Development with a gun in your hand?
Lotte Hofste
5485754
Utrecht University
03 August 2015
A thesis submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial
fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts
in Conflict Studies & Human Rights
2
Name of supervisor: Chris van der Borgh
Date of submission: 03 Augustus 2015
Programme trajectory: research and thesis writing only, 30 ECTS
Word count: 23.086
3
Acknowledgements
During my studies in Nijmegen (Cultural Anthropology and Development studies)
and Utrecht (Conflict Studies & Human Rights) I developed a great interest in how
conflicts influence the development processes in the world.
It is therefore not surprising that the theme of my Master thesis is relating to this
field of interest. The concrete idea for the subject of this thesis came up during the
period that I worked as an intern for Cordaid, business unit security and justice. I am
therefore very grateful to Hetty Burgman, manager, and Rob Sijstermans, security
and justice expert.
I would also like to thank my informants: Rene Grotenhuis, Paul van den Berg,
Willem van de Put, Holke Wierema and Bert van Ruitenbeek and Dick Berlijn, Wilfred
Rietdijk and Hans van Griensven for their readiness to respond to my questions. I
realise that I took a lot of their time. Without the information they provided, this
thesis would never have been formulated. I also want to thank dr. Lau Schulpen and
prof. dr. Paul Hoebink of the Radboud University Nijmegen for advising me on the
content of chapter 3 of this thesis.
A special word of thanks goes to my supervisor dr. Chris van der Borgh. His valuable
advises, comments, and motivating coaching made it a pleasure to work on this
exercise.
Needless to say that I have tried my very best to reproduce the information received
at the interviews as veraciously as possible. When nevertheless their opinions and
information are not correctly stated I take up the full responsibility for that omission.
Lotte Hofste
Nijmegen/Utrecht, 31-07-2015
4
Table of contents
List of acronyms
7
Chapter 1 – Introduction
8
Chapter 2 – Securitization of aid, what is it all about?
11
A theoretical and methodological approach
2.1 Introduction
11
2.2 Back to the Cold War
12
2.3 A clear definition of securitization?
14
2.4 Security interests in bilateral aid policies
19
2.5 Increasing cooperation between military actors and NGOs?
20
2.6 Exploring the difficulties
23
2.7 Conclusion
25
2.8 Methodological approach
27
Chapter 3 – Policies, practices and contention
29
‘A struggle in two arenas’
3.1 Introduction
29
3.2 The 3D approach: from coordination to integration to 3D
29
3.3 Different perceptions of the military and NGOs
31
3.4 Critique from a NGO perspective
32
3.5 A short history of the Dutch funding system: NGO-government relations
35
3.5.1 MFP
35
3.5.2 MFP-broad and TMF
37
3.5.3 MFS I & MFS II
37
3.5.4 Strategic Partnerships
38
3.6 NGOs as an extension of Dutch foreign policy
39
3.7 The Dutch approach in Uruzgan
41
3.8 The Dutch political context
42
5
3.9 The course of the mission
44
3.10 Conclusion
46
Chapter 4 – NGOs and military actors
47
Applying theory to practice?
4.1 Introduction
47
4.2 Before the mission
48
4.3 Start of the Uruzgan mission
50
4.4 In Uruzgan – Interaction between the DCU and the military
54
4.4.1 DCU in relation to military actors
54
4.4.2 Interaction between DCU members and the military
55
4.5 Development of the relationship between the DCU and the military
58
4.6 Uruzgan, NGOs and the Dutch political context
63
4.7 Conclusion
65
Chapter 5 – Conclusion: Development with a gun in your hand?
67
Bibliography
73
Annex A – List of interviews
79
Annex B – Example of a topic list for NGO staff
80
Annex C – Example of a topic list for military staff
81
6
List of acronyms
3D
ANSF
BG
CIMIC
CIVREP
COIN
DAC
DCU
DGGF
DGIS
EU
GIRoA
GTZ
GNI
IED
ISAF
MDG
MFO
MFP
MFS
NATO
NGO
ODA
OEF
PRT
TFU
TMF
UN
US
USAID
WHAM
-
Defence, Diplomacy, Development
Afghan National Security Forces
Battle Group
Civil-Military Cooperation
Civilian Representative
Counterinsurgency
Development Assistance Committee
Dutch Consortium Uruzgan
Dutch Good Growth Funds
Directorate-General for International Cooperation
European Union
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Gross National Income
Improvised Explosive Device
International Security Assistance Force
Millennium Development Goal
Mede Financierings Organisatie
Mede Financierings Programma
Mede Financierings Stelsel
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Non-governmental organization
Official Development Assistance
Operation Enduring Freedom
Provincial Reconstruction Team
Task Force Uruzgan
Thematische Medefinanciering
United Nations
United States
United States Agency for International Development
Winning Hearts and Minds
7
Chapter 1 - Introduction
After the attacks of 9/11 the United States (US) and its allies invaded Afghanistan
and so the Taliban rule came to an end. With the signing of the Bonn-agreement on
5 December 2001 Afghanistan was at the dawn of what many hoped to be a
transition from war to peace. An international peacekeeping force, ISAF (the
International Security Assistance Force) was established. Initially, ISAF was led by an
international coalition, but in August 2003 NATO took over command. Between 2006
and 2010, the Netherlands deployed its armed forces as part of ISAF in the southern
Afghan province of Uruzgan. During the mission the Dutch government applied an
integrated approach wherein defense, diplomacy and development (3Ds) are
combined to tackle security, governance and development goals in the area. It
resulted from the idea that security is complex and in need of multidimensional
answers and is called by many simply the 3D approach. The integration of different
actors is perhaps best demonstrated by the formation of Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs). PRTs are joint teams of contracted international civilian experts and
military personal, operating at the provincial level throughout Afghanistan. These
joint teams undertake activities in the areas of security, reconstruction, support to
the central governance, “wining hearts and minds” and limited relief operations
(McHugh and Gostelow 2004). The Dutch PRT in Uruzgan is seen as the most
important contribution of the Netherlands to the mission. In addition to securing an
area, military actors are, as a part of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), increasingly
involved in reconstruction activities. The 3D approach as applied by the Dutch
government received lots of praise. General Dick Berlijn, former Chief of Defense,
stated that: “I am firmly convinced that the 3D approach is the right one” (Berlijn,
Interview). However not every one shared this widespread believe in integrated
approaches.
In approaches such as the 3D, security and development objectives are increasingly
seen as intertwined (Beall et al 2006). The presumed marriage between security and
development places foreign military forces and NGOs in close proximity and with
allegedly shared objectives within conflict areas. This cooperation can be seen logical
8
in the face of insecurity, contested environments and shared objectives (Beckwith
2012). However it is also firmly criticized by scholars as well as NGOs (Oxfam 2010,
Christian Aid 2004, Cornish and Glad 2008).
In Afghanistan the process of political stabilization, reconstruction and development
have proceeded hand in hand with the prosecution of the War on Terror. The trend
seems to be that security “at home” is becoming the highest priority of both the
security as well as the development agenda. This appearance of Northern security or
global security, as an integrated objective of development is, according to many, a
clear response to the insecurity felt by Europe and the US in a post 9/11
environment. As a consequence one can see, these critical actors argue, that
development itself becomes increasingly instrumental to the security agenda of
western states (Beall et al. 2006). Many call this process ‘the securitization of aid’.
Securitization of aid is not easy to define, as there are many different
interpretations. In addition to these different interpretations the concept is
surrounded by different debates all touching this subject. Mainly the more critical
actors refer to this growing integration as the so-called securitization of aid with
accompanying disadvantages such as that the distinction between military and
civilian actors get blurred with accompanying risks. Others see this growing
integration as a positive move and welcome it because it better coordinates donor
efforts, some even see it as a creative new instrument for improving the
international security (Petrik 2008).
This process of securitization leads to new challenges for NGOs. The question
whether and how they want to relate themselves to military actors in common
operational areas has become crucial. Not only do NGOs have to deal with
positioning themselves in the country where forces are deployed, NGOs are often
involved in a political debate around this same topic in their domestic setting as well.
In this paradigm of civil-military interaction decisions have to be made on two fronts;
a political-financial arena in their domestic setting as well as a political-military arena
in the foreign country where these NGOs are operational.
9
This brings us to the formulation of the following research question:
“How do Dutch NGOs deal with the securitization of aid in Uruzgan between 2006
and 2010?”
In sum, this thesis will mainly focus on the situational context in Afghanistan but
cannot be understood without taking the political context of the Netherlands into
consideration. This will be analyzed from a perspective of those Dutch NGOs
operational in Uruzgan. In this period they had to position themselves in various
debates, such as the intense debate on civil-military cooperation in Uruzgan and the
subsequent debate on the 3D approach in the Netherlands.
The majority of studies concerned with securitization of aid is written from a
theoretical and abstract perspective (see for example Howell 2014, Beall et al. 2006,
Petrik 2008, de Torrente 2004). However, most literature fails to provide a more
practical analysis of this phenomenon and hence more case studies are needed. This
thesis entails a case study about the practical implications of the securitization of aid
for the functioning of Dutch NGOs.
The second chapter of this thesis will outline the theoretical and methodological
approach. It will deal with the question of what is understood by securitization of aid
and will look into the different debates that surround the concept, followed by an
explanation of how the research was set up. The third chapter is about the Dutch
context. It deals with the rise of the 3D approach, critical notes on this from a NGO
perspective, the course of the Dutch mission and it will also look into the funding
relations between the Dutch government and Dutch civil society. One needs this
background in order to understand the case study that is provided in chapter 4. The
case is about the Dutch Consortium Uruzgan (DCU), an umbrella organization of five
Dutch NGOs that had to relate to military actors in Uruzgan. The data in this chapter
is based on interviews with key informants from the military as well as the NGO side
in this debate. The fifth and final concluding chapter will answer the main question
of this thesis.
10
Chapter 2 – Securitization of aid, what is it all about?
A Theoretical and methodological approach
2.1 Introduction
In order to be able to create a theoretical understanding of how NGOs deal with the
securitization of aid, it is important to understand this concept. As mentioned in the
previous chapter after the events of 9/11, security at home became an increasingly
important concept in the security policy of western countries. This process also
touched the thinking about development and subsequent development policies, as
poverty is often considered as a source of conflict and failed states are often seen as
a breeding ground for terrorism (Cornish and Glad 2008). In this way security
interests and development objectives became more and more intertwined. Northern
security or global security, as an integrated objective of development is seen as a
clear response to the insecurity felt by Europe and the US in a post 9/11
environment (Beall et al. 2006). Many scholars call this phenomenon the
“securitization of aid”. This concept has triumphed in the post 9/11 environment,
especially in the context of the Afghan ‘War on Terror’. Some see this process as a
positive move and welcome it because it better coordinates donor efforts, some
even see it as a creative new instrument for improving the international security.
Others strongly oppose this process; they see it as a means of furthering donor’s
national interest or even a shift of funds away from non-political goals of social and
economic development (Petrik 2008). But what do we actually mean with
securitization of aid? It turns out that there is no simple answer to this question, as
the concept is by many scholars differently defined and can be looked at from
different angels.
This chapter provides an overview of the wide range of literature on this subject. It
will start with a short history of how the process of securitization has developed. It
will continue with a more theoretical view on what is understood by different
important scholars on this concept. One can note that securitization as applied by
11
the Copenhagen School has a different meaning than when applied by Duffield or
Balzacq. The following part will look at securitization from a more empirical
perspective and identifies three main discussions surrounding the concept. First, it
addresses the discussion about security interests in bilateral aid policies. Secondly, it
addresses the debate about NGOs in relation to military actors and thirdly it touches
a discussion about the presumed negative consequences of securitization. These
debates originated in the academic world among scholars but with a view on the
developments in Afghanistan this phenomenon also gained more importance in the
field of government policies and as a consequence in their relations with NGOs.
Although in recent years the debate has come more or less to a halt, the implications
of this process still play a role.
2.2 Back to the Cold War
Although the term ‘securitization of aid’ roughly dates from the last decade,
however the idea of aid as an instrument for security interests is not new. Already
during the Cold War years aid was being used as an instrument of foreign policy. A
clear example is the Marshall aid funded by the US to rebuild the economies of
Western Europa in order to form a strong buffer against the Soviet communist
expansion. This example clearly shows the use of financial assistance as in
instrument of winning and maintaining strategic alliances in a strongly divided and
bipolar world (Petrik 2008).
The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence
in the final decade of the last century. In the Western world a growing sense of
optimism rose and triumphalism about the neo-liberal democratic model came up,
culminating in Fukuyama’s “End of History” in 1992. However the securitydevelopment nexus never entirely disappeared and this optimism was short-lived.
There was no ‘end of history’ brought by the end of the Cold War and the neo-liberal
thinking. During the next decades the relationship between development and
12
security became stronger in the context of the so-called ‘new wars’1 (Petrik 2008).
This trend continued with the emergence of the human security concept, which
broadens the concept of security and includes, among other things, livelihood and
health concerns (Borgh and Terwindt 2014). Security was then increasingly
conceptualized as both an objective of and an instrument for development. The last
bits of optimism faded away with the events of 9/11 and the announcement of the
‘War on Terror’ by former US president George W Bush. Since these events, global
security, and in particular US security, has dominated the political agenda. British
Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) published in 2003 a paper on global
security and development. The following quote from this paper shows the impact
and the importance of this increasing focus on global security:
“This international focus on security and terrorism is having an impact on
development, not only by drawing political and media attention away from
development concerns, but by influencing aid allocations and the nature of donor cooperation with developing countries.
The war on Terror is also being used to justify practices that undermine the
achievement of development goals and run contrary to international commitments
on human rights. Such trends are a cause for concern for those who want to see
development remain poverty-focused.” (BOND 2003 in Christian Aid 2004:15)
In other words, the post-Cold War sense of optimism about a new focus for aid, was
now completely gone. Targeting the poor was no longer a primary driver for aid and
1
‘New wars’ are seen as different from inter-state or conventional conflicts in a
number of ways: 1) they do not have precise beginnings and endings, 2) they are
often seen as protracted, 3) they differ in modes of warfare, for example new wars
are fought by soldiers, rebels, civilians, warlords etc. and not by conventional
national armies, 4) external support for local wars often comes from diaspora and
lobby groups, 5) new wars are deterritorialized due to new communication
technology, 6) identity is a important representation of groups that at the core of
these conflicts (Demmers 2012:8) For more information see Kaldor, Mary (1999)
New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford, CT: Stanford
University Press.
13
the renowned Cold War donor interests in the allocation of aid were creeping back
(Christian Aid 2004). Western security reappeared as an important objective in the
policy of development aid of western countries. According to many scholars this shift
was a clear response to the insecurity felt by the developed North and development
aid was again seen as instrumental to the security agenda of western countries (Beall
et al. 2006). This phenomenon is considered by many as ‘the securitization of aid’.
2.3 A clear definition of securitization?
The term securitization, however, is surrounded by a lack of clarity as to what is
precisely meant by this term. The ambiguity about the term securitization arises
partly from the vague nature of the concept of security itself. Williams (2007:1022)
notes in Fisher and Anderson (2015:134) that “security has no objective meaning …
[it is] what people make of it”. In other words security is according to Williams an
‘intersubjective concept’. The stated intersubjectivity of the concept in its turn leads
to further discussions. This paragraph sets forth three important scholars or schools
of thinking about securitization. Duffield approaches security as an objectively
defined security interest of the west, while Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde,
representing the Copenhagen School, do clearly assume the intersubjectivity of it.
Copenhagen School
An important school of thinking about securitization is the Copenhagen School of
security studies. This school is represented by the writings of Buzan, Waever, de
Wilde and others2. They use the notion of securitization to rethink security (Emmers
2007). Influenced by this school many scholars apply securitization as outlined by the
Copenhagen school3. Securitization is understood here as a ‘speech act’ of usually
western policy makers or western governments (the ‘securitizing actors’), whereby
2
See for example Buzan, Waever and de Wilde. (1998) Security: A new framework
for analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers. This book is built around two important
conceptual developments in security studies: 1) Buzan’s notion of sectoral analysis
and 2) Weaver’s concept of ‘securitization’ (Mutimer 2007:60).
3 See for example Howell, Jude. 2014, The securitisation of NGOs post-9/11. Conflict,
Security & Development, 14(2):151-179.
14
an event or space (failed state for example) is presented as an existential threat to a
referent object (western states and their populations). The act of securitization is
only completed once a relevant audience is convinced that the security issue is an
existential threat to the referent object (Emmers 2007). In response to this
existential threat, the securitizing actor has to adopt extraordinary means that go
beyond the ordinary norms of the political domain (Fisher and Anderson 2015). This
existential threat legitimizes the exceptional response. According to Buzan, Waever
