STRATEGY MEMORANDUM (CONSOLIDATED)
I. INTRODUCTION1
Although there are many declarations on the right to food and numerous countries have signed
international agreements pertaining to the right to food, hunger remains a significant and tragic fact of
life for over a billion people.2 Founder John Teton developed the International Food Security Treaty
(IFST) to combat this tragic reality. Unlike other existing covenants, the IFST aims to establish
positive, enforceable international law guaranteeing the right to be free from hunger and to oblige
countries to establish their own correlating domestic law.3 Many important leaders have recognized
IFST as a crucial missing link in the world's efforts to eliminate hunger.4
If ratified, the IFST would make it illegal under international law for national governments to
allow widespread hunger to persist.5 The Campaign estimates that it will take twenty-five to thirty-five
years for the treaty to evolve from its initial concept to a position of nearly universal attention.6 This
timeline reflects an estimate of how long the treaty will be in each phase of development. The Five
Phases of IFST Evolution are: 1) Concept Development, 2) Proposal to the United Nations, 3) Initial
Ratification, 4) The Early Treaty Era, and 5) The Campaign for Universal Ratification.
II. EXISTING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE RIGHT TO FOOD
The modern right to food first appeared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
of 1948.7 Article 25 of the UDHR states that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well being of himself and his family, including food…”8 This was codified in 1966 in the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) under Article 11, providing
that “Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food . . . to be free from hunger.”9
The right to food has also been incorporated into other international agreements, including the
Convention on the Rights of the Child “through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean
drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution.”10 The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women also provides for the
Content is derived directly from the work of John Teton and treaty.org.
ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The New International
Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987) (submitted by Asbjørn Eide).
3 INTERNATIONAL FOOD SECURITY TREATY CAMPAIGN, Welcome Page, http://treaty.org [hereinafter
IFST CAMPAIGN].
4 Id.
5 IFST CAMPAIGN, Law as a Catalyst in the Eradication of Hunger.
6 IFST CAMPAIGN, Welcome Page.
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
8 Id. at ¶ 25.
9 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at ¶ 11,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICESCR].
10 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20,
1989).
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right to food in Articles 12 and 14. 11 Finally the right to food has been addressed through numerous
declarations and development goals published by the UN. These range from laudatory to assertive
expressions of the right to food being an inalienable right.
Despite the inclusion of the right to food within these international agreements, hunger clearly
remains a significant and tragic fact of life for over a billion people.12 This contradiction is most readily
understood within the framework of human rights enforcement identified by Asbjørn Eide in 1987,
which is now the dominant view of characterizing states’ enforcement of human rights under
international law.13 This framework outlines three obligations with respect to international human
rights: the duty to respect, the duty to protect, and the duty to fulfill or facilitate.14
The duty to respect the right to food is “essentially a duty of non-interference with existing access
to adequate food” and is a requirement on states qua states.15 The duty to protect the right to food requires
states to prevent other individuals and non-state entities from interfering with individuals’ right to
food.16 Unlike the duties to respect and protect, the duty to fulfill the right to food is a positive obligation.
This has been interpreted by the CESCR as implying that states must directly provide food to
individuals and groups who have been deprived of the right to food for reasons beyond their control.17
In 2009, UN Food and Agriculture Organization released its “Guide to Legislation” on the right
to food. Rather than implementing a new enforcement document, like a new food treaty, the FAO
focuses on the requirement of the right to food in the ICESCR and the Right to Food Guidelines to
develop a guide to individual state legislation to implement the right to food. FAO also proposes a
framework law for states to reference when implementing laws to enforce the right to food in their
respective states.18
These three duties mentioned above outline the framework of the human right to food in
customary international law; however, such customary international law is a deficient means of
protecting people from hunger by fully guaranteeing that right. There are a number of factors that
explain the lack of full realization of the right to food. First, there currently exists no enforcement
mechanism to make states comply with customary international law in this regard. This is the biggest
hurdle to guaranteeing realization of the right to food. Without an enforcement mechanism, customary
international law remains, in a sense, laudatory, since outside enforcement would have to come from
other states or international organizations. As is well known, such outside interference with a state is
rare when international interests are materially affected.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, at
¶ 12 & 14, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force Sept. 3, 1981.
12 Based on a projection in FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N. (FAO), THE STATE OF FOOD
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: ECONOMIC CRISES—IMPACTS AND LESSONS LEARNED 11 (2009), available
at http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ newsroom/ wfp209430.pdf.
