WIP
Cards from Other Files
Prioritize structural violence in your impact calculus: it’s the only thing that certainly
exists and that we can certainly change.
Taylor, ‘09 (Janelle S. , Prof. of Anthropology, Univ. of Washington, http://depts.washing...er/taylor.shtml, Explaining Difference: Culture,
Structural Violence, and Medical Anthropology)
Structure sounds like a neutral term “ it sounds like something that is just there, unquestionable, part of
the way the world is. By juxtaposing this with the word violence, however, Farmers concept of structural
violence forces our attention to the forms of suffering and injustice that are deeply embedded in the
ordinary, taken-for-granted patterns of the way the world is. From this follow some important and very challenging
insights. First, the same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable and pleasant for some of
us, also mar the lives of others through poverty, insecurity, ill-health and violence. Second, these
structures are neither natural nor neutral, but are instead the outcome of long histories of political,
economic, and social struggle. Third, being nothing more (and nothing less!) than patterns of collective
social action, these structures can and should be changed. Structural violence thus encourages us to
look for differences within large-scale social structures “ differences of power, wealth, privilege and
health that are unjust and unacceptable. By the same token, structural violence encourages us to look for connections between
what might be falsely perceived separate and distinct social worlds. Structural violence also encourages an attitude of
moral outrage and critical engagement, in situations where the automatic response might be to
passively accept systematic inequalities.
Without absolute side constraints against violating human dignity such as the
affirmative, utilitarianism becomes a justification for slavery, torture, and murder.
Clifford, 11 (Professor of Philosophy @ Mississippi State University, Michael, Spring, “MORAL
LITERACY”, Volume 11, Issue 2, https://webprod1.uvu.edu/ethics/seac/Clifford_Moral_Literacy.pdf,
Accessed 7-6-13, TB)
As for fairness of application, here the waters are muddy. On the one hand, utilitarianism
prides itself on fairness, since
everyone’s happiness (i.e. pleasure/pain) must be taken into account when determining what will produce the gr
eatest happiness. Fairness is part of the very justification of utilitarianism in that it assumes, correctly I think, that everyone wants to be happy;
thus it is incumbent upon any ethics to promote this, as far as is possible. In fact, it was this “democratic” aspect of utilitarianism which
prompted James Mill to champion it as a model for political and social reform. On
the other hand, one of the most enduring
criticisms of utilitarianism , especially the sort advocated by Bentham, is that it may require us to
trample upon individual rights if it will increase the pleasure of the majority. An example I like to use in
my courses to illustrate this is black slavery in Mississippi. There was a time when Mississippi had more
millionaires per capita than any other state in the union. Of course, it achieved th at distinction through
the institution of slavery, the evidence of which can still be seen in Rhode Island, where the estates of former cotton barons line the
shores of Newport. Now Mississippi is among the poorest state in the nation. Suppose some savvy economic
consultant suggested that we could bring prosperity back to the South by reinstating the institution of
slavery. The population of African-Americans being only about th irty percent, the majority would
certainly have their happiness increased. Of course, we would immediately object that such happiness would be achieved by
the most atrocious violation of individual rights. What can the utilitarian say to this? Even Ja mes Mill’s son, John Stuart, was very concerned
about this troublesome possibility. He
advocated a form of utilitarianism in which we are obligated to promote
the “higher pleasures” of justice and equality. However, Mill would not allow an appeal to individual
rights, because he did not believe that such rights exist. His defense of individual freedoms in On Liberty
is not based on the idea that human beings have rights, but because of the good consequences for
society that comes from such a recognition. “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions,” says Mill. 14 If this is the case, then a utilitarian, even one as enlightened as Mill, must entertain the possibility that the greatest
happiness could only be bought at the expense of individual freedoms. 15 Whether or not you believe in individual rights,
whether or not you are convinced by arguments one way or another about the metaphysical grounds of
rights, we can all appreciate the idea that any ethics should recognize the fundamental dignity of
human|||s||| beings. This is precisely what worries critics of utilitarianism, that it may require us to
violate that dignity, for some at least, if doin g so will promote the greatest happiness. But to violate
human dignity is to ignore or to misunderstand the very point of ethics. For the deontologist, such as Kant, we have a
duty not to violate human dignity, even if it causes us pain, even if the consequences fail to maximize the overall happiness. The inviolate
character of human dignity is expressed most practically by the idea that we have certain basic rights (whatever the source of rights are,
whether natural or by convention). John Locke defined rights as “prima facie entitlements,” which means that anyone who would restrict my
rights bears the burden of proving that there are good reasons for doing so. For example, the right to private property is sometimes trumped by
the principle of eminent domain, provided that I too sta nd to gain by seizure of my land. My right to free speech is limited by the harm it might
cause by, say, shouting “fire!” in a crowded theatre. There
are times when we feel justified in limiting or abrogating
certain positive rights for the common good, but even here no social outcome justifies torture, slavery,
murder, or any action which violates my fundamental human dignity. Deontological ethics assumes
there to be a line that cannot be crossed, regardless of the consequences. Thus, Kant’s type of ethics would seem to
fair best with respect to the fairness of application criterion beca use it requires, as intrinsic to the Categorical Imperative itself, that we
treat all persons, at all times, as ends and not merely as means to an end. This is not due to any good benefits
that may stem from doing so; in fact, respecting the dignity of others may actually diminish overall pleasure. But we have a duty to do
so, regardless, because reason demands it. It demands it because to do otherwise is irrational given the requirements of the
Categorical Imperative, which are (arguably) three:
TSA AFF
1AC
Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should substantially curtail its domestic
surveillance conducted by the Transportation Security Agency.
Race Adv
Advantage one is racial and ethnic violence
TSA agents are 95% ineffective, failing to detect a majority of undercover trials—it is
long past time to eliminate TSA surveillance policies
Capps 15
(Kriston Capps is a staff writer at CityLab for The Atlantic. He writes about housing, architecture, design, and other factors that shape cities.
Previously, he was a senior editor at Architect magazine. "Airport Security: Astoundingly Expensive and 95 Percent Ineffective," CityLab, The
Atlantic. 6-3-2015. http://www.citylab.com/commute/2015/06/airport-security-astoundingly-expensive-and-95-percentineffective/394778///ghs-kw)
thanks to a leaked report
on the Transportation Security Administration, we have a hard number to assign to our feelings of
frustration: Airline security is 95 percent ineffective. ABC News reports that TSA agents failed to detect a threat in
67 out of 70 recent trials. Posing as passengers, U.S. Department of Homeland Security “Red Teams”
were able to carry weapons and fake explosives (“simulant” threats) through security checkpoints without any
trouble. Former TSA Administrator James Loy, who led the agency in its first year, called the leaked results an “abominable failure.” Homeland Security has since announced a series of steps to overhaul the agency,
including the resignation of the TSA’s acting director. But the nation should be looking more critically—and more analytically—at the
costs and benefits of even attempting to provide total airport security. When the TSA isn’t doing its job,
then airport security is a complete waste of money. But by the strictest measure, airport security screenings are not worth the cost even in the best of circumstances.
Airline security is a miserable business. Getting through a checkpoint is much like being in a fire drill in the middle of a traffic pileup at the busiest intersection in the city. And now,
Back in 2008, researchers from the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle Australia tried to calculate the “annual cost per life saved” of various then-new security measures
implemented in the U.S. after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The paper is a bit dated now, and it depends on a number of generous assumptions. But the fundamental inquiry is still sound, and even more relevant now in light
How much does totalistic American risk-mitigation for flight really cost us? Airport
security screenings are not worth the cost even in the best of circumstances. The researchers found that reinforced cockpit doors
of the revelations about the TSA:
come at an annual cost per life saved of $800,000—a great investment. (According to the researchers, annual costs per life saved of $1–10 million pass the cost–benefit threshold for most U.S. federal agencies.) On the other hand,
another security feature designed to prevent a 9/11–style attack, the Federal Air Marshal Service, has an annual cost per life saved of $180 million. Using the same formula* as the researchers (and some similar assumptions), I
estimated the same costs for airport pre-boarding security. TSA checkpoints have an annual cost per life saved of $667,000,000—two-thirds of one billion dollars. Here’s how this equation works. One critical figure is
counterfactual: the number of lives saved annually by post–9/11 security measures. We have no way of knowing what this number really is. Terrorists haven’t hijacked or bombed any American flights since 9/11. We have no basis
for comparison, either. No one was ever killed by a hijacking within the U.S. before 9/11. So the researchers—Mark G. Stewart and J. Mueller—came up with a number: 300. Here’s how they arrived at this figure: As the threat to
the U.S. homeland is from Al-Qaeda, it would be reasonable to consider the period of a heightened threat from Al-Qaeda to be a suitable time period for the estimation of fatality rate—this is a 10-year period, 1992–2001.
Accordingly, we will assume that, in the absence of enhanced security measures, there would be a 9/11 replication every 10 years in the United States. That is, the annual fatality rate before enhanced security measures is 300 per
year. Risk reduction is also difficult to calculate. Stewart and Mueller explain the assumptions that led to their calculation of risk (R) mitigated by pre-boarding security measures (efforts that may go beyond checkpoint security).
The extra and more vigilant intelligence, immigration and passport control, airport screening, and other pre-boarding security measures implemented since 9/11 as arrayed in the TSA’s 14 layers of security should result in an
increased likelihood of detection and apprehension of terrorists. Increased public awareness is also of significant benefit to aviation security. Added to this are the much-enhanced preventative policing and investigatory efforts that
have caught potential terrorists including, in the U.K. in 2006, some planning to blow up airliners. Combined, we suggest, these measure by themselves reduce the risk of a replication of 9/11 by at least 50%, and this is likely to be a
lower bound value. There has been no successful hijacking anywhere in the world since 9/11 and very few attempts at blowing up airliners—and none of these in the United States. In consequence, we suspect, R(pre-boarding
security) is likely to be much greater than 50%. Nonetheless, for the present analysis assume R(preboarding security)=50%. To calculate R(security checkpoints), I used R(pre-boarding security) x Pr(checkpoint efficiency) = 50.00 x
0.05 = 2.5 percent. If TSA agents caught every threat, then checkpoint efficiency (Pr) would be 1.0. Since they failed to catch 95 percent of threats in recent tests, the rate falls to 0.05. Those are the soft variables it takes to estimate
the annual cost per life saved. The final variable is a hard number:
The TSA spends $5.3 billion on aviation security annually, about 70
percent of its budget. Let’s say $5 billion, since presumably not all of those funds are directly tied to checkpoint security. Here’s the equation that Stewart and Mueller use: (Centre for Infrastructure
Performance and Reliability) Plugging in the variables for security checkpoints comes out to an annual cost per life saved of $667,000,000. Now, it’s only reasonable to toggle the variables. My assumptions might not be correct,
after all. Let’s say everyone at TSA performed admirably. If agents caught every single explosive or weapon at every airport checkpoint, then the annual cost per life saved would still be $33 million: still excessive, at least in terms of
federal tolerances. Cut down the cost of checkpoint security from an estimated $5 billion to $1 billion—and assume also perfect checkpoint performance—and the annual cost per life saved is $7 million. Finally, within the
Just not close to reality by any measure involved. Airport security is especially expensive
when it doesn’t work at all. There’s no good reason to think that TSA security is going to get cheaper or
more efficient any time soon. As Shirley Ybarra explains in a 2013 report for the Reason Foundation, the agency suffers from a fundamental conflict of interest. “All other aspects of airport
security—access control, perimeter control, lobby control, etc.—are the responsibility of the airport, under TSA’s regulatory supervision. But for screening, TSA regulates itself ,” Ybarra
writes. “Arm’s-length regulation is a basic good-government principle; self-regulation is inherently problematic.” The Heritage Foundation would like to solve the problem by
appropriate cost–benefit range!
expanding trusted-traveler programs and engaging private airport screeners. Maybe TSA checkpoint alternatives could bring the costs down a ways. Better technology could also potentially save money. There are a range of
possibilities worth considering. In another study, Stewart and Mueller estimate that expanding the Federal Flight Deck Officer program and cutting the Federal Air Marshal Service would “potentially [save] hundreds of millions of
eliminating the risk presented by every single passenger
on every single flight is always going to be expensive. Especially when the threats that the TSA does
detect—take a look at the agency’s Instagram account for a broad sample—are nowhere near a 9/11 in scale. Factor in the loss of productivity
associated with security-checkpoint bottlenecks and flight delays, and the cost of total airport security
grows even higher. It’s especially expensive when it doesn’t work at all. To be sure, a 9/11 attack every decade would not be an acceptable price
dollars per year with consequences for security that are, at most, negligible.” No matter what, though,
to pay for getting to leave my shoes on at the airport. It’s hardly certain that this is the price we’d actually pay, though. It’s time to consider the real costs and the real risks of flying—and what we’re getting for what we’re spending.
In particular, the TSA’s Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program is
completely unsuccessful and should be abolished
Dickerson 15
(Kelly Dickerson . Kelly is a science reporter at Business Insider, covering space and physics. She graduated from the CUNY Graduate School
of Journalism with an M.A. in science and health reporting. She received at B.S. degree in biology and a B.A. degree in communication from
Berry College. Kelly has previously written for Live Science, Space.com, and Psychology Today. "Yes, the TSA is probably profiling you and it's
scientifically bogus," Business Insider. 5-6-2015. http://www.businessinsider.com/tsa-spot-program-is-scientifically-bogus-2015-5//ghs-kw)
According to a document leaked to The Intercept on March 27, this point system is part of the
TSA's Screening Passengers by
Observation Techniques (SPOT) program. TSA employees have used it since 2007 as a way to identify potential terrorists. How many
terrorists have they caught using this program? Zero. Critics and scientists say that's because it's based on
flawed science and almost certainly leads to racial profiling. The SPOT program The TSA has thousands of what it calls "behavior
detection" officers deployed at more than one-third of US airports. They scan security lines for suspicious looking people and
behavior. There are 92 possible points on the check list leaked to The Intercept, and certain behaviors
get you more points than others. Things like too much fidgeting gets you a point. A cold stare gets you two points. But if you're
woman over the age of 55, you get a point taken off. Despite years of criticism from airport employees and scientists who say
this is just an excuse to yank whoever they want out of line, the TSA has spent nearly $1 billion on the program, and it has
repeatedly denied that SPOT leads to racial profiling. However, back in 2012, employees from the Logan airport in Boston came forward and said they estimated
80% of the passengers being pulled from security lines were minorities. The problem is that the TSA does not
keep a record of the racial background of people that they stop. "They are able to plead ignorance of
those statistics," Handeyside told Buzzfeed News. "We find that incredibly problematic." Reviews of SPOT have shown that only 1% of the 30,000
people stopped every year are ever arrested. And the arrests are for things like drug possession or traveling with
undeclared items — never for terrorism. The documents describing this controversial program are not classified, but the TSA has refused to
share them. The American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request last year for information on the training, methods, and scientific
validity of the SPOT program. The TSA did not respond to the request, and now the ACLU has filed a lawsuit, because it is illegal for a government agency to ignore a
FOIA request. Flawed science Much
of the SPOT program is based on research that began in the 1970s by psychologist Paul Ekman. Ekman's work
hypothesized that subtle facial expressions, called microexpressions, can tell you a lot about a person, and someone trained to read those microexpressions could
guess someone's intentions. However, it's never been proven in any experiment that someone can glance through faces in a crowded place like an airport and tell if
someone is being deceptive or lying, according to Charles Honts, a lie detection expert at Boise State University. There are few (if any) behaviors that are clearly
linked to lying, scientists say. And it's impossible to tell from observing someone for a few seconds in a security line if they're keeping some kind of secret. Sure,
someone might look a little nervous or scared because they're about to commit a horrifying crime. But they may just be nervous about flying or antsy that they're
having to wait in line when they're already running late for their flight. In 2013, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined over 400 studies on lie
detection. From that huge survey, the organization concluded that the average person can only tell if someone is lying 54% of the time. That's barely
better
than pure chance. From the survey, the GAO concluded there's not any scientific evidence that someone can learn to spot who's keeping a secret and
who's not, so it recommended that funding for the SPOT program be limited until the TSA could provide some real evidence that it's useful. The GAO report was just
a recommendation though, and the SPOT program is still up and running. If we consider what behavioral science tells us (or can't tell us), it looks like we really need
a new method for airport security checks. "What
we know about SPOT suggests it wastes taxpayer money, leads to
racial profiling, and should be scrapped," ACLU's staff attorney Hugh Handeyside said in the lawsuit announcement.
Moreover, SPOT is a sure path to racial profiling – the TSA has done nothing to
prevent this, resulting in criminal justice inequities
Love 13
(David A. Love, . "Report: TSA screening is a magnet for racial profiling," theGrio, 6-6-2013. http://thegrio.com/2013/06/06/report-tsascreening-is-a-magnet-for-racial-profiling///ghs-kw)
The TSA’s Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program, also known as SPOT or
“behavioral detection program”—which costs the taxpayers nearly $1 billion—is designed to screen passengers and identify highrisk travelers based on their behavior. Under the program, which is based on the model used by Israeli security forces, airport security officers
are supposed to look for behavior that indicates signs of stress, fear or deception. But the inspector general’s report said it “cannot ensure that
passengers at U.S. airports are screened objectively.” Latinos and African-Americans targeted Airport officers have claimed African-
Americans wearing baseball caps backward and Latinos traveling to Florida are profiled. And these
passengers are profiled, sometimes arrested by officers at the insistence of their superiors, in the
hopes of uncovering arrest warrants, immigration violations or drugs. Under the SPOT program, 644 Behavior
Detection Officers (BDOs) are deployed in 42 airports. Working in pairs, BDOs conduct brief conversations with passengers waiting in
line and observe their actions. Based on the observations, BDOs identify passengers for further screening, and possibly a
referral to law enforcement. A law enforcement officer (LEO) may interact with the traveler to
determine if further steps are necessary. Sometimes it could mean a passenger is not allowed to board
the flight. The report found that “TSA cannot demonstrate that BDOs are screening passengers in a uniform
manner to identify potentially high-risk individuals.” In addition, the TSA has not developed performance
measures to determine the program’s effectiveness, does not collect accurate or complete data, and has
not developed refresher training for BDOs. Homeland Security makes six recommendations to the TSA, such as developing a
strategic plan for SPOT, ensuring accurate data entry, providing continuing training to BDOs and instructors, and identifying issues that affect
SPOT’s success. The TSA, which screens 1.8 million passengers each day in over 450 TSA-regulated airports, falls under the Department of
Homeland Security. It is illegal to target travelers based on race, nationality, ethnicity or religion. But apparently, this racial profiling is
happening every day. Racial profiling as a way of life News of the report comes as the TSA recently pulled its “naked-image” body scanners,
which critics have found humiliating and a health risk. The agency has also come under fire in recent years for intrusive pat-downs and
excessive body searches, including a lawsuit challenging the scanners and pat-downs. And in April, Congressman Bennie Thompson (D-MS),
ranking member of the Committee on Homeland Security, introduced a bill to reform the TSA’s contract screener program. The legislation
increases standards for hiring and training screeners and for handling security breaches and sensitive security information. Many
of us are
no strangers to racial profiling at the airport, whether through firsthand experience or personal observation of the treatment
of other passengers who “fit the description.” Why are the black and brown folks always singled out for special
treatment, that annoying, extra step that few others seem to get? One at the airport, as I was about to
board a plane for London, I recall the screeners harassing a South Asian family—women and children
included— with a long, drawn out search process. There was a sense the humiliating exercise had
more to do with the race of the passengers than any suspicious activity or perceived threat. For
people of color, racial profiling takes place in the airport and in the streets under the guise of observing suspicious
behavior. Last week in Florida, a Miami Dade police officer chased a 14-year-old boy, threw him to the ground and put him in a chokehold for
playing with a puppy while black. According to police, the boy, Tremaine McMillian, exhibited “demunanizing stares” and clenched fists. The
boy wet his pants as a result of the ordeal. Moreover, according to a new report from the American Civil Liberties Union, blacks are four times
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than whites, typically for small amounts. In Washington, DC, Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois,
the arrest rate for blacks is 7.5 to 8.5 times higher. In the “war on drugs,” not unlike the case of the TSA, billions of dollars are spent to boost
some agency’s reputation as crime fighters. So much wasted in time and resources, so little achieved, and so
many people of color
victimized over stereotypes. Racial profiling creates losers in the criminal justice system, causing people
to lose their freedom and even their lives. In remarks made at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, federal Judge Edith
Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit said that “racial groups like African-Americans and Hispanics are predisposed to crime,” are
“prone to commit acts of violence,” and more likely than people of other ethnicities to be involved in “heinous” acts. Jones also said the death
penalty allows prisoners to “make peace with God,” and dismissed as “red herrings” any arguments that the death penalty is discriminatory, is
imposed arbitrarily and violates international law. The judge’s statements are the subject of a lawsuit by the NAACP, the Texas Civil Rights
Project and the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program. In the meantime, criminalizing
people for “flying while black or
brown” does not make anyone safer. It puts everyone at risk. Plus, it wastes lots of money and only
humiliates people in the process. TSA should find the real threats to public safety in the skies, not those
innocent people who are guilty of having darker skin or a certain ethnic or religious background. Until
then, SPOT should be grounded.
