Baba, Erdman, Reynolds, Sandoval 1
Pram v. Martini (1982)
Trial Court of Muskego, Minnesota
DISPOSITION: Injunction denied.
JUDGES: Judge Reynolds concurs with Judges Baba and Sandoval; Judge Erdman dissents in
full and votes to grant the requested injunction.
OPINION BY: BABA with SANDOVAL: Defendant is constructing a home in the private
property of a subdivided residence in Muskego, Minnesota. The construction brings a nuisance
upon the plaintiff, one which leads the plaintiff to call for an injunction to restrain further
building pending adjustment of grade and distance of defendant’s home sufficient for use of solar
power.
First we must address whether or not the situation constitutes a nuisance. Second, pending
establishment of a nuisance, we must determine if it is public or private and balance the equities.
We refer to the definition of a nuisance in Estancias Dallas Corporation v. T.R. Schultz et ux.
which demonstrates that a nuisance is:
“...Any condition, brought about by one party in the use of his property, so unusual and
excessive that it necessarily causes injury or damage or harm or inconvenience to another
party in the use and enjoyment of his property, substantially, materially and unreasonably
interfering with the latter’s comfort and proper use and enjoyment of his property, taking
into consideration the nature and use of the property of both parties and the character of
community in which they are situated, and which condition would be substantially
offensive, discomforting and annoying to persons of ordinary sensibilities, tastes and
habits living in the locality where the premises are situated.”
The construction of a home within private property in accordance with all zoning laws and
regulations is not deemed unusual or excessive in the injury it inflicts. Although defendant has
not addressed the adjustment of house grade with the Architectural Control Committee of the
subdivision, we are led to believe he has done so with the Planning Commission of the City of
Muskego, which means defendant does not exercise unusual or excessive use of property.
Moreover, the construction in this case does not substantially, materially and unreasonably
interfere with the defendants own use of property given that the land is residential and made
specifically for housing development. However, using our definition, the plaintiff does show that
taking his own nature and use of his property into consideration (with regard to solar panel use)
it does inflict an uncomfortable nuisance upon him.
In order for a nuisance to be considered a public one, it “must affect a considerable number of
people, or an entire community or neighborhood,” as stated in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb
Development. By this precedent, we cannot consider the nuisance described in this case to be a
public one. If an injunction is denied, it will not affect or infringe on the enjoyment of a great
number of people’s rights. The nuisance here is a private one, as it only affects the plaintiff. The
establishment of this as a private nuisance overrules the argument that the plaintiff made in
regards to the case of Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. The plaintiff
Baba, Erdman, Reynolds, Sandoval 2
states that the outcome of that case should not be taken into account and instead compares the
situation to that of Estancias Dallas Corporation v. T.R. Schultz. In this case, an injunction was
granted because since the Estancias Dallas Corporation provided no gains to social welfare, there
was “no evidence before us to indicate the ‘necessity of others’.” The plaintiff compares the
defendant to the Estancias Dallas Corporation, declaring that an injunction should be granted
because the nuisance does not provide a benefit to society. However, this is not valid. Estancias
Dallas Corporation produced a public nuisance, keeping a good number of families from
enjoying their legal rights. The situation here is that of a private nuisance, so this case should not
take precedence over that of Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc.
In the case of Sanborn v. McLean, we saw an example of when the benchmark Blackstonian
Land Rights may be overturned. An injunction was granted because there was a restrictive
easement on the land. However, in the case at hand, and as the defense states, no legal right
exists. Because there is no legal right owned by the plaintiff or on the land, and because the
defendant has gotten approval from the Architectural Control Committee to construct, the
defendant’s right to use and abuse his land should be protected.
Upon completion of the house it is true that a nuisance would occur, but we cannot measure to
which extent it would injure the greater public. The same can be said about the loss of social
benefit experienced by filling out empty lots in a subdivision. Constructing more houses would
certainly make a partially empty residential space more attractive, and potentially raise house
value for the entire neighborhood. The immeasurable nature of both social benefits in the future
makes their importance in this case null. The balancing of equities (assuming a public nuisance
as plaintiff would have us believe) in this case shows that both are of approximately equal value
to society, which leaves to consideration which party has a greater private nuisance as a result of
our decision.
In Hill v. Villarreal, cited by plaintiff, he does in fact show “an efficient and economical
means…to conserve what would otherwise be wasted”. We recognize the future necessity to curb
wasteful resource use and the progress public policy has made to encourage it, and do not want
to dis-incentivize investment in these new clean energy accessories for houses. However, we do
not feel that allowing for the construction of defendant’s house would substantially disincentivize future investment in this energy saving technology given that the private benefit that
households experience from it is far greater than the small social benefit it contributes.
In the opinion of the court, no injunction is granted.
DISSENT: ERDMAN, J (dissenting): I do not subscribe to the majority’s opinion that the
nuisance is not only private, but I find that it is public as well. Although numerous issues are
raised, I feel that it is only necessary to answer the following question:
When the construction of a residence creates a nuisance that impedes the utility of
an investment that benefits both the investor and society as a whole, can the court
restrict property rights?
The question before the Court is similar in nature to the question faced by the New York Court
of Appeals in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. It is:
Baba, Erdman, Reynolds, Sandoval 3
“…Should [the Court] resolve the litigation between the parties now before it as
equitably as seems possible; or whether, seeking promotion of the general public welfare,
it should channel private litigation into broad public objectives?”
Solar panels are a relatively new phenomenon. Therefore, there is a lack of litigant precedent
regarding this particular type of nuisance in which private property rights come in conflict with
the conversion of sun into energy. There are numerous cases, however, that have to do with
property rights, individuals’ right to light, private versus public nuisances, and the public welfare
at large.
