Brant J. Stogner
Board Certified - Personal Injury Trial Law
Presents:
PRESENTING, RECOVERING &
CHALLENGING PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES
By: Brant Stogner & Joshua Hilbe
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF PLAINTIFF’S MEDICAL EXPENSES
I. The Era Prior to “Paid or Incurred”
A History Lesson

If a Plaintiff received a favorable verdict for
personal injury damages, he or she would submit:
Affidavits and medical billing records of
providers (or live testimony);
 “Reasonable and Necessary” standard.


Third party payments on behalf of the Plaintiff was
not an issue and not admissible at trial.

If the Plaintiff prevailed, he or she was entitled to
recover up to the full amount of the medical charges
no matter what his or her insurance company paid.
.
What if a Third Party Paid for the
Plaintiff’s Medical Expenses?

Under prior law, the fact that a plaintiff’s
insurance paid for the charges would be
inadmissible in the trial.

Additionally, the amount that was paid to
satisfy the past medical expenses would also be
inadmissible.

Both would violate the Collateral Source Rule.
.
The Collateral Source Rule


“The collateral source rule is both a rule of
evidence and damages. Generally, it
precludes a tortfeasor from obtaining the
benefit of, or even mentioning, payments to
the injured party from sources other than the
tortfeasor. In other words, the defendant is
not entitled to present evidence of, or obtain
an offset for, funds received by the plaintiff
from a collateral source.”
Taylor v. Am. Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
denied).
.
The Collateral Source Rule
Governmental
Assistance
Plaintiff
Worker’s
Compensation
Healthcare Provider
Medicare
Private
Insurance
.
Recovery v. Evidence


Because the Collateral Source Rule has
traditionally been both a rule of recovery
and evidence, the defendant may NOT
introduce evidence at trial of collateral
sources of compensation for a plaintiff’s
injuries.
“As a rule of evidence, the collateral source
rule has excluded such things as evidence
of payments and downward adjustments
in accordance with Medicare guidelines.”

Haygood v. De Escabedo, 2011 WL 2601363 (Tex.) at *8 (Medina, J., Dissenting)
.
How Long Have We Had the
Collateral Source Rule ?

Texas – Since the 1800s
 Tex.
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Levi & Bro.,
59 Tex. 674, 676 (1883)

This is deeply rooted in Texas jurisprudence.

Texas Governor John Ireland
.
How Does Insurance Affect Trial?

It is generally considered error for
insurance coverage of either party to be
mentioned by the other party during trial
of a personal injury cause of action; if
insurance is mentioned, the trial court may
either order a mistrial or instruct the jury
not to consider the improper statement.
 See,
e.g., TEX. R. EVID. 411; Tex. R. Civ. P.
226a(II)9; Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309
(Tex. 1962)
.
How Does Insurance Affect Trial?

This rule applies not only to evidence of a
defendant’s liability insurance, but also
whether the plaintiff has applicable health
insurance coverage.
 See,
e.g., Myers v. Thomas, 186 S.W.2d 811, 813
(Tex. 1945)

This has been referred to as the “balance in
trial evidence.”
.
Policy for the Collateral Source Rule

“The theory behind the collateral source rule is that
a wrongdoer should not have the benefit of
insurance independently procured by the injured
party, and to which the wrongdoer was not privy.”


Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex.
1980)
“A benefit that is directed to the injured party
should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for
the tortfeasor.”

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b
.
Policy for the Collateral Source Rule




In other words, the windfall, if any, should
not go the tortfeasor.
If the injured party was prudent enough to
obtain health insurance – the injured party
should get that benefit, if any.
The injured party paid premiums to obtain
this benefit.
As a society, we want to encourage the
citizens to procure insurance to cover
medical expenses.
.
The Result – Prior to §41.0105


Thus, prior to the paid or incurred statute, a
plaintiff could:

Provide evidence of his or her total past medical
expenses incurred; AND

Recover up to the full amount of those incurred
expenses despite how much was actually paid by
plaintiff or on plaintiff’s behalf by a third party.
Standard was “Reasonable and Necessary.”
.
II.
“Paid or Incurred”
Tort Reform

June 11, 2003 Governor Rick Perry signs HB 4.

HB 4 was an omnibus tort reform bill that was
originally aimed at capping non-economic
damages that could be recovered from doctors
and hospitals.

