Court Metadata Aff – India CMS Adv
1ac
India CMS Advantage – 1ac Draft
India’s bulk surveillance is a counter-productive “honeypot” - it actually ENCOURAGES cyber-retaliation
attacks
Trivedi 13 (Anjani, holds a Master Degree in Journalism from the University of Hong Kong and a Bachelor’s
Degree in Mathematics from MIT. The author has previously held internships at the New York Times and CNN
International. This piece internally quotes Meenakshi Ganguly, The South Asia director for Human Rights Watch;
Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project; and Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for
Internet and Society. “In India, Prism-like Surveillance Slips Under the Radar” – Time Magazine – 6-30-13 http://world.time.com/2013/06/30/in-india-prism-like-surveillance-slips-under-the-radar/#ixzz2YpWhRsrB)
CMS is an ambitious surveillance system that monitors text messages, social-media engagement and phone calls on landlines
and cell phones, among other communications. That means 900 million landline and cell-phone users and 125 million Internet users.
The project, which is being implemented by the government’s Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT), is meant to help national lawenforcement agencies save time and avoid manual intervention, according to the Department of Telecommunications’ annual report. This has
been in the works since 2008, when C-DOT started working on a proof-of-concept, according to an older report. The government set aside
approximately $150 million for the system as part of its 12th five-year plan, although the Cabinet ultimately approved a higher amount. Within
the internal-security ministry though, the surveillance system remains a relatively “hush-hush” topic, a project official unauthorized to speak to
the press tells TIME. In April 2011, the Police Modernisation Division of the Home Affairs Ministry put out a 90-page tender to solicit bidders
for communication-interception systems in every state and union territory of India. The system requirements included “live listening, recording,
storage, playback, analysis, postprocessing” and voice recognition. Civil-liberties groups concede that states often need to
undertake targeted- monitoring operations. However, the move toward extensive “surveillance capabilities enabled by digital
communications,” suggests that governments are now “casting the net wide, enabling intrusions into private lives,” according to Meenakshi
Ganguly, South Asia director for Human Rights Watch. This extensive communications surveillance through the likes of Prism and CMS are “out
of the realm of judicial authorization and allow unregulated, secret surveillance, eliminating any transparency or accountability on the part of the
state,” a recent U.N. report stated. India is no stranger to censorship and monitoring — tweets, blogs, books or songs are frequently blocked and
banned. India ranked second only to the U.S. on Google’s list of user-data requests with 4,750 queries, up 52% from two years back, and removal
requests from the government increased by 90% over the previous reporting period. While these were largely made through police or court
orders, the new system will not require such a legal process. In recent times, India’s democratically elected government has barred access to
certain websites and Twitter handles, restricted the number of outgoing text messages to five per person per day and arrested citizens for liking
Facebook posts and tweeting. Historically too, censorship has been India’s preferred means of policing social unrest. “Freedom of expression,
while broadly available in theory,” Ganguly tells TIME, “is endangered by abuse of various India laws.” There is a growing discrepancy and
power imbalance between citizens and the state, says Anja Kovacs of the Internet Democracy Project. And, in an environment like India where
“no checks and balances [are] in place,” that is troubling. The potential for misuse and misunderstanding, Kovacs believes, is increasing
enormously. Currently, India’s laws relevant to interception “disempower citizens by relying heavily on the executive to safeguard individuals’
constitutional rights,” a recent editorial noted. The power imbalance is often noticeable at public protests, as in the case of the New Delhi gangrape incident in December, when the government shut down public transport near protest grounds and unlawfully detained demonstrators. With
an already sizeable and growing population of Internet users, the government’s worries too are on the rise. Netizens in India are set to triple to
330 million by 2016, according to a recent report. “As [governments] around the world grapple with the power of social media that can enable
spontaneous street protests, there appears to be increasing surveillance,” Ganguly explains. India’s junior minister for telecommunications
attempted to explain the benefits of this system during a recent Google+ Hangout session. He acknowledged that CMS is something that “most
people may not be aware of” because it’s “slightly technical.” A participant noted that the idea of such an intrusive system was worrying and he
did not feel safe. The minister, though, insisted that it would “safeguard your privacy” and national security. Given the high-tech nature of CMS,
he noted that telecom companies would no longer be part of the government’s surveillance process. India currently does not have formal privacy
legislation to prohibit arbitrary monitoring. The new system comes under the jurisdiction of the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, which allows for
surveillance system is not only an “abuse of privacy rights and
security-agency overreach ,” critics say, but also counterproductive in terms of security. In the process of
collecting data to monitor criminal activity, the data itself may become a target for terrorists and criminals — a
“honeypot,” according to Sunil Abraham, executive director of India’s Centre for Internet and Society.
