The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
by Marc Finaud, Faculty Member, GCSP
Security Policy Training Course
Diplomatic Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria
2 March, 2005
1
Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Definitions
The Non-Proliferation Regime
WMD Arsenals and Programs
The Terrorist Risk
Current Trends
Acronyms
Sources
2
1. DEFINITIONS
No generic definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), only
enumeration in UN documents (since 1948 Report of the UN
Commission on Conventional Armaments) and each weapon
defined in relevant treaties:
•
•
•
•
•
Atomic/Nuclear Weapons (NW)
Bacteriological/Biological Weapons (BW)
Chemical Weapons (CW)
 ABC/NBC
Radiological Weapons (RW)
 BCRN
3
1. DEFINITIONS (cont’d)
A) Nuclear Weapons
Device with explosive energy, derived mainly
from:
- fission (splitting the nucleus of an atom,
usually highly enriched uranium or plutonium,
releasing energy and additional neutrons that
bombard nuclei and sustain a chain reaction),
or
- a combination of fission and fusion
processes (a fission explosion creates the
high temperatures necessary to join light
isotopes of hydrogen, usually deuterium and
tritium, which similarly liberate energy and
neutrons),
Causing catastrophic damage due to high
temperatures and ground shocks produced
by the initial blast and the lasting residual
radiation.
Fission bombs (Hiroshima-Nagasaki) are the
easiest to make and provide the catalyst for
more complex thermonuclear explosions.
Most modern nuclear weapons use a
combination of the two processes, called
boosting, to maintain high yields in smaller
bombs.
4
1. DEFINITIONS (Cont’d)
B) Bacteriological/Biological Weapons
Intentional dissemination of infectious diseases and conditions
that would otherwise appear only naturally or not at all,
Using as agents:
- bacteria (such as anthrax),
- viruses (such as smallpox),
- rickettsiae (such as Q fever),
- chlamydia,
- fungi,
- and toxins (such as ricin).
Using as criteria: infectivity, virulence, toxicity, pathogenicity,
incubation period, transmissibility, lethality, and stability.
Using natural replication of living organisms after dissemination
to increase potential impact. Any country possessing a
pharmaceutical or food storage infrastructure already has an
inherent stabilization and storage system for biological agents.
Aerosol delivery is optimal, while explosive delivery is also
effective, but to a lesser extent owing to the possibility for
organism inactivation because of heat from the blast.
5
1. DEFINITIONS (Cont’d)
C) Chemical Weapons
use toxic properties, not explosive properties,
of chemical substances to produce physical or
physiological effects on an enemy;
use as agents:
- chlorine and phosgene (World War I) to cause
respiratory damage and asphyxiation,
- blistering agents as mustard gas and lewisite
(Iran–Iraq War), to cause painful burns and
resource-debilitating casualties,
- nerve gases, or anti-cholinesterase agents to
cause a loss of muscle control, respiratory
failure, and eventually death; effective
when inhaled or absorbed through the skin;
classified as:
* G-agents (sarin),
* V-agents (VX),
- mental and physical incapacitants (such as BZ)
- binary systems (toxic when mixed);
delivered through bombs, rockets, artillery
shells, spray tanks, and missile warheads, using
an explosion to expel an internal agent laterally.
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1. DEFINITIONS (Cont’d)
D) Radiological Weapons
Use conventional explosives such as dynamite
and C–4 to disperse radioactive materials
(pellets, powder or gas) over large areas;
Apart from explosion, victims would receive lifethreatening levels of radiation exposure;
radiation would make rescue operations difficult
and contaminate large areas for years;
A source of radioactive material, such as a
nuclear reactor or spent-fuel storage depots,
could be targeted with large explosive devices to
disperse very high levels of radioactivity into the
atmosphere and the surrounding area.
7
2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
A - International Agreements
B – Export Control Regimes
C – Other Initiatives
8
a)
2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
A) International Agreements
Nuclear Weapons
Bilateral Treaties:
•
USA-USSR/RF: 1972 ABM, 1972 SALT-I, 1974 TTBT, 1976 PNET, 1979
SALT-II, 1987 INF, 1991 START-I, 1992 Agreement on Destruction &
Non-Proliferation of NW, 1993 START II, 1997-98 START-III, 2002
SORT.
