TPA Politics DA
Uniqueness
1NC
Trade promotion authority will pass if Obama maintains his effective push.
Sherman, Politico, 6-3-15
(Jake, “Obama goes into overdrive on trade push”, http://www.politico.eu/article/obama-goes-into-overdrive-ontrade-push/)
President Barack Obama has begun to barrage House Democrats with phone calls in hopes of explaining to members
of his own party why they should break their near uniform opposition and support his trade agenda. House
Republicans, meanwhile, are feeling newfound optimism that at least 190 of their lawmakers will support so-called
trade promotion authority giving the president power to fast-track free-trade agreements, including the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). That would mean roughly 27 Democrats would need to support the
legislation in order to hand Obama his largest legislative victory in years. Eighteen Democrats are currently on
record backing the bill. It’s now up to Obama to flip the rest. Speaker John Boehner, Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy, Majority Whip Steve Scalise
and Chief Deputy Whip Patrick McHenry will meet with undecided Republicans this week to press them to vote yes. A significant number of GOP lawmakers are holding out and will commit to
Republican leaders are sparing no effort in the
whip effort and believe they’re on track to notch a historically high vote total for a trade bill. Ways and Means
Chairman Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) also has several meetings with lawmakers who are undecided or currently opposed to
the package. He will also join GOP leadership in a meeting Wednesday with trade associations, agriculture groups
and manufacturers that’s expected to draw 150 attendees. In a sign of the GOP’s confidence, House Republican leadership sources say they could bring the
no one other than Boehner and McCarthy. They want to convey to the top two leaders how tough of a vote this is.
package of trade bills to the floor for a vote as soon as next week. Top aides and lawmakers say, however, that a vote could easily slip to the week of June 15. Republicans want to make sure they
Getting the needed number
of House Democrats on board is the biggest test of Obama’s legislative prowess in years. Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi of California
schedule a vote as soon as they have the support to pass the package. They are nervous about the White House’s ability to keep Democrats in line.
and Minority Whip Steny Hoyer of Maryland are undecided. Hoyer’s noncommittal posture on the issue is a logistical challenge because the pro-fast-track Democrats will not have their whip on
the House floor. The stakes couldn’t be higher for the president. The Trans-Pacific Partnership is the top legislative priority for his final years in office and passage of the deal would mark the
largest trade initiative in decades. Its defeat would be a major embarrassment for the United States on the world stage. Should it pass the House, it would also be a major victory for Republican
Obama is trying to assuage individual Democrats’ lingering
concerns. He was successful in easing Colorado Rep. Ed Perlmutter’s resistance to TPA: The Denver-area Democrat
once was a firm no but said he might support the bill after meeting with Obama and speaking with him on the phone.
Obama agreed to work with Perlmutter on infrastructure projects, sources said. Obama has also personally reached out to Democratic Reps.
leaders who have worked for months to whittle down opposition and build support.
Jim Himes of Connecticut, Sam Farr of California, David Price of North Carolina, Kathleen Rice of New York, Cedric Richmond of Louisiana and Emanuel Cleaver of Missouri, among others,
as part of his lobbying blitz. The president is especially focused on turning votes in the Congressional Black Caucus, traditionally his most ardent supporters in the House. When Obama called
Richmond, the president tried to make the point that the trade deal would benefit the lawmaker’s New Orleans-area district. Richmond is leaning toward opposing the package. But Richmond
said he’s also been turned off by what he called labor’s scorched-earth tactics against the package. A caucus meeting Tuesday morning featured Connecticut Rep. Rosa DeLauro speaking out
against the package. “I was leaning no, but the more Trumka and others start to talk, the more I lean the other way,” Richmond said, referring to AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka. “So I am all
conflicted.” Obama tried to reach Cleaver, a former leader of the CBC, but the Missouri Democrat was “standing in front of a crowd speaking” so he couldn’t talk to the president. “My chief of
staff took the call and said, ‘Could you call back? Could the White House call back?’” Cleaver said. “I know [Obama] must have been making a number of calls that day.” Obama has been
In addition to Obama’s phone calls, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and
Labor Secretary Tom Perez will be on Capitol Hill on Wednesday for a classified briefing with Democrats on
Mexico’s participation in the TPP. There are some lingering procedural questions for Democrats and Republicans to work out. Pelosi doesn’t approve of the way Trade
unsuccessful in getting Cleaver on the phone.
Adjustment Assistance — aid to help workers displaced or hurt by trade — would be paid for. She wants the financing proposal, currently part of a customs bill, to come to the floor before any
other trade-related legislation. The aid will likely need Democratic support to pass, as it is coming to the floor as a standalone measure. But GOP leadership says flatly they will not pass the
customs legislation first, and they will not change the proposal to pay for the assistance. Crosscurrents within the Democrat ic Caucus are powerful. A caucus meeting Tuesday morning featured
Reps. Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut and Sander Levin of Michigan speaking out against the package as supporters praised it. On Wednesday, pro-trade Democrats like Rep. Ron Kind of
Wisconsin plan to meet with Pelosi to express frustration with the labor movement’s aggressive opposition to Obama’s trade agenda. “Obviously it’s tough for Democrats to get to ‘yes.’ There’s
not a lot of political upside for doing it,” Kind told POLITICO. Noting the worries among Democrats that backing the legislation will trigger a backlash when they’re up for reelection next year,
Kind added: “These are very valuable members. I want to make sure they’re supported, and they’ve got the type of campaigns that (are) gonna get them back here again next year. Leadership has
Rep. Xavier Becerra of California, a member of Democratic leadership who is opposed to
TPA, said Obama is “very persuasive” and will be burning up phone lines until the vote. “This is one of those
votes that it will likely be very close,” he said, “and everyone will work until the final moments to see if they
can get the votes to go their way.”
a role in all that, absolutely.”
2NC Wall
TPA will pass now but barely
Berman, the Atlantic, 6-1-15
(Russell, “Are Democrats Prepared to Abandon Obama on Trade?”,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/obama-democrats-and-the-trade-deal/394454/)
Sometime in the next two weeks, the House will hold one of the biggest votes of Barack Obama’s final two years in office, on whether to give the president the authority to negotiate trade deals
Obama will need only about 20 to 25 Democrats to
support him—barely one-tenth of his own party. This really shouldn’t be that difficult. Led by Nancy Pelosi, this Democratic caucus has
that Congress won’t be able to amend. And unlike just about every other key vote during his administration,
stood loyally by Obama for his entire roller-coaster presidency—delivering him not only landmark stimulus, healthcare, and financial-reform legislation during his first term but also a series of
Yet despite months of public pressure and an aggressive private push
from a man famously averse to schmoozing and arm-twisting, Democrats remain overwhelmingly opposed to a bill
that Obama sees as crucial to extending his economic legacy. So me of the senior critics include lawmakers like Representatives Chris Van Hollen and
hold-your-nose-and-vote-yes budget deals with Republicans in his second.
Rosa DeLauro who regularly credit Obama with rescuing the nation from the Great Recession and transforming its healthcare system. And in another first for the Obama presidency, the White
This thing is too close to call,”
House has been left to whip votes without the public support of a single Democratic leader in Congress. “
said Representative G.K. Butterfield,
a North Carolina Democrat and the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. “I predict it will either pass or fail by a handful of votes.” Passage of Trade Promotion Authority would clear the
way for the administration to finalize major trade agreements first with Pacific Rim nations (the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and then with the European Union. The bill passed after a contentious
debate in the Senate, but the tougher battle has always been forecast for the House, where the Republican waves of 2010 and 2014 have ousted centrist Democrats and left a caucus that is both
much smaller and more liberal. Republicans are predisposed to support trade deals, but the GOP leadership has consistently said it would need Democratic votes, because a few dozen of their 245
enior congressional aides in both parties say there are around 200
Republican votes for the bill, but just 17 or 18 Democrats—out of 188 total—in favor of it. That puts the count
dangerously near the threshold of 217 or 218 (depending on how many absences there are) that the measure needs to pass. In recent weeks, the parties have
bickered over which one bears the blame for TPA’s precarious status. The Obama administration has put on a full-court press over the last few
months, with the president making calls and inviting groups of Democrats into the Oval Office for personal
meetings. Overall, the administration said it has held more than 1,700 briefings for lawmakers with officials from the president on down—that works out to more than three for every
members won’t support anything that gives Obama more power. S
member of the House and Senate, although some trade proponents complain that Obama’s loudest critics on the left have refused to attend them. Republicans, and some Democrats, have long
complained about the president’s poor relationship with Congress and what they see as his disregard for even the most token forms of outreach. (A round of golf, perhaps?) Yet even Obama’s
critics acknowledge he has made a strong effort on trade. The problem, they say, is that the pleas from a lame-duck president don’t appear to have made much difference. “There’s no evidence
that their engagement has moved a single vote from no to yes,” one top Republican aide told me, speaking on condition of anonymity, so as to be able to discuss the sensitive negotiations
candidly. Butterfield exemplifies Obama’s challenge, as do many members of the Congressional Black Caucus who often passionately defend the president but tend to find themselves the targets
of his lobbying on the toughest votes. “My default position is no,” Butterfield said in an interview, repeating an explanation he says he delivered to Obama at the White House earlier this spring.
