INFORMATION
and National Security
Dr. Dan Kuehl
National Defense University (NDU)
Information Resources Management College (IRMC)
My Opinions: not the USG, DOD, or NDU
The Three Stages of Mankind’s Evolution
Homo Erectus:
Mankind standing up and
staring at movie props
“2001 A Space Odyssey” 1968
Homo Sapiens:
Mankind’s Superior Intellect
Monty Python’s “The Holy Grail”
Homo Connectus:
Mankind as OverlyConnected Cyborg
“Beetle Bailey”
Outline
Information and National Power
Cyberspace and Info Space
Information in National Security Strategy
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Infrastructure Protection/Information Assurance
Strategic Communication
Information-Cyber Operations
Joint, Service, Global
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New Developments
Measuring Power
An Information Strategy
Information as Power: DIME
Distinct from yet employed
across/integrated with all other
elements of power
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Political/Diplomatic
From Radio Free Europe to “War of Ideas”
to Strategic Communication
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Military
Military Technical Revolution to Revolution
in Military Affairs to “Transformation” to ??
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Economic
Synergy of Information Communication
Technologies and national economies

Infrastructures
Information Power (1)
The Information Component of Power:
“Combination of information content and
technology used as a strategic instrument to
shape fundamental political, economic, military
and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect
the global behavior of governments, supra- and
non governmental organizations, and societies to
support national security strategies & objectives”
Dan Kuehl, Strategic Forum #115, “Defining Info Power”,(1997)
President Ronald Reagan: National Security Strategy (1987)

Used by every nation state and strategic political
entity, regardless of technological development
Information Environment
Physical/Electronic Connectivity: “Ether”/Cyberspace/”eSpace”
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Infrastructures, wires, networks, etc: a means of delivery
Cyberspace as a unique physical domain (land, sea, air, space)
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Includes human (non-technical) connectivity
Information Content:
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Words, images, databases, 11010111000s
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Deeds/Actions are content
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Context: identical content may be understood differently
Cognitive: “influence/perception”
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Meaning and the Mind: “most important”
Example: Serbian TV vs NATO cohesion 1999

Losing the battle here may negate winning kinetically
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Al Q’aida using kinetic ops to create cognitive effects
Information Power (2)
“The relative ability to operate in and exploit the
information environment
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the aggregated and synergistic combination of
CONNECTIVITY, CONTENT, & COGNITION. It is an
indispensable underpinning for all other forms of power, yet it
is unique in its own right. It is employed across all other
forms of human activity—economics, war, diplomacy—and
across all levels of conflict, from peace to war. Its elements
can be described, and their impact measured, albeit not
necessarily to the exactness as other components of power.”
Analogous to air-sea-space power
Dan Kuehl, “The Information Revolution & the Transformation
of Warfare” (2007)
Cyberspace is…..??
DOD
 “A global domain within the
information environment
consisting of the interdependent
networks of information
technology infrastructures,
including the Internet,
telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and
embedded processors and
controllers.” (“until further
notice”)
J-5 Cyber Directorate (DepSecDef
memo of 12 May 2008)
DTK
“Cyberspace is a global domain
within the information environment
whose distinctive and unique
character is framed by the use of
electronics and the
electromagnetic spectrum to
create, store, modify, exchange
and exploit information via
interdependent and interconnected
networks using informationcommunications technologies
(ICT)”
Dan Kuehl, “Cyberspace & Cyberpower:
Defining the Problem”, Cyberpower &
National Security, 2009
Cyberspace is….
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Man-made technologies are necessary to exploit ALL of our operational
domains and the natural phenomena from which they derive their
characteristics:
Chariots on land, Airplanes in the air, Ships at sea, Satellites in space
PP
CC
Tim Harrell, Booz-Allen-Hamilton
Cyber operations are…
“the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary
purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or
through cyberspace. Such operations include computer
network operations and activities to operate and defend
the Global Information Grid”
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Is the GIG our “base” in cyberspace?
A foundation for Organize, Train & Equip
What is excluded: “operations that may cause effects in
cyberspace—EW, Psyop—[but] that do not employ cyber
capabilities.”
VCJCS Memo 25 September 2008
(Do you agree?)
“First Battles’” Thesis
Traditional Warfare: first defeats-even disastersdid not always equal final defeat; strategic
“space” allowed for recovery