These policies are a form of political control that perpetuates whiteness—the
Otherization of blacks and browns generates racial violence directly rooted in slavery
and the KKK
Jones 12
(Jones, Imara. Imara Jones is the economic justice contributor for Colorlines.com. He served in the Clinton White House, where he worked
on international trade policy; he was also an executive at Viacom. "If the TSA's 'natural hair patdown' practice is not racial profiling, what
is?," Guardian, 12-20-2012. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/20/tsa-natural-hair-patdown-racial-profiling//ghs-kw)
What does America's Transportation Security Agency (TSA) believe that black people are holding in our
hair before we board planes? I was forced to ask myself this question just days ago when two TSA agents halted the security line at
Los Angeles International Airport to search my shoulder-length curls for weapons of war. As the country moves into the busy holiday travel
season, countless more black and
brown Americans with natural hair will be forced to query the same. Over
hair pat downs" have taken place with greater reported frequency. The fact that
they occur at all underscores that America's post-racial future still has roots in its racist past. With a twicethe past year, "natural
elected black man as the country's chief executive, how could the TSA get it so wrong? In the case of people of color v the TSA, it's man v the
machine, apparently. "I have to do what the machine says," declared one of the TSA agents as he pointed wanly to the full-body scanner behind
me. "When the machine can't read through your hair, we have to search it." The machine to which he was referring is the $170,000 per unit xrays devices that can penetrate clothes and certain types of body tissue in order to highlight hidden weapons and objects. The scanners were so
effective, in fact, that they raised privacy concerns in the US regarding nudity, which the TSA was forced to address. Citing health concerns, the
European Commission effectively banned their use in the European Union just months ago. Still, these machines, which have cost the US
government almost $150m, reveal almost everything – except what might be hidden in black hair. By the results of the TSA scanners, kinky
black hair barely registers as human tissue. The unknowing nature of our heads gives the TSA license to violate our bodies. I wasn't the first to
have a TSA agent search my hair – and I won't be the last. Actor Gabrielle Union and pop star Solange Knowles – Beyonce's sister – have both
experienced it. Since I posted my patdown on Twitter, — imarajones (@imarajones) December 18, 2012 @dhsgov @civilrights What exactly
does @tsa believe black people are holding in our naturally curly hair before getting on planes? professors, executives, and even aides to
members of Congress have all told me their TSA stories. Most far worse than mine. One declared, "I thought it was just me." Clearly, it's not.
Both mainstream and niche media outlets have reported on this phenomenon, which has mushroomed in the last 12 months. Type in "natural
hair patdowns" in any search engine and you can spend the better part of an afternoon reading testimonials and watching video of black
people's encounters with the TSA. In
response to complaints of its citizens, the response is silence. The TSA failed to
fact that "natural hair patdowns" have reached a fever pitch
recently, four years after the machines were introduced, suggests that there's something else at work.
The machines didn't just stop working on black hair all at once. The problem may not lie with
machines, but with the men and women running the TSA. It wouldn't be the first time. Hastily put together
after 9/11, the TSA has struggled with charges of racial bias from the beginning. Many Arab-American
groups filed formal complaints of racial profiling by the TSA in the immediate years after the attack. Civil
liberties group, such as the ACLU, reported receiving up to 1,000 complaints a month about invasive TSA
searches. Just last year, TSA agents in Boston cited their colleagues for zeroing in on people of color. A key part of the TSA's
response to 9/11 seems to be the identification of certain groups as the "other", followed by a
systematic targeting of that group for physical scrutiny. The "otherization" of black people by the TSA
is nothing new in America. Classifying black physical characteristics as alien and subhuman was
essential to European rationalization of the brutality meted out to people of African descent during
slavery. Torture and sexual assault were all excused because of the "otherness" of the black body. But
slavery was only a precursor to the violence directed against blacks during the years after Emancipation
and Reconstruction. Once blacks gained freedom, whites in the South became obsessed with new ways to
control the black body. The largest homegrown terrorist organization of its day – the Klu Klux Klan – emerged to create a
climate a fear among African Americans through the public mutilation of black bodies. The goal was to spur
answer a request by me for comment on the issue. The
mass migration of blacks out of the South and to intimidate those who remained into political, as well as economic, subservience. It worked.
Formerly pro-slavery whites regained political control of the South by using these tactics. TSA actions
connect directly with this past. At precisely the time when people of color in America have greater
political authority than ever, the TSA – along with the New York Police Department through "stop-and-frisk" harassment, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and local law enforcement agencies – have targeted black and brown bodies for
intrusive and demeaning treatment.
[Insert dehumanization/other impact cards here]
Furthermore, TSA’s policies discriminate against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South
Asians
In response to the attacks, the federal
government immediately engaged in a sweeping counterterrorism campaign focused on Arabs and Muslims,
and in some cases on persons who were perceived to be, but in fact were not, Arabs or Muslims, such as Sikhs and
other South Asians. That focus continues to this day. The federal government claims that its anti-terrorism efforts do not amount to racial profiling,
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Arabs from Muslim countries.
but the singling out for questioning and detention of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, as well as selective application of the immigration laws to nationals of Arab and Muslim countries,
belie this claim.¶ A prime example of a federal program that encourages racial profiling is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), implemented in 2002.44 NSEERS
requires certain individuals from predominantly Muslim countries to register with the federal government, as well as to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated. A report issued in
2009 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Rights Working Group had this to say about NSEERS:¶ More than seven years after its implementation, NSEERS continues to impact
the lives of those individuals and communities subjected to it. It has led to the prevention of naturalization and to the deportation of individuals who failed to register, either because they
were unaware of the registration requirement or because they were afraid to register after hearing stories of interrogations, detentions and deportations of friends, family and community
members. As a result, well-intentioned individuals who failed to comply with NSEERS due to a lack of knowledge or fear have been denied "adjustment of status" (green cards), and in some
cases have been placed in removal proceedings for willfully" failing to register."45¶ Despite NSEERS' near explicit profiling based on religion and national origin, federal courts have held that
the program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and that those forced to participate in the program have not suffered violations of their rights under the Fourth
or Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which protect against unreasonable search and seizure and guarantee due process, respectively.46¶ Another example of a federal program that
involves racial profiling is Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47 which was instituted just prior to the November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt
terror operations."48 OFL is a covert program, the existence of which was discovered through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
and the Yale Law School National Litigation Project.49¶ According to the 2009 ACLU/Rights Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department of Homeland Security
show that:¶ an astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from Muslim majority countries. Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries
were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted than similarly situated individuals from other countries. Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from the interviews
conducted under this program. What did result, however, was an intense chilling effect on the free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities targeted in
advance of an already contentious presidential election.50¶ Lists of individuals who registered under NSEERS were apparently used to select candidates for investigation in OFL.51 Inasmuch as
the overwhelming majority of those selected were Muslims, OFL is a clear example of a federal program that involves racial profiling. Moreover, because OFL has resulted in no terror-related
Arabs and
Muslims, and those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims based on their appearance, have since 9/11 been targeted by law enforcement
authorities in their homes, at work, and while driving or walking,53 airports and border crossings have become especially daunting. One reason for this is a
convictions, the program is also a clear example of how racial profiling uses up valuable law enforcement resources yet fails to make our nation safer.52¶ Although
wide-ranging and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that states, "in the course of a border search, and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review
and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to enter …. the United States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the standard to copy documents belonging to a person
seeking to enter the U.S. was lowered from a "probable cause" to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.55 Operating under such a broad and subjective guidance, border agents frequently stop
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians for extensive questioning about their families, faith, political opinions, and other private matters, and subject them to intrusive searches. Often, their cell
phones, laptops, personal papers and books are taken and reviewed.¶ The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of every person who, according to the U.S. government, has
"any nexus" to terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e., mistaking non-listed persons for listed persons) and over-classification (i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that makes
this defective "watch-list" causes many problems for Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians seeking to enter the United States, including those who are U.S. citizens.¶ The case of Zabaria Reed, a U.S. citizen, Gulf War veteran, 20-year member
them appear dangerous when they are not),
of the National Guard, and firefighter, illustrates the problem. Trying to reenter the U.S. from Canada where he travels to visit family, Reed is frequently detained, searched, and interrogated
about his friends, politics, and reasons for converting to Islam. Officials have handcuffed Reed in front of his children, pointed weapons at him, and denied him counsel.57¶ In 2005, a lawsuit—
Rahman v. Chertoff—was filed in federal district court in Illinois by nine U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, none of whom had any connection to terrorist activity.58 The
plaintiffs—all of whom are of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent— alleged that they were repeatedly detained, interrogated, and humiliated when attempting to re-enter the U.S. because
their names were wrongly on the watch-list, despite the fact that they were law abiding citizens who were always cleared for re-entry into the U.S. after these recurring and punitive
detentions.59¶ In May 2010, the court dismissed the case, finding that almost all of the disputed detentions were "routine," meaning that border guards needed no suspicion at all to
undertake various intrusions such as pat-down frisks and handcuffing for a brief time.60 Further, the court held that where the stops were not routine, the detentions, frisks, and handcuffings
were justified by the placement of the individuals on the TSC's database—even when the listing may have been a mistake.61¶ Notwithstanding the adverse decision in the Rahman case, and
the continuation of these practices on a national level, it is important to note that there have been certain positive changes in government policy since 2005. Specifically, a standard of
"reasonable suspicion" is now used before a name can be added to the TSC’s database, which marks a sharp departure from the essentially "standardless" policy previously in effect.62¶
Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim head coverings are also profiled for higher scrutiny at
airports. In response to criticism from Sikh organizations, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently revised its operating
procedure for screening head coverings at airports. The current procedure provides that:¶ All members of the traveling public are permitted to wear head coverings (whether religious or not)
procedures subject all persons wearing head coverings to the possibility of
additional security screening, which may include a patdown search of the head covering. Individuals may be referred for additional
screening if the security officer cannot reasonably determine that the head area is free of a detectable
threat item. If the issue cannot be resolved through a pat-down search, the individual will be offered the
opportunity to remove the head covering in a private screening area.63¶ Despite this new procedure, and TSA's assurance that in
implementing it "TSA does not conduct ethnic or religious profiling, and employs multiple checks and balances to ensure profiling does not happen,"64 Sikh travelers report
that they continue to be profiled and subject to abuse at airports.65¶ Amardeep Singh, director of programs for the Sikh
Coalition and a second-generation American, recounted the following experience in his June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
through the security checkpoints. The new standard
my family and I were coming back to the United States from a
family vacation in Playa Del Carmen, Mexico. At Fort Lauderdale Airport, not only was I subjected to extra screening, but so was
[my 18 month-old son Azaad]. I was sadly forced to take my son, Azaad, into the infamous glass box so that he
could [be] patted down. He cried while I held him. He did not know who that stranger was who was patting him
down. His bag was also thoroughly searched. His Elmo book number one was searched. His Elmo book number two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The time spent waiting
for me to grab him was wasted time. The time spent going through his baby books was wasted time. I am not sure what I am going to tell him when he
is old enough and asks why his father and grandfather and soon him—Americans all three—are
constantly stopped by the TSA 100% of the time at some airports.66
and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee:¶ Two months ago,
Modern Islamophobic policies create a state of bare life and wage a perpetual war on
difference
Wise 1
(Tim Wise, Writer, lecturer, antiracism activist, author, and was an adjunct professor at the Smith College School of Social Work and was an
advisor to the Fisk University Race Relations Institute, “Rationalizing Racism: Panic and Profiling After 9/11”, December 10 2001,
http://www.alternet.org/story/12065/rationalizing_racism%3A_panic_and_profiling_after_9_11?paging=off#bookmark) //mL
To many, complaints
about such measures may seem trivial. 'What's the big deal?' ask some. Isn't security
worth the mild inconvenience to those singled out? But as with all other racial profiling, the present
incarnation is every bit as unjust and irrational. Despite calls from many quarters for more profiling, under the rubric of good
"common sense," the fact remains that it is not sensible at all. To single out persons of a particular nationality
or ethnicity, or to heighten one's suspicion of such a group is blatantly unjust. It is in fact plainly racist,
as such generalized suspicion, fear, and mistreatment never seem to attach to white folks, no matter
what profile we may fit. After the Oklahoma City bombing, white men were not singled out, held
incommunicado, rounded up for questioning, nor quizzed when trying to rent moving vans. Indeed, I rented a
Ryder truck shortly after McVeigh blew one of their fleet sky-high, along with the Murrah Building. And despite being a white guy, with short
hair, no one said a word to me, nor asked for a deposit up front, just in case I decided to load it up with fertilizer and ammonium nitrate and
take out a city block. Although white supremacist and militia groups most certainly came in for additional scrutiny in the aftermath of
McVeigh's act of mass murder, notice
the difference between that response and what is happening now: in the
former instance, only very specific kinds of white people became possible suspects. In the latter case,
there is a general response of fear towards all persons fitting the physical, ethnic, and religious
description of the terrorists. Even the bombing of Afghanistan can be viewed as racially selective. After all,
if the attackers of 9/11 had been members of the Irish Republican Army, it is simply inconceivable that
we would have ripped up the real estate of Dublin as punishment. So despite the cavalier claims by many
whites that anti-Arab profiling is no big deal, and that they would be happy to be profiled if white guys
had been behind the attacks in September, the fact remains, whether willing or not, they would never
have had to worry about such a response. And that's the point.
Without absolute side constraints against violating human dignity such as the
affirmative, utilitarianism becomes a justification for slavery, torture, and murder.
Clifford, 11 (Professor of Philosophy @ Mississippi State University, Michael, Spring, “MORAL
LITERACY”, Volume 11, Issue 2, https://webprod1.uvu.edu/ethics/seac/Clifford_Moral_Literacy.pdf,
Accessed 7-6-13, TB)
As for fairness of application, here the waters are muddy. On the one hand, utilitarianism
prides itself on fairness, since
everyone’s happiness (i.e. pleasure/pain) must be taken into account when determining what will produce the gr
eatest happiness. Fairness is part of the very justification of utilitarianism in that it assumes, correctly I think, that everyone wants to be happy;
thus it is incumbent upon any ethics to promote this, as far as is possible. In fact, it was this “democratic” aspect of utilitarianism which
prompted James Mill to champion it as a model for political and social reform. On
the other hand, one of the most enduring
criticisms of utilitarianism , especially the sort advocated by Bentham, is that it may require us to
trample upon individual rights if it will increase the pleasure of the majority. An example I like to use in
my courses to illustrate this is black slavery in Mississippi. There was a time when Mississippi had more
millionaires per capita than any other state in the union. Of course, it achieved th at distinction through
the institution of slavery, the evidence of which can still be seen in Rhode Island, where the estates of former cotton barons line the
shores of Newport. Now Mississippi is among the poorest state in the nation. Suppose some savvy economic
consultant suggested that we could bring prosperity back to the South by reinstating the institution of
slavery. The population of African-Americans being only about th irty percent, the majority would
certainly have their happiness increased. Of course, we would immediately object that such happiness would be achieved by
the most atrocious violation of individual rights. What can the utilitarian say to this? Even Ja mes Mill’s son, John Stuart, was very concerned
about this troublesome possibility. He
advocated a form of utilitarianism in which we are obligated to promote
the “higher pleasures” of justice and equality. However, Mill would not allow an appeal to individual
rights, because he did not believe that such rights exist. His defense of individual freedoms in On Liberty
is not based on the idea that human beings have rights, but because of the good consequences for
society that comes from such a recognition. “I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical
questions,” says Mill. 14 If this is the case, then a utilitarian, even one as enlightened as Mill, must entertain the possibility that the greatest
happiness could only be bought at the expense of individual freedoms. 15 Whether or not you believe in individual rights,
whether or not you are convinced by arguments one way or another about the metaphysical grounds of
rights, we can all appreciate the idea that any ethics should recognize the fundamental dignity of
human|||s||| beings. This is precisely what worries critics of utilitarianism, that it may require us to
violate that dignity, for some at least, if doin g so will promote the greatest happiness. But to violate
human dignity is to ignore or to misunderstand the very point of ethics. For the deontologist, such as Kant, we have a
duty not to violate human dignity, even if it causes us pain, even if the consequences fail to maximize the overall happiness. The inviolate
character of human dignity is expressed most practically by the idea that we have certain basic rights (whatever the source of rights are,
whether natural or by convention). John Locke defined rights as “prima facie entitlements,” which means that anyone who would restrict my
rights bears the burden of proving that there are good reasons for doing so. For example, the right to private property is sometimes trumped by
the principle of eminent domain, provided that I too sta nd to gain by seizure of my land. My right to free speech is limited by the harm it might
cause by, say, shouting “fire!” in a crowded theatre. There
are times when we feel justified in limiting or abrogating
certain positive rights for the common good, but even here no social outcome justifies torture, slavery,
murder, or any action which violates my fundamental human dignity. Deontological ethics assumes
there to be a line that cannot be crossed, regardless of the consequences. Thus, Kant’s type of ethics would seem to
fair best with respect to the fairness of application criterion beca use it requires, as intrinsic to the Categorical Imperative itself, that we
treat all persons, at all times, as ends and not merely as means to an end. This is not due to any good benefits
that may stem from doing so; in fact, respecting the dignity of others may actually diminish overall pleasure. But we have a duty to do
so, regardless, because reason demands it. It demands it because to do otherwise is irrational given the requirements of the
Categorical Imperative, which are (arguably) three:
Trans Adv
Advantage two is transgendered bodies
Despite so-called TSA acceptance policies, transgendered bodies are subject to
harassment and discrimination
Magnet 12
Shoshana, Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Ottawa, 3-1-2012, "Stripping For The State Whole Body Imaging Technologies
And The Surveillance Of Othered," Feminist Media Studies Vol. 12, Issue 1, Pg. 101-118 //MV
Backscatter and millimeter wave technologies have significant consequences for transgender bodies and
mobilities. Whole body imaging technologies can reveal breasts, genitals, prostheses, and binding
materials. These technologies also have the ability to zoom in on a particular area, including genitalia
(National Center for Transgender Equality 2009). As a result, bodies that do not fit normative gender identities may be
singled out by the TSA for special scrutiny, providing the possibility that transgender individuals may be
outed to TSA personnel, or that they may have their bodily privacy further invaded. Here, bodies rendered as matter
out of place are policed. This has especially devastating consequences for transgender individuals who are
closeted and live in small towns, in which case being outed at the local airport could have broader
consequences, such as implications for their job security or for their relationships with friends and relatives. Moreover, a transphobic screener
could easily cause a transgender person to miss their flight by detaining them for special screening or
could subject them to new forms of humiliation and harassment. Given the potential consequences of
whole body imaging technologies, Mara Kiesling, the executive director of the National Center for Transgender Equality,
identified whole body imaging technologies as one of the most pressing issues facing transgender
communities.
