The Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Ghent University, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the
Research Community ‘Neuroscience in relation to Experimental Psychology’ announce:
NEUROSCIENCE & COGNITION:
Consciousness & Cognitive control
December 3-4 2012
Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts (KVAB), Belgium
Mélanie Boly, Victor Lamme, Hakwan Lau,
Lionel Naccache, Mathias Pessiglione,
and David Badre
Discussant
Axel Cleeremans
ORGANISED BY:
Practical Information
Conference Venue:
Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts (KVAB)
Paleis der Academiën
Hertogsstraat 1
1000 Brussel
How to get there?
 From the airport: Take the train to Brussels Central Station
 With the train: Brussels Central Station
 By car: At your own risk

From Brussels Central Station:
o Take a walk (10 minutes)
o Take the underground walk way on your right (while staying in front of the main
announcement panel and ticketing offices - not left which is the exit to the city center)
o Go straight through the shopping mall "Ravenstein", take the steps at the end
o Cross the small street with "Palais des Beaux Arts" at your right, and take the steps at the
end
o Cross the street and cross the Park
o The academy is opposite the right exit
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o
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Or with the metro ( MIVB ): Metro station Troon
From Central Station: line 1 or 5 to Kunst-Wet, then line 2 or 6.
From Nord station: metro Rogier, line 2 or 6, direction Koning Boudewijn or Simonis
(Leopold II).
From Midi station : line 2 or 6 direction Simonis (Elisabeth)
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Oral presentations
All presentations are held in the Auditorium Albert II of the KVAB.
Our six keynote lectures will be 45 minutes with opportunity for a 15-minute discussion.
A scientific committee selected 8 submissions for a short oral presentation. These oral presentations will
be 15 minutes with opportunity for a 5-minute discussion. All speakers are asked to adhere to these time
limits.
Poster sessions
Two poster sessions will be held:
 Poster session 1: Monday December 3, 17.00-19.00, Atrium KVAB
 Poster session 2: Tuesday December 4, 12.20-14.20, Atrium KVAB
From page 14 on, you can see which posters are to be mounted in the first and which in the second
session. If you are in the first session, please mount your poster immediately after registering (so that
early people can already have a look) and remove it before we leave for the conference dinner, so that
the people from the second session can mount their posters early on Tuesday morning. The idea is that
on both days, posters can be seen all day long.
The format for poster preparation is A0 portrait (84.1 cm x 118.9 cm or 33.1 x 46.8 inches). Material to
attach the posters to the poster panels will be provided at the venue. Poster numbers mentioned in this
program correspond to the poster panel where the poster should be displayed.
Organizing committee:
Eva Van den Bussche (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
Filip Van Opstal (Ghent University)
Tom Verguts (Ghent University)
Ralf Krampe (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Bert Reynvoet (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Contact:
Eva Van den Bussche
Eva.Van.den.Bussche@vub.ac.be
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Department of Psychology
Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Phone : +32-(0)2-629 14 82
Fax : +32-(0)2-629 24 89
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Program Overview
Monday 3 December 2012
9.00
10.00 Registration and coffee
10.00 10.10 Welcome
10.10 11.10
Keynote Lecture
Victor Lamme: How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
11.10 11.40 Coffee break
11.40 12.40
Keynote Lecture
Mathias Pessiglione: Subliminal motivation of the human brain
12.40 14.00 Lunch
14.00 15.20 Oral Presentations:
14.00 14.20
14.20 14.40
Rémi Capa: Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious
reward incentives during cued task-switching performance
Floris De Lange: How consciousness changes the relative weights of evidence during human
decision making
14.40 15.00 Kobe Desender: Feeling the conflict: Metacognitive influences in masked priming
15.00 15.20 Gethin Hughes: The role of motor prediction in the processing of sensory action-effects
15.20 16.00 Coffee Break
16.00 17.00
Keynote Lecture
David Badre: Fronto-striatal systems supporting abstract rule learning
17.00 19.00 Poster session 1 and reception
19.15 19.30 Walk to the restaurant
19.30
Conference Dinner
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Tuesday 4 December 2012
9.30
10.00 Coffee
10.00 11.00
Keynote Lecture
Hakwan Lau: How to properly study the functions of consciousness?
11.00 11.20 Coffee Break
Keynote Lecture
11.20 12.20 Lionel Naccache: How far can “conscious posture” influence non conscious cognitive
processes?
12.20 14.20 Poster session 2 and lunch
14.20 15.40 Oral Presentations:
14.20 14.40 Anil Seth: Interoceptive predictive coding, presence, and agency
14.40 15.00 Simon van Gaal: Logical semantic operations in the absence of visual awareness
15.00 15.20 Heiko Reuss: Adaptation to unconscious conflicts in unconscious contexts
15.20 15.40 Tristan Bekinschtein: Losing Consciousness: wakefulness modulation of cognitive control
15.40 16.00 Coffee break
16.00 17.00
Keynote Lecture
Mélanie Boly: Brain connectivity in Disorder of Consciousness
17.00 17.30 Conclusions by Axel Cleeremans
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Keynote Speakers
Monday 3 December
10.10-11.10
How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
Victor Lamme
Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Consciousness has always been defined from introspective and behavioral intuitions. This has gotten us
nowhere. What we need is a radical redefinition of what consciousness really is, from a convergence of
introspective, behavioral and neural arguments. The criterion for success should be whether such a new
definition explains what there is to explain about consciousness, not whether it fits our intuitive notions.
From such an approach (Lamme, 2006; 2010), it emerges that it makes sense to acknowledge that we
have conscious sensations (in the phenomenal, qualitative sense) without attention, without access, and
hence also without thought. In this talk, I will present further arguments that impose such a far reaching
conclusion.
Our latest experiments show that vision without attention is rich, detailed, precise, integrated, and most importantly – shows perceptual inference i.e. goes beyond the retinal image towards a perceptual
interpretation of that image. Moreover, we show a further dissociation between various forms of
cognition (categorization, control) and consciousness, while the association between integrationsegregation and conscious experience is strengthened.
In sum, there is now overwhelming evidence showing that neural representations outside the focus of
attention, and outside the realm of access or thought possess all the key properties of conscious
representations, except – of course – reportability. Moreover, these properties do all the explaining
towards the phenomenal nature of conscious experience. The absence of access does little to explain
that away. The proper conclusion is that we may have conscious sensations even when we don’t know it.
11.40 – 12.40
Subliminal motivation of brain modules
Mathias Pessiglione
Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière, Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière, France
“Eat popcorn” is certainly one of the most famous subliminal messages. It was inserted into a movie and
presented so briefly that the audience could not see it. There is no evidence that such subliminal
advertising actually works in ecological settings. However, several subliminal motivation effects have
been obtained in the lab. For instance, some behavioural experiments suggest that we exert higher
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effort following incentive cues that we do not consciously perceive. Also, we can learn the predictive
value of subliminal cues so as to guide our gambling choices. These processes may be not only subliminal
but also subpersonal, since one side of our body can be motivated independently from the other.
Neuroimaging and pharmacological studies have then identified the limbic basal ganglia and the
neuromodulator dopamine as responsible for such subconscious motivation processes. These deep brain
structures could therefore be considered as modules representing subconscious motivations that would
compete for controlling the behaviour, until they have access to the consciousness space.
16.00 – 17.00
Fronto-striatal systems supporting abstract rule learning
David Badre
Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, USA
People show a remarkable ability to behave flexibly and in a goal-directed way, even in novel situations
with which they have little direct experience. Cognitive control of this type partly arises from the
representation of abstract rule structures that relate classes of contexts and actions to desired
outcomes. This talk will describe a recent line of work investigating how such abstract rules can be
learned and implemented in the brain to control behavior. Evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological,
and fMRI studies of abstract rule use, novel rule learning, and the transfer of previously learned rules to
novel situations will be presented. I will then discuss recent combined computational modeling and fMRI
work that proposes a mechanism by which abstract rule learning might arise via nested loops between
prefrontal cortex and the striatum. Issues related to implicit versus explicit learning and awareness of the
rule structures themselves will be considered.
Tuesday 4 December
10.00-11.00
How to properly study the functions of consciousness?
Hakwan Lau
Psychology Department, Columbia University (USA)
The current consensus seems to be that: without perceptual awareness of the relevant visual
information some cognitive control functions can be exercised, but perhaps awareness enhances or
changes the nature of such functions. However, the relevant empirical studies (including the speaker's
very own) are problematic, because when we render stimuli unconscious, we typically greatly reduce the
stimulus strength & internal perceptual signal as well. So when we say we're comparing between
conscious and unconscious percepts and their respective functions, we do not know if we are just
comparing between strong and weak percepts/signals. This potential confound trivializes current
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empirical results: it's not surprising that a big signal can drive cognitive control better than a weak signal,
and that a weak signal - so long as it is not truly non-existent - can drive some cognitive control functions
weakly. I propose that we try to keep objectively measured signal strength (i.e. perceptual performance)
constant and manipulate subjective awareness in isolation, and see how different levels of subjective
awareness influences cognitive control. This is hard to achieve but I show preliminary data supporting
the possibility of this exciting new approach.
11.20 – 12.20
How far can “conscious posture” influence non conscious cognitive processes?
Lionel Naccache
Paris 6 University & CRICM, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, France
For a long time unconscious processing of information, - as studied by experimental cognitive psychology
-, was considered as necessarily automatic in the “strong version” of the statement, including the
assumption of total impermeability to top down control. Whereas this assumption was discussed early
on, the first experimental invalidations of this robust theoretical assumption were produced around the
beginning of the 21st century: several studies demonstrated that the processing of a subliminal stimulus,
inaccessible to subjective report, was under the influence of many voluntary conscious effects such as
endogenous spatial and temporal attention, response selection or inhibition, and task selection. Far from
being achieved, this dynamic field of research conveys major issues: 1) which are the “limits” (if any) of
this sensitivity of non conscious processing to conscious posture? 2) Is this influence asymmetric, - and
therefore diagnostic of conscious processing -, or may it be observed in the reverse direction? On which
solid bases could the concept of automaticity be reformulated? Far from answering those questions, I
will try to shake them in front of your (conscious?) mind.
16.00 – 17.00
Brain connectivity in Disorder of Consciousness
Mélanie Boly
Coma Science Group, University of Liège, Belgium
During the last decade, functional neuroimaging of disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative
state and minimally conscious state) has evolved from measuring resting cerebral blood flow or electrical
activity to studying functional response to sensory stimuli and to active paradigm asking patients to
concentrate on doing a task like playing tennis. While offering new potential diagnostic tools in these
patients, these methods also show how difficult it is to clinically differentiate different states of
consciousness. Brain connectivity studies aim at evaluating global cerebral function in patients with
disorders of consciousness. In the present talk, I will cover results obtained using a range of functional
and effective connectivity approaches based on PET, fMRI, high density EEG, and TMS-EEG recordings.
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Experimental work performed in other unconscious states (i.e., anesthesia, generalized seizures, and
deep sleep) will also be compared and reviewed. Practical and conceptual implications of these studies
will be discussed in light of recent theories of consciousness.