Geographic and Temporal (“land/distance & time”)
Russia, 1941-44; Pacific, 1941-44
Battles for operational/technological superiority:
Radar, Airspace, Battle of Atlantic
Cyberwarfare: defeat in the first cyberbattle may
be the defining condition for victory

“Victory” in Clausewitzian terms, ie./ political
objectives, not solely/narrowly military
US National Security Strategy
(Past)
President Reagan, 1987/1988
Political and Informational Power
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federal agencies & private sector
counter “public deception &
propaganda”
“full range of US informational
programs” to “reach peoples of denied
areas”
“electronic media, written materials,
increased contact & exchange”
Technology
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strategic advantage
“free flow of information” facilitates
creation & exploitation of advanced
technology
economic health and military capability
computer technology and software
Info support to diplomatic power
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“fight the war of ideas”
President Clinton, 1999/2000
3 Key pillars
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Info Assurance/Critical Infrastructure
Protection (IA/CIP)
Vital national interest, use unilateral
force to defend; “Partnership”

Information Warfare/Ops (IW/IO)
MTR/RMA to Network Centric Ops to
Transformation: Desert Storm to
Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq
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Public Diplomacy/International Public
Information (PD/IPI)
”Softpower” (Joe Nye); (Strategic
Communication)
“increasingly vital….transmit [our]
message to people around the world”
to “counter misinformation &
incitement…mitigate conflict”

“Softpower & Smartpower” (Joe Nye
and SecDef Gates, 2008)
Obama Admin
Three Suggestions
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Do not treat cyberspace in isolation from information
environment (See DepSecDef Memo of May 07)
Need comprehensive Cyberstrategy as a segment of an even
more comprehensive National Info Strategy
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“Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative” (CNCI) is
vital but not enough by itself
Grow the Partnership
Public Sector: Interagency/Government (all levels), Military,
Congress, Intel, Agencies, etc
Private Sector: Industry/Business, Academia, Society
International partners and organizations
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Develop an Information Strategy
Build the “3Cs” (later)
Information Assurance
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Dependency/Interconnections create Vulnerability
National Infrastructure controls
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complex, interconnected, centralized, autonomous: SCADA
energy, transportation, communications, finance, etc
US Government actions 1990s – 200Xs
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Australia, Norway, Sweden, Canada…
Just as valid for Europe, Asia as US: A global trend
NATO, EU
Partnership of Public-Private sectors
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Lessons from Estonia & Georgia?
“Smaller is Better”
Strategic/economic impact/threat
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“Strategic Fragility”
Mobilization = German railroad system 1914?
Cybersecurity Report (Melissa Hathaway’s effort)
The New National/Global
Security Environment
“Global Asymmetric Engagement/Asymmetric
Counterforce’

Cyberwar vs information & networks; operating in a contested
global commons
(see Flournoy/Brimley in USNI July 2009)
Asymmetric warfare & the “revolution in military affairs” =
others are looking for OUR weaknesses
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Information-dependent military operations
Critical infrastructure-dependent national societies
Inter-connected global economies
Have we the organizations, doctrines, personnel needed
to survive and win the First Battle in Cyberspace?
Potential Cyber
Attack Objectives
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Disrupt enemy infrastructure, logistics and supply
chains
Distract, confuse, and disable enemy C4ISR
OODA-Loop effects
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Impair the movement of military forces
Deny similar capabilities to the enemy
Create opportunities for strategic attacks on enemy
infrastructures
Weaken, distract and disorient social cohesion and
political will of both military forces and civil populace
Shape global perceptions of the conflict
Time-Gap: potentially NANOSECONDS!
Bob Miller & Irv Lachow, “Strategic Fragility”,
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/defense_horizons/DH59.pdf
Strategic Influence
Strategic Communication
“Strategic Influence” is a strategic
instrument…and always has been