Scanners force the visibility of trans- bodies to be pronounced and contested, creating
discursive violence that reinforces cisprivilege
Redden 13
Stephanie M., Carleton University, Canada and London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, 6-1-2013, "The End Of The Line
Feminist Understandings Of Resistance To Full-Body Scanning Technology," International Feminist Journal Of Politics Issn: 1461-6742 Date:
06/2013 Volume: 15 Issue: 2 Page: 234-253 //MV
Magnet and Rodgers (2011: 1; see also Johnson 2006: 6) also make clear that it is essential to consider how this technology not only differently affects women, but
also how other ‘marginalized subjects’ are affected. They note that: ... transgender
individuals, people with disabilities, and those
with particular religious affiliations are rendered newly or differently legible. As such, their application
to airport security generates new implications for who are allowed to move through, and who are
afforded justice within, contemporary cultural and transnational spaces. (Magnet and Rodgers 2011: 7) This
differentiated legibility of bodies is nowhere more visible than in the interactions between gender and
identity at border security points. As Currah and Mulqueen (2011: 559) have recently highlighted, the classification of
individuals by the State according to gender metrics produces less certainty for queer, transgender and
other bodies whose realities do not map onto the State’s dichotomous understandings of gender, as
‘securitizing gender does not necessarily secure identity, and may indeed destabilize it’. The intense
gender-based interrogations and pat downs that these individuals often undergo as their bodies are
seen as threatening suggest the deeply problematic and essentializing nature of full-body scanner
technologies and other security practices, whereby a clear gender marker is understood to be a sign of positive identification. Shepherd and
Sjoberg (2012: 15) importantly argue that ‘both the introduction of WBI scanners in airports and the ways in which this
technology has been linked to trans- bodies are forms of discursive violence’. They explain that with the use of
these scanners: the visibility of trans- bodies has become both pronounced and contested, arguing that
this is in itself a form of discursive violence and, further, that such strategies are productive of
cisprivilege, which functions to position trans- bodies as different, deviant and dangerous and
simultaneously as vulnerable and in need of protection. (Shepherd and Sjoberg 2012: 13)
Additionally, these policies marginalize genderqueer bodies and subject them to
dehumanization within contemporary culture
Shepherd & Sjoberg 12
(Laura J Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Social Sciences at UNSW and a feminist
scholar of international relations and international security, 7-1-2012, "Feminist Review," Feminist Review (2012) 101, 5–23.,
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/fr/journal/v101/n1/full/fr201153a.html //MV)
We suggest that
the invisibility of genderqueer bodies in security studies is a function of cisprivilege, but
queer and feminist accounts of (how) gender matters in and to security studies enable us to begin
thinking about how we might move towards a theory of cisprivilege in this disciplinary sub-field. First, we
return to the claim that ‘[d]iscrete genders are part of what “humanizes” individuals within contemporary
culture; indeed, we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right’ (Butler, 1999: 178). The essential
separation of bodies into two categories (‘M’ and ‘F’) informs the ways in which we think about the
body and also the ways in which we think about a host of social and political events and relationships that we conceive of as being ‘to do’ with the body; for this
ordering to occur, we must first commit to the categories of ‘F’ and ‘M’, just as we commit to other
organisational categories that help us make sense of, and feel secure in, our worlds (day/night, inside/outside,
friend/foe). In this way, idea(l)s about gender/sex are ontopolitical claims, ‘as making a statement about
what is is always already to find oneself within an understanding of the is, as such’ (Dillon, 1999: 112). This
results in the rendering invisible of queer bodies in representational practices as it discomforts us to
think differently about gender/sex and to question the categories that structure our conceptual
frameworks. While to conceive of the body as an event is to recognise its incompleteness—to recognise the body as always in the process of becoming—and
therefore to recognise the impossibility of gender security whatever one's gender performance, there is, we think, a degree of cisprivilege
inherent in the notion that the categories of ‘M’ and ‘F’ can be assumed stable. Second, and related to the above, we
suggest that trans-/queer bodies are also rendered invisible, and cisprivilege reproduced, through the implicit
or explicit historical treatment of those bodies as incidental, or, in the alternative, as trickery. Just as
orthodoxies of security insisted on the peripheral relevance of gender to security (see, for example, Adam Jones (1996: 427), who once described certain feminist
scholarship ‘as marginal, if that word still retains its pejorative connotations’), even in feminist scholarship on security, as discussed above, trans-
and
genderqueer bodies are assumed to be chimerical to central concerns about the realities of suffering,
deprivation and violence that security studies seeks to illuminate. Due to the dominance of the
dimorphic structuring of gender/sex in Western discourse, it is assumed that genderqueer bodies are of
marginal importance and can therefore legitimately be written out of war stories and high politics.
When genderqueer bodies are recognised, it is often as fakes, as games and as pretensions—a woman
‘pretended to be a man’ to get involved in a battle, or some such story that focuses on the genderqueer person's dishonesty.
Gender ambiguity, insomuch as it ‘actually’ exists, is assumed to reside in, or be inscribed on, a minority
of bodies, and security theories and practices have historically, traditionally, taken as their referent
object the ‘majority’, usually the state;
Furthermore, trans- bodies are subjected to constant discipline at the hands of the
state, creating discursive and structural violence
Shepherd & Sjoberg 12
(Laura J Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, Associate Professor of International Relations at the School of Social Sciences at UNSW and a feminist
scholar of international relations and international security, 7-1-2012, "Feminist Review," Feminist Review (2012) 101, 5–23.,
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/fr/journal/v101/n1/full/fr201153a.html //MV)
However, even these nuanced accounts of the immanence of gender in global politics as a noun, a verb
and an organisational logic do not explicitly interrogate transgender and genderqueer logics of security.
In fact, frequently they focus on a dichotomous or binary understanding of sex/gender to read gendered
logics of security. This is not to deride or dismiss the important and varied contributions of these scholars, but rather to suggest a way in which we might
contribute in this article to the literature on which we draw, and in relation to which we wish to situate ourselves . Feminist scholars of security
have emphasised the analytical salience of gender and, in doing so, raised questions about the possibility of
security/ies of the self, particularly in reference both to (corpo)realities of gendered violence (see, for example,
Bracewell, 2000; Hansen, 2001; Alison, 2007) and to the ontological security of gender identity itself (see, for example, Browne, 2004; Shepherd, 2008; MacKenzie,
2010). Opening
to critical scrutiny, however, the practices through which gender uncertainty is erased and
gender certainty inscribed—the practices through which the ontological presumption of gender
difference is maintained and gender fluidity denied—allows scholars to develop different understandings of the ways in which
in/security is not only written on the body but is performative of corporeality. We coin the neologism ‘genderinsecurity’ to emphasise the multiple dynamics of
gendering security, understanding gender in security and interrogating gender insecurity, all of which animate in various ways the scholarship we discuss here. In
different ways, these accounts of gender insecurity engage a politics of corporeality, asking under what circumstances, in what ways and with what effects subjects
embody different gendered ideas and ideals. On this view, the
body is ‘not … an object but … an “event” ’(Budgeon, 2003: 36; see also
Wilton, 2000: 251), an ongoing event that is culturally produced, mediated and disciplined (Grosz, 1994: 23). Bodies
are disciplined in part through security practices: those practices that speak to and of the physical
security of the state or individual subject (such as immigration policies); and those practices that aim to order
physical beings in the world (such as surveillance techniques, or the WBI scanning we discuss below).
In both cases, the gendered logics that (re)produce regulatory and disciplinary techniques are firmly
grounded in the idea and ideal of gender/sex as a binary construct. Queer bodies upset this binary logic
in mundane ways (detention facilities, for example, holding those pending immigration review are divided into
‘male’ and ‘female’ accommodations, which led in the USA to ‘a blanket policy of placing transgender
immigrant detainees in restrictive segregation’, according to a complaint filed against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on
behalf of thirteen immigrants by Heartland Alliance for Human Needs and Human Rights on 13 April 20114) and in ways that are less
immediately apparent and less frequently considered, at least in the realm of security studies (such as the
trauma experienced when travelling with identity papers that do not ‘fit’ the assumed gender of the bearer, see Coyote, 2010;5 TransGriot, 20116).
Structural violence outweighs
Taylor 09
(Janelle S. , Prof. of Anthropology, Univ. of Washington, http://depts.washing...er/taylor.shtml, Explaining Difference: Culture, Structural
Violence, and Medical Anthropology)
Structure sounds like a neutral term “ it sounds like something that is just there, unquestionable, part of
the way the world is. By juxtaposing this with the word violence, however, Farmers concept of structural
violence forces our attention to the forms of suffering and injustice that are deeply embedded in the
ordinary, taken-for-granted patterns of the way the world is. From this follow some important and very challenging
insights. First, the same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable and pleasant for some of
us, also mar the lives of others through poverty, insecurity, ill-health and violence. Second, these structures are
neither natural nor neutral, but are instead the outcome of long histories of political, economic, and
social struggle. Third, being nothing more (and nothing less!) than patterns of collective social action,
these structures can and should be changed. Structural violence thus encourages us to look for
differences within large-scale social structures “ differences of power, wealth, privilege and health that
are unjust and unacceptable. By the same token, structural violence encourages us to look for connections between what might be
falsely perceived separate and distinct social worlds. Structural violence also encourages an attitude of moral outrage
and critical engagement, in situations where the automatic response might be to passively accept
systematic inequalities.
The law has empirically encouraged people to similar instances of structural violence –
challenging the system is key
Gilreath 14
(Gilreath, associate professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies, 2014 (Shannon, associate professor of law as well, Wake Forest
University “THE INTERNET AND INEQUALITY: A COMMENT ON THE NSA SPYING SCANDAL” August 15 2014,
https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/handle/10339/39364)
To some extent, one
struggling against the surveillance State feels as if he is in the position of "shouting
against the wind." The sense of futility is often as great as the sense of urgency. How does one, in the face of seemingly
overwhelming governmental power, do anything? At the most basic level, this Essay is one form of resistance.
Speaking out in protest is resistance that is real. From this perspective, Edward Snowden is a hero. Given the blasé attitude of many
Americans toward the government's ever-expanding powers in the name of national security, and given the government's unquestionable ability to annihilate the
individual protestor, Edward
Snowden was shouting against the wind and knew it. Why do not more people
speak up? Why do not more people resist the "turnkey tyranny" Snowden exposed? One reason is that much of the population
does not believe that they are affected by it in any significant way. Beyond that, the ways in which those
of us in the "Land of the Free" are conditioned to obey authority become palpable and important. Lawyers,
as a group, seem to me particularly brainwashed by the thing they call, with all of the majesty they can muster, "the rule of law." Too often the "rule of
law" is simply the metaphor used to explain allegiance to power without the burden of a guilty
conscience. Blind adherence to the rule of law meant that lawyers and judges could make the Nazi
tyranny seem, well, legal. And American lawyers and jurists are certainly not immune from the seductiveness of the rule of law. U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Breyer has cited, as evidence of the magnificence of the rule of law, the reaction
to the decision in Bush v. Gore, the 2000 decision in which a 5-4 vote of the Supreme Court, along
ideological lines, handed the presidency to a man who had not actually been elected. There was no
resistance, no rioting, no blood in the streets. Contrasting this with the 1958 Supreme Court decision of Cooper v. Aaron, in which the
Court's integration decision had to be enforced in Arkansas by federal troops, Justice Breyer concludes that the system works. But is the
fact that Americans have had the will to protest bled out of us really a good thing? We are, after all, a country born from revolution. At the moment
Bush v. Gore came down, a moment as notorious as any in Supreme Court history-a moment in which the Supreme Court
effectively appointed a president of its choosing-there was no resistance. That is a rather remarkable thing, really. As
Professor Ann Scales once observed, "Perhaps we should worry about how little it takes for the legal system to command so much ... dedication. Perhaps we have
been bamboozled." Of course, the
seeming inevitability of authority can convince people to accept much more than
a judicial decision. The "rule of law," understood simply as an uncritical obedience to authority, has chilling implications for
the reality of power and its abuses. In Stanley Milgram's now classic work, Obedience to Authority, college students, assigned the
role of "teacher," in an experiment on learning, administered massive amounts of electroshock to other students,
assigned the role of "student," simply because a scientist told them to do it. In a 1973 article about his study, Milgram said that
most of the subjects delivering the shocks to fellow students did so out of a "sense of obligation." This
observation led Milgram to agree with Hannah Arendt's characterization of evil as "banal," meaning that the capacity for evil does not require
any special personal predisposition. "That is perhaps the most fundamental lesson of our study," Milgram wrote, "ordinary people,
simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part, can become agents in a terrible
destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their work become patently clear,
and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental standards of morality, relatively
few people have the resources to resist authority." It is absolutely critical, then, that we have those
resources-that we work to develop them.
Security Theater
The TSA’s security practices don’t solve for the problems they were created for–their
uselessness creates a theater of security which causes other, hidden forms of violence
Jason Harrington, 10-1-2014, ("Ebola Security Theater Isn’t Going to Make You Any Safer," Vanity Fair,
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/10/ebola-security-tsa-airport?mbid=social_twitter, Jason Edward Harrington is a former TSA
agent)
On Monday, New Jersey governor Chris Christie
defended his decision to detain health-care worker Kaci Hickox
under a New Jersey Ebola quarantine policy similar to ones adopted by several states with this cheerful quote: “Any of us have
seen people who are traveling and they’ve been stopped, whether they are late for a plane or whatever they are doing, they get upset and
angry. That’s fine. I have absolutely nothing but good will for [Hickox] going forward. She’s a good person and went over and was doing good
work over in West Africa.Ӧ For six years, I
was one of the Transportation Security Administration agents who
stopped airline passengers at checkpoints, regularly making them both upset and angry. Often, as Christie suggested, they were
late for their planes. Usually, I was stopping them from doing important things for very stupid, federally mandated reasons. For instance, over
the course of my duty I sometimes had to look airline pilots in the eye and tell them, with a straight face, that
it was necessary to confiscate items from their carry-ons due to the possibility that the items could
potentially be used to hijack their own planes. I did this supposedly in the interest of the safety of the
American public. After such confiscations, I used to turn to my fellow T.S.A. agents and speculate about the chances the pilot would
swing the plane around and crash it into the airport for revenge.¶ The nail-clipper confiscations, as with most official
actions on airport checkpoints, were security theater, much like the quarantine measures that healthcare workers such as Hickox are now being subjected to at some entry points around the United States.¶ If I
were a federal agent at a U.S. airport tasked with enforcing some of the recently implemented policies that travelers arriving from
Ebola hot zones be checked for Ebola-like symptoms, the first thing I would wonder is if my job even made any sense. We
know that Ebola is not terribly contagious until the patient is quite ill. A passenger like Thomas Eric
Duncan, who flew to Dallas with Ebola incubating in his body and lied about his close contact with a dying Ebola patient just days before,
could not have been singled out by any kind of Ebola spot-check: the infected exhibit virtually no symptoms when the
virus is incubating. In yet another example of an airport security measure straight out of Catch-22,the fact of the matter is that a traveler
carrying the Ebola virus in its early stages cannot be identified by superficial security checks (and is not
much of a threat to the general population), while a person carrying the Ebola virus in its advanced, contagious stage can be
detected by travel security checkpoints (but is often too sick to travel anyway).¶ All of this would perhaps be less absurd if the
tools with which officials were attempting to detect the virus at airports weren’t completely useless.
Much like the largely ineffective full-body scanners we employ at T.S.A. to attempt to detect concealed
weapons on passengers, finding incubation-stage Ebola in a crowded airport amounts to a taxpayerfunded search for fleas conducted through a shattered magnifying glass.¶ The thermal no-contact fever
detectors in place at a lot of airports report an alarmingly number of false positives, as one 2011 scientific study reported.
The scanners do not measure body core temperature, the essential indicator of a febrile response to
infectious disease; rather, they detect skin-surface temperature, which can change based on many
factors unrelated to illness such as sunburn, room temperature, and even emotional states, as an enraged Hickox claimed when
her skin temperature reportedly rose, right along with her temper, as the wheels of bureaucracy
creaked into motion and deposited her into a quarantine. Back in 2010, we at the T.S.A. quietly used thermal imagers on
crowds at O’Hare airport. Agents I spoke to who were in charge of running the scanners at the time used to say that thermalimaging duty was a joke: they claimed the technology was so poor as to make it all but a complete waste
of time.¶ Governments have tried in the past to utilize airport security as a means by which to contain viral
outbreaks, and we have studies to prove how ineffective those efforts were. A 2003 Canadian report on the
SARS outbreak and the accompanying airport-screening measures put in place to stop the contagion showed
that the extra security didn’t detect a single case of the virus. At best, the Ebola spot-check would work if all passengers
behaved honestly at all times. As soon as someone hides or chooses to opt-out of disclosing the fact that he or
she was recently in the vicinity of a potentially Ebola-infected area or person, the integrity of the
security system collapses (fevers controlled through the use of medication could similarly foil these efforts). In essence, Ebola
interrogations amount to a new iteration of, “Did you pack your own bags? And have you been in possession of your bags at all times?,” asked
of passengers by airline security since the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. No
one is likely to want to admit to having been near
an Ebola hot zone at an airport security checkpoint knowing that such a disclosure might lead to a threeweek quarantine. The only thing that such honor-system questioning really accomplishes is hassling people and causing delays.¶ And the
biggest problem with quarantine measures, like the grandma and grandpa full-body pat-downs mindlessly administered day in
and day out by the T.S.A., is that we are hassling and delaying precisely the wrong people. The one problem I’ve always
had with the term “security theater” is the connotation of playhouse harmlessness. We all have to put up with a little annoying
bureaucracy in times of national danger. So goes the typical rationalization offered by politicians. But, as any cost-benefit
analyst will tell you, the bureaucratic tangles that result from such security theater can have very real,
even deadly effects.¶ A study in Applied Economics on the unintended consequences of post-9/11 airport security found that the
substitution of driving for flying by those seeking to avoid the ever-increasing security inconveniences
likely resulted in more than 2,000 road fatalities from 2001 to 2005. Senseless attempts to make air
travel safer by confiscating the carry-on items and bottled water only gave people incentive to road-trip to their
destinations, greatly increasing their chances of death. Security theater isn’t just some harmless
bureaucratic placebo and fact of modern-day life: it can discourage activities and behavior in such a way as to
have real, pernicious effects upon society. The health-care workers upon whom the senseless quarantine measures have fallen
the hardest are angry, and rightfully so. The measures will do nothing to secure the U.S. from the threat of an Ebola
outbreak; they will, in fact, only hamper the very real efforts of the people we’re depending on to quell the
outbreak.¶ Like telling a pilot she can’t be trusted to safely maintain control over a pocket knife while she flies a 747, whisking courageous
health-care workers away into quarantine on the pretense that they are incapable of monitoring their own health is not only absurd, it is
downright insulting, and possibly even dangerous.