•
India-Pakistan: 1999 Lahore Declaration and MOU; 2004 Talks
(moratorium on nuclear tests; prior notification of flight tests; nondeployment of nuclear capable ballistic missiles; moratorium on ABM
systems, CBMs; discussion on nuclear doctrines).
•
Brazil-Argentine: 1980 Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear
Energy, 1985 Joint Declarations on Nuclear Policy, 1990 Declaration on
Common Nuclear Policy, 1991 Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful
Use of Nuclear Energy, 1991 Agreement with IAEA.
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements/
a) Nuclear Weapons (Cont’d)
Multilateral Treaties
•
1959 (EIF 1961) Antarctic Treaty: bans any military activity, incl. nuclear
tests. 45 ratifications.
•
1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty : bans all nuclear tests except underground and
assistance to other states’ testing. 124 ratifications.
•
1967 Outer Space Treaty: bans placing any WMD in earth orbit, stationing
WMD in OS or on any celestial body. 98 ratifications.
•
1968 (EIF 1970) Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT): states having
tested NW before 1967 agree not to transfer them, to cooperate with all on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and negotiate on nuclear disarmament;
states without NW agree not to acquire them and conclude safeguards
agreement with IAEA. 189 ratifications (not India, Pakistan, Israel).
•
1971 (EIF 1972) Seabed Treaty: bans deployment and testing of any WMD
on the seabed & ocean floor beyond territorial waters. 92 ratifications.
•
1979 (EIF 1984) Moon Treaty: bans positioning of WMD on Moon, its orbit
and other celestial bodies. 11 ratifications.
•
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): bans all nuclear tests.
Verification regime (CTBTO). 120 ratifications (not USA, China, India,
Pakistan, Israel, Iran, required for EIF).
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements/
a) Nuclear Weapons (Cont’d)
Regional Agreements (Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones)
•
1967 Tlatelolco (Latin America): 33 ratifications + 5 NWS Party to Protocols
•
1985 (EIF 1986) Rarotonga (Pacific): 13 ratifications + 4 NWS Party to
Protocols (US not ratified)
•
1995 (EIF 1997) Bangkok (South East Asia): 10 ratifications. No Protocols.
•
1996 Pelindaba (Africa): 19 ratifications (28 required for EIF) + 3 NWS Party
to Protocols (USA & Russia not ratified).
•
2002 Central Asia: not yet signed, awaiting NWS endorsement.
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12
2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements
(Cont’d)
b) Bacteriological/Biological Weapons
•
1925 (EIF 1928) Geneva Protocol: bans the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. Not
prohibited : use in internal conflicts, threat of use, production, R&D… 133
ratifications with many reservations (not applicable if other states breach).
•
1972 (EIF 1975) BW Convention: bans development, production,
stockpiling, acquisition & transfer of microbial or other biological agents or
toxins and weapons for use of such agents & toxins for hostile purposes or
in armed conflict. Destruction of existing stockpiles. Applies only to types
and quantities not justified for peaceful purposes. No verification
provisions. 152 ratifications. CBMs agreed. Verification Protocol negotiated
but rejected by USA in 2001.
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•
•
•
2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
A) International Agreements (Cont’d)
c) Chemical Weapons
1925 (EIF 1928) Geneva Protocol: bans the use in
war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and
bacteriological methods of warfare. Not prohibited :
use in internal conflicts, threat of use, production,
R&D… 133 ratifications with many reservations (not
applicable if other states breach).
1990 USA/USSR Agreement on CW: stopping of
production, reduction of stockpiles (500 t allowed),
cooperation in destruction, support for a multilateral
ban.
1993 (EIF 1997) Paris Convention on CWC: bans
development, production, stockpiling, acquisition,
use & transfer of toxic chemicals & precursors for
non-peaceful purposes as well as any equipment for
such activities. Destruction of stockpiles & facilities.