Assyrian palace at Nimrud 700BC
TV is everywhere (“Softwar”)
“This weapon of television could be
useful”; Edward R. Murrow 1951
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Vietnam to “Tear Down This Wall” to Al
Firdos bunker to “Live from the WTC”
New mediums: Internet, cell phone
cameras (London 2005), Twitter
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Cyberspace & Terrorism =
cyberterrorism?
Info battle of Iraq: winning?
Global influence: succeeding?
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MUST see through THEIR lens
Al Jazeera - Al Hurra, Radio Sawa
Recent congressional engagement
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Needed for resources, support
Strategic Communication
Symphony Orchestra or Jazz Ensemble?
Cdr Steve Tatham, RN
“Strategic Communication: a Primer”
War of Ideas…or Images?
Narratives and Pictures
Influence “Campaigning”
Elements of an Information “Campaign”
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WHAT is the desired EFFECT?
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WHO is the audience?
Cultural awareness
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Behaving
Cognitive
Dissonance
Confirmation or
Contradiction
Are we listening or just talking?
WHAT is the message?
Content analysis
Perceptions = Reality
DEEDS = messages!
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SensingReceiving
HOW to deliver it?
Goal:
Desired Action
Faith and/or
Reason
Cultural
Mismatch
Which Media and Spokesman:
Shortwave to Arab street, or Imam in
Mosque?
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WAS it successful?
Metrics & measurement
Measure impact, not effort
Believing
PerceivingInternalizing
C2W to Info Ops Roadmap
“Integrated use of
OPSEC, military
deception, PSYOP, EW,
and physical destruction,
mutually supported by
intelligence, to deny
information to, influence,
degrade or destroy
adversary C2
capabilities, while
protecting friendly
capabilities against such
actions.”
JCS, Command and
Control Warfare”

1993
 “Integrated employment
of the core capabilities
of EW, Computer
Network Operations,
Psyop, Military
Deception, and Opsec,
in concert with specified
supporting and related
capabilities, to influence,
disrupt, corrupt or usurp
adversarial human and
automated decision
making while protecting
our own”
 Info Ops Roadmap
 2003
Doctrine Pub 3-13, 2006
“the Thesis”
Highlights/Key Points
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Retains Roadmap definition of Info Ops
Part of “Transformation”
“IW” no longer used; (irregular warfare)
Three interrelated dimensions
Physical, Informational, Cognitive
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Strategic Command
Coord IO across AORs and functional boundaries
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Importance of Strategic Communication
Important role of allied/coalition Info Ops
An Info Ops Map
Services
Air Force
•
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•
•
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Army
EW, Influence, Networks
AFDD-1, 2-5
Realm to control
Cyberspace Command?
24th AF – 67th NW Wg
•
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•
•
•
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Navy
Maritime Dominance
Fleet Operations
Net Centric Ops
NETWAR Command
Cyber Forces Cmd?
Info Warriors
•
•
•
•
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Digital battlefield
FM 3-0 & 3-13
Info Superiority
1st IOpsCmd – 4th POG
FAs 29, 30 & 39
JOINT
Info Ops
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•
•
•
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USMC
Human factors & Tech
MCWP 3-40.5
Command Dominance
• OODA loop
MCIOC at Quantico
IOps career field
RMAs require Operational and Organizational change/”Transformation”
A DOD Map
USD(I)
SERVICES
Info Operations
Mil Dec, CNO, Opsec
Organize/Train/Equip
ASD/NII
Networks &
Info Integration
IA/CIP
Combat Cmds
Plan-Exercise
Execution
SOCOM-Psyop
JCS
JOINT
Info Ops
JROC Process
J2 Threats/TGTS
J39 (DDGO) Offensive
J5 Cyber Division
J6 Networks/Cyberspace
J7 Doctrine/Education
NSA
Threat Analysis
E-space Analysis
JFCC-NW
DIA
DISA
INTEL Focal Point
Indications & Warning
Human Factors Analysis
JIOWCntr
Defensive IW
Support to CoComs
Stratcom –
Global Strike
JTF-GNO
Indications & Warning
NCS/NSTAC
USD(P)
Policy
Roadmap
Psyop-DSPD
STRATCOM
Nodal analysis
Mission/Advocate
Support to CoComs
Plan/Execute
New Cyber Command
JWAC
Nodal Analysis
Allies’ Info Ops
UK Joint Warfare Pub 3-80