13 ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, The New International
Economic Order and the Promotion of Human Rights: Report on the Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (July 7, 1987) (submitted by Asbjørn Eide).
14 Id. at ¶¶ 112–14.
15 Smita Narula, Reclaiming the Right to Food as a Normative Response to the Global Food Crisis, 13 YALE
HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L. J. 403, 406 (2011).
16 Id. See also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights (CESCR),
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol) /3d02758c707031d58025677f003
b73b9?Opendocument).
17 General Comment No. 12, supra note 10 at ¶ 15.
18 “Guide on Legislating the Right to Food,” FAO, 2009.
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Second, states’ obligations are entirely focused on the territorial confines of their country,
ignoring the huge effect that entities such as international financial institutions and transnational
businesses.19 Third, the ICESCR is not ratified by every country, and non-signing States entirely
escape possible enforcement measures under this covenant.20 Thus, without more to ensure that all
State’s respect the right to food through the duty of fulfilling the right, we are left with an unacceptable
status quo in which hunger remains rampant.
The obvious, direct solution to this problem is the enactment of a right to food treaty that
secures the commitment of all ratifying states in fully respecting the right to food. This is what the
IFST does. It specifically requires that states respect, protect and fulfill the right to food of their
peoples.21 The Treaty also includes enforcement mechanisms and the right of both individuals and
NGO’s to file complaints with the CESCR.22 With widespread ratification of the IFST, enforcement of
the right to food becomes possible.
A. Former Attempts to Develop the Food Security Treaty
The World Food Summit report from November 1996 makes reference to a former attempt at a
right to food treaty. In this document, they recognize the right to food in various instruments and
meetings including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICESCR, the World Food
Conference of 1974, and the International Conference on Nutrition of 1992. However, the Summit
recognized that while reiterating the right to food in various document is beneficial to some degree, the
real need is an instrument to implement the rights.23 The Food Summit Report references the Right to
Food Working Group (consisting of US and Canadian NGO’s) that endorsed a proposal for an
International Food Security Covenant. The proposal stated that it would require states to ensure access
to food that would meet a minimum dietary standard for all people. Other proposals included more
support for the world food reserve and elaboration of protocols for the support of such a reserve. The
one thing the summit agreed on was that there would need to be some sort of recourse for those that
claimed their right to food had been violated.
III. TREATY MAKING PROCESS
There are many types of treaties and different methods of ratifying them. They may be
unilateral or multilateral, and generated by NGO’s, states, or international political organizations. As
one may expect, treaty ratification movements cover a wide variety of subjects such as human rights,
trade, healthcare, military issues, labor and environmental law.24 In 2006 there were almost twenty
See generally Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable under International Law,
44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691 (2006) (strongly advocating for a “rights-based approach” to
protecting individuals’ right to food) and Karen Kong, The Right to Food for All: A Rights-Based Approach
to Hunger and Social Inequality, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 525 (2009).
20 The United States has notably failed to ratify the ICESCR, and many other countries have either
expressed numerous reservations about the covenant or consider its term laudatory or subservient to
their own constitutions.
21 IFST CAMPAIGN, INTERNATIONAL FOOD SECURITY TREATY ¶ 6, available at http://treaty.org/.
22 Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.
23 http://www.fao.org/docrep/x0262e/x0262e18.htm#r.
24 Uta Oberdörster, Why Ratify? Lessons From Treaty Ratification Campaigns, 61 VAND. L. REV. 681, 694
(2008).
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global treaty ratification campaigns worldwide.25 Treaty campaigns are led by both international
organizations and NGO’s.26
Likewise, treaty campaigns often have different goals at different stages within the campaign.
Some efforts have focused on getting ratification from powerful nations early on, and then using that as
leverage to persuade other states to ratify. Other campaigns have pursued many less influential
countries to sign on, especially when needed to bring the treaty into force. Both of these tactics address
the fact that many treaties are not effective until a minimum number of states have ratified.27 Often
goals will change as the ratification campaign progresses, adapting to new circumstances and new allies
as momentum grows for ratification. While the vast majority of human rights treaties a created within
the UN, others, such as the Ottawa Convention banning landmines, have been created outside the UN,
providing an alternate route to ratification.