and de Wilde, securitization is therefore “the move that takes politics beyond the
established rules of the game and frames the issue as a special kind of politics”
(Emmers 2007:111). Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have also emphasized the
dangers of securitization. This is for example the case in undemocratic societies,
where populations do not always have the power to reject an illegitimate speech act
and the resulting emergency measures. Even in democratic societies the act of
securitization can result in restraining civil liberties in the name of security. A good
example of this is the post-9/11 context. Emmers (2007) however highlights some
shortcomings of the Copenhagen School and its securitization model. These include
amongst others the Euro-centric nature of the school, the blurred distinction
between securitization and politicization and finally the need for more empirical
research for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of securitization.
Duffield
Duffield is using the concept of securitization in a different way. He approaches
securitization, more generally than the Copenhagen School, from a more global
development perspective. According to Duffield (2001) state-based security is in
crisis after the Cold War ended and a new framework has taken shape. Based upon
ideas of human security and ameliorating the effects of poverty reduction, aid is now
seen as having a direct influence on security. It was seen that developmental states
could not maintain security within their own borders. Poverty, resource competition
and population growth in the context of failed states, were seen as causing an
unprecedented wave of non-conventional internal and regional forms of conflict.
The third-world is according to Duffield (2001) re-mapped in terms of violence and
unpredictable imagery of the borderlands metaphor. This new security paradigm is
15
concerned with modulating and changing the behavior and conduct of populations in
the borderlands. The securitization of development creates a situation in which the
security concerns of metropolitan states (first world) have merged with the social
concerns of aid agencies, according to Duffield (2001), they have become one and
the same thing. Duffield (2010) speaks about an increasing ‘bunkerization of aid’ as a
consequence of the physical and spatial relationship between aid workers and locals
when he reflects on the above element of securitization.
Balzacq
Balzacq is approaching securitization from a different third perspective than Duffield
and the Copenhagen School. Balzacq (2008) objects the idea that the threat, as
identified by the Copenhagen school, can be modeled as the result of a discursive
process that takes place among the securitizing actor and the relevant audience. He
argues that there are other decisive processes of securitization beneath this
discursive level. The discursive approach to securitization gives an incomplete
picture of what a threat is at any given time, because it fails to account for variations
of intensity within the process of securitization (Balzacq 2008:78). Balzacq (2008:76)
suggests that the study of securitization should be shift away from discourse
(classical language of securitization as used by Copenhagen School) towards the
empirical referents of policy. The policy tools of securitization express a specific
threat and indicate what ought to be done about this threat image. Yet (the
perception of the) threat evolves. Thus, focusing on instruments enables us to
account for the transformations of securitization, both in scope and scale. This focus
on policy tools may improve our understanding of securitization in two ways.
Politically, it is helpful to attend the dynamics of securitization. It shows us how
policy makers translate intentions into concrete actions. From a methodological
point of view it makes it easier to conduct research on this topic (Balzacq 2008). In
his article Balzacq analysis the political and symbolic attributes of securitization
instruments in the context of the fight against international terrorism by the EU. He
states that the EU’s counter-terrorism policy transforms the schemas of information
exchange into securitization tools (Balzacq 2008:83). So, when Balzacq looks at the
16
EU policy on counterterrorism he analysis information exchange. From this, Balzacq
argues, we can discern how they shape the EU’s understanding of terrorism and
their implications for EU foreign and interior security policies (Balzacq 2008:83).
But what does ‘policy’ precisely entails? Also policy, just like securitization, is not an
uncontested concept. Colebatch (1997) sees policy as a combination of different
dimensions of policy practice. In this practice he identifies 3 different accounts.
There is a vertical authoritative account where an authoritative leader is making
decisions. There is a horizontal structured interaction account where we see
interaction among stakeholders (for example participants outside government an
international participants). There is also the scene-setting dimension where the
dominant account is social construction. With social construction he means shared
understanding and values about the problem and appropriate action (Colebatch
1997:35). According to Colebatch these dimensions are not alternatives, rather, each
one tends to assume the others. He also states that one needs to use all three
accounts to get a complete perspective on the policy process. The authoritative
choice account concentrates the attention on a point of decision, the structured
interaction account spreads it to ask who can participate and how they get there,
and the social construction account asks how situations are regarded as normal or
problematic, and whose voiced are heard. The combination of these three accounts
makes it hard to identify a point at which policy is ‘made’, rather he sees a
continuous process of framing and reframing (Colebatch 1997:45).
If we’re using Colebatch to reflect on the Copenhagen School’s act of securitization
one could argue that Buzan, Waever and de Wilde focus primarily on Colebatch
‘scene-setting perspective’ as they mainly focus on the discursive element of
securitization and that the other two dimensions are mostly being neglected.
Balzacq however is using all three of Colebatch dimensions as he sees policy
instruments as affected by social processes. While Duffield is focusing more on the
first authoritative dimension of Colebatch as he sees securitization as imposed on
the borderlands by the metropolitan states. There is no room for social construction.
17
For the purpose of this thesis I will define the term ‘securitization of aid' according to
the definition of van der Borgh and Terwindt, they refer to this securitization as a
“process in which development aid is increasingly linked to geopolitical interests or
security concerns of donating countries” (2014:7). This is particularly the case in war
zones, where countries like the United States, the United Kingdom or the
Netherlands have integrated their military and diplomatic interventions with
development assistance (Patrick & Brown 2007 in van der Borgh and Terwindt 2014).
This definition is chosen because it is very broad definition of securitization. It
integrates securitization as a process on a global government level as well as on a
local grassroots level by including the integration of military, diplomatic and
development.
Above I have described different definitions of the concept securitization and how it
is used in different ways. This resulted in several discussions surrounding the
concept of securitization. The next part of this chapter will look at these different
discussions. The first discussion that will be addressed is about changing approaches
to Official Development Assistance (ODA) (see for example Petrik 2008 and 2010,
Beall et al. 2006, Christian Aid 2004, and Oxfam 2011). A second important body of
literature is about exploring the difficulties about the incorporation of security
policies in development concerns and vice versa (see Beall et al. 2006, Oxfam 2010,
Oxfam 2011, Christian Aid 2004). A third important body of literature is concerned
with the increasing cooperation between military actors and NGOs (see Shannon
2009, Beckwith 2012, McHugh and Gostelow 2004, Fowler and Sen 2010, Haysom
and Jackson 2013, de Torrenté 2004, Pugh 2001). But is this closer cooperation
better thought of as the ‘militarization’ of aid, rather than its ‘securitization’?
Militarization of aid can be seen as both a byproduct of securitization and as the
primary effect of the securitization discourse in the field of humanitarian aid
(Beckwith 2012). Although the militarization of aid is a manifestation of the
securitization of aid, I do think it is important to distinguish between these concepts.
Without being clear about how exactly the term securitization is used, there is a big
potential for ambiguity. With the accompanying risk that different people use the
18
same words to discuss different things, perhaps without even realizing that they are
talking at cross-purposes. I think it is important to ask whether securitization of aid is
still a meaningful concept because the concept is so extensive that it has become a
meaningless concept. I recommend that a more refined conceptual framework is
needed when people continue talking about this concept. The next paragraph of this
chapter will take a closer look at above-mentioned discussions. It will present the
effects of securitization on a more empirical base.
2.4 Security interests in bilateral aid policies
One of the discussions around the concept of securitization is about changing
approaches to ODA4. This trend of securitization is amongst others reflected in the
increased amount of ODA flowing to strategically significant countries that have
aligned themselves with the US in its ‘War on Terror’. While many low and middle
income countries, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa, have seen their ODA cut (Beall et
al 2006). This increased aid has a heavy focus on counter-terrorism and is
increasingly targeted at the front lines in the War on Terror. Petrik (2008) notes that
since 2002 the US economic assistance grew rapidly and in 2004 it reached double
the amount prior to 9/11. Most of this increase was channeled through the US
Department of Defense into Afghanistan and Iraq for debt forgiveness,
reconstruction and counter-narcotics efforts. Although the total budget of United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) also increased this was a
fraction of the economic assistance. When taking note of the distribution of the total
US ODA, in 2006 the Department of Defense was accountable for the management
of about 21% versus 5,6% in 2002. USAID, the main agency responsible for projects
targeted at development, poverty reduction and disaster relief was assigned only
38% of the aid budget, while in 2002, before the events of 9/11, it managed half of
all aid (Petrik 2008:5). Also Beall et al. confirm that this increase in ODA is mainly
used for contra terrorism: “aid to Afghanistan and Iraq rose by at least USD 1,5
4
ODA stands for Official Development Assistance. The Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) defines ODA as “those flows to countries and territories on the
DAC List of ODA Recipients. For more information see www.oecd.org/dac.
19
billion in 2004” (2006:55). This resulted in a situation in where Iraq alone receives
the same amount of aid as whole Sub-Saharan Africa together (Petrik 2008).
Besides the US, other bilateral donors are also making long-standing foreign policy
and national security goals more explicit in their aid policies. Canada, for example,
has since 2009 pledged to spend 80 per cent of its bilateral aid on twenty ‘countries
of focus’. These focus countries are all aligned with Canadian foreign policy
priorities. Middle-income Colombia for example was included and at that time just
signed a free trade agreement with Canada. Also Afghanistan was included where
Canadian troops were fighting. On the contrary, seven low-income countries in subSaharan Africa were dropped (Oxfam 2011:15). Also France in its 2009 aid allocation
policy paper emphasized the role of national interests. The majority of French aid
used to go to Francophone African countries because of strategic interest and
historical ties. The policy paper however spelled out that French aid recipients
should now be explicitly selected according to five ‘criteria of interest’. These criteria
include amongst others their importance to French national defense and counterterrorism and their proportion of immigrants to the country (Oxfam 2011:15). Also
elsewhere donors are weighting their national security objectives in their aid
policies. The United Kingdom has brought development aid in priority countries,
since 2010, under examination of a new National Security Council. Moreover specific
country aid plans are required to ensure the UK aid budget makes the maximum
possible contribution to national security (Oxfam 2011:16). The same tendency was
visible in the Netherlands when they reduced the number of partner countries.
Afghanistan was included because as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that:
“After the fall of the Taliban, the Netherlands placed Afghanistan on its list of
partner countries […]. Its reasons for doing so were not only humanitarian. Stability
in the entire region around Afghanistan, from its neighboring countries Pakistan and
Iran to the Central Asian republics, is of the greatest importance to the Netherlands”
(2006:10). Also ‘security and rule of law’ is identified as one of the four priority
themes in development policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013).
2.5 Increasing cooperation between military actors and NGOs?
20
Discussions about securitization not only focus on a governmental level where we
notice a sharp increase in the level of ODA to countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq.
Another important body of literature focuses on issues resulting from the use of
integrated approaches. One of the consequences of the securitization process is the
much greater role for the military or combined civil-military teams in activities that
were traditionally the domain of development organizations (Fishstein and Wilder
2012). This trend is having a major policy impact for these organizations. They are
increasingly enlisted in aid and development projects that are seen as having
stabilization objectives. But this also works the other way around when military
actors and military forces have become increasingly involved in what would
previously have been seen as the work of non-governmental humanitarian and
development agencies to ‘win hearts and minds’ by carrying out ‘quick impact
projects’, such as building schools or bridges (Fishstein and Wilder 2012, Oxfam
2010).
This trend has been crystalized in the “comprehensive,” “whole of government,”
“integrated” and “3D” approaches. These approaches are seen as a clear outcome of
the process of securitization. In this last approach, defense, diplomacy and
development – the three ‘Ds’ – are combined to tackle security, governance and
development in target areas. NGOs are supposed to contribute with their work to
the third D of development. The Dutch ministry of foreign affairs is in strong favor of
this approach and argues that: “the Netherlands believes that in conflict-sensitive
regions development related interventions are not enough, but need to be
combined with action on the political, military and economic front. This integrated
3D approach is essential for achieving lasting peace, security and development”
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006:12).
Because of these integrated approaches NGOs have to relate to military actors, this
generates a lot of discussion. On the one hand they are expected, as the quote of the
Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs above shows us, to cooperate in approaches such
as the 3D approach. On the other hand scholars and also NGOs themselves are
21
strongly critiquing this closer cooperation. Cornish and Glad state for example that
comprehensive approaches have changed the nature of aid. Development and
humanitarian assistance is no longer based on criteria of need and aid effectiveness
but is used as a strategy to appease communities and win ‘hearts and minds’
(2008:3). NGOs are also urged to relate to these matters. Beckwith states for
example that: “Humanitarians must take definitive action to differentiate themselves
from military and militarized forms of aid. Should they proceed without doing so,
they must recognize their own complicity in the securitization of the humanitarian
field” (Beckwith 2012:45).
Shannon (2009) argues that these integrated approaches bring actors such as the
military and private corporations more fully into the humanitarian sphere. This has
implications for the boundaries between different actors that now get blurred. As a
result, these NGOs face a number of challenges and dilemma’s. According to
Shannon (2009) the legitimacy of NGOs, their ability to act impartially, to be
perceived as neutral and to maintain their independence have all become more and
more constrained. She is continuing her argument by stating that the humanitarian
space, which is dependent on the above humanitarian principles of impartiality,
neutrality and independence, is shrinking. This has consequences for who is
delivering aid, where aid is delivered and on what terms aid is getting delivered.
Also Oxfam and seven other influential NGOs operating in Afghanistan perceive this
process as a threat to the true humanitarian principles and they call for the
protection of the ‘humanitarian space’ (Oxfam 2010). These NGOs are also arguing
that blurring the lines between the identities and work of military and civilian actors
makes development work more dangerous, as stakeholders find it increasingly
difficult to distinguish between actors. A rising number of killed aid workers is a
tragic outcome of this situation. Save the Children mentions that in Afghanistan
because of this trend aid workers are sometimes seen as ‘agents’ of the military. To
give an example, in 2004 five humanitarian aid workers were killed in Afghanistan. A
media report quoted a self-declared representative of the Taliban, who claimed
responsibility for the attack, stating: “We killed them because they worked for the
22
Americans against us, using the cover of aid work. We will kill more foreign aid
workers” (2004:35). This negative impact on NGO security results often in resisting
the wider interventionist agenda, in doing so these NGOs are being perceived as
obstructionist and antiquated by the other integrated players such as the political
and military communities (Cornish and Glad 2008).
2.6 Exploring the difficulties
Is it really that problematic that development and security get more intertwined?
Beall et al. (2006) note that it might be seen as beneficial that the root causes of
terrorism are dealt with through development assistance instead of ignoring these
deeply troubled parts of the world. Some authors even think of this developmentsecurity nexus not as beneficial but as positive. In the spirit of the post 9/11 thinking
on development they promote the idea of a win-win situation where aid serves the
security interests of both receiver and donor (Beall et al 2006). Steward argues for
example that conflict involves high development costs, so the promotion of security
is instrumental for development. He continues that development is an important
element in avoiding conflict, so in his circular logic, development is essential for the
achievement of security. (Stewart 2004 in Beall et al. 2006:18). Also Picciotto argues
that there is a reflexive relationship between security and development. He states
that the future of aid lies at the intersection of security and development (Picciotto
2004 in Beall et al. 2006:18). When looking at this nexus between development and
security one can further argue that when Western governments are seeing
development as essential for their own security, this can place a renewed
importance on the use of ODA and this renewed attention may even increase the
amount of ODA which is seen as positive for development countries.
However, these arguments are seen as flawed by many scholars and also various
NGO’s have not remained silent on this topic. The increased amount of ODA is above
all aimed at strategically important countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, other
low-income countries will not benefit from this increase. Nor is this higher amount of
ODA aimed at long-term development projects and poverty reduction as also
military and/or defense activities are being funded with ODA money. This clearly
23