Additionally, the wide-ranging tapping undermines financial markets, Abraham says, by compromising
confidentiality, trade secrets and intellectual property. What’s more, vulnerabilities will have to be built into the existing
cyberinfrastructure to make way for such a system. Whether the nation’s patchy infrastructure will be able to handle a complex
web of surveillance and networks, no one can say. That, Abraham contends, is what attackers will target.
monitoring communication in the “interest of public safety.” The
Successful cyber-attacks on CMS causes widespread internal destabilization of India
Dilipraj 13 (Mr E., Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is also pursuing his PhD at
the Centre for Latin American Studies from JNU, New Delhi. This evidence is internally quoting Sunil Abraham,
who is the Executive Director of the Bangalore based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society, a
non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility
for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness, also internally quoting Mr. Sachin
Pilot, India’s Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology. Modified for potentially
objectionable language. “CYBER WARFARE AND NATIONAL SECURITY” - AIR POWER Journal Vol. 8 No.
3, MONSOON 2013 (July-September) –
http://www.academia.edu/7534559/CYBER_WARFARE_AND_NATIONAL_SECURITY__AN_ANALYSIS_OF_INCIDENTS_BETWEEN_INDIA_AND_PAKISTAN)
security providers for the cyber space have
always been lacking in vigilance to provide security to their country’s cyber networks and infrastructures. Sunil
Abraham, Executive Director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, said during an interview to ‘Al Jazeera,’ “The Indian
government has a very low level of cyber awareness and cyber security. We don’t take cyber security as seriously as
the rest of the world”. The problem of cyber attacks by the hacking groups would not be a big problem if it stopped with the
hacking and defacing of websites. But, in reality, it moves on to the next stage s. The same people who carry out hacking
and website defacing jobs may get involved in cyber espionage and data mining against their enemies. These people may
also volunteer their expert services to the terrorist organisations in return for money and other forms of remuneration. According to a
cyber security professional working with one of India’s intelligence agencies , We once sat down to check the Delhi [internet]
Backbone. We found thousands of systems compromised. All were government systems, Research and Analysis Wing,
While aggression is the only tactic followed by the hacker groups in both countries, on the contrary, the
Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence... we don’t realise how much damage has already happened. The lack of awareness and the lethargic approach in monitoring
The infection ranges from small
Viruses, Botnets to that of Stuxnet level malwares which can hamper the total operations of the network connected to the
compromised computer. It has been observed that out of the 10,000 Stuxnet infected Indian computers, 15 were located at critical infrastructure facilities.
These included the Gujarat and Haryana Electricity Boards and an ONGC offshore oil rig. Though Stuxnet reached the networks of these
infrastructures, thankfully, it did not activate itself on them. In other words, India was only a few flawed lines of
code away from having its power and oil sectors crippled (destroyed). The list of new malwares goes on – Stuxnet, Flame, Duqu, etc – and
many more are in the process of coding; their abilities to operate as cyber weapons are incredible and, at the same time, unbearable, if not
protected against properly. Assuming that the hacker groups get access such malwares, then the situation would become extremely dangerous
for the national security as it is equivalent to terrorists getting access to nuclear weapons. While talking about the same, Mr.