A. Overview
With over 200 multilateral treaties being concluded within the United Nations, the process by
which they were presented and enacted vary significantly. The one constant in the process is that the
General Assembly adopts the treaties and opens them for signing by the States. However, this occurs
after many steps by sub-committees and various experts and NGOs.
Treaties can often be the brainchild of a United Nations sub-committee. It is not atypical for a
small subcommittee to put an issue on their agenda to discuss the possibility of treaty. There is often a
principal body that drafts the initial treaty. This is often a principal organ of the U.N. (i.e. the Economic
and Social Council or the secretariat). However, there have been occasions that smaller sub-committees
have taken part in this aspect of the process as well.
Non-governmental organizations have become more active in multilateral treaty-making in
modern times. International civil society has typically been represented by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has various rights in the UN process that other NGO’s do not have.
The ICRC has special status within the UN called consultant status. This means that it is allowed
greater access and recognition in its role as an advocate for its own interests and that of other NGOs.
Finally, here are two separate stages for NGO participation: pre-diplomatic conference and
diplomatic conference stages. In the pre-diplomatic conference stage NGOs work to raise awareness
and do fact-finding work, often in the hopes that a committee or state will sponsor a treaty. In the
diplomatic conference stage after a treaty has been sponsored, NGOs play generally a more backseat
role, with the exception being the ICRC due to its consultant status.
Pre-diplomatic conference. There are various ways that NGO’s can impact the treaty process
prior to proposals:
Fact-finding. Especially for treaty proposals coming from outside the UN, accurate fact-finding
is crucial. Credibility is key for organizations not associated with the UN. Fact-finding can be done
through research, talking to experts and publishing reports on the subject of the treaty. This plays a key
role in getting support from various States on the issue. Unreliable information and sloppy work will be
unpersuasive and could question the legitimacy of the proposal.
Id.
Id.
27 The IFST requires 20 states’ ratification before taking effect.
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Cooperating with other NGOs. Gathering multiple NGOs to be researching and actively
supporting the same cause can be very beneficial. They may even form a coalition to work together and
speak as one on the issue. This will allow for greater impact that merely having one voice in the crowd.
Getting the support of ICRC is invaluable, particularly considering their impact and privileges at the
UN. Although they do not typically join a cause, they may exchange ideas and give support.
Public Opinion. Advertising and media campaigns are typically warranted only when other
efforts fail. If other NGOs or States are reluctant to support a cause, then turning to the view of public
opinion can be very persuasive. The idea behind media campaigns is that it will help gain the necessary
momentum to get more support and bring the treaty to fruition.
Diplomatic Conference. This is the phase that allows NGOs to bring their ideas to the
attention of the UN. Typically, NGOs are not granted access to UN committee conferences or working
groups, but the ICRC has enjoyed these types of privileges, again because of its consultant status. The
ICRC has been allowed to submit proposals to these committees and prepare documents and make
arguments. The ICRC will typically distribute other materials that would be useful to the participants,
such as a brochure that outlines the proposal. Other NGOs have more difficulty getting their proposals
heard. Many will leave brochures outside the conference for the delegates to grab on their way out of
the conference. This apparently works more often than the logical mind would assume. States take
NGO participation very seriously. Press coverage has also helped the NGOs be heard, particularly in
closed sessions. Many NGOs are able to gain meetings with State’s during the breaks at the conference
to bring their proposals to them. Getting a State to support your proposal will help in being able to
present it to the committee or the conference.
B. The Basic Steps of the Treaty Making Process
Although there are an almost infinite number of avenues to turning an idea into a multilateral
treaty, there are a few basic stages that all treaties go through to be successful. Proposals for new treaty
instruments can be from many different sources for example, Governments/States, Expert groups, the
Secretariat, NGO’s and more. Unfortunately, it does not seem possible to identify any specific treatymaking process by the type of proposal source, as many of these sources have used multiple processes to
effectuate treaties. The United Nations serves as a recipient of suggestions from both within and outside
its organizations. After the proposal is made, the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council
are able to assign the cause to a sub-committee to take into account. Although the UN could likely use
its power of recommendation or its position to effectuate a systematic and organized international
legislative process that would allow for clear steps in the treaty-making process, it has failed to do so.
Pre-initiation studies. Prior to committing to a cause and beginning work on a treaty, a UN
committee will engage in extensive studies to verify that they will not be wasting their time and
resources pursuing a cause that will not end in a multilateral treaty being formed. The studies will
explore the likelihood of success and the optimum method of approaching it. Each group approaches
such studies a little differently, but tends to cover similar aspects of the possible treaty.