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Oral Presentations
Monday 3 December
14.00 – 14.20
Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious reward incentives during
cued task-switching performance
Rémi L. Capa1,2, Cédric A. Bouquet3, Jean-Claude Dreher4, & André Dufour5
1
University of Liège, Department of Psychology, Cognition & Behavior, Belgium; 2 University of
Strasbourg, Department of Psychiatry, INSERM, France; 3 University of Poitiers, CeRCA CNRS, France; 4
University of Lyon 1, CCN Reward and Decision-Making Group CNRS, France; 5 University of Strasbourg,
LINC CNRS, France
Few studies using subliminal stimuli have reported short-lived effects on high-order executive control
functions. Building on research on unconscious motivation, in which a behavior of perseverance is
induced to attain a goal, we hypothesized that subliminal motivation can have long-lasting effects on
executive control processes. We investigated the impact of unconscious/conscious monetary reward
incentives on evoked potentials and neural activity dynamics during long runs of task switching. At the
beginning of each run, a reward (50 cents or 1 cent) was displayed, either subliminally or supraliminally.
Participants earned the reward contingent upon their correct responses to each trial of the run. A higher
percentage of runs was achieved with higher (conscious and unconscious) than lower rewards, indicating
that unconscious high rewards have long-lasting behavioral effects. Event-related potential results
indicated that unconscious and conscious rewards influenced preparatory effort in task preparation, as
suggested by a greater fronto-central contingent negative variation (CNV) starting at cue-onset. However,
a greater parietal P3 associated with better reaction times was observed only under conditions of
conscious high reward, suggesting a larger amount of working memory. Together, these results indicate
that unconscious and conscious motivations of electrophysiological-related executive control processes
have both similarities and differences during task-switching.
14.20 – 14.40
How consciousness changes the relative weights of evidence during human decision making
Floris P. de Lange1*, Simon van Gaal1*, Victor A.F.Lamme2, & Stanislas Dehaene3,4,5,6
1
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Nijmegen, Netherlands; 2 Department of Psychology,
University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 3 Inserm, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif‐sur‐Yvette, France;
4
Commissarìat à l’Energie Atomique, Neurospin Center, Gif‐sur‐Yvette, France; 5 Université Paris‐Sud 11,
Orsay, France; 6 Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France; * These authors contributed equally
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Human decisions are based on accumulating evidence over time for different options. How is this
accumulation of evidence affected by the level of awareness of the information? We addressed this
question using combined behavioral methods and magneto-encephalography. Participants were
required to make decisions by accumulating evidence over a series of visually presented arrow stimuli
whose visibility was modulated by masking. Behavioral results showed that participants could
accumulate evidence under both high and low visibility. However, a top-down strategic modulation of
the flow of incoming evidence was only present for stimuli with high visibility: once enough evidence had
been accrued, the impact of new incoming stimuli was reduced. Neural recordings revealed that, while
initial perceptual processing was independent of visibility, there was stronger top-down amplification for
stimuli with high visibility than low visibility. Furthermore, neural markers of evidence accumulation
showed a strategic bias only for highly visible information, speeding up processing and reducing neural
computations related to the decision process. Our results indicate that the level of sensory awareness
changes decision-making: high visibility leads to important changes in strategical top-down decision
making. Our results therefore suggest a potential role of consciousness, in deploying flexible strategies
for biasing information acquisition in line with one’s expectations and goals.
14.40 – 15.00
Feeling the conflict: Metacognitive influences in masked priming
Kobe Desender1, & Eva Van den Bussche1
1
Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
In recent years, accumulating evidence suggested that some expressions of cognitive control can be
exerted unconsciously. For example, adaptation to unconscious response conflict was found to be
possible both blockwise and on a trial-by-trial basis. However, according to some authors, subjects were
actually aware of the conflict in all these studies, but on a metacognitive level. For example, if subjects
consciously notice that masked incongruent trials are more difficult than masked congruent trials, they
can use this metacognitive information to adapt their behavior. Although theoretically plausible, no
empirical support for this claim has been provided. Therefore, in a masked priming study we carefully
questioned our subjects for different metacognitive variables on each trial. Our results showed that
subjects indeed have a different metacognitive awareness of congruent and incongruent trials. They
rated congruent trials as more positive, easier and less conflicting than incongruent trials. However, our
data seem to suggest that this metacognitive awareness cannot explain cognitive adaptation effects. This
would imply that subjects have some metacognitive awareness about the status of masked trials, but
this information is not used to adapt behavior.
15.00 – 15.20
The role of motor prediction in the processing of sensory action-effects
Gethin Hughes1,2, Andrea Desantis1,2, & Florian Waszak1,2
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1
Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France ;
Perception, UMR 8158), Paris, France
2
CNRS (Laboratoire Psychologie de la
The selection and control of action has been shown to influence the way in which we perceive the
external world. For instance, sensory processing of action-effects has been shown to differ to that of
externally triggered stimuli, both with respect to the perceived timing of their occurrence (intentional
binding) as well as their intensity (sensory attenuation). These phenomena are normally attributed to
forward action models, such that when action prediction is consistent with changes in our environment,
our experience of these effects is altered. We systematically investigated the role of temporal prediction,
temporal control, identity prediction and motor prediction in previous reports of sensory attenuation
and intentional binding. This analysis revealed that the vast majority of studies do not isolate action
prediction mechanisms to be the cause of binding or attenuation. We also report data from 2 behavioral
experiments on intentional binding and an EEG experiment on sensory attenuation, which suggest that
while sensory attenuation is modulated by identity specific motor prediction, intentional binding is not.
These findings have important implications for understanding the way in which action shapes our
perception of the external world.
Tuesday 4 December
14.20 – 14.40
Interoceptive predictive coding, presence, and agency
Anil Seth1,2, Keisuke Suzuki1,2, & Hugo Critchley1,3
1
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex; 2 Department of Informatics, University
of Sussex; 3 Department of Psychiatry, Brighton and Sussex Medical School
We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence, i.e.
the subjective sense of reality of the world and of the self. Our model is based on interoceptive
prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical
predictive coding and dopaminergic signalling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex in
interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of
psychiatric disorders of presence. The model associates presence with successful suppression by topdown predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by visceromotor control signals and,
indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model is relevant to cognitive control by
connecting presence to agency since predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent
sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or
externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the anterior insular cortex as the locus of key neural
comparator mechanisms, with speculative but testable roles for von Economo neurons which have been
previously associated with self-consciousness. Our model makes predictions for manipulations of agency
and presence relevant to the experience of cognitive control, and offers a new view of emotion as
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interoceptive inference. We describe tests of the model using an integrated experimental setup
combining augmented reality, Microsoft Kinect 3D modelling, and physiological monitoring.
14.40 – 15.00
Logical semantic operations in the absence of visual awareness
Simon van Gaal1,2,3,4,5, Julia Meuwese2, Lionel Naccache5, Laurent Cohen5, & Stanislas Dehaene3,4,6,7
1
Radboud University Nijmegen, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Netherlands; 2
University of Amsterdam, Dept of Psychology, Netherlands; 3 Inserm, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit,
Gif‐sur‐Yvette, France; 4 Commissarìat à l’Energie Atomique, Neurospin Center, Gif‐sur‐Yvette, France ; 5
Institut du Cerveau et de la Moëlle épinière, Paris, France ; 6 Université Paris‐Sud 11, Orsay, France
7
Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France
Accumulating evidence suggests that non-conscious cognition is extremely powerful. Brain-imaging
studies have revealed extensive subliminal information processing in many different brain areas, from
low-level perceptual regions, to regions in the parietal and temporal cortex, even up to “executive” areas
at the highest level of the cortical and cognitive hierarchy, in the prefrontal cortex. Although great
progress has been made in characterizing the flow of information triggered by unconscious visual stimuli
in isolation, if and how multiple sources of unconscious information are integrated and combined is
largely unexplored. I will present a series of behavioral and ERP studies in which we probed the possible
flexibility and complexity at which multiple unconscious elements can be logically combined. Therefore,
we designed a masked priming paradigm in which subjects were presented with a rapid stream of three
words: an adverb (“not”/“very”), an adjective (e.g., “good”/”bad”) and a target noun (e.g.,
“peace”/”murder”). The first two words could either be masked or not. Subjects indicated whether the
consciously presented target noun had a positive or negative valence. Crucially, the nature of the adverb
dictated whether the overall three-word sequence was contextually consistent (e.g., very-bad-murder)
or inconsistent (e.g., not-bad-murder). Electrophysiological recordings revealed that such logical
semantic computations can partly unfold unconsciously (reflected in the N400 ERP component).
However, at the same time qualitative neural differences between conscious and unconscious logical
semantic operations were observed (on the P600 ERP component).
15.00 – 15.20
Adaptation to unconscious conflicts in unconscious contexts
Heiko Reuss1, Kobe Desender2, Andrea Kiesel1, & Wilfried Kunde1
1
Julius-Maximilians-University, Würzburg; 2 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
We investigated how context-specific conflict adaptation depends on both awareness of the conflict and
awareness of the context, and how timing of conflict and context is crucial. In Experiment 1, we used a
priming paradigm in which the visibility of the prime was varied and the format of the target represented
a context of either low interference (20% incongruent trials) or high interference (80% incongruent trials).
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By implementing inducing trials and test trials, we controlled for mechanisms of event learning. With
visible primes, congruency effects were larger in the low-interference context than in the highinterference context. With masked primes, however, congruency effects were not modulated by the
context. In Experiment 2, the format of the prime represented the context. Thus, with masked primes,
both conflicting stimulus and context were presented unconsciously. Interestingly, we now found that
the context modulated congruency effects independent of prime visibility. Even with masked primes,
congruency effects were larger in the low-interference context than in the high-interference context,
both in inducing trials and test trials. This indicates that context-specific conflict adaptation processes
are able to operate independently of both conflict awareness and context awareness, but that a
simultaneous occurrence of context and conflicting stimulus is crucial.
15.20 – 15.40
Losing Consciousness: wakefulness modulation of cognitive control
Tristan Bekinschtein1
1
MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK
Understanding states of consciousness and the transitions between conscious and unconscious states
has important theoretical and clinical implications. Yet despite the fact that we typically enter a state of
unconsciousness every night, remarkably little is known about how we fall asleep lose consciousness
while getting sedated. In a series of hd-EEG experiments of people falling asleep or getting sedated with
propofol, we explored the limits of perceptual and semantic decisions, inhibitory control, top-down and
bottom-up target detection and introspection. We found there is a differential modulation of the
cognitive control capacities by wakefulness showing that drowsiness affects faster (earlier in the
transition to unconsciousness) inhibitory control and top-down target detection than perceptual and
abstract (semantic) decisions. We believe these results may experimentally link the Information
Integration Theory of Consciousness and the Global Neuronal Workspace.
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Poster Session I: Monday 3 December 17.00-19.00
[1] Conditional Automaticity in Subliminal Morphosyntactic Priming
Ulrich Ansorge1,2, Bert Reynvoet3, Jessica Hendler2, Lennart Oettl2, & Stefan Evert4
1
Faculty of Psychology, Universität Wien, Austria; 2 Institute of Cognitive Science, University of
Osnabrueck, Germany; 3 Department of Psychology, University of Leuven, Belgium; 4 Institute of
Comparative Linguistics and Literature Studies, Technical University, Darmstadt, Germany
We used a gender-classification task to test the principles of subliminal morphosyntactic priming. In
Experiment 1, masked, subliminal feminine or masculine articles were used as primes. They preceded a
visible target noun. Subliminal articles either had a morphosyntactically congruent or incongruent
gender with the targets. In a gender classification task of the target nouns, subliminal articles primed the
responses: Responses were faster in congruent than incongruent conditions (Experiment 1). In
Experiment 2, we tested whether this congruence effect depended on gender relevance. In line with a
relevance dependence, the congruence effect only occurred in a gender-classification task but was
absent in another categorical discrimination of the target nouns (Experiment 2). The congruence effect
also depended on correct word order. It was diminished when nouns preceded articles (Experiment 3).
