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Following a Rule
1
The Skeptical Paradox


Kripke, S.,1982, Wittgenstein on Rule and
Private Language, Harvard University
Press
McGinn, M., 1997, Wittgenstein and the
Philosophical Investigations, Routledge
this was our paradox: no course of action could be
determined by a rule, because every course of action
can be made out to accord with the rule. (PI: # 201)
2

E.g.: plus (+) and quus ().
When we are asked to add two numbers we do
it on the basis of our past intention that
constitutes our understanding of the rule
governing the addition.
That is, my past intention regarding addition
should determine a unique answer for
indefinitely many new cases in the future.
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

There is, though, nothing to rule out my
intention to use another function, say quus, i.e.:
x  y = x + y, if x, y < 57
= 5 otherwise
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
The sceptic doubts whether any instruction I
gave myself in the past justify to answer ‘125’ to
the question ‘68 + 57 = ?’ rather than ‘5’.
This, then, is the sceptical paradox. When I respond in
one way rather than another to such a problem as “68 +
57”, I can have no justification for one response rather
than another. Since the sceptic who supposes that I
meant quus cannot be answered, there is no fact about
me that distinguishes between my meaning plus and my
meaning quus. Indeed, there is no fact about me that
distinguishes between my meaning a definite function by
“plus” (which determines new responses in new cases)
and my meaning nothing at all. (Kripke 1982: 21)
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
Kripke’s reconstruction of the sceptical
paradox is committed to:
1. The indeterminacy of understanding
Since language is a rule-governed practice the
sceptical paradox can affect our linguistic
practice.
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2. Rules are constitutive and normative
The normative power of a rule is an intrinsic part
of their nature.
7

Hacker & Baker reject this interpretation:
Rules supervene on our behaviour.
As such they are normative but not constitutive.
Chomsky/Pinker/Fodor/… idea that linguistic
rules are mental and innate goes against the
view that they are normative.
8

Understanding is a mix of propositional
knowledge (knowing that) and practical
knowledge (knowing how).
The sceptical paradox rests on the possible gap
between the intellectual grasping of a rule
(knowing that) and its (future) application
(knowing how).
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
General considerations
The paradox applies first of all to the notion of
rule following.
It is only in exploiting the presupposition that
language is a praxis governed by rules that the
paradox expands to the general notion of
language comprehension and on all action
aiming to signify something.
This view of language contrasts with Chomsky’s
notion of I-language.
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
Radical scepticism
The gap between a rule and the action of
following a rule seems unbridgeable.
It is thus logically possible that one never
follows a rule, i.e. that one acts at random and
yet one’s behaviour fits the rule.
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
General Moral
It becomes difficult, even impossible, to
distinguish between the case when one is
following a rule and the case when one is not
following a rule.
For, each behaviour could fit infinitely many rules.
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Kripke’s Solution of the Sceptical
Paradox (Kripkenstein)

Kripke:
Wittgenstein’s solution to the sceptical paradox
contains the argument against the private
language argument, for the solution will not
admit such a language.
13

Wittgenstein gives a sceptical solution:
A sceptical solution of a sceptical philosophical problem
begins … by conceding that the sceptic’s negative
assertions are unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary
practice or belief is justified because … it need not
require the justification the sceptic has shown to be
untenable. (Kripke 1982: 66)
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
Communitarian Conception
The sceptical solution does not allow us to
consider an individual in isolation.
As such, this solution underlines the impossibility
of a private language.

This solution goes hand in hand with
Wittgenstein’s rejection of the classical view
which bases a theory of meaning on truthconditions.
15

In the Tractatus: a declarative sentence gets its
meaning by virtue of its truth conditions
I.e. by virtue of its correspondence to facts that
must obtain if it is true).
16

The second Wittgenstein accepts the
redundancy theory of truth: “p” is true = p.
Wittgenstein replaces the question, “What must be the
case for this sentence to be true?” by two others: first,
“Under what conditions may this form of words be
appropriately asserted (or denied)?”; second, given an
answer to the first question, “What is the role, and the
utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting (or denying)
the form of words under these conditions?” (Kripke 1982:
73)
17
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Assertability Conditions
Wittgenstein’s picture of language is not based
on truth condition, but on assertability
conditions.
(Cf. the positivist verification theory of meaning).
18

