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DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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VIKTORIJA KOTOVA
Date(s) of birth
07.12.1990
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JANUARY 8, 2014
Project title /Synopsis Title/Thesis
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES
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List of Acronyms
Acronym:
Signification:
BaltBat
Baltic Battalion
BaltNet
Baltic Airspace Management Regime
Baltron
Baltic Squadron
BALTSEA
Baltic Security Assistance Group
EU
European Union
IR
International Relations
IO
International Organizations
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO
Non-governmental organization
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SEED
Support for East European Democracy
USA
United States of America
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
2
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 4
1. Theoretical Approach ............................................................................................................. 6
1.1. Liberalism ........................................................................................................................ 6
1.2. Realism ............................................................................................................................ 8
2. Empirical Data ...................................................................................................................... 11
2.1. Historical background of US - Baltic states relations .................................................... 11
2.2. The Baltic states’ integration into NATO and the EU ................................................... 12
2.3. US policy toward the Baltic states after May, 2004 ...................................................... 17
3. The analysis of US policy toward the Baltic states through the prism of realism and
liberalism .................................................................................................................................. 19
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 24
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 25
3
Introduction
The United States of America (USA) has been occupying a significant place in the foreign
policy of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia for a long period of time. The three Baltic states
became independent in 1918 and by 1923 all the three countries had established diplomatic
relations with the USA, 1 however neither the USA nor the Baltic countries were actively
engaged in development of closer relations. Nonetheless, after the occupation of the Baltic
states the USA became a central element in the Baltic states’ effort to restore their
independence and gained even larger importance after the Cold War, when all the three Baltic
countries were seeking for economic and political integration with the West in order to assure
that their independence is no more under threat. The USA had a pivotal role in the Baltic
states’ integration with the West not only by providing various assistance to foster economic
and political reforms in the three countries, but also by ensuring political support to gain
NATO membership.
The project is aimed at tracking the development of US policy toward the Baltic states after
the restoration of their independence with a specific focus on integration of the Baltic states
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The project author will investigate what
role the USA played in economic and political reforms in the Baltic states and will try to
grasp if there were any changes in US policy toward the Baltic states after their accession to
NATO and the European Union (EU). Nevertheless, the project author emphasizes the
importance of understanding US policy in a larger context, in particular, why the USA not
just provided the Baltic states with financial and political assistance but more importantly
why it supported Baltic states’ accession to NATO, especially after considering their low
military capabilities and the Russian factor in US-Baltic relations. Therefore, the project
author has raised the following research question: How can US policy toward the Baltic states
be explained and why was it important for the USA to support the Baltic states’ membership
in NATO?
In order to answer the raised research question the project author has chosen objectivist
approach, which means that the author believes in a possibility of finding the truth and
consequently the answer to the raised issue within an already existing framework. 2 To
approach the given problem the author has chosen to apply interpretivism, in particular,
“A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since
1776: Latvia”, U.S. Department of State. Accessed: September 24, 2013. Available:
http://history.state.gov/countries/latvia
2
Li Xing, Theories of Social Science and Methodology, Lecture one. Aalborg University, February 6, 2013.
1
4
theories of realism and liberalism will be used to interpret collected data and information. In
order to achieve the aim of the project and to answer the raised research question qualitative
and quantitative data will be collected from primary and secondary sources. Primary data will
be collected from official documents such as the US-Baltic Charter, interviews, government
and organizations websites, and during participation in events organized by the US Embassy
in Riga. Secondary data will be collected from books, media, and research papers.
5
1. Theoretical Approach
1.1. Liberalism
After the second World War liberalists became less optimistic than their predecessors liberal
idealists and focused their attention on phenomena such as trade, investment, and new forms
of communication, however they still emphasized the possibility of progress and cooperation
in international relations (IR).3 Generally, liberalists assume that human beings are rational
and, though individuals are self-interested, they share many interests and are able to achieve
cooperation both domestically and internationally, which implies that cumulative progress in
IR is possible.4 Liberalists also assume that IR are not necessarily a zero-sum game and under
certain conditions positive-sum game can be achieved, for instance, “within a separate zone of
peace among fellow liberals.”5 Moreover, unlike realists liberalists are concerned about the
happiness of individual human beings and they regard state as a guarantor of the rule of law
and the liberty of its citizens.6 Liberalists also argued that “such constitutional states would
also respect each other and would deal with each other in accordance with norms of mutual
toleration.”7
Liberalism is not a single theory and all in all it is possible to identify four strands of
liberalism, namely, sociological liberalism, interdependence liberalism, institutional
liberalism, and republican liberalism. To explain US policy toward the Baltic states the
project author has decided to focus on republican liberalism, in particular, on the liberal peace
theory and liberal internationalism. The most prominent thinker, who contributed to the
liberal peace theory, is Immanuel Kant and in his 1795 essay “Perpetual Peace” Kant
observed that liberal states are prone to have peaceful relations with other liberal states,
however they are surprisingly “war-prone in their relations with nonliberal states.”8 Kant’s
theory is built upon the assertion that the peace can be established among states if they adopt
the three definitive articles. 9 The first definitive article requires countries to establish a
representative, republican government, which will ensure freedom and equality of its
citizens. 10 Kant argued that republican government does not own the state, which in turn
3
Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 2nd ed.
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 48.
4
Ibid, 108 - 109.
5
Michael W. Doyle, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, in: Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Steve
Smith et. al. Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 59.
6
Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 109.
7
Ibid, 109.
8
Doyle, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, 61.