Finally, the congruence effect was replicated with a larger set of targets but only for masculine targets
(Experiment 4). Results are discussed in light of theories of subliminal priming in general and of
subliminal syntactic priming in particular.
[2] Mind-Wandering and the Little Voice of Meta-Consciousness
Mikaël Bastian 1, Jonathan W. Schooler 2, & Jérôme Sackur 1
1
Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France ;
META-Lab (Memory, Emotions, Thought & Awareness), University of California, Santa Barbara, USA
2
Research on spontaneous and environment-independent thoughts has impressively grown since a
decade and has distinguished between two types of “mindwandering”: “tuning out” and “zoning out”.
“Tuning out” is mindwandering with meta-awareness : one knows that one’s mind is wandering. In
contrast, “zoning out” is mindwandering without meta-awareness: one experiences mindwandering but
lacks metaconsciousness of this phenomenon, as when one does not that one is reading without
understanding anything anymore. These two aspects of mindwandering challenge the common intuition
that we have a straightforward and permanent access to our thoughts. We suggest that the form of
mental contents during mindwandering predicts meta-awareness of the episode. Building on another
line of research that has suggested a role for language in self-awareness, we hypothesized that
metaconsciousness of an episode of mindwandering might be heightened when its form is verbal. In
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short, verbal thoughts would be more meta-aware than the rest of the thoughts. Using paradigms that
described, suppressed or induced inner speech, we show that intra-individual variation in inner speech
quantity relates to variation in meta-awareness, in the sense that the more inner speech one has, the
more meta-aware one is. Language could therefore be partly responsible for the access to
metaconsciousness of one’s mindwandering.
[3] Higher-Order Thoughts in Action: Consciousness as an unconscious redescription process
Bert Timmermans1, Leonhard Schilbach2, Antione Pasquali3,4, & Axel Cleeremans3
1
Univ Hosp Cologne, Neuroimaging Grp, Psychiat & Psychotherapy Clin, D-50937 Cologne, Germany; 2
Max Planck Inst Neurol Res, D-50931 Cologne, Germany; 3 Univ Libre Bruxelles, Consciousness Cognit &
Computat Grp, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium; 4 Adam Neurogen, Neurogen Res Unit, F-20240 Solaro, France
Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their
own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of
representational redescription processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From
this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of
action or activity on itself, on the world, and on other people through three predictive loops: An inner
loop, a perception-action loop, and a self-other (social cognition) loop, which together form a tangled
hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this form of enactive metacognition. We
extend previous neural network simulations and compare the model with Signal Detection Theory,
highlighting that while the latter approach assumes that both Type I (objective) and Type II (subjective,
metacognition-based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is
closer to dual-route models in that it assumes that the redescriptions made possible by the emergence
of metarepresentations occur independently and outside of the first-order causal chain. We close by
reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea that awareness, self-awareness and social
cognition involve the same mechanisms.
[4] How memory-related consciousness may help patients with schizophrenia improve their memory
reporting accuracy.
Elçin Akdogan1 & Elisabeth Bacon1
1
Inserm u666, dépt de psychiatrie, Hôpitaux Universitaires, BP 426, 67091 STRASBOURG Cedex. France
Understanding cognitive and state of consciousness disturbances is central in understanding the
pathophysiology and for developing new therapies in schizophrenia. How consciousness guides behavior
comes within the metacognitive approach. Metamemory refers to one’s knowledge about memory
including the awareness of one’s cognitive ability and the strategic control of a memory task in progress.
The purpose of this study was to further investigate memory and metamemory processes in patients
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with schizophrenia in a more naturalistic situation, and pave the way for meta-cognitive remediation.
Patients and their healthy matched controls had to answer general knowledge questions whose answers
are all numerical following two conditions: one without any intervention as in a real-life, and two, guided
through a metamemory-based control. Participants answered the questions with respect to two
predefined intervals, one narrow and one large, and then made a confidence level judgment for both
answers, and had afterwards to select one of the two answers. The results show that patients, in spite of
their memory deficit in the free report, when they are offered a framework and allowed to rely on their
metamemory judgments, are able to improve their memory performance up to the accuracy level of the
healthy participants.
[5] Spontaneous and Intentional Social Inferences: Neural evidence of a Common Process
Frank Van Overwalle1, Ning Ma1, Jenny Kestemont1, & Marie Vandekerckhove1
1
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Several lines of recent social neuroscientific evidence in our lab seem to contradict extant dual-process
models which assume that spontaneous and intentional inferences are guided by different (associative
versus symbolic) processes. First, using instructions for spontaneous (“read carefully”) or intentional
(“what is the goal / trait of this person?”) inferences between participants, ERP studies documented that
the onset of social inferences occurs at about the same time irrespective of instructions. Specifically, the
first neural signature was detected after about 200 ms for goal inferences and 600 ms for trait inferences.
Second, several recent fMRI studies using the same between-participants design have consistently found
on overlap between spontaneous and intentional instructions in core areas of mentalizing, including the
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal (mPFC). Collectively, the results suggest that a
common spontaneous process produces an initial social inference (e.g., irrespective of instructions),
after which intentional thoughts (e.g., after instructions) may invite observers to verify more carefully
the material and inference made (which results in additional activation in other brain areas), and to
avoid the fundamental attribution bias (which results in reduced activation in the mPFC, reflecting less
abstract trait-related inferences if they were not asked for).
[6] Short- and Long-term unconscious logo priming of brands and related words
Gigliola Brintazzoli1, Charlotte Muscarella1, Eric Soetens1, & Eva Van den Bussche1
1
Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
It has often been assumed that unconscious influencing in daily life and advertising is highly unlikely,
given the short-lived nature of unconscious priming effects. This study assessed whether real-life
stimulus material can elicit short- and long-term unconscious priming. A typical masked priming
paradigm was used, with brand logo primes. The stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) was manipulated so
17
that the distance between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target was either 350ms, 1000ms
or 5000ms. Our results show that unconsciously presented brand logos (e.g. logo of McDonald's)
significantly prime their brand names (e.g. "McDonald's") in all SOA conditions. The logos also have the
power to prime words associated to the brand (e.g. "hamburger"), but only if the SOA is short (i.e.
350ms). These results indicate that real-life stimuli can unconsciously influence our behaviour, even
when prime and target are separated by a 5-second interval. However, the mental representation of
words related to the subliminal information seems to vanish quickly as time passes.
[7] Unconscious Goal Activation and the Hijacking of the Executive Function
Hans Marien1, Ruud Custers2, 1, Ran R. Hassin3, & Henk Aarts1
1
Utrecht University, The Netherlands;
University, Israel
2
University College London, United Kingdom;
3
The Hebrew
Building on research into unconscious human goal pursuit, and the dynamic nature of our mental and
physical world accompanying the pursuit of goals, we examined the idea that an unconsciously activated
goal hijacks executive control for its own attainment. This hijacking of the executive function by an
unconscious goal should be evidenced by impaired performance on an unrelated task relying on
executive control. The results of six experiments showed that subliminal activation of a socializing goal,
an idiosyncratic personal goal or an academic goal caused participants to perform worse on unrelated
tasks that depend on executive control, such as inhibition of prepotent responses in a memory-probe
task and detection of text errors during reading. These effects were unique to executive control; were
similar when the goal was consciously given; and were independent of task motivation and perceived
inter-goal relatedness between the primed goal and task goal. Furthermore, an unconscious goal
hijacked executive control to advance itself more strongly when the goal had personal value. These
findings are novel and important, and suggest that executive control processes are hijacked by goals in
order to advance themselves without postulating an inner agent that consciously accesses and directs
these control processes.
[9] Neglect Syndrome suggests that spatial awareness depends on unspecific attentional resources
Mario Bonato1
1
University of Padova, Department of General Psychology, Padova, Italy
It is largely unknown how cognitive resources modulate spatial attention and awareness.
Clinical
studies performed on right-hemisphere damaged patients suggest that the availability of unspecific
attentional resources determines successful access to spatial awareness (Bonato, under review).
In detection tasks, the mere request to monitor a wide range of spatial positions results in worst
contralesional performance with respect to when the spatial position to be monitored is only one (Marzi
18
et al., 2002). Moreover, brain-damaged patients with subclinical neglect are able to increase their
response speed to contralesional targets, from pathologically slow up to a normal level, while
performing a detection task (Bartolomeo, 1997). Thirdly, right-hemisphere damaged patients show
strikingly decreased awareness for contralesional targets when concurrent tasks have to be performed,
regardless of their nature (e.g. visuospatial or Working Memory-related; Bonato et al., 2010; 2012). The
ubiquitous variability in performance shown by patients in visuospatial tasks seems to closely depend on
the quantity of attentional resources engaged by the task at hand. Beside their clinical implications for
neglect assessment, these findings suggest that the availability of (unspecific) cognitive resources is a
major determinant for spatial awareness. Insights about the functioning of unimpaired cognitive
architectures will be discussed.
References
Bartolomeo, P. (1997). The novelty effect in recovered hemineglect. Cortex, 33, 323-332.
Bonato, M., (under review). Neglect and extinction closely depend on task demands: A review. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
Bonato, M., Priftis K., Marenzi, R., Umiltà, C. & Zorzi, M. (2010). Increased attentional demands impair contralesional space
awareness following stroke. Neuropsychologia, 48, 3934-3940.
Bonato, M., Priftis, K., Marenzi, R., Umiltà, C. & Zorzi, M. (2012). Deficits of contralesional awareness: A case study on what
paper-and-pencil tests neglect. Neuropsychology, 26(1), 20-36.
Marzi, C.A., Natale, E., & Anderson, B. (2002) Mapping spatial attention with reaction time inneglect patients. In H.-O. Karnath, A.
D. Milner and G. Vallar (Eds.). The cognitive and neural basis of spatial neglect (pp. 275-288). Oxford: University Press.
[10] Attention on subliminal prime: role for unconscious task setting
Sébastien Weibel1, Rémi L. Capa2, Caroline Huron3, & Anne Giersch1
1
INSERM, University Hospital of Strasbourg, France; 2 INSERM, University of Strasbourg, France;
INSERM-CEA U562 Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif/Yvette, France
3
Recent studies showed that unconscious stimuli can trigger task sets. We wondered about a possible
influence of attention processes on these effects. To address this issue, we modulated exogenous
attention with a sound during the task. The subjects’ main task was to make a phonological (2 vs. 3
syllable) or semantic (living vs. not living) decision on a word. The task type was indicated before the
word by means of an instruction letter, which was itself preceded by a masked and undetectable priming
letter. In a control experiment, subjects were instructed to identify the instruction letter. A neutral sound
occurred either with the unconscious prime or with the instruction letter, 83 ms later. We showed that
repetition priming (faster letter identification induced by prime/instruction congruency) was not
modified by attention modulation. On the contrary, unconscious task set priming (faster execution of the
task in case of prime/instruction congruency) was observed only when the sound occurred with the
prime. Synchrony between the sound and prime did not change the prime awareness. Hence attention
19
did not enhance the processing of the prime itself, but facilitated unconscious task set priming, thus
providing an explanation for contradictory findings in the literature.
[11] How can we know when we know we know? Towards measuring metacognition
Adam B. Barrett1, & Anil K. Seth1
1
Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton,
UK
A major goal in consciousness science is to discriminate between unconscious and conscious processes.
