Week 6 - Dr. Louis A. Picard Web Site

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PIA 2020
The Administration of
Public Affairs
Comparative Governance and
Public Policy
The Structure and Process
of Bureaucracies- First Cut
1. Political Institutions and Public Affairs
2. Debates about Public Sector Reform
1. Lobbyists, Networks and Pressures
2. Public Motives vs. Private Economics and
Dealing with Corruption
I. Political Institutions:
Models of Governance
 Who Gets:
Models of Governance: An Ideal
Focus on Relationships
Political Models
1. Separation of Powers
2. Parliamentary System
3. Mixed Systems of Government
4. One Party or No Party Systems
5. Military and Authoritarian Systems
Separation of
Powers
U.S.
Mexico
Philippines
Many Latin
American
Countries
 “Presidential System”
Parliamentary
System: Cabinet
or Fused
Government
United Kingdom
Scandinavia
Central Europe
India
Former British
Colonies
The French
HybridThe Mixed
Presidential
Model
France
French Colonies
Weak Hybrids with a
Ceremonial President
One Party
States:
“Democratic
Centralism”
Communist or
Leninist States
Afro-Marxist
Fascist
“No Party Regimes”
Weak Party Systems
“Absolutism”
Authoritarianism
 Authoritarian systemsStructures absent to
protect citizens from fused
state and bureaucracy
 Non-Constitutional
Systems: Military Regimes
and One Party StatesPoliticized bureaucracy
 Rent Seeking, Nepotism
and Corruption
Does This Help?
Corporatism as the Alternative ConceptGroups and Leadership Francisco Franco
Political Structures and
Society
Statist view of Society- Collectivist (Frances
FitzGerald- Fire in the Lake on Vietnam)- Four
Views
a. Idea of an active, creative state,
development
oriented (Keynes)
b. Marxist-Leninist model- communitarian
c. Corporatist idea of society as groups- civil
service as a group (Western Europe)
d. Focus- Group Mobilization
Mobilization of Working Class
The Power of the Group
Fascism and
Italy
VIDEO
The Banality of
Authoritarianism
II. An Overview of
Public Sector Reform
Reform Epochs: A
Reminder
 16th Century France: Separation of King from
retainers. Creation of Bureaucracy
 18th Century Prussia: Cameralism- Defined civil
administrators in public and Corporate Sector
 Nineteenth Century: British India and British
Reforms: Selection by Examination and Interview
 Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century U.K.
and U.S.: Civil Service Reform: Ending the Spoils
 Last Part of the Twentieth Century: Structural
Adjustment
Bureaucracies, Politicians
and Clients
Overall Themes of the Next Several Weeks in the Reading
1.
Characteristics of Bureaucracies (Schiavo-Campo)
2.
Explaining Bureaucratic Behavior (Swart)
3.
Clients: The comparative advantage of the "Iron Triangle"
model (Executive Bureaucracy, Congress and Staff and
Lobbyists). (Sandel and Kharasch)
4.
Clients and Democracy: The Power of the Lobbyist
(Zakaria)
5.
Corporatism as the Alternative Concept (Conspiracy?)
(Mills)
6.
Evaluating Reform and Understanding behavior (Wilson)
The Public Sector
Problem:
 Inefficiency
 Corruption
 Interest Influence
 Authoritarianism
 Patronage
Lincoln and the
Accusation of Patronage
The U.S. Case Study
Two Views of Behavior
Kenya Poster: A Reminder
How to Reform:
 Organizational and Administrative Reform
(Motivation and Communication)
 Civil Service Reform (Recruitment)
 Fiscal Reform (Spending and Ownership)
 Policy Reform (Law and Order vs.
Development)
Modern Reforms: U.S.
Model

U.S. Civil Service Reform: 1883: End of
Spoils

Hoover Commissions: 1940s and
1950s (Admin. Reform)