Intrusive verification system (OPCW). Cooperation
for peaceful uses. 167 ratifications.
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements
(Cont’d)
d) Radiological Weapons
•
1988 India-Pakistan Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear
Installations and Facilities.
•
1979-1990 Unsuccessful Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) on a Treaty banning the spread of radioactive materials other than
from a nuclear explosion, for hostile purposes.
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME (Cont’d)
B) Export Control Regimes
a) Nuclear Weapons
•
The Zangger (or NPT Exporters) Committee: created 1971
(West+WP)=> 1974 Guidelines (“trigger-lists” of equipments
requiring IAEA safeguards). 35 members (incl. Russia, China).
•
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): 1974 “London Club” (incl.
France)=> 1976 London Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (inc.
technology). Revised 1992 to include dual-use transfers & requiring
full-scope safeguards. “Restraint” of export of sensitive technologies
(uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, heavy water
production). Requirement of physical security. No re-transfer.
National enforcement & consultations. 44 members (incl. Russia,
China).
•
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms & Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: created 1996 to replace
COCOM. Guidelines, information exchanges on “countries of
concern”. 33 members (NATO + Russia, Argentine, S. Korea).
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
B) Export Control Regimes (Cont’d)
b) Chemical Weapons
•
The Australia Group: created 1984 to regulate
export of 8 dual-use chemical precursors; 1991
“Warning List” includes 54 materials (chemicals,
pathogens and toxins, dual-use equipment), shared
with industry and scientific community. Coordination
of national export controls and information sharing
on suspicious activities. 38 States members + EU
Commission.
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
B) Export Control Regimes (Cont’d)
c) Biological Weapons
• The Australia Group (AG): 1991 “Warning List”
includes 54 materials (chemicals, pathogens and
toxins, dual-use equipment), shared with industry
and scientific community. Coordination of national
export controls and information sharing on
suspicious activities. 38 States members + EU.
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
B) Export Control Regimes (Cont’d)
d) Missiles
•
•
The Missile Technology Control Regime: created 1987 (G7) =>
Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers: export of
equipment & technology of systems capable of delivering NW
(300km-range, 500kg-payload); 1992 extended to BW & CW
whatever range & payload. Cat. I: denial; Cat. II: case-by-case.
Lists of “projects of concern”. Denial by one member reinforced
by others (“no undercut rule”). 33 members (incl. NATO +
former WP) + unilateral “adherents” (incl. Israel, China?).
The International Code of Conduct (ICOC) or The Hague Code
of Conduct (HCOC): adopted 2002. Politically-binding
document for restraint in development, testing, use and spread
of ballistic missiles. Increases transparency and introduces
confidence-building measures (annual reporting on missile
programmes, notification of ballistic missile and space
launches). 111 subscribers (not China, India, Pakistan, Iran,
Israel, N.Korea).
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2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME
C) Other Initiatives
•
UN Security Council 1992 Declaration (“Proliferation of WMD is a threat to int’l
peace & security”). 2004 Resolution 1540 (terrorist risk, strengthening of
national legislation, cooperation).
•
The Global Control System (GCS): 2000 Russian initiative (transparency of
missile launches, incentives for renouncing ICBMs and access to SLVs). 71
participants (incl. N.Korea). No meeting since 2001.
•
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): US initiative before 2003 G8 Evian
Summit, joined by 11 members, supported by some 60. Aims at deterring
shipments of WMD-related and dual-use equipment or materials to countries
and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Sept. 2003 Paris Principles of
Interdiction, in conformity with int’l law. Exchange of information, joint exercises.
Several shipments intercepted (to Libya, N.Korea).
•
EU3 (D-F-UK)/Iran: negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program.
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3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS
A)
Nuclear Weapons
5 “official” NWS according to NPT (estimates)
TOTAL
Country
Strategic
Weapons
Non-Strategic
Weapons
Total Weapons
United
Kingdom
180
5
185
France
350
China
250
120
400
United States
8,646
2,010
10,656
Russia
~ 6,000
~ 4,000
~10,000
350
~ 21,591
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3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS
A) Nuclear Weapons (Cont’d)
4 “non-official” NWS according to NPT (estimates)
TOTAL
Country
Strategic Weapons
Non-Strategic
Weapons
Total Weapons
North Korea
3-5
?