Behaviourally, conscious cognition can be inferred by measuring metacognition, (i.e. knowledge of
perception). Metacognition is however difficult to assess consistently. Under popular signal detection
theory models for stimulus classification tasks, measures such as confidence-accuracy correlation, and
type II d’, are highly sensitive to response biases in both type I (classification) and type II (metacognitive)
tasks. Maniscalco and Lau (2011) recently addressed this issue via a new measure: meta-d’. This is the
type I d’ that would have led to the observed type II data had the subject used all the type I information.
Trivially, meta-d’=d’ irrespective of response bias when type I and II decisions are based on the same
Gaussian signal. Here we analyse the theoretical behaviour of meta-d’ under more general scenarios,
such as when metacognitive judgments utilize enhanced or degraded versions of the type I signal. We
also demonstrate new code that can simulate a specific experiment, enable unbiased estimation of
meta-d’, and also estimate the variance of meta-d’ across subjects. Together our results provide support
for meta-d’ as a useful, stable measure of metacognition, and new rigorous methodology for its
application.
[12] Conscious Experience Beyond Cognitive Control
Carolyn Dicey Jennings1
1
Boston University
At least three forms of conscious experience have been argued to be beyond the reach of cognitive
control: gist perception, imagistic consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. After first showing
that the evidence for these three forms of consciousness is inconclusive on the question of whether they
exist outside of cognitive control, I here present a fourth form of consciousness that is likely to be more
successful: conscious immersion. I understand “conscious immersion” to be conscious engrossment in a
task, activity, or process that proceeds via unconscious, involuntary control. Because participants who
emerge from these immersed states sometimes claim to have been conscious during those states
(despite being unable, in most cases, to describe the content of those states), we should conclude that
these immersion experiences are sometimes conscious. Conscious immersion is unlike the other forms
in that it is not perceptual in nature. In lacking the structure of perception, it also lacks the direct
20
accessibility and reportability that conscious perception enjoys. I nonetheless find that these immersed
states are conscious and suggest avenues for more research on the topic.
[13] Perceptual sequence knowledge does not seem to consolidate
Daphné Coomans1, Natacha Deroost1, Eva Van den Bussche1, & Eric Soetens1
1
Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Past research showed that knowledge acquired in a typical structured serial reaction time task can be
consolidated. However, as knowledge in this task consists of perceptual and motor knowledge, it is not
known whether both kinds of knowledge are consolidated. In the current experiments, we determined
the consolidation of perceptual sequence knowledge. Motor components were minimized by varying the
response dimension randomly and by avoiding eye movements, using a circular display with a small
visual angle and a short presentation time. Participants had to respond to the identity of a target,
presented at one of four locations around a fixation cross. Unknown to the participants, target location
changed according to a sequence. To assess learning, the perceptual location sequence turned to
random in certain blocks. After participants acquired perceptual sequence knowledge in an initial
training session, we assessed whether this knowledge was still present after 1, 4 or 24 hours, using a
between subjects design. Results indicated that knowledge was preserved for 1 hour, but declined after
4 and 24 hours. This suggests that perceptual sequence knowledge is temporary, a proposition that fits
well in the sequence learning model of Hikosaka et al. (1999).
[14] Does working memory load influence consciousness?
Esther De Loof1, Wim Fias1, & Filip Van Opstal1
1
Ghent University
Are the frontoparietal connections thought to underlie working memory (WM) equal to those
hypothesized to trigger consciousness by igniting the global neural workspace? We hypothesize that
activating the frontoparietal network by a WM load could either limit the frontoparietal capacity for
consciousness or make the ignition mechanism more sensitive.
We probed consciousness through priming while varying WM load in a secondary task. In the main task,
participants judged a target number to be smaller/larger than five. The target number was primed by a
congruent/incongruent prime number. To manipulate the conscious perception of the primes, the
stimulus onset asynchrony between prime and target was varied. Participants indicated their awareness
of the prime number on each trial. In a secondary task, WM load was manipulated by letting participants
remember zero, two or six letters (i.e., zero, low, and high load conditions).
21
First, WM load limits conscious perception: the visibility threshold for prime numbers rises with
increasing WM load. Second, WM load tends to facilitate the congruency effect: the prime has a slightly
stronger influence on the response to the target when more letters are kept in memory. Both effects
shed light on the involvement of prefrontal cortex in WM and consciousness.
[15] Detecting the Neural Signatures of Conscious Processing in Non-Communicative Patients:
outperforming clinical diagnoses with a systematic EEG approach?
Jean-Rémi King1,2,3*, Jacobo Sitt1,2*, Frédéric Faugeras2,4, Benjamin Rohaut2,4, Imen El Karoui2,5, Lionel
Naccache2,4,6, & Stanislas Dehaene1,7,8
1
INSERM-CEA, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit/CEA/SAC/DSV/DRM/Neurospin Center, 91191, Gif/Yvette,
France; 2 INSERM-ICM Research Center, UMRS 975, 75013, Paris, France; 3 Ecole Doctorale Cerveau
Cognition Comportement, Université Paris 6, 75005, Paris, France; 4 Departments of Neurophysiology &
Neurology , AP-HP, Groupe Hospitalier Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013, Paris, France; 5 Department of Biology,
École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France; 6 Faculté de Médecine Pitié-Salpêtrière, Université Paris 6,
75013, Paris, France; 7 Collège de France, 75005, Paris, France ; 8 Université Paris 11, 91400, Orsay,
France; * These authors contributed equally to this work
Despite their relatively intact arousal, Disorders of Consciousness (DOC) patients present an inability to
demonstrate robust intentional behaviors. Science and modern medicine have been challenged to know
whether these patients were conscious but unable to communicate or unconscious of their surrounding
environment.
We here implemented a series of analyses extracting most of the neural signatures of conscious
processing described in the EEG literature, in order to assess their respective validity and efficiency in the
clinics. We performed 197 high-density EEG recordings at bedside while Vegetative (VS), Minimally
Conscious (MCS) and Conscious patients (CS) were exposed to repeated series of sounds for 30 minutes.
Results demonstrated that although a large proportion of these markers could be used to predict
patients’ consciousness states, those focusing on lower frequency ones (delta - alpha) were by far the
most discriminatory. Secondly, predictive analyses combining all markers demonstrated successful
automatic classifications of patients’ clinical states. Finally, VS patients misclassified as MCS or CS by our
algorithm presented twice more chances of conscious recovery (44% of recovery) than correctly
classified VS patients (20%). On top of providing the first systematic review of the EEG signatures of
conscious processing in a large DOC patient cohort, analyses of misclassified patients’ outcomes thus
suggest the possibility of detecting conscious activity independently of behavior and intentions.
[16] Support for a response control deficit in freezing of gait Parkinson patients
Jochen Vandenbossche1, Natacha Deroost1, Eric Soetens1, Peter Zeischka1, & Eric Kerckhofs1
22
1
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
We investigated response activation and suppression processes in Parkinson’s disease patients with
freezing of gait (FOG). Fourteen freezers, 14 nonfreezers and 14 matched healthy controls performed the
attention network task (ANT) and the Stroop task. The former task has more stimulus-response overlap
and is expected to elicit stronger irrelevant response activation, requiring more inhibition. Congruency
effects were used as a general measure of conflict resolution. Supplementary RT distribution analyses
were utilized to calculate conditional accuracy functions (CAFs) and delta plots to measure response
activation and suppression processes. In agreement with previous research, freezers showed a general
conflict resolution deficit compared to nonfreezers and healthy controls. Moreover, CAFs pointed to a
strong initial incorrect response activation in FOG. As expected, conflict resolution impairment was only
apparent in the ANT, and not in the Stroop task. These results suggest an imbalance between automatic
and controlled processes in FOG, leading to a fundamental breakdown in both motor execution and
cognition.
[17] Distinct brain mechanisms for conscious versus subliminal error detection
Lucie Charles1,2,3, Filip van Opstal1,2,3,4, Sébastien Marti1,2,3, & Stanislas Dehaene1,2,3,5
1
INSERM,U992, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France; 2 CEA,DSV/I2BM, NeuroSpin
Center, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France; 3 Univ Paris-Sud, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191Gif/Yvette,
France ; 4 Ghent University, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium ; 5 Collège de France, F-75005 Paris, France
Metacognition, the ability to monitor one’s own cognitive processes, is frequently assumed to be
univocally associated with conscious processing. However, some monitoring processes, such as those
associated with the evaluation of one’s own performance, may conceivably be sufficiently simple and
automatized to be deployed non-consciously. Here, we used simultaneous electro-and magnetoencephalography (EEG/MEG) to investigate how error detection is modulated by perceptual awareness
of a masked target digit. The Error-Related Negativity (ERN), an EEG component occurring ~100 ms after
an erroneous response, was exclusively observed on conscious trials and showed a step-like increase in
amplitude with stimulus visibility. Nevertheless, even in the absence of the ERN, errors were still
detected at above-chance levels under subliminal conditions. Error detection on conscious trials
originated from the posterior cingulate cortex, while a small response to non-conscious errors was seen
in dorsal anterior cingulate. Our findings suggest two distinct brain mechanisms for metacognitive
judgements: a conscious all-or-none process of single-trial response evaluation, and a non-conscious
statistical assessment of confidence.
[18] Cognitive Control: A Role for Implicit Learning?
Natacha Deroost1, Jochen Vandenbossche1, Peter Zeischka1, Dpahné Coomans1, & Eric Soetens1
23
1
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
We investigated the influence of implicit learning on cognitive control. In a sequential Stroop task,
participants implicitly learned a sequence placed on the color of the Stroop words. The amount of
conflict was manipulated by means of the number of incongruent trials. The results showed that
participants who learned the color sequence were no better at resolving conflict than participants who
did not undergo sequence training. Accordingly, implicit knowledge did not reduce conflict. At the same
time, the amount of conflict had no effect on the amount of learning either. However, conflict had a
significant impact on the expression of implicit learning, as most knowledge was expressed under the
highest amount of conflict. Task-optimization in the Stroop task was thus accomplished by an increased
reliance on implicit sequence knowledge under high conflict. These findings demonstrate that implicit
learning processes can be flexibly recruited to support cognitive control functions
[19] Control of the mindfulness states by multiple levels of sensorimotor experience
Sergio S.C. dC Rubin1,2,3
1
LabMet, University of Gent; 2 Schenkman’s Cell and Moleular Biology Lab, University Federal of Sao
Paulo; 3 Bolivian Center of Biotechnology Research
The mindfulness state is the consciousness of the embodied mind action in the present time of the
experience. The mindfulness can be seen as opposite to the Cartesian state i.e. cogito or mindlessness,
which is more often rooted in our daily activity. Loose and recovering of mindfulness during the
ontogeny may be linked to specific learning process and its background context. The first-person
methodology allows us to recover and have control of mindfulness state by specific multiple levels of
sensorimotor experience such as play a musical instrument, intense and/or equilibrium exercises,
focused meditation as well as by relax-touch experience. Beyond that, this control of mindfulness states
can be extended to daily experience if the practices become habit. Also our observation indicate that the
absence of pain in some human swing pierced skin body suspension is due to they have deep control of
the dissociation body-mind and reach the mindlessness state. Those spaces of possibilities are of applied
interest.