Race/Ethnicity
TSA Bad
Race
The TSA has no defense for the program’s objectivity
Schmidt 13
(Michael S. Schmidt, . "Report Says T.S.A. Screening Program Not Objective," New York Times, 6-4-2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/report-says-tsa-screening-program-not-objective.html//ghs-kw)
The Transportation Security Administration has little evidence that an airport passenger screening
program, which some employees believe is a magnet for racial profiling and has cost taxpayers nearly one billion dollars, screens
passengers objectively, according to a report by the inspector general for the Homeland Security Department. The
T.S.A.’s “behavioral detection program” is supposed to rely on security officers who pull aside
passengers who exhibit what are considered telltale signs of terrorists for additional screening and
questioning. It is illegal to screen passengers because of their nationality, race, ethnicity or religion.
According to the report, the T.S.A. has not assessed the effectiveness of the program, which has 2,800
employees and does not have a comprehensive training program. The T.S.A. cannot “show that the
program is cost-effective, or reasonably justify the program’s expansion,” the report said. As a result of the
T.S.A.’s ineffective oversight of the program, it “cannot ensure that passengers at U.S. airports are screened
objectively,” the report said.
TSA officers concede programs are racist – prefer our ev
Rockler 12
(Harmen Rockler, . "Report of TSA behavior shows racist tendencies," No Publication,
xx-xx-xxxx. http://dailyorange.com/2012/08/report-of-tsa-behavior-shows-racisttendencies///ghs-kw)
The Transportation Security Administration’s attempt to observe airline passengers’ behaviors while
going through airport security was revealed to be a cause for racial profiling this week. TSA officers at
Logan Airport in Boston told the New York Times the program has increasingly targeted minorities to search
instead of actual passengers who pose a threat. Racial profiling is not a solution to the security threat
the United States faces. A security officer at the airport told the Times, “They just pull aside anyone
who they don’t like the way they look — if they are black and have expensive clothes or jewelry, or if
they are Hispanic.” This is not what the intended goal of the program was. The program was launched in 2011 as
a trial, though behavior detection has been used at Logan since 2003. TSA officers were supposed to have a “casual conversation” with
passengers after providing a boarding pass and ID, according to TSA spokesman Greg Soule in the Times article. At the start of the program,
Soule said, “Officers are specifically trained to keep questions purposeful and related to detecting a passenger’s intent. This program is in no
way related to passengers’ race or ethnicity.” What
was found at Logan suggests the program has not been about
passengers’ behavior but their race. Some think we need to profile. Supporters of racial profiling
proclaim we shouldn’t sacrifice our security for political correctness. Because the 9/11 hijackers looked
Middle Eastern, we need to heavily screen those who look similar. Law enforcement officers’ instincts
should be pursued so we can be safer. Not all terrorists who attack the United States have been Muslim
or even look Middle Eastern. White and nonwhite individuals have committed acts of terrorism on U.S.
soil. All individuals should be equally, fairly scrutinized at airport security because anyone could pose a
threat — no matter his or her race. Trying to more heavily screen people who look Arabic is not only a
poor response to the actual threat posed, but it may do further damage to the ability of law
enforcement to protect us from actual threats. We risk alienating the people we need to help us.
There is already a culture of suspicion of Middle Easterners and Muslims caused by the way law
enforcement behaves. Earlier this year, the New York Police Department was found to be spying on Muslim student associations in U.S.
colleges (including Syracuse University) and cataloging mosques in New Jersey. This is one part of the law enforcement system that may not be
treating all citizens as equals.
TSA’s extra-screening policy is not objective nor cost-effective
Washington Times, 6-5-2013, "TSA screenings lack objectivity, probe finds," Washington Times,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/5/audit-finds-tsa-screening-lacks-objectivity/
The TSA’s program to let agents pick out people for closer screening based on the agents’ observation fails to
meet basic standards of training of objectivity, according to a report released Wednesday by the agency’s auditor.¶ More than
3,000 Transportation Security Administration agents have been hired and authorized to conduct
“behavioral detection,” which involves watching or chatting up passengers and trying to pick out clues
that would suggest they are security risks.¶ But the Homeland Security Department’s inspector general
said the agency is running the program without bothering to check to see if it is cost-effective, and
without any sense that agents are exercising good judgment in deciding which travelers they screen.¶
“TSA cannot demonstrate that [officers] are screening passengers in a uniform manner to identify
potentially high-risk individuals,” the auditor said.¶ The inspector general recommended that TSA come up with a strategic plan; do
a better job collecting data on who’s getting screened; provide better training for officers and instructors; and figure out a way to assess
whether instructors are doing a good job.¶ In fiscal 2011, more than 650 million passengers went through airports, and the behavioral detection
program referred 2,214 of them to law enforcement, producing 199 arrests for outstanding warrants, suspected drug possession or being illegal
immigrants.¶ In his official response to the audit, TSA Administrator John S. Pistole said the agency has completed a strategic plan, but it
accepted most of the auditor’s recommendations and has finished or is working on completing the changes.¶ “TSA believes that passengers at
U.S. airports are screened … in an objective manner; [the Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques program] is effective and has been
validated and determined to identify substantially more high-risk travelers than a random screening protocol and the program is executed in an
efficient manner,” Mr. Pistole said.¶ TSA said the behavior program adds a needed layer of security to airport checks, saying that the behavioral
cues their officers look for have been honed through decades of research and experience by other law enforcement branches.¶ The agency said
the program is nine times more likely to identify a high-risk traveler than random screening.¶ The audit report came on the same day that TSA
officials announced they were abandoning a plan to allow passengers to carry small knives, souvenir bats, golf clubs and other sports
equipment onto planes in the face of fierce congressional and industry opposition, the head of the agency said Wednesday.¶ Last month, 145
House members signed a letter to Mr. Pistole urging him not to ease the ban, and a coalition of major airlines also opposed the policy change.
Islam
TSA’s policies discriminate against Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians
In response to the attacks, the federal
government immediately engaged in a sweeping counterterrorism campaign focused on Arabs and Muslims,
and in some cases on persons who were perceived to be, but in fact were not, Arabs or Muslims, such as Sikhs and
other South Asians. That focus continues to this day. The federal government claims that its anti-terrorism efforts do not amount to racial profiling,
The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were carried out by Arabs from Muslim countries.
but the singling out for questioning and detention of Arabs and Muslims in the United States, as well as selective application of the immigration laws to nationals of Arab and Muslim countries,
belie this claim.¶ A prime example of a federal program that encourages racial profiling is the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), implemented in 2002.44 NSEERS
requires certain individuals from predominantly Muslim countries to register with the federal government, as well as to be fingerprinted, photographed, and interrogated. A report issued in
2009 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Rights Working Group had this to say about NSEERS:¶ More than seven years after its implementation, NSEERS continues to impact
the lives of those individuals and communities subjected to it. It has led to the prevention of naturalization and to the deportation of individuals who failed to register, either because they
were unaware of the registration requirement or because they were afraid to register after hearing stories of interrogations, detentions and deportations of friends, family and community
members. As a result, well-intentioned individuals who failed to comply with NSEERS due to a lack of knowledge or fear have been denied "adjustment of status" (green cards), and in some
cases have been placed in removal proceedings for willfully" failing to register."45¶ Despite NSEERS' near explicit profiling based on religion and national origin, federal courts have held that
the program does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and that those forced to participate in the program have not suffered violations of their rights under the Fourth
or Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which protect against unreasonable search and seizure and guarantee due process, respectively.46¶ Another example of a federal program that
involves racial profiling is Operation Front Line (OFL). The stated purpose of OFL,47 which was instituted just prior to the November 2004 presidential election, is to "detect, deter, and disrupt
terror operations."48 OFL is a covert program, the existence of which was discovered through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
and the Yale Law School National Litigation Project.49¶ According to the 2009 ACLU/Rights Working Group report, data regarding OFL obtained from the Department of Homeland Security
show that:¶ an astounding seventy-nine percent of the targets investigated were immigrants from Muslim majority countries. Moreover, foreign nationals from Muslim-majority countries
were 1,280 times more likely to be targeted than similarly situated individuals from other countries. Incredibly, not even one terrorism-related conviction resulted from the interviews
conducted under this program. What did result, however, was an intense chilling effect on the free speech and association rights of the Muslim, Arab and South Asian communities targeted in
advance of an already contentious presidential election.50¶ Lists of individuals who registered under NSEERS were apparently used to select candidates for investigation in OFL.51 Inasmuch as
the overwhelming majority of those selected were Muslims, OFL is a clear example of a federal program that involves racial profiling. Moreover, because OFL has resulted in no terror-related
Arabs and
Muslims, and those presumed to be Arabs or Muslims based on their appearance, have since 9/11 been targeted by law enforcement
authorities in their homes, at work, and while driving or walking,53 airports and border crossings have become especially daunting. One reason for this is a
convictions, the program is also a clear example of how racial profiling uses up valuable law enforcement resources yet fails to make our nation safer.52¶ Although
wide-ranging and intrusive Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) guidance issued in July 2008 that states, "in the course of a border search, and absent individualized suspicion, officers can review
and analyze the information transported by any individual attempting to enter …. the United States."(Emphasis added)54 In addition, the standard to copy documents belonging to a person
seeking to enter the U.S. was lowered from a "probable cause" to a "reasonable suspicion" standard.55 Operating under such a broad and subjective guidance, border agents frequently stop
Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians for extensive questioning about their families, faith, political opinions, and other private matters, and subject them to intrusive searches. Often, their cell
phones, laptops, personal papers and books are taken and reviewed.¶ The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains a list of every person who, according to the U.S. government, has
"any nexus" to terrorism.56 Because of misidentification (i.e., mistaking non-listed persons for listed persons) and over-classification (i.e., assigning listed persons a classification that makes
this defective "watch-list" causes many problems for Muslims, Arabs, and South
Asians seeking to enter the United States, including those who are U.S. citizens.¶ The case of Zabaria Reed, a U.S. citizen, Gulf War veteran, 20-year member
them appear dangerous when they are not),
of the National Guard, and firefighter, illustrates the problem. Trying to reenter the U.S. from Canada where he travels to visit family, Reed is frequently detained, searched, and interrogated
about his friends, politics, and reasons for converting to Islam. Officials have handcuffed Reed in front of his children, pointed weapons at him, and denied him counsel.57¶ In 2005, a lawsuit—
Rahman v. Chertoff—was filed in federal district court in Illinois by nine U.S. citizens and one lawful permanent resident, none of whom had any connection to terrorist activity.58 The
plaintiffs—all of whom are of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent— alleged that they were repeatedly detained, interrogated, and humiliated when attempting to re-enter the U.S. because
their names were wrongly on the watch-list, despite the fact that they were law abiding citizens who were always cleared for re-entry into the U.S. after these recurring and punitive
detentions.59¶ In May 2010, the court dismissed the case, finding that almost all of the disputed detentions were "routine," meaning that border guards needed no suspicion at all to
undertake various intrusions such as pat-down frisks and handcuffing for a brief time.60 Further, the court held that where the stops were not routine, the detentions, frisks, and handcuffings
were justified by the placement of the individuals on the TSC's database—even when the listing may have been a mistake.61¶ Notwithstanding the adverse decision in the Rahman case, and
the continuation of these practices on a national level, it is important to note that there have been certain positive changes in government policy since 2005. Specifically, a standard of
"reasonable suspicion" is now used before a name can be added to the TSC’s database, which marks a sharp departure from the essentially "standardless" policy previously in effect.62¶
Individuals wearing Sikh turbans or Muslim head coverings are also profiled for higher scrutiny at
airports. In response to criticism from Sikh organizations, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently revised its operating
procedure for screening head coverings at airports. The current procedure provides that:¶ All members of the traveling public are permitted to wear head coverings (whether religious or not)
procedures subject all persons wearing head coverings to the possibility of
additional security screening, which may include a patdown search of the head covering. Individuals may be referred for additional
screening if the security officer cannot reasonably determine that the head area is free of a detectable
threat item. If the issue cannot be resolved through a pat-down search, the individual will be offered the
opportunity to remove the head covering in a private screening area.63¶ Despite this new procedure, and TSA's assurance that in
implementing it "TSA does not conduct ethnic or religious profiling, and employs multiple checks and balances to ensure profiling does not happen,"64 Sikh travelers report
that they continue to be profiled and subject to abuse at airports.65¶ Amardeep Singh, director of programs for the Sikh
Coalition and a second-generation American, recounted the following experience in his June 2010 testimony before the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties of the House Judiciary Committee:¶ Two months ago, my family and I were coming back to the United States from a
family vacation in Playa Del Carmen, Mexico. At Fort Lauderdale Airport, not only was I subjected to extra screening, but so was
through the security checkpoints. The new standard
my 18 month-old son Azaad]. I was sadly forced to take my son, Azaad, into the infamous glass box so that he
could [be] patted down. He cried while I held him. He did not know who that stranger was who was patting him
down. His bag was also thoroughly searched. His Elmo book number one was searched. His Elmo book number two was searched. His minimail truck was searched. The time spent waiting
for me to grab him was wasted time. The time spent going through his baby books was wasted time. I am not sure what I am going to tell him when he
is old enough and asks why his father and grandfather and soon him—Americans all three—are
constantly stopped by the TSA 100% of the time at some airports.66
[
TSA’s security procedures are a direct violation of Islamic principle– opt out
exemptions aren’t enough
CS Monitor 10
("Do airport full body scanners violate Islam?," Christian Science Monitor, 3/15/2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0315/Doairport-full-body-scanners-violate-Islam)
As full body scanners debut at O’Hare International Airport Monday, two
American Muslim groups have suggested that the
technology violates the teachings of Islam.¶ The comments are just the latest controversy surrounding full-body scanners, which
some critics call a “virtual strip search” because the technology sees through clothing to show the contours of a
passenger’s body in detail.¶ The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has deployed 150 scanners across 21 US airports this
month, partly in response to the failed Christmas Day bombing of a Detroit-bound jetliner, where bombmaking materials were hidden in a
passenger’s underwear – something full-body scanners would have seen.¶ The TSA expects to install an additional 300 scanners
in nine additional airports by the end of this year. But security officials say they will be able to accommodate the wishes of passengers – Muslim
or otherwise – who object to the full-body screener.¶ TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE Could you pass a US citizenship test?¶ PHOTOS OF THE DAY
Photos of the day 02/08¶ The technology is “completely optional for all passengers,” says Jim Fotenos, a TSA spokesman, and those who choose
not to participate get “an equal level of screening,” which includes a walk through a metal detector and a physical pat-down by an officer of the
same sex.¶ Islamic objections¶ The
screening imagery is a violation of Islam, says The Fiqh Council of North America, a body of
full body imagery “is against the
teachings of Islam, natural law, and all religions and cultures that stand for decency and modesty.”¶ “It is
a violation of clear Islamic teachings that men or women be seen naked by other men and women,” the
statement continued. “There must be a compelling case for the necessity and the exemption to this rule must
be proportional to the demonstrated need.Ӧ The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a Washington-based civil rights
Islamic scholars located in Plainfield, Ind. Last month the council issued a statement that said the
advocacy group, agrees with the Fiqh Council and, according to National Communications Director Ibrahim Hooper, it plans to track Muslims
concerns with the scanners before deciding what actions to take next.¶ “Modesty is a basic principal of the Islamic faith, it’s very important and
always has been,” says Mr. Hooper. “People say, ‘I’ll do anything for safety,’ but that’s not the question. Everybody wants to be safe.
Muslims fly like anybody else … you can be safe and secure and still maintain your privacy rights.”¶ 'A fuzzy
photo negative'¶ To stress the anonymity of the process, the TSA says officers review the images in a remote location and never see the actual
passengers. What they do see via their monitors is automatically deleted from the system once the passenger passes review.¶ According to the
TSA website, what officers see of a passenger’s body either resembles “a chalk drawing” or “a fuzzy photo negative,” depending on the
machine, therefore suggesting passenger privacy is ensured.¶ The Fiqh Council, however, is urging followers to request pat-down searches as
an alternative.¶ CAIR’s Mr. Hooper also advocates an increase in federal funding for alternate screening technologies that do not require visual
screening, such as the "Puffer,” a machine that can identify chemical particles a person may have on their body and analyze whether or not
they are harmful.¶ The TSA’s Fotenos says the current options “shouldn’t substantially impact operations at checkpoints,” saying TSA research
at 19 US airports shows gate delays are primarily caused by carry-on baggage checks.
TSA Aff – Econ
Status Quo Spending Bad
Status quo TSA spending is inefficient and blind – better decision making or budget
cuts need to be implemented (also o/ws terror impact?)
Charles Kenny, Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development and author of The Upside
of Down: Why the Rise of the Rest is Great for the West., 11-18-2012, "Airport Security Is Killing Us,"
Businessweek, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2012-11-18/how-airport-security-is-killing-us
//MV
The attention paid to terrorism in the U.S. is considerably out of proportion to the relative threat it
presents. That’s especially true when it comes to Islamic-extremist terror. Of the 150,000 murders in the U.S. between 9/11 and the end of
2010, Islamic extremism accounted for fewer than three dozen. Since 2000, the chance that a resident of the U.S. would die in a
terrorist attack was one in 3.5 million, according to John Mueller and Mark Stewart of Ohio State and the University of Newcastle, respectively. In fact, extremist
Islamic terrorism resulted in just 200 to 400 deaths worldwide outside the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq—the same number, Mueller noted in a 2011 report
(PDF), as die in bathtubs in the U.S. alone each year. Yet
the TSA still commands a budget of nearly $8 billion—which is why
the agency is left with too many officers and not enough to do. The TSA’s “Top Good Catches of 2011,” reported on its blog, did
include 1,200 firearms and—their top find—a single batch of C4 explosives (though those were discovered only on the return flight). A longer list of TSA’s
confiscations would include a G.I. Joe action doll’s 4-inch plastic rifle (“it’s a replica”) and a light saber. And needless to say, the
TSA didn’t spot a
single terrorist trying to board an airline in the U.S., notes Bruce Schneier. According to one estimate of direct and indirect costs borne
by the U.S. as a result of 9/11, the New York Times suggested the attacks themselves caused $55 billion in “toll and physical damage,” while the economic impact
was $123 billion. But costs related to increased homeland security and counterterrorism spending, as well as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, totaled $3,105
billion. Mueller and Stewart estimate that government
spending on homeland security over the 2002-11 period
accounted for around $580 billion of that total. The researchers quote Rand Corp. President James Thomson, who
noted most of that expenditure was implemented “with little or no evaluation.” In 2010, the National Academy of
Science reported the lack of “any Department of Homeland Security risk analysis capabilities and methods that
are yet adequate for supporting [department] decision making.” In short, DHS (and the TSA in particular) is
firing huge bundles of large denomination bills completely blindly. There is lethal collateral damage associated with all this
spending on airline security—namely, the inconvenience of air travel is pushing more people onto the roads. Compare the dangers of air travel to those of driving.