3-5
India
60
?
60
Pakistan
28-48
?
28-48
Israel
100-200
?
100-200
291-313
23
•
3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Cont’d) B) Biological Weapons
Country
Program
Party to BWC
Algeria
Research effort, but no evidence of production
No
China
Likely maintains offensive program
Yes
Cuba
Probable Research Program
Yes
Egypt
Likely maintains offensive program
No
India
Research program but no evidence of production
Yes
Iran
Likely maintains offensive program
Yes
Israel
Research with possible production of agents
No
N. Korea
Research with possible production of agents
Yes
Pakistan
Possible
Yes
Russia
Research, some work beyond legitimate defence
activities likely
Yes
Sudan
Possible research program
No
Syria
Research, with possible production of agents
No
Taiwan
Possible research program
Yes
Vietnam
Possible research program
Yes
24
25
3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Cont’d)
C) Chemical Weapons
As of 2004, there were 167 member states of the OPCW of which:
• 6 declared stockpiles: the United States, Russia, India, Albania, Libya, and “one
(not made public) State Party", possibly South Korea.
• Iraq's chemical weapons were destroyed under a UN program.
• 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities (Bosnia and Herzegovina,
China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Libya, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, United
Kingdom, United States and possibly South Korea). By the end of 2004, 47 of 64
declared facilities had been destroyed or converted to civilian uses.
• The total world declared stockpile of chemical weapons was about 61,325 tons in
2004. At total of 71,373 tons have been declared to OPCW of which about 10,048
tons had been destroyed.
• Several countries not members are suspected of having chemical weapons,
(Israel, Egypt, Syria, North Korea) or programs (Pakistan, Myanmar, Taiwan,
Vietnam).
• Some member states (including Sudan and China) have been accused of failing to
disclose their stockpiles or are suspected of conducting programs (Algeria, Cuba,
Ethiopia).
26
27
•
All declared chemical weapons production capacity has been inactivated.
Two-thirds of the declared chemical weapons production facilities have been
either verifiably destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes. The remainder of
the facilities await their destruction or conversion.
164 Member States, representing more than 95 percent of the global
population, have joined the OPCW.
All declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been inventoried and
verified.
Almost 25 percent of the declared 8 million chemical weapons, in the form of
munitions, have been verifiably destroyed.
Over 13% of the 70,000 metric tonnes of declared chemical weapons agent
have been verifiably destroyed.
More than 1,800 inspections have been conducted at military and industrial
sites of 65 State Parties.
Over 4,000 industrial facilities are inspectable worldwide
.
•
•
•
•
•
•
28
•
3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Cont’d)
•
C) Missiles
29
30
31
Country
Nuclear
Biological
Chemical
Russia
W
W
W*
United States
W
China
W
W
W
Israel
W
W
W
France
W
United Kingdom
W
India
W
R
W
Pakistan
W
R
R
North Korea
W?
W
W
R
W
W
Egypt
W
W
Syria
R
W
Libya
R
W
Sudan
R
R
Iran
W*
W = Weapons or agents (known or suspected)
R = Research program (known or suspected)
* = Awaiting destruction
32
4. THE TERRORIST RISK
A)
Nuclear Weapons
Low likelihood of use of nuclear explosive device by terrorist group (uneasy
to obtain, divert or manufacture, expensive, uneasy to deliver, easy to
detect). But even low risk could lead to massive casualties and damage.
More probable: use of radioactive materials (radiological weapon) or attack
on nuclear facility. Even if casualties and damage limited, high risk of
terror, panic, disruption of economic life.
33
•
•
Nuclear Materials Trafficking
IAEA Data Base (since 1 Jan. 1993):
182 incidents involving nuclear material,
335 incidents involving other radioactive material
34
4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Cont’d)
B) Biological Weapons
•
•
Terrorist attempts to acquire biological agents have fallen short of
successful weaponization.