9
Ibid, 61.
10
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Pace: A Philosophical Sketch. Richer Resources Publications, 2012, p. 13.
6
means that the consent of the citizens is needed to launch a war. 11 The second definitive
article encourages to create an alliance for peace, which seeks to respect the rights and the
freedom of each participating state.12 The third definitive article states that the principle of
hospitality must be ensured, which “means the right of a stranger who arrives in the land of
someone else not be treated by him in a hostile manner.”13 The maintenance of the principle
of hospitality can help to foster trade and communication between states, which in turn can
lead to interdependence.14 Consequently, according to Kant, the three principles are sufficient
to establish the so-called “pacific union.”15
Liberalists argue that “foreign relations among any other group of states with similar social
structures or with compatible values […] are not similarly peaceful”16, for example, during
the Cold War communist countries did not manage to achieve peace among themselves. 17
Thus, liberalists emphasize that only liberal states demonstrate peaceful restraint and have
achieved a separate peace among themselves, simultaneously recognizing that liberal
countries tend to be more aggressive toward non-liberal regimes, which can be explained by
liberalists as an attempt to protect universal values such as human rights.18 Another factor that
explains liberal internationalism is the aim of liberal countries to spread liberal democracy to
other countries in order to make IR more peaceful.19 Proponents of this theory assume that
increasing number of liberal democracies provides the possibility of expansion of the liberal
zone of peace.20
To sum up, liberalists believe that qualitative changes for the better are possible in IR and that
mutual interests may foster collaboration among states. At the same time, liberalists are also
preoccupied with well-being of separate individuals, which is why they stress the significance
of a democratic regime that respects individual rights and freedoms. Liberalists also point out
that liberal democracies tend to have peaceful relations among themselves, however the issue
of democracy can cause a controversy with non-democratic countries that are perceived by
them as oppressive. Liberal states are less suspicious of other liberal states that share similar
11
Ibid, 14.
Ibid, 20.
13
Ibid, 22.
14
Søren Dosenrode, Theories of International Relations, Lecture one. Aalborg University, September, 2012.
15
Doyle, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, 62.
16
Ibid, 52.
17
Ibid, 52.
18
Ibid, 55.
19
Miriam Dornan, „Liberal Internationalism”, E-International relations. Accessed: October 12, 2013. Available:
http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/02/liberal-internationalism/
20
Doyle, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, 54.
12
7
values, which in turn can diminish the negative effect of anarchy. Thus, another significant
difference between liberalism and realism can be noticed, namely, the issue of ideology in IR.
1.2. Realism
Realism is not a uniform theory and it is possible to distinguish several strands within realism.
The first strand is classical realism developed by realist thinkers such as Thucydides,
Machiavelli, and Hobbes.21 The second strand of realism is called neo-realism or structural
realism and the leading neorealist thinker was Kenneth Waltz, who adopted some elements of
classical realism; however he has rejected any normative concerns and tried to make IR
theory more scientific.22 Waltz believed that states are profoundly influenced by the anarchic
international environment and the distribution of power, which in turn generates sameness in
their behavior.23 While domestic politics is hierarchically ordered, which means that there is
an authority entitled to command and the rest are required to obey, IR take place in the
anarchic environment where all the parts of the system are formally equal. 24 Waltz did
recognize that international organizations (IO) have emerged on the international scene and
that they are able to act effectively, however he also asserted that IO can operate only with the
consent of states, consequently, there are no actors with a system-wide authority. 25 Waltz
believed that states are alike in terms of their functions and thus matter less that the structure,
which dictates policy and makes states to behave in certain ways. 26 According to Waltz, states
can achieve a balance of power, however war is always possible since the system is
anarchical.27
Nevertheless, even structural realism “can be divided into two competing versions with
competing assumptions and policy prescriptions: offensive realism and defensive realism.”28
The project author has decided to pay more attention to offensive realism in order to use it for
the explanation of US policy toward the Baltic states. If defensive realists claim that in certain
circumstances the war-generating potential of anarchy can be reduced, offensive realists have
a firmer position on the war-generating potential of anarchy.29 Consequently, clear distinction
21
Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 70.
Ibid, 85.
23
Steven E. Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism”, in: The International Studies
Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denmark. Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 6651.
24
Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979, pp. 81, 88.
25
Ibid, 88.
26
Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 85, 87.
27
Ibid, 85.
28
Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism”, 6651.
29
William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and Foreign Policy”, in: Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, eds. Steve
Smith et. al. Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 35.
22
8
between the two versions “is the role of the anarchic international system and whether it
encourages states to maximize their security or to maximize their power and influence.” 30
Defensive realists believe that anarchy induces states to employ moderate and restrained
strategies, as competition and expansion would cause the security dilemma and therefore
counterbalancing behavior, which in turn will hamper any attempt to increase state’s
security.31 Offensive realists, on the contrary, are convinced that status quo is very rare in the
international system and states can never be certain about their security.32 Thus, according to
offensive realists, lack of security “compels states to maximize their share of world power and
to seek superiority, rather than equality, in order to make themselves more secure and thereby
increase their odds of survival. The ultimate goal of every major power is to become a
hegemon”33.
Robert Gilpin, for example, considers that “as the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend
its territorial control, its political influence, and/or domination of the international economy.