Included in HB 4 was the new “paid or
incurred” statute.

CPRC §41.0105
.
CPRC § 41.0105
Evidence Relating to Amount of Economic
Damages:
 “In addition to any other limitation under
law, recovery of medical or health care
expenses incurred is limited to the amount
actually paid or incurred by or on behalf of
the claimant.”
.
Why Did it Matter ?

The new “paid or incurred” language
created much controversy as to its meaning.

It was no longer clear what damages a
plaintiff could recover for past medical
expenses based on the language of the
statute.

Statute did not mention anything related to
presentation of evidence – just “recovery.”
.
Consider an Example

Plaintiff John Doe had a total of $100,000.00
in past medical expenses incurred;

John Doe’s insurance company paid
$50,000.00 at a reduced rate to satisfy his
charges in full with no remaining balance.
.
Consider an Example

Under the old law, John Doe could:
Put on evidence of the full $100,000.00 in medical
expenses that he was charged; AND
 Recover up to the full $100,000.00.


Both of these were allowed, despite the third
party payment, pursuant to the long-standing
Collateral Source Rule.

The tortfeasor did not get to reduce his or her
liability due to John Doe’s payment of
insurance premiums.
.
Interpretation Issue
Under § 41.0105, no one knew
how to apply the “paid or
incurred” language to either
admissible evidence or recovery.
.
Defendant’s Interpretation

Aggressive defendants argued that this statute
only allows John Doe the ability to present
evidence of past medical expenses of
$50,000.00 – the amount that was actually paid,
despite $100,000.00 being incurred.

Additionally, defendants argued that John
Doe’s recovery as to his past medical expenses
should, at most, be $50,000.00.
.
Defendant’s Other Arguments

John Doe should not be allowed to recover more for
his past medical expenses than was actually paid.

Defendant’s interpretation furthers the alleged
purpose of § 41.0105 – to limit recoverable damages
in a civil case (but ignores the word “OR” in the
statute).

Although not in the statute, aggressive defendants
also maintained that this statute affected the
presentation of evidence and limited that
presentation to the amount actually paid.
.
Plaintiff’s Interpretation - Recovery


The word “OR” has a clear and plain meaning:

John Doe is entitled to recover any amounts that
were actually paid (50K) OR incurred (100K) –
John Doe just cannot recover more than 100K.

John Doe cannot recover more than what was
actually paid OR incurred.
Therefore, John Doe is allowed the same benefits
under the previous rule and this codifies existing
and long-standing law. It also addresses the
situation with unpaid balances.
.
Plaintiff’s Interpretation - Evidence

Defendant’s interpretation would swallow the
collateral source rule completely.

Pursuant to the Plaintiff’s interpretation, the
collateral source rule is left intact and prevents
the interjection of insurance coverage into trial.

Defendant should not benefit from the fact that John
Doe has his own insurance.

Defendant’s interpretation would not give an
accurate guidepost of medical expenses when
determining how much to award John Doe on noneconomic damages.
.
Courts’ Initial Interpretation

§ 41.0105 should be applied post-verdict and
pre-judgment:
 Evidence
of John Doe’s providers’
adjustments and/or write-offs should be
inadmissible before a jury;
 Such
evidence should be handled after the
verdict has been rendered to reduce John
Doe’s medical expenses recovery.
.
Courts’ Initial Interpretation

Evidence:
 A jury
would see John Doe’s total incurred
medical expenses and enter a verdict.

Recovery:
 Before
judgment would be entered, the court
would look to see what was actually paid by John
Doe or on his behalf and reduce his past medical
expenses award accordingly based on evidence of
write-offs and adjustments presented by
defendants.
.
The Effects

The courts’ initial interpretation settled in
the middle of the two competing
arguments:
 Defendants
would not have to pay more for a
plaintiff’s past medical expenses than was
actually paid to the health provider(s); and
 Plaintiffs
could still submit evidence of the
full amount of his or her medical charges –
giving a jury an accurate guidepost for
awarding non-economic damages and
assessing the severity of the injury.
.
III.
Haygood v. De Escabedo
Argued: September 16, 2010
Opinion Delivered: July 1, 2011
Facts

Involved an automobile collision in which Escabedo
pulled out of a grocery store parking lot and collided
with Haygood’s vehicle;

