Implicature
Pragmatics
So far in class we’ve been concerned with literal
meaning.
But people mean more things when they use
words than just what those words literally mean.
Presupposition
“Who stole the money?”
Presupposes someone stole the money.
“Michael’s brother won the race.”
Presupposes Michael has a brother.
“Michael stopped using heroin.”
 Presupposes Michael used to use heroin.
Overstatement (Hyperbole)
• “He’s as strong as an
ox.”
• “She’s faster than the
wind.”
• “I’m so hungry I could
eat a horse.”
Understatement
Metaphor
Sarcasm
IMPLICATURE
H.P. Grice
• British philosopher
• One of the most
influential theorists of
pragmatics
“Implicate”
Grice introduces a new word ‘implicate’ to
describe a certain phenomenon.
“Implicate”
S1: “How is X doing in his new job at the bank?”
S2: “He’s doing well, he likes his colleagues, and
he hasn’t been to prison yet.”
S2 implicates that S1 is troublesome and liable
to steal from the bank he works for (or
something like that).
Second Example
[I write on your application to graduate school]:
“She has very good handwriting.”
This is a phenomenon often called “damning by
faint praise.” I implicate that you’re not a good
philosopher, because although I praise you in
the letter, I don’t praise you high enough, or on
your relevant abilities.
Implicature
Implicature is something that a speaker does,
not something that a sentence does.
What a speaker implicates is different from what
s/he says.
Implicatures are also not what the hearer learns,
beyond the literal meaning, from what the
speaker says.
Speaker Meaning
Suppose I say: “Stop walking so slowly! Get out
of my way!”
You may learn that I am a very disagreeable
person. But I am not implicating that, because I
am not attempting to get you to believe that I
am disagreeable.
H.P. Grice
Grice’s investigation is
going to be to find out
how speakers implicate
what they do.
That’s what we’re going to
do too.
WHAT IS SAID
Literal Meaning
The literal meaning of a sentence is along the
lines of its normal, dictionary-definition
meaning.
“I said she had good handwriting. I didn’t
literally say that she was a bad philosopher.”
What Is Said
Grice says that what a speaker says is closely
related to what the literal meaning of the
sentences the speaker utters.
What Is Said
However, what a speaker says is not equivalent
to the literal meaning of her utterance. We also
must take into account the contributions of:
(a) Resolutions of anaphora
(b) The context of the utterance
(c) Resolutions of ambiguity
“He is in the grip of a vice.”
(a) We must resolve the
anaphoric reference: who
does the speaker mean by
‘he’?
“He is in the grip of a vice.”
(b) We must determine
the context of the
utterance: if he “is” in the
grip of a vice, what time
was the present time
when the speaker spoke?
“He is in the grip of a vice.”
(c) We must resolve the
ambiguity: does ‘in the
grip of a vice’ mean here
that he is caught in a
certain kind of tool, or
that he can’t rid himself of
a bad character trait?
CONVENTIONAL IMPLICATURE
Conventional Implicature
Grice argues that not all conventional meaning
is literal meaning, and part of what is said.
For example, if I say the sentence: “He is an
Englishman; he is, therefore, brave,” I have
implicated that all Englishmen are brave by
using the word ‘therefore.’
Conventional Implicature
1. It is a matter of convention, Grice says, that
using ‘therefore’ gives rise to an implicature.
2. If not all Englishmen were brave, what I said
would nevertheless be true, if I had spoken of
a brave Englishman.
3. I did not say that all Englishmen are brave; I
only implicated it.
Cancelability
An implicature is said to be cancelable if you can
deny the implicature right after saying
something that seems to implicate it.
[Suppose again you’re applying to be a professor
of philosophy and I write on your
recommendation:] “She has good handwriting—
and in addition, she’s a great philosopher.”
Detachability
An implicature is detachable if you can rephrase
what you just said in such a way that the new
sentence has the same literal meaning, but
doesn’t have the implicature. For instance, in
the handwriting case, the implicature is NOT
detachable:
“She has good handwriting”
“Her handwriting is good”
“I’m impressed by her handwriting” etc.
Conventional Implicatures
We can identify conventional implicatures with
ones that are detachable and non-cancelable.
Example:
“Even Ken knows that’s stupid”
Implicates: Ken is the least likely person (among
some relevant group of people) to know that the
action in question is stupid.
Example
You can’t cancel the implicature:
??“Even Ken knows that’s stupid, but it’s not
unusual or surprising that he does.”
But you can detach it:
“Ken knows that’s stupid too.”
Conventional Implicature?
Although Grice believed in
conventional implicatures,
many linguists and
philosophers don’t.