Reciprocally, these developments tend to increase the power of the state as more and more
resources are made available to it.”34 However, Gilpin also noted that there are certain limits
to state’s ability to extend its control and political influence, as at one point costs will exceed
estimated benefits.35 Thus, it can be concluded that more power state acquires, more political
influence it tries to exert, though this action will be restrained when expenses exceed
estimated profit. This is the reason why some realists believe that global hegemony is
impossible, for example, John Mearsheimer asserted that geography prevents a single state
from becoming a world hegemon.36
To sum up, realists propose a darker view on IR and unlike liberalists they rule out the
possibility of progress in this field. For example, for Waltz this is true as long as IR take place
in anarchic environment, which persists as each state strives to protect its independence and
thus to prevent appearance of a higher authority. Realists describe IR rather as a zero-sum
game, thus underlining the conflictual nature of IR. At the same time, realism consists of a
number of different theories and in the analytical part the main focus will be on offensive
realism. Offensive realism underlines that state can never achieve absolute security, which is
why it always seeks an opportunity to enhance its power and influence. Therefore, states can
Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism”, 6651.
Ibid, 6652, 6658.
32
Ibid, pp. 6654, 6658.
33
Ibid, 6652.
34
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 106.
35
Ibid, 107.
36
Lobell, “Structural Realism/Offensive and Defensive Realism”, 6657.
30
31
9
be described as power and security-hungry, which compels them to employ offensive
strategies instead of more restrained strategies.
10
2. Empirical Data
2.1. Historical background of US - Baltic states relations
The USA has been playing a significant role in supporting the sovereignty of the three Baltic
states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – for a long period of time.37 After the first World War,
the Baltic states became sovereign countries, and by 1923 the USA had granted de jure
recognition to all three.38 During the interwar period US relations with the Baltic states were
not as important as nowadays, for example, the USA was using its diplomatic mission in Riga
first of all as a “listening post” to gather information on the USSR.39 However, events that
followed in 1940 drew much larger attention of the USA to the three Baltic states.
After the occupation of the Baltic states in June 1940 the USA adopted the policy of nonrecognition, in particular, the USA refused to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states
into the Soviet Union as legal.40 The policy of non-recognition was connected to the so-called
Stimson Doctrine, which meant non-recognition of the forcible seizure of territory.41 The US
policy of non-recognition, which lasted throughout the whole period of occupation, had an
important impact on history of the Baltic states,42 since it helped all the three countries not
only to preserve their assets such as ships, money, and diplomatic representations43, but also
to maintain their identity and to promote their cause abroad.
The Baltic states issue has always been a stumbling-stone in relation between the USA and
the Soviet Union, but the real crisis in US-Soviet relations appeared after Lithuania adopted
the Declaration of Independence on March 11, 1990.44 Though the USA did not recognize
Lithuania’s independence, the USA exerted some pressure in 1991 by threatening to interrupt
economic aid and to block USSR’s special associate membership in the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, after violent clashes with Soviet special forces had occurred
first in Vilnius and later in Riga. 45 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there was neither
Luke Coffey, “U.S. – Baltic Relations: Lying the Groundwork for Deeper Cooperation”, The Heritage
Foundation. Accessed: September 24, 2013. Available: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/08/usbaltic-relations-laying-the-groundwork-for-deeper-cooperation
38
Ibid.
39
Daunis Auers and Nils Muizžnieks, “Introduction”, in: Latvia and the USA: From Captive Nation to Strategic
Partner, ed. Daunis Auers. University of Latvia, 2008, p. 5.
40
Pauls Raudseps, “The Long Vigil: US-Latvian Relations, 1940-1991”, in: Latvia and the USA: From Captive
Nation to Strategic Partner, ed. Daunis Auers. University of Latvia, 2008, p. 33.
41
Ibid, 35.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid, 34.
44
Ibid, 45, 47.
45
Ibid, 47-48.
37
11
significant pressure nor even symbolic sanctions against the USSR,46 and, as analysts explain,
this proved that the Baltic issue was less important than good relations with the Soviet Union
in order not to hamper Gorbachev’s reforms and negotiations on arms control. 47 However,
after a coup against Gorbachev on August 19, 1991 the Baltic states could finally restore their
independence and the US policy of non-recognition suddenly came to an end.48 Baltic states’
lasting legal status in the USA not only strengthened demands of the Baltic states for selfdetermination but it also made it much easier to return their independence in 1991.49 Thus, the
country that did not have close cooperation with the Baltic states during the interwar period
became the one that supported the Baltic states in their quest for independence after the Soviet
occupation.
2.2. The Baltic states’ integration into NATO and the EU
After the three Baltic states regained their independence the Baltic issue still continued to
affect US relations with the successor of the USSR - Russia. This can be proved by the fact
that the USA was the last among Western countries that recognized restored independence of
the Baltic states. George H. W. Bush explained why the USA recognized independence of the
Baltic states only on September 2, 1991, arguing that it was necessary to give the Soviet
Union time to release the Baltic states and not to push them toward military action.50 It is
obvious that the prime interest of the USA was the advancement of Gorbachev’s reforms,
however active support of independence of the Baltic states could have undermined both
objectives.51
It is apparent that right after the breakup of the Soviet Union the Baltic states did not take a
major place in US foreign policy. The Baltic states, even though there were many discussions
whether to follow Western development model or not, in the early 1990s expressed their
willingness to become NATO and EU members. For example, in 1993 the Baltic states made
a joint statement, declaring that they see NATO as the main guarantee of their security. 52
46
Frank Moller, Thinking Peaceful Change: Baltic Security Policies and Security Community Building. Syracuse
University Press, New York: 2007, p. 176.
47
Ibid, 176.