Haygood’s injuries required surgical treatment;

Haygood sued Escabedo for injuries he sustained in the
collision, resulting in total incurred medical expenses of
$110,069.12;

Haygood was a Medicare beneficiary, and his health care
providers adjusted his bills, leaving Haygood with an
outstanding balance of $27,739.43;

By the time of trial, Medicare had paid approximately
$13K with the rest remaining outstanding.
.
Facts, cont’d…

Escabedo, relying on § 41.0105, moved to exclude
evidence of health care bills other than those paid or
owed;

In response, relying on the long-standing Collateral
Source Rule, Haygood moved to exclude evidence of
health care bills other than those charged (incurred);

Trial Court granted Haygood’s motion and denied
Escabedo’s (allowed full incurred amount);

The jury found Escabedo’s negligence caused the accident
and awarded the full amount of past medical expenses
incurred; and

Tyler Court of Appeals reversed, and Haygood petitioned
to the Supreme Court of Texas.
.
Issues

Whether § 41.0105 precludes recovery of
expenses that a health care provider billed to a
plaintiff, rather than expenses actually paid or
owed by or on behalf of a plaintiff; and

Whether § 41.0105 precludes admitting
evidence of expenses that a health care
provider billed to a plaintiff, rather than
expenses actually paid or owed by or on
behalf of a plaintiff.
.
Respondent’s Arguments


Escabedo first argued that the court of appeals’
decision should be affirmed because the plain
language of § 41.0105 indicates that a claimant
cannot recover medical care expense damages
which have been written off, discounted or
adjusted.
Next, Escabedo maintained that § 41.0105
properly measures damages and limits the
admissibility of medical care expenses to the
amount a plaintiff owes or has paid, rather
than the amount billed.
.
Petitioner’s Arguments

Haygood first argued that the plain
meaning of § 41.0105 clearly indicates that
a plaintiff can recover the past medical
expenses incurred:
 In
support of this contention, Petitioner
pointed to the actual wording of the statute
and argued that “actually” only applies to
“paid” and not to “incurred.”

Petitioner also argued that this was
consistent with long-standing law
regarding the Collateral Source Rule and
recovery of past medical expenses.
.
Holding

The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the Court of
Appeals’ decision on both evidence and recovery;

§ 41.0105 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
limits recovery to expenses that a medical
provider has a legal right to be paid;

Further, only evidence of recoverable medical
expenses is admissible at trial – otherwise, not
relevant; and

Lastly, the collateral source rule continues to
apply and juries may not be told whether the
parties to the suit are covered in whole or in part
by insurance.
.
John Doe Example
Under the Current Law

Plaintiff John Doe has a total of $100,000 in
past medical expenses; and

John Doe’s insurance company paid only
$50,000, at a reduced rate, to satisfy the
charges in full.
.
John Doe Example Under the
Current Law

Under the current law, John Doe may only
submit evidence of and recover up to:
 What
was actually paid by him or on his
behalf, AND
 Any
outstanding medical charges.
.
John Doe Example Under the
Current Law

John Doe may only submit evidence of what was
paid by his insurance company ($50K) and may
not submit evidence of the actual total amount
incurred ($100K);

Additionally, John Doe can only recover, if any, up
to the reduced amount of $50,000 paid on his
behalf – which must then be paid to his insurance
company due to the contractual right of
subrogation contained in his policy; and

John Doe does not get his premiums back or any
recovery whatsoever for having insurance.
.
What are the Practical Consequences?
.
Facilitating Tort Reform

Haygood v. De Escabedo facilitates the purpose
of the 2003 tort reform:

In 2003, the Texas legislature enacted § 41.0105 as
an attempt to cap plaintiffs’ non-economic
damages;

Haygood took a further step towards reaching this
goal by precluding juries from using a plaintiff’s
total incurred medical charges as a guidepost on
awarding non-economic damages.
.
Non-Economic Damages

The Rationale – What’s the Big Deal?

The lower the amount of medical expenses that a
jury sees, the lower the amount it will award for
non-economic damages.

There is an underlying presumption that a
plaintiff with $50,000 in medical charges is not as
severely injured as another plaintiff with $100,000
in medical charges.