Sachin Pilot , Minister of State for Communications and Information Technology said: The entire economies of some
countries have been (destroyed) paralysed by viruses from across the border. We have to make ourselves more resilient.
Power, telecom, defence, these areas are on top of our agenda. A careful study of the series of hacking on one another’s websites and networks by
the private hacking groups of India and Pakistan would reveal a basic fact that something which started as a small act of hate
has now taken on a much different shape in the form of personal revenge, economic profits, a race to show off technical supremacy, and antinational propaganda. This was very much evident from one unwanted event that disturbed the internal security of India in August 2012. The Indian government
and providing security to the cyber networks by India led to thousands of compromised computers across the country.
was alerted by the exodus after thousands of people from the northeast gathered at railway stations in various cities all over the country after being threatened by the
rounds of SMS and violent morphed pictures that were being circulated on more than 100 websites. The SMS threatened the northeastern people living in various
cities in India of a targeted attack on them, asking them to go back to their homeland, whereas the pictures circulated on the internet were images of some violent
bloodshed. Out of the various SMS that were in circulation, one said: It is a request to everyone to call back their relatives, sons and daughters in Bangalore as soon as
possible. Last night, four northeastern guys were killed by Muslims in Bangalore (two Manipuri, two Nepali). Two Nepali girls were kidnapped from Brigade Road.
The reports say that from August 20, marking Ramzan, after 2 pm, they are going to attack every northeastern person. The riot started because of the situation in
Assam.32 Another SMS said: Many northeast students staying in Pune were beaten up by miscreants believed to be Muslims following the Assam riots. Heard that it
is happening in Muslim areas like Mumbai, Andhra Pradesh, Bangalore. At Neelasandra, two boys were killed and one near passport office.33 The Government of
India reacted soon on this matter and a 43-page report was prepared by intelligence agencies along with the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO) and
India Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN) which traced several doctored images to Pakistan. The origins of these morphed images were later traced
back in specific to Lahore, Rawalpindi and other Pakistani cities by the Indian intelligence agencies. "From all available forensic evidence, we are fairly convinced
that all those postings came from Pakistan," said an official of NTRO. Another
senior official who has been involved in India's Pakistan
watch for several years said, It has been happening for several months now. This is a low cost, very effective way of destabilising
us. They don't need to send terrorists and explosives to create mayhem. Internet has been a very effective platform for
instigating communal divisions in India. They also have a multiplier effect , first resulting in anger and hatred, then riots
and, finally, many taking to terrorism. This act of unnecessary involvement by Pakistan-based elements is seen as cyber terrorism and cyber psychological warfare
against India to cause internal security disturbance and eventually to create a huge crisis in the country. This incident which created major
turmoil in the internal security of the country is the biggest example of the adverse effects of wrong use of cyber technology.