But he has not completely closed the door to changing his mind, saying that while he is “leaning no,” he wants to see evidence from Obama and other proponents that the trade deals under
consideration will create jobs in his district—and not merely grow the economy overall. Broadly speaking, Democrats were traumatized by the experience of NAFTA, the Clinton-era agreement
that they say never delivered on its promises, and which they blame for the outsourcing of jobs. (The position can sometimes be hard to square with the laudatory statements many of the same
Democrats make about Bill Clinton’s economic record during the ’90s.) “NAFTA was a disaster—in my district anyway,” Butterfield said. “In some places in the country it may have been a
bonanza, but in my district it was a disaster.” Obama and his allies have made several substantive arguments for why Democrats skeptical of trade deals should still give him the authority to
negotiate them. First, they point to enforceable labor and environmental standards that making the Trans-Pacific Partnership “the most progressive” trade agreement in history. And they argue
that it’s not a question of whether to trade with Pacific nations, but whether the U.S. can determine the rules, or whether a competitor like China will continue to undercut U.S. companies. “China
will fill the vacuum if we’re not there,” said Representative Ron Kind of Wisconsin, chairman of the business-friendly New Democrat Coalition. Those arguments have resonated with
lawmakers, but Obama has had to fend off criticism from Elizabeth Warren and others that the public cannot see the details of the pending agreements and that members of Congress can only
review them in a “secret room” in the Capitol. The administration counters that the deal is still being negotiated and that the final agreement will be public for 60 days before Congress votes to
The most potent argument for fence-sitting Democrats—
both stated and implied—goes back to trust, loyalty, and politics. Obama has suffered all kinds of snubs and defeats
at the hands of Republicans, but never one of this magnitude from his own party. “Do you really want to be the
instrument of this kind of devastating loss for this president?” asked Representative Gerry Connolly, a Virginia Democrat and TPA supporter.
An even more discouraging thought for Democrats is that with Republicans running both chambers of Congress, this
might be the last significant legislation that Obama can get during his presidency. “A lot of my colleagues don’t
want to contemplate that proposition,” Connelly said.
approve or reject it. As Kind acknowledged: “It’s tough to sell something that doesn’t exist yet.”
Will pass-vote count
House, Bloomberg Politics, 5-28-15
(Billy, “Obama Trade Bill Seen Gaining Enough Support for Final Passage”,
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-05-28/obama-trade-bill-seen-gaining-enough-support-for-finalpassage)
Republican and Democratic supporters of a fast-track trade bill are confident the U.S. House will pass the measure,
sending it to President Barack Obama’s desk, two House aides said. Informal vote counts show more than 200
Republicans support the measure and about 25 House Democrats are prepared to vote for the bill, known as trade
promotion authority. That is enough for a clear majority of the 433 members of the House, the aides said. Along with 18 to 20
Democrats who already have stated their support, Representative Gregory Meeks, a New York Democrat, said
“there’s a sizable number” of other Democrats he thinks will sign on. That includes some House Democratic leaders,
said Meeks, who supports the measure. “I think that TPA is going to pass,” Meeks said in an interview. “I think there are sufficient Democrats to get
it done.” Passage of the measure in the Senate last week -- after a brief rebellion by Democrats -- has proven to uncommitted House members that the legislation
will come up for a vote. Lawmakers will have to choose between the business lobby, which backs the bill, and labor, environmental and other groups that bitterly
oppose it. ‘More People’ “Now that the Senate has moved, that is going to move more people to decide,” said Representative Ron Kind, a Wisconsin Democrat who
supports the measure. “Some people were wondering whether this would even come up.” The trade measure, H.R. 1314, would let Obama submit trade agreements to
Congress for an expedited, up-or-down vote without amendments. The president has said he wants to complete a 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade
agreement, and send it for approval under that procedure. The House will reconvene Monday after a one-week recess. House Republican leaders don’t intend to bring
the measure to the floor next week as they are still gathering support for it, a House aide said. Action the week after is possible. The
optimistic outlook for
passage contains some caveats, the Republican and Democratic aides said, who asked for anonymity to discuss the
legislation in advance of a vote. House leaders still must decide how to sequence votes on the trade authority bill
that came over from the Senate. It also contains a renewal of trade adjustment assistance, a program to help workers
displaced by trade agreements that many Republicans oppose. Yet Republican leaders have promised to ensure that
renewal is included to draw Democratic votes. Labor Unions Also, groups on both sides are pressuring undecided members during the recess, and
labor unions have organized protests against Democrats who have announced they’ll vote yes, such as Representative Ami Bera of California. Outside Bera’s office in
Sacramento, activists this week waved giant cotton swabs to urge him to “clean out his ears” and listen to voters who don’t want the bill. The business coalition
pushing for the bill, also known as fast-track negotiating authority, has brought undecided members to factories to demonstrate the importance of trade. Companies
including engine manufacturer Cummins Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores Inc. held such events, and employees of Dow Chemical Co. sent 6,000 e-mails to 200 members of
Congress. Among Democrats, supporters are focusing on the pro-business New Democrat Coalition and the Congressional Black Caucus, according to one of the
House aides. ‘Reaching Out’ In
recent weeks there has been “a dramatic reaching out to everybody,” by Obama and
administration officials, said Representative Charlie Rangel, a New York Democrat. Rangel said he and other black
caucus members want domestic job-creation provisions tied to the trade bill.
Obama Key – 2NC
Obama must expend capital to keep Dems together.
Babington, Associated Press, 6-1-15
(Charles, “Obama’s trade agenda faces tough battle heading into House”, http://www.seattletimes.com/nationworld/obamas-trade-agenda-faces-tough-battle-heading-into-house/)
At the White House, officials say Obama might rely less on the public speeches and high-profile interviews that
characterized the drive toward the Senate vote and focus more on targeted lobbying to retain Democratic
supporters and win over any remaining fence sitters. The White House has been especially impressed by the efforts of House Ways and
Means Chairman Paul Ryan, a Wisconsin Republican who has worked to persuade conservatives who are reluctant to give a Democratic president fast-track authority.
Ryan has written opinion pieces with Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, a darling of the conservative movement, in support of trade and has courted other conservative leaders
to back fast track. On
the Democratic side, labor has made opposition to trade a priority, and the AFL-CIO has frozen its
political action committee contributions to lawmakers until after the trade votes. During the Memorial Day congressional recess,
a coalition of fast-track opponents aired ads in 17 Democratic congressional districts criticizing the legislation and calling for its defeat. But those efforts are running
up against a more muddled public view of trade. A recent Pew Research Center poll found that 58 percent of those surveyed, including a majority of Democrats, say
free trade agreements have been good for the U.S. Moreover, when Pew asked Americans to list their top priorities for the president and Congress this year, global
trade ranked 23rd.
Capital is key to ensure enough votes for TPA
Sink, Bloomberg Business, 6-2-15
(Justin, “Obama Starts New Trade Push Targeting Reluctant House Democrats”,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-02/obama-starts-new-trade-push-targeting-reluctant-housedemocrats)
President Barack Obama is putting new pressure on reluctant lawmakers in the U.S. House to win final passage of
fast-track trade authority. Obama is sticking to the same play book he used to push the bill through the Senate last month, granting interviews promoting
trade with local television stations, making speeches and offering cover to Democrats who are on the fence. “The politics of this issue in the House
are even more difficult” than in the Senate, White House press secretary Josh Earnest told reporters Tuesday. “ While challenging, we continue
to be confident that we we’ll be able to build a bipartisan majority in the House.” The president is planning a public
and private campaign to sell the need for the fast-track bill, known as trade promotion authority, as well as a free-trade accord that’s being
negotiated with 11 other Pacific Rim nations. One piece: an appeal to voters in the districts of lawmakers targeted by the White
House lobbying campaign. Obama will sit for a round of interviews with local news programs on Wednesday, Earnest said. He’s also made direct pitches
to individual members, assuring them of his support against challengers in a potential Democratic primary. The president’s aides say they know the bill faces an uphill
climb in the House, after clearing the Senate last month in a hard-won 62-37 vote. The pathway to passage in the House will be less than direct and may face more
obstacles than in the Senate, they said. Democratic Votes House
Democrats largely oppose Obama’s trade agenda. He is more
likely to convince undecided Republicans than to sway members of his own party, Representative Xavier Becerra of
California, the fourth-ranking Democrat, said last month. Democrats face growing pressure from labor unions, which historically provide the party with campaign
support. Unions have told voters that Obama’s Asia-Pacific trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, will lead to more jobs shipped overseas. “We’re aware the
president is making calls and the White House has the Cabinet out flying across the country, urging members to change their minds,” Bill Samuel, director of
government affairs for the AFL-CIO, said in a telephone interview. “Our resources are much more limited but we do have voters, and activists.” Union Ads The AFLCIO recently aired ads targeting Representative Ami Bera of California, who came out in favor of the trade bill. It also posted a Craigslist ad in Bera’s Sacramento
district seeking a “Congressman w/ a backbone.” The Coalition to Stop Fast Track, which includes the AFL-CIO, is airing ads against the trade promotion bill in 16
congressional districts. Samuel said the trade bill is about 20 to 30 votes short of a majority in the House, with as many as 90 percent of House Democrats opposed.