It is presumed that the first plaintiff did not
endure as much pain and suffering or physical
impairment as the second plaintiff because his
medical expenses were not as substantial.
.
Correlation of Damages

To Dollars From Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative Translation in Jury Damage Awards
Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 2011 (Hans & Reyna)
.
Overall Damages

The Rationale
 A jury
instructed or inclined to use the
multiplier method of calculating noneconomic damages will automatically
calculate a lower award for non-economic
damages if the “amount actually paid” is the
only admissible evidence.
 If
Medicare pays 15 cents on the dollar for the
injured party’s treatment – the actual severity
of the injury is distorted.
.
Non-Economic Damages

Henderson v. Spann, Amarillo COA 2012

The trial court allowed the incurred past medical
expenses to be submitted, then post-verdict,
reduced the verdict dollar for dollar for the writeoffs.

Defendant appealed and Plaintiff argued that any
error was harmless due to the post-verdict
reduction.

This was a brilliant argument. Indeed, if the goal
of 41.0105 was simply to prevent plaintiffs from
recovering for expenses that the provider had no
right to be paid, this approach accomplishes that.
.
Non-Economic Damages

Henderson v. Spann, Amarillo COA 2012
 However,
the court held that “the post-verdict
adjustment method is inadequate to account
for or remedy any effect the inadmissible
evidence of unadjusted past medical expenses
may have had on the jury’s assessment of
non-economic damages.”
 Accordingly,
it is clear that the appellate
courts ARE using this statute to limit noneconomic damages.
.
Where Does the Collateral Source Rule Fit In?
.
Using the Collateral Source Rule

The long-standing rule in Texas has been that
neither party is permitted to mention anything
regarding insurance coverage.

How do we follow this rule while also complying
with the Haygood v. De Escabedo opinion, which is
centered around the admissibility of a plaintiff’s
medical expenses that may or may not have been
paid by an insurance company?

How do we enter evidence of past medical
expenses?
.
Using the Collateral Source Rule

Before:

Prior to Haygood v. De Escabedo and under “paid
or incurred,” a plaintiff would have a strong
interest in applying the collateral source rule.

Since a plaintiff was allowed to submit evidence
of the total amount a plaintiff was actually
charged (incurred), a plaintiff wanted to preclude
a jury from seeing what was actually paid by an
insurance company or Medicare (most likely at a
reduced rate).
.
Using the Collateral Source Rule

Now:

A plaintiff may seek to have the collateral source
rule waived in trial and a defendant has a
compelling interest to apply it.

Since a plaintiff, who had his or her healthcare
treatment covered by his or her insurance or
Medicare, is only permitted to submit evidence of
what the insurer paid for those expenses, a
plaintiff may find it to his or her benefit to waive
the collateral source rule.
.
Are We Rewarding the Uninsured?
.
Rewarding the Uninsured

A possible unintended consequence of
Haygood v. De Escabedo is that an uninsured
plaintiff, or one that has not had anything
paid by a third party, may obtain a higher
verdict than if he or she were insured.
.
Rewarding the Uninsured

The John Doe Example:

John Doe’s twin sister, Jane Doe, was also in the
car with him when they were negligently struck
by the Defendant;

John Doe incurred $100,000 in medical expenses
and his insurance satisfied these charges in full
with a payment of $50,000;

Jane Doe incurred the exact same injuries,
received the exact same treatment, and incurred
the exact amount of medical expenses ($100,000) Jane Doe, however, has no insurance.
.
Rewarding the Uninsured

At trial, John Doe, is awarded $50,000 to cover the
amount actually paid towards his medical
expenses;

The jury, not seeing John’s total incurred amount
of $100,000, awards John $100,000 in noneconomic damages, including pain and suffering
and physical impairment at a 2X multiplier;

John Doe’s Judgment = $150,000
.
Rewarding the Uninsured

Jane Doe goes to trial in front of the exact same
jury, however, she is not precluded from
submitting her total amount of medical expenses
incurred because no third party paid them on her
behalf ;

Therefore, the jury awards her $100,000 to cover
her past medical charges;

The jury then awards her $200,000 in noneconomic damages based on the amount of
expenses they saw for her using the same
multiplier;

Jane Doe’s Judgment = $300,000
.
Rewarding the Uninsured

Result:

The courts may be setting precedent that it is
better to be uninsured for the purposes of being
awarded more in non-economic damages.