illustrates the prioritization of security over humanitarian goals (Beall et al. 2006).
Christian Aid sends a strong warning signal by arguing, “when international
development goals and humanitarian principles become increasingly subordinate to
foreign-policy objectives, international efforts towards global poverty reduction will
be seriously weakened” (2004:24). They also show that much of the aid earmarked
for Afghanistan ends up with the military or military related projects instead of long
term development projects. This will not improve the security situation in
Afghanistan itself. Also Oxfam endorses this view by arguing that development
projects implemented with military money or through military-dominated structures
aim to achieve quick impact however these are often poorly executed, inappropriate
and they are not sustainable because of a lack of community involvement (Oxfam et
al. 2010). Oxfam America (2008) believes that this securitization process will
eventually be self-defeating. When the short-term objectives of national security are
prioritized over long term strategies of poverty reduction and Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) this will eventually not lead to a safer world resulting in
the vanishing of the securitization process (Oxfam 2008 in Petrik 2008:7). Former UN
secretary Kofi Annan expressed his concerns on this situation on the Annual Meeting
of the World Economic Forum in Davos, where he stated that:
“Five years ago, here in Davos, I asked you, the world’s business leaders, to join the
United Nations on a journey.. I felt obliged to warn that global unease about poverty,
equity and marginalization was beginning to reach critical mass…Today, not only the
global economic environment, but also the global security climate, and the very
conduct of international politics, have become far less favorable to the maintenance
of a stable, equitable, and rule-based global order.
So I come before you again, asking you to embrace an even bigger challenge..
International terrorism is not only a threat to peace and stability.. It also has caused
our attention to drift away from the Millennium Development Goals. It is time to
rebalance the international agenda. Let us remember that non of the issues that
faced us on 10 September have become less urgent” (Annan 2004, in Christian Aid
2004:24)
24
Another last body of important points of critique is the presumed link between
poverty and terrorism. According to Beall et al. there is no obvious link between
poverty en terrorism and so the aid spent on the prevention of terrorism will not
reach those most in need. Those who are likely to be recruited by terrorist
organizations, such as Al-Qaida, do often not have a particularly low economic status
(Beall et al. 2006).
2.7 Conclusion
The term securitization has become an overarching concept for related yet different
processes. We noticed how securitization has a different meaning for authors such
as Buzan, Waever and the Wilde, Duffield and Balzacq. These different meanings
have crystalized in different debates around the concept of securitization.
The first debate is about the sharp increase of ODA funding to countries such as Iraq
and Afghanistan at the expense of countries in Sub-Sahara Africa. ODA has become
re-affected by a security-lens through which many Western governments now view
the world and its failing and fragile states. These failing states, with their potential to
be a safe haven for terrorism, are increasingly seen as a potential security threat by
western countries for their populations. As a result integrated approaches, where
military, diplomacy and development are complementary employed to stabilize
fragile states and to secure western security interests are seen as a natural
continuation of this logic. This touches the second important discussion around the
term securitization. This discussion is concerned with how NGOs now to a larger
extend have to relate to military actors in their area of expertise. In the NGO world,
opinions vary widely on how to positions themselves in the debate around the more
intertwining relations between military and civil actors. The more critical actors refer
to this as the securitization of aid with accompanying disadvantages such as that the
distinction between military and civilian actors get blurred with accompanying risks.
Above is seen as resulting in a shrinking of the humanitarian space. Others see this
growing integration as useful and logical in the face of insecurity, contested
25
environments and shared objectives (Beckwith 2012). A third important field of
discussion around the concept of securitization is about the question if this process
is really that problematic. A majority of scholars and NGO staff do think that it is
problematic due to a weakening of global poverty reduction, poorly executed
development projects in countries such as Afghanistan and the presumed link
between terrorism and poverty. There are however also scholars we view this
process as a win-win situation for both the western world as well as for developing
countries.
26
2.8 Methodological approach
With this theoretical frame in mind how then can we analyze how NGOs deal with
this highly abstract concept of securitization of aid? According to the definition of
van der Borgh and Terwindt (2012) the integration of military and diplomatic
interventions with development assistance is an important component of
securitization. This process of more integration manifests itself in approaches such
as the 3D approach. So, in this thesis I consider the 3D approach as an
operationalization of the securitization of aid. Although integrated approaches, i.e.
the relation between NGOs and military actors, are not the only component of
securitization, I do chose to focus on the 3D approach as this approach specifically
links NGOs with the securitization of aid debates.
In order to answer the research question, a two-track strategy was chosen. The first
step was to conduct an extensive literature study on the concept securitization of
aid, the 3D approach, the Dutch funding system and the Afghan context that
provided a very broad background and the primary data source for chapter 2 and 3.
The second step was to conduct in-depth qualitative interviews, which provided the
primary data source for chapter 4. This chapter is providing a small case study of the
work of the ‘Dutch Consortium Uruzgan’ (DCU) in Uruzgan. This consortium
consisted of five Dutch NGOs; Cordaid, Healthnet TPO, Save the Children, ZOA and
the Dutch committee for Afghanistan. These five NGOs partnered with ten local
organizations to work on development projects in Uruzgan. This case study was
chosen because Uruzgan provided a perfect example of the Dutch 3D approach and
the DCU represented a unique partnership between Dutch NGOs that had to relate
to the presence of military actors in Uruzgan. For that reason the primary data
source for this chapter were in-depth interviews (see annex A for an overview of
respondents). As this thesis focuses on Dutch NGOs it was possible to conduct the
entire research in the Netherlands. These interviews where conducted between the
first week of April and the third week of June. A total of 8 respondents were
interviewed. Custom-made semi-structured interview guides were used for key
informants (see annex B&C for topic lists). Respondents included current and former
27
NGO directors, NGO staff and high-ranking military staff. The NGOs were selected
because they participated in the DCU. The military personnel was selected because
of their influential position, involvement in the mission or their knowledge of the
PRT, TFU or cooperation with NGOs. Six out of eight interviews were conducted in
person, however due to problems with distance (one of the respondents is living on
the Philippines now) two semi-structured interview guides were sent by email.
As this thesis is aimed at providing insight into the choices of NGO staff in their
relation with military actors, this study relied partly on the stated perceptions and
opinions of the respondents stated above. I acknowledge the need for caution when
basing findings on these stated perceptions of respondents as these perceptions
may not always accurately reflect the true situation on the ground. To balance the
subjectivity of the interviews I have also reviewed relevant literature on this topic in
order to objectivate the information received.
Unfortunately, after multiple attempts it was not possible to get in contact with the
NGO ZOA. When interpreting the views and opinions expressed by my respondents
one has to take into account that it might not necessarily reflect to total picture of
the DCU. I nevertheless do believe that the largest three out of five NGOs still
provide this case study with a firm base. The fifth NGOs ‘Dutch committee for
Afghanistan’ was not contacted because this NGO was aimed at veterinary services,
was very small and did not play a major role within the DCU.
28
Chapter 3 - Policies, practices and contention
‘A struggle in two arenas’
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter was about the concept of securitization of aid. As was already
explained in that chapter, integrated approaches such as the 3D approach are seen
as a logical continuation of this process. The Dutch government applied the 3D
approach during the Dutch mission in Uruzgan from 2006 till 2010. The DCU was also
involved in this approach as they accepted the funding of the Dutch government to
work on development projects in Uruzgan. This chapter will take a closer look at the
3D approach. It will start with an overview of the developments that leaded to a
more integrated approach used by the Dutch government. The next part will
illustrate the different perceptions of NGOs and the military on the 3D approach.
Although the third D of development does not only consist of NGOs (as this chapter
will show) to limit the scope of this research I focus on the role of NGOs. The next
part will summarize three main issues of critique on the 3D approach coming from
Dutch NGOs. This chapter shows that NGOs have a very critical attitude towards the
3D approach but yet they did get involved in this approach. I will argue that this
paradoxical situation might be partly a result of the quickly shrinking maneuvering
space of NGOs. I will point out two trends in the financial relationship between the
Dutch government and the civilateral channel that are decreasing this space
resulting in a more securitized environment for NGOs. This chapter ends with a more
specific description of how the 3D approach was applied in Uruzgan as well as in
Dutch politics. It will further outline and specify the course of the Dutch mission.
3.2 The 3D approach: from coordination to integration to 3D
In 1992 former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali presented its “Agenda for
peace”. This agenda replaced the military-strategic notion of security and gave rise
to a broader conceptualization of security. This broader conceptualization also
explicitly included development concerns. The resulting ‘second-generation’ peace
missions were led by an expended mandate to not only maintain the military status
29
quo but to also build on a durable peace (Frerks and Goldewijk 2007). Conflicts were
now increasingly seen as complex and these conflicts required multidimensional
answers. The military or civilians cannot address these answers exclusively and each
crisis or conflict situation requires an individual, tailored and comprehensive
response (van der Lijn 2011). Development actors were stimulated to work in
cooperation with other relevant actors so that they could jointly address these more
diffuse and complex security concerns whilst working on sustainable solutions. This
new way of looking at conflicts and their solutions also led to a shift in policy. Policy
since then was characterized as being comprehensive and integrated. With this new
focus on multi-actor responses to complex emergencies the idea of a 3D approach
was introduced. The 3D approach integrates the efforts of the Ministries of Defense,
Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation and so incorporates diplomacy,
defense and development simultaneously. Van der Lijn (2011:10) defines the 3D
approach as “action to ensure that international peace and stability operations are
embedded in a system-wide strategic approach aimed at combining the broadest
possible set of dimensions – typically including the security, governance,
development and political dimensions”. Frerks and Goldewijk note that this
approach implies that “economic and development aid policies explicitly include the
issues of conflict and are mobilized to contribute to conflict resolution and
peacebuilding” (2007:25). These comprehensive and integrated approaches are
according to them now widely accepted in policy circles.
The 3D approach was at first introduced in Dutch politics and in the subsequent
policy field at the start of the past decade. In 2003 this new emphasis on coherence
was recorded in a coalition agreement stating that: “At the implementation of Dutch
foreign policy and security policy, there needs to be an integrated decision making
process, whereby the various relevant policy fields are being coordinated” (own
translation, Matthijssen 2014:230). This principle of integration was further
operationalized in the following years. In 2008 the Dutch government presented a
strategy paper called ‘Security and Development in Fragile States’ that states: “When
the integrated policy, adopted by the Netherlands, is applied to fragile states, it uses
the ‘whole-of-government’ approach, in which several ministries work together.
30
Whenever work is being done in fragile states, the goals and activities in the various
sectors must tie in closely with one another” (Kamerbrief 2008:19).
The notion of 3D was not a Dutch invention (it is often called the Dutch approach
however the notion originated in Canada), the Dutch use of this notion was built
upon the concept of ‘comprehensive approach’ as being used in the EU and the
NATO and also on the concept of ‘integrated missions’, as being used in the UN (van
der Lijn 2011). Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Lakhdar Brahimi first
mentioned the term ‘integrated mission’ in 2000. The derivative term ‘integrated
approach to peacekeeping’ was soon abbreviated to ‘integrated approach’. This term
is now embedded in Dutch policy (Matthijssen 2014). In letters and policy
documents of the Dutch government this integrated approach is often mentioned in
the same sentence as the 3D approach (Jansen 2008). Also in the military the 3D
approach is interwoven in their policy. For example, the main principle underpinning
the mission in Uruzgan was that it should be “as military as necessary, as civilian as
possible” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006:20).
3.3 The different perceptions of NGOs and the military on the 3D approach
According to van der Lijn (2011) NGO perceptions on the 3D approach follow the
categorization of civil-military relations developed by Frerks et al (2006). According
to them the interaction between NGOs and the military actors can range from
minimal to intensive and they describe the following typology. There are principled
neutralists, organizations or actors who want to stay independent. These actors do
not want to collaborate with the military at all and avoid contact as matter of
principle as the humanitarian principles (neutrality, independence and impartiality)
have the highest priority. There are pragmatists, those who make their choices
based on functionalist or instrumentalist considerations, their decision to cooperate
with the military is based on the specific context. And there are supporters, who see
military action as necessary and they do not object to a closer collaboration (Frerks
et al. 2006:33). NGOs can be positioned in the same way following the above
categorization with regard to the 3D approach. The principled neutralists are firmly
against the 3D approach as it endangers the humanitarian principles and blurs the
31
lines between different actors. They fear a politicization, or even securitization, of
aid where development will be subordinate to the military. The pragmatists balance
their principles against functionalist and instrumentalist considerations. The
supporters see no harm in closer cooperation and see the 3D approach as useful to
enhance security (van der Lijn 2011).
The goals of the 3D approach are often aligned with the ones of the participants in
this joint undertaking. For this reason the military in Uruzgan saw the 3D approach
as a part of their counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. From their perspective, 3D is
seen as a mean to reach their goal of COIN. On the other side, NGOs and most
diplomats see the 3D approach as a mean to create a secure environment to reach
their goals aimed at development, good governance and security. To reach this goal,
defeating insurgents can work counterproductive. The reason for this is that an
insurgency may have its origins in a population that fights oppression; these are the
people NGOs hope to assist (van der Lijn 2011). Thus NGOs try to do their work
without opposing insurgents. Most NGOs would therefore never be part of a COIN
operation, as they would lose their neutrality. Therefore, principled neutralists (see
Frerks et al. 2006) equate the 3D approach with COIN. Diplomats from the ministry
of foreign affairs are often situated in the middle of this continuum, between the
military and principled neutral NGOs (van der Lijn 2011).
3.4 Critique from a NGO perspective
As the above continuum and the previous chapter indicates there is no overall
support for the 3D approach among the NGO community in general. Organizations
fear that development will become an instrument for an international security
agenda. NGOs also fear for their humanitarian space and independence. Throughout
the wide range of literature one can identify three main bodies of critique.
The first point of critique arises from the perceived substantial differences between
the intervening actors. Military interventions have a completely different strategy
and a different time horizon compared to development organizations. Jansen
(working for Oxfam, later ICCO) (2008) argues that the believe that diplomats, the
32
military and development workers all have the same end goal with their
interventions in conflict areas is incorrect. She notes that within the ISAF mandate
increasing the stability and legitimacy of the Karzai government is the highest
priority. Protection of civilians is seen as a sub-goal in the ISAF mandate. Often
politicians call this a win-win situation where they believe ‘self interest and altruism
go hand in hand’. However, experience shows that the actors who are ‘gaining’ in
this situation are often the concerned states and the central government in Kabul.
The population outside Kabul’s sphere of influence gets nothing out of this ‘win-win
situation’. Jansen (2008) argues that diplomats and the military are primarily
focusing on enhancing security and stability at an inter-state level. While for
development workers the protection of civilians and human security comes first.
When military actors and diplomats argue that human security is also paramount,
then main- and sub-objectives or end goals and the means to reach them are being
confused. Grotenhuis (then director of Cordaid) (2008) also points out an important
difference when he states that the legitimacy of military actors and development
organizations is based on different facets. He argues that development organizations
have a mandate that is completely different from the intervention forces.
Intervening forces are legitimized by a UN mandate or by recognition of the ruling
government to safeguard security. Development organizations operate on the basis
of legitimacy granted by the local population. It is often in fragile or even failed
states that there is a large gap between the government and its population. Actions
of the government often do not reflect the desires of its population. In fragile states
the government must come from far away to re-build its legitimacy. Peace forces
that work on behalf of this government are not automatically legitimate partners in
the reconstruction process.
The second body of critique from NGOs on the 3D approach is about the assumption
that the integration of diplomacy, development and defense will always, and in
every context, create an added value. According to Jansen (2008) this is not always
the case. There are countless situations where the 2 D’s of development and
diplomacy can reach more than the D of defense. Sometimes conflicts even turn
more violent with the addition of another armed force, or the conflict is at a state