[20] Electrodermal activity during implicit processing for emotional faces
Thibaut Dondaine1,2,3, Jean-François Houvenaghel1,2, Paul Sauleau1,2, Gabriel Robert1,3, Bruno Millet1,3,
Marc Vérin1,2, & Julie Péron1,4
1
Behavior and Basal Ganglia' research unit (EA 4712), University of Rennes 1, Hôpital Pontchaillou, CHU
de Rennes, rue Henri Le Guilloux, 35033 Rennes, France; 2 Psychiatry Unit, Hôpital Guillaume Regnier, 108
avenue du Général Leclerc BP 60321 - 35703 Rennes, CEDEX 7; 3 Neurology Unit, Hôpital Pontchaillou,
CHU de Rennes, rue Henri Le Guilloux, 35033 Rennes, France; 4 ‘Neuroscience of Emotion and Affective
24
Dynamics’ laboratory, Department of Psychology, and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of
Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland
Automaticity can be defined as uncontrolled, unintentional, unconscious, efficient or/and quick behavior.
A dynamic blend of these features is possible according to the emotional situation. Electrodermal activity
characterizes the treatment of emotional information. In this study, we explored electrodermal activity
in the context of an implicit emotional task.
We proposed a two-alternative forced-choice task (‘same’ or ‘different’) with explicit genre/implicit
emotion and explicit emotion matching conditions in a sample of 42 healthy participants. During these
tasks, electrodermal activity was recorded.
We did not show difference between the rate of electrodermal responses between emotional conditions
for the two different tasks (implicit or explicit). For the implicit task, we showed an interaction between
responses choice (‘same’ or ‘different’) and emotion (F> 3.30; p<0.001) for both behavioral and
electrodermal data. Contrasts revealed a significant difference between ‘same’ and ‘different’ choice
only for anger.
In conclusion, we showed an effect of automatic emotional processing correlated with electrodermal
activity: when the participant had to make a decision about sex matching, we observed greater
electrodermal activity if the faces displayed anger emotional state. This study showed the influence of
automatic processing on biologically relevant and physiological responses. This automatic processing of
emotions is involved in many situations that require quick and appropriate response.
[21] Involuntary processing of facial emotions studied with ERPs in anxious participants
Wioleta Walentowska1 & Eligiusz Wronka1
1
Psychophysiology Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland
There is a common suggestion that trait anxiety can influence the processing of threat-related
information even without reaching the level of conscious awareness. To test this hypothesis, ERPs were
recorded in response to subliminally presented and backward masked faces (fearful and neutral) and
non-faces in the preselected low- and high-anxious individuals. The N170 amplitude was found to be
larger when elicited by faces in comparison to non-faces, however it was not found to be emotionsensitive or modulated by the level of anxiety. Interestingly, early differences between low- and highanxious individuals appeared within the latency of P1 component irrespective of the stimulus content. At
later stages, within the EPN component, stronger negativity specific for fearful faces was recorded
exclusively in the low-anxious participants. These findings indicate that anxiety level can modulate early
stages of information processing (P1 component), which leads to the anxiety-related differences in
involuntary emotional expression detection at later stages (EPN component).
25
[22] A matter of matching: how goals and primes affect experiences of self-agency.
Anouk van der Weiden1, Henk Aarts1, & Kirsten I. Ruys2
1
Utrecht University; 2 University of Tilburg
The experience of causing action-outcomes, also referred to as the sense of self-agency, is a pervasive
experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research
suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit
outcome-priming process. Two experiments examined potential differences between these two
processes. In these experiments, participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with
the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome
that either matched or mismatched the goal or prime. After observing each outcome, participants
indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals and outcomeprimes equally enhanced self-agency overmatching outcomes. Furthermore, goals reduce self-agency
over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching
outcomes, and even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. The differences in
how goals and primes affect experienced self-agency over mismatching outcomes are explained in terms
of cognitive control processes and spreading of activation. Our findings provide novel evidence that selfagency experiences result from two distinct inferential routes, and that goals and primes differentially
affect the perception of our own behavior.
[23] Two ways to miss your target in Attentional Blink conditions
Chie Nakatani1 & Cees van Leeuwen1
1
KU Leuven, Belgium
We typically perceive some, but not all of the things that occur in our visual field. Certain events are
missed, even when a perceiver is alert, attentive, and knows what to look for. Some of these effects are
systematic. Amongst these perceptual blindness phenomena, the Attentional Blink (AB) is probably the
one most widely explored. To explain the AB, several neuro-computational models have been proposed.
The most recent of these, the Visual Selection and Awareness model (ViSA, Simione et al., in press)
predicts the timing of certain task-relevant neural activities, such as the onset of inhibition among
adjacent target and non-target items, a fast build-up of activity in visual cortices to sustain target
information, and a slower, large-scale activity to consolidate target information in working memory. In
particular, ViSA predicts that the onset of consolidation would be delayed in AB compared to non-AB
conditions. The onsets of the predicted activities were estimated from human EEG data recordings from
an Attentioanl Blink task. The analyses confirmed the model predictions. Moreover, they showed two
distinct AB scenarios: failure of sustained target activation versus premature onset of consolidation
activity.
26
[25] Delta plots reveal the role of response inhibition in lying
Evelyne Debey1, Bruno Verschuere2, Richard Ridderinkhof2, & Jan De Houwer1
1
Ghent University, 2 University of Amsterdam
Previous research has shown that lying is accompanied by longer reaction times than truth telling. Since
lying involves withholding the truth, this ‘lie effect’ (lie – truth) may be due to the time-consuming
process of response inhibition. We investigated this response inhibition hypothesis on lying using the
delta-plot method, in which condition differences are mapped as a function of reaction time. Delta plots
prototypically have a positive slope. However, if the conditions differ in the amount of inhibition that is
applied, a gradually developing inhibition process makes delta plots level off for slow responses. This
leveling-off has shown to be more pronounced in people with better inhibitory control (Ridderinkhof,
2002). In two experiments, we let participants perform a reaction time task in which they alternately lied
and told the truth on autobiographical questions. We hypothesized (1) that the delta plot of the lie effect
would level off for slow responses and (2) that this leveling-off would be more pronounced in
participants with better inhibition skills (i.e., smaller lie effects). The results of both experiments verified
these predictions. Our experiments therefore support the hypothesis that response inhibition may be
crucially involved in lying. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
[26] Analysis of the unconscious context effects
Goultchira Chakirova1,2
1
Department of Psychiatry, the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK;
Foundation
2
The Human Brain Research
A significant part of perceived information is processed outside of conscious awareness. This includes not
only lower level of analysis such as sensory analysis but also complex cognitive processing. Some of the
consciously processed information might become unconscious (through some protective psychological
defence mechanisms, for example repression or suppression). However, this information does not
disappear but rather is stored even if it is believed to be forgotten, and could be retrieved. This storage
of information consists of primitive instinctive impulses, desires, emotions and memories that
sometimes are too stressful if they are accessed consciously. Such repressed information, however,
influences human behaviour and decisions. Moreover, life scenario could be created on the basis of this
repressed information. Retrieved life scenario information in four volunteers demonstrated that those
scenarios were created during early childhood and were realised later. At least one of those scenarios
consisted of the entire life plan including an approximate date of death. This preliminary data indicates a
vital importance of understanding of the relationship between conscious and unconscious processing
and provided an insight on the degree to which unconscious processes might influence our behaviour
and decisions.
27
28
Poster Session II: Tuesday 4 December 12.20-14.20
[27] Sequence learning under different practice schedules in the Serial Reaction Time paradigm
Koen Homblé1 & Natacha Deroost1
1
Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Both laboratory and field studies on motor learning have demonstrated that the organization of training
can have a large influence on the acquisition of procedural skills. In general, using highly variable practice
schedules is found to be more advantageous than using more structured training schedules. We
investigated whether similar effects also apply for sequential learning in a Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task.
Two groups of participants performed an SRT task with the same sequence under either fragmented or
blocked practice conditions. Both indirect and direct measurements of implicit and explicit sequential
knowledge were administered afterwards. Contrary to our expectations, the blocked practice group
showed a larger implicit sequential learning effect as compared to the fragmented practice group. No
differences in explicit knowledge were found between conditions. We propose that the use of different
processing strategies in the SRT task might explain these results.
[28] Cognitive control, response inhibition and error detection of children with ADHD in the StopSignal Task: An event-related potentials study.
Magdalena Senderecka1, Jakub Szewczyk2, Krzysztof Gerc3, Roman Chmylak4, & Anna Grabowska5
1
Cognitive Science Unit, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 2
Psychophysiology Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 3 The
Department of Developmental and Health Psychology, Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian
University, Cracow, Poland; 4 NZOZ EEG-GRAF, EEG Laboratory, Cracow, Poland; 5 Nencki Institute of
Experimental Biology, Warsaw, Poland
The first aim of the study was to determine whether deficient inhibitory control distinguishes children
with a diagnosis of ADHD combined type from normally developing children. The second aim was to
investigate error processing in ADHD children. 40 right-handed children aged between 6.9 and 12.3 years
participated in the study, with 16 boys and 4 girls in each groups. Participants performed a standard
Stop-Signal Task. Relative to controls, the go stimulus reaction time and the stop-signal reaction time
were prolonged in ADHD children. They showed reduced P2, enhanced, delayed N2, and reduced P3
component to auditory stop-signal compared with controls in successful stop-signal trials. Additionally,
the amplitude of response-locked event-related potentials, containing the ERN-Pe complex, was smaller
in ADHD children. These results support the hypothesis of a complex deficit of inhibitory control, conflict
monitoring, and error recognition mechanisms in ADHD. Reduced amplitude of the P2 reflects an early
29
orienting deficit. Enhanced amplitude and delayed latency of the N2 are associated with inability to
activate an urgent inhibitory process. Reduced amplitude of the P3 reflects a deficit in cognitive control
operations affecting overall performance monitoring. Finally, reduced amplitude of the ERN-Pe complex
is associated with impaired error detection and evaluation.
[29] The neural correlates of stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition: a comparison
Margot A. Schel1,2, Simone Kühn3, Marcel Brass3, Patrick Haggard4, & Eveline A. Crone1,2,5
1
Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, the Netherlands; 2 Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition
(LIBC), the Netherlands; 3 Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium; 4 Institute
of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, United Kingdom; 5 Department of Psychology,
University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Response inhibition can be both externally driven, such as when a traffic light turns red, and internally
driven, such as when one decides not to take another biscuit from the biscuit box. Until now the
concepts of external stimulus-driven inhibition and internal intentional inhibition have never been
compared in one study. The present study was set out to compare the neural correlates of these two
forms of response inhibition. A group of adults (N=24, aged 18-26) performed two response inhibition
tasks while lying in the scanner. Stimulus-driven inhibition was measured by a stop-signal task in which
participants had to inhibit an already initiated motor-response when a stop-signal was presented.
Intentional inhibition was measured by the marble task, in which participants are instructed to freely
decide between acting on and inhibiting a prepotent response triggered by a rolling marble. Results
showed that during both stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition a similar neural network, consisting
of lateral prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex / presupplementary
motor area, was recruited. The same neural network was also activated during intentional action.
Together these results indicate that the same decision-making network is involved in stimulus-driven
inhibition, intentional inhibition, and intentional action.
[30] Modulating effect of COMT genotype on the brain regions underlying proactive control process
Mathieu Jaspar1,2, Julien Grandjean1,2, Eric Salmon1, Pierre Maquet1, & Fabienne Collette1,2
1
Cyclotron Research Centre;
Liège, Belgium
2
Department of Psychology: Cognition and Behavior, University of Liège,
Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) is an important enzyme which degrades catecholamines, such
dopamine, notably in the prefrontal cortex [1]. A large number of studies reported an effect on executive
functioning of COMT genotype [2], each genotype being associated with a different COMT enzymatic
activity [3].