“Co-ordinated actions
undertaken to influence an
adversary or potential
adversary in support of
political and military
objectives by undermining
his will, cohesion and
decision-making ability,
through affecting his
information, informationbased processes and
systems while protecting
one’s own decision-makers
and decision-making
processes.”
EU Military Info Ops
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EU Mil Committee 2/2008
“Military function that
provides advice and
coordination of military
activities affecting
information and information
systems in order to create
desired effects in support of
the mission specific Crisis
Information Strategy and of
the political and military
objectives of the EU”
What is a “crisis info strat”?
NATO
Info Ops comprises three interrelated activities
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Changing, influencing or reinforcing perceptions and
attitudes or adversaries, potential adversaries, others
Preserve and protect Alliance freedom of maneuver in
the information environment by defending the data
and information [of] decision makers/processes
Countering command, functions, and capabilities by
affecting data/info of adversaries’ C2, intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and weapons systems
an integrating function focused on the info
environment, not a capability in its own right
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Military Policy on IO MC 422/3 9 March 07 (agreed July 2008)
Allied Joint Pub 3-10 (pending official publication)
Others’ IO
China
Russia
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“Information Security Doctrine
of the Russian Federation”
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Protect the IT industry
Send: reliable info on the RF
Protect: spiritual life of the RF
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Info Technical, Psychological
Tim Thomas, FMSO at
Ft Leavenworth
Focus on non-technological
Unconventional warfare
Not a battlefield force
enabler/multiplier
“Anti-Info-Strategy
Technology”
Russian Info Ops
Two, not five, core areas
Overlays IW with ideology
“New People’s War”-“Overcome superior with
inferior”
9 Sept 2000
Protect “national interests…in
the information sphere”
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Info campaign precludes the
need for military action!---a
preemption weapon
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Jim Mulvenon, “PLA in Info
Age”, RAND
Discussion
Is Cyberspace a warfighting domain?
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Define “domain” (Definitions DO matter!)
Did the USAF try to “grab the cyberturf”?
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How much of Cyberspace does AF/DOD
“own”?...civilian infrastructure is 90%+ of DOD use
Are we making the right changes in…

Organizations, doctrines, technology
What are coalition partners/allies doing?
Who will be the “Billy Mitchell” of Cyberspace?
(do we need/want one?)
Cyber Changes
US Strategic Command

New Subordinate Unified
Cyber Command
Director National Security
Agency 4 stars, 2 hats
JFCC-NW and JTF-GNO
folded into it
Missions, Roles,
Responsibilities evolving
Protect military—not
civilian—networks

Generating significant
discussion/unease
QDR Cyber Strategy

Broad goals (draft)
Freedom of Action in
cyberspace
Prevent/Deter conflict
Cyber support to
homeland defense
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Supports
Secure Networks
Cyber Ops
External partners
DOD & national efforts
Information Operations
QDR sub-panel on Info Ops
Moving away from “5 core competencies”, and
towards the “Information Environment”
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DTK proposal (based on QDR proposals):
[M] = Military
Information Operations are [M] activities conducted in or via
the information environment to affect and protect information
itself as well as the connectivity necessary to exchange that
information and create cognitive effects. Info Ops is thus the
integrated and coordinated [M] use of the information
environment in order to create desired [M] effects. This use
of the [M] information environment spans the range of
operations, and exists within and supports larger
governmental and national uses of the information
environment and information power in national security.
Measuring PIME
Traditional measure of power is control of
resources