33
where prevention still has a good change of success. Also Grotenhuis (2008) argues
that the instrument of military intervention is overrated. Often this instrument is not
able to win the fight against terrorist groups, because it is too inflexible. He further
explains this by bringing forward the example of the Vietnam War, where a heavy
armed US army could not defeat the military strategy of the Vietcong. A similar
situation occurred in Afghanistan where the intervening power was able to prevent a
power takeover but was not able to defeat the Taliban.
The third body of critique is about the presumed relation between development and
security. According to Jansen (2008) this relation is insufficiently tested. One-liners
as ‘there is no development without security and vice versa’ are often refuted by
findings of studies showing that there is no direct link between poverty and
terrorism. Also Grotenhuis (2008) argues that the idea that there has to be security
in order for development to take place is based on false premises. As military
interventions are limited, most of the conflicts have to be settled with the two other
D’s of defense and development. Also, a strong emphasis on military interventions
will result in the neglecting of prevention as an instrument to prevent conflicts.
According to Grotenhuis (2008) military interventions should be seen as a last resort
and should only be deployed when other instruments have proven not to work.
From the above it is clear that NGOs are very critical about the integration of their
organizations in the 3D approach. Yet we see how some Dutch NGOs, for example
the DCU the case study of this thesis, went along in the 3D approach in Uruzgan.
These NGOs accepted the funding of the Dutch government aimed at carrying out
development projects in Uruzgan. The next part will outline a situation in where it
becomes clear that maneuvering space of Dutch NGOs is shrinking fast. Dutch NGOs
are in the middle of a quickly changing landscape. The Dutch government has always
recognized the importance of the civilateral aid channel5 to perform development
activities. However, for some years the Dutch government is strongly reducing the
structural funding to Dutch NGOs. The economic crisis is one driver for funding
cutbacks to development assistance related activities. Another driver is a shift in
5
In Dutch development cooperation a distinction is made between three channels of
aid; bilateral, multilateral and a civilateral channel.
34
government policies leading to a shift from aid to trade. In order to understand this
changing landscape where NGOs are located in it its import to have some knowledge
of the history of the Dutch NGO funding system and the accompanying conditions
for funding.
3.5 A Short history of the Dutch funding system: NGO-Government Relations
3.5.1 MFP
Dutch government funding to NGOs dates back to 1965. In this year the Dutch
government provided funds for non-commercial private aid organizations aimed at
development activities in development countries. Initially three aid organizations
were funded with this budget for development. This funding occurred along the
Dutch system of compartmentalization. Organizations that received funding were:
catholic Cebemo (now Cordaid), protestant ICCO and non-religious Novib (now
Oxfam Novib). Ten years later in 1978 a fourth actors was admitted to this funding
scheme, the humanistic organization Hivos. Almost twenty years later a fifth and
final NGO was included in the funding schema, Foster Parents Plan Nederland
(Schulpen and Hoebink 2014). These five big NGOs were called in Dutch the cofinancing organizations (in Dutch ‘Mede Financierings Organisaties” (MFO). This
funding system was known as the co-financing program (or in Dutch “Mede
Financierings Programma” MFP). From 1965 onwards, especially since the 1980’s
Dutch NGOs were increasingly flourishing. The public and political interests in NGOs
were growing. The prevailing ideology was one of free market, privatization and a
smaller government and it was seen that NGOs could fill this vacuum (Schulpen and
Hoebink 2001). This growing attention for NGOs was accompanied by a sharp
increase in funding. The table below shows the sharp increase in the MFP-budget in
million EUR.
35
Table 3.1 MFP budget in millions. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006
According to Schulpen and Hoebink (2001) this period could be described by ‘NGO
euphoria’. In the 1970s, as one of the first countries in the world, the aid budget of
the Dutch government (headed by the then minister Jan Pronk) reached the 0,75 per
cent of GNI in ODA (NCDO 2012). In the following years this budget increased even
more.
The first decades of the MFP were mainly characterized by one, an almost
unanimous and constant positive political attitude towards the MFOs and two, a
struggle for a bigger maneuvering space for the MFOs. At first the NGOs were
funded on a project basis, the ministry had to appraise each project separately.
However, in 1980s this was converted into program financing, NGOs had to approve
their own projects and funds were supplied as a block-grant, i.e. autonomous
allocation with justifications afterwards over the total expenditure (Schulpen and
Hoebink 2001). From the above it thus can be concluded that during the MFP the
five MFOs were relatively free to implement projects where, when and how they
wanted.
36
3.5.2 MFP-broad and TMF
This way of funding lasted until 2002. MFP was replaced with a system know as cofinancing program broad or in Dutch “Mede Financierings Programma breed (MFPbroad). Until MFP-broad there was an almost automatic renewal of agreements
between NGOs and the government (Schulpen and Hoebink 2001). However, with
the introduction of this new funding system a lot has changed for NGOs. In this new
scheme NGOs had to apply for funds and were assessed beforehand (Schulpen and
Hoebink 2014). A more rigid policy framework was introduced that restricted the
operational autonomy of the recipient organizations. NGOs had to meet certain
requirements before they were seen as eligible to receive subsidy. For the smaller
and more theme-based organizations a separate funding scheme was introduced,
known as theme based co-financing, or in Dutch “Thematische Medefinanciering”,
(TMF). In contrast to the earlier MFP, MFP-broad and TMF only lasted for four years.
Schulpen and Hoebink acknowledge that this shift represents a substantial break
with earlier ways of funding (2014:189)
3.5.3 MFS I & II
In 2007 MFP-broad and TMF were merged into the first co-financing grant (or in
Dutch “mede financierings stelsel” or MFS), which covers the period from 2007 till
2010. The total MFS I budget was 2,246 billion euro for four years (Hessen 2009).
MFS I was succeed by MFS II, this was accompanied by major budget cuts. A total
sum of EUR 2,125 billion was made available to cover the five-year (2010-2015) MFS
II period Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). This was however already less (26 per
cent) than the NGOs asked for. Because of budget cuts agreed upon in the new
cabinet this amount was later reduced with another EUR 250 million. These
reductions had a major impact on NGOs, particularly on the large ones such as ICCO
and Cordaid. They had to make significant changes in their programming and staff.
After the granting of the MFS II subsidies a further reduction in government funding
to NGOs was announced. This trend was then continued by the next and current
cabinet (where Liliane Ploumen is Minister for Foreign Trade and Development
Cooperation) and this trend will remain after 2016 as the current government has
again announced a major overhaul of the subsidy schema for private aid
37
organizations in the Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014).
The guiding role of the Dutch government in MFS II is clearly visible in the criteria
accompanying the funding schemes. Schulpen (2011) summarizes some of these
criteria. The government wanted to fight the fragmentation in the NGO field and for
this reason NGOs could only apply for funds in an alliance. Applications of individual
NGO had no chance. The Dutch government also wanted NGOs to work with other
players in the field, so organizations that could not prove to cooperate with for
example the bilateral channel saw their chances reduced (this is called
harmonization). Another important point is that when NGOs want to apply for funds,
60 per cent of their program expenditure has to be in one of the partner countries of
the bilateral aid channel of the Dutch government. In MFS II a new framework for
applications was introduced. This framework is no longer an open system where
NGOs can submit their programs; it is now a tender system where NGOs, as
subcontractors, can subscribe for projects that are in the interest of the Dutch
government (Schulpen 2011:2).
3.5.4 Strategic Partnerships
In 2016, MFS II will be replaced with a new subsidy schema known as ‘strategic
partnerships’ (2016-2020). The focus of this schema will only be on subsidizing lobby
and advocacy activities. ‘Lobby and advocacy’ aims at strengthening civil society
organizations in low and middle-income countries (SOMO 2013). The programs of
the NGOs applying for funds will be designed in a dialogue between DGIS
(Directorate-General for International Cooperation) and the applying organization.
The policy framework even states that at the end of the design process the
government still has the possibility to reject the jointly designed proposal (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs 2014). Only 185 million EUR per year has been made available for
these strategic partnerships (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014). Once being the frontrunner as one of the first countries to reach the 0.7 percent GNI in ODA, it now falls
back to 0,55 percent of GNI in ODA.
Although there is a sharp decrease in structural funding for NGOs, this does not
38
mean that all their grant opportunities disappear. The Dutch government puts more
emphasis on tenders. The subjects of these tenders however, are also in line with
the Dutch foreign policy. An example of this is the ‘Dutch Good Growth Fund’
(DGGF). The DGGF issues export and investment financing to Dutch and local
businesses for activities in developing countries (SOMO 2013). The DGGF fits in
perfectly with the emphasis on trade that the current Dutch government has. The
ministry of foreign affairs states in their 2013 policy document called ‘‘A World to
Gain: a New Agenda for Aid, Trade and Investment’ that:
“The combination trade and development cooperation forms the core of Dutch
development cooperation policy. At international level, the Netherlands pursues 3
aims: 1) to eradicate extreme poverty (‘getting to zero’) in a single generation; 2) to
achieve sustainable, inclusive growth all over the world, i.e. economic growth from
which the poor also benefit; 3) to ensure success for Dutch companies abroad.
We fight extreme poverty out of solidarity with people. We encourage trade and
investment mainly in our own interests. Where aid and trade meet, we will act out of
both solidarity and enlightened self-interest.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, 6).
3.6 NGOs as an extension of Dutch foreign policy
From the above, one can draw a twofold conclusion. First, after decades of relative
operational freedom NGOs become now increasingly aligned with the foreign policy
of the Dutch government. With the decline of the structural funding from the Dutch
government, NGOs had to start focusing on safeguarding their income through other
means; often this is done by signing in on tenders (see Cordaid 2014). As a result
they become more restricted in their work if and when they want to continue
working with government funding. We see a changing landscape from relatively free
policy frameworks (during MFP), to more rigid policy frameworks in granting
schemes, to more tightly regulated tenders. The second important conclusion is that
the amount of structural funding from the Dutch government decreased very
sharply. The table below gives an overview of this decrease.
39
MFS 1
MFS 2
Strategic
Partnerships
Amount of EUR p.a.
562 million
425 million
185 million
Table 3.2. Source MFS1: Hessen 2009. Source MFS 2: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009. Source strategic
partnerships: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014
During the years of ‘NGO euphoria’ a lot of NGOs have become reliant on funding
sources of the Dutch government. Schulpen and Hoebink (2014, 181) indicate this
level of dependency in the table below over the year 2008 (only the four MFOs are
used here).
Table 3.3 level of dependency on government funding in 2008. Source: Schulpen and Hoebink 2014
During the era of ‘NGO euphoria’ abundant funding was available and this caused an
enormous increase in the number and capacity of NGOs. However, when NGOs want
to maintain their capacity and volume they are forced to diversify or raise funding
income from other sources. As we noted in the first part of this conclusion, these
other sources will often be tenders, where NGOs are seen as subcontractors of the
Dutch foreign policy. The Dutch government determines on what themes and in
which countries the money is spent. To illustrate the importance of tendering one
can look for example at the 2014 annual report of Cordaid. In this report one of the
six concrete aims for 2015 was to increase success rates in focused tendering
(Cordaid 2014).
40
So one can note how the financial and policy maneuvering space of NGOs is
decreasing. One should consider the willingness of NGOs to relate to Dutch
government policy, despite their critique on its approach, in this context. This could
be a possible explanation. The following part will more specifically elaborate on the
Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan and the role of the Dutch NGOs.
3.7 The Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan
Between 2006 and 2010 the Netherlands was part of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. The Netherlands deployed its armed forces in
southern province of Uruzgan. ISAF aimed at a ‘comprehensive’ approach for the
whole of Afghanistan. The long-term aim of the ISAF mission was to enable the
Afghan government to guarantee security and stability within its own borders,
allowing reconstruction to take place (van der Lijn 2011). Its mission statement
reads:
“ISAF, in support of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan],
conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and the will of the
insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socioeconomic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable
stability that is observable to the population.” (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Defense 2011).
Derived from this the Dutch mission was aimed at security, stability and
reconstruction in Uruzgan. During this mission the Dutch applied the 3D approach by
striving for coherence in their policies and actions. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs
stated that: “Security and stability are essential conditions for development. That is
why the Netherlands believes that in conflict-sensitive regions development-related
interventions are not enough, but need to be combined with action on the political,
military and economic front. This integrated approach (Defense, Development and
Diplomacy) is essential for achieving lasting peace, security and development”
(2006:12). The mission officially ended on July 31, 2010 and is by many perceived as
41
a great success in terms of coherence (van der Lijn 2011). Also Colonel Mathijssen
(2014) is of the opinion that, since Uruzgan, there is room for improvement (of the
3D approach) but there is already a firm base.
The Dutch government, argued in line with the 3D approach, that “it is of crucial
importance that the military in south Afghanistan do not limit themselves only to the
improvement of security and stability. They will also be involved in the
establishment of the requirements for governance and economic construction.”
(Kamerbrief 2005 in van der Lijn 2011:32). According to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (2006:12) the main principle underpinning the mission is that it should be “as
military as necessary, as civilian as possible.” The aim according to them is for rapid,
visible improvements, such as the reconstruction of basic infrastructure. Rapid
assistance is seen as essential in order to prevent the Taliban regaining popular
support. Reconstruction work itself is not being done by soldiers, but by the Afghan
government and local and international organizations.
3.8 The Dutch political context – Dutch 3D approach as a polder model
The political context in the Netherlands had a great influence on the development of
the 3D approach. Although the ISAF mission was one of counterinsurgency this word
was not used in Dutch politics. Dutch politicians were framing the missions as a
stabilization- and reconstruction-mission in order to gain support from the more leftwing parties for the mission in Dutch parliament. Concepts such as war and
counterinsurgency were not used and even were avoided (Dimitriu and de Graaf
2009). According to Dimitriu and de Graaf this resulted in a gap between
expectations in the Netherlands and the reality in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency
indicates that fighting is part of the mission, while reconstruction suggests that the
local population welcomes the intervening forces (2009:617). Because the mission
was framed this way (stabilization and reconstruction) a great emphasis was put on
development activities and its civil character and therefore NGOs were pushed to
contribute to the mission. According to van der Lijn (2011) these developments gave
the 3D approach a head start and a quick dynamic that it would otherwise not have
gained so quickly.
42
During the mission the actual situation on the ground and discussions in parliament
vary widely. While Dutch parliament was still stuck in discussions about the
character of the mission (reconstruction versus fighting), those in the field
considered this as irrelevant. According to van der Lijn (2011) those deployed in
Uruzgan saw the mission as a very complex operation where fighting and
reconstructing took place simultaneously. He also notes that the mission, besides an
idealistic goal, also served Dutch political interests. These interests (such as fighting
terrorism and protecting Dutch or alliance interests) were by most politicians
excluded from the agenda to maintain the public support.
Because of the mission was not framed in clear terms by the Dutch government, it
remained difficult to define what the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan precisely
entailed. Jansen (2008) also point out that the definition of the 3D approach is
depending on who is defining it. According to the ‘Article 100 procedure’6 the aim of
the mission was contributing to security, stability and reconstruction in Uruzgan
(Dimitriu and de Graaf 2009). This resulted in confusion both in and out the
parliament. At one end of the spectrum were those who perceived the mission as a
reconstruction mission, these actors were mostly development workers and leftwing politicians. At the other end of the spectrum were those who saw the mission
was about stability, counterinsurgency and the global war on terror, part of this
group were the military and more right wing politicians. Both sides of the spectrum
see however that security, stability and development are related but the difference
is in the main aim of the mission and the relation between security and development
(van der Lijn 2011). This is also in line with the arguments of Jansen (2008) en
Grotenhuis (2008) in a previous paragraph of this chapter. Van der Lijn (2011) argues
that the deliberate vagueness of the 3D approach was in some way a smart move
because it guaranteed broad support across the political spectrum. It was political
convenient not to choose between reconstruction and defense and security. In this
way, different actors could step in this approach and take part in the mission, while
6
Article 100 serves as the framework for the decision-making process on the sending
of troops abroad. The government must inform parliament about the deployment of
Dutch troops in maintaining or promoting the international legal order (Wessel
2008).
43
they were still able to work along the lines of their own goals. The 3D approach
became accessible for different actors with widely varying goals. These goals could
be brought together in an overall 3D goal that was then embraced by all (van der Lijn
2011). As a result, this ‘polder model 3D approach’ received the critique that the