30
In an event-related fMRI study, a modified form of the Stroop task was administered to three groups of
15 young adults according to their COMT val158met genotype (VV, VM and MM). Based on the theory of
dual mechanisms of control [4], the Stroop task has been built to induce proactive or reactive control
processes according to the task context.
Behavioral results did not show significant group differences for reaction times. However, fMRI results
revealed that proactive control is specifically associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex in MM and VM groups by comparison to VV, but also with increased activity in the middle frontal
gyrus in the VV and VM groups by comparison to MM.
These observations, paralleling to the higher cortical dopamine level in MM individuals, confirms our
expectation of a COMT Val158Met genotype modulation of the brain regions underlying proactive
control, especially in frontal areas as suggested by Braver & al. [4].
References
[1] Männistö, P.T., & Kaakkola, S. (1999), ‘Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT): Biochemistry, molecular biology,
pharmacology, and clinical efficacy of the new selective COMT inhibitors’, Pharmacological Reviews, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 593-628.
[2] Barnett, J. H., Jones, P.B., Robbins, T. W., & Muller, U. (2007), ‘Effects of the cathecol-O-methyltransferase Val158Met
polymorphism on executive function: a meta-analysis of the Wiscosin Card Sort Test in schizophrenia and healthy control’, vol.
12, no.5, pp. 502-509.
[3] Weinshilboum, R. M., Otterness, D. M., & Szumlanski, C. L. (1999), ‘Methylation pharmacogenetics: cathecol Omethyltransferase, thiopurine methyltransferase, and histamine N-methytransferase’, Annual Review of Pharmacology and
Toxicology, vol. 39, pp. 19-52.
[4] Braver TS, Gray JR, Burgess GC (2007) Explaining the many varieties of working memory variation: Dual mechanisms of
cognitive control. In: Conway ARA, Jarrold C, Kane MJ, Miyake A, Towse JN, editors. Variation in working memory. New York:
Oxford University Press. pp. 76-106.
[31] Psycholinguistic approaches of speech control
Sarah Brohé1, Véronique Delvaux1, Kathy Huet1, Myriam Piccaluga1, & Bernard Harmegnies1
1
University of Mons, Belgium
While the acquisition of a second language has been extensively examined in the literature, many
questions remain open with respect to the cognitive processes involved in phonetic learning. Our
research project deals with the factors influencing the control of perception and production of foreign
sounds by individuals. The acquisition of new ways of speech control is submitted to manipulable,
extrinsic factors but also to intrinsic ones whose knowledge is relatively poor. Precisely, we aim at
highlighting the cognitive processes contributing to the control of speech perception and production,
namely attention and memory, using classical psycholinguistic tasks. As an example, in a previous study
we addressed the effect of orienting attention (by providing information about the cues that were
relevant for distinguishing the sounds and by giving feedback after each response) on the processing of
31
unfamiliar speech sounds in a categorization task. Ultimately, our research program is designed to
provide insights into controversial issues: the role of attention in learning, the potential role of feedback
in regulating behavior and the relevance of implicitversus explicit methods in phonetic training.
[32] An Evolutionary Based Mathematical Model for Consciousness
Suketu Patel1
1
Baruch College: Zicklin School of Business
In order to develop a general theory of consciousness we must focus and analyze the most significant
event in human history. This is the great leap that led anatomically modern humans to behave
behaviorally modern. The major artifacts that contribute to the development of a theory of
consciousness and also exhibit modern behavior is the Lebombo1 and Ishango2 bones. These both
demonstrate modern behavior through complex mental capabilities such as rudiments of counting and
time keeping. The importance of an understanding of infinite enumeration is that it also implies that
humans have the potential capability to implement an infinite succession of steps when creating tools.
In addition to explaining the complexity of our behavioral tendencies, this paper will also present how
enumeration also lends itself to the pivotal concept of how and why we possess a theory of mind.
Acquiring a theory of mind ability took millions of years of evolution through the hominid linage. I
believe the most dominating facet of this evolutionary period is that social groups become increasingly
complex. In order to maintain social groups, similar notions of morality were necessary between group
members. These group dynamics necessitated that the nervous system evolve to increase the amount of
available information for an individual to be aware. By applying Block's distinction3 of access and
phenomenal consciousness to the physical structure of the brain, we can infer that the evolutionary
direction took hominid development from the formally dominant phenomenal consciousness pathways
toward the prevailing access-consciousness pathways.
This analysis of the components of consciousness ultimately leads to a conceptual understanding of
qualia and subjective experience. The historically hypothesized fundamental nature of subjective
experience becomes logically evident as a quale is interpreted and evaluated through the survival needs,
desires, and limitations of an individual to then ultimately compute a valence. The fundamental nature of
any experience is it's valence and whether it is beneficial, detrimental or in fact neutral to the biological
or artificial system. Even though the true valence of a quale is subjectively unique, it can still be very
accurately guessed by a 3rd person through a shared theory of mind.
The latter part of this paper discusses the cognitive model in respect to developing artificially intelligent
systems and their metaphysical implications on free will and rationality. Since the fervid goal is to one
day recreate human intelligence on a artificial substrate, a mathematically based consideration of
consciousness will allow us to effectively discover the potential challenges that are necessary overcome.
References
32
1 Williams, Scott W. (2005). "The Oldest Mathematical Object is in Swaziland". Mathematicians of the African Diaspora. SUNY
Buffalo mathematics department. http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/Ancient-Africa/lebombo.html
2 J. Bogoshi, K. Naidoo and J. Webb, The oldest mathematical artifact, Math. Gazette, 71:458 (1987) 294.
3 Block, N. (1995). ON A CONFUSION ABOUT A FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2): 227-287.
[33] Neural correlates of individual differences in self control
Anja Waegeman1, Carolyn H. Declerck1, Christophe Boone1, Ruth Seurinck2, Wim Van Hecke3, & Paul M.
Parizel3
1
University Antwerp, Management Department, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp; 2 University Ghent,
Department of Data-Analysis, H. Dunantlaan 1, B-9000 Ghent; 3 University Hospital Antwerp,
Wilrijkstraat 10, B-2650 Edegem
Effective self control is known to have much predictive value correlating withpsychological health, wellbeing, career choices, leadership abilities and success, while self control failure characterizes many
clinical and personality disorders. Using event related fMRI (n = 41) we investigated individual
differences in inter-situational self control in two different experimental tasks that engage two
commonly studied aspects of self control: the ability to control impulses in a time discounting task and
the ability to adapt behaviour to a changing environment in a probabilistic reversal learning task. Based
on cognitive control theory and research, we hypothesize (1) that cognitive control across both tasks is
associated with activation in a lateral neural network (e.g. inferior frontal gyrus and nucleus caudatus)
and (2) that this network is more active in individuals with high self control compared to low self
controlled individuals for whom behaviour is driven by brain regions involved in reward processing (e.g.
medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum). By focusing on the joint activation pattern of two
different tasks in individuals with high and low self control abilities, we are able to draw conclusions
regarding the generalizability of self control as a stable individual trait and as an inter-situational
construct.
[34] Reward-based learning of unconscious sequences during crowding
Anne Atas1, Nathan Faivre2, Axel Cleeremans1, & Sid Kouider2
1
Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation Group (CO3); Université Libre de Bruxelles; 2 Laboratoire de
Sciences Cogntives et Psycholinguistique (LSCP); Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris
Can we learn complex information without awareness? During the last fifty years, this important issue in
neuroscience has been extensively investigated. However, most of empirical data suggests that learning
is accompanied by awareness. This lack of evidence for unconscious learning might reflect the systematic
use of visible stimuli during the learning phase. In the present study, we overcome this problem by
testing whether sequence learning can take place when each stimuli within a sequence cannot be
33
perceived consciously. We used gaze contingent crowding to ensure that each visual event can be
presented for a long duration while remaining invisible. Our task involved discriminating between two
subliminal sequences based on a corresponding outcome: one sequence was always associated with a
monetary reward and the other with a monetary punishment. Our results revealed a significant
facilitation of responses times for the reward sequence in comparison with punish sequence, whereas
awareness tests indicated no awareness of the sequence of stimuli. Our results thus demonstrate, for
the first time, that sequence learning can take place completely unconsciously. These findings also
suggest that the serial structure of unconscious information can not only be processed but also lead to
long-lasting traces in the brain.
[35] Mindwandering heightens accessibility of negative cognitions in at-risk individuals
Igor Marchetti1, Ernst H.W. Koster1, & Rudi De Raedt1
1
Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium
Mindwandering (MW) is defined as a shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal
information and consistently associated with both positive and negative outcomes. Among the latter,
negative mood and negative cognitions have been reported, but the mechanisms through which this
happens are still unclear. We put forward that MW could either directly enhance negative thinking or
indirectly heighten the accessibility of negative thoughts. We measured in our sample (n = 79) emotional
thoughts during the Sustained Attention on Response Task (SART) which induces MW, and the
accessibility of negative cognitions by means of the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) after the task. We
also measured both depressive symptoms and rumination. Results show that, only in individuals with
significant levels of depression, MW during SART predicts higher accessibility of negative thoughts after
the task, rather than negative thinking during the task. This effect was not due to mood changes and
rumination was associated with MW-related negative thinking. These findings contribute to our
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of MW and may shed light on the relationship between
task-involvement and affect.
[36] Stress related diminishment of cognitive control in Non-Suicidal Self-Injury.
Ingrid Van Camp1 & Mattias Desmet1
1
Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, Ghent University, Belgium
The Social Problem Solving Skills Task (SPST; Nock, 2006) assesses a person’s choice of an optimal
response to a stressful situation and their actual response. Twenty five self-harming subjects with a
history of at least one traumatic event were assessed and compared with a large control group. Results
show that both groups perform equally well in choosing an optimal problem solution, which suggests an
intact mentalization capacity. Self-harmers did differ significantly from controls in their most likely actual
34
response: self-harmers tend to vent emotions as opposed to non-self-harmers whose response
approaches the optimal problem solution.
This suggests the occurrence of a regression to a lower level of mentalization, which is a welldocumented phenomenon supported by neurocognitive research. Extreme arousal at the time of a
traumatic event produces lasting neurobiological changes. (1) Changes in the neural arousal mechanisms
cause the arousal system to be easily triggered by later relatively mild emotional stimuli. (2) Triggering of
the arousal system causes a neurochemical switch from conscious, declarative memory, mediated by the
hippocampus, to the activation of the amygdala thereby provoking the expression of emotional
responses.
These findings confirm the validity of the SPST as a test of mentalization quality and regression
probability.
[37] CNV, LRP, and ERN/PE effects in the differentiation-of-deception paradigm
Kristina Suchotzki1, Bruno Verschuere2, Fren Smulders3, Ewout Meijer3, & Geert Crombez1
1
Ghent University; 2 University of Amsterdam; 3 Maastricht University
The Differentiation-of-Deception paradigm is unique in that the experimental (lie) and control (truth)
condition only differ in the crucial variable: Deception. We extended the paradigm to gain insight in the
cognitive mechanisms of deception using event-related components: the Contingent Negative Variation
(CNV), the Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP) and error-related components, i.e., the Error-Related
Negativity (ERN) and the Error Positivity (Pe). Twenty participants committed a mock crime and gave
speeded yes/no responses to crime and control questions using left and right button presses. A question
was presented (e.g., Did you steal a…) for 2000 ms, followed by a truth (T) or lie (L) cue. The cue was
replaced after 1500 ms by a keyword (e.g., wallet), allowing participants to respond. The CNV was
measured during the cue-keyword interval, the LRP during the keyword-response interval, and the ERN
and Pe after (correct) responses. Results revealed an enlarged frontal CNV after the lie cue, which could
probably be interpreted as anticipation of higher cognitive workload. The stimulus-locked LRP and the
ERN did not differ between both conditions. A larger Pe was found after lie responses compared to truth
responses, which may indicate a conscious conflict between the lie response and the known truth.