According to Ronald Coase, we must consider a problem of reciprocal nature when analyzing the
conflicting property rights between Pram and Martini. Traditionally, when A inflicts harm on B,
the question is: how should we restrain A? Instead, Coase suggests that we must decide should A
be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? In this case, A not only harms B, but
harms C (the general public) as well.
The first step in answering this question is defining who came to whom? The plaintiff’s home
was the first residence built in its subdivision. Therefore, the likelihood that the plaintiff knew its
panels would be shadowed is less likely than the defendant’s knowing it would impose harm on
the already-established plaintiff. In this way, the defendant created the nuisance and is
responsible for the harm he imposes on the plaintiff and, more generally, on society at large.
Second, the court must determine if the nuisance is private, public, or both.
Mathematical calculations reveal that defendant’s house, under current construction plans, will
shade the plaintiff’s solar panels and reduce the panels’ efficiency at an increased cost to the
plaintiff. It is clear that the nuisance created by the defendant is private. But is it also a public
nuisance?
As stated in Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development, “The difference between a private
nuisance and a public nuisance is generally one of degree. A private nuisance is one affecting a
single individual or a definite small number of persons…while a public nuisance is one affecting
the rights enjoyed by citizens as a part of the public. To constitute a public nuisance, the
nuisance must affect a considerable number of people or an entire community or neighborhood.”
The opinion also states that, if the injury is “slight,” then the solution lies in payment of damages
after balancing the equities. Application of this precedent will result in the denial of Pram’s
sought injunction and will require Martini to pay the costs associated with the damage resulting
from the panels’ decreased efficiency. This is inefficient because it fails to consider the increased
cost of society’s increased energy burden.
The injury caused in this case is not “slight” and harms society as a whole when considered as a
precedent for all future solar energy cases that may come before the courts. The aggregate social
benefit that results from a decreased use of nonrenewable energy is clear, but very difficult and
costly to quantify. With respect to ‘balancing the equities,’ the fixed cost of moving the
Baba, Erdman, Reynolds, Sandoval 4
defendant’s home must be compared to the sum of the public benefit and the plaintiff’s increased
costs. Unlike the constant cost of moving the defendant’s residence, if the panels are shaded,
costs to society and plaintiff are variable and increase over time.
When balanced in this way, the cost of shading the panels far outweighs the fixed cost associated
with moving the defendant’s residence further away from the plaintiff’s lot line. Therefore, the
court cannot simply permit the defendant to continue building and pay the plaintiff permanent
damages. Doing so would license a continued wrong that results in an increased nonrenewable
energy burden, similar to the sentiment of the dissenting opinion in Boomer v. Atlantic
Construction Co. In the case before us, an injunction is necessary to promote general welfare
resulting from Martini’s inflicted private and public nuisance.
With respect to the plaintiff’s claimed entitlement to the right to light, the defendant cites the
Fountainebleau Hotel Corp v. Forty-five Twenty-five, Inc. decision that states there is no
American law that entitles citizens to the right to natural sunlight. However, their example case
has to do with a transfer of profit from one business to another because of a private nuisance, not
a net loss in social welfare. Because of this, the cases are not analogous and the plaintiff’s right
to light is not used for simply private gain. Economically, the first transaction between
businesses is efficient and results in no net change in social welfare. However, Martini’s shading
of Pram’s solar panels produces inefficiency as a byproduct of a public nuisance.
Instead, consider the precedent established by Pierson v. Post. In the nineteenth century, the fox
was a ‘wild and noxious beast’ and hostem humani generis [hostile to humanity in general]. The
Court’s ruling ultimately incentivized fox hunting because of its benefit to farmers and society as
a whole. Now, liken the benefit of solar panels to the benefit of fox hunting. In modern society,
the conversion of sun into energy benefits society in an even more beneficial way than fox
hunting. Solar panels reduce humanity’s global carbon footprint; compare this to the
extermination of a population of noxious animals in a contained area. Therefore, the Court must
rule in favor of the plaintiff and incentivize an action that benefits society. Tempora mutantur
[times change] and the Blackstonian Bundle of Land Rights must be overlooked in this rare
situation.
In a day when there is a growing concern for clean energy, it is the Court’s responsibility to set
precedent that encourages this type of investment. A ruling in favor of the defendant would
discourage overall investment in necessary solar technology.
The defendant argued that the granting of the injunction would dis-incentivize homebuilding
because individuals will need to consider neighboring solar panels. This argument is null.
Houses will be built because society needs houses, regardless of the ruling. Society doesn’t need
solar panels in the way society needs houses. Houses will be built whether or not solar panels
are built. But if solar energy is dis-incentivized there is a broader social consequence. Therefore,
to rule in favor of the defendant would discourage investment in clean technology in a way an
inverse ruling would not affect housing demand. Farmers in the nineteenth century didn’t need
fox hunting to continue farming. But without fox hunting, successful farming would be
jeopardized in the long term. Just as without incentivizing clean energy, the future prosperity of
humanity will be jeopardized.
Baba, Erdman, Reynolds, Sandoval 5
I am of the opinion that the defendant’s proposed construction is not only damaging to the
plaintiff, but is also decidedly harmful to the general public. I foresee grave dangers in not
protecting investments in solar energy resources that will then decrease dependency on
nonrenewable energy resources. The Court cannot permit landowners to disregard preexisting
neighboring investments in solar energy, because doing so would result in increased
nonrenewable energy use and will ultimately cause exponential damage to social welfare.