That sparks nuclear war with Pakistan – risks of miscalc, accidents, and unauthorized theft all increase –
your impact D doesn’t apply
Busch 4 (Nathan, Professor of Government and co-director of the Center for American Studies at Christopher Newport
University and former Professor of IR @ UGA, Ph.D. in International relations from the University of Toronto and an MA in
Political Science from Michigan State University. The author previously held the position of Research Fellow, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and also held the position of Visiting
Faculty, National Security Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory. No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear
Proliferation - p. 202-209)
In addition, because
the Indian military currently has little experience handling nuclear weapons, the risks of accidental use
could be very high during a crisis situation, at least for some time to come. If the order were given to prepare India's nuclear weapons for possible use,
the military (perhaps in conjunction with India's nuclear scientists) would need to assemble the warheads rapidly; mate them to the deliver)' vehicles (gravity bombs or
missiles); and prepare them for use, either by loading them into bombers or by aiming the missiles and preparing them for launch. All these procedures require
training and precision, and, given the early stages of India's new command-and-control arrangements, it is not at all clear that the Indian military would be able to
carry them out safely under extreme time constraints.194 If India decided to develop a rapid-response capability, some of these dangers would be lessened, but more
serious dangers would be introduced. In particular, there would be a significantly increased risk of an accidental launch of nuclear-armed missiles. India
would
need to engage in a great deal of additional research into safety mechanisms to prevent such an accidental launch,
and it is simply not known how much effort India is devoting, or will devote, to this area. 195 Because the Prithvi and the twostage Agni-I missiles contain a nonstorable liquid fuel, it would be impossible to deploy the current configuration of either missile to allow for a rapid response. This
significantly reduces the likelihood of these missiles being launched accidentally during normal circumstances, though the
risks of accidental launches
would probably increase significantly if they were fueled during a crisis situation. As noted, however, India has conducted several successful flight
tests of the Agni and Agni-II missiles. Because these missiles use a solid fuel, they could be deployed in a rapid-response state. If India were to choose such a
deployment option, the risks of an accidental launch could increase significantly. These risks would depend on the extent to which India integrates use-control devices
into its weapons to prevent accidental launches, but there is little evidence that India is currently devoting significant efforts to develop such use-control devices.196
Furthermore, even if India intends to develop such use-control devices, if a nuclear crisis were to arise before India had developed them, it still might be tempted to
mate warheads on its missiles. If India does decide to weaponize its arsenal, it still remains to be seen what type of deployment option it would choose. According to a
statement in November 1999 by India's foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, India would not keep its weapons on a "hair-trigger alert," though he did suggest that these
weapons would be dispersed and made mobile to improve their chances of surviving a first strike.197 If this statement is true, then the risks of accidental launch
would be relatively small during normal circumstances.198 But these risks would increase significantly during crisis situations, when India would presumably mate
the warheads to the missiles.199 If the military still has not been given physical control over the warheads, this would further reduce risks of accidental use during
peacetime, though the transfer of nuclear weapons to the military during a crisis could significantly increase the risks of an accident due to the military's inexperience
in handling the nuclear weapons.200 What deployment option Pakistan might adopt depends in part on India's weapon deployment. It appears that if India were to
adopt a rapid-response option, Pakistan would probably adopt a similar missile deployment, thereby increasing the risks of an accidental launch of its nuclear weapons
as well. But even if India were to deploy its weapons (in field positions) withour the warheads mated, concerns about survivability might nevertheless cause Pakistan
to adopt a rapid-response capability. If such an event were to occur, the risks of Pakistani accidental missile launches could be quite high, especially because it is
unlikely that Pakistan currently has the technical capacity to integrate sophisticated launch controls into its missile designs. Just
as in India, it is also
unlikely that Pakistan's nuclear devices are designed to minimize risks of accidents. 201 Because Pakistan's warheads
are based on an early Chinese warhead design, they probably do not contain one-point safety designs, IHE, or fireresistant pits. If Pakistan were to assemble its nuclear warheads, there could be an unacceptable risk of an accidental
detonation of its nuclear weapons. Moreover; if Pakistan were to mate nuclear warheads to its missiles, either because it chose to establish a rapidresponse capability or because of an ongoing nuclear crisis, then similar concerns would exist about accidental launches of Pakistani nuclear weapons. The current
risks of unauthorized use of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are probably relatively small because they have a very small