This contrasts, for instance, both with the
Augustinian picture and Platonism in
mathematics.
Wittgenstein, like the nominalists, suggests that
instead of positing entities as the referents of
numbers we look at the circumstances under
which numerical assertions are actually uttered,
and at what role such assertions play in our
lives..
19

Assertability conditions involve reference
to a community
Since they are inapplicable to a single agent in
isolation, Wittgenstein rejects the private
language argument.
20
A sceptical problem is posed, and a sceptical solution to
that problem is given. The solution turns on the idea that
each person who claims to be following a rule can be
checked by others. Others in the community can check
whether the putative rule follower is or is not giving
particular responses to that they endorse, that agree
with their own. (Kripke 1982: 101)
21

The solution rests on three key concepts:
1. agreement
2. form of life
what has to be accepted, the given, is the form of life.
(PI: 226)
3. criteria
an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria. (PI:
# 580)
22

Since rules are norms, then:
the normative element (i.e. the distinction
between a correct and incorrect use of a word or
application of a rule)
(i) is an essential part of our ordinary concept
of meaning or rule-following and
(ii) it enters into the picture when we consider
the individual in relation to a community of
speakers.
23

Why is it a sceptical solution?
It leaves the sceptical paradox as it stands, i.e. it
does not propose a direct answer to the paradox.
That is to say, it does not rely on an objective
fact the sceptic may have ignored.
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
Main advantage of the sceptical solution
While the sceptical paradox forced us to give an
objective solution of semantic competence, a
semantic based on assertability conditions
stresses the fact that semantic competence rests,
at least partly, on intersubjective factors.
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
General moral
Semantics competence does not merely rest on
objective facts belonging to the speaker’s
individual psychology.
It also rests on the audience judging the
speaker’s competence.
This goes hand in hand with the argument
against the possibility of a private language.
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General Criticism of Kripke’s
Interpretation

Kripke takes Wittgenstein as offering a
constructive philosophical picture on how
meaning and understanding are possible.
Wittgenstein, though, does not take philosophy
to embody a particular doctrine.
So a philosopher can make no substantial claim.
Philosophy is a mere therapy.
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
The connection between a rule and a practice
that Wittgenstein proposes is not put forth as a
philosophical analysis of the concept of ‘a rule’.
It is merely intended to describe what can be
observed in our language games.
Following a rule is a analogous to obeying and order. We
are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular
way. (PI: # 206)
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Rules and Understanding

Four thesis can be ascribed to Wittgenstein—
tree negative and one positive (see Colin McGinn
1984, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Blackwell)
1. To mean something by a sign is not the
subject of an inner state or process
This goes hand in hand with the idea that
understanding is not a mental process, i.e. that
meaning something consists in certain conscious
or experiential state and processes.
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2. To understand a sign is not to interpret
it in a particular way
This goes with the view that understanding
cannot be reduced to a kind of propositional
knowledge (knowing that).
It mainly corresponds to a knowing how activity,
a practical knowledge.
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3. Using a sign in accordance with a rule
is not founded upon reasons
It is not sufficient for a sign to possess a
particular meaning that some item come before
one’s mind.
One follows a rule blindly, without interpreting it: ‘When
I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.’ (PI:
# 219)
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4. To understand a sign is to have mastery
of a technique or custom of using it
Understanding is a practice. As such:
(i) understanding is manifested in a
behaviour/activity,
(ii) understanding qua practice must be
repeatable, and
(iii) understanding is closely related to the
circumstances in which the activity occurs.
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
General moral
Meaning is use (Wittgenstein) and a theory of
meaning is a theory of understanding
(Dummett).
Use occurs in a language, thus in a language
game.
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
The notion of language game rests on a system
of rules.
Rules determine the game and depend on a
community playing that game.
Hence, if meaning is use in a language game
and a theory of meaning is a theory of
understanding, understanding ultimately rests
on an intersubjective activity.
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