrants played an initiating role or were used at a later point
in the investigation. (Click on the link to go to a database of all 225 individuals, complete with additional details about them and the government’s investigations of
these cases: http://natsec.newamerica.net/nsa/analysis). Surveillance of American phone metadata has had no discernible impact on preventing acts of terrorism
and only the most marginal of impacts on preventing terrorist related activity, such as fundraising for a terrorist group. Furthermore, our examination of the role of
the database of U.S. citizens’ telephone metadata in the single plot the government uses to justify the importance of the program – that of Basaaly Moalin, a San
Diego cabdriver who in 2007 and 2008 provided $8,500 to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia – calls into question the necessity of the Section 215 bulk
collection program. According to the government, the database of American phone metadata allows intelligence authorities to quickly
circumvent the traditional burden of proof associated with criminal warrants, thus allowing them to “connect the dots” faster and
prevent future 9/11-scale attacks. Yet in the Moalin case, after using the NSA’s phone database to link a number in Somalia to
Moalin, the FBI waited two months to begin an investigation and wiretap his phone. Although it’s unclear why there was a delay between the
NSA tip and the FBI wiretapping, court documents show there was a two-month period in which the FBI was not monitoring Moalin’s calls, despite official
This undercuts the government’s theory that the database
of Americans’ telephone metadata is necessary to expedite the investigative process, since it clearly didn’t expedite
the process in the single case the government uses to extol its virtues. Additionally, a careful review of three of the key
terrorism cases the government has cited to defend NSA bulk surveillance programs reveals that government officials
have exaggerated the role of the NSA in the cases against David Coleman Headley and Najibullah Zazi, and the significance of the threat posed by
statements that the bureau had Moalin’s phone number and had identified him.
a notional plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange. In 28 percent of the cases we reviewed, court records and public reporting do not identify which specific
methods initiated the investigation. These cases, involving 62 individuals, may have been initiated by an undercover informant, an
undercover officer, a family member tip, other traditional law enforcement methods, CIA- or FBI generated intelligence, NSA surveillance of
some kind, or any number of other methods. In 23 of these 62 cases (37 percent), an informant was used. However, we were unable to determine whether the
informant initiated the investigation or was used after the investigation was initiated as a result of the use of some other investigative means. Some of these
cases may also be too recent to have developed a public record large enough to identify which investigative tools were used. We have also identified three
additional plots that the government has not publicly claimed as NSA successes, but in which court records and public reporting suggest the NSA had a role.
However, it is not clear whether any of those three cases involved bulk surveillance programs. Finally, the overall problem for U.S. counterterrorism
officials is not that they need vaster amounts of information from the bulk surveillance programs, but that they don’t sufficiently
understand or widely share the information they already possess that was derived from conventional law enforcement and
intelligence techniques. This was true for two of the 9/11 hijackers who were known to be in the United States before the attacks on New York and
Washington, as well as with the case of Chicago resident David Coleman Headley, who helped plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, and it is the unfortunate
pattern we have also seen in several other significant terrorism cases.
FAILED STATES TURN
2ac
Failed states key to terrorism
Piazza 08 (James A. Piazza is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at Penn State University, Ph.D., New
York University. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” Published Aug 7, 2008.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x/full#b17)
But Hehir (2007) argues that this is only one possible dimension of state failure . In addition to “coercive incapacity,” failed states suffer from
“administrative incapacity,” which involves a failure to provide the basic services that most citizens expect from modern
governments, such as a minimal level of personal security, economic stability, and functioning bureaucratic and judicial
institutions. Rotberg (2002) explains that failed states are unable to provide “political goods,” and describes a pattern of distinguishing
features that failed states exhibit: government failure to maintain the essential wellbeing of their populations and/or governments
that have begun to “prey upon their own citizens” through kleptocracy; a sustained degradation of the infrastructure necessary for
citizens to maintain a “normal” life, resulting in substantial humanitarian crises and/or migration; widespread lawlessness to the
point that criminal groups act with impunity or rival the authority of government actors; and a transference of some or many
citizens’ loyalties to non-state actors in many parts of the country. First, because they lack the ability to project power internally and
have incompetent and corrupt law enforcement capacities, failed and failing states provide opportunities, and lower costs,
for terrorist groups to organize, train, generate revenue, and set up logistics and communications beyond those
afforded by the network of safe houses in non-failed states .1 Terrorist groups can therefore develop their own capabilities
with little governmental interference or scrutiny. This phenomenon is also referred to as the exploitation of “stateless areas,” or
the use of actual, spatial regions of a country that are beyond the policing control of the central government and within which
non-state actors can set up autonomous political, economic, and social institutions, or the segments of the polity of a country that
are impenetrable by state power and provide networks of resistance to state authority. An example of the former would be the southern region of
Afghanistan where the Taliban is active, and an example of the latter would be the system of radical “madrassas” or religious schools in Pakistan. The presence of
stateless areas within states frees-up group resources otherwise allocated towards evading government agents and
permit more extensive and aggressive fundraising, recruitment, and training efforts . Those groups with ambitions to
launch transnational attacks, in particular have more extensive logistical and training needs and therefore need autonomous
space without the costs of evading law enforcement.
1ar
Failed states have lots of recruits for terror groups.
Piazza 08 (James A. Piazza is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at Penn State University, Ph.D., New
York University. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” Published Aug 7, 2008.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x/full#b17)
Second, failed states offer terrorist groups a larger pool of potential recruits because they contain large numbers of
insecure, disaffected, alienated, and disloyal citizens for whom political violence is an accepted avenue of behavior .2
Failed states are chronically unable to provide basic security and economic sustenance to their citizens, and thereby give rise to
what Ehrlich and Liu (2002) and O’Neil (2002) identify as a key contributing factor to the growth of terrorism—“basic
human insecurity.” Also, Gunaratna (2002) argues that poor governance, poor economic development, corruption, and lack of
human rights—all hallmarks of failed states—sharpen the appeal of fanaticism, and by extension terrorism, among potential
political actors. Failed states, through their incompetence, create “political goods vacuums” into which terrorist groups can step
and parcel out personal security, economic assistance, or other services to win the support of the local population and widen
their activities.3
Failed states have high levels of corruption within the governments
Piazza 08 (James A. Piazza is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at Penn State University, Ph.D., New
York University. “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” Published Aug 7, 2008.
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x/full#b17)
Finally, as recognized states in the international system, failed states retain the “outward signs of sovereignty” (Takeyh and
Gvosdev 2002, 100). This helps to promote transnational terrorist groups in two ways. First, the principle of state sovereignty
places legal limits on intervention by other states, thereby shielding terrorists from the military and law enforcement capacity of
outside countries targeted by or interested in addressing terrorism. Second, failed states are sovereign and legally recognized
states, and so their government officials, who are often underpaid, poorly trained and monitored, and are therefore highly
corruptible, can provide terrorists with access to legal documentation, such as passports, visas and end-user certificates to
import and export arms, in exchange for money, political support, or physical protection.
Failed states are the root cause of terrorism
Rotberg 02 (Robert I. Rotberg is Director of the Program on Intrastate Conflict at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy
School of Government and President of the World Peace Foundation. “Failed States in a World of Terror” Published: July/August
2002, Foreign Affairs Magazine https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-07-01/failed-states-world-terror)
Although the phenomenon of state failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever before. In less interconnected
eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now, these states pose dangers
not only to themselves and their neighbors but also to peoples around the globe. Preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail,
are thus strategic and moral imperatives. But failed states are not homogeneous. The nature of state failure varies from place to place, sometimes dramatically. Failure and weakness
can flow from a nation's geographical, physical, historical, and political circumstances, such as colonial errors and Cold War policy mistakes. More than structural or institutional
weaknesses, human agency is also culpable, usually in a fatal way. Destructive decisions by individual leaders have almost always paved the way to state failure. President Mobutu
Sese Seko's three-plus decades of kleptocratic rule sucked Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, or DRC) dry until he was deposed in 1997. In Sierra Leone, President Siaka
Stevens (1967-85) systematically plundered his tiny country and instrumentalized disorder. President Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-91) did the same in Somalia. These rulers were
personally greedy, but as predatory patrimonialists they also licensed and sponsored the avarice of others, thus preordaining the destruction of their states. Today's
failed
states, such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders,
leaving their territories governmentally empty. This outcome is troubling to world order, especially to an international system that
demands -- indeed, counts on -- a state's capacity to govern its space. Failed states have come to be feared as "breeding
grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder" (in the words of political scientist Stephen Walt), as well as reservoirs and exporters of
terror. The existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they harbor, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods
of their own peoples but endangers world peace.
Failed states have no ability to monitor insurgents within their own borders.
Krasner and Pascual 05 (Stephen Krasner is an international relations professor at Stanford University and is a former
Director of Policy Planning at the United States Department of State and Carlos Pascual is the State Department's Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. “Addressing State Failure” Published:
July/August 2005, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2005-07-01/addressing-state-failure)
Further complicating matters, modern conflicts are far more likely to be internal, civil matters than to be clashes between opposing
countries. "State death" as a result of external invasion, common before World War II, has almost disappeared since 1945. The lack of good governance in weak
states means they often do not have the ability to deal with disaffected or criminal groups within their own borders. Recent
scholarship suggests that civil strife is no more likely in ethnically or religiously divided countries than it is in homogeneous ones.
Internal discord is more likely to arise in countries suffering from poverty, a highly unequal income distribution, recent decolonization, weak institutions, ineffective police and
counterinsurgency forces, and difficult terrain -- conditions that allow small guerrilla bands to thrive. Valuable raw materials, such as diamonds or oil, also tend to spark conflict among
competitors who want to seize control of the wealth. Warring
groups generally have easy access to weapons and may even control territory,
giving them a base for launching attacks on the state, its citizens, or its neighbors. Other nonstate actors, including transnational
terrorist organizations, can also take root in such environments, posing a threat to global security.
EUROPE COOP TURN
2ac
NSA overreach hurts US-EU terror cooperation
Mix 15 (Derek E. , Analyst in European Affairs “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf , February 3)
In 2013, press reports began surfacing about U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs in the United States
and Europe created tensions in the transatlantic relationship. Among other allegations, the reports asserted that objects of U.S.
spying included the EU offices in Washington, DC and the cell phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The information was
based on leaked, classified documents obtained from Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor; and focused on operations
allegedly conducted by the NSA and the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (the UK’s signals intelligence
agency). The reports raised serious concerns on both sides of the Atlantic about the extent of U.S. surveillance operations, the
degree of involvement by European intelligence services, and the appropriate balance between promoting security and
upholding privacy rights and civil liberties. Some observers worry that the allegations have resulted in lasting damage to
transatlantic trust, negatively affecting U.S.-European political, security, and economic ties. Many European leaders, EU officials,
and European citizens were deeply dismayed by the reports and concerned that such operations could violate European privacy
rights and civil liberties and compromise the security of European citizens’ personal data. Criticism has been most pronounced in
Germany, where disclosed NSA activities appear to have been broad in scope and the issue of government surveillance of
private citizens evokes particularly strong feelings due to the legacy of domestic spying by the Nazi and East German regimes.
Many analysts point out that the fallout from the reports could have implications for U.S.- European cooperation on
counterterrorism and data privacy by complicating negotiations about renewal of the SWIFT and passenger name record (PNR)
agreements (in 2015 and 2019, respectively), as well as the proposed Data Privacy and Protection Agreement. In the European
Parliament, the reports exacerbated long-standing objections to the SWIFT and PNR agreements and intensified MEPs’
concerns about U.S. data protection safeguards and access to European citizens’ personal data . In the aftermath of the reports, the
European Parliament called for 17 suspension of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor agreement that allows commercial data exchanges, and there have been suggestions
that the purported U.S. surveillance activities may have a wider effect on economic relations, including with regard to negotiations on the proposed TTIP.
1ar- aff solves coop
Europe specifically hates surveillance of information held by US companies- the aff solves their
concerns
Moyer 13 (Edward, Edward Moyer is an associate editor at CNET News and a many-year veteran of the writing and editing
world “Eye on surveillance: France's PRISM, EU's concerns,” Eye on surveillance: France's PRISM, EU's concerns July 4)
Valls isn't the only European concerned about the U.S. National Security Agency: The European Parliament has adopted a joint, cross-party resolution to
begin investigations into widespread NSA surveillance of the citizens of member states. As Zack Whittaker at CNET sister site ZDNet reports, the vote calls on
the U.S. "to suspend and review any laws and surveillance programs that 'violate the fundamental right of EU citizens to privacy
and data protection,' as well as Europe's 'sovereignty and jurisdiction'." The resolution also gives the European Commission the go-ahead to
suspend data-sharing laws between Europe and the U.S., should the commission decide[d] to. The resolution says the EC should "give consideration to
all the instruments at their disposal in discussions and negotiations with the U.S...including the possible suspension of the
passenger name record (PNR) and terrorist finance tracking program (TFTP) agreements. " If the PNR were put on ice, flights between the
U.S. and Europe could conceivably be grounded. The vote also notes "concern" over PRISM surveillance programs involving EU
countries including Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Sweden. And it gives the European Parliament's Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs committee the greenlight to start gathering evidence from U.S. and EU sources on how surveillance activities might violate EU citizens' rights to privacy
and data protection. The committee plans to deliver its conclusions by the end of the year. In other Europe-related news, the Guardian cited a German
government spokesman in reporting that "a working group of high-level U.S. and German intelligence experts will begin 'an immediate and intense discussion'
over the issues of data protection and intelligence collection" to address mounting European concerns that are "threatening to overshadow trade negotiations and
damage Silicon Valley exports." Those talks could begin as soon as Monday. Also, EC Vice President Neelie Kroes said in a statement after the meeting of the
European Cloud Partnership Board that though "cloud computing helps us benefit from the data revolution and is a gift to our economy," questions surrounding
surveillance efforts are a problem. "If European cloud customers cannot trust the United States government or their assurances
[regarding surveillance efforts], then maybe they won't trust U.S. cloud providers either. That is my guess. And if I am right then there are
multibillion euro consequences for American companies." "We need trust," Kroes said. "In some cases, of course, it may be legitimate for authorities
to access, to some degree, information held online; child protection and terrorism are good examples. Such access must be based on transparent
rule of law, and is the exception to the rule." Is all this world-shaking cloak-and-dagger business beginning to sound like fodder for a Hollywood-style film?
Well, a group of Hong Kong-based indie filmmakers have already been there, done that -- sort of. The Wall Street Journal's Speakeasy blog recently noted the
posting to YouTube of the 5-minute short "Verax," which imagines what might have happened as U.S. and Chinese intelligence officers raced to find PRISM
leaker Edward Snowden as he hid out in Hong Kong. Co-creator Marcus Tsui described the effort to Speakeasy as "a snapshot in time," as residents of the city
speculated about the fate of Snowden, who was eventually allowed to leave the city because a U.S. extradition request did not fully comply with Hong Kong law.
Snowden has reportedly filed for political asylum in 20 countries but is still apparently holed up in the transit section of Russia's Sheremetyevo airport. And
Mashable reported today that members of Iceland's Pirate Party introduced a bill that would give Snowden Icelandic citizenship, should he end up in that country.
The film's title, "Verax" ("truth teller" in Latin), refers to the code-name Snowden used when dealing with The Washington Post, to which, along with the U.K.'s
Guardian, he leaked top-secret documents regarding NSA spying programs. Here's the film. We imagine someone will make a feature length movie about the
Snowden saga one of these days.