48
Raudseps, “The Long Vigil”, 48.
49
Ibid, 31, 43-44.
50
Ibid, 49.
51
Moller, Thinking Peaceful Change, 172-173.
52
Erik Mannik, “The Evolution of Baltic security and Defense Strategies”, in: Apprenticeship, partnership,
Membership: Twenty Years of Defence Development in the Baltic states, eds. Tony Lawrence and Tomas
Jermalavicius. International Centre for Defense Studies: Tallinn, 2013, pp. 21-22.
12
However, the USA tried to avoid any discussion on their possible membership in NATO.53
Per Carlsen, the Danish Ambassador to Latvia, reflecting on the events that took place in the
1990s approved that in the very beginning the USA was not involved in cooperation with the
Baltic states and neither was Germany, primarily because of Russia. 54 The Ambassador also
mentioned that Russia did not object to cooperation between Western countries and the Baltic
states even in a military and defense sphere, however it did not tolerate any negotiations
concerning NATO.55
It is obvious that until Russian military troops had been removed from the Baltic states there
could not be any discussion on the Baltic states’ membership in NATO. Russia, even though
it had lost the status of superpower, still wanted to be a great power and to maintain its sphere
of influence, and was arguing that it had the right to be “a regional hegemon in the “near
abroad””.56 Russian ambitions could be “confirmed by public statements by senior Russian
military figures that the concept of sovereignty did not apply to the post-Soviet states and that
Russia’s borders must be understood to mean the borders of the former USSR.” 57 Thus,
Russia had a strong desire to keep the Baltic states in its sphere of influence, which is why it
was so important for the Baltic states to remove Russian troops from their territory as soon as
possible. Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Lithuania on August 31, 1993, but
from Estonia and Latvia - one year later.58
Though in the beginning of the 1990s the USA had no any clear policy toward the Baltic
states, the USA played a central role in withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states.
Negotiations on troop withdrawal started only in January 1992, 59 and albeit Russia had
promised to remove its troops by 1994, it tried to establish its own terms and to get significant
concessions from the Baltic states. 60 The US role was significant in the process, since the
USA tried to exert pressure on Russia by threatening to interrupt its foreign aid amounting to
839 million dollars in case Russian troops were not withdrawn according to agreed
schedule.61 The USA has also adopted a 166 million dollars program, which sought to provide
53
Mark Kramer, NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: a framework for sustainable enlargement. Harward
University, 2002, p. 740.
54
Per Carlsen, Interview by Viktorija Kotova, October 4, 2013.
55
Ibid.
56
Richard C.M. Mole, The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union: Identity, discourse and
power in the post-communist transition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Routlege, 2012, p. 122.
57
Ibid, 122.
58
Ibid, 3.
59
Mole, The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union, 122.
59
Ibid, 122.
60
Ibid, 123.
61
Ibid, 128.
13
withdrawn Russian military pensioners with housing.62 At the same time, the USA tried to
exert pressure not only on Russia, but also to induce the Baltic states to make certain
concessions that the Baltic states perceived as detrimental to their interests.63 For instance, the
former Latvian defense minister acknowledged that Latvia signed the agreement due to strong
pressure emanating from the USA, thus sacrificing its core interests, in particular, allowed to
remain military pensioners in Latvia, legalized the existence of a military installation for a
long time and has not received any compensation from Russia.64
The Baltic states gained a major importance during the Clinton’s administration. In autumn
1996, the State Department adopted a “Baltic Action Plan”, which committed the USA to help
the Baltic states to integrate into NATO and the EU, however there was still no any near-term
prospect of joining NATO.65 This can be proved by the statement made by William Perry, the
Secretary of Defense, in his 1996 interview with the newspaper “Segodnya”: “The Baltic
States are not ready to join NATO. These countries simply do not meet the alliance’s
standards, which call for developed democracy, the absence of conflicts with neighbors,
market economies, and armed forces capable of operating jointly with NATO.”66 Therefore,
the Baltic countries were perceived by the USA as ill-prepared to join the alliance.
Nevertheless, in 1997 there was a shift in US policy67, which later resulted in the signing of
the US-Baltic Charter. The US-Baltic Charter was signed on January 16, 1998 and its main
aim was to support the Baltic states in their endeavor to integrate into NATO and the EU, as
well as to set the principles and goals of cooperation.68 It can be traced from the Charter that
the USA supported the Baltic states’ willingness to join NATO and there was an emphasis on
the significance of cooperation in political, security, defense and economic realms in order to
develop economies of the Baltic states and to deepen their integration into transatlantic and
European institutions.69
Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, on July 15,
1998 made a statement in which he reiterated that the USA is supporting integration of the
Baltic states with NATO and the EU, however he emphasized that like any other country the
Steven Woehrel, “The Baltic States: US Policy Concerns. Congressional Research Service”. Report 96-584,
2004, p. 10.
63
Moller, Thinking Peaceful Change, 179.
64
Ibid, 179.
65
Kramer, NATO, the Baltic States and Russia, 740.
66
Mole, The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the European Union, 149.
67
Ibid.
68
“US-Baltic Charter”, Estonian Embassy in Washington. Accessed: October 11, 2013. Available at:
http://www.estemb.org/estonia_and_the_us/charter
69
“US-Baltic Charter”.
