“Intelligent Design”:
Philosophy of Science
Issues
Wesley R. Elsberry
Wildlife & Fisheries Sciences
Texas A&M University
“Did you hear about the Aggie
professor…?”
Problems With “Intelligent
Design” Arguments
Use of “marker of intelligent agency” approach is
invalid in principle (Irreducible Complexity &
Specified Complexity)
Mistaking criticism of Darwinian theories for a
positive case for “Intelligent Design”
Making unsubstantiated or overblown claims
False claims of “scientific” status
Poor track record of following scientific practice
in pursuing Intelligent Design arguments
Dembski’s Explanatory Filter &
Design Inference (EF/DI)
Explanatory Filter: Supposed to capture the
essential features of how humans already
make design inferences
Design Inference: Supposed to make the
argument of the Explanatory Filter rigorous
Argument by elimination of alternatives
“Design” is a residue
Going from “design” to agency is based
upon induction
Criticism of Dembski’s EF/DI:
Invalidity
In spite of limited publication venue of
EF/DI, it has attracted significant criticism
Several critics contend that Dembski’s basic
arguments are invalid
Fitelson & Sober, 1999
Ellery Eells, 1999
Massimo Pigliucci, 1999
Eli Chiprout, 1999
Richard Wein
Criticism of EF/DI: Improper
Procedures
The methods deployed in Dembski’s EF/DI
have come under criticism
Elsberry, 1999
Wilkins & Elsberry, (in press)
Ivar Ylvisakar
Criticism of EF/DI: Interpretation
Some critics contend that even if basic
EF/DI is a valid argument, that certain
interpretations made do not follow
Elsberry, 1999
Wilkins & Elsberry, (in press)
Criticism of EF/DI: Theology
Criticism of Dembski’s EF/DI on
theological grounds
Howard Van Till
Edward Oakes
Nancey Murphy
Criticism of EF/DI: Methodology
Bill Jefferys’ point that DI is not predictive
Proper practice of natural science
Show the work before making public claims
No significant empirical testing of EF or DI
Is DI even subject to empirical test? (Dembski 1997)
Dembski has thus far only proposed a verificationist
program
Historical review (“regression testing”)
• Does DI put fairies in the fairy rings?
Look where the evidence is, not where it isn’t
• Examine Krebs’ citric acid cycle, mammalian middle ear, etc.
The Ordinary & the
Extraordinary
Humans & certain animals executing plans
to a purpose are within our empirical
experience, and hence are ordinary
Action of God is not within the same scope
of empirical experience, hence
extraordinary
“This cell made by YHWH” example
• Naturalizes God, result is a “God who is not very
Godly” [Pennock]
Design Inferences: The Ordinary
& the Rarefied
Inference to Ordinary Design: a class of causal
regularity warranted in cases of known agency
Inference to Rarefied Design: a class of causation
based solely upon characters of artifacts examined
The color “Red” as an invalid marker of Rarefied
Design
CSI as a(n invalid) marker of Rarefied Design
Mnemonics[*]
• Ordinary Design, DAWKINS: “Design As We Know It, Not
Supernatural”
• Rarefied Design, DEMBSKI: “Design (Exclusively
Maintained By Scanty Knowledge) Inference”
[*] Acronyms due to John Wilkins
The Pitfalls of Inferring
Intelligent Agency
The question is not really over “design”
The point of the ID movement is to infer
“intelligent agency” (IA) as a cause for
biological examples
“Design” has simply been a means to this
end
Replacement of “artifact” with “event”
What does an inference to “intelligent
agency” require of us?
Finding the Action of an
Intelligent Agent
Desired class of events
“Intelligent Agency” (IA)
• Sufficient grounds: We observe the agent produce the
artifact
• Epistemological warrant often occurs via multiple
independent lines of evidence which imply existence
and/or establish the identity of the agent causing the
artifact
• Artifacts classed in IA because of evaluation of all the
relevant evidence & consideration of the plausibility of
agent causation
• Are we limited to “ordinary design” in assigning an
artifact to “IA”? I argue “Yes”.