Formal initiation of treaty-making. This step is often undefined, depending on the
organization or committee that is in the process. Sometimes it’s as small as putting the item on an
agenda to vote whether to commence with the treaty-making process, and sometimes it’s as extensive as
having a Conference on that issue.
Decision as to type of instrument. This is where the committee must make a decision as to
whether the international regulation will be a recommendation or a convention or a combination of the
two types of instruments. Some committees or organizations deliberately postpone this decision until
after negotiations. There are also times that committees decide to create a Declaration on the particular
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issue of the treaty. This may be done for multiple reasons, including: (1) to ameliorate the situation
more quickly than a treaty-making project; and (2) to make a guideline for the treaty project and test
certain principles of the proposed treaty.
Drafting and Negotiations:
Initial Draft. The initial draft of a treaty is written at various different stages of the process
depending on the organization and the different concerns that law-makers have about putting
something on paper at any given stage. Typically the initial draft will only contain the substantive
provisions of the proposed treaty. More provisions will likely come after negotiations
Negotiation. Although negotiations exist throughout the treaty-making process, there is a
tendency to have a lot of negotiations in the drafting process. Each organ or State that is participating
in the drafting of the instrument will take part in the negotiation process.
Consultations with Governments. This process allows those governing bodies that would be
signing the treaty to have a voice in what it says. This allows for governments that are not partaking in
the drafting process to give input. This process can be executed in a number of ways; such as,
circulating questionnaires, distribution of comments/copies of the treaty, distributing a report written
by expert in the field, or direct consideration by the states.
Drafting Committees: Most organizations stress the importance of drafting committees to prepare
drafts and give advice to the organization and to coordinate and review all drafts. Drafting committees
can vary in size from just a handful of people to a large number. The decision on how big to make a
drafting committee typically depends on the organization sponsoring the treaty.
Final Clauses: The final clauses tend to be carbon copies or at least substantially similar to all
other treaties created by that organization. They cover topic matter about which States become parties,
entry into force, duration of validity, etc.
Adoption. Formal adoption typically takes place in a representative organ that contains those
States that are meant to participate in the treaty. Sometimes, if the treaty is open for participation by all
States, then the formal adoption may take place in the General Assembly.
C. Examples of Ratification Campaigns
This section presents three examples of three recent treaty ratification campaigns. The focus
here is the background and characteristics of the campaigns, and how they entered into force.
Landmines Treaty. The Convention to Ban Landmines, also known as the Ottawa Convention,
makes the use of antipersonnel landmines unlawful under international law.28 The ICRC guided the
negotiations for the final version of the treaty, with vital support from NGOs and the UN.29 The
Convention entered into force more quickly than any other human rights treaty, and is an important
example to consider when thinking of possible routes for the IFST to follow to ratification.
The campaign to end the use of landmines took its first big step in 1992 with the formation of
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (“ICBL”).30 This organization is a global coalition of
Oberdörster, supra note 32. The Convention’s formal title is the “Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction”.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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NGOs representing 90 countries.31 The efforts of the ICBL and its constituent organizations was
multilateral in that it worked to create normative standards with individual countries in committing to
stop using landmines, and raised public awareness of the harm caused by landmines, while also pursuing
an international treaty.32
Several aspects of the Ottawa Convention’s ratification process are unique to it. First, NGOs
and States worked collaboratively to a greater degree than with other conventions.33 This cooperation
happened because the NGOs were extremely well coordinated and were relatively lucky in having inside
support from Canadian government officials.34 The NGO coalition was well coordinated and had started
working years before in raising public awareness of the damage caused by landmines.