62
14
Baltic states should meet high standards that NATO established for any new member. 70 Marc
Grossman also reflected on cooperation in political, economic and security realms. In political
realm the USA was helping to consolidate democracy in the Baltics, for example, along with
the Soros Foundation the USA financed the “Baltic-American partnership Foundation” that
provided 15 million of dollars to support local NGOs and to develop civil society. 71 The USA
has also assisted, especially Estonia and Latvia, on the questions of social integration, namely,
to help legislation of these countries to conform with prescriptions of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concerning citizenship issues.72 Concerning the
economic domain, it was mentioned that the USA sought to bolster US investment and
perceived the Baltic states as a platform that can help US companies to access markets in
Russia and the EU.73 From the US-Baltic Charter it is clear that in the 1990s the USA aimed
at reduction of trade barriers and establishment of a better environment for American and
regional business. 74 Moreover, in the 1990s the USA organized the Baltic-American
Enterprise Fund that provided the Baltic states with approximately one million dollars a
month in loans and investments.75 All in all, “from 1990 to 1999, the USA obligated 29,7
million dollars in aid from the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) program to
assist political and economic reform in Estonia,” 76 however in 1996 due to Estonia’s
achievements it was “graduated” from the US aid program.77 “From 1990 to 1999, the United
States obligated 54,3 million dollars in SEED aid to Latvia,” 78 and during the same time
period Lithuania received 79,73 million dollars in SEED aid.79
Security cooperation turned to be a top priority in relations between the USA and the Baltic
states.80 The USA helped to develop a long-term plan for modernization of the Baltic states’
defense forces, but the Baltic Security Assistance Group (BALTSEA) operated to coordinate
donor assistance to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.81 “Programs such as BALTSEA, the Baltic
Battalion (BaltBat), Baltic Airspace Management Regime (BaltNet), the Baltic Squadron
(Baltron) and the Baltic Defense College”82 had also been established in order to contribute to
“Statement by Marc Grossman”, Federation of American Scientists. Accessed: October 11, 2013. Available at:
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/congress/1998/98071501_wpo.html
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.
74
“Statement by Marc Grossman”.
75
Ibid.
76
Woehrel, “The Baltic States”, 11.
77
Ibid, 11.
78
Ibid, 11.
79
Ibid, 11.
80
“Statement by Marc Grossman”.
81
Ibid.
82
Ibid.
70
15
the Baltic states’ national defense and broader European security.83 At the same time, there
were not only annual joint military exercises, but the US Congress had also “increased the
amount of security assistance for the Baltic states under the Warsaw Initiative program to
$18,9 million.” 84 Another important stage was participation of the Baltic states in the
“Partnership for Peace” program, but the USA in its turn helped to finance all of the above
mentioned projects.85 For example, “total US military aid to Latvia since 1992 has amounted
to 80 million dollars.”86
The US-Baltic charter is a document, which recognized the Baltic states as US partners in the
region. Moreover, the document, even though it did not guarantee Baltic states’ admittance to
NATO, demonstrated that the purpose was to create the conditions that would allow the three
states to join NATO.87 “Thus, by the time George W. Bush’s administration took office in
January 2001, the USA had already gone a long way towards supporting the Baltic states in
their quest to join NATO.” 88 “In June 2002 President Bush signed into law the Freedom
Consolidation Act, which called for the further expansion of NATO and provided $21 million
in new military aid to the Baltic countries.” 89 Thus, in May 2004 the three Baltic states
became members of both NATO and the EU. The question of NATO enlargement to the
Baltic states was very sensitive for Russia, which can be backed up by the fact that Russia did
not sign any formal border treaty with Latvia and Estonia in the expectation that this unsettled
border dispute will disrupt their chance to join NATO, however when Russia had realized the
inevitability of the Baltic states’ membership in NATO Russia’s position became more
conciliatory.90 For example, in July 2002 Sergey Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, publicly
declared that NATO membership is “a sovereign right of any country and we are not going to
rattle with weapons.”91
83
Ibid.
Ibid.
85
Žaneta Ozoliņa, “The United States and Latvia: Standing Shoulder to Shoulder in International
Organizations”, in: Latvia and the USA: From Captive Nation to Strategic Partner, ed. Daunis Auers. University
of Latvia, 2008, pp. 81-82.
86
Ibid, 82.
87
Kramer, NATO, the Baltic States and Russia, 741.
88
Ibid, p. 741.
89
Ibid, 741.
90
Ibid, 742, 747-748.
91
Moscow does not object against NATO expansion to the Baltics [Москва не возражает против расширения
НАТО на Прибалтику], inoСМИ.Ru. Accessed October 13, 2013. Available at:
http://www.inosmi.ru/untitled/20020730/153985.html
84
16
2.3. US policy toward the Baltic states after May, 2004
On August 30, 2013 Barak Obama had a meeting with the Baltic states’ Presidents, which
emphasized the close ties between the USA and the three Baltic countries. 92 In a joint
statement the leaders stressed their commitment to strengthen their relations through
expansion of trade ties and strategic cooperation in order to cope with global security
challenges, as well as through promotion of democracy and human rights all over the world.93
The Presidents have reaffirmed their “commitment to negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership”94, commitment to cooperation on cyber security in the region,
“commitment to strengthen energy security in the Baltic region”95 and commitment to further
promote the rule of law.96 It is especially important that a joint statement released by the
White House declared that the Baltic states “have become valued members of NATO and the
European Union.” 97 It has also been added that for the USA and the Baltic states it is
significant to contribute to global security, and the Presidents reiterated their commitment to
maintain adequate levels of defense investment: “[…] we reaffirm our commitment to achieve
or maintain defense spending at 2 percent of GDP.”98 It is obvious that the last commitment is
first and foremost related to the Baltic states that are still struggling to raise their defense
budgets up to two percent of their GDP.