Regulation of domestic surveillance is sufficient to solve- it’s key to compliance with international
agreements
PROFFITT 13 (BRIAN , Brian Proffitt is a technology expert specializing in enterprise, cloud computing and big data with 23 years of
journalism and publishing experience. He is the author of 24 books on mobile technology and personal computing and an adjunct instructor at
top-ranked Mendoza College of Business at the University of Notre Dame. Breathing is a hobby. “PRISM Fallout: U.S. Internet Companies
Stained By Intelligence Actions
Is the cloud about to be geo-fenced into Balkanized collections of data thanks to PRISM? ,” http://readwrite.com/2013/07/03/prism-fallout-usinternet-companies-stained-by-intelligence-actions, JUL 3)
It was bound to happen sooner or later: faced with mounting global criticism on its use of Internet data to monitor international denizens
for intelligence reasons, the U.S. is now starting right up there with China as safest places to store data on the Web. If trust in U.S. web and data
services continues to erode, the future of global cloud computing will be a much different place than what is currently envisioned. The AP is reporting
today that German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich is warning anyone on the Internet to avoid using U.S.-based services such as
those from Facebook, Google or Microsoft. … Friedrich told reporters in Berlin on Wednesday that "whoever fears their communication is
being intercepted in any way should use services that don't go through American servers ." Germany is only one of several nations that
are particularly angered by revelations that the U.S. apparently is engaging in wide-scale intelligence gathering using data
collected directly from private Internet firms via the so-called PRISM project. If the allegations implied by the leaked PRISM
documents are true, then PRISM would seriously jeopardize business relations between the U.S. and other countries. The
European Union may be the first relationship to get damaged. See also: PRISM Fallout: In Cloud We Don't Trust? In order to comply with
strict E.U. data laws, which essentially prevent data being stored outside an E.U. member nation's borders, the E.U. and the U.S.
have established a Safe Harbor agreement that enables data to be stored in U.S.-based cloud services so long as the U.S.
service providers self-regulate themselves to maintain strict standards of privacy protections. Recent assertions show that U.S.
intelligence services may actually have on-site equipment on PRISM participants' property, despite repeated denials from those services, which also include
Yahoo, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. If the information from the leaked PRISM documents is true, this is a serious breach of
their Safe Harbor agreement. Even if PRISM turns out to be fictitious, just the hint that something like PRISM could exist could evaporate a large amount
of trust and business for U.S. cloud vendors—even ones not named in the PRISM documents. Friedrich's comments today are a sharp reminder of
just how fast the relationship between E.U. and U.S. companies could deteriorate Bound by law not to discuss what they are doing to help
intelligence services, the named PRISM companies and services are facing a P.R. nightmare, where all they can do is deny and hope the problem goes away.
International policy makers are growing increasingly angered at what they see as U.S. arrogance . (Yesterday's search of Bolivian
President Evo Morales's plane by Austrian authorities in Vienna for Edward Snowden, the self-identified leaker of the PRISM documents, probably does not help
that perception.) We may very well be heading for a new geo-fenced world of data isolationism, where the storage of data across international borders will not be
so commonplace as it is today. If that becomes the case, how will the Internet landscape work then? Will apps that sell on an international scale be forced to
maintain separate Balkanized data collections for each nation served? Or will any Internet-based company now be forced to lock down their data in direct
defiance of state-sanctioned data collection operations? Neither choice seems palatable, but to regain the trust and business of a global audience,
the U.S. may have to take such drastic measures. What's your picture of a post-PRISM Internet future?
The perception of restoring oversight is key to solve European concerns
Lister 13 (Tim, CNN, 10-25-2013, "Europe falls out of love with Obama over NSA spying claims," CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/24/world/europe/europe-us-surveillance/)
On July 24, 2008, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama addressed tens of thousands of Germans on the avenue that leads
from the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. In a pointed reference to the outgoing administration of President George W. Bush, he
promised a new era of "allies who will listen to each other, who will learn from each other, who will, above all, trust each other."
One German present among the hugely enthusiastic crowd said the occasion reminded him of Berlin's famous "Love Parade." No U.S. politician since John F.
Kennedy had so captured Europeans' imagination. Five years on, in the words of the song, it's a case of "After the Love Has Gone." The
U.S. ambassador in Berlin has been summoned to the foreign ministry over reports in Der Spiegel that the U.S. National Security
Administration (NSA) monitored Chancellor Angela Merkel's official cellphone. His counterpart in Paris received a similar
summons earlier this week after revelations in Le Monde. Merkel says Europe's trust must be repaired after U.S. spying claims
Both Der Spiegel and Le Monde used documents provided by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. U.S. denies report it
spied on Merkel. One of Chancellor Merkel's closest allies, Defense Minister Thomas de Maiziere told broadcaster ARD there would be
consequences. "We can't simply turn the page," he warned. Der Spiegel reported Thursday that Thomas Oppermann, who leads the
parliamentary committee that scrutinizes Germany's intelligence services, complained that "the NSA's monitoring activities have
gotten completely out of hand, and take place beyond all democratic controls ." In an article for the forthcoming edition of Foreign Affairs
magazine, Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore argue that it's the disclosure of such practices rather than their existence
that is damaging . "When these deeds turn out to clash with the government's public rhetoric, as they so often do, it becomes
harder for U.S. allies to overlook Washington's covert behavior and easier for U.S. adversaries to justify their own," they write.
"The U.S. government, its friends, and its foes can no longer plausibly deny the dark side of U.S. foreign policy and will have to
address it head-on," they argue. Among the Twitterati, #merkelphone has gained some traction, with the famous Obama motif
"Yes We Can" finding a new interpretation. And the European media has begun to debate whether the revelations provided by
Edward Snowden to The Guardian and other newspapers will do to Obama's image on the continent what the Iraq war did to that
of President George W. Bush. Hyperbole perhaps, but the Obama administration is on the defensive, caught between fuller disclosure of just what the
NSA has been up to and the need to protect intelligence-gathering methods. The president himself received what German officials describe as an angry call from
Merkel Wednesday demanding assurances that there is no American eavesdropping on her conversations. The language out of the White House has been less
than forthright, with spokesman Jay Carney saying that "the president assured the chancellor that the United States is not monitoring, and will not monitor, the
communications of the chancellor." His careful avoidance of the past tense has heightened suspicions in Europe that only the Snowden disclosures have forced
a change of practice. Even pro-U.S. newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung are in full throttle, writing that: "The government in Washington
has apparently not yet understood the level of damage that continues to be caused by the activities of American intelligence
agencies in Europe." Le Monde reported that the NSA collected details of millions of phone calls made in France, and described
it indignantly as "intrusion, on a vast scale, both into the private space of French citizens as well as into the secrets of major
national firms." French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault commented it was "incredible that an allied country like the United
States at this point goes as far as spying on private communications that have no strategic justification, no justification on the
basis of national defense." The U.S. Director of National Intelligence insisted in a curt statement that "the allegation that the
National Security Agency collected more than 70 million "recordings of French citizens' telephone data" is false." But President
Obama called his French counterpart, Hollande, and the White House subsequently acknowledged the allegations had raised "legitimate questions for our
friends and allies." The fall-out may be more than rhetorical. Germany's opposition Social Democrats are asking whether the European Union can -- or
should -- agree a free trade deal with the U.S. in the current atmosphere. Negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership were already in a
fragile state and will not be helped by claims in Le Monde that large French corporations such as telecom company Alcatel-Lucent have been targeted by the
NSA. The European parliament has always been prickly about data-sharing with the U.S., and for years held up the U.S.
Treasury's efforts to use the SWIFT interbank apparatus to keep tabs on terrorists' financial flows. The parliament this week
passed a non-binding resolution calling for the agreement that was eventually reached to be suspended . And a parliamentary
committee has agreed tough measures that would forbid U.S. companies providing data services in Europe to transfer the information to the U.S. without
obtaining permission. The legislation must be agreed with member states, but for those hoping to get the provision deleted the wind is blowing in the wrong
direction. Not unlike the WikiLeaks disclosures, reports based on the Snowden documents have caused embarrassment and friction around the world. President
Dilma Rousseff of Brazil cancelled a visit to the United States after it was alleged that the NSA had intercepted her messages as well as communications from
the state oil company, Petrobras, now one of the biggest players in the oil industry. Spiegel reported the U.S. had also accessed emails to and from former
Mexican President Felipe Calderón while he was still in office. Obama, in his address to the U.N. General Assembly last month, tried to head off the gathering
storm - saying: "We've begun to review the way that we gather intelligence, so that we properly balance the legitimate security
concerns of our citizens and allies with the privacy concerns that all people share." U.S. spy chief says reports of NSA logging
French phone calls are false And there is a hint in the U.S. response this week that, to borrow from Hamlet: "The lady doth
protest too much." The NSA itself has made the point that "the United States gathers foreign intelligence of the type gathered by
all nations." The UK and France are among governments that run their own expansive technical programs. Der Spiegel reported -- again based on Snowden's
disclosures -- that the British equivalent of the NSA was involved in a cyber-attack against Belgium's state-run telecommunications company, Belgacom. The
company would only say that "the intruder had massive resources, sophisticated means and a steadfast intent to break into our network." The Europeans have
been very grateful to share the benefits of the NSA's immense data-gathering abilities in counter-terrorism and other fields. U.S. diplomatic cables disclosed by
WikiLeaks show Germany was enthusiastic in 2009 and 2010 for closer links with the NSA to develop what is known as a High Resolution Optical System
(HiROS) -- a highly advanced "constellation" of reconnaissance satellites. One cable from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin said: "Germany
anticipates that their emergence as a world leader in overhead reconnaissance will generate interest from the USG and
envisions an expansion of the intelligence relationship." The 9/11 attacks changed espionage beyond recognition, leading to
massive investment in the U.S. in "technical means" -- the flagship of which is the enormous NSA data center being completed in
Bluffdale, Utah. Its computing power, according to the specialist online publication govtech.com is "equivalent to the capacity of
62 billion iPhone 5s." But 9/11 also shifted the balance between intelligence-gathering and civil liberties, with the U.S. federal
government acquiring new powers in the fight against terrorism -- some sanctioned by Congress but others ill-defined. The
technology that allows such enormous data-harvesting cannot be put back in the box, but the limits to its use pose an equally huge challenge. Ultimately, the
Europeans need to collaborate with the U.S. on intelligence-gathering, to deal with international terrorism, cyber threats and
organized crime. But the Snowden allegations, whether reported accurately or not, have changed the public perception and
mood in Europe, obliging leaders like Merkel to take a tougher stand. At least there has been plenty of room for black humor amid the diplomatic
back-and-forth. "Earnest question: What do European leaders talk about that's worth spying on?" asked Politico's Blake Hounshell on Twitter, while New York
Times London bureau chief Steve Erlanger quipped: "I'm not sure I'd want to listen in to Silvio Berlusconi's cellphone."
NSA surveillance hurts EU-US cooperation
Ball 13 (James, special projects editor, The Guardian. 10/25. www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-worldleaders-calls)
The National Security Agency monitored the phone conversations of 35 world leaders after being given the numbers by an
official in another US government department, according to a classified document provided by whistleblower Edward Snowden.
The confidential memo reveals that the NSA encourages senior officials in its "customer" departments, such the White House,
State and the Pentagon, to share their "Rolodexes" so the agency can add the phone numbers of leading foreign politicians to
their surveillance systems. The document notes that one unnamed US official handed over 200 numbers, including those of the 35 world leaders, none of
whom is named. These were immediately "tasked" for monitoring by the NSA. The revelation is set to add to mounting diplomatic tensions
between the US and its allies, after the German chancellor Angela Merkel on Wednesday accused the US of tapping her mobile phone. After Merkel's
allegations became public, White House press secretary Jay Carney issued a statement that said the US "is not monitoring and will not monitor" the
German chancellor's communications. But that failed to quell the row, as officials in Berlin quickly pointed out that the US did not
deny monitoring the phone in the past. Arriving in Brussels for an EU summit Merkel accused the US of a breach of trust. "We
need to have trust in our allies and partners, and this must now be established once again. I repeat that spying among friends is
not at all acceptable against anyone, and that goes for every citizen in Germany." The NSA memo obtained by the Guardian
suggests that such surveillance was not isolated, as the agency routinely monitors the phone numbers of world leaders – and
even asks for the assistance of other US officials to do so. The memo, dated October 2006 and which was issued to staff in the agency's Signals
Intelligence Directorate (SID), was titled "Customers Can Help SID Obtain Targetable Phone Numbers". It begins by setting out an example of how US officials
who mixed with world leaders and politicians could help agency surveillance. "In one recent case," the memo notes, "a US official provided NSA
with 200 phone numbers to 35 world leaders … Despite the fact that the majority is probably available via open source, the PCs
[intelligence production centers] have noted 43 previously unknown phone numbers. These numbers plus several others have been tasked." The document
continues by saying the new phone numbers had helped the agency discover still more new contact details to add to their monitoring: "These numbers
have provided lead information to other numbers that have subsequently been tasked." But the memo acknowledges that
eavesdropping on the numbers had produced "little reportable intelligence". In the wake of the Merkel row, the US is facing growing
international criticism that any intelligence benefit from spying on friendly governments is far outweighed by the potential
diplomatic damage. The memo then asks analysts to think about any customers they currently serve who might similarly be happy to turn over details of
their contacts. "This success leads S2 [signals intelligence] to wonder if there are NSA liaisons whose supported customers may be willing to share their
'Rolodexes' or phone lists with NSA as potential sources of intelligence," it states. "S2 welcomes such information!" The document suggests that sometimes
these offers come unsolicited, with US "customers" spontaneously offering the agency access to their overseas networks. "From time to time, SID is offered
access to the personal contact databases of US officials," it states. "Such 'Rolodexes' may contain contact information for foreign political or military leaders, to
include direct line, fax, residence and cellular numbers." The Guardian approached the Obama administration for comment on the latest document. Officials
declined to respond directly to the new material, instead referring to comments delivered by Carney at Thursday's daily briefing. Carney told reporters: "The
[NSA] revelations have clearly caused tension in our relationships with some countries, and we are dealing with that through
diplomatic channels. "These are very important relations both economically and for our security, and we will work to maintain the
closest possible ties." The public accusation of spying on Merkel adds to mounting political tensions in Europe about the scope of
US surveillance on the governments of its allies, after a cascade of backlashes and apologetic phone calls with leaders across
the continent over the course of the week. Asked on Wednesday evening if the NSA had in the past tracked the German
chancellor's communications, Caitlin Hayden, the White House's National Security Council spokeswoman, said: "The United
States is not monitoring and will not monitor the communications of Chancellor Merkel. Beyond that, I'm not in a position to
comment publicly on every specific alleged intelligence activity." At the daily briefing on Thursday, Carney again refused to answer repeated
questions about whether the US had spied on Merkel's calls in the past. The NSA memo seen by the Guardian was written halfway through George W Bush's
second term, when Condoleezza Rice was secretary of state and Donald Rumsfeld was in his final months as defence secretary. Merkel, who, according to
Reuters, suspected the surveillance after finding her mobile phone number written on a US document, is said to have called for US surveillance to be placed on a
new legal footing during a phone call to President Obama. "The [German] federal government, as a close ally and partner of the US, expects
in the future a clear contractual basis for the activity of the services and their co-operation," she told the president. The leader of
Germany's Green party, Katrin Goring-Eckhart, called the alleged spying an "unprecedented breach of trust" between the two
countries. Earlier in the week, Obama called the French president François Hollande in response to reports in Le Monde that the NSA accessed more than
70m phone records of French citizens in a single 30-day period, while earlier reports in Der Spiegel uncovered NSA activity against the offices and
communications of senior officials of the European Union. The European Commission, the executive body of the EU, this week backed proposals that could
require US tech companies to seek permission before handing over EU citizens' data to US intelligence agencies, while the European parliament voted in favour
of suspending a transatlantic bank data sharing agreement after Der Spiegel revealed the agency was monitoring the international bank transfer system Swift.