With Canada and other States leading the charge with respect to this treaty, they effectively
worked around the UN in both fostering and negotiating the language of the treaty. The convention
itself, occurring in Ottawa, involved State representatives, NGO’s and interested UN agency
representatives in developing the final treaty, despite the convention not being an official UNsanctioned event.35 The reason for this type of campaign probably stems from the fact that power States,
namely the US, Russia and China, have not ratified the treaty and were not supportive of it, making its
campaign within the UN likely to be slow, at best, and stymied at worst.36
The Convention was a productive one, due in part to the fact that attendance at the convention
was selective: only countries that “opted in” by agreeing to the principles of the treaty and the agenda
items were allowed to participate.37 111 did so, effectively circumventing the consensus rule used to
ratify treaties within the UN.38 Part of the campaign’s success is also due to its simplicity. The ICRC
and the ICBL both stressed the importance of maintaining a simple message that a landmine ban was a
humanitarian disaster that could only be stopped by a total ban on their use.39
To date, 156 countries are signatory to the Ottawa Convention, with 155 countries having
signed the treaty from December 3, 1997 when the treaty opened for signature until March 1, 1999,
when the treaty entered into force.40 While the US has not signed or ascended to the treaty, it has
stated support for the “spirit” of the treaty.
Disability Treaty. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional
Protocol41 provides for equal treatment and rights for all people regardless of any disabilities they may
have. Its preamble state that “all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and
interrelated” of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and the convention is guided by a
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, Campaign History, http://www.icbl.org/
index.php/icbl/About-Us/History.
32 Oberdörster, supra note 32, at 701.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 ICBL, Bar History, http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Treaties/MBT/Ban-History.
38 Id.
39 supra note 39, at 700.
40 ICBL, State Parties, http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties.
41 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, art. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at http:// www.un.org/disabilities/convention/
conventionfull.shtml.
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number of principles emphasizing equality, universal accessibility, respect and full participation in
society.42
The treaty established the Committee on the Right of Persons with Disabilities, which is
comprised of 18 experts who serve for four-year terms in their individual capacities, rather than as
government representatives. State Parties provide reports to the Committee every two years. The
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is a side-agreement to
the Convention, which allows its parties to recognize the competence of the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities to consider complaints from individuals.43
In 1987 there was a meeting of experts that recommended that the UN General Assembly draft
an international convention on the elimination of discrimination against persons with disabilities. Italy
and Sweden proposed draft convention outlines, but no consensus was reached. Many government
representatives believed the existing human rights documents were sufficient. Despite that, in 1993 the
UN General Assembly adopted the “Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons
with Disabilities”, a non-compulsory standard.
From 1993 until 1999, there was little action toward creating a treaty. In 1999, though, five
leading international disability NGOs—Rehabilitation International, DPI, Inclusion International,
World Blind Union, World Federation of the Deaf—called for a meeting to discuss the a treaty to
replace the noncompulsory rules.44 This same group issued the “Beijing Declaration” in 2000. The
Beijing Declaration called on all governments to support a convention. This was following by a
proposal from Mexico in 2001, in which the General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to
consider proposals for a comprehensive and integral convention to promote and protect the rights and
dignity of persons with disabilities.
This led to the adoption of the Convention and Option Protocol by the UN on December 13,
2006. The Convention opened for signature on March 30, 2007 and entered into force May 3, 2008. The
Option Protocol has 89 signatories and 57 parties.
Similarly to the Landmines Treaty, the ratification campaign of the Disability Treaty started
with an attempt to gain momentum and public awareness outside of the UN. However, unlike that
treaty, the disability NGOs actively courted the support of States to initiate treaty-making procedures
within the UN. One difference with the landmines treaty is the political volatility of the issue at hand.
Because discrimination against persons with disabilities is largely already inferentially prohibited by
other international treaties, it was less controversial, and thus easier to get state support.
Montreal Protocol. Described by Kofi Annan as the most successful international agreement
to date, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is part of the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, enacted in 1985. It provides for all States to phase
out production and use of clorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons, and other substances that
deplete the ozone layer. The Montreal Protocol is one of the first international environmental
agreements that provides for trade embargos against violators of the Convention.
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guiding Principles,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?navid=15&pid=156.
43See www.un.org; www.Internationaldisabilityaliance.org; and www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
disabilities -convention.htm.
44 DISABILITY WORLD, A UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Next Steps,
http://www.disabilityworld.org/01-03_03/news/unconvention.shtml.
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Background research on the impacts of CFC’s in the Earth’s atmosphere began in the 1970s and
80s with scientists Frank Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina at UC-Irvine. They proposed that
CFCs might be expected to cause a break down of ozone (O3) in the stratosphere. The two scientists
testified at a hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives in December 1974, and two years later
the National Academy of Sciences released a report confirming the credibility of the ozone depletion
hypothesis. In 1985, 20 nations signed the Vienna Convention, thereby establishing a framework for
negotiating international regulations on ozone-depleting substances.