To make flying as dangerous as using a car, a four-plane disaster on the scale of 9/11 would have to occur every month, according to analysis published in the
American Scientist.
Flight Delays
TSA Causes Delays
TSA inspections cause flight delays – every minute is wasted money
Jamie Rhein, 8-20-2008, "TSA inspector damages planes and causes major flight delays," Gadling,
http://gadling.com/2008/08/20/tsa-inspector-damages-planes-and-causes-major-flight-delays/ //MV
As one of the duties to make sure air travel is safer, TSA
inspectors check planes for security issues while the planes
are parked. Unfortunately, knowing which parts of planes should not be touched, and what a ladder looks like is a skill set that still needs
some fine tuning. According to this ABC News report, an inspector at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport used sensitive
instrument probes as handholds while climbing into nine American Eagle airplanes. These TAT probes, pictured, are
important to the operation of flight computers. As a result, 40 commuter flights were delayed. At the time,
the TSA agent was attempting to determine if the aircraft could be broken into and an agency official is quoted as saying “Our
inspector was following routine procedure for securing the aircraft that were on the tarmac.”
Security procedures cost millions of hours of wasted time
Chris Edwards, director of transportation policy, Reason Foundation, 12-1-2013, "Privatizing the
Transportation Security Administration," Downsizing the Federal Government,
http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/homeland-security/tsa
Aside from invasions of privacy, the frequent congestion at U.S. airports caused by security procedures
has a large cost in terms of wasted time. There are about 740 million passenger flights a year in the
United States.107 For example, if a new security procedure adds 10 minutes to each flight, travelers
would consume another 123 million hours per year. That is a lot of time that people could have used
earning money or enjoying life with their families. Policymakers need to remember that citizens value
their time and that unneeded bureaucratic procedures destroy that precious resource.
Delays are expensive
Airline delays are costly for the airline industry
Associated Press, 12-10-2014, "Flight delays are costing airlines serious money," Mashable,
http://mashable.com/2014/12/10/cost-of-delayed-flights/ //MV
"If you're late out of the driveway in the morning, you're probably going to be a little bit late to work," says Steve Hozdulick, Southwest's senior director of
operational performance. "You're going to hit the two traffic lights that you never hit." In
the airline world, delays build as the day wears
on. This summer, for example, airlines were on-time around 85% or better until mid-morning. By mid-afternoon, the rate dropped into the low 70s, then plunged
into the 60s by dinner time. Delays are costly for airlines and their passengers. A 2010 study commissioned by the Federal Aviation
Administration estimated that flight delays cost the airline industry $8 billion a year flight delays cost the airline industry $8 billion a
year, much of it due to increased spending on crews, fuel and maintenance. Delays cost passengers even more — nearly $17 billion. In the first nine
months of the year, more than 1 million U.S. airline flights arrived late — about one in five. According to the Department of
Transportation, delays were slightly up in October compared to September. Tardiness creates other problems including missed
connections, lost bags and short tempers among frustrated travelers. A little problem has a ripple effect On a freezing
morning recently at Dallas Love Field, Southwest supervisors showed up at 4 a.m., two hours before the first flights. They assign two or more bag handlers to each
flight. The last bag should be on the plane and the bin doors closed five minutes before scheduled departure, says Dave Obeso, a Southwest ramp supervisor. The
pilots for Flight 454 to Phoenix inspected their Boeing 737 in the dark. Workers called "ops agents" calculated load weight and balance and completed paperwork. A
fueler gassed up the jet. Inside the terminal, agents at Gate 12 started boarding the 136 passengers — they're supposed to close the aircraft door five minutes
before scheduled departure. And then, a snag. A broken communications radio. A replacement was ordered and installed, a tug pushed the plane back from the
gate, and the pilots taxied into position for takeoff. But the damage had been done. Flight 454 left 29 minutes behind schedule and arrived in Phoenix 34 minutes
late. Southwest's control center relayed word of the delay to Phoenix employees, who "turned" the aircraft faster than normal before its next flight. Still, the plane
remained nine to 28 minutes behind schedule for the remaining four flights of the day, according to the tracking service FlightAware.com.
Aviation is key to Econ
Aviation is key to economic success
Teri L. Bristol is the Chief Operating Officer of the Air Traffic Association. June 2014. “The Economic
Impact of Civil Aviation on the U.S. Economy” https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/2014economic-impact-report.pdf //MV
Flying is an inspiring part of American life. It’s a symbol of our freedom, pioneering spirit, and economic success. As the nation continues to revitalize itself following
the most recent recession, civil aviation has outpaced the national economy. In
2012, aviation accounted for 5.4% of our gross
domestic product (GDP), contributed $1.5 trillion in total economic activity, and supported 11.8 million
jobs. Aviation manufacturing also continues to be the nation’s top net export. The nation’s economic
success depends on having a vibrant civil aviation industry. To support this effort, the FAA remains committed to ensuring the
safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. We’re focused on the following four strategic priorities: making aviation safer and smarter, delivering benefits
through technology and infrastructure, enhancing global leadership, and empowering the FAA’s workforce so we can innovate. We’re in the process of transforming
the airspace system by deploying the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NextGen will make aviation more fuel and cost efficient, and more
environmentally friendly.
Civil aviation spurs economic growth
DRI-WEFA July 2002. “The National Economic Impact of Civil Aviation”. https://www.aiaaerospace.org/stats/resources/DRI-WEFA_EconomicImpactStudy.pdf //MV
Civil aviation has become an integral part of the U.S. economy. It is a key catalyst for economic growth
and has a profound influence on the quality of life of populations around the globe. It integrates the
world economy and promotes the international exchange of people, products, investment, and ideas.
Indeed, to a very large extent, civil aviation has enabled small community and rural populations to enter
the mainstream of global commerce by linking such communities with worldwide population,
manufacturing, and cultural centers. Civil aviation products and services generate a significant surplus
for the U.S. trade accounts and are in the forefront in the development and use of advanced
technologies. Fundamentally, civil aviation touches nearly every aspect of our lives, and its success will,
to a great degree, shape American society and the U.S. economy in the coming decades.
Trans
Trans Scanning
Transgendered bodies are policed by scanning technology – which can have broader
consequences on their rights
Magnet, Shoshana, Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Ottawa, 3-1-2012, "Stripping For
The State Whole Body Imaging Technologies And The Surveillance Of Othered," Feminist Media Studies
Vol. 12, Issue 1, Pg. 101-118 //MV
Backscatter and millimeter wave technologies have significant consequences for transgender bodies and
mobilities. Whole body imaging technologies can reveal breasts, genitals, prostheses, and binding
materials. These technologies also have the ability to zoom in on a particular area, including genitalia
(National Center for Transgender Equality 2009). As a result, bodies that do not fit normative gender identities may be
singled out by the TSA for special scrutiny, providing the possibility that transgender individuals may be
outed to TSA personnel, or that they may have their bodily privacy further invaded. Here, bodies rendered as matter
out of place are policed. This has especially devastating consequences for transgender individuals who are
closeted and live in small towns, in which case being outed at the local airport could have broader
consequences, such as implications for their job security or for their relationships with friends and relatives. Moreover, a transphobic screener
could easily cause a transgender person to miss their flight by detaining them for special screening or
could subject them to new forms of humiliation and harassment. Given the potential consequences of
whole body imaging technologies, Mara Kiesling, the executive director of the National Center for Transgender Equality,
identified whole body imaging technologies as one of the most pressing issues facing transgender
communities.
Full body scanning subjects transgender bodies to constitutional rights violations and
privacy violations every time they pass through the airport
Abini, D. B., 2014, "TRAVELING TRANSGENDER: HOW AIRPORT SCREENING PROCEDURES THREATEN
THE RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY," Southern California Law Review Volume 78, pg. 120A //MV
Full-body scanning and other airport screening procedures have provoked outcry from the transgender
community because of how they force transgender individuals going through airport security to disclose
intimate details about their bodies, invading their privacy and making travel stressful and sometimes
even dangerous. n2 In addition, the United States Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") has been under
increased scrutiny, both for its departure from a risk-based screening system as well as for the weaknesses in its current screening
system. While the TSA has taken some action to ameliorate privacy concerns by decommissioning one type of wholebody scanner, n3 such action only reflects a change in agency policy, which does not prevent the TSA from
reverting back to its old ways. The right to informational privacy has only been directly addressed in
three Supreme Court cases, all of which found that, on balance, no constitutionally impermissible privacy
intrusion occurred. However, the Court reached these decisions without explicitly indicating that the right to informational privacy
existed, leaving circuit courts to define the contours of the right. Relying on the guidelines set out by circuit courts that best comport with
the constitutional right to informational privacy
is seriously intruded upon when transgender travelers pass through airport security checkpoints. Although
Supreme Court informational privacy jurisprudence, this Note contends that
others have addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of full-body scanning in preflight screening, n4 this Note is the first to do so from
the informational privacy perspective.
Scanners force the visibility of trans- bodies to be contested – this kind of discursive
violence reinforces cisprivelege
Redden, Stephanie M., Carleton University, Canada and London School of Economics and Political
Science, UK, 6-1-2013, "The End Of The Line Feminist Understandings Of Resistance To Full-Body
Scanning Technology," International Feminist Journal Of Politics Issn: 1461-6742 Date: 06/2013 Volume:
15 Issue: 2 Page: 234-253 //MV
Magnet and Rodgers (2011: 1; see also Johnson 2006: 6) also make clear that it is essential to consider how this technology not only differently affects women, but
also how other ‘marginalized subjects’ are affected. They note that: ... transgender
individuals, people with disabilities, and those
with particular religious affiliations are rendered newly or differently legible. As such, their application
to airport security generates new implications for who are allowed to move through, and who are
afforded justice within, contemporary cultural and transnational spaces. (Magnet and Rodgers 2011: 7) This
differentiated legibility of bodies is nowhere more visible than in the interactions between gender and
identity at border security points. As Currah and Mulqueen (2011: 559) have recently highlighted, the classification of
individuals by the State according to gender metrics produces less certainty for queer, transgender and
other bodies whose realities do not map onto the State’s dichotomous understandings of gender, as
‘securitizing gender does not necessarily secure identity, and may indeed destabilize it’. The intense
gender-based interrogations and pat downs that these individuals often undergo as their bodies are
seen as threatening suggest the deeply problematic and essentializing nature of full-body scanner
technologies and other security practices, whereby a clear gender marker is understood to be a sign of positive identification. Shepherd and
Sjoberg (2012: 15) importantly argue that ‘both the introduction of WBI scanners in airports and the ways in which this
technology has been linked to trans- bodies are forms of discursive violence’. They explain that with the use of
these scanners: the visibility of trans- bodies has become both pronounced and contested, arguing that
this is in itself a form of discursive violence and, further, that such strategies are productive of
cisprivilege, which functions to position trans- bodies as different, deviant and dangerous and
simultaneously as vulnerable and in need of protection. (Shepherd and Sjoberg 2012: 13)
Misc Stuff
TSA scanning virtually strips the body to nudity and in doing so strips the rights from
those bodies
Magnet, Shoshana, Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Ottawa, 3-1-2012, "Stripping For
The State Whole Body Imaging Technologies And The Surveillance Of Othered," Feminist Media Studies
Vol. 12, Issue 1, Pg. 101-118 //MV
Standing outside her place of work in Baghdad’s Green Zone, an Iraqi woman holds up an image of a
naked woman’s body taken by a backscatter camera. Farah al-Jaberi is protesting that she must consent
to be scanned by this type of technology as a condition of her employment (Corey Flintoff 2008). Noting that
male guards can see these images, and could conceivably photograph and save them to view later, alJaberi highlights the ways that these technologies violate both her bodily privacy and her religious
beliefs. At the same time, vendors of whole body imaging scanners such as backscatter X-rays market them as objective and
able to eliminate systemic forms of discrimination since “To them, everyone is the same color” (William
Saletan 2007). We live in a virtual world, it is said, where bodies no longer matter. Yet the material body is
central to modern forms of power and thus also key to state policies, borders, media, and
technologies. As a result, new ways of visualizing the body are central to contemporary regimes of
governance. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, we have witnessed the rise of a multitude of new identification technologies that emphasize
the productive potential of the human body for the governance of the state. Using new ways of visualizing the body, individuals are
increasingly linked through their bodies into networks as part of what Simone Browne (2009) calls the
“identity–industrial complex,” in which the body itself becomes the primary object of surveillance. Whole
body imaging technologies, capable of virtually stripping the body naked and which are becoming central to airport security, are the subject of this article.
TSA Scanning perpetuates neoliberal rhetoric of consumerist choice – when in fact
nothing is being chosen from at all (?)
Magnet, Shoshana, Professor of Gender Studies at the University of Ottawa, 3-1-2012, "Stripping For
The State Whole Body Imaging Technologies And The Surveillance Of Othered," Feminist Media Studies
Vol. 12, Issue 1, Pg. 101-118 //MV
In this way, whole body imaging technologies are also marketed using a rhetoric of choice. As the TSA
asserts: “The passenger has the option of receiving a full pat down or going through the Whole Body
Imaging system” (National Center for Transgender Equality 2009). Here, we see how the need for a strip
search is naturalized as the question becomes, instead of “Why must I submit to a strip search?” a
matter of “What kind of strip search would I prefer?” As such, the deployment of whole body scanners
through a rhetoric of choice manifests a logic of neoliberal governmentality. Inderpal Grewal notes that,
by the early twenty-first century, consumer culture has become central to neoliberalism, “promoting
endlessly the idea of choice as central to a liberal subject and enabling the hegemony of both capitalist
democracy, American style, and the selfactualizing and identity-producing possibilities of consumption”
(2005, pp. 219–220). A rhetoric of consumerist choice and concomitant freedoms is everywhere in a US
citizen/consumer’s experience of air travel, from Southwest Airlines’ promise that low fares mean “You
are now free to move about the country,” to flight attendants’ stoking customer loyalty with the familiar
phrase: “We know you have a choice of carriers when you fly, and thank you for choosing our airline”
(Southwest 2010). In airport security contexts, such neoliberal discourses position individual travelers as
having agency to choose which option, scanner or pat-down, best suits their travel schedule (e.g., “Is
there enough time for a pat-down or would the scanner be more efficient?”) or their personal
preferences (e.g., “I’d rather not have a stranger’s hands on my body so I’ll choose the scanner”)—when
in fact the subject can only “choose” between slightly different expressions of the state’s interests in
bodily surveillance.
Scanning forces the feminine body to be objectified by male authority
Redden, Stephanie M., Carleton University, Canada and London School of Economics and Political
Science, UK, 6-1-2013, "The End Of The Line Feminist Understandings Of Resistance To Full-Body
Scanning Technology," International Feminist Journal Of Politics Issn: 1461-6742 Date: 06/2013 Volume:
15 Issue: 2 Page: 234-253 //MV
As Rakow (1988: 66–8) argues, most
technologies can be seen as being both being gendered in and of themselves
and that, once in existence, they can also be used in ways that are gendered and serve to further
perpetuate an existing gendered order. She explains that ‘although women are active creators and users
of technologies, men have been in a position to create technologies that dominate and serve certain
masculine values and purposes’ (Rakow 1988: 66). Below we briefly outline the existing feminist literature which, similar to Rakow’s earlier piece,
has centered on exploring the complex – and in some cases ‘mutually constitutive’ (Wajcman 2004: 8) – relationship between gender and technology. We then build
on these insights in order to examine how – and in what ways –
full-body scanners can be seen as a ‘gendered technology’
which has led to ‘gendered practices’ within the airport security screening setting (Rakow 1988: 57). Feminist
scholars writing about the relationship between technology and gender have noted that there is a
complicated and intimate connection between the two which is reflected in both the development and
utilization of most technologies (Terry and Calvert 1997; Johnson 2006; Rosser 2006; Monahan 2009), with many viewing the
relationship as ‘mutually constitutive’ (Wajcman 2004: 8). As mentioned previously, the ‘backscatter’ technology utilized
in many airport full-body scanners was developed by American inventor Martin Annis thirty years ago
(Nickisch 2010: 1). Annis did not develop or evaluate --------------------------------------------------- Stephanie M. Redden and Jillian Terry/The End of
the Line 237 the technology in a way that would make it gender sensitive. As he stated in a recent interview: [Annis] When I first
invented the system, people would say, ‘Well, what would a woman look like?’ And everybody has not got good motives in this. [Journalist] He asked a relative of
his to test it – a pretty, young woman. He says it made her less attractive. [Annis] You don’t see the woman’s nipple. They look a little like Barbie dolls. So in fact, it’s
not very sexual. (Nickisch 2010: 2) Annis’
comments point toward the obviously gendered implications of body
scanning technology – by attempting to remove sexuality from the equation completely, the technology
emphasizes the physical attributes of women and men, highlighting the apparently problematic nature
of such interactions between the body and modern technologies. The mere mention of attractiveness in
Annis’ remarks remind us of the continued importance of feminist scholarship examining the male gaze,
and how that gaze is mediated through a lens of technology. According to Monahan (2009: 288), these modern
technologies can ‘betray their gendered dimensions through various forms of “discrimination”’. Fullbody
scanner technology most clearly embodies a form of ‘body discrimination’, as he outlines. He explains
that most technologies are ‘designed better for use by men than women. This is in large part, a product
of the frame of reference of technology designers, software developers, and engineers, most of whom
are men designing with themselves in mind’ (Monahan 2009: 288). Tellingly, full-body scanners have raised privacybased concerns among many female passengers because when one goes through the scanner, ‘sanitary
napkins’ are made visible to those reviewing the scan, and in some cases, women wearing these items have been targeted for
additional security screening (Daily Mail 2010: 1–6; Sharkey 2010: 2; Shores 2010: 3). Had this technology been designed with both men
and women in mind, this issue would have been acknowledged and addressed by its creator. In addition, much
like the forms of video surveillance discussed by Monahan, full-body scanners require someone to be in a private viewing area
separate from passengers to analyze the images produced from the scanner. This separation can prove
to be problematic as it can serve to mask potential forms of sexual harassment being committed by
those monitoring and reviewing surveillance video, or in this case full-body scans (Monahan 2009: 288).