1ar- coop key to terror
NSA overreach undermines counter-terror operations- international cooperation is key
Riechmann 13 (Deb, journalist for the Associated Press. "NSA Spying Threatens U.S. Foreign Policy Efforts"
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/26/nsa-spying-foreign-policy_n_4166076.html)
Secretary of State John Kerry went to Europe to talk about Mideast peace, Syria and Iran. What he got was an earful of outrage
over U.S. snooping abroad. President Barack Obama has defended America's surveillance dragnet to leaders of Russia, Mexico,
Brazil, France and Germany, but the international anger over the disclosures shows no signs of abating in the short run. Longer
term, the revelations by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden about NSA tactics that allegedly include
tapping the cellphones of as many as 35 world leaders threaten to undermine U.S. foreign policy in a range of areas. This
vacuum-cleaner approach to data collection has rattled allies. "The magnitude of the eavesdropping is what shocked us," former
French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said in a radio interview. "Let's be honest, we eavesdrop too. Everyone is listening to
everyone else. But we don't have the same means as the United States, which makes us jealous." So where in the world isn't the
NSA? That's one big question raised by the disclosures. Whether the tapping of allies is a step too far might be moot. The British ambassador to Lebanon, Tom
Fletcher, tweeted this past week: "I work on assumption that 6+ countries tap my phone. Increasingly rare that diplomats say anything sensitive on calls."
Diplomatic relations are built on trust. If America's credibility is in question, the U.S. will find it harder to maintain alliances,
influence world opinion and maybe even close trade deals. Spying among allies is not new. Madeleine Albright, secretary of state
during the Clinton administration, recalled being at the United Nations and having the French ambassador ask her why she said
something in a private conversation apparently intercepted by the French. The French government protested revelations this
past week that the NSA had collected 70.3 million French-based telephone and electronic message records in a 30-day period.
Albright says Snowden's disclosures have hurt U.S. policymakers. "A lot of the things that have come out, I think are specifically
damaging because they are negotiating positions and a variety of ways that we have to go about business," Albright said at a
conference hosted by the Center for American Progress in Washington. "I think it has made life very difficult for Secretary Kerry.
... There has to be a set of private talks that, in fact, precede negotiations and I think it makes it very, very hard." The spy flap could
give the Europeans leverage in talks with the U.S. on a free trade agreement, which would join together nearly half of the global economy. "If we go to the
negotiations and we have the feeling those people with whom we negotiate know everything that we want to deal with in advance, how can we trust each other?"
asked Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament. Claude Moniquet, a former French counterintelligence officer and now director of Brussels-based
European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center, said the controversy came at a good time for Europe "to have a lever, a means of pressure ... in these
negotiations." To Henry Farrell and Martha Finnemore at George Washington University, damage from the NSA disclosures could "undermine Washington's
ability to act hypocritically and get away with it." The danger in the disclosures "lies not in the new information that they reveal but in the documented confirmation
they provide of what the United States is actually doing and why," they wrote in Foreign Affairs. "When these deeds turn out to clash with the government's public
rhetoric, as they so often do, it becomes harder for U.S. allies to overlook Washington's covert behavior and easier for U.S. adversaries to justify their own." They
claim the disclosures forced Washington to abandon its "naming-and-shaming campaign against Chinese hacking." The revelations could undercut
Washington's effort to fight terrorism, says Kiron Skinner, director of the Center for International Relations and Politics at
Carnegie Mellon University. The broad nature of NSA surveillance goes against the Obama administration's claim that much of
U.S. espionage is carried out to combat terrorism, she said. "If Washington undermines its own leadership or that of its allies, the
collective ability of the West to combat terrorism will be compromised," Skinner said. "Allied leaders will have no incentive to put
their own militaries at risk if they cannot trust U.S. leadership." The administration asserts that the U.S. is amassing intelligence
of the type gathered by all nations and that it's necessary to protect the U.S. and its allies against security threats. Kerry discussed
the NSA affair in Europe with French and Italian officials this past week. Most governments have not retaliated, but some countries are pushing back.
Germany and France are demanding that the administration agree by year's end to new rules that could mean an end to reported American eavesdropping on
foreign leaders, companies and innocent citizens. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff canceled her official state visit to the White House. She ordered measures
aimed at greater Brazilian online independence and security after learning that the NSA intercepted her communications, hacked into the state-owned Petrobras
oil company's network and spied on Brazilians. Brazil says it is working with other countries to draft a U.N. General Assembly resolution that would guarantee
people's privacy in electronic communications. A European Parliament committee approved rules that would strengthen online privacy and outlaw the kind of
data transfers the U.S. is using for its spying program. European lawmakers have called for the suspension of an agreement that grants U.S. authorities access
to bank data needed for terrorism-related investigations. "We need trust among allies and partners," said German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
whose cellphone was allegedly tapped by the NSA. "Such trust now has to be built anew."
U.S. – E.U. cooperation key for counter-terrorism
Mix 15 (Derek E. , Analyst in European Affairs “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf , February 3)
The United States and European countries have been cooperating in efforts to counter the Islamic State and seek a political solution to the conflict in Syria.
Recent estimates suggest that upward of 3,000 European citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join groups involved in the conflict, and the potential threat
posed by returning “foreign fighters” has become a central concern. U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation has been strong since 9/11, although
differences regarding data privacy have posed some key information-sharing challenges. The United States and Europe remain
central actors in negotiations seeking to reach an agreement that ensures that Iran’s nuclear program can be used solely for
peaceful purposes. While an extensive array of U.S. and EU sanctions have worked to isolate and pressure Iran, the final
outcome of talks remains uncertain. • The United States and EU share broad objectives with regard to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Increased European support for recognizing Palestinian statehood, however, has diverged from the approach taken by the United States
and strained Europe’s relationship with Israel. • The United States and the EU have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. The two sides
have been negotiating a free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aimed at boosting jobs and growth on both sides, but
obstacles could make it difficult to conclude a deal by the end of 2015. While the conditions that fueled the Eurozone crisis from 2010-2012 appear to have
stabilized, there is considerable doubt that underlying economic problems in Europe have been fully resolved. • Allegations of U.S. spying and
surveillance programs in Europe have caused a sharp backlash and damaged transatlantic trust. Although tensions appear to have
proven manageable and U.S. intelligence cooperation with European governments continues, data privacy concerns could complicate future talks
on U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements. The United States takes over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May 2015. The Artic is
increasingly viewed as a region of potential economic and geopolitical importance. As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment,
some observers assert that the global influence of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama Administration’s announced intention of “rebalancing” U.S. foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United States and
Europe are likely to remain one another’s closest partner, and that U.S.-European cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international
action on a wide range of critical issues.
US-EU cooperation is key to stopping terror
Mix, 2015 (Derek E. , Analyst in European Affairs “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf , February 3)
Overall, in the years since the 9/11 attacks, transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism has been strong. U.S. and European officials
from the cabinet level down maintain regular dialogues on issues related to homeland security and counterterrorism . In 2010, new
U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance entered into force. The United States and the EU have also reached
agreements on container security and sharing airline passenger data as part of their efforts to strengthen aviation, transport, and
border security. In addition, the United States and the EU actively work together to track and counter the financing of terrorism, in
forums such as the Financial Action Task Force and through information sharing deals such as the U.S.-EU “SWIFT agreement,” which allows
U.S. authorities access to financial data held by a Belgium-based consortium of international banks as part of the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). While the EU has been increasing its relevance in this area, bilateral intelligence
sharing and law enforcement cooperation between the United States and individual European countries also remains key to
disrupting terrorist plots and apprehending those involved . Although overall counterterrorism cooperation is strong, areas of tension
exist. European policy makers have had significant concerns over the adequacy of data privacy safeguards in a number of
U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements. The EU considers data privacy a basic right and has strict regulations protecting
personal data. During the past several years, objections raised in the European Parliament complicated and delayed the
adoption of the most recent version of the SWIFT deal and the agreement on sharing airline passenger name record (PNR) data.
The United States and the EU have been negotiating a framework Data Privacy and Protection Agreement (DPPA) since 2011.
Over the past decade, the United States and the EU have largely aligned their lists of entities designated as terrorist
organizations. In July 2013, the EU added Hezbollah’s military wing to its terrorist list, a move welcomed as a positive step by U.S. officials. Successive U.S.
Administrations and many Members of Congress have long urged the EU to include Hezbollah on its common terrorist list. Critics contend, however, that listing
only Hezbollah’s military wing is insufficient because Hezbollah is still allowed to fundraise in Europe and there is no meaningful distinction between Hezbollah’s
political and military wings. In December 2014, the General Court of the European Union ruled that Hamas should be removed from the EU’s common list of
designated terrorist organizations on procedural grounds related to the decision-making process used in adding the group to the list over a decade ago. The EU
External Action Service responded that the ruling was not a political or substantive decision made by EU governments, and that restrictive measures against
Hamas will remain in place as an appeal process goes forward. The United States and Israel both urged the EU to maintain its sanctions against Hamas.
1ar- Germany module
Regulations of domestic surveillance key to US-German cooperation
Pangburn 13 (DJ, A contributor for NY Times, Vice, and others. He has a BS in Political science “Surveillance for All: Foreign
Governments' Responses to the PRISM Scandal Are Telling,” http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/surveillance-for-all-foreigngovernments-responses-to-the-prism-scandal-are-enlightening , , June 20)
One other thing to keep in mind when looking at the various international responses to the NSA program is that each country's political leaders will have a
different response to the revelations. Support or opposition sometimes falls along party lines—those who are currently in power, and those seeking to upset the
status quo. "We want to know what the government knew about it and whether there was any benefit for the German authorities in what the US authorities did."—
Michael Hartmann Germany's Chancellor Andrea Merkel, for instance, noted the need for telecommunications surveillance, but with " due
diligence" undertaken to ensure privacy . “Free democracies live off people having a feeling of security,” Merkel said. Choice
words. Secure from foreign aggressors and terrorists, as well as the eyes of Big Brother. This might have been a good discussion to have before the Snowden
leak, when Germany—like other European countries—was benefiting from America's dirty work. Not convinced of her pandering? “It’s necessary for us to
debate these issues,” she said. “People have concerns.” Well, indeed, people had concerns about NSA surveillance even before Snowden's leaks.
What we can learn here is that Merkel didn't seem to have any concerns pre-Snowden; or, at least she didn't express them publicly. Michael Hartmann,
spokesman on domestic issues for Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), echoes this sentiment. " We want to know what the government knew
about it and whether there was any benefit for the German authorities in what the US authorities did, " Hartmann told the Guardian. "We
can't accept this although we know that after 9/11 there were new rules and we have to be careful and well informed, but you can't defend
our free society by destroying it." Peter Schaar, Germany's federal data protection commissioner, is of the same opinion. "So far,
the US has no adequate level of data protection guaranteed in law and with independent oversight, like in Europe," Schaar told
the Guardian. "It's essential for me that we cannot ignore anymore the question of what happens with the data of the private sector
if it's collected by US or third-party companies and public authorities want to surveill this data." "I don't know how far European governments are
informed over the details of US authorities to the data," Schaar added. "[B]ut one problem might be that the data gathered by the US authorities comes back from
the US to Europe and is used by European authorities. We have to discuss this with our governments."
That solves terrorism
Miko and Froehlich 14 (Francis T., Christian, Specialist in International Relations Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division “Germany’s Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for U.S. Policy” http://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32710.pdf, December 27
)
This report examines Germany’s response to global Islamic terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. It looks at current German
strategy, domestic efforts, and international responses, including possible gaps and weaknesses. It examines the state of U.S.-German cooperation, including
problems and prospects for future cooperation. This report may be updated as needed. Although somewhat overshadowed in the public view by the strong and
vocal disagreements over Iraq policy, U.S.-German cooperation in the global fight against international terrorism has to be extensive.
German support is particularly important because several Al Qaeda members and 9/11 plotters lived there and the country is a key hub
for the transnational flow of persons and goods. Domestically, Germany faces the challenge of having a sizable population of Muslims, some with
extremist views, whom terrorists might seek to recruit. German counterterrorism strategy shares a number of elements with that of the
United States, although there are clear differences in emphasis. Like the United States, Germany now sees radical Islamic terrorism as its primary national
security threat and itself as a potential target of attack. Today, Germany also recognizes that threats to its domestic security lie far beyond its own borders, in
places such as Afghanistan. Germany has introduced a number of policy, legislative, and organizational reforms since 9/11 to make
the country less hospitable to potential terrorists. Despite these reforms, critics point to continuing problems hampering Germany’s domestic efforts.
German law enforcement and intelligence communities face more bureaucratic hurdles, stricter constraints, and closer oversight than those in many other
countries. The German government has sent troops into combat beyond Europe for the first time since World War II. Currently Germany has about 7,800
troops based abroad of which some forty percent are directly engaged in counterterror missions. In Afghanistan, some 2,300 German soldiers
participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany’s role in Afghanistan’s stabilization and reconstruction is substantial. German
military efforts have been hampered to some extent by delays in implementing military reforms to make German forces more expeditionary. A key question
for U.S. German relations is whether differences on issues such as Iraq policy — shaped by different national interests, practices, and historical
experiences — will harm U.S.-German cooperation against terrorism. Some believe that understanding and accepting these differences (agreeing
to disagree) may be the best approach to enhancing future U.S.-German cooperation in the global war on terrorism. Both countries have strong incentives to
make the cooperation work.
EMERGING POWERS
2ac
NSA overreach hurts cooperation with emerging powers- that’s key to global security efforts
Lewis , Director of CSIS, 15 (James, Director And Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity Policy Hearing: [1],
March 14. "Cybersecurity: Setting The Rules For Responsible Global Cyber Behavior.", proquest,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051415_REVISED_Lewis_Testimony.pdf )
Dealing with these countries also requires a broad diplomatic strategy to win support from key allies and from emerging new
powers, like Brazil, India and others. These new powers from a middle ground between western democracies and authoritarian regimes, and the
policies these countries choose to pursue will determine the future of the internet and cybersecurity. Most of the new powers
support fundamental human rights, and in particular freedom of speech and free access to information . This puts them at odds with the
authoritarian view of cyberspace, but they also believe that national sovereignty and government must play a larger role in internet matters, and they were
troubled by the NSA revelations, factors that work against U.S. influence. To win the global support, the U.S. needs persuasive
arguments on privacy, internet governance, and the use of force in cyberspace. We do not now have these persuasive arguments and some of what
we say now about the internet is seen as duplicitous. The NSA leaks of the last two years, whose selective release is used intentionally to damage the U.S., have
not helped us. Cybersecurity is a military and intelligence contest with dangerous opponents . There are significant trade issues. The
internet has immense political effect that threatens authoritarian regimes and has led them to mount significant challenges to market and democratic ideals and
the international institutions created to support them. The focal point of this challenge is to reduce U.S. influence, not just over the internet but also
in trade, security, and finance. We face a determined effort to dismantle American leadership in international affairs.
Cooperation with emerging powers is key to counter-terror efforts
Jones 11 (Bruce, director and senior fellow at the NYU Center on Int'l Cooperation and Senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution. "Beyond Blocs: The West, Rising Powers, and Interest-Based International Cooperation. October.
www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/jonespab1011b.pdf)
The first pattern worth observing here is the sustained intensive cooperation since 9/11 between the United States, Russia, India,
China, and myriad other states on combating Al Qaeda and other forms of terrorism. At times, this cooperation took the ugly form of a “you
kill your terrorists and we’ll kill ours” compact. The fissure in this sphere was not between the United States and the emerging powers ; far
from it. Instead, the public split was between the United States and Europe over the question of the application of international legal and human rights standards
in the counterterrorist endeavor. This is not to say that the United States and the emerging powers agreed or agree on all things terrorist. Indeed, the
political/ideological dispute over whether Palestinian nonstate actors are engaged in terrorism or resistance continues unabated at the United Nations—but that
issue divides the United States as much from Europe as it does from the emerging powers. Operationally, though, intelligence sharing and political
backing for counterterrorist moves has been remarkably steady between the United States , Russia, and the emerging powers. This
is unsurprising. Terrorism poses simultaneous both to sovereign security as well as to the very infrastructural networks on which
globalization depends, and the United States and the emerging powers share profound interests in protecting both .
India module
Domestic surveillance hurts US-Indian cooperation
Burke 13 (Jason, south Asia correspondent, The Guardian. 9/25. www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/nsa-surveillanceindian-embassy-un-mission)
The US National Security Agency may have accessed computers within the Indian embassy in Washington and mission at the
United Nations in New York as part of a huge clandestine effort to mine electronic data held by its south Asian ally. Documents
released by the US whistleblower Edward Snowden also reveal the extent and aggressive nature of other NSA datamining
exercises targeting India as recently as March of this year. The latest revelations – published in the Hindu newspaper – came as
Manmohan Singh, the Indian prime minister, flew to Europe on his way to the US, where he will meet President Barack Obama.