From this joint statement it is possible to notice that US policy toward the Baltic states has
changed in a certain way, in particular, there has been a shift toward more equal cooperation.
If in the 1990s the USA was committed to help the Baltic states to integrate into the EU and
especially NATO, then today the Baltic states as NATO members have to take certain
responsibilities, for example, to raise their defense budget to an adequate level, to contribute
to collective security, as well as to participate in the decision-making process. It is worth
noting, that the Baltic states take part in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, including
deployment of their troops. As Zaneta Ozolina, an expert of international relations, asserts,
“NATO membership means that co-operation in the security arena is more focused,
consolidated and targeted.”99
92
Joint Statement by the United States of America, Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of
Lithuania, The White House. Accessed: October 10, 2013. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/08/30/joint-statement-united-states-america-republic-estonia-republic-latvia-a
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
Ibid.
99
Ozoliņa, “The United States and Latvia”, 86.
17
At the same time, in 2008 there were still ongoing programs “such as Foreign Military
Financing, which granted 39 million dollars to Latvia in 2008, International Military
Education and Training, which allows young people from Latvia to attend US military
academies, and the State Partnership Programme, which involves co-operation between the
Latvian Armed Forces and the National Guard of the US state of Michigan.” 100 In March of
2013 it was also announced that the USA will provide Lithuania’s armed forces with
approximately 6,5 million of euro. 101 Thus, Lithuania’s soldiers in Afghanistan will be
provided with new military equipment, which will remain with Lithuania’s armed forces after
the mission in Afghanistan is over.102 It is clear that the USA is still providing the Baltic states
with a certain degree of military assistance, nevertheless nowadays there are also new forms
of collaboration between the USA and the Baltic states, which implies more equal partnership
and certain commitments on the part of the Baltic states.
100
Ibid, 86.
“US to provide EUR 6,5-million-euro aid to Lithuania’s Armed Forces”, 15.min.lt. Accessed October 13,
2013. Available at: http://www.15min.lt/en/article/world/us-to-provide-6-5-million-euro-aid-to-lithuania-sarmed-forces-529-315565
102
Ibid.
101
18
3. The analysis of US policy toward the Baltic states through the prism of
realism and liberalism
Analyzing US policy toward the Baltic states since the 1990s it is possible to distinguish two
important phases in relations between the USA and the Baltic states. The first phase is a
period when the Baltic states regained their independence and strived to integrate into
Western institutions, in particular, into the EU and NATO. The second phase starts after the
Baltic states’ accession to the EU and NATO and, as mentioned before, there was a transition
toward a more equal partnership between the USA and the Baltic states. Nowadays relations
between the USA and the Baltic states have become more routine, which implies further
cooperation in security domain and promotion of economic ties. Therefore, the project author
has decided to pay a greater attention to US policy toward the Baltic states prior to their
accession to NATO and the EU, in particular, why the USA provided these countries with
military and economic assistance and, more importantly, why it has decided to endorse the
Baltic states’ accession to NATO.
US support concerning the Baltic states’ accession to NATO is especially important since the
question of whether the Baltic States managed to meet all the membership requirements set by
NATO is still controversial. One could argue that by the time of accession the Baltic states
had fulfilled such requirements as functioning democratic political system, market economy,
or respect for minority rights103, however NATO have another membership requirement such
as the ability to contribute to collective security104 and it is still disputable whether the Baltic
states are able make a proper military contribution or not. For example, Estonia is the only
Baltic country that managed to raise its military budget up to two percent of its GDP, while
Latvia and Lithuania spend on military purposes even less than one percent of their GDP.105
Another issue is the effect that US Baltic policy had on other actors of the international
system, in particular, on Russia. As previously mentioned, Russia strongly opposed the Baltic
states’ accession to NATO and tried to sabotage their chances to achieve NATO membership.
A number of experts have criticized the decision to expand NATO to the East, for instance,
they argued that NATO expansion would undermine collaborative relationships between
Russia and the West106 and would push Russia toward China.107 The decision to admit the
“NATO Enlargement”, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Accessed: November 17, 2013. Available:
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm
104
Ibid.
105
“Lithuania will increase the defense budget” [Lietuva palielinās aizsardzības budžetu]. La.lv. Accessed:
November 17, 2013. Available: http://www.la.lv/lietuva-palielinas-aizsardzibas-budzetu/
106
Jackson and Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, 94.
107
Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”. International Security, Vol. 25, No 1, p. 22.
103
19
Baltic states to NATO was very sensitive for Russia, taking into account their territorial
proximity, which is why a deeper US engagement in Europe, including the Baltic states, could
provoke insecurity in other countries, especially Russia. Therefore, US Baltic policy cannot
be easily explained and both realists and liberalists hold a different view on the issue.