Add-Ons
Constitutionality
2AC
TSA procedures are unconstitutional—4th amendment
Rosen 10
(Jeffrey Rosen . "Why the TSA pat-downs and body scans are unconstitutional," Washington Post. 11-28-2010.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/24/AR2010112404510_pf.html//ghs-kw)
Courts evaluating airport-screening technology tend to give great deference to the government's national security interest in preventing terrorist attacks. But in this
case, there's a strong argument that the
TSA's measures violate the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the Supreme Court hasn't evaluated airport screening technology, lower courts have
emphasized, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled in 2007, that "a particular airport security screening search is
constitutionally reasonable provided that it 'is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the
light of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or explosives.' " In a 2006 opinion for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, then-Judge Samuel Alito stressed that screening procedures must be both "minimally intrusive" and
"effective" - in other words, they must be "well-tailored to protect personal privacy," and they must
deliver on their promise of discovering serious threats. Alito upheld the practices at an airport checkpoint where passengers were
first screened with walk-through magnetometers and then, if they set off an alarm, with hand-held wands. He wrote that airport searches are
reasonable if they escalate "in invasiveness only after a lower level of screening disclose[s] a reason to
conduct a more probing search." As currently used in U.S. airports, the new full-body scanners fail all of
Alito's tests. First, as European regulators have recognized, they could be much less intrusive without sacrificing
effectiveness. For example, Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport, the European airport that employs body-scanning machines most extensively, has incorporated
crucial privacy and safety protections. Rejecting the "backscatter" machines used in the United States, which produce revealing images of the body and have raised
concerns about radiation, the Dutch use scanners known as ProVision ATD, which employ radio waves with far lower frequencies than those used in common handheld devices. If the software detects contraband or suspicious material under a passenger's clothing, it projects an outline of that area of the body onto a genderneutral, blob-like human image, instead of generating a virtually naked image of the passenger. The passenger can then be taken aside for secondary screening. TSA
Administrator John Pistole acknowledged in recent testimony that these "blob" machines, as opposed to the "naked" machines, are the "next generation" of
screening technology. His concern, he said, is that "there are currently a high rate of false positives on that technology, so we're working through that." But courts
might hold that, even with false positives, "blob" imaging technology that leads to a secondary pat-down is less invasive and more effective than imposing a choice
between "naked" machines and intrusive pat-downs as primary screening for all passengers. In the Netherlands, there's another crucial privacy protection: Images
captured by the body scanners are neither stored nor transmitted. Unfortunately, the TSA required that the machines deployed in U.S. airports be capable of
recording, storing and transmitting images when in "test" mode. The agency promised, after this capability was revealed by a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, that the test mode isn't being used in airports. But other agencies have abused the storage capability of the
machines. The U.S. Marshals Service admitted in August that it had saved more than 35,000 images from body scanners at the Orlando federal courthouse. In
evaluating the constitutionality of these scanners, U.S. courts might hold that the machines can't be considered
"minimally invasive" as long as images can be stored and recorded. In January, the European Commission's information
commissioner criticized the scanners' "privacy-invasive potential" and their unproven effectiveness. And tests have shown that the machines are not good at
detecting low-density powder explosives: A member of Britain's Parliament who evaluated the scanners in his former capacity as a defense technology company
director concluded that they wouldn't have stopped the bomber who concealed the chemical powder PETN in his underwear last Christmas. So there's
good
reason to believe that the machines are not effective in detecting the weapons they're purportedly
designed to identify. For U.S. courts, that's yet another consideration that could make them
constitutionally unreasonable. Broadly, U.S. courts have held that "routine" searches of all travelers can be conducted at airports as long as they
don't threaten serious invasions of privacy. By contrast, "non-routine" searches, such as strip-searches or body-cavity
searches, require some individualized suspicion - that is, some cause to suspect a particular traveler of
wrongdoing. Neither virtual strip-searches nor intrusive pat-downs should be considered "routine," and
therefore courts should rule that neither can be used for primary screening.
Policymakers must uphold constitutional rights—no violation is ever legitimate
Carter, 87
(Brigham Young University Law Review No. 3, p. 751-2)
The constitution, which is after all a species of law, is thus quite naturally viewed as a potential impediment
to policy, a barrier that must be adjusted, through interpretation or amendment, more often than preservation of government under that constitution is viewed as a desirable policy in itself. In this modern
student of policy is like the modern moral philosopher—and like a good number of constitutional theorists as well---in denigrating the value of preserving any particular process and exalting the desirable result. But
constitutionalism assigns enormous importance to process, and assigns costs, albeit perhaps intangible ones, to violating the constitutional process. For the constitutionalist, as for classical liberal democratic theory,
the autonomy of the people themselves, not the achievement of some well-intentioned
government policy, is the ultimate end for which government exists. As a consequence, no
violation of the means the people have approved for pursuit of policy---here, the means
embodied in the structural provisions of the Constitution---can be justified through
reference to the policy itself as the end. Somewhere between the totalitarian horror of a society driven entirely by its zeal to achieve stated ends, and Grant
Kilmore’s Kafkaesque evocation of a society so bound up in the forms of law that it becomes a living hell, drifts the moderately progressive American constitutional ideal. I am not at all sure that we best pursue it by
freeing our legislature entirely from the bonds of constitutionalism, trusting to nothing but the independent and largely unguided judgement of the courts to decide when the legislature goes too far.
Sexual Harassment
2AC
Internals
Generic TSA Bad
TSA’s counterterrorism strategies are ineffective beyond increasing other forms of
terror
Dylan Matthews, 9-11-2013,( "Twelve years after 9/11, we still have no idea how to fight terrorism.," Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/11/twelve-years-after-911-we-still-have-no-idea-how-to-fight-terrorism-2/)
Counterterrorism may be the most significant area of government policy where we still have no idea
what the hell we're doing.¶ Everywhere else, policymakers are at least trying to know what they're doing. Development researchers
and education wonks have become obsessive about running randomized controlled trials to evaluate interventions. Indeed, the popularity of
charter schools is due in part to the fact that their frequent use of lottery-based admission makes them good ways to randomly test different
school designs. Criminologists have run experiments on a variety of police tactics, probation designs, anti-gang initiatives, approaches to
domestic violence, and more. And While there's still plenty we don't know about what health measures work, the Affordable Care Act is
devoting millions to building up more evidence, and big-deal health policy experiments like the Oregon Medical Study receive the attention
they deserve.¶ But terrorism? We have no idea. The Afghanistan war has cost $657.5 billion so far, we
spend $17.2 billion in
classified funds a year fighting terrorism through the intelligence community, and the Department of
Homeland Security spent another $47.4 billion last year. And we have very little idea whether any of it is
preventing terrorist attacks.¶ Some of this is just that it's harder to collect good evidence than it is in other policy areas. You can't
randomly select some airports to have security screenings and some to not and measure how many hijacking occur at the ones with or without
them — or, at least, you can't do that and conform to anything remotely resembling research ethics. But merely because true experiments are
often impossible doesn't mean that you can't evaluate policy interventions using other means. And people have tried those experiments. It's
just that nothing seems to have any significant effect one way or another. The Campbell Collaboration, an
organization that publishes peer-reviewed systematic reviews of the evidence on various policy topics, first released its review of the
literature on counterterrorism, written by criminologists Cynthia Lum (George Mason), Leslie Kennedy and Alison Sherley (both at
Rutgers), in 2006 (it's been updated since).¶ The first problem the review identifies is that barely any of the terrorism literature
even tries to answer questions about effective counterterrorism. "Of the over 20,000 reports regarding
terrorism that we located," the authors write, "only about 1.5 percent of this massive literature even remotely discussed
the idea that an evaluation had been conducted of counter-terrorism strategies."¶ They found 354 studies that
did, however. Further culling left them 80 studies that could be reasonably said to evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. Of
these, only
21 of those 80 studies "appeared to at least attempt to connect an outcome or effect with a
program through a minimally rigorous scientific test." Of those 21, only 10 met the Campbell review's methodological
standards. Three of those were medical studies dealing with the effects of bioterrorism, leaving seven for the review to consider.¶ It's worth
dwelling on that number. In
2009, eight years after 9/11, and after decades of work on terrorist groups ranging from the IRA to ETA in Spain
to Palestinian groups to the Tamil Tigers, only seven studies, or 0.035 percent of all terrorism studies, evaluated the
effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. By comparison, a Campbell Systematic Review of anti-bullying programs in schools
found 622 reports "concerned with interventions to prevent school bullying," of which 89 were rigorous enough to include. Stopping bullying is
vitally important and I don't mean to trivialize that cause, but it's more than a little concerning that we have almost 13 times as many studies
on how to stop bullying as we do on how to stop terrorism.¶ Anyway, back to the seven measly studies. For one thing, they are mostly done by
the same handful of people. Three were coauthored by Walter Enders (at the University of Alabama) and Todd Sandler (at University of Texas –
Dallas), two by Enders and Sandler alone and the other one with Jon Cauley (at the University of Hawaii – Hilo). Cauley did another study with
Eric Iksoon Im (also at Hilo). So over half of the studies included were coauthored by one of Enders, Sandler, or Cauley. They're all excellent
researchers, and one should not discount their work because of their higher output, but generally we want a range of studies from a range of
sources when building a literature like this.¶ The seven studies include among them 86 findings about the effectiveness of counterterrorism
programs, and those findings are startling. Lum, Kennedy and
Sherley report that the average effect of the programs
examined was negative. That is, the intervention was found to increase terrorist incidents rather than
reduce them. The results varied by the type of intervention, but not in a way that should give us any comfort about our strategy:¶ •
Metal detectors reduce hijackings, but terrorist just do other stuff instead.¶ The studies find that, on
average, adding metal detectors and security screenings at airports leads to about 6.3 fewer airplane
hijackings in the years examined. But they also find that those policies lead to significant increases in
"miscellaneous bombings, armed attacks, hostage taking, and events which included death or wounded
individuals (as opposed to non-casualty incidents) in both the short and long run." In fact, metal detectors and
security screenings at airports lead to about 6.8 more of these substitute events. "When calculating the
overall weighted mean effect size for all of the findings examining the effectiveness of metal detectors, the
positive and harmful effects cancel each other out," the review's authors conclude.¶ • Fortifying embassies and protecting
diplomats doesn't appear to reduce attacks.¶ Most of the results here are not statistically significant. "In total, the findings do not indicate that
the fortification of embassies and efforts to protect diplomats have been effective in reducing terrorist attacks on these targets," the review
authors conclude. More on this issue here.¶ • There's no evidence harsher penalties reduce hijackings.¶ Only one study looked at what
increasing penalties for plane hijackers did to hijacking rates, and that one found no effect. That doesn't mean that it doesn't work, just that we
shouldn't reject our original assumption that it's not effective.¶ • Strongly written letters from the U.N. don't help much.¶ One U.N. resolution,
which included a recommendation that airports use metal detectors, was associated with a significant reduction in hijackings. But that could
just mean that the metal detectors, rather than the U.N. resolution, caused the reduction, and the same substitution issues explained above
hold
TSA profiling practices are inefficient and counterproductive–the plan solves best
Bruce Schneier, 5-9-2012 (My current position is at BT as its Chief Security Technology Officer, "The Trouble with Airport Profiling,"
Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceschneier/2012/05/09/the-trouble-with-airport-profiling/)
Why do otherwise rational people think it’s a good idea to profile people at airports? Recently, neuroscientist and best-selling author Sam
Harris related a story of an elderly couple being given the twice-over by the TSA, pointed out how these two were obviously not a threat, and
recommended that the TSA focus on the actual threat: “Muslims, or anyone who looks like he or she
could conceivably be Muslim.”¶ This is a bad idea. It doesn’t make us any safer — and it actually puts us
all at risk.¶ The right way to look at security is in terms of cost-benefit trade-offs. If adding profiling to
airport checkpoints allowed us to detect more threats at a lower cost, than we should implement it. If it
didn’t, we’d be foolish to do so. Sometimes profiling works. Consider a sheep in a meadow, happily munching on grass. When he
spies a wolf, he’s going to judge that individual wolf based on a bunch of assumptions related to the past behavior of its species. In short, that
sheep is going to profile…and then run away. This makes perfect sense, and is why evolution produced sheep — and other animals — that react
this way. But this sort of profiling doesn’t work with humans at airports, for several reasons.¶ First, in the sheep’s case the
profile is accurate, in that all wolves are out to eat sheep. Maybe a particular wolf isn’t hungry at the moment, but enough wolves are hungry
enough of the time to justify the occasional false alarm. However,
it isn’t true that almost all Muslims are out to blow up
airplanes. In fact, almost none of them are. Post 9/11, we’ve had 2 Muslim terrorists on U.S airplanes: the
shoe bomber and the underwear bomber. If you assume 0.8% (that’s one estimate of the percentage of Muslim Americans) of the
630 million annual airplane fliers are Muslim and triple it to account for others who look Semitic, then
the chances any profiled flier will be a Muslim terrorist is 1 in 80 million. Add the 19 9/11 terrorists — arguably a
singular event — that number drops to 1 in 8 million. Either way, because the number of actual terrorists is so low, almost
everyone selected by the profile will be innocent. This is called the “base rate fallacy,” and dooms any type of
broad terrorist profiling, including the TSA’s behavioral profiling.¶ Second, sheep can safely ignore animals that don’t look
like the few predators they know. On the other hand, to assume that only Arab-appearing people are terrorists is
dangerously naive. Muslims are black, white, Asian, and everything else — most Muslims are not Arab.
Recent terrorists have been European, Asian, African, Hispanic, and Middle Eastern; male and female;
young and old. Underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab was Nigerian. Shoe bomber Richard Reid was British with a Jamaican
father. One of the London subway bombers, Germaine Lindsay, was Afro-Caribbean. Dirty bomb suspect Jose Padilla was Hispanic-American.
The 2002 Bali terrorists were Indonesian. Both Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber were white Americans. The Chechen terrorists who blew
up two Russian planes in 2004 were female. Focusing on
a profile increases the risk that TSA agents will miss those
who don’t match it.¶ Third, wolves can’t deliberately try to evade the profile. A wolf in sheep’s clothing is just a story, but humans are
smart and adaptable enough to put the concept into practice. Once the TSA establishes a profile, terrorists will take steps
to avoid it. The Chechens deliberately chose female suicide bombers because Russian security was less thorough with women. Al Qaeda has
tried to recruit non-Muslims. And terrorists have given bombs to innocent — and innocent-looking — travelers. Randomized secondary
screening is more effective, especially since the goal isn’t to catch every plot but to create enough uncertainty that terrorists don’t even try.¶
And fourth, sheep don’t care if they offend innocent wolves; the two species are never going to be friends.
At airports, though, there is
an enormous social and political cost to the millions of false alarms. Beyond the societal harms of
deliberately harassing a minority group, singling out Muslims alienates the very people who are in the
best position to discover and alert authorities about Muslim plots before the terrorists even get to the
airport. This alone is reason enough not to profile.¶ I too am incensed — but not surprised — when the TSA manhandles four-year old girls,
children with cerebral palsy, pretty women, the elderly, and wheelchair users for humiliation, abuse, and sometimes theft. Any bureaucracy
that processes 630 million people per year will generate stories like this. When people propose profiling, they are really asking for a security
system that can apply judgment. Unfortunately, that’s really hard. Rules are easier to explain and train. Zero tolerance is easier to justify and
defend. Judgment requires better-educated, more expert, and much-higher-paid screeners. And the personal career risks to a TSA agent of
being wrong when exercising judgment far outweigh any benefits from being sensible.¶ The
proper reaction to screening horror
stories isn’t to subject only “those people” to it; it’s to subject no one to it. (Can anyone even explain what
hypothetical terrorist plot could successfully evade normal security, but would be discovered during secondary screening?) Invasive TSA
screening is nothing more than security theater. It doesn’t make us safer, and it’s not worth the cost. Even
more strongly, security isn’t our society’s only value. Do we really want the full power of government to act out our stereotypes
and prejudices? Have we Americans ever done something like this and not been ashamed later? This is what we have a Constitution
for: to help us live up to our values and not down to our fears.
TSA is plagued by employee misconduct and a lackluster workforce—it’s only getting
worse
Pearson et al 13
(Michael Pearson. Ed Payne and Rene Marsh, Cnn "Government report: TSA employee
misconduct up 26% in 3 years," CNN. 8-1-2013.
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/31/travel/tsa-misconduct///ghs-kw)
Let's get this out of the way straight off: The Transportation Security Administration is probably not going to top anyone's list of Favorite Federal Government
Agencies. And the stories of its failures spread faster than a speeding jetliner: TSA
officers stealing money from luggage, taking
bribes from drug dealers, sleeping on the job. So it shouldn't come as any surprise that a new Government
Accountability Office report, citing a 26% increase in misconduct among TSA employees between 2010
and 2012, is striking a nerve with some travelers who've had to endure the shoeless, beltless shuffle on the trip through security. "Whenever you
get an organization that has to be there, sometimes it just starts to take on a weight of its own," traveler Chris Simon said Wednesday at San Francisco International
Airport. "So maybe it's just not being managed." "This makes me never want to check my bag," Twitter user KathrynPowers1 posted Wednesday in response to the
news. "That's disgusting, " tweeted user RidockKing. Among the report's findings: -- Misconduct
cases involving TSA employees -from 2,691 a year in 2010 to 3,408 in 2012. -- About a
third of the cases involved being late or not reporting for work, the largest single category of offenses. -10% of offenses involved inappropriate comments or abusive behavior. -- About a quarter involved
screening and security failures -- including sleeping on the job -- or neglect of duty offenses that resulted in losses or
careless inspections. Photos: 20 odd items confiscated by the TSA Examples of violations The report details one case of a TSA
agent suspended for seven days after trying to carry a relative's bag past security without screening. A
supervisor interceded and the bag was found to contain "numerous prohibited items," according to the
GAO report. It didn't say what the items were. In another case, a TSA agent was suspended for 30 days after a closed-circuit camera caught the officer failing
to individually examine X-ray images of passenger items, as required by agency policy. Among the 9,622 offenses cataloged in the
report, the GAO also found 384 ethics and integrity violations, 155 "appearance and hygiene"
complaints and 56 cases of theft. While not specifically mentioned in the report, notable cases of theft by TSA agents
include a 2012 case in which two former employees pleaded guilty to stealing $40,000 from a checked
bag at New York's John F. Kennedy Airport, and a 2011 guilty plea from an officer who admitted stealing
everything from being late to skipping crucial security protocols -- rose
between $10,000 and $30,000 from travelers at Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey. The
officer in the 2011 case, Al Raimi, admitted he would "kick up" some of that money to a supervisor, who in turn allowed him to keep stealing. The supervisor,
Michael Arato, also pleaded guilty to accepting kickbacks and bribes. Airport officer claims he was fired for exposing sleeping guards Taking it seriously Overall, 47%
of the offenses detailed in the report resulted in a letter of reprimand, at least 17% cost the employees their jobs and 31% ended with a suspension. "If they're
stealing, they're doing drugs or breaching the security system intentionally and I can prove it, they're out," TSA Deputy Administrator John W. Halinski told a joint
hearing of two House Homeland Security subcommittees on Wednesday. But he said, even the letters of reprimand handed out in nearly half of the cases are
serious punishment. Such letters can block employees from receiving a bonus or promotion, and stay with them their entire career, he told Rep. Richard Hudson, RNorth Carolina, chair of the Transportation Security subcommittee. "It's a serious thing, sir," Halinksi said. He also defended his agency's 56,000 employee workforce
as overwhelmingly upright. But Rep. John Mica, a Florida Republican and longtime critic of the TSA who requested the audit, is skeptical. He told CNN that the
report shows the TSA is not doing enough to respond to and prevent misconduct. "There's not even a
way to properly report some of the offenses, so this may be just the tip of the iceberg of some of the offenses," he
said. TSA agents at Newark spared from firings after violations Some other lawmakers stood by the agency Wednesday, saying the offenses represent a small
percentage of TSA's 56,000 employees. "Transportation security officers have an undeniably hard job and the overwhelming majority of them conduct themselves
honorably and in accordance with TSA protocols," Rep. Cedric Richardson, D-Louisiana, said during Wednesday's hearing. Analyst: Turn the tables on TSA Frost and
Sullivan airport security analyst John Hernandez said the
report isn't particularly surprising. The TSA has been plagued by
uneven training for years, he said, resulting in a work force that isn't always properly educated about how
to do their jobs.