[38] Personalized Cognitive Training in Unipolar and Bipolar Disorder: A study of cognitive functioning
Marek Preiss1 & Evelyn Shatil2,3
1
Prague Psychiatric Center, University of New York in Prague; 2 Department of Psychology and the Center
for Psychobiological Research, the Max Stern Academic College of Emek Yezreel, Israel; 3 CogniFit Ltd,
Yoqneam Ilit, Israel
35
Cognitive deficits, especially in executive control, attention and memory persist during remission, and
some types of cognitive deficits represent fundamentals trait characteristics. Eight week interventional
home-based study investigated the effects of CogniFit cognitive training on cognitive performance and
everyday cognition in individuals with depressive disorders. Participants were assigned to either the
cognitive training group or control group. Participants were instructed to complete a 20-30 minute
session three times a week for the duration of eight weeks (24 total sessions). Thirty five (18 in the
computer training group and 17 in the control group) completed the study. The cognitive training group,
reported significantly lowered depression levels on the BDI-II (F=6.60, p=0.015 and Cohen's d= 0.89) and
improved memory on the EMQ (F=4.119, F=0.051 and Cohen's d=0.70). In addition this group also
improved on the Global executive score, Shifting and Divided attention (F=9.463, 6.12, 5.854; p=0.006,
0.020; 0.023 and Cohen's d=1.29, 0.92, 0.91 respectively). Within-group differences show that the
cognitive training group, but not the control group, improved on all measures but one, of executive
control and attention. Computerized cognitive remediation training improved objectively measured
executive control and attention as well as subjectively measured everyday functioning and mood in
depressed patients.
[39] Chunking in rapid serial visual presentation: consequences for visual awareness
Maria Falikman1,2 & Vyacheslav Stepanov3
1
Center for Cognitive Studies, Dept. of Linguistics, and Dept. of Psychology, Lomonosov Moscow State
University; 2 Cognitive Research Lab, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow,
Russia; 3 UsabilityLab Inc., Moscow, Russia
Visual events that occur beyond awareness due to the lack of attention (or, at least, do not enter
conscious report) can become conscious, when they form a part of a larger whole. This is true for various
modifications of the phenomenon known as a word superiority effect (WSE), first described by J.M.
Cattell more than a century ago and rediscovered by cognitive psychologists in 1960-es. In our
experiments, we studied WSE in a variety of attentional paradigms, including a dual-task rapid serial
visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm with letter-by-letter presentation of Russian words. We have
demonstrated that the lack of visual awareness known as an attentional blink, normally observed in this
paradigm, disappears for target letter stimuli embedded in words. Using word and nonword strings with
instructions "to read words" and "to identify letters", we have also demonstrated that this effect is due
to the controlled strategy of word reading rather than to the automatic word processing. Finally, by
introducing an extra probe stimulus in letter strings containing words, we have also shown that the
attentional blink does not completely disappear but rather shifts towards the end of a to-be-read word
as a functional "unit" of visual information processing.
[40] Traits are represented in the medial Prefrontal Cortex: An fMRI adaptation study
Ning Ma1, Kris Baetens1, Marie Vandekerckhove1, Jenny Kestemont1, & Frank Van Overwalle1
36
1
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
Neuroimaging studies on trait inference about the self and others have found a network of brain areas,
the critical part of which appears to be medial PreFrontal Cortex (mPFC). In this study, we investigated
whether the mPFC plays an essential role in the neural encoding and representation of traits. To localize
the neural representation of traits, we used fMRI-adaptation, which is a rapid suppression of neuronal
responses upon repeated presentation of the same underlying stimulus, in this case, the implied trait.
Participants had to infer an agent’s (social) trait from brief trait-implying behavioral descriptions. In each
trial, the critical (target) sentence was preceded by a sentence (prime) that implied the same trait, the
opposite trait, or no trait at all. The results revealed robust suppression of activation in the ventral mPFC
in all three target conditions compared to their respective primes, and nowhere else in the brain.
Crucially, this adaptation effect was graded: strongest after being primed with a similar trait, moderate
after an opposite trait and weakest after a trait-irrelevant prime. In line with previous research on fMRI
adaptation, we interpret these findings as indicating that trait concepts are not only processed, but also
encoded and represented in the ventral mPFC.
[41] Sleep deprivation selectively disrupts cognitive control in the Stroop task.
Wim Gevers1, Gaetane Deliens2, Sophie Hofmann3, Wim Notebaert1, & Philippe Peigneux2
1
Unescog, Cognitive Neurosciences Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ,Bruxelles, BE; 2 UR2NF,
Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles
(ULB) ,Bruxelles, BE; 3 Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, BE; 4 Department of Experimental
Psychology, Ghent University ,Ghent, BE
Sleep deprivation (SD) markedly impacts prefrontal cortex, a brain area known as an essential
component in executive functions and cognitive control. In the paradigmatic Stroop task, participants
must name the ink colour of written colour words, eventually leading to interference when meaning and
ink colour are discrepant. However, besides overall increased RT, prior studies failed to show SD-‐related
changes in Stroop interference (e.g. Cain et al., 2011). Here, we investigated this issue taking sequence
effects into account. Indeed, it is known that congruency effects are weaker after incongruent than after
congruent trials, a sequential modulation effect explained by top-down, increased cognitive control after
the detection of conflict. Alternatively, bottom-up repetition effects of stimulus and response features
have been proposed. Notebaert et al. (2006) demonstrated that both bottom‐up and top‐down
modulations can operate in parallel but that top‐down control needs time and cognitive resources to
build up. We used this paradigm to investigate the influence of SD on bottom‐up and top-down
processes in the Stroop task. We demonstrate that SD impacts on top- down but not bottom-up
modulations of congruency effects in the Stroop task, hence reflecting the inability of sleep‐deprived
subjects to raise cognitive resources needed for increased cognitive control after conflict detection.
[42] Memory repression can be triggered unconsciously.
37
Alexandre Salvador1, Fabien Vinckier2, & Raphaël Gaillard1.
1
Centre de Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, INSERM U894, Paris ; Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle,
INSERM U610, Paris
In 2001, Anderson argued that people can exert cognitive control to prevent unwanted declarative
memories from entering awareness, which results in a long lasting deterioration of recall. This process
relies on a conscious effort, and is associated with increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
Meanwhile, the view that cognitive control requires consciousness is being challenged. Recent findings
show that non consciously perceived stimuli can activate complex cognitive functions, such as task
switching, response inhibition or orienting of attention.
Our study questioned whether the scope of unconsciously triggered cognitive control processes could be
further extended to memory repression.
After initial learning of 24 word pairs, we trained 30 subjects to repress or to allow the recall of the
second word when presented with the first, in response to an arbitrary geometric cue. We then
subliminally presented the geometric cues while asking subjects to perform an unrelated task on the first
word (gender determination). We then measured recall performance.
Results indicate that a cue associated with the memory repression task set but non consciously
perceived deteriorated performance on future recall, compared to baseline.
We therefore extend the scope of unconsciously triggered cognitive control processes to memory
repression.
[43] Progression of auditory discrimination based on EEG decoding predicts awakening from coma
Athina Tzovara1, Andrea Rossetti2, Lucas Spierer3, Jeremy Grivel4, Micah Murray2, Mauro Oddo6, &
Marzia De Lucia1
1
Center for Biomedical Imaging, Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and
University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 2 Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Centre Hospitalier
Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 3 Department of Medicine, University of
Fribourg, Switzerland; 4 Psychiatry Department, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of
Lausanne, Switzerland; 5 Adult Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and
University of Lausanne, Switzerland
In comatose patients neural evidence of mismatch negativity (MMN) has been associated with their
chance of survival. Because auditory discrimination has been typically assessed at various delays after
coma onset, it is still unclear whether this impairment depends on the time of the recording. Here, we
studied 30 post-anoxic comatose patients resuscitated from cardiac arrest and five healthy, age-matched
controls. Using a MMN paradigm, we performed two electroencephalography (EEG) recordings: the first
38
within 24 hours after coma onset and under mild therapeutic hypothermia, and the second after one day
and under normo-thermic conditions. We analyzed EEG responses based on a multivariate decoding
algorithm that automatically quantifies neural discrimination at the single-patient level. Results showed
high average decoding accuracy in discriminating sounds both for control subjects and comatose patients.
Importantly, accurate decoding was largely independent of patients’ chance of surviving. However, the
progression of auditory discrimination between the first and second recordings was informative of
patients’ chance of surviving. A deterioration of auditory discrimination was observed in all non-survivors.
We show evidence of intact auditory processing even in comatose patients who do not survive and that
progression of sound discrimination over time is informative of patients’ chance of surviving.
[44] Alertness and shielding effects of language on task switching: dopamine and goal activation
contributions.
Hichem Slama1,2,3, José Morais2, Sarah Bourgognon1, & Philippe Peigneux1
1
UR2NF - Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit, Faculty of Psychology; 2
UNESCOG - Cognitive Neurosciences Research Unit, Faculty of Psychology; 3 Department of Clinical and
Cognitive Neuropsychology, Erasme Hospital Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
The impact of verbal mediation on task switching1,2 has been recently studied using verbal activation (VA)
or verbal interference (VI) procedures3‐5. In this study, twenty participants were tested in both VA
(repeating aloud the cue) and VI (articulatory suppression), and in long (LPT) and short preparation time
(SPT) baseline conditions. A new cued sorting task was used that reduces the memory load of
stimulus‐response mappings, and targets the task goal. Proactive interference mechanisms were studied
using neutral and interfering transitions in switch trials. Eye blink rates (EBR) were recorded as markers
of dopamine activity6. Results indicated that both VA and VI had a general positive effect on speed. VA
also affected accuracy switch costs (ASC) with fewer errors in switch trials compared to LPT and VI.
Greater ASC were also observed in LPT compared to SPT reflecting an increase in goal neglect with time.
Higher EBR were correlated with reduced ASC when proactive interference was present. Together, those
results suggest two roles of language in task switching. First, a shielding role against proactive
interference, correlated with dopamine activity, and affecting task goal activation. Second, a general
alertness function observed in both VA and VI.
References
1. Vandierendonck A, Liefooghe B, Verbruggen F. Task switching: interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychol
Bull;136:601‐626.
2. Kiesel A, Wendt M, Jost K, et al. Control and Interference in Task Switching‐A Review. Psychological Bulletin 2010;136:849‐874.
3. Kirkham AJ, Breeze JM, MarGreek Small Letter Iota With Tonos‐Beffa P. The impact of verbal instructions on goal‐directed
behaviour. Acta Psychol 2012;Vol.139:pp.
4. Saeki E, Saito S. Verbal representation in task order control: An examination with transition and task cues in random task
switching. Memory & Cognition 2009;Vol.37:pp.
39
5. Kray J, Eber J, Karbach J. Verbal self‐instructions in task switching: a compensatory tool for action‐control deficits in childhood
and old age? Dev Sci 2008;11:223‐236.
6. Dreisbach G, Muller J, Goschke T, et al. Dopamine and cognitive control: the influence of spontaneous eyeblink rate and
dopamine gene polymorphisms on perseveration and distractibility. Behav Neurosci 2005;119:483‐490.