New Public Administration: Advocacy
Reform and Affirmative Action

Structural Adjustment: Debt
Management and PrivatizationInternationalized Reform

New Public Management: Customers
and Clients
Evaluating
Reforms?
III. Lobbyists, Networks
and Pressures
Clients: The Role of Groups
The Role of Groups
 Reform Perspective
 Extent of access to public sector
 Iron Triangle
 Problem of Illicit Access
The Iron Triangle and the
Revolving Door
Group Influences-Five
Models:
1. Japan/Asia- Johnson's perspective (State Centric
Planning and one way movement)
2. Europe- (Orwell, Greene, Ferrel Heady (Representation
vs. Corporatism)
3. U.S.- Pluralism vs. Elite Theory (Dahl vs. C. Wright
Mills)
4. Latin America: Military Corporatism and Patron Client
Relationships
5. Africa/Middle East: Crony Capitalism
Peronism vs. Chile
Video:
Pluralist vs. Controlling
 Power Elite- Class
 Pluralist
(Competitive)
C. Wright Mills, The Power
Elite (1916-1962)
Mills commuted to
Columbia College on his
motorcycle, 1950s
How Valid?
LDCs
 An absence of "clients" or Too many?
 The Role of patronage, corruption and
Crony capitalism.
-Indonesia
-Korea
-West Africa
-China
-U.S.?
Crony Capitalism
Coffee Break
Ten Minutes
Video: The Ministry of
Silly Walks
IV. AT ISSUE
 Public Interest vs. private interests
(and the bureaucracy as an interest
group)
 Question: Is there such a thing as a
Public Interest Group? (PIG)
 NGOs: Public, private or Ideological?
The Ideal
Clients and
Democracy
John Q. Public
Is there such a person?
Major themes in Comparative
Public AdministrationAdministrative Structures and Society- An
Individualist view of state-society relationships
a. Common law view of society;
b. Anglo-Saxon model: law and order as
basic function of government;
c. Society made up of individuals- liberalism
Political Structures and
Public Management Themes
1. Issues of Governance, Interests
and Political Development
2. The Administrative State Problem:
Weak Political controls and a strong
bureaucratic elite
Control: How to vs. Should
one?
Political Structures and
Public Management
III. Elite vs. egalitarian views of public service. (A
Reminder)- Interests within the State)
a. Maximum Deferred Achievement (No
pre-selection)
b. Maximum Ascriptive Model (Class based)
c. Progressive Equal Attrition Model
Egalitarian- Professional- collectivist
Political Structures and
Public Management
1. Structure of Civil Service Systems: The role of
Mandarins and political penetration into the civil
service
2. Decayed and Transferred Institutions: (Kings
and Colonies)- The creation of an organizational
bourgeoisie (Irving Markovitz)
3. Corporatist Systems can be royalist, military,
social (Spain, Argentina, Scandinavia)
The Myth: Classical NonPartisanism
 The Politics/Administration Dichotomy:
The Role of Non-Partisan Movements and
Generic Management
 POSDECORB (Luther Gulick)
 (Planning, Organizing, Staffing, Directing,
Coordinating, Reporting, and Budgeting)
 How Neutral?
Differences between the public and
the private sector- How much, or
how little?
1. No significant differences between
personnel in large private vs. public
organizations
2. Differences in the structures within
which the individual has to work
3. The bureaucracy is an institution of
government
Government: Differences
from the private sectorDifference in Product
4. Private- emphasis is on profit, economy
and efficiency
5. Public- need to account for the political
and social- not what is always efficient
6. Issue- motivation or its absence in the
public sector
The Bottom Line
Government Has THE Monopoly of
Power (Ultimately Life and Death)
An Anti-Bureaucrat
 Video
Father Charles Coughlin
Comments and
Discussion
Bureaucratic Behavior
Supplementary Slides
THE PROBLEM
Management of the public sector
organization is separated from the
major management functions-
eg. promotion, firing, discipline,
collective bargaining
Basic Principles?
 The Bureaucracy is an institution of
government
a. The public bureaucrat has greater
recourse to sanctions than the private
b. Only partly true- the credit card
company and the collection agency
Origins of bureaucratic
power
a. Bureaucracy is largely autonomous, only
10% of actions controlled by politicos
b. Actions are seldom subjected to political
or judicial review
c. Problem of bureaucratic lethargy- resists
change
Origins of bureaucratic
power-2
d. Bureaucracies are COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONS and are difficult to control
e. Bureaucrats have the market cornered
on expertise
f. Bureaucrats play "bureaucratic politics"
behind the politicians' backs
Recruitment: The Only Game
in Town (for Reform)
KEY: The recruitment of professionals and
specialists contradicts with the issue of political
control
a. Problem- management, eg. the Department,
often does not control recruitment
b. Legislation sets the rules- merit system with
civil service commission overseeing the
process
c. Civil Service Commission or Office of
Personnel acts as an intermediary
The Process: Images of
Recruitment
Lethargy (Dong Eun Kim)
Bureaucratic Method: U.K.
Theories of Behavior
 Rational Behavior and DecisionMaking
 Standard Operating Behavior (SOPs)