The NSA operation targeting India used two datamining tools, Boundless Informant and Prism, a system allowing the agency
easy access to the personal information of non-US nationals from the databases of some of the world's biggest tech companies,
including Apple, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. In June, the Guardian acquired and published top-secret documents about
Boundless Informant describing how in March 2013 the NSA, alongside its effort to capture data within the US, also collected
97bn pieces of intelligence from computer networks worldwide. The largest amount of intelligence was gathered from Iran, with
more than 14bn reports in that period, followed by 13.5bn from Pakistan. Jordan, one of America's closest Arab allies, came third
with 12.7bn, Egypt fourth with 7.6bn and India fifth with 6.3bn. Though relations between India and the US were strained for
many decades, they have improved considerably in recent years. President George Bush saw India as a potential counterweight
to China and backed a controversial civil nuclear agreement with Delhi. Obama received a rapturous welcome when he visited in
2010, though concrete results of the warmer relationship have been less obvious. According to one document obtained by the
Hindu, the US agency used the Prism programme to gather information on India's domestic politics and the country's strategic
and commercial interests, specifically categories designated as nuclear, space and politics. A further NSA document obtained by
the Hindu suggests the agency selected the office of India's mission at the UN in New York and the country's Washington
embassy as "location targets" where records of Internet traffic, emails, telephone and office conversations – and even official
documents stored digitally – could potentially be accessed after programs had been clandestinely inserted into computers. In
March 2013, the NSA collected 6.3bn pieces of information from internet networks in India and 6.2bn pieces of information from
the country's telephone networks during the same period, the Hindu said. After the Guardian reported in June that Pm program
allowed the NSA "to obtain targeted communications without having to request them from the service providers and without
having to obtain individual court orders", both US and Indian officials claimed no content was being taken from the country's
networks and that the programs were intended to aid "counter-terrorism". Syed Akbaruddin, an external affairs ministry
spokesperson, said on Wednesday there was no further comment following the latest revelations. Siddharth Varadajaran, editor
of the Hindu, said the Indian government's "remarkably tepid and even apologetic response to the initial set of disclosures" made
the story a "priority for Indians". A home ministry official told the newspaper the government had been "rattled" to discover the
extent of the the programme's interest in India. "It's not just violation of our sovereignty, it's a complete intrusion into our decisionmaking process," the official said. Professor Gopalapuram Parthasarathy, a former senior diplomat, said no one should be
surprised by the Hindu's story. "Everybody spies on everyone else. Some just have better gadgets. If we had their facilities, I'm
sure we would do it too. The US-Indian relationship is good and stable and if they feel India merits so much attention then good
for us," he told the Guardian. Others have been less phlegmatic. Gurudas Dasgupta, a leader of the Indian Communist party,
asked the government to raise the issue with Obama. Anja Kovacs of the Delhi-based Internet Democracy Project said the
articles showed that such datamining was not about any broader "struggle to protect society as a whole through something like
fighting terrorism, but about control". The Hindu argued that "the targeting of India's politics and space programme by the NSA
busts the myth of close strategic partnership between India and US", pointing out that the other countries targeted in the same
way as India "are generally seen as adversarial" by Washington.
Improved US-Indian security cooperation is key to fighting terrorism
Panda 14 (Ankit, 10/2. Ankit Panda is a foreign affairs analyst, writer, and editor with expertise in international relations,
political economy, international security, and crisis diplomacy. He has been an editor at The Diplomat since 2013.
thediplomat.com/2014/10/10-takeaways-on-us-india-security-cooperation/)
7. The statement understandably has a broad focus on countering terror groups in South Asia and elsewhere. The statement
mentions the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Haqqani Network, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the D-Company. The
statement was relatively specific on areas of U.S.-India cooperation on counter-terrorism, highlighting the “dismantling of safe
havens for terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical support for networks.” Furthermore, the statement
identifies areas for growth in bilateral cooperation on criminal law enforcement, military information exchange, and legal
cooperation — all areas where considerable lacunae exist in Indo-U.S. security ties. In the context of cooperation in these areas,
the statement mentions interdicting terrorist activities in cyberspace — an area of concern for both countries.
CHINA TURN
2ac
Surveillance overreach hurts US-Chinese tech cooperation
Song 13 (Sophie, Sophie is a graduate of Northwestern University. She covers the emerging markets in Southeast Asia, with a particular interest in foreign
investment in the region. “Growing Chinese Animosity Following PRISM Revelations Could Threaten Tech Firms' Prospects In World's No. 2 Economy,”
http://www.ibtimes.com/growing-chinese-animosity-following-prism-revelations-could-threaten-tech-firms-prospects-worlds-no , July 19)
Edward Snowden’s revelations about the U.S. government’s PRISM surveillance program have triggered a backlash against American
technology firms that threatens their growth in the world's second-largest economy. Following Snowden's exposure of PRISM
Chinese authorities and the public have become increasingly worried about exposure to U.S. technology and equipment, according
to a note published on Thursday by the Rhodium Group (RHG), a New York-based advisory firm that frequently provides business insights related to China.
When the leak of PRISM hit Chinese media in early June, two major storylines emerged. The first accused the U.S. of operating
under double standards – the U.S. government was monitoring other nations, companies and individuals, while accusing China
and Chinese companies like Huawei Technology Co Ltd (SHE:002502) and ZTE Corporation (SHE:000063) of aiding the Chinese government in
conducting espionage, as PRISM proved. The other headline, far more threatening to U.S. and other foreign businesses, according to RHG, is
what the state-run media termed a “de-Cisco campaign.” The state-backed China Economic Weekly ran a cover story calling
eight U.S. companies – Cisco Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ:CSCO), International Business Machines Corp. (NYSE:IBM), Google Inc. (NASDAQ:GOOG),
QUALCOMM (NASDAQ:QCOM), Intel Corporation (NASDAQ:INTC), Apple Inc. (NASDAQ:AAPL), Oracle Corporation (NYSE:ORCL) and Microsoft Corporation
(NASDAQ:MSFT) – the eight “guardian warriors” that had “ seamlessly penetrated ” Chinese society. The weekly newspaper called Cisco “the
most horrible”, given its over 50 percent market share in China’s information infrastructure in financial, military, government and transportation sectors. In the
past, comparative advantage in IT innovation has made U.S. equipment suppliers’ products more popular than those of Chinese
suppliers, but if recent rhetoric is any indication that popularity may end in the near future. The Chinese government has already
spent massive sums developing its own supercomputers and satellite navigation systems, and now Chinese officials seem to
think Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE, the very companies that have been repeatedly suspected of espionage in the west, are mature
enough to replace Cisco, Microsoft and IBM. This could be bad news for both sides. China is a fast-growing market and a large contributor to
these tech companies’ overall revenue. If the campaign against American companies gains traction these firms could see their market share dwindle. Last year,
following the House report warning Huawei may pose a security risk, Unicom, China’s leading telecom operator, replaced Cisco routers in one of its backbone
networks, citing security concerns. Other similar replacements may happen in the future. The effects could even trickle down to other U.S. firms, in particular
those firms in supplying the tech giants. Cisco’s equipment and network is too widespread in China to be eliminated completely in the short term, if ever. Any
policy like the de-Cisco campaign would almost certainly damage China’s economic and security interests, by radicalizing foreign trading partners who may be
less willing to engage positively with China across a wider portfolio of interests, according to RHG’s research note. Now most of the back and forth remains
China will
not drop the issue without further investigation, and as such, the fates of American firms under suspicion in uncertain at best.
“The situation for the American technology firms in China is not very clear right now.” Bao said. “We don’t think Huawei and other Chinese firms can
replace the technology 100 percent, but when the issue concerns national security, China is unlikely to back down.”
rhetoric, but Beibei Bao, a New York-based China analyst at Rhodium Group and the author of the report, believes the situation will likely escalate.
Cooperation necessary between US – China to stop terrorism
deLeon and Jiemian 14 (Rudy - Secretary of Defense for Clinton’s administration, and Yang – Professor, ph.D in political science ,“U.S.-China
Relations Toward a New Model of Major Power Relationship,” https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/ChinaReport-Full.pdf ,February)
Officials and experts in both countries need a more effective dialogue with their citizens on the importance of the U.S.-China
relationship and what newmodel relations exercise is designed to prevent and achieve. There are many positive stories of workaday Sino-American
cooperation that do not make the mainstream press and are therefore not known to the public —and in some cases to key political leaders, particularly at the
local level. For example, the American and Chinese Coast Guards cooperate frequently and effectively on an operational level, but that kind of operational
cooperation is not as likely to attract media attention as bilateral flare-ups on sensitive issues. As one Chinese participant in our dialogues pointed out, we
should seek to increase the attention paid to the positive attributes of the relationship that can shift the focus from “crisis
management” to “opportunity management.” There are many areas of cooperation that could be expanded, including counterpiracy
efforts; U.N. peacekeeping operations, or UNPKO; joint humanitarian, disaster-relief, and search-and-rescue exercises; multilateral military exercises or
exercises hosted by third countries; professional military educational exchanges; maritime law enforcement; fisheries protection; taking steps to counter
nuclear proliferation; and international terrorism. To build up a NMMPR is also in the common interests of regional and global order in transition.
Both China and the United States are two key players with systematic influence on the international order in transition. A
constructive bilateral relationship is the foundation of effective cooperation on both regional and global levels. On the one hand, if
these two countries are able to work together, they can play a leading role in global and regional governance through
coordinated policies on climate change, economic and financial governance, energy security, anti-global poverty and sustainable development,
nonproliferation and international counterterrorism, and other global and regional challenges . On the other hand, neither bilateral confrontation
nor G-2 would be welcomed by the international community as other members will either have to choose the side or worry about their respective national
interests that would be jeopardized. For the collective interests of international community, a stable and healthy China-U.S. relationship based
upon mutual respect and win-win cooperation could contribute to peace, security, and prosperity around the world.
1ar- plan solves China
Restoring confidence in protection of domestically held data is critical to Chinese perceptions
SHAHANI, 2014 (AARTI ,Aarti Shahani is a Tech Reporter on NPR's Business Desk, where she covers breaking news, and does investigative and
enterprise reporting.“A Year After Snowden, U.S. Tech Losing Trust Overseas,”http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/06/05/318770896/a-yearafter-snowden-u-s-tech-losing-trust-overseas , June 5)
This week marks the one-year anniversary of the Snowden revelations. Whatever you may think about Edward Snowden’s the man — is he a traitor or a
hero? — one fact is indisputable. His leaks shook the world technology industry to its core. And the reverberations keep on coming. Take
Cisco. The Silicon Valley giant is now at risk of losing its once-stellar reputation with foreign customers — at the exact same moment it needs to grow abroad.
Security Worries For The Cloud Cisco is one of the companies that connect us to the cloud, by making routers and switches. About half of its business is abroad,
and every year Cisco throws an event for its customers. The latest one was a concert by rock legend Lenny Kravitz. He performed at AT&T Park in San
Francisco and, between the crowd's cheers, he complained about the weather. "It's cold here. I live in the Bahamas." Many in the audience came from much
farther away. In fact, 25,000 high-powered executives from around the world flew into town. To keep growing, Cisco needs the trust of these foreign customers.
The Snowden revelations don't help. Take one man I randomly bump into, Elly Resende from Brazil. He is responsible for the technology for staging the 2016
Olympic Games in Rio. He's the kind of guy who dives headfirst into the newest gadgets and gear. "I'm like a freak with ... I like technology a lot," he says. But
this past year, he hit the brakes on a hot trend: cloud computing. That's when you put data online, in servers that can be outside your own country. Mike Janke is
the chief executive officer of Silent Circle, a company that sells privacy devices and apps. ALL TECH CONSIDERED A Privacy Capitalist Wins Big After
Snowden Cisco provides cloud services and was putting them on display prominently at the conference. Resende is a client who is skeptical. While he likes the
convenience of accessing data from anywhere, he's worried about security — especially with data that is valuable to the competition, like athletes' training
results. "This is a concern especially after the Snowden thing," he says. "How do you guarantee that your data is accessed only by you? Who else has the same
access to the information that you produce, you think you control?" Plenty Of Questions From Customers Cisco hears such concerns all over the world. "I think
it's been pretty universal outside of the U.S.," says Christopher Young, Cisco senior vice president of security. "So you can go to Latin America, you can go to
Europe, to Asia, and there's many examples of customers asking those questions." The very first Snowden revelation — which was about the
National Security Agency spying on phone calls — did not rock the high-tech industry. But the news bomb that came one day
later, about a program called PRISM, did. The U.S. was tapping directly into the central servers of nine leading Internet companies
including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook and Apple. The journalist who broke the Snowden story, Glenn Greenwald, published a picture of a Cisco router
allegedly intercepted in the mail, taken out of the box and tampered with by the NSA.i The journalist who broke the Snowden story, Glenn Greenwald, published
a picture of a Cisco router allegedly intercepted in the mail, taken out of the box and tampered with by the NSA. No Place to Hide / Metropolitan Books
Suddenly cloud computing could be a platform for mass surveillance. American tech companies could be working hand-in-hand with their
government, and foreign clients would not get the memo. Young says the revelations have shaken customer confidence: "People say, 'Hey, we've known Cisco
for a long time. We know we trust you guys. But given what's going on, how much can we really trust you?' " The answer is a moving target because the
revelations keep on coming. Recently Cisco got caught in the cross hairs. The journalist who broke the Snowden story, Glenn Greenwald, published a picture of
a Cisco router allegedly intercepted in the mail, taken out of the box and tampered with by the NSA. Another progressive journalist, Amy Goodman, asked
Greenwald about it on her show Democracy Now: "So they get the Cisco router — with the knowledge or without the knowledge of Cisco?" Greenwald
responded, "It's unclear." 'More Shoes To Drop?' Cisco says it was not aware of its routers being hacked. And CEO John Chambers wrote an open letter to
President Obama, telling him that the actions, if true, "undermine confidence in our industry." Chambers also urged standards of conduct that meet national
security objectives without jeopardizing business interests. It's not every day that an industry in hypergrowth loses trust with its customers in a big way. Andrew
Bartels, with Forrester Research, studies cloud computing. "At this point, we don't know which direction it's going to take," he says. "Is everything out? Or [are]
there still more shoes to drop?" By his estimate, a sector that hardly existed five years ago will be worth $191 billion by 2020. But that big number, he says, hides
the rates at which different countries are moving to the cloud, and new resistance to that move. "You found in Europe, Germany in particular, companies putting
those plans on the shelf because of the privacy issues," Bartels says. According to a study by German high-tech association Bitkom, cloud use grew just 3
percent in 2013, compared with a 9 percent increase in 2012. When Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff found out her emails were monitored by the NSA, she
called for an end to the unquestioned use of U.S.-based servers. Bartels says, "That in turn has cascaded through the Brazilian government, which does still own
a certain large portion of the economy." And businesses are realizing that cloud computing exposes them to new levels of domestic spying, Bartels says. "In
China’ s or like Russia, I think the issue here is concerns in the private sector about giving business information to the
government," he says. In this messy landscape, Cisco is losing ground. In its last quarterly earnings call, the company reported that
orders from emerging countries fell 7 percent — down 27 percent in Brazil alone, 8 percent in China and 28 percent in Russia. The company
and its Silicon Valley competitors are now retooling services, trying to rebuild trust — or offer more secure products.
markets like
ISIS TURN
2ac
US-led international cooperation is key to stop ISIS- unilateral action alone will inevitably fail
Katulis, Lang, and Singh 14 (Brian Senior Fellow at American Progress, Hardin Senior Fellow at American Progress and
Vikram Vice President for National Security and International Policy at American Progress, Defeating ISIS: An Integrated
Strategy to Advance Middle East Stability. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2014/09/10/96739/defeatingisis-an-integrated-strategy-to-advance-middle-east-stability/)
As with efforts to counter extremism elsewhere, defeating ISIS will require a concentrated effort over time. Any successful U.S.
strategy must be built on a foundation of regional cooperation that requires coordinated action from U.S. partners—a central
concept of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund that President Barack Obama proposed earlier this year. The strategy will be
multifaceted, involving intelligence cooperation, security support, vigorous regional and international diplomacy, strategic
communications and public diplomacy, and political engagement. While military action alone will be insufficient to defeat ISIS, the
United States and other nations may need to undertake airstrikes and provide military assistance to disrupt and degrade ISIS in Syria. These strikes should
be conducted in concert with regional and international partners. Ideally, such airstrikes would receive the support from the
United Nations or—absent action to authorize the use of force by the U.N. Security Council—from a coalition of America’s Gulf
partners and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, allies. As always, the United States should reserve the right to undertake unilateral
military action to defend the homeland or protect U.S. personnel from imminent harm. Whether unilaterally or with partners, U.S. military strikes should be limited
in terms of scope and duration and under clear oversight of Congress. As CAP said in June when it advocated for action against ISIS in Iraq, “The United States
should not undertake military action lightly and should be wary of unintended consequences. But not all military action is the same. Ground troops or invasions to
control a country are very different from limited air strikes or targeted assistance to help push back terrorist extremists.” Focusing too much on direct U.S. military
action in the fight against ISIS ignores the equally important diplomatic and economic steps that will be required to defeat this extremist
group. U.S. military strikes or even boots on the ground cannot defeat ISIS alone and could become a rallying cry and recruitment tool for extremists, repeating
one of the most costly strategic errors of the 2003 Iraq War. At the same time, building a unified, committed coalition to effectively degrade ISIS
will require intense diplomatic and military leadership from the United States to mobilize and coordinate partners. The United States
must leverage its unique capabilities in the military, security assistance, and intelligence arenas. Working together, nations committed to defeating ISIS should
take concerted action to empower regional and local forces to fight back against ISIS terrorism.
