“Proving” or “Disproving”
Theories
Theory as methodology
Relation of theory to data:
 A theory
can neither be “proved” nor
“disproved” by data alone.
 It
is one of the commonest errors of
undergraduate research to suppose they
can.
 Yet the relation of theories to data is central
to any empirical science.
Lieberson on Einstein, again
When there is a case, like that of the “proof”
of general relativity and the “disproof” of
Euclidian space, that implies:
 The auxiliary assumptions by which one gets
from basic principles to observed measures
are widely accepted.
 Lieberson was arguing that me need to spend
more time and attention on middle range
theories and measurements.

Theories cannot be proved true

The fact that a theory predicts correctly does
not show that the theory is true
 because there are always indefinitely many
alternate theories for any particular empirical
finding or body of facts.
 This is true both of very general theories and of
very specific hypotheses.
 It is a well-known empirical fallacy to argue: “A
implies B; B is true; therefore A is true.” “If all
humans are female, then Mary Queen of Scots
was female; she was; therefore, all humans are
female.”
 A theory course must make one better able to
think of alternate theories for any finding.
Falsificationism: Karl Popper

Popper stressed the fact that if a theory
predicts falsely, this does imply that the
theory, as formulated, is false.
 Finding a single black swan shows that it is
not true that “All swans are white.”
 Popper argued that good theories are those
that make many predictions which could have
been false but which turned out not to be.
 This position is called falsificationism, and is
accepted, with modifications, by many
sociologists, such as A. Stinchcombe.
The point of falsificationism
Popper’s real targets were Marx and Freud.
 He thought that conceptions such as the
“unconscious” or “latent class struggle” were
dishonest ways of avoiding real tests of the
theories,
 Which were overly flexible, and could be
made consistent with any observations,
whatever.
 He argued for simpler theories that generated
hypotheses that could be directly tested.

Why theories cannot be
disproved, either

The central problem of falsificationism was pointed
out by one of Popper’s students, Lakatos:
 The fact that a theory has predicted incorrectly
shows that there is some kind of problem with the
theory or with the assumptions used to apply it,
 But it does not show what the problem is.

Only with indefinitely many auxiliary assumptions is any
particular data consistent or inconsistent with any particular
theory.
An example: the discoveries
of Uranus and Pluto

For Popper, the discoveries of the outer
planets, not visible to the naked eye, were
among the great triumphs of Newtonian
mechanics.
 The theory was specific enough, so that when
the know planets orbits were not as
predicted, it was possible to calculate where
additional planets would have to be to disturb
the orbits in the ways, observed.
 But note that Newtonian theory was not
rejected, but fixed.
Dealing with an “Anomaly”

When a theory predicts incorrectly, in a way we
do not understand, that is called an anomaly.
 One solution to the anomaly of Neptune’s orbit
was an additional planet, which was found,
 But many other solutions were possible: a dust
cloud, a magnetic field, a dark body, an optical
problem, and scientists would never have
rejected Newtonian mechanics without a superior
theory, nor should they.
 Theories only make predictions with “auxiliary
assumptions” and if one can make these
arbitrarily, then any theory can be made
consistent with any data.
Dealing with anomalies

Whenever you apply a theory to data you
make auxiliary assumptions,
 and the auxiliary assumptions may be
nonproblematical in any particular case.
 Anomalies have been part of many scientific
revolutions, such as Einstein’s.
 Deciding how to respond to an anomaly is a
theoretical judgment.
 Usually one makes the simplest, most modest
and most economical corrections available
(e.g. measurement assumptions.)
The main paradigms in
sociology


1.
2.
P. 267-276 of OW shows that the different
maps of the main theoretical positions in
sociology can be translated into each other.
They boil down to two dimensions: functional
v conflict and micro v macro. However:
The 20-odd different sections of sociology
such as medical sociology contain
importantly different theoretical positions.
Any way of dividing the 20,000 or so
practicing sociologists into a small number of
“schools” is bound to simplify
The main map
Functional
macro-theory
e.g. Durkheim,
Parsons
Organizational- Conflict macromacro-theory
theory
e.g. Weber’s
e.g. Marx
rationalization
Functional
microtheory
e.g. some
aspects of
Merton
Interactionist
micro-theory
e.g. Mead
Conflict microtheory
e.g. Mills
Functional theory

Functional theorists mainly treat society as a
stable solidary system.
 Durkheim is the classical example.
 Parsons’ view of social structure as a selfmaintaining normatively integrated system is
the main contemporary example.
 There are functional approaches and theories
in every section and sub field of sociology
Conflict theory
 Other
theorists mainly treat society as a
competitive system.
 Marx’ view of modes of production and
exploitation as replacing each other by a
process of class conflict is the classic
example
 Mills, Feagin, Massey, and Reskin are
contemporary examples.
Organization theories as a Mix
 The
interactionist/organization theories
stemming from Weber, Mead, and
others, can be viewed as an ambivalent
synthesis of elements of conflict and
functional theory.
 Often the elements that distinguish
them from functional or conflict theory
appear at the micro level.
Micro-theory v Macro-theory

Micro-theories mainly treat social structure as
the outcome of individual choices and actions.
 Parsons took Weber’s action theory as the main
model.
 Other American sociologists took George
Herbert Mead’s interactionism as a model.
 The main difference between rational-action
theories stemming from Weber and symbolic
interaction theories, stemming from Mead is the
nature of the tinker-toy, but they are both tinkertoy models.
Macro-theory
 Macro-theories
focus on the fact that
humans and human behavior is shaped
by the social structure.
 This leads to concentrating on how
social structures influence their
members and other social structures.
Theory simplifies to the
“essential”

It is trivially true that both:


and also that:


functional and conflict processes operate
individuals create social structures and social
structures shape individuals.
However, it is also trivially obvious that any
theory must simplify, and that models that
include everything are usually too complex to
use or test.
Theory and research
I) model specification
 The
first set of jobs that “theory” does is
called “model specification”
 One can only test a hypothesis if one
can make assumptions about what
variables are involved and what is their
causal order.
 These follow from general theoretical
considerations; often they are adopted
from the existing strand of research.
Theory and research
II) Domain Specification
 A theory
is a claim.
 Usually it applies to some set of cases
more limited than all social structures in
all of recorded history.
 Theory involves establishing the domain
of the theory.
 Statistical interactions are the main
clues about domains
Theory and research
III) Generalization
 Particular
findings, empirical
generalizations, and hypotheses (e.g.
Protestants have higher suicide rates)
need to be related to more general
processes.
 Conceptualization (e.g. “deviance”
rather than “crime” or “suicide”) is partly
a matter of generalizing.
Theory and research
IV) Explanation
 The
conceptualization, and the
establishment of the conditions and size
of the effects is basic to establishing
what is the mechanism that brings it
about.
 The main paradigms propose
mechanisms.
Theory and research
 Research
establishes that there is an
association.
 Theoretical questions involve Why?
How? and When?
 I.e. what direction does the causal
arrow run in, under what circumstances,
why and how?