 Irvin Janus defines it as: A mode of thinking
that people engage in when they are deeply
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the
members' strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative
courses of action
 Origins
 This term was coined by William H. Whyte in
Fortune
 Group think was is remincient of doublethink and
duckspeak of George Orwell’s 1984
 Conditions
 High Stress
 Little hope for a better
alternative
 High Group
Cohesiveness
 Persuasive strength
of the group leader
 Eight indicative Symptoms
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Illusion of invariability
Unquestioned believe in groups’ morality
Collective Rationalization of decisions
Shared stereotypes of out-group, especially
opponents
Self-censorship
Illusion of unanimity
Direct pressure for dissenters to conform
Self-appointed mind-guards, prevent neg. info.
 Seven Symptoms of Affects
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Incomplete survey of Alternatives
Incomplete survey of Objectives
Failure to examine risks of preferred choices
Failure to reevaluate rejected alternatives
Poor information search
Selective Bias
Failure to work out contingency plans
 Dissolve decision power
 Appoint someone to
disagree or Dissent
Papers
 Anonymity of
suggestions
 Preserves social capital
 Have an inspector or
outside role which
individuals can appeal to
 Consensus Decision
Making
 Group works in a less
competitive situation to
agree on terms
 US special ops raid of a
North Vietnamese POW
camp
 Bright leadership
 Brigadier General Leyor
Simons and Colonel
Arthur D. Bull Simons
 Perfect execution /
Stupid mistake
 Illusion of invulnerability
 “Everything is going to work out all right because we
are a special group.” - ““95 to 97 percent assurance
of success”
 They placed an exact estimate of assured success
without thinking of their alternate outcomes
 Inherent mortality of the group
 We’re saving POWs how can it be bad
 “How could anyone not approve this?” (President
Nixon)
 Collective rationalization
 General Blackburn, General Bennett and
Admiral Moore meet to decide if it is a go
 Blackburn was the sponsor and felt the
mission was the only option, but had fears
that Bennett or Moore would feel different
 Despite recent intelligence they felt the same.
 Out-group stereotyping
 Planners lamented the lack of HUMINT and over
reliance on technical means
 Yet they discarded all HUMINT that did not support
a “GO” decision
 Lucky Break assulting a secondary school
 Self-censorship
 Admiral Train admitted 12 hours before the raid they
had almost indisputable evidence the campe was
empty
 A Four Star Flag Officer remained silent to be a team
player
 Illusion of unanimity
 By remain silent the group interpreted it as
agreement
 If the fall out was bigger, like Watergate, there would
have been more dissenters afterward
 Direct pressure on dissenters
 After being told the camp was empty by DIA
Intelligence agents General Blackburn scolded them
“How the hell can you make heads or tails out of the
data
 Shortly after they thought that the prisoners were moved
back