From the offensive realist perspective US policy toward the Baltic states can be explained by
US desire to expand its influence in Europe. In the case of the Baltic states the USA had an
opportunity to exert a greater influence on the neighboring with Russia territories, for
example, cooperation in military realm and following NATO expansion provided the USA
with an access to these strategic territories, which in turn could help to further reduce Russia’s
influence in the region. Another case to mention is US anti-missile shield in Europe. Though
it was declared that this shield will be established against Iran, the USA rejected Russia to be
an equal partner and to have de facto control over the system.108 Thus, it is clearly seen that
US – Russian relations are still tense. According to offensive realism, the status quo is
impossible in the international system, which is why the USA might still perceive Russia as a
rival and by applying offensive strategy the USA pursued to reduce Russia’s influence in the
region.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, its successor Russia perceived the Baltic states as the
“near abroad” and tried to preserve its sphere of influence. Russia initiated establishment of
such organizations as the Commonwealth of Independent States and later the Collective
Security Treaty Organization that consist of a number of former Soviet Republics. The
establishment of these organizations can be regarded as Russia’s attempt to create an
instrument to maintain its influence in the post Soviet territories. Another proof of Russia’s
ambitions to influence the “near abroad” is its harsh reaction on Ukraine’s plan to sign the
EU’s Association Agreement, for example, Dmitry Medvedev warned Ukraine that Eurasian
Customs Union will be closed for Ukraine,109 but Dmitry Rogozin, Deputy Prime Minister of
Russia, anticipated that all weapons production facilities would be removed from Ukraine.110
Therefore, Russia still has ambitions to preserve its influence in the post-Soviet space,
however US policy toward the Baltic states helped to shrink Russia’s sphere of influence.
“Russia developing counter-measures for European anti-missile shield”, United Press International.
Accessed: November 23, 2013. Available: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2013/05/28/Russiadeveloping-counter-measures-for-European-anti-missile-shield/UPI-41171369713720/
109
“Medvedev warns: Agreement with the EU will close the door to Ukraine to the Customs Union” [Медведев
предупреждает: договор с ЕС закроет для Украины дверь в Таможенный союз], NEWSru.com. Accessed:
November 18, 2013. Available: http://www.newsru.com/finance/09sep2013/ukr_med.html
110
“Russian arms boss warns Ukraine, EU over planned agreement”, Rt.com. Accessed: November 18, 2013.
Available: http://rt.com/politics/russia-ukraine-warning-eu-708/
108
20
From the point of liberalists, US policy can be explained in two possible ways. First of all, the
USA supported the Baltic states partially because of its commitment to such values as human
rights, which can be also proved by its non-recognition policy during the Cold War. To a
certain extent this liberal argument has its ground, since in some circumstances state’s
political regime does matter. For example, in the 1970s there was a risk that the President
Nixon could officially recognize Soviet Union’s postwar borders, however Baltic exile
organizations started to lobby the US Congress to maintain the policy of non-recognition,111
which was possible only in a democratic regime. However, it should also be mentioned that
the USA has never seriously challenged Moscow’s control over the Baltic region. Even
during Gorbachev’s reforms the USA paid little attention to the Baltic region and tried not to
undermine good relations with Moscow. Realists could argue that foreign policy can be
influenced by state’s political regime, however this influence is very limited, especially when
it comes to national interests and security issues, since the continuation of political and
economic reforms in the USSR was much more vital than the right of the Baltic states to selfdetermination. Thus, the Baltic states issue was of minor importance for the USA during the
Cold War, however the breakup of the USSR provided an opportunity to reduce Russia’s
impact in the region, which is why the USA took such an active part in withdrawal of Russian
troops from the Baltics.
From the point of liberalism, however, the fact that the USA paid little attention to the Baltic
states during Gorbachev’s reforms can be explained otherwise. Taking into consideration
republican liberalism it can be asserted that the US grand strategy is to expand a “liberal zone
of peace”. From this it follows that state’s political regime is crucial for establishing peaceful
international relations, which is why the USA tried to support political and economic reforms
in the USSR with a hope that it will make the Soviet Union a democratic country with a stable
market economy. This is the reason why the USA paid less attention to the Baltic states, since
the advancement of Gorbacev’s reforms could also improve political situation in the Baltics.
Elaborating on the US willingness to promote the liberal peace, it is worth mentioning that the
USA played an important role in the market reforms and consolidation of democracy in the
Baltics, for example, the USA made it clear that in order to integrate into NATO Estonia and
Latvia must settle the question of ethnic minorities, in particular, bring the citizenship law in
accordance with OSCE standards. It is clear that ideology and political regime does play its
role in international relations, as such organization as NATO, though it consists of its member
states, also holds certain values that must be respected. Molly Montgomery, the Deputy Chief
111
Raudseps, “The Long Vigil”, 41.
21
of Political-Economic section at the US Embassy in Latvia, asserts that the admission of the
Baltic States to NATO was seen as an opportunity to bring Eastern European countries in line
with the West and to support democratic and economic reforms in these countries. 112 In the
2000s Montgomery served in the NATO Office and she declares that NATO member
countries share certain values such as adherence to market economy or respect for human
rights, which is why prior to the Baltic States’ accession to the transatlantic alliance NATO
officers were more employed with the human rights and Jewish property restitution issues in
the Baltics rather than with their ability to make proper military contributions.113
It is worth mentioning that during the negotiation process the USA had an opportunity to use
NATO membership as a leverage in order to achieve certain concessions from the Baltic
states, for example, the previously mentioned concessions made by Latvia in regard to the
withdrawal of Russia troops. Montgomery notes that nowadays the USA cannot interfere
anymore in Latvia’s internal affairs or to force Latvia to adopt certain policies, for example, to
change citizenship law or to foster the question of Jewish property restitution. 114 Currently,
the only thing that the USA can do is to attract public and politicians’ attention to these issues.
For example, in October Embassy’s officers met with Latvian Non-citizens’ Congress in order
to discuss the problem of non-citizens in Latvia and organized a discussion on the Jewish
property restitution issue in Latvia.