[45] Can task instructions overcome automatic Stroop processing of conscious and subliminal stimuli ?
Imen El Karoui1,2,3, Kalliopi Christoforidis1, & Lionel Naccache1,4,5
1
ICM Research Center, INSERM/UPMC UMRS 975, 75013, Paris, France; 2 Department of Biology, École
Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France; 3 Ecole Doctorale Cerveau Cognition Comportement, Université
Paris 6, 75005, Paris, France; 4 Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris, Groupe Hospitalier PitiéSalpêtrière,
75013, Paris, France; 5 Faculté de Médecine PitiéSalpêtrière, Université Paris 6, 75013, Paris, France
The present study investigates whether a behavioral strategy established on conscious stimuli can be
applied to nonconscious stimuli. We derived our experimental paradigm from the task used by Merikle
et al (1995, Consciousness & Cognition). In this paradigm, subjects are asked to respond to the color of a
green or blue string of ampersands. Preceding this target, the word “GREEN” or “BLUE” is presented
either consciously or nonconsciously. Trials are organized in conscious and nonconscious blocks. In each
block, 80% of the trials are incongruent. Critically, we added rare nonconscious trials inside conscious
blocks. We also included one conscious and one nonconscious control blocks, in which the proportion of
incongruent trials is 50%. We will present behavioral and EEG data, using this paradigm. We are currently
analyzing these data, but preliminary analyses indicate that subjects show a reverse Stroop effect on
conscious trials and a highly reduced Stroop effect on nonconscious trials embedded in conscious blocks
compare to the unconscious control block. Interestingly, the Stroop effect was reduced in nonconscious
blocks only when they were presented after conscious blocks, suggesting that subjects can strategically
adapt to the frequency of incongruent trials when the word is visible, but that they can apply this
strategy to subsequent trials.
[46] Conflicting Stimuli and Their Impact on Processing Strategies in Artificial Grammar Learning
Ivan Ivanchei1 & Nadezda Moroshkina1
1
Department of Psychology, St. Petersburg State University, Russia
The interaction of conscious and unconscious processing in artificial grammar learning was investigated.
The main research question was how the conflict between implicitly learned dependencies in stimuli
affects their classification. The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first phase participants
memorized letter strings generated by a finite state grammar. All grammatical strings had also an
additional subtle feature: the letters' lengthiness was increased. In the second phase participants
classified the new strings as grammatical or not. For the first group of participants, all grammatical
40
strings had the increased lengthiness, and all nongrammatical had not. For the second group,
grammaticality and lengthiness did not correlate. The results of the experiment showed that participants
implicitly learned to classify the new stimuli according to both grammar and lengthiness. Participants of
the two groups demonstrated similar level of classification accuracy, but their strategies were different.
Participants of the second group were not aware of the contradiction between grammaticality and
lengthiness, but changed their strategy to a more analytical one. It was evident from the lower Yesrate
and, as a consequence, lower level of false alarms. This result suggests that conflicts in implicit
knowledge enhance conscious control of the task performance.
[47] Using the Spatial Tapping task to explore the relations between attention and executive control
Mariama Dione1, Laurent Ott1, & Yvonne Delevoye-Turrell1
1
University Lille Nord de France; 2 URECA EA 1059, rue du Barreau BP 60149, 59653 Villeneuve d’Ascq
Cedex, France
Executive functions are usually assessed using complex planning tasks. Although these tasks are largely
used for clinical assessment, there are known to suffer of validity problems. The objective of this study
was to propose Spatial Tapping as a novel task to observe and measure executive functions. Following
the theoretical assumptions of Cools (2006) and Miyake (2000), we propose that executive control is
under the influence of two mutually opponent computations, i.e. cognitive stability (that requires
maintaining a cognitive representation in WM) and cognitive flexibility (that requires shifting attention
from a current mental state to the next). In the present study, we propose a simple task in which we
manipulated the tempo of task execution. By analysing the spatio-temporal properties of error
distribution, we demonstrate that participants (N=31) maintain attention on the current target in slow
tempi, but shift attention quickly from a current action to the next for fast tempi, in order to keep
synchronized to a sequence of tones. In a second task (N=41), in order to confirm that the previous
results are related to the attentional abilities of 'maintaining & shifting', we used abrupt onsets to
facilitate/distract attention performances in the Spatial Tapping task.
[48] Global mismatch negativity does not require awareness of stimulus regularity
Alexandre Simonin1, Athina Tzovara2, Andrea Rossetti1, Micah Murray2, Mauro Oddo3, & Marzia De Lucia2
1
Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of
Lausanne, Switzerland; 2 Center for Biomedical Imaging, Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier
Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 3 Adult Intensive Care Medicine, Centre
Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland
Auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) are informative of intact brain functions of comatose patients. One
marker is provided by the differential AEPs responses to standard and deviant sounds in mismatch
41
negativity (MMN) paradigms. A rich literature interprets this effect as a preattentive and unconscious
processing of the incoming stimuli. By contrast, MMN effect induced by the identical repetition of groups
of sounds (global MMN) has been reported only when subjects were aware of the regularity. Here we
test this hypothesis in five postanoxic comatose patients who underwent therapeutic hypotermia. We
recorded AEPs while delivering groups of five sounds. They included either four identical sounds and one
different in duration or five identical sounds. Each of these group of sounds was used either as standard
or as deviant stimuli in a way that we could test the global MMN while controlling for the local MMN.
We carried out a single-trial topographic analysis which quantifies the differential responses between
two experimental conditions at single patient level. Three patients show the global irregularity effect
despite unconscious and despite their hypotermic condition. These results suggest that active
maintenance of perceptual representation do not require consciousness and that comatose patients can
discriminate complex patterns of sounds.
[49] Cognitive control and number comparison : An fMRI-guided TMS study
Michael Andres1, Charlotte Desmet1, Filip Van Opstal1, Marcel Brass1, & Wim Fias1
1
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University
Number comparison is known to recruit the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) but also frontal regions associated
to cognitive control, such as the inferior frontal junction (IFJ). It is unclear, however, whether these
regions are necessary to perform comparison tasks and whether their role is selective for numbers. We
used fMRI to reveal the parieto-frontal networks involved in number processing and cognitive control, as
measured by a Stroop task. Results showed overlapping activations in the left IFJ, SMA and IPS, with
number-related activations extending more anteriorly in IPS than control-related activations. The same
participants were then asked to select the largest of two numbers or the most dangerous of two animals
while rTMS was used to create virtual lesions of left IFJ or IPS. Preliminary results (N=6) showed that,
when compared to a control site, rTMS over IPS slowed down responses irrespective of stimulus
category. Although our fMRI results converge with others to underline the involvement of IFJ in number
comparison, our results failed to evidence a deficit after rTMS over this region. We propose that IFJ
codes the rules that underlie stimulus-response associations during number comparison, but that its
integrity is required only when these rules need to be updated.
[50] Training subjective experience in binocular rivalry
Michał Wierzchoń1, Bert Windey2, Krzysztof Gociewicz1, Marcin Koculak1, & Axel Cleeremans2
1
Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology, Consciousness Research Lab;
Bruxelles, Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group
2
Universite Libre de
42
Here, we explore the possibility of intentional training of subjective experience in binocular rivalry (BR).
In this paradigm, a different stimulus is presented to each eye, leading to the suppression of one of both
stimuli. Typically, which stimulus is seen or suppressed varies over time in a regular manner (i.e. regular
switches between percepts are observed every few seconds). However, early studies suggest that
instructions can influence the perceptual transitions in BR, resulting in changes of subjective experiences
of stimuli. In the present study, we further investigated this finding, asking whether it is possible to learn
to control our perceptual experience in BR. To test this research question, we asked participants to
control their perception, trying to focus on one of the possible percepts for the whole block of the task.
We trained participants for 20 blocks, 1 minute each, counterbalancing the stimuli that should be
perceived by participants. As a result of training, we expected participants to report proportionally
longer perception of the image that they are required to focused on. The results are under analysis and
will be discussed in context of the Radical Plasticity Thesis predictions (Cleeremans, 2011).
[51] Placebo-suggestion modulates conflict adaptation in the Stroop Task
Pedro M. Saldanha Da Gama1, Hichem Slama2, Emilie A.Y. Caspar1, Wim Gevers3, & Axel Cleeremans1
1
Research Unit in Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group (CO3), Department of Psychology,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 2 Research Unit in Cognitive Neurosciences (UNESCOG) and
Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit (UR2NF), Department of Psychology,
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 3 Research Unit in Cognitive Neurosciences (UNESCOG),
Department of Psychology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
Expectation manipulations such as suggestion, placebo and post-hypnotic suggestion have been shown
to bias several cognitive processes (pain, visual awareness and emotions). Here we demonstrate that a
mixed placebo-suggestion is able to create expectations that have a profound impact on conflict
adaptation assessed by objective measures. Two groups were exposed to a placebo-suggestion to induce
either positive or negative expectations about the properties of a sham “brain wave” machine while
performing a Stroop task. The experimental design associated a placebo (the equipment and procedure)
to a suggestion (verbal and written persuasive information). The machine was described as either
enhancing (positive group) or impairing (negative group) participants’ ability to perceive colors. In the
baseline condition, participants completed the Stroop task without the equipment. We found a double
interaction between Stroop conditions, suggestion and group. Planned comparisons indicated that the
suggestion only influenced accuracy in the incongruent conditions. Participants committed fewer errors
compared to baseline when under the positive suggestion but more errors when under the negative
suggestion. Furthermore, participants’ intra-individual variability was influenced by suggestion and group.
This study thus demonstrates that expectations induced by a placebo-suggestion can modulate cognitive
conflict.
[52] Timing, Sequencing, and Cognitive Control in Complex Movement Coordination
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Ralf Krampe1, Nici Wenderoth1, Ann Lavrysen1, & Stephan Swinnen1
1
KU Leuven, Belgium
80 young (20--35 yrs) and older (54-67 yrs) professional musicians and age-matched novices (20 in each
group) performed unimanual tapping tasks, which either required low-level timing (isochronous tapping
of identical target intervals), rhythmic sequencing (performance of a rhythm consisting of multiple target
intervals) or switching between different rhythmic sequences. Data was collected during two fMRI scan
sessions with (for novices) six laboratory training sessions in between. In general professional musicians
outperformed novices with effects of expertise increasing with task complexity. Age-effects were
pronounced in novices and in tasks requiring sequencing or cognitive control. Besides well-documented
motor networks active in all groups, we found that novices heavily relied on parieto-prefrontal networks
(Left post IPS, Right IPL, R+L Lateral PFC) for sequencing and switching tasks, evidencing high levels of
cognitive control. In contrast, expert musicians showed no (young musicians) or less activation (older
musicians) of prefrontal regions or IPS in these tasks. Instead, musicians showed pronounced activation
in the primary sensorimotor cortex. Acquisition and maintenance of high-level motor control apparently
amounts to a gradual release from domain-general cognitive control through optimizing task-specific
"lower-level" functions.
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Sponsorship
This conference is organized with the financial support of:



The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts (http://www.kvab.be/)
VISITBRUSSELS (http://visitbrussels.be)1
The Research Community ‘Neuroscience in relation to Experimental Psychology’ sponsored by
the Research Foundation Flanders (http://www.fwo.be/)
1
Only the organizers of NEUROCOG’12 are responsible for all communications or publications with regards to the
conference. VISITBRUSSELS is not responsible for the use that can be made of the information in these
communications or publications.
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