number of nuclear weapons and those weapons are tightly controlled by their nuclear establishments. But there are a number of factors that could
increase risks of unauthorized use in the future. Although both India and Pakistan currently possess nuclear weapons that could be delivered by
aircraft, and are both actively developing nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, none of their weapons appear to contain sophisticated use-control devices to prevent
unauthorized use. Instead, the nuclear
controls in both countries appear to be based on guards, gates, and guns . As we have seen in the
the "3 G's" might be sufficient during normal circumstances, they are particularly
vulnerable during political, economic, and social upheaval s. The Russian case has demonstrated that severe domestic upheavals can
undermine central controls and weaken the infrastructures that previously maintained the security for nuclear weapons. In particular, such
upheavals can undermine the loyalty of guards and workers at nuclear facilities, especially if the state collapses economically
and can no longer afford to pay those employees. Neither India nor Pakistan appears to have taken the necessary steps to prevent such
weaknesses from arising in their nuclear controls. Because Indian and Pakistani nuclear controls rely on the "3 G's" while reportedly lacking
personnel reliability programs, there could be a significant risk of thefts of nuclear weapons during severe upheavals. The
Russian and Chinese cases, while
Russian analogy is particularly relevant in the Pakistani case. The Pakistani state is far from stable. After the nuclear tests in 1998 and the military coup in 1999, the
Pakistani economy came close to collapsing and remained quite unstable for the next several years.202 In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
the United States removed economic sanctions and approved nearly $1 billion in international foreign aid to Pakistan. But with a debt burden of nearly $39 billion,
massive economic disparities, and continuing low levels of foreign investment, there still is significant cause for concern about the prospects for Pakistan's long-term
political and economic stability.203 If the Pakistani state were to fail, there could be significant risks of a collapse in its nuclear controls. Were such an event to occur,
there could be an extreme risk of thefts of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic militants.204 In the events following the September
11 attacks and President Musharraf's decision to support U.S. military strikes in Afghanistan, there were serious concerns about a potential collapse of Pakistani
nuclear controls. These concerns were spurred by reports of public riots, a close affiliation among some elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence community
with the Taliban regime and al Qaeda, and the tenuous hold that Pakistani president Musharraf appears to have in Pakistan.205 In October 2001, President Musharraf
took significant steps to centralize his control by removing high-level military and intelligence officers with ties to the Taliban, but analysts have nevertheless
continued to raise concerns about Musharraf's ability to maintain control.206 Due to the seriousness of these risks, President Musharraf ordered an emergency
redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the United States has offered to advise Pakistan on methods for securing its nuclear stockpile. ' If the U.S. military
strikes in Afghanistan had extended for a longer period, Musharraf might have found it increasingly difficult to remain in power and reign in the more extreme
elements in his country. One also cannot
Pakistan,
rule out the possibility that terrorists might choose to target nuclear facilities in India and
especially if domestic instability were to increase. Both India and Pakistan have serious problems with domestic terrorism.208
These terrorists are increasingly well-armed and have targeted critical infrastructures and military bases in the past.209 Although current defenses at both Indian and
Pakistani nuclear weapons storage facilities are probably sufficient to defend against most terrorist attacks,210 the physical protection systems at other nuclear
facilities might be less effective.211 Moreover, if the defenses
at the most sensitive facilities were weakened by domestic upheavals, then
the risks of successful terrorist attacks—either for purposes of theft or sabotage—could increase significantly. But even if such
extreme events did not occur, the tightly controlled decision-making and underdeveloped command-and-control structures in both India and Pakistan could potentially
allow unauthorized use, particularly during crises. In India, some of these risks have been minimized by the formalization of its command structure, though the
military units are still fairly inexperienced with handling these weapons.212 Moreover, because
India probably still lacks clearly defined, detailed operational
procedures and established, resilient communication channels, there would still be a fairly high risk of unauthorized use arising
from confusion or miscommunication during a crisis. These concerns will probably remain for some time to come, though the specific risks
could eventually be improved, depending on the training the military receives and the degree of professionalism among the troops. Because Pakistan is currently under
military rule, and its nuclear weapons are controlled by the military, one would expect a better coordination of nuclear decision-making and command-and-control
systems. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with Pakistani command and control as well. The lack of a clear operational use doctrine, combined with