CYBER-TERROR TURN
2ac
Absent the Plan; US security surveillance policies lead to cyber-attack
Lewis , Director of CSIS, 15 (James, Director And Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity
Policy Hearing: [1], March 14. "Cybersecurity: Setting The Rules For Responsible Global Cyber Behavior.", proquest,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051415_REVISED_Lewis_Testimony.pdf )
For the U.S., better cybersecurity requires changing the behavior of four countries. Russia is the principle source of cyber crime
and extremely active in political-military espionage, and is the most skilled opponent we face. China leads in economic cyber
espionage. Iran has developed significant cyber capabilities and uses them to apply political pressure on the U.S. It has also
done the network reconnaissance necessary to launch cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, as have China and Russia.
North Korea has invested for decades in building cyber attack capabilities. There are also jihadist groups who have rudimentary
cyber capabilities. Hezbollah and the Syrian Electronic Army are connected to Iran and through Iran, perhaps to Russia. ISIS,
with its sophisticated internet skill, bears watching carefully as a group that could develop the capability for low-level attack.
Dealing with these countries also requires a broad diplomatic strategy to win support from key allies and from emerging new
powers, like Brazil, India and others. These new powers from a middle ground between western democracies and authoritarian
regimes, and the policies these countries choose to pursue will determine the future of the internet and cybersecurity. Most of the
new powers support fundamental human rights, and in particular freedom of speech and free access to information. This puts
them at odds with the authoritarian view of cyberspace, but they also believe that national sovereignty and government must play
a larger role in internet matters, and they were troubled by the NSA revelations, factors that work against U.S. influence. To win
the global support, the U.S. needs persuasive arguments on privacy, internet governance, and the use of force in cyberspace.
We do not now have these persuasive arguments and some of what we say now about the internet is seen as duplicitous. The
NSA leaks of the last two years, whose selective release is used intentionally to damage the U.S., have not helped us.
Cybersecurity is a military and intelligence contest with dangerous opponents. There are significant trade issues. The internet
has immense political effect that threatens authoritarian regimes and has led them to mount significant challenges to market and
democratic ideals and the international institutions created to support them. The focal point of this challenge is to reduce U.S.
influence, not just over the internet but also in trade, security, and finance. We face a determined effort to dismantle American
leadership in international affairs.
TECH COMPANIES
2ac
Cooperation between Government surveillance and the private industry is key to breaking down
terrorism- the plan is key to restoring trust necessary to effective surveillance
Michaels, J.D, 08 (Don Michaels: J.d. from Yale, Prof at UCLA Law School “All the President's Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror” California Law Review: Vol. 96, No. 4 (Aug., 2008), pp. 901-966,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20441037 (pg. 901))
Unable to target or repel terrorists using conventional military tactics and munitions alone, the United States is acutely aware that
today's pivotal battlefield is an informational one. Teams of U.S. intelligence agents, acting as eavesdroppers, infiltrators,
interrogators, and data-miners, must race against the clock to anticipate terrorists' actions, frustrate their missions, and dismantle
their infrastructure.' Because the U.S. government does not know the who, what, where, and when of the next terrorist strike, but
recognizes that the plot might be hatched on domestic soil, its first step must be to cast a wide net to gather all sorts of data
points, any one of which might be the clue that leads intelligence agents to prevent another September 11-like catastrophe.3 In
this regard, there is no better ally than the private sector. Its comparative advantage over the government in acquiring vast
amounts of potentially useful data is a function both of industry's unparalleled access to the American public's intimate affairsaccess given by all those who rely on businesses to facilitate their personal, social, and economic transactions-and of regulatory
asymmetries insofar as private organizations can at times obtain and share information more easily and under fewer legal
restrictions than the government can when it collects similar information on its own.
1ar
Cooperation with private companies allows access to a wider data set which prevents terror
Michaels, J.D. 08 (Don Michaels: J.d. from Yale, Prof at UCLA Law School “All the President's Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror” California Law Review: Vol. 96, No. 4 (Aug., 2008), pp. 901-966,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20441037 (pg. 908))
Technological advances and the concomitant universal reliance on such innovations to communicate and to conduct personal
and business transactions electronically have generated an unprecedented number of data points about individuals who use
email, surf the web, speak via telephone, wire money, bank, travel commercially, and transact business via the Internet.18 All of
the information about particular electronic transactions (and all of the background details people supply to subscribe to shopping
or frequent-traveler membership clubs or to gain access to websites' content) is possessed in large measure by private firms
involved in commerce, finance, and telecommunications.'9 With high-powered computers and increasingly sophisticated
software,20 analysts can mine these stores of data and detect particularly significant patterns of behavior, including activities
ostensibly indicative of terrorist planning. People simply do not interface with the government in the same ways or with the same
frequency as they do with the private sector, and thus the intelligence agencies find themselves particularly drawn to, and in
some respects dependent upon, private data resources.2
Cooperation solves-Private data regulations are less restricted, leading to an increase in available
data
Michaels, J. D, 08 (Don Michaels: J.d. from Yale, Prof at UCLA Law School “All the President's Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror” California Law Review: Vol. 96, No. 4 (Aug., 2008), pp. 901-966,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20441037 (pg. 908-909))
Coupled with the private sector's attractiveness as a convenient repository of information is its legal allure, notably in instances
when private data gathering is subject to less stringent regulation than what the government faces. That is, federal lawenforcement and intelligence-gathering offices (along with, for example, health and labor departments) are at times
comparatively hamstrung in their direct ability to collect and catalog private, personal information about U.S. persons.23 The
reasons for this asymmetry include legislative happenstance, consumer convenience, and the assumption that private
businesses can do less "harm" with personal information than the government can. But if the government can convince private
businesses to share their data collections, it can make an end-run around the more stringent restrictions limiting its ability to
access information directly.
Private Sector cooperation is key to prevent terror
Wiktorowicz and Amanullah 15 (Quintan Wiktorowicz is a PhD from Cornell. He served as senior adviser for technology
at the Department of State from 2011-2014, “How tech can fight extremism” Published: Feb 17, 2015,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/16/opinion/wiktorowicz-tech-fighting-extremism/)
Violent extremists like the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, have become increasingly sophisticated at
creating dense, global networks of support online, networks that are helping these groups run virtual circles around governments
and communities. And it is activities like these that have raised a disturbing prospect, one that has serious implications for
fighting extremism: We could lose the information war. It's with this troubling reality in mind that the Obama administration will
this week hold a Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, where it will underscore the importance of technology companies in
the fight against terrorist recruitment. This is critical. As Robert Hannigan, director of Britain's Government Communications
Headquarters (the National Security Agency's sister organization), emphasized, technology companies' services "have become
the command-and-control networks of choice for terrorists." ISIS, in particular, has proven virulent in using technology to
radicalize. It has mobilized armies of online followers to engage audiences in ways that take advantage of the decentralized and
open nature of the Internet, leveraging online tools such as Twitter, Facebook, Ask.fm, Kik, SoundCloud and Instagram, to name
just a few. Indeed, in a single day this past summer, ISIS supporters sent out some 40,000 tweets, and supporters often
repetitively tweet specific hashtags at particular times of day to maximize message trending. ISIS also has strategically run
hashtag campaigns to tap into trending topics on Twitter, such as the World Cup and Ebola, which have nothing to do with
violent extremism. ISIS-linked extremists have used social media to focus group messages, disseminate ideological simulator
games, and broadcast high production videos, and the group has created its own technologies, including a smartphone app
released last year that amplifies its messaging campaigns. Governments are struggling to keep up. How should they respond?
For a start, they need to leverage the talent, creativity and capabilities of the private sector. Yet involving technology companies
in countering extremism will be challenging. True, the U.S. government has been engaging Google, Twitter, Facebook and other
large companies on the problem since at least 2008. But while this has generated a few initiatives, such as social media training
for Muslim Americans and the Network Against Violent Extremism online network catalyzed by Google Ideas, we have yet to
see the scale of involvement required for strategic impact. Part of the challenge is that, although large companies clearly want to
help, they have to navigate complicated priorities that distinguish them from governments, such as shareholders, profits, brands
and market forces. Just as importantly, these high-profile companies could face real safety risks. When Twitter shut down ISISaffiliated accounts last year, for example, a prominent ISIS supporter called for the assassination of Twitter employees.
Given recent attacks in Paris and Sydney, these kinds of threats are chilling. The Obama administration will therefore need to
figure out how to help companies navigate the inherent risks of the private sector countering violent extremism. One solution is to
encourage the involvement of more agile start-ups that are willing to move into niche markets like countering extremist
messaging. These companies are lean, hungry and less encumbered by the risk calculations that circumscribe large companies.
Moreover, the start-up community is increasingly emphasizing social impact as a core business imperative, and this trend likely
will accelerate as more millennials start new businesses. Interestingly, research shows that millennials place a premium on
investments that generate positive social impact. Just as importantly, the counter-extremism "marketplace" is in many ways
better suited to small, flexible businesses than large companies. Radicalization is driven by a host of different factors (such as
identity crises, a sense of disempowerment, a desire for adventure, and even misguided idealism), each of which represents a
potential business opportunity. Large companies may not be interested in addressing these market needs if it takes them away
from their core products and services, leaving room for a constellation of specialized start-ups. The Muslim youth market, in
particular, is experiencing immense political, cultural and religious transformations, and many large companies are nervous
about the volatility. As a result, the 500 million-strong Muslim youth market is woefully underserved. Start-ups, especially those
from within Muslim communities, may be better positioned and motivated to address Muslim youth needs in a way that helps
counter radicalization. At the White House Summit, the President will likely call on technology companies for help, and we
encourage the administration to involve talented and passionate start-ups in addition to brand name companies. This week, to
support the summit and facilitate greater private sector involvement, we will launch a specialized start-up incubator (Affinis Labs)
and are forming a $5 million private equity fund for start-ups involved in countering extremism. The reality is that ISIS operates
like a mission-driven, agile start-up to spread its evil ideology, and we will not defeat it through government and large
corporations alone. America is the vanguard of entrepreneurship and innovation, and there are start-ups ready to heed President
Obama's call, including start-ups led by passionate Muslim Americans who are building businesses and social enterprises that
challenge violent extremist narratives. We believe firmly that American entrepreneurs are ready to support the fight against
radicalization.
Tech companies key to solve terror
Schechner and Gauthier ’15 [Sam Schechner and David Gauthier-Villars Feb. 17, 2015 5:11 p.m. ET . Sam is a Europe
Tech Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal. Sam covers technology across Europe, based out of the Wall Street Journal's
Paris bureau. He has previously served as a French business correspondent and covered the U.S. television industry. Sam has
been a reporter for the Journal since 2005. David Gauthier-Villars is a Deputy Bureau Chief, The Wall Street Journal. Accessed
June 25, 2015, “Tech Companies Are Caught in the Middle of Terror Fight” http://www.wsj.com/articles/tech-companies-arecaught-in-the-middle-of-terror-fight-1424211060]//JZ WB
French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve heads to Silicon Valley this week to enlist a new force in his fight on terror: U.S.
tech giants. Weeks after deadly terror attacks in Paris , and days after apparent copycat shootings in Denmark, France’s
top cop plans to meet on Friday with senior executives at Apple Inc.,Google Inc., Facebook Inc., and Twitter Inc . His
message : U.S. tech companies and social networks must do more to rid their services of extremist postings , and
should open up encryption to ease government surveillance . “We are facing a new threat,” Mr. Cazeneuve said in an
interview ahead of the trip. “We need tech companies to realize that they have an important role to play .” Mr. Cazeneuve’s
West Coast tour—coming after a layover Wednesday and Thursday in Washington to attend a summit on terror—raises
European pressure on U.S. tech companies over how best to use the Internet to fight terrorists. Executives say it thrusts them
into a tricky dilemma—how to support their users’ privacy and free-speech rights while also being tough on terrorism. In Paris
and other European capitals, government officials say Islamic State and other insurgencies have succeeded in harnessing social
networks to rally scores of young Europeans to their cause, and lure hundreds of converts to the battlegrounds in Syria and Iraq.
Online videos showing the beheading of U.S. reporter James Foley and other hostages by Islamic State are terrorism
propaganda that must be censored, they say. But until recently, some of the same European governments were assailing some
of the same companies for allegedly being overly cooperative with the U.S. National Security Agency, U.S. tech executives say.
“Internet companies find themselves caught in the middle,” said Eduardo Ustaran, a privacy lawyer for Hogan Lovells who
represents some tech companies. “On one hand, there is a need to make sure these horrible attacks don’t recur . “At a
gathering of European law enforcement representatives in Luxembourg last October, U.S. companies including Google,
Facebook, Twitter and Microsoft Corp. pledged to help governments . But in meetings since then, the European officials
and company representatives have sparred on important issues, such as whether the companies can or should pre-emptively
filter their services for terrorist content, or respond only when it is flagged by governments, people familiar with the meetings
said. Mr. Cazeneuve, who has dealt with U.S. companies over tax issues during his one-year stint as budget minister until last
spring, said he expects them to step up their effort in censoring content that could be regarded as hate speech. “What would be
the interest of tech companies in broadcasting hateful images that incite terrorism?” he said. When it comes to terror, U.S.
tech executives respond they already cooperate extensively with governments , particularly in emergencies like the ones
France and Denmark recently endured, both by removing content from terrorist groups, and by turning over user data. On Jan. 7,
when videos proliferated of masked gunmen shooting a French policeman at close range, Google’s YouTube was able to
remove copies of the footage in minutes , French officials said. T he company says it removed 14 million videos in 2014
for featuring gratuitous violence, incitement to violence or hate speech . That same day, Microsoft says it was able to
turn over content from email accounts linked to the Kouachi brothers—suspected of being the killers—w ithin some 45
minutes. The request came through an emergency channel from French prosecutors to the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Microsoft said. But people within the companies also say that they will only go so far, given the pressure they still
feel to fight government surveillance in the wake of the Snowden leaks. “Over the last three years, first Edward Snowden and
now [Islamic State], we have seen the political debate about government access to information swing from one end of the
spectrum to the other,” said Rachel Whetstone, Google’s global head of public policy, in a speech to the Bavarian parliament
earlier this month. Ms. Whetstone is among the Google executives Mr. Cazeneuve is set to meet on Friday, his office said. One
flash point on the agenda is encryption. Politicians and law-enforcement officials in the U.K., France, and U.S. have said that
encrypted communications on apps like Facebook’s WhatsApp or Apple’s new iPhone pose a problem because
companies say they don’t have the ability to unlock them even when they receive valid law-enforcement requests. Mr.