House Republican leaders have said they plan to move forward on the bill this month. Trade supporters in both
parties have previously said that they expect to get enough votes to win a majority in the 433-member House. The
White House declined to name the television stations interviewing Obama on Wednesday. One station, KVIA in El Paso, Texas said it was sending a reporter to the
White House on Wednesday for a five-minute interview about trade. The district is home to Representative Beto O’Rourke, a Democrat who has not said how he’ll
vote on the trade bill. Obama will also be interviewed about trade Wednesday on American Public Media’s “Marketplace” radio program. Primary Help Earnest
said Obama has told Democrats that he would “stand with them” if they’re targeted in a primary over their trade
votes. “There’s ample data to point you to that indicates the influence that the president has among
Democratic voters all across the country,” he said. “Having the strong support of the most popular figure in
Democratic politics for your re-election, I think most Democrats are going to find beneficial to their
congressional campaigns.”
Obama Pushing – 2NC
Obama is pushing TPA aggressively now
Lillis, The Hill, 6-1-15
(Mike, “Dems in pressure cooker on trade”, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/243502-dems-in-pressure-cookeron-trade)
House Democrats are in a pressure cooker ahead of a high-stakes vote on a vital piece of President Obama's
ambitious trade agenda. The White House, joining the powerful business lobby, is applying a full court press in
an effort to rally lawmakers behind contentious fast-track legislation that would grant the administration new powers to seal enormous
international trade deals that would rank atop Obama's economic achievements. The effort is being countered by a lobbying blitz — and unveiled threats, by some
accounts — from labor unions, environmentalists and other liberal groups warning of the detrimental effect such deals would have on a range of quality-of-life issues,
not least the erosion of U.S. jobs. Squeezed
in the middle are dozens of on-the-fence Democrats whose votes will likely prove
crucial to the fate of the trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation that squeaked through the Senate last week and
now heads to the lower chamber. GOP leaders want to move the bill quickly when Congress returns to Washington this week after a holiday recess, but
lack enough party support to do so without Democratic votes. Rarely have the minority Democrats faced such a difficult choice. On one hand, they want to
support their ally in the White House on the top economic priority of his second term. On the other, they feel burned
by the false promises of trade deals past and have deep-seated concerns that Obama's agenda — particularly a sweeping 12-nation
accord with Pacific Rim nations that's nearing finalization — would prove little different. "Just because the administration says it's the most progressive trade deal in
history doesn't make it so," said Bill Samuel, director of government affairs at the AFL-CIO. If the arguments haven't changed, the lobbying intensity has. Obama
this month staged a high-profile speech at Nike headquarters in Oregon to tout the economic benefits of the TransPacific Partnership (TPP). U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has prowled the halls of the Capitol
explaining the proposed deal’s nuances and urging support. And the president called dozens of House Democrats to
the White House for a rare two-hour meeting in which he vowed to use all his political capital to defend supporting
lawmakers from campaign attacks, left or right.
Link
Generic – Costs Capital
Obama has to expend capital to get real NSA reform.
Burnett, retired Silicon Valley executive, 2014
(Bob, “Why Hasn't Obama Reined in NSA?”, 1-10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-burnett/obamansa_b_4574910.html)
There are three explanations for the president's weak NSA policy. 1.
Obama decided not to expend political capital changing it.
Given the economic problems he inherited from George Bush, plus the difficulty of working with a divided Congress, Obama may
have decided it was not worth the effort to rein in the NSA. That's been true of national security in general. Obama had
increased defense spending, expanded the national-security state, and maintained the hundreds of US military bases that dot the globe. Obama tried to shut down
Guantanamo but was thwarted by Congress.
Even seemingly uncontroversial proposals cost Obama.
Gerstein, Politico, 2014
(Josh, “The limits of President Obama’s power on NSA reform”, 1-13, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/nsasurveillance-limits-102081.html)
It’s unclear whether Obama’s speech and his endorsement of specific reform proposals can break the legislative
logjam that has frozen action on the issue in Congress for months. There is a flurry of bills proposing surveillance changes that range
from added transparency to modest reforms on the retention and use of bulk data to outright repeal of the authority to collect it. Senate Intelligence Committee
Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) favors tweaks to the current system. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) would do away with bulk
collection altogether, as would other program critics like Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Rand Paul (R-Ky.). Whether they would support legislation to facilitate
collecting the data as the review group has suggested is uncertain. There are similar divisions in the House. A senior House Judiciary Committee member, Rep. Jim
Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.) has signed on to Leahy’s bill to kill the program. However, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-Mich.) is arguably the
program’s staunchest and most unapologetic defender on Capitol Hill. In July, the House narrowly defeated, 205-217, an amendment that would have blocked the
NSA call tracking program. However, that was amid the shock of the initial revelations. In
other policy areas, the White House has shied
away from endorsing specific legislation out of fear of a backlash among House Republicans hostile to the
president. Some GOP members may have voted against the program last July because they identified it with
Obama. If a reform measure is seen as having the president’s support, some in the GOP might oppose that as
well. Even proposals that don’t seem terribly controversial, like the public advocate for the intelligence court, can
stir up trouble on Capitol Hill. Last week, Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) pressed Justice Department official John Carlin to endorse the notion that
the advocate should be able to step into any case he or she thinks would benefit from a second viewpoint.
Aggressive NSA reform costs Obama capital.
Schoen, Forbes political strategist, 2013
(Doug, “Obama Plays Politics With The NSA”, 8-16, http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2013/08/16/obamaplays-politics-with-the-nsa/)
While I have no doubt that a degree of effort will be taken to reign in and circumscribe the purview of the NSA, an
additional fact is clear: the White House is playing politics. President Obama and his staff understand that criticism
of the NSA’s policies is coming from both the left and the right, and that in order to respond to critics and protect
what is left of the President’s dwindling political capital, the White House must balance the concerns of the
security community with those of the general public. However, Obama is in no rush to push through reforms, and it is very likely that
the congressional oversight and investigation of the NSA’s surveillance program, in addition to the bipartisan effort
that will be needed to streamline and prevent any further overreach within the surveillance program, are still a ways
down the line.
Nothing Beyond Metadata
Anything beyond metadata would face stiff opposition.
Gross, IDG News Service, 6-5-15
(Grant, “Don't expect major changes to NSA surveillance from Congress”
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2932337/dont-expect-major-changes-to-nsa-surveillance-from-congress.html)
After the U.S. Congress approved what critics have called modest limits on the National Security Agency’s
collection of domestic telephone records, many lawmakers may be reluctant to further change the government’s
surveillance programs. The Senate this week passed the USA Freedom Act, which aims to end the NSA’s mass collection of domestic phone records, and President Barack
Obama signed the bill hours later. After that action, expect Republican leaders in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to resist further calls for surveillance reform. That resistance is at odds with many rank-and-file
lawmakers, including many House Republicans, who want to further limit NSA programs brought to light by former
agency contractor Edward Snowden. Civil liberties groups and privacy advocates also promise to push for more changes. It may be difficult to get
“broad, sweeping reform” through Congress, but many lawmakers seem ready to push for more changes, said Adam Eisgrau, managing director of the office of
government relations for the American Library Association. The ALA has charged the NSA surveillance programs violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. “Congress is not allowed to be tired of surveillance reform unless it’s prepared to say it’s tired of the Fourth Amendment,” Eisgrau said. “The American
Other activists are less optimistic about more congressional action. “It will a long slog getting more
restraints,” J. Kirk Wiebe, a former NSA analyst and whistleblower said by email. ”The length of that journey will
depend on public outcry—that is the one thing that is hard to gauge.” With the USA Freedom Act, “elected officials have opted to reach for lowpublic will not accept that.”
hanging fruit,” said Bill Blunden, a cybersecurity researcher and surveillance critic. “The theater we’ve just witnessed allows decision makers to boast to their constituents about reforming mass
surveillance while spies understand that what’s actually transpired is hardly major change.” The “actual physical mechanisms” of surveillance programs remain largely intact. Blunden added by
email. “Politicians may dither around the periphery but they are unlikely to institute fundamental changes.” What’s in the USA Freedom Act? Some critics have blasted the USA Freedom Act as
fake reform, while supporters have called it the biggest overhaul of U.S. surveillance program in decades. Many civil liberties and privacy groups have come down in the middle of those two
views, calling it modest reform of the counterterrorism Patriot Act. The law aims to end the NSA’s decade-plus practice of collecting U.S. telephone records in bulk, while allowing the agency to
search those records in a more targeted manner. The law also moves the phone records database from the NSA to telecom carriers, and requires the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) to consult with tech and privacy experts when ruling on major new data collection requests from the NSA. It also requires all significant FISC orders from the last 12 years to be released
to the public. The new law limits bulk collection of U.S. telephone and business records by requiring the FBI, the agency that applies for data collection, to use a “specific selection term” when
asking the surveillance court to authorize records searches. The law prohibits the FBI and NSA from using a “broad geographic region,” including a city, county, state or zip code, as a search
term, but it doesn’t otherwise define “specific search term.” That’s a problem, according to critics. The surveillance court could allow, for example, “AT&T” as a specific search term and give
the NSA the authority to collect all of the carrier’s customer records. Such a ruling from FISC would seem to run counter to congressional intent, but this is the same court that defined all U.S.