goal was broad and vague or that there was no common overall goal at all. The next
part of this chapter will focus on the more practical part of the mission and will
outline shortly the course of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan.
3.9 The course of the mission
With the start of the mission in 2006 all three minister of Defense, Foreign Affairs
and Development cooperation were involved. The Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) was the
main Dutch contribution to the mission, its main components were a Dutch battle
group (BG) and a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The TFU main activities were
stabilizing Uruzgan and securing the military bases and TFU staff. ISAF adapted the
idea of PRTs that was initiated by the US during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).
The PRT in Uruzgan was based on the structure of the PRT in Baghlan province
where the Dutch were deployed from 2004 till 2006. The main difference with the
PRT in Baghlan was that with the PRT in Uruzgan the number of civilians increased.
Already from the start the PRT in Uruzgan had three civilian advisors a development,
cultural and political advisor. The PRT mission teams also consisted of functional
specialist (often reservists) that were performing tasks within their own areas of
expertise such as economy, infrastructure and humanitarian aid. PRT staff was also
working on projects aimed at ‘winning of hearts and minds’ of the Afghan citizens.
Although the number of civilians increased, military personnel remained by far the
most dominant component in the PRT (van der Lijn 2011). Also Dimitriu and de
Graaf (2009: 618) emphasize that the mission had a clear hierarchy. The political goal
comes first, instruments such as diplomatic, military and development efforts are
seen as means to reach this goal.
With the start of the mission the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs both
made their own separate plans and the strategic planning of operations was barely
integrated. There was no interdepartmental mission design although they were
44
partly synchronized. On a field level the TFU tried to integrate both of the ministries,
both ministries were however giving their own instructions. In the field the military
struggled with the above-mentioned discussion whether the missions was a
reconstruction mission or a combat mission. ISAF introduced the so-called ‘ink-spot
strategy’ and the Dutch were following this. Herein the territory that was already
under control was enlarged and authority was given to the Afghan National Security
Forces (ANSF) (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2009). The mission started with 1.450 military
staff and three Dutch civilian staff members deployed by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. According to van der Lijn (2011, 34) the military felt clearly that they had the
lead, while they did acknowledged that decisions on development funds where
made by the Minister of Development Cooperation. According to van der Lijn (2011)
there were some troubles during the mission; amongst others on the number of
development advisors send by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The military had the
idea that because of the presence of only three civilians they had to take on the task
of development in the field. However during the mission the cooperation between
the military and civilians improved.
Although development projects were also included in the ink spot strategy, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs however decided to also work outside this ink spot and
focused on the whole of Uruzgan. Although many in the military believed that
development needs security first, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs legitimized the
broader focus because they felt that development projects could also function in
insecure environments. The embassy supported local NGOs directly without the
intermediary of Dutch NGOs (van der Lijn 2011).
In December 2007 it was decided by the Dutch government to extend to Dutch
mission in Uruzgan. The discussions on this extension in the Dutch parliament had a
major influence on the evolution of a more civil character of the mission and on the
3D approach. There was put more pressure on the reconstruction element of the
missions as it became clear for diplomats and development workers that more
civilian people were needed in order to be more effective. The number of political,
development and cultural advisor in the TFU increased. By the end of the mission the
TFU counted 12 civilians, instead of the 3 they started with, this increased their
45
influence (Homan 2007). In 2008 the PRT was brought under the leadership of a Civil
Representative (CivRep) and in 2009 the TFU came under a dual-headed leadership
of civilian and military. As a result of this increased integration the military and most
diplomats felt that the overall 3D approach improved. Once the area became more
secure and more funding became available the number of NGOs increased. Towards
the end of the mission the strategy of attracting as many NGOs as possible
remained. The presence of more NGOs would make the mission more civil (van der
Lijn 2011).
3.10 Conclusion
Integrated approaches are seen as a key part of securitization of aid. NGOs firmly
criticize this development. Frerks et al. provided a typology how NGOs did relate to
these approaches. A paradoxical situation arose when NGOs, despite their fierce
criticism, decide to join the DCU and accept funding in order to work alongside the
other two Ds. I argued that at the same time the financial- and policy-maneuvering
space of NGOs is decreasing. One can note that the Dutch government is back into
the drivers seat. Easy access to abundant funding was replaced by more rigid policy
frameworks, tender procedures and far less available funding. As they choose to
maintain their existing capacity they have to follow the political and policy priorities
of the Dutch government and as a result increasingly becoming an instrument of
Dutch foreign policy.
When looking at the situation in Uruzgan, the Dutch 3D mission was at the beginning
and for political reasons framed as a civil reconstruction mission. The emphasis on
coherence was pushed by the Dutch government in order to give the mission a more
civilian face to gain broad support for the mission. The desired presence of (Dutch)
NGOs had to legitimize this. Looking at a day-to-day practice the military character
has always been dominant. This is likely caused by the fact that the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs seems to follow its own priorities. This will be further elaborated in
the next chapter, where some respondents also confirm the apparent lack of
coherence.
46
Chapter 4 NGOs and Military actors
Applying theory to practice?
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it became clear how the Dutch government applied the 3D
approach in Uruzgan. In order to keep up the appearance of the civilian character of
the mission the presence of NGOs was of utter importance. In 2006, before the start
of the operation Dutch NGOs were called to together to discuss their possible input
for the third D of development. It was seen that their development projects could
contribute to the aim of the mission set at security, stability and reconstruction. In
2006, three Dutch NGOs, Save the Children, Healthnet TPO and Cordaid, decided to
join their forces in the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU). In 2008 the Dutch
Committee for Afghanistan Veterinary Programmes (DCA) and ZOA Refugee Care
decided to join the DCU. In 2009 their proposal was approved and the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted funding. The DCU wanted to achieve immediate
and lasting change in the lives of people in Uruzgan, more specifically they focused
on: civil society and institutional development (all, ZOA in particular), health care
(Healthnet TPO), education (Save the Children), social development (Save the
Children), rural development (ZOA and Cordaid) and livestock and animal health
(DCA).
The DCU operated independently from the TFU and the military personnel stationed
in the province. This chapter aims at analysing how the DCU as a consortium and its
member organizations individually, defined and perceived their relationship to the
military presence in Uruzgan. A framework for analysing these relationships is
provided by McHugh and Gostelow (2004: 43). They identify that NGOs might adopt
four possible approaches to engage with the military. These four approaches are
1) Principled non-engagement. NGOs will not engage with the military, directly
or indirectly, as the military component is a party to an internationalized
47
internal conflict, and any association may impair their actual or perceived
independence.
2) Arm’s-length’ interaction. NGOs only interact with the military indirectly via
an intermediate organization and only if operational needs dictate. NGOs will
participate in briefing sessions but will not initiate such meetings.
3) Proactive, pragmatic, principled engagement. NGOs will engage with the
military using a proactive, pragmatic, yet principled approach. NGOs will
build on existing relationships to facilitate these interactions.
4) Active, direct engagement and cooperation. NGOs will engage directly with
the military and coordinate with them in terms of identifying humanitarian
and reconstruction projects.
This framework is used to characterize the NGOs interviewed in their relation with
the Dutch military. In order to understand the dynamics of these relationships this
chapter starts with a description of the period prior to the mission. Prior to the start
of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan we already see an increasing coherence between
the military and Dutch NGOs. This part will be followed by a paragraph describing
some important elements at the start of the mission. Then it will analyse how the
DCU and its member organizations were relating to the Dutch military. This part is
followed by a paragraph that set forth the developments in the relationship between
the DCU and the military with accompanying incidents and problems. The last
paragraph will outline the Dutch political situation to which the DCU also had to
relate to.
4.2 Before the mission
In the period before the actual start of the mission in Uruzgan, NGOs were already
engaged in a dialogue with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Defense about a closer cooperation between these 3Ds (van de Put, Interview).
According to van de Put, director of Healthnet TPO, there was a common
understanding between these three Ds that sharing of information between these
parties was not necessarily being disapproved. Berlijn, former Commander of the
48
Armed Forces between 2004-2008, states that the relationship between NGOs and
the military has gone through important developments. Traditionally NGOs and the
military did not consider each other as natural allies. However, with the increasing
involvement of the Dutch military in international peacekeeping operations in the
so-called new-wars, there is a growing tendency within Defense to recognize the
importance of NGOs in fulfilling certain activities. NGOs, just like diplomats, are
according to Berlijn important to take away the root causes that disrupt societies.
Defense is not able to do this alone but sees diplomatic and development efforts as
necessary (Interview). Berlijn characterize this tendency over the years as a process
in which both parties increasingly understand and respect each others position and
background, coming from different minds sets that were world apart (Interview).
This increasing coherence was not a result of the Uruzgan mission but the operation
did fasten and strengthen its process. Or as Berlijn stated: “in Uruzgan these
developments were more manifestly put in practice” (Interview). Initially however,
at the start of the mission a lot of NGOs and the military were still standing with
their backs against each other (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). There was a lot of
distrust and prejudices, including additional caricatures, coming from both sides (van
der Lijn 2015). The rise of the 3D approach also caused contradicting opinions and
subsequent positions amongst the Dutch NGOs. A distinction arose between the
stricter NGOs and the more moderate NGOs. The strict NGOs were firmly against
cooperation with the military, corresponding with the first position of McHugh and
Gostelow 2004. While the more moderate NGOs were more pragmatic or flexible in
this cooperation, corresponding with the other positions of McHugh and Gostelow
(Grotenhuis, Interview). According to Grotenhuis, former director of Cordaid 20032013, this distinction led to firm discussions between these NGOs. Cordaid, classified
by Grotenhuis as a more moderate NGO, was facing in these discussions the more
strict NGOs such as ‘the Red Cross’, who adhere very strictly to the humanitarian
principles. These camps are however not a very strict distinction as there were also a
lot of NGOs that were somewhere in between these two extremes of the continuum,
such as Oxfam and ICCO (Grotenhuis, Interview). Wierema puts this in a slightly
different perspective as he uses the terms strict and moderate and defined his own
49
organization as moderate whereas he placed Cordaid between his organization and
the stricter end of the continuum (Wierema, Interview). This shows how the
positioning of the NGOs is not fixed but more fluid and subjected to interpretation.
4.3 Start of the Uruzgan Mission
With the start of the Uruzgan mission Dutch NGOs were subsequently confronted
with the invitation to go the Uruzgan (van der Lijn 2015). The creation of the Dutch
Consortium Uruzgan (DCU) was a response to the mission and the invitation.
However, the creation of the DCU was an autonomous decision of the associated
NGOs and not, as often has been the case, a reaction on tender requirements of the
Dutch government (van Ruitenbeek Interview). According to van Ruitenbeek, former
coordinator within the DCU, all five of the NGOs included in the consortium already
had experience with working in Afghanistan and most of them also in Uruzgan. It
was jointly concluded, although on an initiative of Save the Children NL, that it would
be better for all the parties involved if the NGO activities in Uruzgan were well
coordinated. This coordination had the greatest change of success when a
comprehensive plan was developed in where all the associated NGOs were
responsible for their own areas of expertise. The Dutch government was very
pleased with this initiative, both for substantive reasons, the willingness of the NGOs
to relate to the Dutch government goals in Uruzgan, as well as for managerial
reasons as it is better to have one comprehensive plan with one contract holder than
several sub-plans with several contracts (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). On the
background two other important factors had an influence on the creation of the
DCU, the first one is the fact that the expertise from all the consortium members
turned out to be complementary instead of competitive, the second point is that all
of the members preferably addressed the safety issues around working in Uruzgan
together (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). Although none of the respondents mentioned
so, it is not unlikely to assume that access to funding also played a role in this
decision as in general the structural funding for NGOs sharply declined in these
years.
50
The Dutch government funded the program of the DCU. The contract management,
supervision and guidance were done by the Dutch embassy in Kabul. Based on their
proposal, the Dutch embassy in Kabul allocated an amount of 14 millions Euros for
2009 up to early 2013 for the DCU. The availability of this sum of money caused the
DCU to work, as is usually the case, as close as possible on their planning and to
report adequate on their activities. No other specific requirements on the content of
the program were formulated (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). If there had been any
further requirements for the content of the program none of the NGOs would have
accepted this funding. For it would have been impossible for them to function in
Uruzgan as they would become very vulnerable to amongst others the Taliban. The
Taliban does not allow any activities that have a direct link to the ISAF mission. These
NGOs were willing to work in Uruzgan but only on their own terms. Van den Berg,
political advisor at Cordaid, states that the DCU got a lot of space to develop their
own programs. There was no interference of the Dutch government in this phase
(Interview).
However, it took nearly 8 months until the proposal of the DCU was finally approved.
This lengthy period caused strong irritations amongst the NGOs involved. In the
mean time, the German semi-state NGO GTZ received a total of 34 million euros
from the Dutch government to construct a road connecting the capital of Uruzgan,
Tarin Kowt, with the far-flung Chora district (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
Defense 2011). This led to discontent among the Dutch NGOs who could not
understand why it took eight months for the government to approve their proposal
while GTZ could already start working in Uruzgan (van de Put, Interview). While the
DCU was still waiting for their proposal to be approved, the military at the beginning
of the mission, got involved in CIMIC projects. The PRT, by the use of CIMIC projects
wanted to trigger ‘quick impact’ (see also Chapter 2) to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of
the Afghan population. These CIMIC projects were rejected on all fronts by the DCU
member organizations. According to van den Berg, these CIMIC projects resulted in
major problems. These were all short-term projects, they cost a lot of money, they
were not considered sustainable and there was no involvement of the local
population. These CIMIC projects were primarily intended to gain support for the
51
Dutch military presence in Uruzgan (van den Berg, Interview). The usual quality
criteria applied by Dutch NGOs did not seem to apply for these CIMIC projects.
Also Wierema, former director of Save the Children NL, states that because of the
military felt the need to legitimize their own presence they were building schools
and bore holes in the name of CIMIC projects. This is not a good case as because the
roles of military and development actors get blurred, as it is not clear who is
responsible for what. It depicts development work as an extension of military aims
(Interview).
Van de Put endorses this view by stating that while the NGO GTZ was building the
above-mentioned road, a task that should actually be performed by the military in
his eyes, the Dutch military was in the mean time handing out pencils to children
from a primary school. This resulted in the Taliban blowing up the school the
following day because of the ISAF involvement. According to van de Put this is a clear
example of where the changing of roles led to reckless and dangerous situations.
Van de Put states that one of the Dutch ambassadors for Afghanistan shared his
opinion on these matters when he stated that: “I have to represent the top-level of
the armed forces, that applies a heavily outdated development model” (own
translation, van de Put, Interview). The CIMIC projects were according to van de Put
of very poor quality and did not remained for long. He states that it is regrettable
that there was in that time never a better coordination between the activities of the
PRT and the Dutch NGOs (Interview).
Van Griensven, former commander of the TFU from January till August 2007, stated
that the PRT always tried to work complying with the 3Ds. However, at the start of
the mission the security situation was that bad that the main point of focus was a
military one. Nevertheless the PRT also tries to focus on the other two Ds of
development and diplomacy, although the cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Development Cooperation was almost non-existent. In the absence of
development specialists the military had to take up these tasks their selves, knowing
that they were no experts in these areas. At the start of the mission there were
52
hardly any NGOs present in Uruzgan. Van Griensven states that: “Off course I had
hoped that expert organizations would take their share within the 3D approach.
Initially, this was a bit disappointing” (own translation). Van Griensven explains this
by emphasizing the unfamiliarity between these different actors and the poor
security situation in Uruzgan (van Griensven, Interview).
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, in March 2008 the PRT came under