Cazeneuve says he plans to push the topic in California. “It is a central issue,” he said. Apple Inc. Chief Executive Tim Cook
defended the company’s stance last week, sayingweakening privacy controls could “risk our way of life.” Other companies argue
that creating back doors to encryption would give a leg up to criminal hackers, and weaken security for all Internet users. “Given
most people use the Internet for the reasons it was intended, we shouldn’t weaken security and privacy protections for the
majority to deal with the minority who don’t,” said Google’s Mr. Whetstone.
INFO OVERLOAD
2ac
Too much data collection hinders security.
The Washington Blog citing Binney, Former Head of the NSA’s global intelligence gathering operations.
(Washingtons Blog, “NSA Admits It Collects Too MUCH Info to Stop Terror Attacks” Washingtons Blog,
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2015/05/nsa-admits-it-collects-too-much-info-to-stop-terror-attacks.html, 5-7-15)
Top security experts agree that mass surveillance is ineffective … and actually makes us MORE vulnerable to terrorism. For example, the former
head of the NSA’s global intelligence gathering operations – Bill Binney – says that the mass surveillance INTERFERES with the government’s ability to catch bad guys, and that the
government failed to stop 9/11, the Boston Bombing, the Texas shootings and other terror attacks is because it was overwhelmed with data from mass surveillance on Americans.
Binney told Washington’s Blog: A good deal of the failure is, in my opinion, due to bulk data. So, I am calling all these attacks a result of “Data bulk failure.” Too
much data and
too many people for the 10-20 thousand analysts to follow. Simple as that. Especially when they make word match pulls (like Google) and get dumps of data
selected from close to 4 billion people. This is the same problem NSA had before 9/11. They [the NSA] had data that could have prevented 9/11 but did not
know they had it in their data bases. This back then when the bulk collection was not going on. Now the problem is orders of
magnitude greater. Result, it’s harder to succeed. Expect more of the same from our deluded government that thinks more data improves possibilities of success. All
this bulk data collection and storage does give law enforcement a great capability to retroactively analyze anyone they want. But, of course,that data cannot be used in court since it
was not acquired with a warrant. Binney and other high-level NSA whistleblowers noted last year: On December 26, for example, The Wall Street Journal published a lengthy front-page
article, quoting NSA’s former Senior Technical Director William Binney (undersigned) and former chief of NSA’s SIGINT Automation Research Center Edward Loomis (undersigned)
warning that NSA is drowning in useless data lacking adequate privacy provisions, to the point where it cannot conduct effective terrorist-related surveillance and analysis. A recently
disclosed internal NSA briefing document corroborats the drowning, with the embarrassing admission, in bureaucratize, that NSA collection has been “outpacing” NSA’s ability to ingest,
process, and store data – let alone analyze the take. Indeed, the pro-spying NSA chief and NSA technicians admitted that the NSA was drowning in too much data 3 months before
9/11: In an interview, Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden, the NSA’s director … suggested that access isn’t the problem. Rather, he said, the sheer volume and variety of today’s
communications means “there’s simply too much out there, and it’s too hard to understand.” “What we got was a blast of digital bits, like a fire hydrant spraying you in the face,” says
one former NSA technician with knowledge of the project. “It was the classic needle-in-the-haystack pursuit, except here the haystack starts out huge and grows by the second,” the
former technician says. NSA’s computers simply weren’t equipped to sort through so much data flying at them so fast. And see this. If more traditional anti-terror efforts had been used,
these terror plots would have been stopped. So why does the NSA collect so much information if it admits that it’s drowning in info? Here are a few hints.
Add-Ons
EU RELATIONS
2ac add-on – eu rel i/l
The EU’s trust with the U.S. was broken by PRISM; coordination between the EU and the U.S. won’t
happen till this is fixed.
PROFFITT 13 (BRIAN , Brian Proffitt is a technology expert specializing in enterprise, cloud computing and big data with 23
years of journalism and publishing experience. He is the author of 24 books on mobile technology and personal computing and
an adjunct instructor at top-ranked Mendoza College of Business at the University of Notre Dame. Breathing is a hobby. “PRISM
Fallout: U.S. Internet Companies Stained By Intelligence Actions
Is the cloud about to be geo-fenced into Balkanized collections of data thanks to PRISM? ,”
http://readwrite.com/2013/07/03/prism-fallout-us-internet-companies-stained-by-intelligence-actions, JUL 3)
It was bound to happen sooner or later: faced with mounting global criticism on its use of Internet data to monitor international
denizens for intelligence reasons, the U.S. is now starting right up there with China as safest places to store data on the Web. If
trust in U.S. web and data services continues to erode, the future of global cloud computing will be a much different place than
what is currently envisioned. The AP is reporting today that German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich is warning anyone on
the Internet to avoid using U.S.-based services such as those from Facebook, Google or Microsoft. … Friedrich told reporters in
Berlin on Wednesday that "whoever fears their communication is being intercepted in any way should use services that don't go
through American servers." Germany is only one of several nations that are particularly angered by revelations that the U.S.
apparently is engaging in wide-scale intelligence gathering using data collected directly from private Internet firms via the socalled PRISM project. If the allegations implied by the leaked PRISM documents are true, then PRISM would seriously
jeopardize business relations between the U.S. and other countries. The European Union may be the first relationship to get
damaged. See also: PRISM Fallout: In Cloud We Don't Trust? In order to comply with strict E.U. data laws, which essentially
prevent data being stored outside an E.U. member nation's borders, the E.U. and the U.S. have established a Safe Harbor
agreement that enables data to be stored in U.S.-based cloud services so long as the U.S. service providers self-regulate
themselves to maintain strict standards of privacy protections. Recent assertions show that U.S. intelligence services may
actually have on-site equipment on PRISM participants' property, despite repeated denials from those services, which also
include Yahoo, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. If the information from the leaked PRISM documents is true, this is a
serious breach of their Safe Harbor agreement. Even if PRISM turns out to be fictitious, just the hint that something like PRISM
could exist could evaporate a large amount of trust and business for U.S. cloud vendors—even ones not named in the PRISM
documents. Friedrich's comments today are a sharp reminder of just how fast the relationship between E.U. and U.S. companies
could deteriorate. Advertisement — Continue reading below Bound by law not to discuss what they are doing to help intelligence
services, the named PRISM companies and services are facing a P.R. nightmare, where all they can do is deny and hope the
problem goes away. International policy makers are growing increasingly angered at what they see as U.S. arrogance.
(Yesterday's search of Bolivian President Evo Morales's plane by Austrian authorities in Vienna for Edward Snowden, the selfidentified leaker of the PRISM documents, probably does not help that perception.) We may very well be heading for a new geofenced world of data isolationism, where the storage of data across international borders will not be so commonplace as it is
today. If that becomes the case, how will the Internet landscape work then? Will apps that sell on an international scale be forced
to maintain separate Balkanized data collections for each nation served? Or will any Internet-based company now be forced to
lock down their data in direct defiance of state-sanctioned data collection operations? Neither choice seems palatable, but to
regain the trust and business of a global audience, the U.S. may have to take such drastic measures. What's your picture of a
post-PRISM Internet future?
--xt prism hurts eu rel
NSA overreach hurts US-EU terror cooperation
Mix 15 (Derek E. , Analyst in European Affairs “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf , February 3)
In 2013, press reports began surfacing about U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs in the United States
and Europe created tensions in the transatlantic relationship. Among other allegations, the reports asserted that objects of U.S.
spying included the EU offices in Washington, DC and the cell phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The information was
based on leaked, classified documents obtained from Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor; and focused on operations
allegedly conducted by the NSA and the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (the UK’s signals intelligence
agency). The reports raised serious concerns on both sides of the Atlantic about the extent of U.S. surveillance operations, the
degree of involvement by European intelligence services, and the appropriate balance between promoting security and
upholding privacy rights and civil liberties. Some observers worry that the allegations have resulted in lasting damage to
transatlantic trust, negatively affecting U.S.-European political, security, and economic ties. Many European leaders, EU officials,
and European citizens were deeply dismayed by the reports and concerned that such operations could violate European privacy
rights and civil liberties and compromise the security of European citizens’ personal data. Criticism has been most pronounced in
Germany, where disclosed NSA activities appear to have been broad in scope and the issue of government surveillance of
private citizens evokes particularly strong feelings due to the legacy of domestic spying by the Nazi and East German regimes.
Many analysts point out that the fallout from the reports could have implications for U.S.- European cooperation on
counterterrorism and data privacy by complicating negotiations about renewal of the SWIFT and passenger name record (PNR)
agreements (in 2015 and 2019, respectively), as well as the proposed Data Privacy and Protection Agreement. In the European
Parliament, the reports exacerbated long-standing objections to the SWIFT and PNR agreements and intensified MEPs’
concerns about U.S. data protection safeguards and access to European citizens’ personal data. In the aftermath of the reports, the
European Parliament called for 17 suspension of the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor agreement that allows commercial data exchanges,
and there have been suggestions that the purported U.S. surveillance activities may have a wider effect on economic relations,
including with regard to negotiations on the proposed TTIP.
U.S. – E.U. cooperation key for counter-terrorism
Mix 15 (Derek E. , Analyst in European Affairs “The United States and Europe: Current Issues,”
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22163.pdf , February 3)
The United States and European countries have been cooperating in efforts to counter the Islamic State and seek a political solution to the conflict in Syria.
Recent estimates suggest that upward of 3,000 European citizens have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join groups involved in the conflict, and the potential threat
posed by returning “foreign fighters” has become a central concern. U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation has been strong since 9/11, although
differences regarding data privacy have posed some key information-sharing challenges. The United States and Europe remain
central actors in negotiations seeking to reach an agreement that ensures that Iran’s nuclear program can be used solely for
peaceful purposes. While an extensive array of U.S. and EU sanctions have worked to isolate and pressure Iran, the final
outcome of talks remains uncertain. • The United States and EU share broad objectives with regard to resolving the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Increased European support for recognizing Palestinian statehood, however, has diverged from the approach taken by the United States
and strained Europe’s relationship with Israel. • The United States and the EU have the largest trade and investment relationship in the world. The two sides
have been negotiating a free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) aimed at boosting jobs and growth on both sides, but
obstacles could make it difficult to conclude a deal by the end of 2015. While the conditions that fueled the Eurozone crisis from 2010-2012 appear to have
stabilized, there is considerable doubt that underlying economic problems in Europe have been fully resolved. • Allegations of U.S. spying and
surveillance programs in Europe have caused a sharp backlash and damaged transatlantic trust. Although tensions appear to have
proven manageable and U.S. intelligence cooperation with European governments continues, data privacy concerns could complicate future talks
on U.S.-EU information-sharing agreements. The United States takes over the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in May 2015. The Artic is
increasingly viewed as a region of potential economic and geopolitical importance. As the United States and Europe face a changing geopolitical environment,
some observers assert that the global influence of the Euro-Atlantic partnership is in decline. In addition, the Obama Administration’s announced intention of “rebalancing” U.S. foreign policy toward Asia has caused some anxiety among Europeans. Overall, however, most analysts maintain that the United States and
Europe are likely to remain one another’s closest partner, and that U.S.-European cooperation is likely to remain the foundation of international
action on a wide range of critical issues.
HEGEMONY
2ac add-on – heg i/l
NSA overreach is broadly spurring counter-balancing across security and economic sectors – plan
key
Lewis , Director of CSIS, 3/15 (James, Director And Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and International Cybersecurity
Policy Hearing: [1], "Cybersecurity: Setting The Rules For Responsible Global Cyber Behavior.", proquest,
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/051415_REVISED_Lewis_Testimony.pdf )
Dealing with these countries also requires a broad diplomatic strategy to win support from key allies and from emerging new powers, like
Brazil, India and others. These new powers from a middle ground between western democracies and authoritarian regimes, and the policies these countries
choose to pursue will determine the future of the internet and cybersecurity. Most of the new powers support fundamental human rights, and in
particular freedom of speech and free access to information. This puts them at odds with the authoritarian view of cyberspace, but they also
believe that national sovereignty and government must play a larger role in internet matters, and they were troubled by the NSA revelations, factors that
work against U.S. influence. To win the global support, the U.S. needs persuasive arguments on privacy, internet governance, and the use of force in
cyberspace. We do not now have these persuasive arguments and some of what we say now about the internet is seen as duplicitous. The NSA leaks of the last
two years, whose selective release is used intentionally to damage the U.S., have not helped us. Cybersecurity is a military and intelligence contest with
dangerous opponents. There are significant trade issues. The internet has immense political effect that threatens authoritarian
regimes and has led them to mount significant challenges to market and democratic ideals and the international institutions
created to support them. The focal point of this challenge is to reduce U.S. influence, not just over the internet but also in trade, security, and
finance. We face a determined effort to dismantle American leadership in international affairs .
TECH LEADERSHIP
2ac add-on – tech lead i/l
NSA Surveillance has angered U.S. Tech companies- Damaged Reputations
Gustin ‘13, Fellow at Harvard University, Graduate from Columbia University
(Sam Gustin, “NSA Spying Scandal Could Cost U.S. Tech Giants Billions”, Time Magazine,
http://business.time.com/2013/12/10/nsa-spying-scandal-could-cost-u-s-tech-giants-billions/, December 10, 2013)
The National Security Agency spying scandal could cost the top U.S. tech companies billions of dollars over the next several
years, according to industry experts. In addition to consumer Internet companies, hardware and cloud-storage giants like IBM,
Hewlett-Packard, and Oracle could suffer billions of dollars in losses if international clients take their business elsewhere. Now,
the nation’s largest Internet companies are calling for Congress and President Obama to reform the U.S. government’s secret
surveillance programs. Google, Apple, Microsoft, Yahoo, Twitter and Facebook are facing intense scrutiny following revelations
from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, who leaked classified documents about the NSA’s snooping programs. In particular, the tech giants have been stung by
disclosures about a classified U.S. intelligence system called PRISM, which the NSA used to examine data — including e-mails, videos and online chats — via requests made under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Snowden’s disclosures stoked privacy concerns about how the largest U.S. tech companies handle their vast troves of user data. Since then, the companies have strenuously denied that they give the NSA “direct” or unfettered access to their computer
the NSA taps directly into the networks of the tech giants, a
disclosure that prompted outrage from top company executives, most notably Eric Schmidt, Google’s executive chairman. After Snowden’s leak, the Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation (ITIF), a non-partisan, D.C.-based think tank, published a report saying that U.S. cloud computing providers could lose as much as $35 billion by 2016 because
of the NSA revelations. ITIF senior analyst Daniel Castro, the report’s author, wrote that Snowden’s disclosures “will likely have an immediate and lasting
impact on the competitiveness of the U.S. cloud computing industry if foreign customers decide the risks of storing data with a U.S. company outweigh the benefits.” Analysts at Forrester,
the respected tech industry research firm, went even further. In a blog post, Forrester analyst James Staten projected a net loss for the Internet service provider industry of as much as $180
billion by 2016, which would amount to a 25% decline in the overall information technology services market. “All from the unveiling of a single kangaroo-court action
called PRISM,” Staten wrote. His estimate includes domestic clients, which could bypass U.S. cloud providers for international rivals, as well as non-U.S. cloud providers, which could lose as much as 20% of their business due to foreign governments
servers, and they’ve waged a public competition to demonstrate their commitment to transparency. But recent reports have described how
— like Germany — which have their own secret snooping programs. With numbers at that scale, it’s not hard to understand why the top U.S. Internet companies are vehemently protesting the government’s secret surveillance programs. Silicon Valley
executives frequently tout their belief in idealistic principles like free speech, transparency and privacy. But it would be naive to think that they also aren’t deeply concerned about the impact of the NSA revelations on the bottom line. “Businesses increasingly
recognize that our government’s out-of-control surveillance hurts their bottom line and costs American jobs,” Rep. Justin Amash, the Michigan Republican and outspoken critic of the NSA’s secret programs, told TIME by email. “It violates the privacy of their
a coalition of the largest U.S. Internet companies launched a campaign to pressure the
government to reform its surveillance programs. “People won’t use technology they don’t trust,” said Microsoft general counsel Brad Smith. “Governments have put
customers and it erodes American businesses’ competitive edge.” On Monday,
this trust at risk, and governments need to help restore it.” Several tech CEOs, including Google’s Larry Page, Yahoo’s Marissa Mayer and Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg, are personally throwing their weight behind the effort. It’s the most high-profile effort yet
The coalition is calling for limits on government authority to collect user
information; better oversight and accountability; greater transparency about the government’s demands; respect for the free flow
of data across borders; and the avoidance of conflict between governments. “Recent revelations about government surveillance activities have shaken the trust of our users, and it is
by the tech titans to repair the damage to their corporate reputations caused by the NSA revelations.