Locus classicus: Kent Bach,
“The Myth of
Conventional Implicature”.
Conventional Implicatures?
Conventional implicatures
have been recently
revived by Chris Potts, but
most people think Potts is
talking about something
else.
Examples from Potts
Epithets:
“Those fucking kids won’t stay off my lawn.”
Implicature: I have a negative attitude toward
those kids.
Non-restrictive relative clauses:
“The pizza delivery boy, who was wearing a
necktie, thanked me for the tip.”
Implicature: he wore a necktie.
THE COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE
The Cooperative Principle
In conversation, we don’t merely make random
or disconnected remarks. Conversations have
purposes: we engage in them for reasons.
The purpose of a conversation can be
introduced by a question or set of questions; it
can also evolve as the conversation progresses.
The Cooperative Principle
At each point in the conversation, certain
“moves” (assertions, questions, etc.) will be
“unsuitable”—that is, at odds with the purpose
of the conversation.
The Cooperative Principle
“Make your conversational contribution such as
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged.”
Categories of Maxims
The Cooperative Principle, according to Grice,
gives rise to four categories of maxims (rules),
that must be obeyed if conversation is to
proceed cooperatively: the categories
• Quantity
• Quality
• Relation
• Manner
Category of Quantity Maxims
Maxim 1: “Make your contribution as
informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange).”
Maxim 2: “Do not make your contribution more
than is required.”
Category of Quality Maxims
Supermaxim (includes the others): “Try to make
your contribution one that is true.”
Maxim 1: “Do not say what you believe to be
false.”
Maxim 2: “Do not say that for which you lack
adequate evidence.”
Category of Relation Maxims
Maxim: “Be relevant.”
Difficulties with elaborating on the maxim:
• What are the different kinds of relevance?
• How does what is relevant evolve with the
conversation?
• Why are some complete changes of topic
acceptable?
• Etc.
Category of Manner Maxims
Supermaxim: “Be perspicuous.”
Maxim 1: “Avoid ambiguity.”
Maxim 2: “Avoid obscurity of expression.”
Maxim 3: “Be brief.”
Maxim 4: “Be orderly.”
Nonconversational Maxims
Grice admits there are other maxims, such as
“be polite,” that guide us in conversations.
But he believes these maxims are not intimately
related to the purposes of rational
communication in the way that the maxims in
the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and
manner are.
Important Note!
The maxims are not moral recommendations.
Grice is not telling you that you have to be
truthful, or that you ought not to be obscure.
The maxims are a description of how we assume
other people are behaving in cooperative
speech. Why that assumption is warranted is a
question Grice will try to answer.
NO
“The maxims presuppose
an almost Utopian level of
gentlemanly conduct on
the part of a speaker and
an old-fashioned standard
of truthfulness that
George Washington might
have found irksome. They
remind one of the early
Puritanism of the Royal
Society…”
NO
“A speaker should give not
too much but just enough
information, hold his
tongue about what he
believes to be false, or for
which he has insufficient
evidence, be relevant, be
brief and orderly, avoid
obscurity of expressions
and ambiguity.”
NO
“. . . Would we want to
have dinner with such a
person, such an
impeccably polite maxim
observer?”
COOPERATIVE ENDEAVORS
Cooperative Endeavors, Generally
Grice believes that the Cooperative Principle
and the categories of maxims he outlines,
extend to other cooperative human endeavors.
Imagine that you and I are making a cake. There
are some rules we should obey…
Quantity and Quality
(Quantity) Make your contribution neither more
nor less than is required. If I need a cup of sugar,
don’t hand me half a cup; and don’t hand me 10
cups either.
(Quality) Make your contribution “genuine and
not spurious.” If I need a cup of sugar, don’t
hand me a cup of salt.
Relation
Make your contribution appropriate to the
immediate needs at each stage of the
cooperative endeavor.
If I need a cup of sugar, don’t hand me an oven
mitt (though do hand me it later when I need it);
and don’t hand me an interesting book (though
do when we’re preparing for a long plane flight).
Manner
Make your contribution perspicuous.
If I need you to grease a baking sheet before I
can proceed, don’t do it in secret so that I don’t
know whether I can proceed; nor should you
take 2 hours to do it.
WHY FOLLOW THE MAXIMS?
A Fundamental Question
What is the basis on which we can expect other
speakers to be cooperative?
This question is important to Grice, because
most implicatures depend on the assumption
that the other participants in the conversation
are cooperative.
Solution #1
People are simply in the habit of being
cooperative, and it is a difficult habit to break.
For instance, Grice points out that it’s easier to
tell the truth than to lie.
Reasons to Reject #1
Grice isn’t satisfied with this solution because he
thinks people must have a reason to be
cooperative that transcends the fact that it’s
habitual.