phone records as “relevant” to a counterterrorism investigation under the old version of the Patriot Act’s Section 215. The USA Freedom Act also does nothing to limit the NSA’s surveillance of
overseas Internet traffic, including the content of emails and IP voice calls. Significantly limiting that NSA program, called Prism in 2013 Snowden leaks, will be a difficult task in Congress,
with many lawmakers unconcerned about the privacy rights of people who don’t vote in U.S. elections. Still, the section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that authorizes those NSA
foreign surveillance programs sunsets in 2017, and that deadline will force Congress to look at FISA, although lawmakers may wait until the last minute, as they did with the expiring sections of
the Patriot Act covered in the USA Freedom Act. The House Judiciary Committee will continue its oversight of U.S. surveillance programs, and the committee will address FISA before its
Supporters of new reforms will have to bypass
congressional leadership, however. Senate Republican leaders attempted to derail even the USA Freedom Act and
refused to allow amendments that would require further changes at the NSA. In the House, Republican leaders
threatened to kill the USA Freedom Act if the Judiciary Committee amended the bill to address other
surveillance programs. Still, many House members, both Republicans and Democrats, have pushed for new surveillance limits, with lawmakers adding an amendment to end soprovisions expire, an aide to the committee said. Republican leaders opposed to more changes
called backdoor government searches of domestic communications to a large appropriations bill this week.
Not Before 2017
Section 702 reform is controversial before 2017
Kayyali, Electronic Frontier Foundation activism team, 2015
(Nadia, “Yesterday's USA Freedom Markup: A Glimpse into the Fight to Reform Section 702”, 5-1,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/usa-freedom-markup-glimpse-fight-reform-section-702)
The amendment also addressed the NSA’s backdoor into products and services. Leaked documents have shown that the NSA, with
the help of the FBI, has sought backdoors into products and services, from encryption software to online communications tools like Skype. While the government
claims that these backdoors would only be accessible to them, tech companies and security experts have made it very clear that security backdoors make products and
services, and by extension the Internet, less secure for everyone. Yet both the FBI and NSA Directors have recently urged companies to install security "backdoors"
into hardware or software, even while American businesses continue to suffer reputational harm overseas and even lose business. Ultimately,
the
amendment failed 9-24.[2] Rep. John Conyers echoed Rep. Goodlatte’s comments on the compromise represented
by the legislation in explaining his no vote: Any amendment to this compromise threatens to stop this legislation
dead in its tracks. This is not mere speculation. House leadership had all but assured us that if the bill is amended, it
will not be considered on the House floor. However, Rep. Conyers and others who voted against the amendment expressed clear support for what
the amendment would have done. Rep Goodlatte noted, “this committee will exercise its jurisdiction on this and soon. We will hold a hearing on this . . .” Echoing
Rep. Goodlatte’s sentiments, Rep. Darrell Issa noted: If I get an opportunity to vote for it on a bill that cannot be blown up by the House leadership and/or the Senate,
I will vote for it, and I think that is what we need to do. Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner also said that he supports the policy, but stated, “The
time and the place
to do this is when Section 702 comes up for reauthorization.” The sentiment that the FISA Amendments Act
expiration is the right time for 702 reform was echoed by several others as well. But the FISA Amendments
Act doesn’t expire until December 31, 2017. We don’t think reform to this unconstitutional spying bill should wait that long.
A2: Millennials Shield
Millennials like the NSA
Santos, Red Alert Politics staff writer, 2015
(Maria, “Poll: The NSA is more popular among millennials than any other generation”, 3-4,
http://redalertpolitics.com/2015/03/04/poll-nsa-popular-among-millennials-generation/)
Pew’s new poll on public views of various government agencies finds that a lot of agencies are viewed favorably by
the majority of Americans—including the NSA, CDC, CIA, and VA. The IRS, however, is the one agency with a favorable-view
percentage below 50 percent—no surprise here. Some of the most interesting numbers come from views of the NSA. Overall, 51
percent view the agency favorably, and 37 percent unfavorably. Democrats are bigger fans than Republicans—58 to
47 percent. (The CIA is the only agency that Republicans favor more than Democrats—64 to 46 percent.) And
millennials—generally thought to distrust institutions—have more favorable views of the NSA than any other
generation. 61 percent of 18-29 years view the NSA favorably. That number dwindles down to 55 percent
within the 30-49 age group, and down further, to 40 percent, among those 65 and older.
Impacts
Asia War – 1NC
TPA is key to TPP which solidifies the Asia Pivot
Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy at CSIS, 2013
(Matthew, December, “economics and the rebalance,”
http://csis.org/files/publication/131220_Global_Economics_Monthly_v2issue12.pdf)
Economics is at the heart of U.S. involvement in the Asia Pacific. This statement is as true today as it was in 1784, when the first U.S. merchant ship
bound for Canton set sail from New York. Trade, investment, and other economic ties across the Pacific today are measured in the trillions of
dollars, support millions of American jobs, and underpin our national security. Like administrations before it, the Obama administration
has put economics at the center of its Asia-Pacific strategy. But it has arguably raised the stakes by making the
overall success of its policy of “rebalancing” to Asia contingent on a successful economic strategy, in particular
completion of a high-standard Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement. The economic leg of the rebalance is driven by three broad objectives: promoting growth and jobs,
upholding and updating the rules of the international trading system, and supporting America’s long-term presence in the region. It is worth noting that these objectives get to both sides of the
coin regarding the relationship between economics and foreign policy: using diplomatic tools to support better economic outcomes, such as more growth and jobs; and—arguably more
challenging—using economic tools in a strategic way to support foreign policy objectives, such as strengthening the rules and supporting our presence in the region. In pursuit of these objectives,
the Obama administration has used a multilayered approach to economic engagement in the Asia Pacific. This has bilateral, regional, and global strands, from the Strategic & Economic Dialogue
with China, to TPP and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, to the G-20, half of whose members are Asia-Pacific countries. And it encompasses all aspects of economic
policy, including promotion of strong domesticdemand- led growth in large Asian surplus economies; negotiation of bilateral investment treaties; and strategic use of development assistance. But
TPP in particular—is the sharp end of the spear when it comes to Obama economic strategy in Asia. Through TPP,
the administration seeks to advance all three objectives mentioned above, with an accent on updating the rules. TPP aims
trade—and
to establish disciplines on an array of behind-the-border impediments, such as excessive or nontransparent regulation; preferences for domestic, especially state-owned, enterprises; and
inadequate intellectual property protection. The administration’s aim appears to be making a successful TPP the driver and de facto template for a new multilateral system of rules. Failure to
reach a TPP deal at this month’s ministerial meeting in Singapore was disappointing but not fatal. Trade talks are always darkest—and noisiest—before the dawn, as differences are narrowed to
the most politically contentious issues. There are still grounds for optimism that a basic TPP deal can be reached by the time of President Obama’s planned trip to Asia next April. The stakes
could not be higher for the White House. Conclusion of TPP is the sine qua non of success for the Asia rebalancing strategy. In addition to its economic benefits, a successful agreement would
Without TPP, the rebalance would contain little of
substance that is new and would be perceived in the region as driven primarily by military considerations. The U.S.
Congress can support the economic leg of the rebalance in several important ways. First, enacting trade promotion authority
legislation would give the administration the guidance and certainty it needs to close a high-standard TPP deal;
without TPA, it is difficult to see how the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) can persuade its counterparts that it can
fulfill its end of the bargain.
anchor the United States more firmly in the Asia Pacific and bolster American leadership there.
Asia pivot prevents great power war
Hiatt, the Post editorial page editor, 2013
(Fred, “Asian tensions add urgency to Obama’s ‘pivot”, 2-10, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0210/opinions/37026174_1_kim-jong-eun-diaoyu-islands-young-leader)
As President Obama ponders his second-term foreign policy, he faces
jihadists spreading across North Africa, Syria dissolving
into chaos, Israelis and Palestinians further apart than ever, Iraq trending toward civil war, Afghanistan mired in
corruption and Iran relentlessly accelerating its nuclear program. That may turn out to be the easy stuff. In Asia,
things could get really scary. Since he entered the White House, Obama has wanted to shift attention and resources to the Pacific. The
biggest opportunities are there: economic growth, innovation, potential for cross-border investment and trade. That the 21st century will be
a Pacific century has become a cliche. The cliche may still prove out. But rather suddenly, the region of economic
miracles has become a zone of frightening confrontation. The North Koreans are turning out videos depicting New
York in flames. Chinese warships have fixed their weapon-targeting radar on a Japanese ship and helicopter. Quarrels
have intensified between South Korea and Japan, North Korea and South Korea, China and the Philippines, India and
China. Taiwan is always a possible flashpoint. Any one of these could drag the United States in. The scariest
development may be in North Korea, the world’s only hereditary prison camp, where the young leader — the third-generation Kim —
seems determined to expand and improve his nuclear arsenal until he becomes a genuine threat not only to South
Korea and Japan but to the United States as well. Chinese officials are said to be alarmed by his intransigence but unwilling to
try to rein him in, fearing even more the instability that might result. Obama in his first term adopted a reasonable policy of ignoring
North Korea as much as possible, while making clear that he would reciprocate if it became more accommodating. Kim Jong Eun, who is thought
to be in his late 20s, could find ways to make that stance untenable. Meanwhile, China’s increasing assertiveness discomfits
neighbors throughout Southeast and East Asia. China has claimed pretty much the whole South China Sea, though
its coastline is farther from much of it than that of Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines. It has sent planes and ships to challenge Japan
over a few rocky outcroppings that Japan calls the Senkakus and China the Diaoyu Islands. It has been steadily increasing
the size and capability of its military forces; for the first time in many years, a neighbor, Japan, is following suit. If all this
seems decidedly last century, maybe it’s because new leaders in every key country are second- or third-generation, bearing the burdens of their
past. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is the grandson of a leader of imperial Japan—including in occupied China — who remade himself as
a pro-American prime minister after World War II. South Korea’s president-elect, Park Geun-hye, is the daughter of a longtime president; her
mother was killed by a devotee of North Korea. (The bullet was intended for her father, who was later assassinated by his intelligence chief.) Xi
Jinping, China’s new president, is the son of a revolutionary colleague of Mao Tsetung who helped battle the Japanese during World War II.