The push to ban CFCs was led by States, with the US and Canada at the forefront of the effort.45
At the same time, it was strongly opposed by powerful business interests.46 In particular, The Alliance
for Responsible CFC Policy argued that the science was too uncertain to justify action. Despite this, all
countries in the United Nations ratified the original Montreal Protocol on September 16, 2009. The
implementation of the Montreal Protocol is aided by the Multilateral Fund to help developing countries
phase out the use of ozone-depleting substances. The Fund is managed by an executive committee with
an equal representation of seven industrialized and seven Article 5 Countries, which are elected annually
by a Meeting of the Parties.
Unlike the previous treaties, the Montreal Protocol is a sub-part of the already existent Vienna
Convention, which expressly provided for such additional protocols.47 This made ratifying the protocol
simpler and anticipated because there already existed a procedure and committee for considering such
protocols.
D. Conclusions from these Campaigns and Recommendations for Treaty Ratification
There are essentially two different routes that IFST can embark upon at this point in time.
First, it could continue to court sponsorship by a member state to get the treaty moving through the
UN development and ratification process. These processes are those outlined infra section IV(a). The
second option is to pursue a multilateral treaty ratification campaign outside the UN system. This path
to ratification would likely resemble the Ottawa Convention described in section IV(b). There are
advantages and disadvantages to each, as will be discussed below.
Inside the UN. The route to ratification within the UN has the advantages of have a relatively
understood path and procedures. As detailed above, treaties ratified within the UN follow the Vienna
Convention, which provides a series of steps to follow. The advantage of the relative predictability of the
Vienna Convention is not merely academic, as it may be beneficial for NGOs and states to be able to
plan for future steps and anticipate possible problems and setbacks.
State sponsorship. The most traditional method of creating treaties within the UN, state
sponsorship can be very beneficial for a treaty campaign, especially when powerful states sponsor them.
State sponsorship and support from powerful nations can build a great deal of momentum for a
ratification campaign, as happened with the Montreal Protocol when it was sponsored by the United
States and Canada.
Of course, enlisting the support of powerful nations is not easy to do. The campaign would have
to convince the executive to not only agree with the need for the food security treaty, but also to
positively adopt it as a part of its foreign policy. Despite the political support voiced by many politicians,
RICHARD BENEDICK, SCIENCE, DIPLOMACY AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL (2007) available at
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Science,_diplomacy,_and_the_Montreal_Protocol.
46 Id.
47 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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this would seem to be a daunting undertaking. This is not at all to say that it cannot be done. For it to
be feasible, however, the Campaign would need to have a broad coalition of organizations supporting the
Campaign, as well as effective advocacy outreach.
There is also the possibility that state adoption of a food security treaty would undermine one
or more of the essential substantive principles of the IFST, which could be counterproductive. For
example, watering down the enforcement provision would significantly weaken the treaty to the point of
near meaninglessness. Although at this point it is difficult to say what steps should be taken to address
this problem, it seems that a stronger coalition and broader public awareness and support could mitigate
this risk.
NGO driven. One way for NGOs to effectuate a treaty ratification campaign is to persuade a
state to sponsor it, at which point two strategies blur together since often NGOs and States work
together in putting forth proposed treaties. Unless a member state decides to lead a food security treaty
campaign sua sponte (at this point an unlikely development), NGOs will quite certainly need to apply
political pressure to convince a state to sponsor the treaty in the UN.
Alternatively, NGOs can also propose treaties to UN bodies, which may then study the
feasibility of ratification and decide to act or not following that determination. The likelihood of success
in this route is unclear, as we do not have good information on how often such proposals are adopted by
UN bodies. In any case, while theoretically possible, it would seem that the more persuasive and
powerful the NGO, the greater the likelihood of getting its proposal adopted.
Not all NGOs are created equal. A push by the ICRC, for example, with its special consultant
status could be very persuasive with some states, and thus cultivating that organization’s support could
be key to the ratification campaign. Others, such as Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and Bread for the World, for example, could be incredibly helpful not only because they
have name recognition and legitimacy, but also because they have sophisticated advocacy capabilities
that could be invaluable.
Internal UN Push. As mentioned above, UN organs can also sponsor treaties to the General
Assembly. After being sponsored, treaties then follow the same procedure within the UN. The FAO and
the Special Rapporteur on the Right To Food are probably the best candidates for proposing the IFST
to the General Assembly. This route has the advantage of the sponsors are already within the UN and
presumably have expertise and connections that could make the ratification campaign development
more quickly or easily.