Focusing on US National Security Strategy, it is necessary to point out that promotion of
democracy worldwide is emphasized in every document on the national security strategy,
consequently, US assistance to the Baltic states in economic and political realms can be seen
as implementation of the national strategy. In US National Security Strategy of 1993 it is also
mentioned that the USA helped to establish a democratic community or a „zone of peace” in
the Western Hemisphere and after the Cold War the USA seeks to facilitate political and
economic reforms in Eastern European countries. 115 Montgomery emphasized that US
strategy after the Cold War was to expand the “zone of peace” in order to eliminate the
possibility of another world war.116 From this point of view it is possible to argue that the
USA is trying to promote liberal world order to make the world, and the USA in particular,
safer. However, it must also be noted that nowadays security is the main area of cooperation
between the USA and the Baltic states, which in a certain degree proves the realist assertion
112
Molly Montgomery, Interview by Viktorija Kotova, December 10, 2013.
Ibid.
114
Ibid.
115
“National Security Strategy of the United States”. The White House, January 1993, pp. 5-6.
116
Molly Montgomery, Interview by Viktorija Kotova, December 10, 2013.
113
22
concerning US interests to use the region for its military and security purposes. The US
Ambassador to Latvia Mark Pekala noted that at the moment trade and investment between
the USA and Latvia are not big, and though promotion of economic cooperation between the
two countries is an important task of the Embassy, cooperation in the security domain is the
prime matter.117 Moreover, Montgomery agrees that NATO enlargement to the Baltic states
was also aimed at showing Russia their boundaries and that this is not their sphere of
influence anymore. 118 In addition, the USA acquired new alliances in places like Iraq or
Afghanistan and support in international organizations such as the United Nations.119
In the National Security Strategy it has also been underlined that the integration of Eastern
European countries into organizations such as NATO, the EU, or OSCE will help to preserve
economic and democratic reforms launched by these countries. 120 Nevertheless, it must be
noted that NATO is first and foremost a security organization and traditionally such aims as
promotion of democracy and market economy are not the aims of any security alliance. Thus,
we can clearly see a shift in NATO’s goals, as initially this organization was established
against a certain external threat and military issues dominated the agenda. This can be seen as
an attempt to preserve NATO after the Cold War, as NATO’s external threat, which was the
main reason of NATO existence, has disappeared. From the realist point of view this means
that the USA is trying to maintain NATO in order to use it as a tool to influence affairs in
Europe, which also partially explains why the Baltic states have been admitted as NATO
members.
The Baltic states’ admission to NATO is better explained by realist arguments, however,
liberalism can also provide a strong argumentation to explain this phenomena. As previously
mentioned, in the beginning of the 1990s the USA stayed quiet on the possible Baltic states’
membership in NATO, which can be explained by the desire not to provoke Russia and not to
undermine democratic developments in this country. Thus, the USA tried to foster economic
and political reforms both in the Baltic states and Russia, however after the USA realized
Russia’s persistent ambitions to control its “near abroad” and Russia’s failure to become a
liberal democratic country, the USA might turn to more realist strategy, in particular, to
integrate the Baltic states into NATO and thus to show Russia that the Baltic states are no
more in its sphere of influence.
117
Mark Pekala, The Diect Line with Latvian Minister of Economics, November, 6, 2013.
Molly Montgomery, Interview by Viktorija Kotova, December 10, 2013.
119
Ibid.
120
“A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement”. The White House, February 1996, p. 32.
118
23
Conclusion
After analyzing US policy toward the Baltic states through the prism of realism and liberalism
it can be concluded that US domestic regime and such liberal values as human rights do play a
certain role in US foreign policy. Moreover, US financial and political assistance to the Baltic
states can be regarded as an attempt to expand the zone of liberal countries and to strengthen
economic and democratic reforms launched in these countries. However, when it comes to
NATO expansion realist arguments are better prepared to explain US Baltic policy and the
decision to support the Baltic states’ membership in the alliance.
US adherence to liberal values might be reflected in the willingness to help the Baltic states to
launch the necessary economic and political reforms and to achieve greater integration with
the West, however US support toward the Baltic states’ membership in NATO cannot be
explained solely by the liberal values, as NATO first and foremost is a military alliance and
US support toward the Baltic states included a number of costs and risks, for instance,
Russian harsh reaction on the issue, low Baltic states’ military contribution and inability to
protect themselves in a case of serious attack, which in turn could undermine the credibility of
the alliance.
At the same time, it can be argued that after the breakup of the USSR the USA was guided by
a liberal vision and tried to support democratic reforms not only in the Baltic states, but also
in Russia. At first the USA did not speak about NATO expansion, thus trying not to disrupt
democratic developments in Russia, since NATO expansion to the Baltics could provoke
more radical Russian politicians who might gain a larger electoral support. However, in the
end of the 1990s it became clear that the state was failing and hopes that Russia could become
a more liberal country faded, which is why the USA might decide to employ a more realist
strategy, thus helping the Baltic states to consolidate their democratic and economic reforms
and showing Russia its boundaries.
Moreover, US Baltic policy and the decision to support the Baltic states’ accession to NATO
could help the USA to achieve a number of strategic aims. First of all, the USA could use
membership negotiations as a leverage to affect certain issues in the Baltic states. However,
the project author asserts that the main motive for supporting the Baltic states’ membership in
NATO was the necessity to reduce Russian sphere of influence and to strengthen US position
in Europe. Moreover, the USA acquired new allies to support its policies and military
operations abroad.
24
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