Only two significant biological attacks by terrorists :
– Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo tried to produce and weaponize
botulinum toxin and anthrax. The group’s extensive efforts failed, and
the cult resorted to using the chemical agent sarin for attacks in a
Tokyo subway in 1994 and 1995.
– First successful terrorist incident in 1984 in Dalles, Oregon, when a
religious cult, Rajneesh, disseminated salmonella bacteria in ten
restaurants, infecting 750 people, but with no fatalities.
– In October 2001, letters containing anthrax sent to members of US
Congress and the media, which killed 5 and infected 18 others. This
limited attack caused mass disruption and cost billions of dollars in
decontamination and prevention expenses.
35
4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Cont’d)
C) Chemical Weapons
Five levels of risk for terrorist use:
– Threatened use, with no real capability (many cases of “hoaxes”)
– Unsuccessful attempts to acquire CW (1970’s: Weathermen, Animal Liberation
Front, Neo-Nazi groups)
– Actual possession of CW (1980’s: Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord group,
various Palestinian groups)
– Unsuccessful attempts to use CW (Ricin found in London?)
– The successful use of CW (1990’s: Aum Shinrikyo sarin attacks in Tokyo)
• Advantages
– Inexpensive
– Easy availability
– Long “shelf life”
– High level of control and containment
– Effect (death or disability) is immediate
– Destroys infrastructure
– Low risk of detection
– Lack of a “signature” allows anonymity
36
4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Cont’d)
Required quantities for lethal effect
Weapon
Aerial explosives
Fragmentation cluster bombs
Hydrocyanic acid
Mustard gas
Sarin nerve gas
Radiological weapon
Type A botulinal toxin
Anthrax spores
Grams
320 million
32 million
32 million
3.2 million
800,000
5,000
80
8
Attack on a water supply
Potassium cyanide
Nerve agent VX
Typhoid culture
18,000
100
1
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5. CURRENT TRENDS
A) Nuclear Proliferation
•
•
•
•
Less opposition West/Third World: 1992
UNSC Declaration + Resolution 1540 =>
legitimacy of non-proliferation.
Decline in arsenals of NWS (end to
“vertical proliferation”?). Issue of qualitative
developments (US “mini-nuke”) and
fragility of testing moratoria without CTBT.
Risks related to regional conflicts (Middle
East, South Asia, Korean Peninsula) =>
incentive for renewed efforts to address
them.
Risks related to non-state actors (nuclear
trafficking) and commercial/criminal
networks (Abdul Kadeer Khan)
38
5. CURRENT TRENDS
B) Biological Proliferation
• Difficult to get complete picture of countries or groups with biological
weapons or programs. Official assessments rarely distinguish
between suspected, capability, developing, and weapon. States with
such capabilities or programs often lumped together in lists with
countries with CW programs or capabilities.
• Attempts to negotiate intrusive verification protocol to the BWC
failed (US does not deem it effective, protects biotech industry) =>
voluntary transparency & cooperation measures, CBMs + stricter
export control regime may raise cost of proliferation but not totally
prevent it.
39
5. CURRENT TRENDS
C) Chemical Proliferation
•
OPCW is efficient but:
– destruction deadlines (2007) will not be met (Russia),
– challenge inspections not used yet: risk of loosing legitimacy.
•
Still programs of concern:
– by OPCW members (Iran, India, China, Sudan, Pakistan)
– by non-OPCW members (North Korea, Israel, Syria, Egypt)
– Russia: issue of “novichoks” (circumvention of CWC?)
40
5. CURRENT TRENDS
D) Missile Proliferation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Decreasing ICBM (>5,500 km-range) arsenals: 1987 USSR: 9,378 warheads on 2,380
ICBMs => 2002 Russia 5,000 warheads on 1,022 missiles (- 57 percent less missiles capable
of striking continental USA).
IRBM (3,000-5,500km-range) arsenals largely eliminated: INF Treaty scrapped from USRussian arsenals. France deactivated and destroyed its 18 land-based and 32 submarinebased IRBMs, while China retains some 20 IRBMs. If North Korea launched its Taepo Dong
II, it would add a few missiles to this category.