time for the United States government to act to restore the confidence of citizens around the world,” said Mayer, Yahoo’s CEO. Page, Google’s CEO, said: “The security of users’ data is critical, which is why we’ve invested so much in encryption and fight for
transparency around government requests for information. This is undermined by the apparent wholesale collection of data, in secret and without independent oversight, by many governments around the world.” Monday’s statement by the leading Internet
companies is the most forceful sign yet that they are serious about repairing the damage done to their reputations — and future business prospects — by the NSA revelations. But one group of companies that has also been implicated in the Snowden leaks
remains conspicuously absent: The nation’s largest telecom companies. Both AT&T and Verizon have remained stone-cold silent about their role in the NSA’s programs. Last week, AT&T said it planned to ignore a shareholder proposal calling for greater
transparency about government data requests. The United States government is now at a crossroads. America faces difficult choices about how to balance the vital imperatives of national security and consumer privacy. For years, civil liberties groups warned
that the Internet giants posed the greatest risk to privacy in the digital age. After the Snowden revelations, it’s become clear that the gravest threat to civil liberties comes not from the private sector, but from the U.S. government itself. U.S. policymakers must
decide if they wish to continue down the path toward an ever-more intrusive surveillance state — risking billions of dollars in damage to the U.S. economy — or apply real oversight and reform to an intelligence apparatus that has undermined confidence in the
government and the nation’s most innovative and profitable business..
--xt prism hurts tech lead
NSA Surveillance Forces Companies To Move Overseas- IBM Proves
Miller ‘14, Graduate from Yale University’s Writing Program
(Claire Cain Miller, “Revelations of NSA Spying Cost American Companies”, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html, March 21, 2014)
SAN FRANCISCO — Microsoft has lost customers, including the government of Brazil. IBM is spending more than a billion dollars to build data centers overseas to reassure
foreign customers that their information is safe from prying eyes in the United States government. And tech companies abroad, from
Europe to South America, say they are gaining customers that are shunning United States providers, suspicious because of the revelations by Edward J.
Snowden that tied these providers to the National Security Agency’s vast surveillance program. Even as Washington grapples with the diplomatic and political fallout of Mr.
Snowden’s leaks, the more urgent issue, companies and analysts say, is economic. Technology executives, including Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook, raised the issue when they went to the White House on Friday for a meeting with President Obama. It is
impossible to see now the full economic ramifications of the spying disclosures — in part because most companies are locked in multiyear contracts — but the pieces are beginning to add up as businesses question the trustworthiness of American technology
products. The confirmation hearing last week for the new N.S.A. chief, the video appearance of Mr. Snowden at a technology conference in Texas and the drip of new details about government spying have kept attention focused on an issue that many tech
executives hoped would go away. Despite the tech companies’ assertions that they provide information on their customers only when required under law — and not knowingly through a back door — the perception that they enabled the spying program has
the United States cloud
computing industry could lose $35 billion by 2016. Forrester Research, a technology research firm, said the losses could be as high as $180 billion, or 25
percent of industry revenue, based on the size of the cloud computing, web hosting and outsourcing markets and the worst case for damages. The business effect of the disclosures about the N.S.A. is felt most in the daily
lingered. “It’s clear to every single tech company that this is affecting their bottom line,” said Daniel Castro, a senior analyst at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, who predicted that
conversations between tech companies with products to pitch and their wary customers. The topic of surveillance, which rarely came up before, is now “the new normal” in these conversations, as one tech company executive described it. “We’re hearing from
customers, especially global enterprise customers, that they care more than ever about where their content is stored and how it is used and secured,” said John E. Frank, deputy general counsel at Microsoft, which has been publicizing that it allows customers
to store their data in Microsoft data centers in certain countries. At the same time, Mr. Castro said, companies say they believe the federal government is only making a bad situation worse. “Most of the companies in this space are very frustrated because
there hasn’t been any kind of response that’s made it so they can go back to their customers and say, ‘See, this is what’s different now, you can trust us again,’ ” he said. In some cases, that has meant forgoing potential revenue. Though it is hard to quantify
, American businesses are being left off some requests for proposals from foreign customers that previously would
have included them, said James Staten, a cloud computing analyst at Forrester who has read clients’ requests for proposals. There are German companies, Mr. Staten said, “explicitly not inviting certain American companies to join.” He
missed opportunities
added, “It’s like, ‘Well, the very best vendor to do this is IBM, and you didn’t invite them.’ ” The result has been a boon for foreign companies. Runbox, a Norwegian email service that markets itself as an alternative to American services like Gmail and says it
does not comply with foreign court orders seeking personal information, reported a 34 percent annual increase in customers after news of the N.S.A. surveillance. Brazil and the European Union, which had used American undersea cables for intercontinental
communication, last month decided to build their own cables between Brazil and Portugal, and gave the contract to Brazilian and Spanish companies. Brazil also announced plans to abandon Microsoft Outlook for its own email system that uses Brazilian data
centers. Mark J. Barrenechea, chief executive of OpenText, Canada’s largest software company, said an anti-American attitude took root after the passage of the Patriot Act, the counterterrorism law passed after 9/11 that expanded the government’s
surveillance powers. But “the volume of the discussion has risen significantly post-Snowden,” he said. For instance, after the N.S.A. surveillance was revealed, one of OpenText’s clients, a global steel manufacturer based in Britain, demanded that its data not
cross United States borders. “Issues like privacy are more important than finding the cheapest price,” said Matthias Kunisch, a German software executive who spurned United States cloud computing providers for Deutsche Telekom. “Because of Snowden,
our customers have the perception that American companies have connections to the N.S.A.” Security analysts say that ultimately the fallout from Mr. Snowden’s revelations could mimic what happened to Huawei, the Chinese technology and
telecommunications company, which was forced to abandon major acquisitions and contracts when American lawmakers claimed that the company’s products contained a backdoor for the People’s Liberation Army of China — even though this claim was
companies have complained to government officials that federal actions are hurting American technology
businesses. But companies fall silent when it comes to specifics about economic harm, whether to avoid frightening shareholders or because it is too early to produce concrete evidence. “The companies need to keep the priority on the
never definitively verified. Silicon Valley
government to do something about it, but they don’t have the evidence to go to the government and say billions of dollars are not coming to this country,” Mr. Staten said. Some American companies say the business hit has been minor at most. John T.
Chambers, the chief executive of Cisco Systems, said in an interview that the N.S.A. disclosures had not affected Cisco’s sales “in a major way.” Although deals in Europe and Asia have been slower to close, he said, they are still being completed — an
experience echoed by several other computing companies. Still, the business blowback can be felt in other ways than lost customers. Security analysts say tech companies have collectively spent millions and possibly billions of dollars adding state-of-the-art
IBM said in January that it would spend $1.2
billion to build 15 new data centers, including in London, Hong Kong and Sydney, Australia, to lure foreign customers that are
sensitive about the location of their data. Salesforce.com announced similar plans this month. Germany and Brazil, where it was revealed that the N.S.A. spied on government leaders, have been particularly adversarial
encryption features to consumer services, like Google search and Microsoft Outlook, and to the cables that link data centers at Google, Yahoo and other companies.
toward American companies and the government. Lawmakers, including in Germany, are considering legislation that would make it costly or even technically impossible for American tech companies to operate inside their borders. Yet some government
officials say laws like this could have a motive other than protecting privacy. Shutting out American companies “means more business for local companies,” Richard A. Clarke, a former White House counterterrorism adviser, said last month.
CHILLING EFFECT
2ac add-on – chilling effect i/l
Government Surveillance limits freedom of assembly by creating fear among citizens.
Starr et al 08 (Amory Starr-Ph.D. in Sociology from University of California, Luis A. Fernandez- Ph.D. in Justice Studies
from Arizona State University, Randall Amster- J.D. from Brooklyn Law School and a Ph.D. in Justice Studies from Arizona
State University, Lesley J. Wood- Ph.D. from Columbia University, Manuel J. Caro- Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of
Miami, “The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis,” Published in
Qualitative Sociology, Date: 10 July 2008, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11133-008-9107-z/fulltext.html)
As we have shown, current surveillance is an alarming threat to mobilizations (constitutionally protected assemblies) and social movement
organizations (protected associations). Our findings about the post-Seattle era are consistent with studies of previous eras (Marx 1970, 1974, 1979, 1988, 1992; Flam 1998;
Churchill and VanderWall 1990, 2002; Donner 1980, 1990; Schultz and Schultz 1989, 2001; Powers 1987; Cunningham 2004; Davenport 2005, 2006; Boykoff 2006) with the
enhancements of technology and influenced by the current popular leniency for policing and criminalization. Readers may be surprised by the broadbased nature of current surveillance
and by the inclusion of pacifist organizations among targets. However, as Cunningham (2004) has documented, the lack of criminal standard or test is nothing new. And Donner (1990)
traces the recent history of “terrorist” accusations against pacifist organizations to the early 1980s targeting of anti-nuclear, anti-death penalty, and Latin American solidarity
organizations by local police, as well as federal agencies. Disruptive counterinsurgent activity against organizations which have not met a criminal standard was officially forsworn with
the closure of COINTELPRO. Yet these same acts are now undertaken by a network of law enforcement organizations. We are concerned by social movement organizations’ persistent
attempt to rationalize surveillance and repression. Rather than opposing government repression, too many organizations work to reinforce a hard line between legal and illegal political
activities (a distinction also claimed by the organizations who refused interviews on these grounds), expending extensive resources in “careful wording” which they believe will keep
them safe. This conceptual framework simply does not correspond with scholarship on surveillance, which documents a long and continuing history of targeting of non-criminal
organizations on the basis of their political ideas. Lack of clarity about who is targeted for surveillance has led to a rationalization of repression, taking the form of blaming young people
for their repression (particularly for “provoking” police actions at protests); and little support for “Green Scare” defendants and others facing illegal investigations, “terrorist” indictments,
absurd bonds, and decades-long sentences for non-violent political activities. Rationalization collaborates with the creeping criminalization of dissent and political activity.
As shown above, the
impacts of surveillance on associations included: fundraising, relations with members, reputation and
connections with allies, redirection of agendas, displacement of strategic framing, and foreclosure of space for civil disobedience.
Interviewees’ quantification of activists who have dropped out due to surveillance was striking. Moreover, rather than finding the customary dualism in which
hardcore activists become more militant while others become more moderate . (Lichbach 1995; White 1989; Tarrow 1998; Zwerman and Steinhoff
2005) we found signs of pervasive pacification. In lieu of going “underground” to continue their actions (Davenport 2006; Johnston 2005; Zwerman et al. 2000), organizations are
abandoning “grey area” civil disobedience activities and moving toward doing exclusively educational and permitted activities.
Yet, knowing that even educational events are under surveillance, organizations do not feel safe even undertaking this most
pacific type of action, increasing the risk and burden on groups wishing to participate in democratic dialogue . We heard reports from all
types of groups that strategic and ideological dialogue has been both reduced and self-censored.
We were most alarmed to find security culture displacing organizing culture in most groups, including peace groups, pacifist groups, and
other groups who only do legal activities. Activists concerned about creeping criminalization of grey and formerly legal activity
take extreme precautions, foregoing inclusivity and destroying all written records of their work . Groups also reported not taking notes at
meetings. “We’re afraid to have a piece of paper with anything written on it at the end of any meeting.” Many interviewees, having internalized suspicion of undercovers, said that they
don’t want to be seen writing anything down, as it would make them look as if they are surveilling the meeting. Moreover, concerned about future investigations, they do not keep
diaries. This lack of archiving is the destruction in advance of the history of the movement, with implications for social movements’ capacity for active reflexivity. Moreover, affiliations
become more temporary and less committed, with the result that “I’ve noticed a big shift from long-term strategizing and community building.”
Conservative decisions on the part of activists and organizations are understandable in light of the costs of surveillance to organizational resources. The
government
provides no administrative mechanisms of accountability for false accusations, improper or unwarranted investigations, or
erroneous surveillance. One organization that was illegally searched spent more than 1500 hours of volunteer time dealing with
the fallout for their membership and relations with other organizations. Their lawsuit for damages took 5 years to resolve. Of the
71 organizations in our study, only two had managed to take legal action regarding surveillance. Our findings indicate that the harm suffered by
political organizations and individuals as a result of widespread surveillance, infiltration, and documentation, is legally cognizable and not at all speculative (cf. ACLU-NCA 2005),
suggesting that legal standing can be established to overcome the burdens raised by the case of Laird v. Tatum, 408 US 1 (1972).
Based on our reading of Cunningham (2004) and our data, we conclude that much
current law enforcement surveillance is more properly
conceptualized as counterinsurgency. The implementation of counterinsurgency (whose destructiveness is well-established) against a social
movement (whose agenda is well known to be noncriminal) violates the fundamental protections of the First Amendment (which is the foundation of a
democratic society, variously conceptualized as a marketplace of ideas, a context of free debate and dissent, or self-governance). Our socio-legal analysis encourages a shift in the unit
of analysis and litigation from individual activists and organizations to the context of diverse associational activities which make assembly possible: the social movement. If a social
movement could gain standing as a class, it could include event participants who are not members of an organization, as well as dissenters who may have never taken action because
of anticipatory conformity. The concept of social movements can bind overt repression, indirect interference (with fundraising, networks, etc.), and intimidating chilling effects.
We also point to the need for a legal concept which could provide the basis for complaints regarding violations of the rights of political organizations and movements. Melucci
emphasizes “collective action as a social production, as a purposive, meaningful and relational orientation” (1996, p. 386). Associational
life depends on membership,
donations, and access to space in which people feel comfortable engaging political ideas. Assaults on organizations that deprive
them of resources and democratic space, and which burden potential participants with excessive risk amount to what are
understood on an individual level as assault or excessive use of force. If private enterprise is protected by tort law from libel, denial of service, interference
with customer access to premises, (tortious interference), then nonprofit organizations and civil society groups should also be protected from interference with advantageous
relationships that affect their resources, capacity to mobilize them, and opportunity to compete in the marketplace of ideas.
--xt prism chills rights
Privacy protections are critical human rights law—key to democratic norms
Banisar and Davies 98 (This report was written by Privacy International with a grant provided by the Open Society
Institute. The primary authors of this report are David Banisar of the Electronic Privacy Information Center and Simon Davies of
Privacy International. Additional research was provided by Wayne Madsen, Michael Kassner, Ronnie Breckheimer, and Shauna
Van Dongen. Knowledgeable individuals from academia, government, human rights groups and other fields were asked to
submit reports and information. Their reports were supplemented with information gathered from Constitutions, laws,
international and national government documents, news reports, human rights reports and other sources. A list of contributors is
located at Appendix D. 1998, Privacy and Human Rights," Open Society Institute, http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html,
Accessed: 5-26-2015, /Bingham-MB)
OVERVIEW Privacy is a fundamental human right recognized in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and in many other international and regional treaties. Privacy underpins human dignity
and other key values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech. It has become one of the most important
human rights issues of the modern age . The publication of this report reflects the growing importance, diversity and complexity of this fundamental right. This
report provides details of the state of privacy in fifty countries from around the world. It outlines the constitutional and legal conditions of privacy protection, and summarizes important
issues and events relating to privacy and surveillance. Nearly
every country in the world recognizes a right of privacy explicitly in their
Constitution. At a minimum, these provisions include rights of inviolability of the home and secrecy of communications. Most recently-written Constitutions such as South Africa's
and Hungary's include specific rights to access and control one's personal information. In many of the countries where privacy is not explicitly recognized in the Constitution, such as the
United States, Ireland and India, the courts have found that right in other provisions .