TSA is an ineffective government bureaucracy that has resulted in billions of wasteful
spending – insiders concur
Edwards 14
(Chris Edwards. Edwards holds a BA and MA in economics, and he was a member of the Fiscal Future Commission of the National Academy
of Sciences. Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at Cato. He is a top expert on federal and state tax and budget issues. Before
joining Cato, Edwards was a senior economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a manager with PricewaterhouseCoopers,
and an economist with the Tax Foundation. Edwards has testified to Congress on fiscal issues many times, and his articles on tax and budget
policies have appeared in the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and other major newspapers. "End the TSA," Cato Institute, May
2014. http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/end-tsa//ghs-kw)
But U.S. aviation is too important to leave to government. It is
a giant industry that serves 740 million travelers every
year and provides a crucial service to every other industry. Aviation will keep on growing, but it will need ever
more complex systems to keep up with rising demands and increased international competition. Our
government aviation bureaucracies are not up to the challenge. A Bureaucratic Nightmare Let’s look at TSA. The
agency was created in a rush after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Congress and the George W. Bush
administration moved rashly to nationalize airport security screening without appreciating the downsides of a government takeover.
TSA’s main activity is operating passenger and baggage screening at the nation’s 450 or so commercial airports. It has an annual budget of $8
billion and more than 60,000 employees. About
85 percent of the employees are airport screeners. Nationalizing U.S.
of the principal architects of the 2001 TSA legislation, Rep. John Mica (R-FL), has
called the agency a “bureaucratic nightmare” with a “track record of security failures.” He says that TSA
has a “penchant for bungling aviation security and wasting taxpayers’ money.” Even former TSA chief
Kip Hawley has called TSA “hopelessly bureaucratic.” TSA’s huge, and now unionized, labor force has been one source of
airport screening was a mistake. One
problems. The Government Accountability Office found in 2012 that TSA ranked 232 out of 240 federal agencies in terms of employee
satisfaction. The GAO reported in 2013 that there
has been a large increase in TSA employee misconduct in recent
years. One workforce problem has been substantial employee theft from passenger baggage. Another
problem has been a rash of incidents at airports where workers are found not following security procedures. Mica calls these episodes TSA
“meltdowns.” Billions Wasted The TSA is no better at managing investments than it is at managing its workforce. TSA
has spent billions
of dollars on programs that have shown few benefits: TSA spent $30 million on 207 “puffer” machines to
detect explosives. But the machines did not work and had to be shelved. TSA spends more than $200 million a
year on the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program to catch terrorists from
suspicious behaviors in airports. But TSA has not caught any terrorists with SPOT, and the GAO found in
2013 that there was no “scientifically validated evidence” for the program. TSA spends more than $240
million a year to operate Advanced Imaging Technology or full- body scanning machines at major
airports. The machines are costly, cause airport congestion, and have dubious detection benefits. They can
detect high-density objects, but are less effective with low-density materials such as gels, powders, and liquids. Another problem is that
terrorists could evade the machines by boarding planes at smaller U.S. airports or foreign airports. TSA
spends about $1 billion a year on the Federal Air Marshal Service, which places about 5,000 armed
agents on about 5 percent of all U.S. flights. The program has resulted in relatively few arrests usually
for minor offences, and no arrests related to terrorism. Security experts, such as Mark Stewart and
John Mueller, have criticized TSA for not allocating its resources based on detailed risk assessments.
And TSA tends to proceed with expensive projects, such as the AIT machines and the SPOT program,
before it even completes cost-benefit analyses to see whether they are worthwhile.
AT Terror
No terrorists—we’ve been at risk for a decade due to TSA maintenance policies
Kimery 15
(Anthony Kimery. Editor-in-Chief Anthony "Tony" Kimery is one of the founding editors of Homeland Security Today in 2004. A respected
award-winning editor and journalist, he's covered homeland, national and global security, intelligence and defense issues for more than
three decades. He was founding Washington bureau chief of Money Laundering Alert; an editor of three B2B newsletters on financial
institution regulation; and Washington editor of Financial Planning and Trader's magazines. Kimery also was a Washington correspondent
for the Paris-based Intelligence Newsletter; a columnist for The Veteran; and managing editor of Kerrigan Media International, a Washington
publisher of magazines covering military and defense. Kimery also served as managing editor of SOURCES, a San Francisco-based security
intelligence news service; a founding contributing writer for Homeland Defense Journal; and a contributing writer for Insight, a weekly
current affairs magazine that was published by The Washington Times Co. He's also written for The Washington Post, Wired, Vietnam,
Common Cause, SAGA, and the Investigative Reporters & Editors Journal, to name a few. "Homeland Security Today: TSA Fails to Properly
Manage Airport Screening Equipment Maintenance Program," No Publication, 5-11-2015. http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-newsanalysis/single-article/tsa-fails-to-properly-manage-airport-screening-equipment-maintenanceprogram/46616b11285a46d761439081bc03cd62.html//ghs-kw)
US airline passengers appear to have been in potential jeopardy to terrorist attacks for nearly a
decade “because the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has not properly been managing
the maintenance of its airport screening equipment,” said a new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Inspector General (IG) audit report. Consequently, the IG stated, TSA may have to be using other screening
measures that “may be less effective at detecting dangerous items.” The screening equipment the IG
investigated proper maintenance of included Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines, Advanced
Imaging Technology (AIT) machines, Bottled Liquid Scanners, X-ray machines and walkthrough metal
detectors. The IG also reviewed maintenance data for Explosives Detection System (EDS) and EDT
checked baggage screening equipment. The IG reported that “TSA has not issued adequate policies and
procedures to airports for carrying out equipment maintenance-related responsibilities.” And because
TSA hasn’t been adequately overseeing its equipment maintenance, “it cannot be assured that
routine preventative maintenance is performed or that equipment is repaired and ready for
operational use,” the IG said. “Without diligent oversight, including implementing adequate policies and
procedures and ensuring it has complete, accurate and timely maintenance data for thousands of
screening equipment units,” the IG’s audit report said, “TSA risks” shortening the life span of equipment and
incurring unnecessary costs to replace the equipment. And “if the equipment is not fully operational, TSA
may have to use other screening measures, which could result in longer wait times and delays in
passenger and baggage screening,” the IG said. But “more importantly, the IG emphasized, “our prior work
on airport passenger and baggage screening demonstrated that these other measures may be less
effective” in detecting concealed weapons and other dangerous items. “Correctly maintaining sensitive screening
equipment at our nation’s airports is critical to both protecting the flying public and preserving this taxpayer-funded investment," Rep. Bennie
G. Thompson (D-Miss.), ranking member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, responded to the audit. "With hundreds of millions
spent on this critical function every year, TSA must ensure maintenance contractors are in compliance and do the work they are paid for. I hope
TSA quickly implements the Inspector General’s recommendations to ensure security gaps, cost overruns and longer wait times are not
needlessly created.” TSA relies on its passenger and baggage screening equipment to prevent dangerous items from being carried onboard
aircraft. The agency screens nearly 2 million passengers and more than 1 million checked bags at roughly 450 domestic airports across the
nation. TSA’s four maintenance contracts that are supposed to cover both preventative and corrective maintenance for out of warranty
equipment the IG said are valued at about $1.2 billion. The Inspector General reported that there were two levels of preventative maintenance
contracts in place at the time of our review – Level I maintenance performed by local TSA personnel daily or weekly which does not require
opening a machine to inspect mechanical operations; and Level II maintenance primarily performed monthly, quarterly or annually by trained
maintenance technicians. As part of Level II maintenance, contractors are supposed to verify TSA personnel’s’ performance of Level I
preventative maintenance. “Other than a calibration test for EDT machines, TSA
has not provided sufficient guidance to local
TSA personnel on procedures to properly document, track and maintain Level I preventative maintenance
actions,” the IG’s audit found, noting, “For the nine airports we reviewed, we noted that some maintenance logs contained
incomplete or inconsistent data.” Continuing, the IG determined “TSA personnel at seven of the nine airports we reviewed
could not provide any documentary evidence that contractors were verifying Level I maintenance.” “Without
accurate and complete maintenance logs for all equipment, TSA cannot ensure that airport personnel are performing
Level I preventative maintenance,” the IG said, adding, “TSA also cannot be certain contractors are complying with
the requirement to verify performance of Level I preventative maintenance actions.”
Airlines and local police will prevent attacks–more effective than the TSA
Veronique De Rugy, 12-5-2013, ("Time to get rid of the TSA," Washington Examiner, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/timeto-get-rid-of-the-tsa/article/2540280)
Federal airline security oversight has a long track record of failure. Few people know that prior to Sept. 11, 2001, four different federal agencies
-- the FBI, CIA, FAA and INS -- were entrusted to protect commercial airlines. They clearly did not do their jobs. Why, then, has the federal
government further nationalized the process?¶ After the 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress rushed to create a new agency to protect America's
planes, trains and trucks. The Transportation Security Administration enabled the federal government to control the screening of passengers
and baggage at all but five of the 429 U.S. commercial airports. Eleven years and billions of dollars later, the
TSA has mastered the
art of the grope but falls short on increasing security.¶ Throughout the TSA's existence, the 62,000-employee bureaucracy
has been constantly inundated with complaints about its performance. Several reports from support travelers' concerns. In July, the
Government Accountability Office reported almost 10,000 cases of employee misconduct at the TSA between 2010 and 2012. Outrageous
anecdotal stories -- like tales
of TSA agents frisking teary-eyed children, forcing travelers to remove prosthetic
limbs, and even interfering with elderly passengers' feeding tubes -- fuel discontent among jet-setters. But do
the TSA's invasive methods even make us safer?¶ Many analyses suggest that the TSA provides “security
theater” instead of security. another recent GAO report assessed a program intended to identify and apprehend terrorists based on
behavioral patterns and concluded that the $200-million-a-year program isn't working and should be ended.¶ So what is the TSA good at? In
2011, the TSA proudly thwarted birds, turtles, science projects, and Chinese throwing stars -- but no terrorists. Embarrassing, but perhaps not
surprising: Research
from the RAND Corp. suggests that cockpit security, passenger vigilance and passport
verification are the most effective security procedures. Given that the TSA spends two-thirds of its
budget on ineffective, expensive passenger- and baggage-screening procedures, it is easy to see why the
agency is better at catching turtles than terrorists.¶ TSA incompetency is an easy target for late-night talk shows but the
agency's troubles are no laughing matter. Not only is it ineffective, it is incredibly wasteful and expensive. Since its
creation, TSA's budget increased from $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $7.9 billion in fiscal year 2013. To that amount, we need to add the $606
billion in estimated lost tourism revenue from unreasonable procedures over past decade. What's more, many TSA agents have been caught
stealing travelers' personal items and squandering budget money. Waste is rampant: another GAO report shows that agents intentionally lower
productivity to raise wages -- and ultimately increase costs on taxpayers.¶
It is also a lot of money for an agency whose main
role -- preventing attacks in the style of Sept. 11 -- has already been generally accomplished. Cockpit barricades,
passenger vigilance, and passport screening are already implemented and effective at lower cost. What
about baggage screening? If the TSA prevents terrorists from bringing explosives onto planes, wouldn't this be worth the cost? Even
here, the TSA fails; there is evidence TSA agents do not systematically check bags for explosives.¶
SPP
Screening Partnership Program (SPP) Solvency
SPP screening is more efficient than the TSA
The Hill, 7-29-2014,( "Lawmakers spar with TSA union over private airport security," http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/213673lawmakers-tsa-union-spar-over-private-airport-security)
The chairman of the House panel that oversees transportation security issues accused the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on
Tuesday of blocking efforts to privatize airport security checkpoints. ¶ “Under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, unless an
airport's participation in [Screening Partnership Program] would hurt security or drive up costs, TSA
must approve all new applications,” Rep. Richard Hudson (R-N.C.) said during a hearing of the House Homeland Security
Committee’s Transportation Security Subcommittee. ¶ “While I have great respect for [TSA] Administrator [John] Pistole, as far as I am
concerned, there
will always be at least three clear and substantial advantages to privatized screening,”
Hudson continued. “Number one, the private sector operates more efficiently than the federal government and
can save precious taxpayer dollars. Number two, the private sector provides better customer service,
which is severely lacking at many of our nation's screening checkpoints. And number three….with
private screening, TSA can stop dealing with the time-consuming human resources issues that come
with managing a workforce of over 50,000 screeners.” ¶ The SPP program is designed to allow airports to
opt-out of utilizing TSA security personnel if they can prove they can provide the same level of
protection with private workers at lower costs. The requests have to be approved by TSA, however, which has led to friction
between GOP lawmakers and the TSA. ¶ Republicans have championed the effort to privatize airport security for
several years because they argue that many of the TSA’s techniques, including its pat down hand
searches and X-ray scanners, invade the privacy of airline passengers. ¶ The TSA has come under fire often
in recent year for its treatment of elderly and child passengers. ¶ Pistole was not there Tuesday to defend the TSA’s position
on the privatization program, but the union that represents TSA workers argued that the agency’s workers were better trained to meet federal
standards for airport security that have been in place since the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. ¶ “It is clear that the screening partnership
program, SPP, does not improve aviation security and it does not save the taxpayers money,” American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE) President J. David Cox Sr. told the panel. ¶ “Rather, SPP harms security, costs more, and hurts the TSOs who bear the brunt of the
outsourcing program,” Cox continued. “Only security contractors benefit.” ¶ Cox said Republicans were overstating the desire for airports to
opt-out of TSA security. ¶ “There is no demand for airports to privatize the work of our nation's [Transportation Security Officers],” he said.
“Although the 2012 FAA Modernization and Reform Act made it easy for airports to apply to privatize their TSA workforce, only a handful have
done so. With the exception of the Montana airports, over the past two years, only three airports have asked TSA for permission to switch to
private screeners.” ¶ Hudson said privatization program did not allow airports to skimp on security. ¶ “To be clear, this
does not mean
airports that participate in SPP are opting out of robust federal oversight and regulations, which were severely
lacking before 9/11,” he said. “It means opting to use qualified private vendors to carry out day-to-day screening
functions, which lets TSA concentrate on setting and enforcing security standards.” ¶ The North Carolina
lawmaker said he was open to “simple but crucial” changes to the program, such as increasing outreach to airports about their ability to
request to participate. ¶ But he added that “the
only barrier to action is TSA's well-known resistance to expanding
SPP.”¶ TSA’s Screening Partnership Program Director William Benner disputed the idea that the agency has blocked the expansion of the
privatization program, saying the agency has allowed 31 airports to opt-out of using its personnel, however. ¶ “The SPP is a voluntary program
whereby airports may apply for SPP status and employ private security companies to conduct airport screening according to TSA standards,”
Benner said. ¶ “Participation depends on interest from airport operators,” he continued. “Since the program began in 2004, 31 airports have
applied, including the original statutory five pilot airports. Of those 31, 18
are currently participating in the SPP program,
and either have private contract screeners in place or are in the process of transitioning to contract
screeners.” ¶ Benner added that even airports that successfully opt-out of using TSA personnel still had to meet the agency’s standards for
protecting U.S. airline passengers. ¶ “Regardless of whether an airport has private or federal employees conducting passenger screening
operations, TSA maintains overall responsibility for transportation security,” he said. “As new and emerging threats are identified, we must be
able to adapt and modify our procedures quickly to protect the traveling public. Federal Security Directors oversee the contracted security
screening operations to ensure compliance with Federal security standards throughout the aviation network.”
Plan solves, airport security gets better with SPP
David Inserra, 10-1-2014, "19th Airport Joins Screening Partnership Program," Daily Signal,
http://dailysignal.com/2014/10/01/dropping-tsa-19th-airport-joins-efficient-private-screening-program/
David Inserra specializes in cyber and homeland security policy, including protection of critical
infrastructure, as research assistant in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies
Tired of long lines at TSA airport checkpoints? Today, the Orlando Sanford International Airport (SFB) began a transition to private security
screeners rather than Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners in a change that promises more efficient security measures.¶ SFB
just joined the TSA’s Screening
Partnership Program (SPP) that allows airports to replace TSA screeners with
more flexible and cost-effective screening services provided by private companies and overseen by the
TSA. While this may seem strange to many Americans who have grown accustomed to TSA-manned checkpoints, it really isn’t abnormal
for airports to manage their own security with government regulation and oversight. After all, most European
airports are run this way, and now 19 airports in the U.S. are as well.¶ The main benefits of the SPP are enhanced productivity
and lower costs, while maintaining equal or greater levels of security. How can this be? One major reason is that the
private sector can be far more efficient and flexible in hiring and training employees than the
government, reducing employee turnover, increasing productivity, and lowering personnel costs even
though salaries and benefits are identical to TSA agents. A study by the House Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure found that taxpayers could save “$1 billion over five years if the Nation’s top 35 airports
operated as efficiently as [San Francisco International Airport] does under the SPP model.Ӧ With TSA managers still
overseeing screening operations at SPP airports, security is not endangered. In fact, when the workforce is
better managed under the SPP, other benefits including better security and better customer service, naturally follow.¶
The TSA, however, has been loath to get out of frontline screening. The TSA started rejecting all requests for SPP expansion in 2011 until
Congress acted in 2012 to reverse the TSA. The TSA has been slow to approve SPP requests as it has held that the SPP is actually more
expensive, even though various government and nongovernment studies have criticized its findings.¶ As SFB joins the list of SPP-administered
airports, the TSA should do more to get out of the personnel management game and return its focus to overseeing security at U.S. airports.
The existing SPP framework should be reformed to allow more airports to easily join SPP and to choose
their own contractors from a list of TSA-approved screeners.¶ The SPP offers better, more efficient, and
friendlier screening for less money. SFB and 18 other airports are reaping these benefits—isn’t it about time the SPP came to the
airport nearest you?