More MRBM (1,000-3,000 km-range) programs: also eliminated for US & RF (INF). But
China has 80–100 MRBMs. North Korea tested its Taepo Dong I (1,320-km) and deployed No
Dong (1,300-km ). Iran tested Shahab III (1,300-km). Israel deployed 50 Jericho II (1,500km). India produces Agni II (2,000-km) and works on Agni III (3,500-km). Pakistan tested
Ghauri (1,300-km) and Ghauri II (2,000-km).
Aging SCUD inventories: short-range Scuds from USSR in decline. North Korea now
primary supplier of Scud-type missiles.
Fewer, poorer programs: number of countries developing long-range ballistic missiles
reduced. Also smaller, poorer, and less technologically advanced countries.
US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence: controversial, expensive, probably ineffective, risk of
pushing China to develop ICBMs quantitatively & qualitatively.
Proliferation of MANPADs (man-portable air defence systems): threat to civil aviation from
non-state actors.
41
Reported non-state use of MANPADs: 1999-2001
Date
NonState
Group
Missile
Type
Killed/
Injured
Aircraft
Notes
23 Oct 00
LTTE
Stinger
4/0
Mi-24 'Hind'
Shot down (Trincomalee).
04 Oct 00
Chechen
rebels
Stinger
1/0
Su-24MR
Shot down (Urus-Martan)
04 Oct 00
Chechen
rebels
Stinger
Unknown
Su-25
Shot down on reconnaissance
10 Aug 00
LTTE
Unknown
0/0
Fighter
aircraft
Govt aircraft fired at. No damage.
25-30 Aug
00
Chechen
rebels
SA-7
0/0
Unreported
Federal helicopters fired on. All
missiles miss.
07 May 00
Chechen
rebels
Unknown
2/0
Su-24MR
Shot down (Southern Chechnya)
31 Mar 00
LTTE
Unknown
40/0
An-26
Transport craft downed
10 Nov 99
FARC
Unreport
ed
5/0
DC-3
FARC mistakenly downs civilian
craft
04 Apr 99
Hizbullah
SA-7
0/0
F-16s
2 missiles fired on IsraelF-16s.
Both miss.
06 Mar 99
PKK
Unknown
20/0
Puma
helicopter
Helicopter shot down (Southern
Turkey)
02 Jan 99
UNITA
Unknown
14/0
C-130
UN plane shot down (Central
Angola)
42
7. SOURCES
•
•
•
•
John Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002
Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, Peace
Research Institute, Oslo, 2001
www.opcw.org
www.iaea.org
http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/database/nukestab.html
•
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agni.asp
•
•
http://www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/products/ahec_chem/ppt/17
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir021128_1_n.shtml
•
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6. ACRONYMS
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ABC
Atomic, Biological, Chemical
ABM
Anti-Ballistic Missile
BCRN
Biological Chemical Radiological Nuclear (Defence)
BW
Biological Weapon
BWC
Biological Weapons Convention
CBM
Confidence-Building Measure
CD
Conference on Disarmament
COCOM
Coordination Committee
CTBT
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation
CW
Chemical Weapon
CWC
Chemical Weapons Convention
EIF
Entry into Force
EU
European Union
GCS
Global Control System
HCOC
The Hague Code of Conduct
HEU
Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICOC
International Code of Conduct
IRBM
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
LEU
Low Enriched Uranium
44
6. ACRONYMS (Cont’d)
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MANPADS
MOU
MRBM
MTCR
NATO
NBC
NPT
NW
NWS
OPCW
OS
PNET
PSI
RF
SALT
SLV
SORT
START
TTBT
UN
UNSC
WMD
WP
Man-Portable Air Defence System
Memorandum of Understanding
Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
Missile Technology Control Regime
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
Nuclear, Biological Chemical
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Nuclear Weapon
Nuclear Weapon State
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Outer Space
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty
Proliferation Security Initiative
Russian Federation
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Space Launch Vehicle
Strategic Offensive Reductions Talks
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks
Threshold Test Ban Treaty
United Nations
United Nations Security Council
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Warsaw Pact
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