the leadership of a CivRep, the then lieutenant colonel Rietdijk. He is responding to
the critique of NGOs on CIMIC projects stating that it was never the intention of the
military to carry out sustainable CIMIC projects. According to him the military did not
want to affect the already operating systems of for example healthcare due to the
fact that the military would leave in a few years. They did not want the local
population to become reliant on these projects. Rietdijk also points out that the
CIMIC projects were dedicated to safely perform the mission and to bring safety for
the military and were not aimed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. CIMIC projects
are as it were a kind of extension of the safety apparatus according to him. The
downside of this is that these CIMIC projects become less sustainable and have less
impact but, according to Rietdijk, this is better than doing nothing (Rietdijk,
Interview).
Later in the mission the number of CIMIC projects carried out decreased because
more NGOs were getting involved in the area. Reasons for the greater presence are
according to van den Berg an improved security situation and a greater availability of
funds for NGOs. From the above we can conclude that both actors, the military as
well as NGOs, had wished for an earlier presence of the latter in Uruzgan. Especially
in the first years of the mission there seem to be very little, or even no, coordination
between the different Ds, caused by the apparent absence of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. It was only in 2009, nearly a year after the DCU submitted its proposal, that
the DCU could start with their programs in Uruzgan. The next part will outline how
the DCU and its member organizations related to the military presence.
53
4.4 In Uruzgan – Interaction between DCU and the military
4.4.1 DCU in relation to the military presence
Within the DCU there was an overall agreement about the absolute necessity of
visible separation of the DCU and the military. Except for consultative meetings in
The Hague, on a field level there was no direct cooperation between the DCU and
the military. It was inconceivable that the military would visit the DCU office and
projects in Uruzgan. According to van Ruitenbeek this was a matter of life or dead
for DCU staff and especially for the Afghan staff so this was unanimous agreed upon.
Sometimes there was an exchange of information as this was necessary to
implement the projects in an effective way (Interview). For the contact between the
DCU and the military the Dutch embassy in Kabul was an essential intermediary (van
der Lijn 2015). This contact was always behind closed doors and almost never at
Kamp Holland, making it as invisible as possible. Never military actors or weapons
entered the DCU office. When this would have been the case “the Taliban would
have visited us the next day” (van den Berg, Interview). For the same security
reasons, DCU had an agreement with the military that they would not interfere with
each other except for emergency situations (Wierema, van den Berg, Interview). Van
de Put however stated that Healthnet TPO never made such agreements with the
military (Interview).
The Dutch government acknowledged the importance of this separation, where they
state in their ‘Final evaluation Netherlands contribution to ISAF, 2006-2010’ that:
“It was essential to guarantee the independent character of NGOs, so as not to
compromise their security. Successful deployment of civil relief organisations
required them to be autonomous and not an extension of ISAF. Respect for the
mandate and the expertise of the various actors had to be a first priority.
Discretion with regard to the programme, actors and activities was necessary. It
was vital that external actors should keep a low profile in order not to endanger
local communities and their organisations.” (2011:69)
However, despite the general DCU policy on interaction with military actors, its
members interpreted it differently. One member organization forbade its staff to
54
enter the Kamp Holland while others member organizations entered the camp for
shelter, meetings with embassy personnel etc. These different views have never led
to strained relations (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). The next part of this chapter will
take a closer look at separate approaches of three of the member organizations of
the DCU. Respectively Cordaid, Healthnet TPO and Save the Children.
4.4.2 Interaction between DCU members and the military
As was already stated in the introduction of this chapter respondents were asked to
position their NGOs against one of the four approaches to the military based on the
research of McHugh and Gostelow (2004).
Cordaid
Grotenhuis (Cordaid) and van den Berg (Cordaid) both position Cordaid at the third
approach of proactive, pragmatic principled engagement. For Cordaid the most
important aspect in making their choice whether or not to work with the military
was their legitimacy in the eyes of their Afghan partners. According to Grotenhuis
the extent to which Cordaid cooperated with the military depended on the question
whether Cordaid would still be a reliable and legitimate partner in Uruzgan. He
argued that trust of the local populations and partners forms Cordaid’s license to
operate and therefore his organization followed the perception of its local partner
(Grotenhuis, Interview). Van den Berg confirms that local partners guided Cordaid in
its decision (van den Berg, Interview).
Grotenhuis argued that their local partners were already in contact with the PRT.
Staff of AHDS, their local partner working on basic healthcare, was cooperating with
the PRT, so did the staff of the rural development program. There was no active
cooperation but people did inform each other on safety issues etc. Whether
Grotenhuis liked it our not, this was the reality that he had to take into account and
it formed the basis for Cordaid’s interaction with the military and the PRT. According
to him Cordaid’s choice was pragmatic: “We want something, you want something,
we both understood that we are very different, but when we respect each others
55
boundaries and when we work pragmatic then we can go a long way” (own
translation). Although Cordaid has a humanitarian mandate (a lot of humanitarian
organizations adhere to strict values of neutrality and independency corresponding
to the first approach of McHugh and Gostelow) they have chosen to enter into a
dialogue with the military, although this was on their terms and security of their
staff, local partners and beneficiaries was the most important. Cordaid never shared
sensitive information about key leader engagement. The dialogue focused on
practical information such as security and logistics and was mainly initiated by the
civilian part of the PRT (van den Berg, Interview).
Principled non-engagement, the first option of McHugh and Gostelow (2004), is
according to Grotenhuis a matter of ‘clean hands policy’ towards donors. This nonengagement will not make life better for the ordinary Afghans. On the contrary,
direct engagement, the fourth option of McHugh and Gostelow, is also not possible
because as an NGO you will end up as an extension of the military forces. The
military apparatus is very inflexible and bold and so for a NGO hard to relate to. He
fears that the military will use NGOs as in instrument for their own strategy. In this
way the whole organization will be compromised which can be very dangerous.
When NGOs cooperate with the military in a direct way, they will lose their status as
an independent actor. That is why Cordaid never cooperated in an operational way
(Grotenhuis, Interview). From a more practical perspective van den Berg points at
the complete different time span that makes it impossible to work in closer
cooperation with the military. NGOs work with a time horizon of decades while the
military has a time span with a maximum of five years. If NGOs would fully cooperate
with the military their legitimacy would end together with the end of the mission,
which is not how NGOs work and function (van den Berg, Interview).
So Cordaid’s choice to interact with the military was not a principled choice but
rather a pragmatic decision. The presence of the Dutch military actors was seen as a
‘fact of life’ and decisions were based on the question of what was possible under
the given circumstances. It seemed that cooperation was possible as long as they
expected it to serve their best interests. However, the choice of Cordaid to go along
56
with the decision of their local partners raises some questions, as NGO staff is often
located in the urban middle-class while their target groups are often located in a
rural and lower class.
Healthnet TPO
Healthnet TPO on the other hand had a different and more ambivalent approach.
Van der Lijn argued that their approach was more fluid (2005, 82). In the Dutch
media and in debates in the Netherlands it took a principled position. Willem van de
Put, the director of Healthnet, emphasized repeatedly in Dutch media that the TFU
should not be involved in reconstruction activities in Uruzgan as the military was not
trained and equipped to do this. Overall it would endanger the Healthnet staff, as
they would be perceived by the Taliban as cooperating with ISAF. Van de Put would
rather see military actors working on safety and aid workers on the construction of
hospitals and schools (Botje 2009). However, in practice it turned out that they were
also pragmatic in their approach. Van de Put positions Healthnet TPO at the second
approach of arms-length engagement. According to van de Put, Healthnet TPO
understood that it was necessary to oust the Taliban with violence so this legitimizes
to a certain extent the presence of military actors. Healthnet TPO was willing to talk
to the military and to exchange information. They wanted to understand what the
military was doing in Uruzgan. However, it was important for them to keep their
distance as it was considered dangerous for the staff as they could be seen as an
extension of military actors. According to van de Put the first approach, principled
non-engagement is very simple minded. These principled non-engaged NGOs do,
according to him, not accept funding from countries that are participating in a war.
However their position is only possible because they have enough unrestricted
funding available. Van de Put also argues that these humanitarian principles are
outdated. The fourth approach, direct engagement, is not an option according to van
de Put. In this approach NGOs are reduced to become fully instrumental to the
military and a central part of counterinsurgency operations. This is dangerous and
NGOs will lose their identities.
So Healthnet TPO had a more ambivalent approach. One can note a distinction
57
between the opinions of Healthnet as expressed in the Dutch media and the
practical realities in Uruzgan. In the Dutch media they portrayed themselves as
principled and firmly against military presence in Uruzgan. This approach would
correspond with the first principled non-engagement approach of McHugh and
Gostelow. However, in practice they did accept funds related to Uruzgan by joining
the DCU. In Uruzgan they adopt a pragmatic position in where arm-length
interaction with the military was possible.
Save the Children NL
Wierema positions Save the Children also at the second approach of arms-length
interaction. This was mainly a practical consideration. The presence of the military
was seen as a fact. Conducting very principled discussions was considered as not
helping the Afghan people at that moment as it was clear that the military would not
leave soon. There was no interaction at an operation level. The interaction that did
take place was about practical issues such as locations and security. Save the
Children also saw the military as important for providing more stability in
Afghanistan.
The three NGOs positioned themselves at different approaches however in practice
it turned out that the differences between these NGOs were hardly present. For all
of these NGOs it was clear that it was not possible to directly cooperate with the
military. Information exchange was fine, as long as this did not include sensitive
information. The boundaries of this information sharing do slightly vary per NGO.
However, it seems that this positioning is more a matter of framing towards the
Dutch public opinion where they, especially Healthnet TPO, took a more principled
stance, where in the day-to-day practice in the field a pragmatic attitude
(corresponding to the typology of Frerks et al (2006)) got the overhand. Choices
were especially made on the basis of best interests for their own organizations.
4.5 Development of the relationship between the DCU and the military
The relationship between the NGOs involved at the DCU and the military became
58
stronger during the mission. Initially the contacts between the NGOs and the military
were limited. There was a lot of distrust from both sides and NGOs feared violence
and intimidation directed at them (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). Van de Put describes
that with the start of the mission the Afghan staff warned Healthnet TPO that the
area had become very unsafe for Dutch NGOs. They advised Healthnet to leave
Uruzgan for a while. Healthnet took these warnings into consideration but decided
to stay (van de Put, Interview).
Although the strict DCU policy of separation from the military remained valid, the
contact between these actors grew. The embassy in Kabul was an essential
intermediary between NGOs and the military. Gradually direct contacts and
coordination at different levels increased and the initial distrust and prejudice
disappeared to a certain extend. Van Ruitenbeek states “initially we were standing
with our backs against each other but gradually we were able to look each other in
the eyes” (own translation, Interview). The policy of separation, in Uruzgan applied
very strictly as a matter of life and death, weakened as the distance with Uruzgan
increased. On a Kabul-level it was easier and safer to speak to each other. One of the
reasons for the increasing contact, also on the Uruzgan level, is according to van der
Lijn, the greater emphasis on the role of civilians in the missions from 2008 onwards,
especially once the PRT was civilian led (see also chapter 3). Another important
reason for the changing attitude of the Dutch NGOs in the DCU is related to their
partner organizations working in Uruzgan. Initially partner organizations were very
reluctant to the Dutch military presence. Later a ‘modus operandi’ was developed
where partner organizations saw the added value of the Dutch presence (van den
Berg, Interview). The number of civilian representatives from the PRT grew; they
were the entry point for the local partner organizations. More information was
exchanged and security briefings for partner organizations were organized at Kamp
Holland about for example the location of improvised explosive devices (IED). This
exchange of information went both ways and remained during the mission (van den
Berg, Interview). Van der Berg claims that these developments have strengthen the
3D approach.
59
Van de Put states that while the dialogue with the defense top in The Hague was
fruitful, this decreased the more it reached the field level. According to him,
policymakers working for Defense were miles away from the reality on the ground.
With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there was hardly any dialogue at all. They were
fully encapsulated in the military agenda (van de Put, Interview). The lacking of
dialogue resulted in poor coordination between the NGOs, Defense and Foreign
Affairs, leading in its turn to a number of incidents and problems. Van den Berg
contradicts these statements of Van de Put when he mentions the good
relationships between Cordaid, Defense and Foreign Affairs in Uruzgan, Kabul and in
The Hague (van den Berg, Interview). Regardless whether the relationships are
characterized as fruitful or not, problems nevertheless still remained.
One of these incidents is where the DCU received a request of the Dutch embassy.
The embassy, at the request of the military leadership of the Uruzgan mission, asked
the DCU to start development projects in a strategic area for the mission (van de Put,
van Ruitenbeek, Interviews). DCU took this up with their Afghan partner
organizations and they gave a negative advice. The DCU refused to cooperate in this
project and no one, nor Defense or Foreign Affairs, did blame the DCU for this
decision (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). Also Healthnet, outside the DCU, was being
approached several times to start development projects in an area that was just
cleaned by the military. These questions came directly from the PRT and the Dutch
embassy was not involved. According to van de Put these questions resulted from
the hectic situations in Kamp Holland where Foreign Affair officers were under great
pressure of military tactics. As a matter of course Healthnet always rejected these
requests.
The DCU has always acted very carefully in these situations. They stood firmly
against the image of the DCU as an extension of the military, this was accepted by
the military without further debate. These requests point to a lack of understanding
about the positions of the different actors. This is not so much a problem of
coordination as it is problem of understanding the different mandates of the
different actors involved.
60
This lack of understanding on the different mandates is reflected in the discussion
about the goals of both actors. NGOs point out that their goals and the goals of ISAF
were by defense actors often seen as the same. Berlijn also states that in the end,
both actors have the same end goal, namely the provision of stability (Berlijn,
Interview). This point of view is however strongly contradicted by the NGOs.
According to van de Put NGOs do not operate in Afghanistan to bring stability.
Healthnet’s work is aimed at offering local Afghans access to health systems.
Healthnet does not operate in Afghanistan to legitimize these systems, whereas
legitimacy is very important for the military. In the end both actors want a better
Afghanistan but the differences are in the means and the strategy to reach this goal.
Or as van de Put states: “You don’t develop with a gun in your hand” (Interview).
Because of the very poor coordination other incidents occurred. Cordaid and Save
the Children both refer to an incident where a PRT commander and a director of a
health center were opening a school together. The following day a photo of this
event was published in a Dutch newspaper. Off course this was strongly rejected by
the DCU because of the accompanying risks of the situation. The responsible person
at Defense was contacted by the DCU and such situations never happened again
(Wierema, Interview).
All the NGOs refer to one big incident where the Dutch military forcefully entered a
hospital in Uruzgan linked to AHDS, one of the partner organizations of the DCU. The
Dutch military was looking for Taliban fighters that had attacked the Dutch camp.
They believed that these fighters were nursed in this hospital (Grotenhuis,
Interview). However, this is a violation of forth convention of Geneva, related to the
protection of civilian persons in time of war (Boom 2010). The DCU made the
decision, just like the ministry of Defense, to not inform the media about this.
Cordaid director Rene Grotenhuis wrote, in the name of the DCU, an official protest
letter to Defense and Foreign Affairs. These complaints were taken very seriously.
They responded with understanding, apologies and a promise that it would never
happen again (Grotenhuis, Interview). The decision not to disclose this incident also
61
led to fierce discussions within the DCU. Van de Put did not agree with this decision
as he still has the opinion that the DCU should have revealed this invasion
(Interview). According to van de Put this was the right time to show how the Dutch
military was exactly making the same mistakes as the Americans did. The DCU could
have pointed out the impossible combination of winning hearts and minds and at
the same time participating in the war on terror (Interview). According to van de Put,
Healthnet was constantly finding itself participating in a balancing act. “We believe
in NGOs cooperating to accomplish greater results but this may however not result
in actively concealing such important information” (own translation, Boom 2010).
As a consequence of poor coordination other problems came up as well. NGOs often
had the feeling that they were not kept informed on certain situations concerning