Are we limited to “ordinary design” in
assigning an artifact to “IA”?
Consider an “IA” inference by looking at
sets via Venn diagrams
Set view shows problems in the generalized
logical argument:
• Instances of artifacts with attribute X are in IA
• No instances of artifacts with attribute X are not
in IA
• Thus, attribute X is a reliable marker that an
artifact is in IA
Call such classes “Marker of Intelligent
Agency:X”
The ID “Treasure Map”: The Search for
a Reliable Marker of Intelligent Agency
Argument from design advocates have
searched exhaustively for their own
“treasure map”
No map so far has gotten them to a reliable
means of inferring rarefied design
“Specified Complexity marks the spot”
Latest “treasure map” features statistics
Same old conceptual problems remain
Reliability
Claim by Dembski that his EF/DI makes no
false positive attributions
Ignores a priori biases in application
Ignores reliance upon current ignorance
No test procedure yet given by an ID advocate
Claim by Dembski that his EF/DI finds
design in biological systems
Where are the calculations?
No fulfillment of requests for the work
Marker of Intelligent Agency: An
Invalid Approach to Infer IA
“Marker of Intelligent Agency:X” (MIA:X)
is then taken to imply IA without reference
to plausibility of the designing agent or
other evidence of an event
Inductive basis of argument provides no
warrant for claims of reliability of any
MIA:X approach, whatever “X” instantiates
MIA:X is an attempt to conclude IA on the
cheap
MIA:X is an Appeal to Current
Ignorance
Consider “red color” as a possible marker of
intelligent agency
• Small enough experience
favors view that MIA:RED is
a proper subset of IA, and
thus warrants inferring that
event E in MIA:RED -> IA
• Examples: Red flashlight,
fire truck, toolbox, fire
hydrant
Intelligent Agency
MIA:RED
Induction Means That MIA:X Is
Inherently Unreliable
• View that MIA:RED is a proper subset is based inductively
• Testing status are done by reference to empirical data
• Logic is insufficient to
establish warrant for use of
MIA:RED
This ->
IA
MIA:RED
• Asymmetry: can establish
that MIA:RED is not a proper
subset, but cannot establish
that it is a proper subset
IA
*
MIA:RED
Or this ->
Dembski & Markers
“In The Design Inference (Cambridge, 1998)
I argue that specified complexity is a reliable
empirical marker of intelligent design.”
“Thus a likelihood analysis that pits
competing design and chance hypotheses
against each other must itself presuppose the
legitimacy of specified complexity as a
reliable empirical marker of intelligence.” –
WA Dembski, Another Way to Detect Design?
MIA:SC Is an Unreliable Basis
Upon Which to Infer IA
MIA:SC fares no better than any other MIA:X
Quantitative difference, not qualitative
difference
>=50 bits
>=100 bits
Intelligent
Agency
>=250 bits
MIA:SC
>=500 bits
5
4
3
2
1
MIA:IC Is an Unreliable Basis
Upon Which to Infer IA
Michael Behe’s “irreducible complexity” (IC) is yet
another case of MIA:X, & has the same problems
Examining MIA:IC
Given a mousetrap & knowledge of mousetrap makers,
make ordinary design inference to IA (IC attribute is
superfluous)
Given a defective mousetrap & knowledge of fallible
mousetrap makers, make ordinary design inference to
IA (non-IC does not interfere with ordinary DI)
Given sealed box labeled, “Contains IC widget”, have
no warrant to make either an ordinary or a rarefied
design inference to IA (IC attribute is uninformative
regarding IA) [Behe’s “black box”]
Falsifiability
Popperian concept of “falsifiability”
What is falsifiability?