 Bureaucratic Politics- Turf and Control
 Group Think
Role Theory
Role Theory: Animal
Behavior?
 The bureaucrat can have a
complex set of
interpersonal relationships
1. Analyst and advocate
2. Planner
3. Managers and lobbyists
4. Professional and
employee
5. Citizen
6. Spouse and Parent
Bureaucratic Norms?
Graham Allison: Org.
Theory
Kennedy Center, Harvard
Born, March 23, 1940
Cuban Missle Crisis
The Rights of the
Bureaucrat
 The role of Unions and strikes in the
public service
 Restrictions on political activity, eg.
the Hatch Act in the U.S.
 Secrecy, Clearance and Whistle
Blowing
Hatch Act
1833-1896
Governance Theory in the 1990s
a. Often turns out to be very specific: i.e. focused
institutions
1. Ombudsman
2. Auditor General
3. Territorial Governor as rep. of national
authority- the Prefectoral system
b. The Problem: Comparative studies of institutions
are very expensive-run out of money/go back to
case studies
c. The New Solution: Integration- The Whole of
Whole of Government
Swedish Ombudsman
Comparative Methodology Issues
 Impact of the “Asian Model” and
international experience
 Debates about Soft State Problem
 Weak Private Sector Problem
 Debates about Governance and
Authoritarianism
Comparative Methods
Comparative Public
Administration Issues
a. The politics-administration dichotomy
b. Environmental and cultural factors are important. Ecology
as an issue
c. Bureaucracy as a Negative? Keep government out of
people's lives
d. Search for a “non-Western Model”
ISSUES, Continued
e. Comparative as a methodstructural-functionalist
f. Systemic influence on the
individual- role definition, socialization
and development of organizations vs.
institutions
Gabriel A. Almond (12 January 1911 –
25 December 2002)
Family of Russian
Immigrants
Inputs- Interest Articulation
Interest Aggregation
Socialization
“Conversion- The Black Box”
Outputs- Laws, Regulations
And Policies
Systemic Approach to
Governance and Development
Development Administration: C.A.G.- Focus on
comparative and development administration.
 Foundations and CAG- chalets in Italy to discuss
administrative and political development
 USAID and Universities- 3 out of every 4 dollars never left the
U.S. Now .93 never leaves.
 Post-Vietnam and Iran: Bad
Reputation
 Ferrel Heady, Founder of
SICA, 1916-2006 Spent much
Life in Aisa
CAG Contined
 NIPAs, staff colleges and IDMs spring up all over Africa and
Asia
 After 1975/80- Foundations pulled the plug
 CAG End of Ford grant, 1974
 Post-Vietnam syndrome: Withdrawals, Ayatollas, now nineone-one
 End of Development as a consensus
Northern Tier goal
Development Management Flounders after 1983?
Missionary Life
Fred Warren Riggs, 90, University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa,
Professor emeritus of political science, passed away on
February 9, 2008 “Father” of Comparative Approach to Public
Affairs
Riggs Life
Professor Riggs was born in Kuling,
China on July 3, 1917, the son of
agricultural missionary parents
Charles H. and Grace (Frederick)
Riggs. He attended Nanking
University, 1934-35. Research in
Thailand and Philippines.
End of Macro-Approach
2. Things often done by different
structures and processes
Key:- Who makes rules
- who carries out,
implements
3. Critics: Lack of systems level theory
End of Macro-Approach
1.The Macro Approach: No Longer In Vogue (except with
Ferrel Heady)
a. Systems building from Almond to Riggs
b. Almond's functions and Easton's black boxes
c. Theme- Look at common functions- focus on
INSIDE processes of executive government
2. Governance- Basis for Comparison
THEORY: Civil Society vs. State
DEBATES
John D. Montgomery vs. Milton
Esman
(Experience Japan and Vietnam)
Middle Range Theory:
a. Role Theory, Exchange Theory
b. Focus on specific relationships: eg.
bureaucracy and political and moral
variables within a country
c. Mostly case studies- Egypt,
Botswana, the U.S. All the same
method. "The Case Study"
The political implications
of role theory
 ROLE SETS (Robert Merton)
 Role Conflict in the bureaucracy
 Role vs. Status vs. Individuals
Robert King Merton
July 4, 1910 - February 23, 2003
The political implications
of role theory
 ROLE SETS (Robert Merton)
 Role Conflict in the bureaucracy
 Role vs. Status vs. Individuals
The Situation in 1983:Modified "traditional
Approach"- A Micro and Meso level approach
a. Most like an "orthodoxy" of public administration
b. Comparative Study of:
1. Parts of the System- budgeting,
personnel, inter-governmental relations,
policy process- Focus on Relationships
2. Or whole systems- Britain vs. France,
U.S. vs. Russia, Botswana vs. Tanzania- Not
Comparative
Possible Discussion
 V. S. Naipaul, In a Free State
 Robert Penn Warren, All the King’s Men
 Daniel Okrent, Last Call
 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite
 James Lemann, The Black Migration
V.S. Naipaul: Born 17
August 1932
 Significance of
Stories?
Daniel Okrent, Last Call
(Note New Ken Burns Film)
Video: The Last Call
Born, April 2, 1948
Why is Booze Important?
Next Week
 Robert Kharasch
 Jamil Jriesat
 Nadine Gordimer
Revisit: Naipal, Penn Warren, Lemann
(What did you learn?)
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