SPP is cost-effective and increases airport security efficiency- their studies are wrong
David Inserra, 3-3-2015, "Congress Should Expand Trusted Traveler Programs and Private Airport
Screeners," Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/03/congress-shouldexpand-trusted-traveler-programs-and-private-airport-screeners David Inserra specializes in cyber and
homeland security policy, including protection of critical infrastructure, as research assistant in The
Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies
Several months ago, President Obama announced that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would provide work authorization and
protection from deportation to as many as 5 million unlawful immigrants. A serious side effect of this action is the harmful redirection of
attention and resources away from other pressing homeland security issues ranging from terrorism to institutional reform at the DHS. The
demands of implementing the President’s sweeping order are such that Secretary Jeh Johnson and other leaders at the DHS will not have the
time, money, manpower, or trust of Congress to make needed reforms to these other critically important areas. It falls to Congress to correct
these misplaced priorities.¶ The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) could benefit from significant changes and reforms. Continuing to
expand and strengthen trusted traveler programs, such as PreCheck, will increase the focus that TSA screeners spend on travelers of higher or
unknown risk. Additionally, the
TSA should be forced to expand the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) that
saves the government money and enhances productivity by allowing airports to use private screeners
with TSA oversight in place of TSA screeners.¶ Trusted Travelers¶ DHS has several trusted traveler programs that provide
participating low-risk travelers with access to streamlined security, customs, and immigration screening. These programs, including TSA
PreCheck and Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Global Entry and NEXUS, are all predicated on the concept of risk-based security. The U.S.
could treat every individual who enters the U.S. as an equal potential threat to U.S. security, or it could differentiate between lower-risk
individuals and those who are greater risks or simply unknown. This risk-based security allows the U.S. to use its limited security resources more
efficiently, focusing security on individuals who are higher risks or unknown risks.¶ TSA PreCheck ensures participants usually receive an
expedited screening process, including the ability to keep on shoes, belts, and light jackets and to keep computers and liquids in their bags at
around 124 participating airports. To join PreCheck, individuals must apply at a TSA application center and undergo a background check, be part
of other trusted traveler programs, or be a member of the military or military academies. Additionally, PreCheck occasionally includes frequent
travelers as well as randomly included individuals through a process known as managed inclusion.[1] TSA PreCheck has grown from around
4,000 travelers in December 2013 to just over 800,000 as of December 2014.[2] While TSA is continuing to seek to grow TSA PreCheck,
concerns regarding security have been raised by the Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others.[3] Security
assessments should be undertaken and heeded if PreCheck is to remain a beneficial tool to the TSA.¶ The other trusted traveler programs run
by CBP also require a background check and include PreCheck benefits for U.S. citizens and permanent residents but also provide expedited
immigration and customs processing at airports or land borders depending on the specific program.[4] Global Entry is open to U.S. citizens and
permanent residents as well as citizens from several other nations including Germany and South Korea, which allow U.S. citizens to join an
equivalent program. The NEXUS program provides U.S. and Canadian citizens and residents with expedited processing when travelling between
the two countries, while the SENTRI program expedites processing through land ports of entry on the U.S. southern border.[5] Reciprocal
agreements, such as those through the Global Entry program, should be expanded to provide both the U.S. and other allies with the security
and convenience benefits of trusted traveler programs.[6]¶ Congress and the DHS should:¶ Improve security assessments. In order to continue
the judicious growth of TSA PreCheck and risk-based security, the TSA must conduct proper security assessments and refine the screening and
vetting process to minimize security risks.¶ Expand Global Entry reciprocity agreements. The U.S. should look to build on existing partnerships,
not only among nations already participating in Global Entry, but also with Visa Waiver Program member countries, thus creating a trusted
travel superhighway that enhances security and facilitates travel¶ Private Screeners¶ While
the DHS has advanced trusted
traveler programs, the same cannot be said of the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) that substitutes
private screeners with TSA oversight in place of TSA screeners. Created as a result of the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001, SPP allows airports to opt out of federal screening so long as they can show that private
screening will not be more costly, compromise security, or harm the effectiveness of screening.[7]¶ Despite
its potential benefits, SPP has had a rocky implementation, being suspended by the Obama Administration before Congress restored it.[8] As of
January 2015, 21 airports were participating in SPP.[9] There
are multiple reasons that an increasing number of U.S.
airports are using SPP, including productivity, cost, and security. In terms of productivity, a case study undertaken by
the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in 2011 found that SPP screening was as much as 65 percent more
efficient than federal screeners.[10] One reason for this productivity gap could be the higher level of attrition in the TSA than
private screening. A related factor in productivity could be better staffing measures ranging from day-to-day scheduling to more efficient hiring
and union practices. Beyond just pure efficiency, SPP
airports also report improved customer service from their
private-sector screeners.¶ Productivity also bleeds over into considerations of cost. A more productive
workforce with less attrition is less expensive to maintain and operate. Although TSA studies found SPP programs
to be more costly than government screening, they were widely criticized, including by the GAO, for flawed methodologies.
When some of these flaws were corrected, the TSA found SPP and government screening to be nearly equal in
cost.[11] Furthermore, the Transportation Committee study found that when considerations such as increases in productivity were accounted
for, the cost of the program fell dramatically. Together with smaller overhead costs and lower levels of attrition, the SPP program is
likely a financial boon for most airports.¶ Importantly, cost and productivity is not harming security. Nearly every study
undertaken, whether by the TSA or others, has found that private screening is at least as good as, if not better than,
government screeners in finding security threats.[12]¶ It is for all these reasons that the vast majority of European countries
allow airports to provide their own screening force or have a contractor provide it.[13] Sadly, the process to join and renew an
SPP contract remains mired in bureaucracy, taking as long as four years.[14] Rather than allow an airport to
determine the best way to provide screening, the SPP program is micromanaged by the TSA, with the TSA selecting a
screening contractor for each SPP airport. Furthermore, the TSA has given its workforce collective bargaining rights, pitting
security and cost-effectiveness against labor demands.[15]¶ Rather than allow the TSA to continue to make bureaucratic
and union-focused decisions, Congress should:¶ Simplify the SPP approval and contracting process. The
process for joining SPP should be streamlined to make it easier for airports to apply and TSA
adjudication faster, fairer, and more consistent. Airports joining SPP should also be allowed to select and
manage their own screening contractors from a list of TSA-approved companies rather than continue
the TSA’s micromanaging of the program.¶ Limit collective bargaining. Collective bargaining in the screening line is harming
security and costing taxpayers and travelers. Congress should expressly forbid the TSA from collective bargaining.¶ Restoring Transportation
Security¶ The
TSA’s near complete control of transportation security, from top-level regulations to
everyday screening, is an overly bureaucratic mistake that increases airport screening costs and harms
efficiency and even security. The SPP program answers this problem by unravelling government
inefficiencies and substituting private-sector productivity and cost-effectiveness. In combination with judiciously
expanding risk-based trusted traveler programs that also promote security, Congress and the TSA can improve airport screening and security.
SPP Inherency
Inherency- SPP reform still needed
Bart Jansen,, 7-29-2014, "Airports: Privatizing TSA security remains challenging," USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/29/tsa-airports-privatize-montana-kansascity/13316121/
As Congress seeks to privatize more aviation security, airport officials described their difficulties Tuesday in
getting the Transportation Security Administration to hire contractors.¶ A small airport in Montana is
about to get screeners after a four-year application process, the House Homeland Security subcommittee on
transportation heard Tuesday.¶ And the Kansas City airport director told lawmakers he is worried about a roughly
four-year-long contract dispute that prevented a contract extension.¶ The question for airports seeking
private screening and the lawmakers who advocate it is how to improve TSA's application process to
work faster and easier.¶ The TSA was created to standardize and improve airport security after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But the
agency has the Screening Partnership Program for airports that prefer to hire private contractors, so long as they maintain the same level of
security as the TSA.¶ Congress would like to expand the program beyond the current 18 airports — the largest in San Francisco
and Kansas City — that handle a combined 4.5% of all passengers nationwide.¶ But after a 2012 law made the application process easier so
more airports could participate, lawmakers say the results are still balky.
Inherency
TSA Doesn’t Solve Terror Now
TSA’s counterterrorism strategies don’t work–it just increases other forms of terrorism
Dylan Matthews, 9-11-2013,( "Twelve years after 9/11, we still have no idea how to fight terrorism.," Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/11/twelve-years-after-911-we-still-have-no-idea-how-to-fight-terrorism-2/)
Counterterrorism may be the most significant area of government policy where we still have no idea
what the hell we're doing.¶ Everywhere else, policymakers are at least trying to know what they're doing. Development researchers
and education wonks have become obsessive about running randomized controlled trials to evaluate interventions. Indeed, the popularity of
charter schools is due in part to the fact that their frequent use of lottery-based admission makes them good ways to randomly test different
school designs. Criminologists have run experiments on a variety of police tactics, probation designs, anti-gang initiatives, approaches to
domestic violence, and more. And While there's still plenty we don't know about what health measures work, the Affordable Care Act is
devoting millions to building up more evidence, and big-deal health policy experiments like the Oregon Medical Study receive the attention
they deserve.¶ But terrorism? We have no idea. The Afghanistan war has cost $657.5 billion so far, we
spend $17.2 billion in
classified funds a year fighting terrorism through the intelligence community, and the Department of
Homeland Security spent another $47.4 billion last year. And we have very little idea whether any of it is
preventing terrorist attacks.¶ Some of this is just that it's harder to collect good evidence than it is in other policy areas. You can't
randomly select some airports to have security screenings and some to not and measure how many hijacking occur at the ones with or without
them — or, at least, you can't do that and conform to anything remotely resembling research ethics. But merely because true experiments are
often impossible doesn't mean that you can't evaluate policy interventions using other means. And people have tried those experiments. It's
just that nothing seems to have any significant effect one way or another. The Campbell Collaboration, an
organization that publishes peer-reviewed systematic reviews of the evidence on various policy topics, first released its review of the
literature on counterterrorism, written by criminologists Cynthia Lum (George Mason), Leslie Kennedy and Alison Sherley (both at
Rutgers), in 2006 (it's been updated since).¶ The first problem the review identifies is that barely any of the terrorism literature
even tries to answer questions about effective counterterrorism. "Of the over 20,000 reports regarding
terrorism that we located," the authors write, "only about 1.5 percent of this massive literature even remotely discussed
the idea that an evaluation had been conducted of counter-terrorism strategies."¶ They found 354 studies that
did, however. Further culling left them 80 studies that could be reasonably said to evaluate the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. Of
these, only
21 of those 80 studies "appeared to at least attempt to connect an outcome or effect with a
program through a minimally rigorous scientific test." Of those 21, only 10 met the Campbell review's methodological
standards. Three of those were medical studies dealing with the effects of bioterrorism, leaving seven for the review to consider.¶ It's worth
dwelling on that number. In
2009, eight years after 9/11, and after decades of work on terrorist groups ranging from the IRA to ETA in Spain
to Palestinian groups to the Tamil Tigers, only seven studies, or 0.035 percent of all terrorism studies, evaluated the
effectiveness of counterterrorism measures. By comparison, a Campbell Systematic Review of anti-bullying programs in schools
found 622 reports "concerned with interventions to prevent school bullying," of which 89 were rigorous enough to include. Stopping bullying is
vitally important and I don't mean to trivialize that cause, but it's more than a little concerning that we have almost 13 times as many studies
on how to stop bullying as we do on how to stop terrorism.¶ Anyway, back to the seven measly studies. For one thing, they are mostly done by
the same handful of people. Three were coauthored by Walter Enders (at the University of Alabama) and Todd Sandler (at University of Texas –
Dallas), two by Enders and Sandler alone and the other one with Jon Cauley (at the University of Hawaii – Hilo). Cauley did another study with
Eric Iksoon Im (also at Hilo). So over half of the studies included were coauthored by one of Enders, Sandler, or Cauley. They're all excellent
researchers, and one should not discount their work because of their higher output, but generally we want a range of studies from a range of
sources when building a literature like this.¶ The seven studies include among them 86 findings about the effectiveness of counterterrorism
programs, and those findings are startling. Lum, Kennedy and
Sherley report that the average effect of the programs
examined was negative. That is, the intervention was found to increase terrorist incidents rather than
reduce them. The results varied by the type of intervention, but not in a way that should give us any comfort about our strategy:¶ •
Metal detectors reduce hijackings, but terrorist just do other stuff instead.¶ The studies find that, on
average, adding metal detectors and security screenings at airports leads to about 6.3 fewer airplane
hijackings in the years examined. But they also find that those policies lead to significant increases in
"miscellaneous bombings, armed attacks, hostage taking, and events which included death or wounded
individuals (as opposed to non-casualty incidents) in both the short and long run." In fact, metal detectors and
security screenings at airports lead to about 6.8 more of these substitute events. "When calculating the
overall weighted mean effect size for all of the findings examining the effectiveness of metal detectors, the
positive and harmful effects cancel each other out," the review's authors conclude.¶ • Fortifying embassies and protecting
diplomats doesn't appear to reduce attacks.¶ Most of the results here are not statistically significant. "In total, the findings do not indicate that
the fortification of embassies and efforts to protect diplomats have been effective in reducing terrorist attacks on these targets," the review
authors conclude. More on this issue here.¶ • There's no evidence harsher penalties reduce hijackings.¶ Only one study looked at what
increasing penalties for plane hijackers did to hijacking rates, and that one found no effect. That doesn't mean that it doesn't work, just that we
shouldn't reject our original assumption that it's not effective.¶ • Strongly written letters from the U.N. don't help much.¶ One U.N. resolution,
which included a recommendation that airports use metal detectors, was associated with a significant reduction in hijackings. But that could
just mean that the metal detectors, rather than the U.N. resolution, caused the reduction, and the same substitution issues explained above
hold
TSA’s policies are ineffective
Eric Bradner and Rene Marsh, Cnn, 6-2-2015, ("TSA screeners failed tests to detect explosives, weapons," CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/01/politics/tsa-failed-undercover-airport-screening-tests/)
Washington (CNN) The Department of Homeland Security said Monday that the acting administrator for the Transportation Security
Administration would be reassigned, following a report that airport
screeners failed to detect explosives and weapons in
nearly every test that an undercover team conducted at dozens of airports.¶ According to a report based on an
internal investigation, "red teams" with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector General were able to get
banned items through the screening process in 67 out of 70 tests it conducted across the nation.¶ The test
results were first reported by ABC News, and government officials confirmed them to CNN. Mark Hatfield, acting deputy director, will take over
for Melvin Carraway until a new acting administrator is appointed. It was not immediately clear Tuesday where Carraway would be reassigned.¶
RELATED: Despite security gaps, no full screening for airport workers¶ Late Monday, Johnson issued a statement announcing Carraway's
reassignment.¶ "Today,
all air travelers are subject to a robust security system that employs multiple layers
of protection, both seen and unseen, including: intelligence gathering and analysis, cross-checking passenger
manifests against watchlists, screening at checkpoints, random canine team screening at airports, reinforced cockpit doors, Federal Air
Marshals, armed pilots and a vigilant public," the spokesperson said.¶ "In combination, these layers provide enhanced security creating a much
stronger and protected transportation system for the traveling public."¶ RELATED: Report says U.S. airport security equipment improperly
managed¶ Homeland Security's report on the tests is set to be issued later this summer and is still being written. ¶ A Homeland Security
spokesperson said that "the numbers in these reports never look good out of context, but they are a critical element in the continual evolution
of our aviation security."¶ Rep.
Jason Chaffetz, chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, called the
failure rate "deeply alarming."¶ "Over the past six years, we have seen TSA consume an enormous
amount of government resources, but I'm not convinced we have much to show for it," he said in a statement.
"After spending over $540 million on baggage screening equipment and millions more on training, the failure rate today is higher
than it was in 2007. Something is not working."¶ "I have long been a proponent of using low-tech bomb-sniffing dogs to detect weapons
and explosives," he said. "Government needs to recognize that the most effective solution is not always the most expensive one."¶ The
spokesperson said DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson directed TSA to take "a series of actions, several of which are now in place," to address the issues
the red team tests identified -- but didn't identify what those actions are.
Solvency
Abolishing TSA Good
TSA Security checks are a violation of privacy and human rights and is unconstitutional
Scott Holleran, 12-10-2013, ("TSA has done nothing for air safety, should disappear," ldnews,
http://www.ldnews.com/opinion/ci_24693962/tsa-has-done-nothing-air-safety-should-disappear)
It's peak travel season, so it's a good time to examine the Transportation Security Administration, a government agency created by former
President George W. Bush to supposedly protect air passengers.¶ As a recent government accountability report and deadly attack on the Los
Angeles airport suggest, the
TSA is a failure.¶ That's because the agency is based on a false and unconstitutional
premise -- that government's proper role, providing police and military defense, necessitates the authority to
restrict the right to travel.¶ Leaving aside current claims against the TSA's existence, including lawsuits asserting violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the right to travel without being molested by the state is implied in the nation's founding
principles. As Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, comparing it to the right of association, wrote in 1969: The right to
travel is "guaranteed by the Constitution to us all."¶ Police must protect and defend commercial and passenger air travel,
particularly during war, though it must be noted that none of the Islamic hijackers on 9/11 violated aviation law. But national defense
and security expressly exist to serve and protect, not systematically breach, individual rights.¶ The ends do
not justify the means. By mandating government inspection of each passenger's body -- regardless of context,
such as a judicially approved watch list or even targeted profiling -- as a requisite for air travel, the TSA violates rights.¶ What
is wrong in theory is a disaster in practice. Most aviation attacks since 9/11, for example, were discovered and/or prevented by passengers and
crew, not the government, let alone the TSA. In fact,
the TSA has been useless in most major threats and attacks to
U.S. air travel. This is true from the terrorist attack at LAX in 2002 -- in which an El Al employee and a passenger were murdered and a
security guard was stabbed by an Egyptian limousine driver -- to the recent assault by an apparently anti-government shooter that took a TSA
officer's life at the same airport.¶
The TSA's value proposition to provide security as a trade-off for infringing on
rights is flimsy; despite years of service and billions of dollars, the agency fails to prevent the initiation of
force. As we've seen, the government agency's existence increases the threat to today's traveler.¶ The TSA's
power is arbitrary. Agents disrupt travel, molest passengers at random and have been accused, charged and
jailed for petty and worse crimes including sexual and physical assault -- and acts of terrorism. One TSA
agent at LAX, for instance, was arrested on Sept. 11 year for exploding bombs underneath passenger jets. This story was greatly underreported.¶ Meanwhile, numerous assaults have been initiated at airports and on airplanes across the U.S. -- including in-flight shoe- and
underwear-bombing attempts by Islamic terrorists who successfully evaded the TSA, according to the TSA's own Web site. ¶ Whatever slips past
the TSA -- and whatever the TSA slips past the public -- the individual in the United States has a fundamental right to travel. The
TSA's very
existence is an inherent violation of each American's individual rights. At best, the TSA is antagonistic
toward aviation safety.¶ The TSA does not protect and defend Americans; it endangers Americans. In the aftermath of the
latest attack, there is talk of providing weapons to agents of the TSA. But we should go to the root of the problem and insist on doing the
opposite. Instead of arming the TSA, we
ought to abolish the TSA. We should dismantle the failed agency, return
aviation security to its proper practitioners -- police, airports and airlines -- and begin to restore the right
to travel.
A2: Terrorism Becomes Simple