He doesn’t want why we in fact are cooperative.
Instead he wants to explain why it is reasonable
for us to be cooperative-- why we should not be
uncooperative
Solution #2
Entering into a conversation is like entering into
a quasi-contractual agreement, where all parties
agree to aid one another for a common goal
over a short period of time.
Reasons to Reject #2
First, in a quarrel, for
instance, neither party
seems to have some
‘contractual obligation’ to
continue the quarrel until
its aims are met
satisfactorily.
Reasons to Reject #2
Second, if one participant in the conversation is
obscure or ambiguous, it does not seem that he
has let down others (not fulfilled his half of the
contract) by not cooperating; he has rather let
down himself.
Grice’s Solution
Grice suggests that being cooperative (in the
way he outlines) may be a precondition for the
individuals engaged in conversation to achieve
the goals of the conversation (e.g. “giving and
receiving information, influencing and being
influenced by others”).
Grice’s Solution
He does not spell out this suggestion in further
detail. This is because, he says, a large part of
demonstrating that this is so will rest on
determining what the nature of relevance is,
and when and how it is required.
FAILING TO FULFILL A MAXIM
Ways to Fail to Fulfill a Maxim
#1 Someone can simply violate a maxim. She
can say something underinformative, something
she believes to be false, something irrelevant, or
something ambiguous.
Opting Out
“I’m sorry, I can’t give you that information” (opting out
of Quantity)
“Here’s what I think, but I admit I’ve got no evidence for
it.” (opting out of Quantity)
“On a completely unrelated matter…” (opting out of
Relation)
When one filibusters, one has typically opted out of
Manner.
Maxim Clash
Suppose you are asked “How many children does
John have?” You know that he has more than one,
but not exactly how many he has. You could say:
(ii) “More than one” (fulfilling Quality, but not
Quantity)
(iii) “Exactly three” (fulfilling Quantity, but not
Quality)
Flouting
To flout a maxim is to blatantly fail to fulfill it.
(a) Lying is typically a case of violating Quality (it’s
not obvious one is lying)
(b) Overstatement is typically a case of flouting
Quality (it is obvious that what one is saying is false)
Flouting, Grice will argue, gives rise to
conversational implicatures. This he calls
‘exploiting’ maxims.
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES
The Standard Case
Speaker S, in saying that p, implicates that q, if
and only if:
1. It is common knowledge, among all parties in
the conversation, that S is following the
Cooperative Principle.
2. It is common knowledge, among all parties in
the conversation, that unless q were true, S
would not be following the Cooperative
Principle.
The Standard Case
Hearer H reasons: “S said that p; unless q were
true, S would be uncooperative in saying that p;
but S is cooperative; therefore he is implicating
that q.”
Standard Example, Relevance
S1: “I’m out of gas”
S2: “There’s a gas station around the corner.”
All S2 literally said was that there was a gas
station around the corner. This is consistent with
the gas station being closed.
Relevance
But, if S2 believes the gas station to be closed,
his utterance would violate the cooperative
principle (it would be irrelevant, in the context,
because the purpose of the conversation is to
resolve S1’s gas worries).
Relevance
S1 assumes that S2 is being cooperative (why
else has he stopped to help?) and thus
concludes that S2 must believe, and intend to
get S1 to believe, that the gas station around the
corner is open.
Standard Example, Quantity
S1: “How many children does Sally have?”
S2: “Two.”
What S2 literally said, in context, was that Sally
had two children. This is consistent with Sally
having exactly five children, because if you have
five children then you have two. (Compare: “Do
you have two dollars?” does not mean: “Do you
have neither more nor less than two dollars?”)
Quantity
But, if S2 believed Sally to have more than two
children, his utterance would violate the
cooperative principle (it would not give all of the
information requested, thus violating the first
maxim of quantity).
Quantity
S1 assumes that S2 is being cooperative (why
else has he bothered to answer?) and thus
concludes that S2 must believe, and intend to
get S1 to believe, that Sally has no more than
two children.
Scales
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Numbers: 1 < 2 < 3…
Quantifiers: some < many < most < all
Frequency: sometimes < often < usually < always
Likelihood: possible < likely < certain
Obligatoriness: permitted < expected < required
Logical Operators: or < and
Temperature: lukewarm < warm < hot
Goodness: OK < good < excellent
High Compatible with Low
S1: “Do you have 2 dollars?”
S2: “Yes, I have 100 dollars.”
S1: “Did many of the students pass the exam?”
S2: “yes, all of the students passed.”
S1: “Did you have an OK summer?”
S2: “Yes, I had an excellent summer.”