In many countries, international agreements that recognize privacy
rights such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention on Human Rights have been adopted into
law. In the early 1970s, countries began adopting broad laws intended to protect individual privacy. Throughout the world, there is
a general movement towards the adoption of comprehensive privacy laws that set a framework for protection. Most of these laws are
based on the models introduced by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Council of Europe. In 1995, conscious both of the shortcomings of law, and
the many differences in the level of protection in each of its States, the European Union passed a Europe-wide directive which will provide citizens with a wider range of protections over
abuses of their data.[fn 1] The directive on the "Protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data" sets a benchmark for
national law. Each EU State must pass complementary legislation by October 1998. The Directive also imposes an obligation on member States to ensure that the personal information
relating to European citizens is covered by law when it is exported to, and processed in, countries outside Europe. This requirement has resulted in growing pressure outside Europe for
the passage of privacy laws.
More than forty countries now have data protection or information privacy laws. More are in the process of
being enacted. Reasons for Adopting Comprehensive Laws There are three major reasons for the movement towards comprehensive privacy and data protection laws. Many
countries are adopting these laws for one or more reasons. To remedy past injustices. Many countries, especially in Central Europe, South America
and South Africa, are adopting laws to remedy privacy violations that occurred under previous authoritarian regimes. To promote electronic commerce. Many countries,
especially in Asia, but also Canada, have developed or are currently developing laws in an effort to promote electronic commerce. These countries recognize consumers are uneasy
with their personal information being sent worldwide. Privacy
laws are being introduced as part of a package of laws intended to facilitate
electronic commerce by setting up uniform rules. To ensure laws are consistent with Pan-European laws. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe are
adopting new laws based on the Council of Europe Convention and the European Union Data Protection Directive. Many of these countries hope to join the European Union in the near
future. Countries in other regions, such as Canada, are adopting new laws to ensure that trade will not be affected by the requirements of the EU Directive. Continuing Problems Even
with the adoption of legal and other protections, violations of privacy remain a concern. In many countries, laws have not kept up with the technology, leaving significant gaps in
protections. In other countries, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have been given significant exemptions. Finally, in
the absence of adequate oversight and
enforcement, the mere presence of a law may not provide adequate protection. There are widespread violations of laws relating
to surveillance of communications, even in the most democratic of countries. The U.S. State Department's annual review of human
rights violations finds that over 90 countries engage in illegally monitoring the communications of political opponents, human rights workers,
journalists and labor organizers. In France, a government commission estimated in 1996 that there were over 100,000 wiretaps conducted by private parties, many on behalf of
government agencies. In Japan, police were recently fined 2.5 million yen for illegally wiretapping members of the Communist party. Police
services, even in countries
with strong privacy laws, still maintain extensive files on citizens not accused or even suspected of any crime . There are currently
investigations in Sweden and Norway, two countries with the longest history of privacy protection for police files. Companies regularly flaunt the laws, collecting and disseminating
personal information. In the United States, even with the long-standing existence of a law on consumer credit information, companies still make extensive use of such information for
marketing purposes. THREATS TO PRIVACY
The increasing sophistication of information technology with its capacity to collect, analyze
and disseminate information on individuals has introduced a sense of urgency to the demand for legislation . Furthermore, new
developments in medical research and care, telecommunications, advanced transportation systems and financial transfers have dramatically increased the level
of information generated by each individual. Computers linked together by high speed networks with advanced processing systems can create comprehensive
dossiers on any person without the need for a single central computer system. New technologies developed by the defense industry are spreading into
law enforcement, civilian agencies, and private companies. According to opinion polls, concern over privacy violations is now
greater than at any time in recent history. [fn 2] Uniformly, populations throughout the world express fears about encroachment on
privacy, prompting an unprecedented number of nations to pass laws which specifically protect the privacy of their citizens.
Human rights groups are concerned that much of this technology is being exported to developing countries which lack adequate
protections. Currently, there are few barriers to the trade in surveillance technologies. It is now common wisdom that the power,
capacity and speed of information technology is accelerating rapidly. The extent of privacy invasion -- or certainly the potential to
invade privacy -- increases correspondingly. Beyond these obvious aspects of capacity and cost, there are a number of important trends that contribute to privacy
invasion : GLOBALISATION removes geographical limitations to the flow of data. The development of the Internet is perhaps the best known example of a global technology.
CONVERGENCE is leading to the elimination of technological barriers between systems. Modern information systems are increasingly interoperable with other systems, and can
mutually exchange and process different forms of data. MULTI-MEDIA fuses many forms of transmission and expression of data and images so that information gathered in a certain
form can be easily translated into other forms. Technology transfer and policy convergence The macro-trends outlined above have had particular effect on surveillance in developing
nations. In the field of information and communications technology, the speed of policy convergence is compressed. Across the surveillance spectrum -- wiretapping, personal ID
systems, data mining, censorship or encryption controls -- it is the West which invariably sets a proscriptive pace.[fn 3] Governments of developing nations rely on first world countries to
supply them with technologies of surveillance such as digital wiretapping equipment, deciphering equipment, scanners, bugs, tracking equipment and computer intercept systems. The
transfer of surveillance technology from first to third world is now a lucrative sideline for the arms industry . [fn 4] According to a 1997 report
"Assessing the Technologies of Political Control" commissioned by the European Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee and undertaken by the European Commission's Science and
Technology Options Assessment office (STOA), [fn 5] much of this technology is used to track the activities of dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, student leaders, minorities,
trade union leaders, and political opponents. The
report concludes that such technologies (which it describes as "new surveillance technology") can exert a
powerful 'chill effect' on those who "might wish to take a dissenting view and few will risk exercising their right to democratic
protest". Large scale ID systems are also useful for monitoring larger sectors of the population. As Privacy International observed, "In the absence of
meaningful legal or constitutional protections, such technology is inimical to democratic reform. It can certainly prove fatal to
anyone 'of interest' to a regime." Government and citizen alike may benefit from the plethora of IT schemes being implemented by the private and public sectors. New
"smart card" projects in which client information is placed on a chip in a card may streamline complex transactions. The Internet will revolutionize access to basic information on
government services. Encryption can provide security and privacy for all parties. However, these
initiatives will require a bold, forward looking legislative
framework. Whether governments can deliver this framework will depend on their willingness to listen to the pulse of the
emerging global digital economy and to recognize the need for strong protection of privacy.
Gov Surveillance kills freedom of assembly
Starr et al 08 (Amory Starr-Ph.D. in Sociology from University of California, Luis A. Fernandez- Ph.D. in Justice Studies
from Arizona State University, Randall Amster- J.D. from Brooklyn Law School and a Ph.D. in Justice Studies from Arizona
State University, Lesley J. Wood- Ph.D. from Columbia University, Manuel J. Caro- Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of
Miami, “The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis,” Published in
Qualitative Sociology, Date: 10 July 2008, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11133-008-9107-z/fulltext.html)
We now know more about surveillance than how victims feel about it; we also know a good deal about its intents. Cunningham explains that intelligence
operations can serve two goals, investigation of federal crimes and (the more controversial) precautionary monitoring through information gathering about
organizations. Counterintelligence operations may take a preventative goal, to “actively restrict a target’s ability to carry out planned actions” or may take the form
of provocation for the purpose of entrapment of targets in criminal acts. (2004, p. 6) Some of the “normal intelligence” activities undertaken by the
FBI outside of official COINTELPRO which nevertheless have a preventative counterintelligence function are: harassment by
surveillance and/or purportedly criminal investigations, pressured recruitment of informants, infiltration, break-ins, and labeling or
databasing which harms the group’s reputation impacting its ability to communicate with the media, draw new members, and
raise funds, “exacerbat[ing] a climate in which seemingly all mainstream institutions opposed the New Left in some way.” In
addition, infiltrators acting as agent provocateurs is, inexplicably, a part of normal intelligence operations (pp. 180–214). Can these kinds of operations
be understood as violations, not only of individuals’ political rights, but against associations themselves?
Since associations and social movements work for decades, they have interests separate from their participants. Previous literature shows that
knowledge (or fear) of surveillance and infiltration forces organizations to direct their energies toward defensive maintenance and
away from the pursuit of broader goals. (Boykoff 2006; Cunningham 2004; Davenport 2005; Flam 1998; Goldstein 1978; Marx 1970, 1974, 1979, 1988)
Alternately, activists may respond by turning from overt collective forms of resistance toward more covert, individualistic forms of
resistance (Davenport 2006, Johnston 2005, Zwerman et al. 2000) or to the emergence of more militant, even violent, factions (della Porta
1995). Organizations’ funding, relationships with other groups, the press, and the public may be affected as well (Marx 1970, 1974, 1979, 1988; US Congress
1976; Theoharis 1978; Churchill and Vander Wall 1988; Davenport 2006; Klatch 2002; Schultz and Schultz 2001).
The current NSA is threatening individual liberties
Jordan 06 (David Alan Jordan- J.D. with honors 2003, Washington and Lee University School of Law “Decrypting the Fourth
Amendment: Warrantless NSA Surveillance and the Enhanced Expectation of Privacy Provided by Encrypted Voice Over
Protocol” Published: BCL 5/1/06, http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2330&context=bclr)
The broad scope of the NSA's vigilant efforts has the potential to threaten the legitimate rights of American citizens, and appropriate
checks must be in place.234 FISA provides a well-established legal framework that has protected the rights of American citizens from unwarranted government surveillance since
1978.235 Although it
appears that this framework recently may have been circumvented through a secret executive order,236
warrantless surveillance of Americans is nothing new.2 37 Gaps in our legal protections have existed since FISA's enactment.2 38 The NSA's minimization
procedures provide strong protection for the rights of U.S. citizens under most circumstances, but they allow breaches to occur in situations that are
arguably the most crucial. Although the NSA is required to destroy information inadvertently obtained about U.S. citizens in most cases, the current minimization
procedures allow the agency effectively to initiate criminal investigations by turning over such information to law enforcement if criminal conduct is revealed. This places
Americans at risk of criminal prosecution resulting from warrantless eavesdropping on their private
telecommunications. This should not be permitted . Although it may not be practicable for the NSA to obtain a warrant in every case where information about
U.S. citizens may be inadvertently acquired, the heightened expectation of privacy provided by encrypted Internet telephony should require additional limitations on what may be done
with such information after it is acquired. USSID 18 must be redrafted to forbid the use of inadvertently obtained information for the purpose of initiating criminal investigations against
the government would be ensuring that
the NSA stays focused on its primary mission-protecting the United States from terrorism and foreign intelligence
operations-and not engaging in general criminal investigations domestically . Under the current directive, the NSA has an incentive to collect as much
U.S. citizens unless exigent circumstances are presented. By disallowing the use of such information for these purposes,
"inadvertently acquired" information as possible. If the possibility of using such information to initiate unrelated criminal investigations were removed, the agency would cease to have an
the agency with an incentive to maintain its focus on foreign
terrorism and counterintelligence, and it would curb the temptation to stray into unrelated matters more appropriately
left to those charged with domestic law enforcement. This solution would allow the NSA to protect U.S. national
security, while also enabling American citizens to communicate with foreign acquaintances without fear . It would also have
the benefit of restoring public confidence in the NSA, effectively combating the perception that the agency engages in
frequent violations of the very rights it was created to defend.
incentive to collect information unrelated to its national security mission. This would provide
Domestic Surveillance in Status Quo causes “Chilling Effect”, effectively killing civil liberties- Plan
Solves
Gardella, 06 (Todd, "BEYOND TERRORISM: THE POTENTIAL CHILLING EFFECT ON THE INTERNET OF BROAD LAW
ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION," No Publication,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/216777370/fulltext/2801B54E0FF345A4PQ/1?accountid=14667)
48 In addition to privacy issues , there is also concern that this provision will result in a chilling effect upon people 's
reading habits.49 Within the context of the Internet, online vendors have claimed this provision has had an adverse impact on ecommerce, with the thrust of the dissension coming from online booksellers.50 Although the government has provided
limited information to the public regarding its use of this section,51 the Justice Department disclaims any charges of
abuse and suggests that concerns over library surveillance are overblown .52 As with the surveillance provisions, this
section was enacted as a sunset provision, scheduled to expire after four years.53 "[T]he Supreme Court has been careful and vigilant in protecting
free speech on the Internet."127 The series of cases where the Court sustained online free speech protections against so compelling a governmental interest as the protection of
children manifests the Court's deference to free expression in cyberspace.128 Recently, the
Supreme Court sought to compel the government to explore
alternative technologies as a means to further the government interest rather than rely on legislation that would
impermissibly chill protected speech as an incidence to its enforcement .129 In justifying its protective disposition toward
cyberspace, the Court has distinguished the Internet from traditional broadcast media.130 The characteristics of the Internet,
however, continue to change; the challenge thus lies in developing sound principles to fit a medium where the constituent
properties rapidly continue to evolve. Online speech generally is protected by the First Amendment to the same extent as speech
in newspapers or magazines. 131 Legislatures have wide latitude, however, to discriminate among various mediabecause such discrimination is based on the medium and is thus content-neutral-when drafting statutory media rights
and privileges .132 This leaves open, for example, the question regarding the extent to which those who publish on the Internet
can consider themselves "journalists" for the purpose of invoking the privileges customarily granted to that profession.133 As
"hloggers"134 continue to log on in droves-and as their influence and value continue to be recognized135-the boundaries of such privileges remain nebulous . Thus , it seems
the fundamental status distinction that has granted the press considerable protection in our society cannot be easily
translated to apply within cyberspace . The challenge here lies in applying the rights and privileges appurtenant to the status
of a person when the distributive nature of the source of online content makes it difficult to classify the persons providing that
content.136 Regardless of any ability to claim special press privileges, publishers of online content are still entitled to
fundamental free speech protections.137While considering speech within the context of cyberspace, the definition of speech
itself warrants discussion. Traditionally, political justifications have served as the strongest basis for protecting speech.138
Several courts, however, have upheld the notion that computer code itself constitutes protected free speech.139 Of course, the
Supreme Court has long recognized the notion that " 'all ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance,' including
those concerning 'the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts' have the full protection of the First Amendment."140
Computer code, however, serves a broader purpose than the mere conveyance of ideas; not only does code have substantial
value as a language for communicating ideas,141 but in the aggregate it composes the framework of the Internet, serving as its
rivets and I-beams. It also acts as the law of cyberspace.142 As such, computer code falls within the category of multi-purpose
speech, warranting strict scrutiny by courts.143Although a prior restraint on the publication of scientific speech has been upheld
in lower federal courts on the ground of national security, the Supreme Court has never decided a case in which the issue was
the constitutionality of suppressing scientific speech.144 This leaves open the possibility that when the Court does confront this
issue, it may be "facing a case where the government's argument for suppression will be hard for the Justices to resist."145
This is especially true considering that "some scientific speech is now capable of facilitating some extremely serious
harms ."146While many of the cases that relate to the Internet are a testament to the modern Supreme Court's strong protection
of free speech, 147 history demonstrates that the Court has acted with skepticism toward new technology .148 "After all, it took
the Court 35 years, two World Wars and a Great Depression to ... extend free speech and free press protections to motion pictures."149 In coupling this perspective of thin protection
with the current war on terror,
one has to consider that free speech protection on the Internet
may be
quite fragile .150