• Theory X implies class of observation Y
• If there exists y in Y such that ~y, then ~X
Need to state “theory” as a specific proposition
• For example, “Flight” is not specific enough, but
“All birds fly” is a falsifiable proposition
• Finding a flightless bird falsifies the proposition
• A “basic statement” which contradicts the theory is a
falsifier
Nothing in there about somebody else’s idea
Dembski & Falsifiability
Dembski’s claim that Darwinian explanation of
bacterial flagellum would falsify “specified
complexity” as a marker of intelligent agency
(2001/04/25) reveals confusion
No entailment, and thus no consequences for SC
Can simply say, “OK, what about this other
example?”
Not really falsification
Behe & Falsifiability
Claim that IC as a marker of intelligent
agency would be falsified by a Darwinian
explanation of a bacterial flagellum
Same problem: no statement of a specific
proposition & implied class of required
consequences
Same confusion: the validity of another
proposition in no way constitutes a falsification
of the proposition being tested
The Excluded Muddle
EF/DI as an argument by elimination has
practical as well as philosophical problems
Relies upon current ignorance (like all “marker
of intelligent agency” approaches)
Relies upon completeness of generation of
alternative hypotheses (regularity or chance)
Relies upon accurate assessment of plausibility
of causation by regularity or chance hypotheses
• Begging the question by broaching hypothesis, but
not correctly assessing its ability to cause the event
• EF/DI is a conduit for a priori biases
Real Design Inferences Are
Ordinary Design Inferences
Properties of warranted design inferences
Use “design” as an independent category, not
a residue of elimination
Evaluate plausibility of agent causation
Compare evidence & plausibility with respect
to various causal hypotheses
Allow uncertainty to lead to categorization in
“don’t know yet/get more data” bin
• World is open, not closed
Real Design Inferences are
Ordinary Design Inferences
Where the Rubber Meets the Road
Dembski’s examples of existing DIs are
examples of Inference to Ordinary Design
• Includes SETI, “Made By YHWH” examples
Dembski’s real-world examples include the
properties of warranted design inferences & use
of ordinary design inferences (last slide)
Dembski extrapolates “ordinary” design
inferences to “rarefied” design inferences
Not warranted
Summary (1)
Inductive arguments from a “marker of
intelligent agency” give no warrant for either
ordinary or rarefied design inferences
Ordinary design inferences remain our only
reliable approach to inferring intelligent
agency
Critics have argued variously against
Dembski's underlying logic, his procedures,
and his interpretations of results
Summary (2)
Dembski has consistently failed to properly
subject his ideas to effective empirical test
Dembski has put little effort into explicating DI
methodology in the peer-reviewed scientific
literature
Dembski has failed to fulfill requests from his
colleagues for data and work underlying publiclymade assertions
Dembski’s implication that his EF/DI is something
that re-invents the basis of doing science is hype
The End
Dembski & the Genome
Features of genome due to “de-evolution”
(U. Georgia lecture, 2001)
TDI says that the specificity of information can
imply plagiary
Why is the specific information of dead viruses,
parts of bacterial genes, and transposable
elements not evidence of copying?
Dembski & ID Activism
“Though design theorists believe Darwinism is dead wrong,
unlike the creationist movement of the 1980's, they do not try to
win a place for their views by taking to the courts. Instead of
pressing their case by lobbying for fair treatment acts in state
legislatures (i.e., acts that oblige public schools in a given state to
teach both creation and evolution in their science curricula),
design theorists are much more concerned with bringing about an
intellectual revolution starting from the top down. Their method
is debate and persuasion. They aim to convince the intellectual
elite and let the school curricula take care of themselves. By
adopting this approach design theorists have enjoyed far more
success in getting across their views than their creationist
counterparts.” – WA Dembski, What every theologian should know
about creation, evolution and design
Dembski on Criticism
"I would go further than that and say that
I value objective peer review. I always
learn more from my critics than from the
people who think I'm wonderful."
- William A. Dembski as quoted by Fred Heeren
Dembski on Visceral Responses
"If we're generating such strong, visceral
responses, we must be doing something
right."