Land, iron/coal/oil, people
M and E: easily visible and quantifiable
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Military: hardware, troops, training
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Economic: GDP, trade, industry
P/D: may have some visible metrics
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Stability, continuity, participation
Embassies, treaties, diplomats
I most difficult of all
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What metrics can we use?
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Information/Cyber Power
“Use of information
content and technology
as strategic instruments
to…affect global
behaviors”
“The relative ability to
operate in and exploit
the information (cyber)
environment…”
Two Critical and measurable
factors:

CONNECTIVITY
Exchange of information
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CONTENT
What’s exchanged
One somewhat less—but
still-measurable factor
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COGNITIVE
Influence/behavior
Bottom Line:
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Impact and Effectiveness
Information Power…
Who’s in Charge?
Diplomatic and Military…
Centralized and Hierarchical
Economic and Information…
Diffused and Shared
Which model is correct for Information?
What’s Lacking
Who and Where do we go to
shape and create Information
Power?
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National Information Council?
Public & Private Partners
What do need from them?

National Information Strategy
What are we lacking? Why
don’t we have one?

We need a strategic and
conceptual foundation for how
we can employ Information
Power to support national
security
Needed: Information-age
corollary to the “Long
Telegram”
The “Long
Telegram”
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
The Charge in the Soviet Union (George
Kennan) to the Secretary of State
[was classified at the time…now declassified]
Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received
February 22--3: 52 p.m.]
511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves
questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our
form of thought, and so important to analysis of our
international environment that I cannot compress
answers into single brief message without yielding
to what I feel would be dangerous degree of oversimplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with
me if I submit in answer to this question five parts,
subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
(2) Background of this outlook
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.
(4) Its projection on unofficial level.
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US
policy.
Information Strategy
Builds on “3Cs”

Build, enhance, support Connectivity
Physical: networks, infrastructures, Information-Communication
Technology (ICT)
Human: one-one, one-many, many-many
Get the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)
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Build/Use institutions that create Content
Entertainment, News, Marketing, Education, more
Get the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)

Measure Cognitive impact
Get the REAL experts (ie. Private Sector)
All Three require partnerships beyond government,
military, and especially the private sector to include nonUS, and they require a long-term view…this isn’t years,
it’s decades

Taliban: “Americans have all the watches, we have all the time”
What’s Needed?
“Wire the World!”
New strategy is not
“Containment”…it’s
CONNECTIVITY
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See Hart-Rudman Commission’s 2nd
Report, May 2000
An (increasingly) Networked World
Free flows of information and
exchange of CONTENT
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Via both Human & Technological
Interaction
Enhance economic growth and
productivity, standards of living and
health care, etc
Enhance strategic communication,
which can enhance
Human rights, Democracy, Peace
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Bridge the “Core-Gap” paradigm
…BUT: won’t be 100% successful
Critical Issues
Questions for Discussion
How do we develop and protect “National Cyberspace?

What is it? Who?
Organizations, people, doctrines
How do we leverage Info Ops to fully support military
operations/commanders?

Enabler? Multiplier? Partner? Supported/ing?
How do we communicate and influence?

Who? What? How? Did we Succeed?
Roles

Intel Community, Private Sector, Allies/Friends, NGOs
Where fit within NATO security strategy?
Cubicle-Centric Warfare
Are we too busy fighting ourselves…and not paying
sufficient attention to THEM?
Dr Dan Kuehl
kuehld@ndu.edu 202-685 2257
Twittersphere: “Daninfowar”
http://www.ndu.edu/irmc/programs/index.html
Programs/Certifications for/in…
Chief Information Officers
Information Assurance
Organizational Transformation…
…and
Information Strategists