North Korea’s Kim Jong Eun is the grandson of Kim Il-sung, who according to North Korean mythology fought the Japanese in the 1930s and
1940s and the Americans and South Koreans in the 1950s. It’s intriguing to speculate on the ghostly whisperings these leaders
may hear. It may be more useful, though, to focus on the national weaknesses that may propel them to act. North Korea
is a failed and hungry state for which blackmail and bluster have long been the only survival strategy. China is a
rising power and a growing economy — but led by a one-party regime that may be tempted to use nationalism to distract
a restive population from domestic troubles. Japan has discarded one prime minister after another , pretty much on an
annual basis, for most of the past decade, an instability that leaves it punching below its economic and military
weight. All of this makes the region hungry for U.S. presence and leadership, which Obama understood with his
first-term promise of a “pivot” to Asia. Regional leaders hope he can make good on that promise in a second term but wonder whether
U.S. policy, too, will be shaped by political weakness. They notice when the Navy announces that it is, again, reducing its planned number of
ships or Defense Secretary Leon Panetta orders an aircraft carrier kept in port because of budgetary constraints. They wonder who will inherit the
Asia focus of former secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton and departing assistant secretary Kurt Campbell. They see the dangers, from
Mali to Kandahar, that pull Obama’s attention. They hope it won’t take a more dangerous crisis in their region to
make the pivot a reality.
Turns Case – Economy
PC is key to TPA – boosts the global economy and U.S. leadership
Zoellick, former US trade representative, 2014
(Robert, “A Trade Opportunity for Obama and the New Congress”, 12-28, http://www.wsj.com/articles/charlesboustany-and-robert-b-zoellick-a-trade-opportunity-for-obama-and-the-new-congress-1419811308)
political commentators identified trade policy as one area for cooperation between President Obama and
the Republican Congress. We agree. Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress has authority over trade. But the active direction and use of
that authority depends on an energetic executive, in partnership with Congress . According to a recent Pew Research survey, 66% of Americans believe
After the midterm elections,
greater U.S. involvement in the global economy is a “good thing,” with only 25% thinking it is bad. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement is a “good thing” in the eyes of 55% of Americans, versus 25% who consider it
the presidency
relied on the “power to persuade.” It’s time for Mr. Obama to persuade on trade. He must make use of the convening
power of the executive to bolster his advocacy. His administration must work closely with Congress—to listen,
explain, address problems and cut deals. So why does trade matter? First, Americans are feeling squeezed. On the eve of the election, Pew Research reported that 79% of Americans considered
bad; the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) scores 53% good and 20% bad. These inclinations offer opportunity. Prof. Richard Neustadt explained to President John F. Kennedy that
the economy to be poor or at best fair. A boost in U.S. trade can increase wages and lower living expenses for families—offering higher earnings and cutting taxes on trade. Manufacturing workers who produce exports earn, on
average, about 18% more, according to the Commerce Department. Their pay raise can be traced to the higher productivity of competitive exporting businesses. Since World War II, U.S. trade policy has focused on lowering barriers
to manufacturing and agricultural products. But U.S. trade negotiators also use free-trade agreements (FTAs) to pry open service sectors and expand e-commerce. In recent years, such business services as software, finance,
architecture and engineering employed 25% of American workers, more than twice as many as worked in manufacturing. Business service employees earned over 20% more than the average manufacturing job, and the U.S.
consistently runs a trade surplus in business services. Over the past five years, the World Bank reports, about 75% of the world’s growth has been in emerging markets, which generally have higher barriers to trade. As America’s
. With the boom in U.S. energy innovation and production, fuel
exports could spur more investment and jobs in that sector, too. American families, and businesses, benefit from higher incomes and lower-priced imports. The
World Trade Organization reports that the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Uruguay Round, the last big global trade agreement,
have increased the purchasing power of an average American family of four by $1,300 to $2,000 every year. The
Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that the new trade deals in the works could offer that family another
$3,000 or more a year. Second, the U.S. and world economies desperately need a shift from extraordinary governmental
spending and zero-interest-rate monetary policies to growth led by the private sector. Sustained growth can only be
generated by private investment, innovation and purchases. American companies need greater confidence in freeenterprise policies before investing their big cash reserves. Trade policy offers an international partnership to
overcome structural impediments to growth. The negotiations for the TPP, for example, aim to create an open trade and
investment network among the U.S., six current FTA partners, and five new ones. The biggest additional market is Japan, a pivotal Pacific ally.
highly productive farmers and ranchers have seen, growing world markets are the drivers of higher sales
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe wants to use the TPP to press his own economy toward more competition, without which his goal of reviving Japan will falter. Vietnam and Malaysia would also take part; they believe they can
use the rules and disciplines of the TPP to boost growth, improve industries and services, expand global linkages, and avoid the so-called “middle income” trap, where countries’ lack of productivity growth slows the rise to higher
incomes. The TTIP under negotiation with the 28 countries of the European Union could overcome regulatory barriers that now choke off Europe’s economic recovery and weigh down U.S. growth. The industries that already operate
across the Atlantic—such as autos, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and advanced manufacturing—could offer examples of ways to promote more competition with high standards. The U.S. is well-positioned to benefit from new,
expanded and enforceable rules for fair competition. With an advanced economy at the technological frontier, American companies have demonstrated a rare capacity to innovate—as we have seen in software, use of Big Data, energy,
robotics and bioengineering. The demands of consumers and business for better services—in retail, communications, entertainment, education, health care, infrastructure, transport and logistics—in both developed and developing
U.S. foreign policy has been drifting. President Obama’s disengagements, have
eroded confidence in America’s staying power. Trade policy can help re-establish America’s international economic
commitment; U.S. economic interests underpin political and security ties. New economic links with key security
partners on the Pacific and Atlantic rims of the Eurasian continents advance our primary geopolitical interests. And
trade policy enlists America’s greatest asset—its dynamic private sector—in support of U.S. foreign policy. Just as American commerce in the 19th and 20th
economies, offer private-sector opportunities for growth. Third,
centuries sailed with missionaries, engineers and educators, so 21st-century trade, investment and business networks will promote the causes of civil society, human rights, the environment and gender equality.
Turns Case – Hegemony
Trade leadership is key to overall hegemony
Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, 2-17-15
(Michael, “The Geopolitical Stakes of America’s Trade Policy,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/17/thegeopolitical-stakes-of-americas-trade-policy-tpp-ttip/)
This century’s defining battle could be won or lost without a shot fired . As President Barack Obama’s National Security
Strategy makes clear, the rules-based system we have led since World War II is competing against alternative, more
mercantilist models. Unlike past challenges to American leadership, this competition is primarily economic in
nature, and victory hinges more on opening markets and raising standards than on building bombs and raising
armies. To be sure, the traditional link between economics and strategy hasn’t been upended as much as extended. Beginning with the first
estimates of national income, which were developed in 17th century Europe to compare the ability of states to raise and support militaries,
economic power has been viewed primarily as an enabler for military power. This basic belief was widely adopted and held
sway among most strategists through the Cold War. More recently, however, leaders and strategic thinkers around the world have
come to see economic strength as more than merely a purse for military power. They now understand prosperity to
be a principal means by which countries exercise power itself. As the National Security Strategy states, “America’s growing
economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad.” In
this environment, trade has emerged as one of America’s most important foreign policy tools — both for increasing our
strength at home and for exercising it abroad. At home, one-third of our economic growth since 2009 is due to the
increase in U.S. exports. Last year, the United States exported $2.35 trillion in goods and services, a record amount that supported over 11
million U.S. jobs. During a period of uneven global growth, growing exports are a key driver of America’s resurgence. Above and
beyond its immediate benefits for the U.S. economy, President Obama’s trade agenda is advancing three objectives outlined in
the National Security Strategy: setting new rules of the road, strengthening our partnerships, and promoting inclusive
development. In the Asia Pacific, we’re negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which will help set rules of the road for the world’s
fastest-growing region. A main pillar of our rebalance toward Asia, this agreement will cover nearly 40 percent of the global economy. It will
level the playing field for American workers and businesses by establishing the strongest environmental and labor standards of any trade
agreement in history, as well as the first disciplines on issues like state-owned enterprises and on maintaining a free and open Internet. By
leading on these issues, the United States can launch a race to the top, rather than be subject to a race to the bottom
that we cannot win and should not run. At a time when the crisis in Ukraine has triggered deep unease, the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) will remind the world that our transatlantic partnership is second-to-none. This agreement will deepen our
economic relationship with the European Union, already the world’s largest, by bridging divergences between our regulations and standards —
without compromising health, safety, environmental, and consumer protection on both sides of the Atlantic. Many in Europe are looking to TTIP
not only to spur much-needed economic growth but also to support efforts to reform European energy policies and create greater energy security.