However, given that the FAO has clearly thrown its weight behind the voluntary guidelines
approach to food security, it is hard to know if they would sponsor the IFST anytime soon. It may be
the case that after further developments the FAO would be willing to sponsor the treaty. On the one
hand, if the FAO voluntary guidelines become more widespread among UN member states, that would
make the case for IFST stronger by showing growing states’ support. On the other, the FAO may wish
to jump on the bandwagon if IFST builds a strong coalition and engenders public support for a food
security treaty.
External route. Besides working through the UN and the Vienna Convention Process, the
Campaign could alternately pursue an independent multilateral treaty with States on its own. This route
would be similar to that of the Ottawa Convention. The Ottawa Convention was formed through a
convention of NGOs and UN agencies that were only allowed to participate on the condition of future
support for the core principles of the treaty. The interested NGOs took this route because of the likely
rejection of any landmine ban efforts by China, Russian and the US. By going around the UN, the
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Ottawa Convention was able to be ratified by UN member states despite a near certain veto by UN
powerhouses.
Similarly, IFST may well encounter resistance from powerful UN member states. Part of this
may be because of likely problems with the legality of sanctions and embargos as instruments of
international diplomacy. Additional problems may arise from political resistance to mandatory,
actionable requirements of what many states consider “soft rights.” IFST could avoid resistance within
the UN by pursuing such an independent route.
The Ottawa Convention benefitted greatly from the support of not only the government of
Canada, but also the ICRC and a broad coalition of NGOs. This coalition consisted of nearly a thousand
NGOs across the world, many of which had been doing fact finding and publicity raising activities for
decades before joining the coalition. Clearly the Ottawa Convention was especially successful because of
the public support and momentum built by decades of strategic alliances and hard work by an incredible
number of NGOs and governments around the world.
Regional organizations. Another possible route to ratification outside the UN is through
regional organizations such as the Organization of American States. Such organizations have the
advantage of already having processes for ratification of multilateral treaties while also avoiding the
need to get agreement from a large number of states.
Suggestions. We believe that the most fruitful route to pursue for ratification is to begin with
building strategic alliances and coalitions to gain public recognition. This should be done with an eye
towards gaining the traditional sponsorship within the UN for ratification. By taking a multilateral
approach the Campaign will be prepared to adapt to problems or resistance encountered in the future.
Thus the Campaign should aim to directly campaign to UN bodies to see if they may be willing to
accept proposals for IFST. The Campaign should also endeavor to persuade the same UN bodies to
sponsor IFST in their own capacities. Finally, the Campaign should reach out to UN member states
with the hope of state sponsorship of IFST within the UN. These outreach efforts, in combination with
fact-finding and public awareness campaigns, provide the most likely path to ratification.
That being said, the Campaign should remain open to the idea of pursuing an alternate, non-UN
treaty campaign. There may be entrenched interests that are resistant to the idea of a food security
treaty, represented in member states or within the UN. If such resistance seems likely to derail the
ratification campaign within the UN, pursuing a non-UN treaty campaign may be the only feasible
option available. Hopefully, when the Campaign has developed to the point at which it can determine
whether or not the UN is the best option, it will have likely developed a strong enough coalition of
organizations to pursue the non-UN route.
As may be inferred from the previous section, attaining such a high degree of coordination and
strategic alliances with other organizations takes a lot of time, effort and money to start and maintain.
Communication between organizations takes a lot of effort and time in addition to the other advocacy
and outreach programs that many such NGOs perform. There is every reason to believe that the IFST
campaign will similarly tax all parties to such a strategic alliance. Many of the NGOs who may be
willing to partner with the Campaign likewise perform a great deal of direct and indirect outreach to
alleviate hunger, in addition to advocacy work. Maintaining constructive communication and
coordination with such organizations will be a large endeavor in itself.
Deciding which route to pursue will necessarily occur later in this process, after coalitions and
alliances have been built. Once the coalitions and alliances have been built, the Campaign will be in a
position to build towards gathering the broad support necessary for either path to ratification. Once
sufficient momentum has been built for ratification to become feasible, the Campaign will be able to
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assess the feasibility of the two options. The following section will address what steps the Campaign
should take to begin broadening its outreach and forming alliances.
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