inadequate C3I could increase the risks of unauthorized use during crises: "there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and communications
systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in time to be of
use in a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical [nuclear] missiles."213 The risks or unauthorized use would
increase if India and Pakistan were to deploy their weapons on ballistic missiles. Risks of decapitation and questions about the survivability of the nuclear forces
would probably cause both India and Pakistan to deploy mobile systems if they were to operationalize their nuclear forces. These systems would significantly increase
difficulties in command and control, especially because their weapons lack use-control devices.214 In addition, because of the risks of decapitation, Pakistan is likely
to adopt a "delegative" system, where the authority to launch nuclear weapons is given to a number of military officials.215 As the number of people authorized to
launch nuclear weapons increases, so does the risk of a use of nuclear weapons that has not been commanded by the central authorities.216 The
greatest
concerns have been raised about a possible inadvertent use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The combined effects of mutual
mistrust, very short flight times for missiles, continual armed conflicts along their borders, and few reliable CBMs make the risks of inadvertent use quite severe,
especially during crisis situations. According
to George Perkovich, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, "Kargil proved that having nuclear weapons would not deter new conflicts. It also showed that unless
such conflicts themselves were prevented, the possibility of an accidental or deliberate nuclear exchange would also increase given both states' relatively poor systems
of intelligence surveillance and nuclear command and control."217 Due
to continual mistrust between the two countries, each would be
likely to misinterpret military movements, missile tests, or accidental detonations as an impending attack by the other side. The risks
of misinterpreting each other's motives are compounded by the vulnerability of their nuclear forces and the short flight times of the forces to key targets. For example,
because the runways at Pakistani Air Force bases could be destroyed by a conventional air strike or nuclear attack,218 India could effectively eliminate Pakistan's
nuclear bomber capability. During
an acute crisis, Pakistan might be faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma , in that it
would need to attack rapidly or lose its ability to retaliate altogether. For this reason, Pakistani officials would be
extremely suspicious of any Indian actions that could be interpreted as preparations for an attack. Because the
flight time of Indian bombers is approximately ten minutes, Pakistani leaders would have a very limited amount of time to decide whether to launch their own
attack.219 These conditions thus create an ongoing environment in which inadvertent use is quite possible. In addition, both countries have unreliable intelligence
systems, which have repeatedly misinterpreted the other's intentions. For example, during the Brasstacks incident, Pakistani intelligence reported that India's exercise
was merely a cover for an attack. Meanwhile, Indian intelligence overlooked the defensive nature of the Pakistani troops' position. These intelligence failures caused
each side to escalate the tensions unnecessarily. In addition, their intelligence systems have sometimes failed to detect major troop movements altogether. As we have
seen, during the Brasstacks crisis, Indian surveillance planes did not detect Pakistani troops positioned at their border for two weeks. And in the 1999 Kargil war,
Indian intelligence failed to detect the Pakistani invasion until several months after they had positioned themselves at strategic locations in the Kargil heights. These
intelligence failures could have two consequences. First, if either side were surprised by comparatively benign actions (such as Pakistan's defensive positioning during
the Brasstacks crisis), it would be more likely to overreact and mistakenly conclude that an attack is imminent. And second, if one side (especially Pakistan) is
confident that an invasion would not be detected at first, it might be more likely to launch attacks across the border: Each of these scenarios would greatly increase the
risks of nuclear escalation.220 Presumably owing to the massive intelligence failure prior to the 1999 Kargil war, however, India has recently made significant
The dangers of miscalculations
and intelligence failures are increased by the crude early-warning systems employed by both countries, particularly
Pakistan. Several incidents serve to illustrate this point. First, prior to Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan reported that it had detected an air force attack on
investments in its intelligence-gathering capabilities, which could reduce risks of such failures by India in the future.221
its radars and warned that it had mated a number of warheads to its Ghauri missiles.222 While this report might have been circulated in order to justify their nuclear
tests, circulating such a report could have caused India to mate weapons to its missiles, greatly increasing the risks of inadvertent use (as well as accidental and
unauthorized use). Another, perhaps more troubling, incident occurred prior to the U.S. missile strike on Afghanistan in August 1998. The United States sent a highlevel U.S. official to Pakistan because it feared Pakistan would detect the missile and interpret it as an Indian strike. Pakistan never even detected the missile, however.