Low Implicates Not-High
“John has 2 kids” → “John doesn’t have 3 kids or
more”
“Some students failed the exam” → “Not all the
students failed the exam”
“The mail usually comes on time” → “The mail
doesn’t always come on time”
“It’s possible that 7/11 has champagne” → “It’s not
likely that you can get champagne at 7/11”
“You’re permitted to leave” → “You’re not required
to leave, you can stay”
“You can have tea or cake” → “You can’t have tea
and cake”
Scalar Implicatures
These implicatures all follow from the Quantity
maxims. Since speakers are required to say as
much as they can (that’s true and relevant), not
saying the high-up thing (choosing something
low) implicates that the high-up thing is false.
Flouting Maxims
In the standard cases, speakers don’t fail to fulfill
the maxims. Implicatures are generated because
the assumption that speakers are cooperative
requires other things to be true, besides what
the speaker says.
In cases of flouting maxims, speakers do fail to
fulfill them, and implicatures are generated in a
different way.
Flouting Quantity
Suppose you’re selecting candidates for a
philosophy job. For candidate X, you have
received the following letter of
recommendation:
“Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is
excellent, and his attendance in classes has been
regular. Yours truly, Professor so-and-so.”
Quantity
You reason first that the letter writer is flouting the
first maxim of quantity. He has taken the time to
write the letter, so he cannot be opting out of the
conversation; additionally, he must have more
information, because the person for whom he is
writing the letter is his student.
Thus, the writer must be attempting to convey
more information than he has literally said. But why
would he not come out and say it? Perhaps because
what he has to say about the student is negative.
Flouting
The form of a flouting inference is something
like this:
“The speaker is openly failing to fulfill such-andsuch maxim, though I have strong reason to
think the speaker wants the purpose of the
conversation to succeed. The only good reason
to be uncooperative, given that, would be if q.
So the speaker must want me to believe q.”
Flouting Quality
One typically flouts the maxims of quality when
one engages in irony, metaphor,
understatement, and hyperbole.
For example: The speaker said “Dick Cheney is a
monster”; but he can’t really believe that
Cheney is a monster, because monsters don’t
exist; he must really mean that Cheney is a
terrible person.
Flouting Relation
A case of flouting the maxim of relation:
[Location: a prim and proper tea party]
S1: “Ms. X is an old bag”
S2: “My, it’s such lovely weather we’ve been
having of late!”
Relation
S2’s utterance is clearly not relevant to the topic
of conversation introduced by S1.
The most plausible explanation is that S2
believes that it is improper to be discussing Ms.
X in the way that S1 wants to.
So S2 has implicated, by exploiting relation, that
this is an improper topic of conversation.
Flouting Manner
A case of flouting: be brief!: a reviewer for a stage
performance says “Ms. X produced a series of
sounds resembling the lyrics to ‘Home Sweet
Home.’”
The reviewer could have said something much
briefer, namely: “Ms. X sang ‘Home Sweet Home.’”
There must be some explanation for his lack of
brevity; most likely, he believes that Ms. X did not
do a good job of singing the song; thus, this is what
he implicates.
Particularized vs. Generalized
Implicatures
An implicature is particularized if it only arises in a
special context. For example:
S1: Is Sue pretty?
S2: She has a wonderful personality.
S1: Oh, so she’s not pretty.
Here, B implicates that Sue is not pretty, because
he’s not observing Quantity and Relation: he was
required to give information about Sue’s
attractiveness, but he instead gave information
about her personality.
Particularized Implicature
S1: I’m looking for someone to go on a date with.
S2: Take Sue, she has a wonderful personality.
Here, S2 doesn’t implicate that Sue is not pretty,
because his utterance doesn’t violate/ flout or
otherwise exploit any of the maxims. It’s true,
relevant, orderly, and a sufficient reason to go out
on a date with someone (that is, it satisfies
Quantity).
Generalized Implicature
An implicature is generalized if only in special
circumstances does it not occur.
S1: I’m looking for a woman to go on a date with.
S2: Take Sue, she’s pretty.
S1: Oh, so she’s not beautiful.
Since S2 is contributing information on Sue’s
attractiveness, he should state the greatest degree
of attractiveness that she has. Since he didn’t say
‘beautiful’ which is a greater degree than merely
‘pretty’, she must be pretty but not beautiful.
Generalized Implicature
In special circumstances, however, this implicature
is not present:
A: No one here is pretty.
B: Sue is pretty!
Here, the point of B’s utterance is to give evidence
against A’s claim. Thus, he satisfies the quantity
requirement by saying that Sue is pretty, and this is
compatible with him also thinking that she’s more
than just pretty, she’s beautiful.