- William Dembski as quoted by Lynn Vincent
Does this imply that when critics evoke a
strong, visceral response from Dembski,
that they too are doing something right?
Who is Wesley R. Elsberry? (1)
Wesley’s allocation of scholarly effort
Let’s look at the publications & participation from the
time of the NTSE conference…
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(+) Enterprising science needs naturalism, 1997
(+) Optimality book, co-editor, INNS series, 1997
(+) First audiogram of a marine mammal at depth, JASA, 1997
(+) TTS in delphinoids, JASA, 1997
(+) U.S. Navy technical report #1751 on TTS, 1997
(+) Letter responding to TTS comments, JASA, 1998
(+) Dolphin dorsal fin morphology poster, 1998
Who is Wesley R. Elsberry? (2)
Wesley’s allocation of scholarly effort
More publications and participation
• (+) Simultaneous digital data of physiological & acoustic
signals during dolphin biosonar, poster, 1999
• (-) Review of TDI by William A. Dembski, 1999
• (+) Review of Tower of Babel by Robert Pennock, 1999
• (+) Dissertation research (intranarial pressure and biosonar
click production in bottlenose dolphins), 1999-present
• (+) Multiple sound sources in the bottlenose dolphin, JASA,
2000
• (+) Deep Hear paper, J. Exp. Biol., in press
• (-) Wilkins & Elsberry, Biol. & Phil., in press
Who is Wesley R. Elsberry? (3)
Wesley’s allocation of scholarly effort
Other activities
• (-) Dembski commentary on the Internet
(talk.origins, web page, other fora)
• (+) Non-Dembski EvC discussion on the Internet
Dembski & Markers (1)
“When SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial
Intelligence) researchers attempt to discover
intelligence in the extra-terrestrial radio
transmissions they are monitoring, they assume an
extra-terrestrial intelligence could have chosen
any number of possible radio transmissions, and
then attempt to match the transmissions they
observe with certain patterns as opposed to others
(patterns that presumably are markers of
intelligence).” – WA Dembski, Intelligent Design
as a Theory of Information
MIA:CSI Is an Unreliable Basis
Upon Which to Infer IA
MIA:CSI fares no better than any other MIA:X
Proper subset?
Examples known
from IA are expected;
this does not
validate inference to
IA
IA
MIA:CSI >=500
bits
MIA:CSI Is an Unreliable Basis
Upon Which to Infer IA
MIA:CSI fares no better than any other MIA:X
Assertion that no example is outside IA
Current ignorance
IA
*
MIA:CSI >=500
bits
MIA:CSI Is an Unreliable Basis
Upon Which to Infer IA
MIA:CSI fares no better than any other MIA:X
What about “local small probability bounds”?
>=50 bits
IA
>=100 bits
>=250 bits
MIA:CSI
>=500 bits
3
2
1
History: Arguments To & From
Design
Paley’s watch and watchmaker
The artifact implies an artificer
Paley and criticism
The Pre-criticism of Hume
• The insufficiency of analogy as a warrant
Darwin & alternative explanation
• The sufficiency of natural causation to explain
adaptation
Dawkins and the “Blind Watchmaker”
More on Paley…
A “Sober” Re-evaluation of Paley
Elliott Sober’s classification of Paley’s
argument as abduction
Paley Redux: The “Intelligent Design”
Movement
The rehabilitation of “natural theology”?
Dusting for Fingerprints
Forensics & fingerprints
Trace evidence implies existence of an agent
Trace evidence can identify the agent
This trace evidence is in the form of physical artifacts
The search for God’s fingerprints
A popular theological pastime
100% failure rate so far
Track record commends modesty in claimants
Why Do We Find Man’s
Fingerprints & Not God’s?
We know the features & actions of our
fellow humans by our sense experience &
intersubjective critique
God has not yet deigned to be examined
under the microscope