Taken together, TPP and TTIP will help update the rules-based order as well as solidify America’s strategic
position within it. With these agreements in place, the United States will be at the center of a free trade zone covering
nearly two-thirds of the global economy. Combined with all of the strengths that already make the U nited States an
attractive place to invest and do business — a highly skilled and innovative workforce, a large market backed by a strong rule of law,
and an abundant supply of affordable energy — we’ll be one step closer to becoming the world’s production platform of
choice, further increasing our economic strength and influence . Our trade policy aims not only to update the global economic
architecture but also to expand it through efforts like the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The cornerstone of U.S. trade policy with subSaharan Africa since 2001, this program has supported hundreds of thousands of jobs in the region and created countless market opportunities for
American businesses. Updating and renewing this program to reflect changes within Africa and between African countries and their trading
partners would send a strong message that America remains deeply committed to this dynamic region and to promoting broad-based development
through trade. The geopolitical stakes become even clearer when you consider the alternatives. In the Asia-Pacific
region, for example, over 200 trade deals have been struck in recent years and more are currently under negotiation .
Unlike TPP and TTIP, the vast majority of these agreements make no commitment to protecting labor rights and environmental standards,
creating disciplines on state-owned enterprises, and promoting the digital economy. We face an important choice. We can lead and
ensure that the global trading system reflects our values and our interests, or we can cede that role to others, which
will inevitably create a less advantageous position for our workers and our businesses. The economic implications
are stark, but so too are the strategic ones. Sitting on the sidelines, we’ll see our partnerships weakened as
they’re deprived of the strength that comes from enhanced economic relationships, and we’ll miss the
opportunity to forge new habits of cooperation among key partners. We cannot allow that to happen. As
economic power has become more consequential in world affairs, so too has American leadership on trade . If
the United States leads on trade, it can strengthen the rules-based order. For over seven decades, American
leadership of the global trading system has helped bring jobs to our shores, partners to our defense, and peace and
prosperity to those around the world who have embraced openness and fairness. Economically and strategically,
that leadership is now more important than ever.
Asia Conflict Outweighs
All other regional wars will remain insulated – Asian war risks destabilizing spread and
escalation
Naím, senior associate in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2013
(Moisés, chief international columnist for El Pais and La Repubblica, Spain's and Italy's largest dailies, “The Most
Dangerous Continent,” 10-17, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/10/the-most-dangerouscontinent/280528/)
Some problems travel well. Sometimes too well. Financial crashes have taught us that in some cases what starts as a very local economic
problem quickly escalates and becomes a global crisis. Think Greece—or more recently Cyprus. And we know that terrorism also has a way of
going global in unpredictable and dangerous ways. But what about regions? Which continents are more prone to infect the rest
of the world with their problems? Africa and Latin America's woes, for example, remain mostly insulated. Of course, the
mass emigration of Africans to Europe and Latin Americans to the United States is an example of how one continent’s problems spill over into
another, but this contagion has had much less of an impact than the economic crisis in the U.S. or Europe, for example.
Millions of people all over the world, and especially in Europe, are still paying the consequences for that financial earthquake. The point is that
the problems of some continents are more ‘systemic’ than others. This is to say that the agonies of some regions
affect the entire world, no matter how far away they are. The question, then, is: Which of the five continents is bound to
spread more unhappiness in the future? One way to answer is to think about which threats travel the easiest and with
no trouble skirt borders, fortifications, or the public policies that we naïvely believe protect us. An economic crash in
China, for example, is bound to be felt everywhere and by everyone. Nor may we be able to dodge the consequences of
the nuclear experiments of a young, inexperienced North Korean tyrant. So, which continent is the most dangerous? Asia.
This may surprise those who see the ‘Asian economic miracle’ as a model for the rest of the world. Or those who think that
conditions in the Middle East are ripe for a lengthy and rising wave of armed conflicts, religious radicalization and
international terrorism. All this is true. But the problems that originate in Asia will prove more and more complicated, as
their already gigantic economies continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace than in the last several decades. The main threats to
humanity today are: 1) climate change; 2) nuclear proliferation; 3) the outbreak of a disease with no known cure that
spreads across the globe claiming a large number of victims; 4) global economic crises and, of course, 5) an armed conflict
between two or more military powers, such as China and India, for example. Of course, there are other threats: terrorism, the
increased scarcity of water, criminalized governments, structural unemployment, and the proliferation of failed
states. But none of these would generate the colossal consequences of the five I list. Asia is the region with the most
countries that have the potential to create and spread these five problems . The much celebrated economic success of the
‘Asian tigers’ obscures the fact that this continent is also home to the principal threats to global stability. According to
the Asian Development Bank, Asia is on the path to double its consumption of oil, triple its use of natural gas, and see an
81 percent increase in its use of high polluting coal, speeding up and doubling its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by
2035. Asia alone, then, would be emitting the total amount of CO2 that experts have calculated to be the maximum
sustainable level for the entire planet. Asia is also the continent with the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons.
These capabilities are present in high-risk countries like North Korea and Pakistan, which also happen to be those that
have shown no qualms in selling their nuclear technology to the highest bidder. Many of the world’s longest-lasting
armed conflicts are found in Asia. From Afghanistan to Sri Lanka and from Kashmir to the unending armed insurgencies in
Indonesia and the Philippines, wars are routine. Asia is also marked by the most explosive borders in the world: China
and India, Pakistan and India, and between the two Koreas. From Asia came the avian bird flu pandemic. While the
mortalities proved lower than feared, the world was alerted to Asia’s potential to rapidly spread disease across the globe.
Are these accidents and Asia-originated problems inevitable? Of course not. But they are unfortunately more
important and urgent than issues that more frequently absorb the world’s attention.
Asian wars outweigh – no checks on escalation
Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, 2014
(Aaron, “Asia Emerges As Center of Gravity in the International System”, 10-25,
https://www.aei.org/publication/eye-asia/)
As Henry Kissinger and others have observed, Asia is emerging as the center of gravity in the international system. The rapid economic growth that began with Japan during the 1960s spread to South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in
Today, Asian nations account for an increasing
share of global military resources and overall economic output. Even though defense budgets and force levels have declined in Europe and North America, Asia’s have
the 1970s; China in the 1980s; and India in the 1990s. As has become indisputable, throughout history, prosperity brings power in its train.
The region is home to five nuclear-armed militaries (China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Russia), and their number could increase.
Asian nations have been investing in advanced combat aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles,
submarines, and surface vessels and progressively expanding arsenals of both long-range ballistic and cruise missiles.
Compared to Europe, Asia has weak international organizations and means of resolving disputes . Moreover, it contains different
types of states — from liberal democracies to authoritarian regimes of various stripes and repressive totalitarian dictatorships — with myriad
outstanding differences over borders and maritime claims. Asia is also a region in which the domestic politics of many significant
players are characterized by strident forms of nationalism. For these reasons, Asia is one region of the world where conflicts
among major powers remain plausible and may even be probable . It is also a region where the United States has
substantial economic interests, strong alliance commitments, quasi-alliance relationships, and a continuing interest
in preserving freedom of navigation across the Western Pacific. Contrary to what Thomas Friedman has maintained, the world is not flat. Geography still matters,
expanded.
Meanwhile, on the conventional side of the weapons ledger,
certainly in military affairs, and that is nowhere more evident than in Asia. Compared with Europe, the Middle East, and other areas of intense geopolitical interaction, strategic Asia is very large; distances within the region are huge,
Nations that
wish to deter, coerce, or attack enemies must generally be prepared to project power across great expanses of water
and airspace, which until recently few were actually capable of doing. Moreover, this is a region in which suitably equipped major powers may fight
what Chinese strategists have called noncontact wars, engaging one another on the sea and in the air — and perhaps even in space
and cyberspace — without ever coming into contact on the land. Many Asian nations, including China, Japan, and South Korea but with the notable exception of India, face aging
and one key player is more than 6,000 miles away. Save for China and Russia, and partly for China and India (which are separated by the Himalayas), the major powers are not physically contiguous.
populations. Others, notably Japan and Russia, will shrink in absolute terms over coming decades. The implications of these demographic trends for economic growth, social cohesion, military policy, and international behavior more
generally are unclear, but they could be profound. Despite their remarkable performance in recent decades, there is considerable uncertainty about the future trajectories of major Asian economies. India’s ability to achieve and
maintain annual growth rates closer to 10 percent than 5 percent will go a long way toward determining whether it can achieve its potential to become a true great power. For China meanwhile, the question is when and how rapidly its
economic engine will slow. Not even the most optimistic denizens of China’s state planning apparatus think that the near double-digit rates of the last three decades can be sustained indefinitely. What remains to be seen is whether
growth slows gradually and gracefully or plummets, perhaps as the result of a crisis involving years of politically motivated overinvestment in real estate and infrastructure. Steady, rapid economic growth has enabled China to expand
military budgets without greatly increasing the share of gross national product devoted to defense. Slower, more erratic progress would likely mean an increased incidence of social unrest as well as tougher trade-offs between guns
and butter. The development and diffusion of strategically relevant technologies will substantially affect the distribution of military power. Nuclear proliferation is the most obvious manifestation of this large and multifaceted process.