From the example, it is easy to see how a jury
may be influenced by the amount of expenses a
plaintiff incurred.

Jane Doe could have easily been awarded twice as
much in non-economic damages as her twin John
Doe, who sustained the exact same injuries and
received the exact same treatment at the exact
same hospital.
.
Big Bird Tree Services v. Gallegos

Plaintiff (Gallegos) is working for Defendant
(Big Bird) on a ladder that breaks, injuring his
foot and requiring multiple surgeries.

Plaintiff is indigent, without health insurance,
and receives $86,882.11 in medical care from a
charitable program administered by Parkland
Memorial Hospital. Plaintiff did not have to pay
for the medical care, and there was no balance.

Plaintiff brings a nonsubscriber case against his
employer for negligence
.
Big Bird Tree Services v. Gallegos

At trial, Plaintiff sought damages for the past
medical expenses incurred – including the
charity care.

To provide his R&N past medical expenses,
Plaintiff submitted billing records affidavits and
the billing records into evidence – including the
expenses from Parkland Memorial Hospital.

Plaintiff was awarded $86,882.11 in past medical
expenses by jury (total verdict award of
$171,762.11)
.
Issue on Appeal by Defendant

In light of Haygood, does § 41.0105 preclude the
recovery of medical expenses for “free” medical
care so as to prevent a Plaintiff from recovering
the value of the medical services received?

In this specific case, it was medical expenses
paid for or born by a charitable program
administered through the treating hospital.
.
Holding

No. Unlike in Haygood v. De Escabedo, there was no
evidence of any contract or statute that would have
prohibited Plaintiff’s medical providers from
charging Plaintiff the full cost of his medical care.

Furthermore, the custodian of records for one of
Plaintiff’s providers testified that the providers could
attempt to recover their full costs from Plaintiff’s
eventual recovery.

Finally, allowing tortfeasors to avoid liability for
medical expenses born by a charity would result in a
windfall to the tortfeasor. (public policy)
.
Questions from Big Bird

The holding seemed to turn on the fact that the
hospital could reverse its decision and decide to
collect the past medical expenses from Plaintiff.

Indeed, the hospital also testified through its records
custodian that it expected to be paid if Plaintiff did
recover.

However, if there were a contract or statute that
prohibited the hospital from charging for the full
value of services rendered, the holding would likely
have been different.
.
Huston v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Plaintiff (Huston) was rear-ended by a UPS
delivery driver and sustained personal injuries.

Plaintiff had outstanding balances with several
medical providers.

Plaintiff entered into an agreement with A/R
Net, who purchased the accounts receivable for
some of Plaintiff’s medical providers at a
discounted rate.
.
Huston v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Pursuant to the agreement, Plaintiff remained
liable to A/R Net for the full amount of the
medical services billed by her medical providers,
not the discounted rate at which A/R Net
purchased the accounts.

Receivables Purchased by A/R Net: $240,849.44

Amount Paid by A/R Net:
$81,589.00
.
Huston v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

Prior to trial, Plaintiff and Defendant could not
agree on the amount of past medical expenses to
be submitted to the jury.

Plaintiff wanted to submit the gross total amount
of her bills, since was liable to A/R Net for the
total amount.

Defendant argued that Plaintiff could only
submit the amount that A/R Net paid those
providers for their receivables.
.
Huston v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

The court agreed with the Defendant, and the
parties stipulated on the amount that Plaintiffs
medical providers had been paid or were
entitled to be paid.

The jury returned a verdict on past medical
expenses that was significantly lower than the
stipulated amount.

On appeal, the 1st COA held that Plaintiff’s
complaint on this issue, even if valid, amounted
to harmless error. The court punted.
.
The Great Unknown
.
Complying With Both
§ 18.001 and § 41.0105

In Texas, a victim may recover reasonable and
necessary accident-related medical expenses.

§ 18.001 now provides that admission of medical
expenses is limited to paid and unpaid amounts, but
allows admission through affidavits – even from a
custodian of records.