safety. This led to dangerous situations for NGO staff and their local partners, as they
did not know when, where and how the military was working on certain operations.
NGOs understood that from a military perspective these situations can be classified
as secret operations but for the NGOs it felt as one-sided cooperation (van de Put,
Interview). This example clearly demonstrated the dual effect of military presence.
On the one hand they secure an area and their presence also increased the available
funding for NGOs. On the other hand their presence can also be conflict attracting
and this example shows how easily NGOs could get involved in combat activities. In
addition, this poor coordination also resulted in a waste of money. Reservists,
stationed in the PRTs, were often ordering expensive equipment for hospitals
without consulting the involved NGOs. When these reservists leave (after a short
period of time) no one knew how the use this equipment resulting in incoming
complaints about rusted machinery. If NGOs were consulted first this would not
have happened (van de Put, Grotenhuis, Interview).
Next to coordination problems with the PRT, NGOs are also questioning the whole
concept of PRTs. NGOs raised serious questions about the efficiency of PRTs.
According to Grotenhuis reservists who where part of the PRT, were employed in
Uruzgan for only six weeks, a very short period of time. What can you reach in such a
short time frame Grotenhuis questions? This also means that the local population
62
constantly has to deal with new faces and relationship and trust building constantly
has to begin from scratch again. Also in terms of costs PRTs are disputed as often the
local population was not hired to perform consultancy tasks but expensive foreign
consultants were approached. In Afghanistan there were enough consultants
available who stayed there for a longer period of time, who did speak the language
better and who could move around more freely. According to Grotenhuis “PRT staff
only left Kamp Holland in armored trucks while local NGO staff was just driving
around in shabby Toyota Corola’s” (own translation, Interview). PRTs are seen as a
concept that is very high in costs but is largely ineffective (Grotenhuis, Interview).
In the end none of the NGOs felt integrated in a 3D approach. From the above we
can conclude that a tighter integration was not desired and could even work
counterproductive. Cordaid however felt part of a broader approach on peace,
security and development in Uruzgan (van den Berg, Interview). Van de Put strongly
contradicts this by stating that the results obtained by the Dutch NGOs where by the
Dutch government shamelessly ascribed to the credits of the 3D approach (van de
Put, Interview). This does not demonstrate feelings of being a part in a shared
approach. All of the above shows a remaining inconvenience between Defense and
NGOs. This was often the result of poor coordination resulting in for example safety
issue. However in some situations it goes even beyond poor coordination when we
note a complete misunderstanding of the different mandates of both parties by
Defense and Foreign Affairs. As a tighter integration was not desired by the NGOs, it
seems that a better coordination could have contributed to the goals of both actors.
Besides this political-military arena in Uruzgan, the DCU also had to relate to a
political-financial arena back home. The financial part is already analyzed in chapter
3.5. The political part of this arena will be dealt with bellow.
4.6 Uruzgan, NGOs and the Dutch political context – a debate in the Netherlands
about this interaction
Different opinions about the interaction between Dutch NGOs and the military were
also voiced in the Dutch parliament. Opinions ranged from voices that want to
63
completely integrated the Dutch NGOs in a kind of big consortium while other voices
had a better understanding of the complex situation (Grotenhuis, Interview).
Grotenhuis emphasized the political effect for NGOs of the 3D approach. According
to him some members of parliament called for a more integrated program. They did
not understand why these NGOs did not want to work in closer cooperation with the
Dutch government. They firmly criticize NGOs when they refused to work in closer
proximity under the banner of ‘it is our tax money you are spending’ (Grotenhuis,
Interview). Also van den Berg states that some members of parliament felt that the
progress made by the Dutch NGOs was too little. This did not fit in the image they
tried to evoke of Dutch NGOs working on ‘hearts and minds projects’ in the wake of
the Dutch military victory in Uruzgan (Interview). This interference was clearly
illustrated in the Dutch newspaper ‘de Telegraaf’. On July 2008 de Telegraaf reporter
Sanders wrote an article about the waist of Dutch development funds in Uruzgan.
According to him, the then minister ‘Dagobert Duck’ Koenders wasted a huge
amount of tax money on development projects in Uruzgan, while the Task Force
Uruzgan has to tighten its belt (de Telegraaf 2008). Following this article, two
members (Boekestijn en van Baalen) of the VVD (liberal party) started asking critical
questions about the alleged waist of development funds in Afghanistan. These two
members demanded that independent inspection teams would go to Uruzgan to
take a closer look at expenditures by development cooperation in order to prevent
wastage (Kamerstuk 2008).
A few months before this another Dutch newspaper ‘het Parool’ had already
published an article about problems in the coordination between defense and
development cooperation in Uruzgan and the very slow pace of the reconstruction
projects. Abovementioned lieutenant colonel Rietdijk predicted that it would take
until 2010 before there will be any schools opened in Chora (district in Uruzgan). He
further expresses his fears that the absence of tangible results of reconstruction
projects might increase the risk of directing the Afghan population into the arms of
the Taliban. In response to ‘de Parool’ article three members of parliament (Ferrier,
Van Gennip and Knops) of the CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) raised critical
questions about the fears expressed by Rietdijk and they question the slow pace of
64
the reconstruction projects (Kamerstuk 2008).
There where however also voices who better understood the reality in Uruzgan.
They understood that there was an absolute necessity for both the Dutch DCU
member organizations but also for their Afghan partners to prevent their work from
being seen as an integral part of the ISAF mission as this would make these NGOs a
legitimate target in the eyes of the Taliban. As is already mentioned before
Grotenhuis and van de Put emphasize that especially Defense staff in the Hague
understood very well that the reality on the ground differ from the proclaimed
reality in the parliament.
Members of parliament and Dutch press evoked an image of Dutch soldiers that had
to do the dirty jobs risking their own lives whereas the NGOs were not delivering any
results (van den Berg, Interview). Besides the direct link to the mission, perhaps this
discussion could be better understood in the light of underlying political debates and
framing about the legitimacy and perceived (lack of) effectiveness of development
aid.
4.7 Conclusion
While the increasing coherence between NGOs and Defence was already there, the
Dutch mission has accelerated this trend. Dutch NGOs were needed to complete the
third D of development. The Dutch government was very pleased to find, initially
three and later five NGOs were, under the flag of the DCU, willing to relate to the
Dutch government goals in Uruzgan applying the 3D approach. The establishment of
the DCU, the Dutch mission and the funding for the DCU, are inseparably linked. DCU
applied a policy of strict separation for their own and their partner’s safety.
Perceived as being an integral part of ISAF was unthinkable. After an initial period of
distrust the contact between the NGOs and the military gradually increased.
Nevertheless a lack of coordination remained resulting in several incidents and
problems. The question is justified whether this is just poor coordination or the
essential difference in nature of both parties. Although the military emphasized a
65
common goal of ISAF for them and the NGOs, there is a substantial difference
between the means and the strategy of these actors to reach their goals. This
difference is also reflected in the debate in Dutch politics. While development
organizations have a time horizon of (several) decades, military actors are working as
fast as possible. This discrepancy resulted in questions about a lack of efficiency
addressed to the NGOs. Funding for the DCU was granted from 2009 till 2013.
According to all the NGOs it was possible to keep working in Uruzgan after the
mission ended because they were not perceived as an extension of ISAF. However, in
2013 the funding for the DCU came to an end and was not renewed.
66
Chapter 5 Conclusion
Development with a gun in your hand?
The idea that in the aftermath of 9/11 aid has become securitized is widespread. It is
seen by many, scholars as well as NGOs, that development aid is increasingly used as
an instrument to stabilize fragile states in the name of antiterrorism. Evidence for
these assumptions however is not prevalent. There are few thorough analyses made
on these assumptions that focus on the practical implications of this process. The
aim of this thesis was to analysis how Dutch NGOs, in particular the DCU, are relating
to this securitization of aid. The research question will be answered by looking at the
Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan.
Comprehensive or integrated approaches such as the 3D approach, where political,
military and development interventions are seen as complimentary instruments for
stabilization, have according to many, changed the nature of aid. Development aid is
more and more used as a strategy to strengthen communities and ‘win hearts and
minds’. The Netherlands applied this 3D approach during the Dutch mission in
Uruzgan from 2006 till 2010. The major underlying principles of the mission is clearly
reflected in several ministerial letters to Dutch parliament (‘kamerbrieven’) and
subsequent policy documents, all emphasizing the importance of an integrated
approach in achieving durable and long-lasting peace, security and development. In
Dutch parliament a fierce debate followed about the framing of this mission: a
presumed contradiction between combat versus reconstruction. To gain a broad
support, in society and especially in parliament, it was felt utterly important to give
the mission a more civilian character, therefore NGOs had to be involved. With the
beginning of the mission Dutch NGOs were subsequently invited by the Dutch
government to complete the third D of development in Uruzgan. It was seen that
their development projects could contribute to the aim of the mission set at security,
stability and reconstruction and thus funding was made available for Dutch NGOs.
Five NGOs responded to this with the creation of the DCU. The DCU developed a
program focused on improving a number of basic provisions in the province of
67
Uruzgan. The Dutch government approved this program and funding was granted. By
accepting this funding, the DCU, partly, went along in the 3D approach and the
subsequent process of securitization. The Dutch government needed these NGOs to
start working in Uruzgan for the sake of a successful mission and so they did.
Wierema confirms this when he states that the policy priority of the Dutch
government and the resulting funding made it possible for Save the Children to work
in Uruzgan (Interview).
So the third D of development was partly outsourced to the DCU. Another part of
this D was formed by CIMIC projects conducted by the PRT. The PRT used these
CIMIC projects (such as building schools) to trigger quick impact and in this way win
‘the hearts and minds’ of the Afghan population. These projects were however
rejected on all fronts by the DCU member organizations that characterize these
projects as short-term, inefficient, non-sustainable and a waste of money. According
to van den Berg these projects were primarily aimed at gaining the support for the
Dutch military presence in Uruzgan (Interview). Cordaid and Healthnet TPO both
indicate that it is regrettable that there never was a better coordination between the
activities of the PRTs and NGOs (Interviews).
We can conclude that the Dutch NGOs were operating very autonomous in Uruzgan.
There was some interaction between the DCU member organizations and the Dutch
military. This interaction was particularly aimed at security issues and always took
place behind close doors in order to avoid the image of the DCU as an extension of
the Dutch mission. If they were perceived as an extension of ISAF this would
automatically make them a target for the Taliban. From this interaction we can draw
three concluding points.
The first point is that while the DCU was operating in Uruzgan they were free to
develop and implement their projects in a way they found appropriate according to
their own quality standards. There were no further substantive requirements
attached to the funding provided by the Dutch government. There was minimal
pressure on the DCU to work alongside the Dutch policy for Uruzgan. Also it was left
68
open to the NGO’s how to relate to military actors in the field. It was even accepted
if they did not want to relate to the military at all. This acceptance is reflected in the
ISAF evaluation by the Dutch government when they emphasize the independent
character of NGOs, their discretion and their need to keep a low profile (2001: 69).
The second concluding point is that there are still some fundamental differences in
the worldviews of NGOs and the military. It has often been argued by defense that
the NGOs as well as the military were having the same goals in Afghanistan. NGOs
firmly rejected this. The previous chapter notes a complete misunderstanding of the
different mandates of both parties by Defense and Foreign Affairs. These differences
are also evident in the poor coordination between the two actors, resulting in
several incidents and problems between them. As a tighter integration was not
desired, this could even work counterproductive, by the NGOs, it seems that a better
coordination could have contributed to the goals of both actors.
The third and final point is that the implications of military presence in a 3D
approach are two-fold. The presence of military actors results on the one hand in an
improved security situation and a greater availability of funding for NGOs. The
downside of this is that the presence of military actors can also work conflict
attracting. This resulted for Healthnet in a serious warning from their local staff to
leave the area because of the increasing security risks brought by the Dutch military.
Although the DCU members position themselves, and each other, against different
approaches developed by McHugh and Gostelow (2004) in practice it turns out that
there were no major differences between these DCU NGOs. None of these NGOs
chose to operationally cooperate with the military, corresponding with the fourth
option of McHugh and Gostelow. The first option of McHugh and Gostelow,
principled non-engagement, was also rejected by all of the DCU NGOs. The main and
shared reason for this was that the Afghan population would gain nothing by such a
principle stand. They all positioned themselves between the second approach of
arms-length interaction and the third approach of proactive, pragmatic engagement.
Information sharing was fine but only on safety issues and never on sensitive
69
information such as key-leader engagement. There were however some differences
in how some NGOs portray themselves in the Dutch media and how they were
operating in reality. Healthnet TPO took a very principled stance in the Dutch media
arguing that it would be better if the whole military apparatus would leave in
Uruzgan (Vrij Nederland 2009). In practice it turned out that they were more
pragmatic in their interaction with the military and they did accept funds related to
the mission by joining the DCU.
The first concluding point above shows us how there was almost no interference in
the work of NGOs by the Dutch government, although there are a few exceptions
both in Uruzgan as well as in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands the DCU
experienced some pressure of Dutch politics to shape their program along with the
Dutch policy for Uruzgan (Grotenhuis, Interview). Some members of parliament
were asking critical questions about the alleged waist of development funds in
Afghanistan and about the slow pace of the reconstruction project. Also in Uruzgan
the DCU was approached once by the Dutch embassy. At the request of the military
leadership in Uruzgan the embassy asked the DCU to start development projects in
strategic areas for the mission. The DCU turned this request down and this caused
no further problems (van Ruitenbeek, Interview). Also van de Put acknowledges that
his organization was approached several times. According to him these question(s),
asked by the PRT, originated from the hectic situation in Kamp Holland. “It was a
very operational question, there were more, in a reality that was from day to day
perceived by Foreign Affairs officers under great pressure of the military strategy”
(own translation, van de Put, Interview)
To conclude, the DCU and accompanying NGOs partially went along in the 3D
approach and the subsequent securitization of aid by the Dutch government as they
did except funds to achieve common goals in Uruzgan. Although the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs proclaimed that the results made by the DCU were results of the 3D
approach, none of the NGOs felt this way (van de Put, Interview). Off course there is
a clear relation between the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, the creation of the DCU and
the funding provided for these NGOs, however from the perspective of the DCU it
70
never became a subcontractor (van der Lijn 2015). An important note to make here
is that on a higher decision making level the maneuvering space of these NGOs
sharply decreased. As chapter 3 shows us, the majority of the structural funding for
NGOs has disappeared in the last decade. If NGOs want to maintain their capacity,
accumulated during the ‘NGO euphoria’, they have to find other sources of income.
Often this is done by signing in on tenders where the government determines
where, when, how and on what themes NGOs are going to work. One can argue that
if these NGOs wanted to maintain their projects in Uruzgan (Healthnet TPO and
Cordaid were already working in Uruzgan) this funding gave them a change to do so.
Off course no one pushed these NGOs to join to DCU. Nevertheless this is a clear
example of how the Dutch government is trying to increase its influence on NGO
policy and therefore is increasingly seeing these NGOs as an extension of
government policy. However, on a more operational level in Uruzgan, it turned out
that the NGO share in the third D of development was not tightly regulated and
stood separate from the other two Ds. It also turned out that there was not one 3D
approach as every organization could decide on its own interaction with military
actors.
Securitization of aid as it is operationalized in the 3D concept seems to be of
particular importance in Dutch policy-talks, where an image is created of integration
and close cooperation. In the day-to-day reality of the field however it appears that
there is a large room for maneuver and that there is hardly any coordination at all
between the different Ds. The 3D approach as a policy concept was miles away from
the everyday reality in Uruzgan. In practice, seen from an NGO perspective, there
were hardly any operational implications of the applied 3D approach and the
subsequent securitization of aid.
71
72
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Annex A – List of interviews
1. René Grotenhuis, director of Cordaid 2003 -2013. 02 April 2015, Utrecht
2. Paul van den Berg, policy advisor Cordaid 2007 – present. 22 April 2015, the
Hague
3. Willem van de Put, director of Healthnet 1998-present. 01 May 2015,
Amsterdam
4. Dick Berlijn, Chief of Defence 2004-2008. 19 May 2015, the Hague
5. Holke Wierema, director of Save the Children NL 2002-2014. 26 May 2015,
Voorschoten
6. Bert van Ruitenbeek, DCU coordinator 2009-2013. 08 June 2015, over email
7. Hans van Griensven, commander of the TFU January-August 2007. 26 June
2015, over email
8. Wilfred Rietdijk, commander of the PRT 2008. 09 July 2015, over Skype
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Annex B – Example of a topic list for NGO staff