. The
likelihood of South Korea, Japan, and perhaps other nations following suit has always existed in theory, but today it is being
considered more openly and taken more seriously than at any time in the past. Whatever happens in the nuclear domain, more states
are obviously determined to acquire the capabilities to project conventional military power beyond their borders. This
Although its implications have not become fully apparent, that North Korea has established itself irrevocably as a nuclear weapons state is beginning to register in the minds of the people within the region
trend, in turn, fuels interest in antiaccess and area-denial capabilities similar to those that China has developed to counter the preponderance of U.S. military forces. Low-cost drones and cruise missiles launched from land, sea,
subsurface, and aerial platforms will threaten naval vessels or commercial ships operating dozens or even hundreds of miles from China’s coasts. The proliferation of antiship ballistic missiles could extend defenses even further and
Crowded Asian coastal waters could quickly be transformed into nogo zones in a war, with implications felt around the world. Outside nations that lack a military presence, as do most European
powers, could find their interests threatened by developments over which they can exercise little direct control . State and possibly
non-state actors will also have the increasing capacity to launch cyber-attacks. This form of warfare is likely to be appealing in a region where disputes are deeply rooted and the costs of open conflict remains high. The
question facing the new leaders in Beijing is whether to continue the assertive approach to long-running maritime
disputes with its neighbors that it began in 2010. In Japan, on the other hand, the question is how best to respond to Chinese
forcefulness. The answer, at the moment, seems to involve resistance rather than appeasement . Tokyo has announced plans to increase
affect naval warfare in ways comparable to the advent of carrier aviation in the interwar years.
defense spending and seek tighter strategic cooperation with Washington. It also has taken measures that include relaxing the ban on arms sales to third parties, which are aimed at shoring up the regional balance of power in the face
of the current Chinese military buildup. Australian decision makers and analysts are debating how to manage deepening economic relations with China while preserving their traditional security alliance with the United States. The
South Korean military posture and future diplomatic disposition are also in flux. Seoul has already taken steps to loosen American-imposed restrictions on its missile forces, and the issue of an independent nuclear deterrent seems to
be back on the table. Even though South Korean elite and public opinion have been growing warmer toward the United States and cooler toward China, relations with Japan remain strained. Meanwhile, in Washington, debate
continues over whether the Obama administration’s pivot, or rebalance, toward Asia, an initiative undertaken largely in reaction to Beijing’s increasing assertiveness, is stabilizing or provocative. AirSea Battle, which is the integrated
warfare doctrine associated with the pivot, has become a source of lively disagreement. Looming above such questions is whether the intensified geopolitical rivalry with China is affordable for the United States given fiscal
popular nationalism is likely to prove particularly important in shaping national strategies. It would
To the contrary, collective pride and
deep-seated animosity, fear, and resentment can play critical roles in shaping national strategy, even when the end
results seem obviously counterproductive. Beyond current national interests and memories of the past are deeper patterns of thought that influence policy makers. China, India, Japan, and
constraints. Of the factors at work in Asia,
be a mistake to assume, as so much of the political science literature does, that international behavior is produced by rational deliberation and calculation.
other nations have undergone centuries of internal and external conflicts and competition. As a result, they have developed characteristic ways of thinking about politics, diplomacy, and war that differ from those of the West. In their
initial interaction with outside powers, Asian societies’ obvious material weakness overshadowed their unique strategic cultures. Whatever advantage they might have enjoyed from the subtlety of their statecraft or skill at employing
deception in time of war was overwhelmed by the superior strength of their enemies. The current situation is different, but it is not entirely without precedent. The first wave of scholarly interest in strategic culture in the 1970s
coincided with a growing recognition that the United States no longer had a massive edge in military power over the Soviet Union. Albeit belatedly, some American and other Western strategists began to realize their counterparts
were not simply laggards who needed to be schooled in the revolutionary effects of nuclear weapons and the virtues of stability. The Soviets had their own approach to warfare, which if put to the test, might have proved superior. In
the growing strength of
China, India, and other Asian nations is kindling a resurgence of interest in their distinctive strategic cultures. Standing
any event, the obvious erosion of previous American advantages made it clear that bolstering deterrence required gaining a better understanding of Soviet thinking. Similarly,
back and contemplating the evolving pattern of interaction among key players, the broadest questions concern the structure of the emerging Asian system and its major axes of antagonism and alignment. Will Asia become really
multipolar, with several independent centers of power, including China, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, and perhaps Indonesia, maneuvering with and against one another? Or will the regional system become increasingly bipolar, with a
line drawn between China and the United States and like-minded powers, including allies such as Japan and quasi allies like India? Or is Asia — at least East Asia — moving toward a hierarchical order, with China at the center,
resembling the premodern tribute system? Established U.S. relationships with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea are all in flux, with a trend toward even closer ties. Nevertheless, the combination of growing concern
over Chinese power and the likelihood of persistent downward pressure on U.S. defense budgets means that burden sharing is regaining salience and could become a source of controversy. Efforts by Washington to increase the
efficiency of the hub-and-spoke alliance system by promoting greater cooperation among partners also face difficulties, especially in the case of Japan and South Korea. Moreover, the United States is seeking ways to use commercial
policy as an instrument of national strategy, proposing free-trade agreements as an alternative to friends and allies being drawn into the orbit of the massive Chinese economy. At the same time, Beijing is attempting to promote
alternative regional institutions of its own design that exclude or marginalize Washington. In addition to transpacific ties, many Asian nations are seeking to forge stronger strategic relationships within their region. The linkages take
different forms, including bilateral and multilateral dialogues among participants such as Australia, India, Japan, and Vietnam. Military exercises, intelligence exchanges, and arms sales are also increasing in frequency and volume.
Enhanced cooperation in some
relationships is being accompanied by intensified military competition in others . Although it has taken time for U.S. officials to acknowledge the obvious,
Beijing and Washington have been competing for the better part of two decades. Strategists on both sides regard the
other as a potential enemy, which influences deployments, exercises, war plans, research and development, and
procurement. While China and the United States are not engaged in a simple action-reaction arms race, each is increasingly focused on the other and their plans
are becoming more tightly linked. Each aims to deter the other from taking actions that it opposes and seeks to improve the chances to achieve its military objectives if deterrence fails. China in
Whatever the United States does, Asian nations are seeking ways to work together to shore up their positions in relation to an increasingly powerful China.
particular appears to have adopted a competitive-strategies approach, developing weapons and operational concepts that target U.S. vulnerabilities and will be disproportionately expensive to counter, such as using comparatively
Military competition between China and the United States will not be the only
struggle in Asia. China and India observe each other warily across the Himalayas and in the Indian Ocean. China
inexpensive cruise and ballistic missiles to attack multibillion-dollar aircraft carriers.
and Japan are not only planning for conflict but maneuvering their forces against one another in the Western Pacific .
Additionally, Japan and South Korea are developing capabilities to project power in response to other contingencies, which
can possibly be seen as mutually threatening. The nations bordering the South China Sea are enhancing their ability
to defend their maritime claims against China, but some have long histories of mutual mistrust. Military interaction
in the Asia-Pacific region is complex, multifaceted, and dynamic — and likely to intensify.