Follows Haygood v. De Escabedo
§ 41.0105 provides that “recovery of medical or heath
care expenses incurred is limited to the amount actually
paid or incurred by or on behalf of the claimant.”
.
The § 18.001 Affidavit
a. $________Total Amount charged by (Medical Provider)
b. $________Total amount written off from the total charges, which
(Medical Provider) agrees that it will never seek to collect from any
source.
c. $________ Total amount paid to date on the referenced account by
or on behalf of John Doe.
d. $________________ Total amount presently outstanding on the
referenced account or which (Medical Provider) is legally entitled to
collect.
e. $________________ Total amount paid plus total amount presently
outstanding on the referenced account that (Medical Provider) has the
legal right to collect (item c plus item d)
.
Changes to 2014 Rules
a. $________Total Amount charged by (Medical Provider)
b. $________Total amount written off from the total charges, which
(Medical Provider) agrees that it will never seek to collect from any
source.
c. $________ Total amount paid to date on the referenced account by
or on behalf of John Doe.
d. $________________ Total amount presently outstanding on the
referenced account or which (Medical Provider) is legally entitled to
collect.
e. $________________ Total amount paid plus total amount presently
outstanding on the referenced account that (Medical Provider) has the
legal right to collect (item c plus item d)
.
Changes to 2014 Rules


§ 18.001(b-1) now provides a sample affidavit
specifically for proof of medical expenses;
What about § 18.001(c)?;


“The form of an affidavit provided by this
section is not exclusive and an affidavit that
substantially complies with Section 18.001 is
sufficient.”
Pre-trial Stipulations
.
What do we do now?

Defendants:

File controverting affidavits;

Reach stipulations with opposing counsel on the
amounts of past medical expenses that can be
presented and ultimately recovered; and

Send depositions on written questions to the
plaintiff’s healthcare providers – confirm the
adjustments/write-offs, amounts paid, owing,
etc. (timing is important!)
.
What do we do now?

Defendants:


See the Adley v. Privett case. In that case, the
Plaintiff submitted “flawed bills” from 3
providers.

One bill was unadjusted (whose burden?)

One bill showed write-offs
Object to any past billing records that show or
contain charges that are unrecoverable. This is
reversible error.
.
What do we do now?

Plaintiffs:

See the Metropolitan Transit Authority v.
McChristian. In that case, the Defendant objected
to Plaintiff’s past medical bills entered into
evidence.

Defendant claimed that there was no
evidence that the bills were “actually paid or
incurred.”
.
What do we do now?

The Plaintiff offered 15 medical bills into
evidence. Some of the bills showed “billed
amounts and affirmatively indicate on their face
that no adjustments or write-offs have been
made to the billed amounts; others show only
billed amounts with no indication that ‘list
prices’ have been reduced or written off
pursuant to insurance reimbursement discounts
or other reasons.”
.
What do we do now?

The 14th COA held that the admission of the
medical bills did not violate 41.0105 because
there was no evidence that these medical
expenses included “list price charges for which
the service providers billed but had ‘no right to
be paid.’”

There was no evidence of any contract or
statute that would have prevented these
medical providers from charging Plaintiff the
full value of the services rendered.
.
Issues Coming…

Write-offs (real or illusory?);

Premium recovery; and

Refusing to plead or ask for recovery of
medical expenses?
Future medical expenses – does the statute
apply to this too?

.
Future Medical Expenses?

On 1/1/2014, the Individual Mandate of the
Affordable Care Act became effective

By law, virtually everyone required to have
health insurance, so everyone’s future
medical care could have some adjustments
or write-offs
.
Discovery

Different insurance carriers have different
discounts with different providers.
re Jarvis (14th COA) – Defendant was
entitled to discover the insurance contracts
between the plaintiff’s insurer and healthcare
providers “to aid in determining whether the
providers are required to accept payments of
less than the amounts billed.” (Past Medical
Expenses)
 In
.
Issues Coming…

Other considerations…
 Settlement
 Client
 Trial
negotiations;
screening;
strategy;
 What
will be allowed by the courts; and
 Plaintiff’s
billing record affidavits.
.
Brant J. Stogner
Abraham, Watkins, Nichols,
Sorrels, Agosto & Friend
800 Commerce St.
Houston, TX 77002
Tel: 713-222-7211
Tel: 1-800-870-9584
Fax: 713-225-0827
References
 Haygood
v. de Escabedo…
 Henderson
 Trial
v. Spann,
strategy;
 What
will be allowed by the courts; and
.