Introduction thesis topic

General information about the organization and their projects, especially in
Afghanistan

Changes in projects with the start of the mission

Experiences with the DCU, how did the organization experienced the
cooperation within the DCU

Funding of the DCU, requirements?

DCU and military actors, how did they relate? Was there a policy?

Framework McHugh and Gostelow: interpretation of these policy options,
advantages and disadvantages of these approaches, positioning. How, why,
when?

Description of the interaction with military actors. Encountered difficulties?
Positive aspects?

Approach changed through time?

Approach chosen affected the work of the organization?

Approach reflected in design, implementation, and evaluation of projects?

Humanitarian space in relation to interaction with military actors

Coordination between NGOs, Defence and Foreign Affairs

What about CIMIC?

Pressures from the other two Ds?

Feelings of integration?
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Annex C – Example of a topic list for military staff

Introduction thesis topic, emphasize militarization instead over securitization

General information about functions and tasks of person interviewed

Concrete cooperation with NGOs in the field. Development through time

Experiences with cooperation with NGOs. Discussions, difficulties etc.?

Expected contribution of NGOs to the mission, added value of NGOs?

Defence could meet the expectations of NGOs and the other way around?
Different goals, different worlds

Reflections on 3D in general

Critics of NGOs on CIMIC

Understanding of doubts of NGOs?

Feelings of integration?
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