TPA Key to Asia Pivot – 2NC
TPA rights the U.S. ship in Asia – overcomes all of the other problems with the pivot
Cronin, Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New
American Security, 3-18-15
(Patrick, The Straits Times, “Why the Pacific trade pact is in the US national interest,” lexis)
SOME business analysts are stressing that the pending Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) between the United States and 11 other countries
promises smaller rewards - if also fewer risks - than previous multilateral efforts to liberalise trade. But such a
judgment omits altogether the national security reasons for finalising both the trade pact and the Tr ade Promotion
Authority that would strengthen the role of the US President in advancing regional commerce. First, the TPP would
help to reverse the impression that the US is a declining and one-dimensional military power. Whatever the
image of US power in North America, Asia-Pacific countries continue to harbour considerable doubt about
American staying power and strength relative to a rising China. Even our closest allies in the region are enhancing
their economic and development ties with China. At the same time, they and others fear what continued US military
dominance could bring to the region in dealing with the increasing tension among major powers. A multilateral trade
pact accentuates the dimension of US power and interest that appeals to all actors in the Asia-Pacific region. In Asia,
trade is the coin of the realm. The TPP rebrands America as a leading market power, rather than just a security
guarantor that brings big guns to settle local disputes. In addition, the TPP bolsters a model of sustainable economic
growth that is essential to maintaining our long-term security posture, both with respect to defence spending and
forward military presence. Second, the Pacific trade pact would do more to reassure our key allies than simply
tinkering on the margins of our military presence. Our presence is vital. But if we want to signal that we are
serious about being a permanent Pacific power, then long-term trade frameworks are more compelling. Despite our
military activity, Japan and Australia remain anxious about our future intentions. That is not good, given how important these allies are. Indeed, Australia is becoming
increasingly important for rotational presence and exercising, and the only other country beyond Japan and South Korea where we can imagine being prepared to
conduct "Phase 2" combined operations designed to "seize the initiative". The converse of reassurance would be an action - or in this case, inaction - that would sow
great doubt on American credibility. The failure to complete this trade pact would strike a serious blow to our reputation, and one from which it would be difficult to
recover. The TPP anchors our future interests in the region that speaks to Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and others worried about US power and purpose in the wake of
events such as the protracted post-9/11 diversion or the impact of the 2008 Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy on regional calculations. A third and related national interest
in completing the TPP is that it would allow the US to entrench itself in the world's most dynamic world and thereby reach out to new partners in non-military ways.
This simultaneously enables such new engagement and lowers the transaction costs on our security cooperation throughout the region. Importantly, among the other
initial stakeholders in the TPP are three of the four South-east Asian countries with disputed claims in the South China Sea. The fourth, the Philippines, is already a
treaty ally of the US. But with this trade pact, the US would be able to tighten cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei without having to focus exclusively on
maritime defence issues. In addition, the TPP would also solidify US ties with Chile and Peru, two key South American economies with a Pacific orientation. Thus,
the TPP gives us leverage in the decade ahead as we
begin negotiations on second-round entrants. This could be a major tool for engaging China, given that our clear
objective is to integrate a rising China, not to contain it. It also gives us a potential tool for managing Taiwan, whose
growing dependence on the mainland is leaving it little international space for avoiding coercion. Other allies, notably South
we can expand our regional partners while underscoring our broad Pacific role. Fourth,
Korea, would like to join, and ought to be at the front of the queue. The US-Thai alliance has been undermined by political instability in Thailand, and trade may
provide a path toward alliance renewal. Finally, other key regional actors, especially Indonesia, could be prepared for admission in a second round, making the TPP a
dominant trade framework for the region. Fifth, a
regional trade pact would preserve and adapt a largely US-created regional
architecture as we compete to shape the 21st century global order. What we want is what all nations in the region
should want: namely, unfettered access to trade and the global commons. The TPP would reinforce a regional
coalition around common high-standard trade norms and rules, and thereby balance against alternative rule sets that, for instance, favour
state-owned enterprises. The aim is not US primacy so much as the primacy of a rules-based system. For all of these
reasons, beyond the obvious economic ones of expanding trade in relatively new sectors as well as services, the TPP
is squarely in the national security interest of the US and the Asia-Pacific region.
TPA and TPP solidify US commitment to Asia – overwhelms alt causes.
Flournoy, Center for a New American Security chief executive, 3-8-15
(Michele, “A Trade Deal With a Bonus For National Security,” http://www.wsj.com/articles/michele-flournoy-andely-ratner-a-trade-deal-with-a-bonus-for-national-security-1425854510)
On the Big Island of Hawaii beginning Monday, U.S.
officials will host trade negotiators from 11 nations spanning Asia and
the Americas to work toward completing what could be the most significant trade deal in a generation. Five years in the
making, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would cover 40% of global gross domestic product and a third of world trade.
Any such deal ultimately will have to make it through the U.S. Congress. In order to prevent lawmakers from amending the agreement and
undoing years of international negotiations, Congress will first have to provide President Obama with trade promotion authority, also known as
“fast-track,” that allows a yes-or-no vote on the package. This
is the time for advocates on both sides to move beyond the usual
economic arguments and consider the extraordinary geopolitical stakes involved. Not every trade agreement puts
America’s prestige, influence and leadership on the line, but the TPP does. Much of the history of the 21st
century will be written in Asia, and no region will affect U.S. prosperity and security more in the coming decades.
Few in the region doubt the foundations of American power—favorable geography, abundant energy and resources,
healthy demographics, diversity and immigration, cutting-edge technology and education, and a penchant for
innovation. But it’s less clear that Washington can govern effectively and sustain America’s traditional global role.
Bipartisan congressional action on fast-track authority would provide a welcome counter to skeptics who
question the U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific. By opening new opportunities for trade and leveling the
playing field for American businesses and workers, the TPP would further fuel America’s economic recovery
and support long-term growth. A healthier fiscal environment would in turn help Washington reverse
defense cuts that threaten to undermine the U.S. military’s readiness and technological edge when we need them
more than ever. Deeper economic engagement in Asia would also help strengthen America’s security ties, which are
a unique and central feature of U.S. global power . These critical partnerships are at their strongest and most
durable when military cooperation rests on a foundation of shared economic interests. Wealthier partners
benefiting from a more open regional trading system would be able to devote greater resources to helping the U.S.
address global and regional security challenges, from counterterrorism and maritime security to humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief. The TPP also represents an unprecedented opportunity—and one that may not return for
decades—to establish widespread trade rules in Asia that advance U.S. values and interests. The agreement would lock in
stronger labor and environmental protections, while establishing new rules on intellectual property rights and curbing unfair government
subsidies to state-owned enterprises. Ensuring that countries like Japan, Malaysia and Vietnam elevate their practices to meet these higher
standards would yield economic and social reforms that the U.S. has long sought to advance in Asia. This wave of reform would continue as
other countries line up to join the pact in future rounds. Critics of free trade in general, and the TPP in particular, claim these standards don't go
far enough. Perhaps, but the perfect should not be the enemy of the good. Given the painstaking negotiations and the diversity of countries
involved, disrupting the deal now would likely lead to no deal at all. In that event the leadership vacuum left by the U.S. would
quickly be filled by other powers, most likely China, which would be more than happy to set laxer rules and lower
standards for global trade. How would the U.S. benefit from such a race to the bottom? The good news is that this
contest is Washington’s to lose. Polls show that more than two-thirds of Americans support increased trade ties overseas, and there
remains a strong bipartisan consensus for U.S. engagement in Asia. Now it is up to lawmakers on Capitol Hill to
ensure that the U.S. reaps the national security windfall of the TPP. To fail would be a historic strategic folly .
Asia Pivot Good – 2NC
The pivot is critical to Asian stability – prevents outbreaks of nuclear conflict
Neuman 11/16/12 (Scott, works as a Digital News writer and editor, handling breaking news and feature stories for NPR.org. He spent the
previous two years as the international desk editor at the AP, while living in New York. Neuman was part of the team that earned the Pulitzer
Prize awarded to The Wall Street Journal for overall coverage of 9/11 and the aftermath. A graduate from Purdue University, Neuman earned a
Bachelor's degree in communications and electronic journalism, “Why Obama Put Asia On The Agenda Now”
http://www.npr.org/2012/11/16/165302731/why-obama-put-asia-on-the-agenda-now)
There is no getting around the fact that China
is the dominant power in Asia and that its economic, military and political power is
rapidly growing. Its economic tentacles have turned much of the region into an outsourcing hub for its own shop floors,
with Southeast Asia, for example, becoming a major source of computer chips and hard drives. At the same time, Beijing has stepped up its
muscle-flexing over long-standing claims in the South China Sea and elsewhere — sending patrol vessels to the Senkaku
Islands, claimed by both Japan and China, and the Scarborough Shoals, disputed territory with the Philippines. "The U.S. sees this pivot
toward Asia as a way to counterbalance China's growing influence in the region," says Suzanne DiMaggio, vice
president of Global Policy Programs at the Asia Society. "I think the U.S. looks to Asia and sees China's fingerprints
everywhere." Among other things, providing a counterbalance to China means strengthening military ties and
commitments in the region. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said the U.S. would increase the number and size of its
military exercises in the Pacific. By 2020, he said, the U.S. Navy would shift the bulk of its fleet to the Pacific, including six carrier battle groups.
But in a larger diplomatic sense, the goal is to rein in Beijing and promote regional stability without provoking the
ire of a resurgent China, which sees itself as the logical lead power in Asia. This so-called pivot to Asia has been in motion since the first
days of the Obama administration, said John Ciorciari of the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. "President
Obama ... sees this as a foreign policy legacy for his administration. It speaks to the big role that the U.S. sees for
itself in Asia, which is to be there for the long term." Dean Cheng, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Asia Studies
Center, says Asia is important because it could easily become a region of major instability. "You have multiple
nuclear powers: China, Russia, North Korea," he says. "So, with any outbreak of hostilities, given the economic importance
of the region, it will inevitably affect the American economy and the global economy." How does Southeast Asia fit into
the grand strategy? "Throughout the region, you have small countries that have relatively robust ties to China, but as small
powers, they don't want to be too beholden to their great neighbor to the north," Ciorciari says. "The president's trip, I
think, is a very conscious attempt to take advantage of that opportunity to build its relationships."