Scholars have pointed out that this incident emphasizes not only the U.S. concern about inadvertent nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but also that Pakistan's
early-warning system "has serious flaws, and such shortcomings are more likely to foster nervousness than calm. To the extent that they lack reliable early-warning
systems, India or Pakistan could base launch decisions on unreliable sources, increasing the chance of mistakes."223 But even if India and Pakistan had reliable earlywarning systems, the risks of inadvertent war would still be extremely high. If Indian or Pakistani radars detected aircraft headed toward them, they would have very
little time to decide what to do before the aircraft reached their targets. In addition, because there would be a great deal of uncertainty about whether attacking
bombers carried conventional or nuclear weapons, the attacked side (especially Pakistan) could
face a "use them or lose them" scenario and
be tempted to launch a nuclear attack to ensure that its nuclear capability was not destroyed. 224 Thus, even if India and
Pakistan do not deploy nuclear weapons on missiles, the risks of an inadvertent use in these circumstances could be extremely high. If India and Pakistan were to
deploy their nuclear weapons on missiles (a scenario that is quite likely, given the vulnerability of Pakistani airfields and India's stated need for deterrence against the
People's Republic of China), the risks of inadvertent use would become even worse. Because the flight time for ballistic missiles between the two countries is less than
five minutes,225 Indian and Pakistani leaders would have virtually no time to decide what action to take (or perhaps even to launch a retaliatory strike) before the
According to Francois Heisbourg, once theater
situation will resemble the Cuban missile crisis, except that it "would be permanent rather
than tempo-rary, would occur without adequate C3I in place, and with political leadership located less than five minutes from
mutual Armageddon." 227
missiles hit their targets.226 The psychological effect on the two countries would be tremendous.
missiles are deployed in South Asia, the strategic
Indo-pak nuclear war risks extinction – draws in China, sparks nuclear winter
Shifferd 14 (1/3, Kent, Ph.D, historian who taught environmental history and ethics for 25 years at Wisconsin’s
Northland College, “What’s Worse Than A Nuclear War?”
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:vL8emRqb4SAJ:worldbeyondwar.org/whats-worsenuclear-war/+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
What could be worse than a nuclear war? A nuclear famine following a nuclear war . And where is the most
likely nuclear war to break out ? The India-Pakistan border . Both countries are nuclear armed, and although their
arsenals are “small” compared to the U.S. and Russia, they are extremely deadly. Pakistan has about 100 nuclear weapons; India
about 130. They have fought three wars since 1947 and are contending bitterly for control over the Kashmir and for influence in
Afghanistan. While India has renounced first use, for whatever that is worth, Pakistan has not, declaring that in the
event of an impending defeat by India’s overwhelming conventional forces it would strike first with nuclear
weapons. Saber rattling is common. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that a fourth war could take place if the Kashmir
issue wasn’t resolved, and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh replied that Pakistan “will never win a war in my lifetime.” A nuclear
China already hostile to India could also quickly become involved in a conflict between the two enemies, and Pakistan is on
the brink of becoming a failed state¾a development unknown and thus highly risky for a nuclear weapons nation-state. Experts
predict a nuclear war between India and Pakistan would kill about 22 million people from blast, acute radiation, and
firestorms. However, the global famine caused by such a “limited” nuclear war would result in two billion deaths
over 10 years. That’s right, a nuclear famine . A war using fewer than half their weapons would lift so much black soot
and soil into the air that it would cause a nuclear winter . Such a scenario was known as far back as the 1980s, but no one had
calculated the impact on agriculture. The irradiated cloud would cover vast portions of the earth, bringing low temperatures,
shorter growing seasons, sudden crop-killing extremes of temperature, altered rainfall patterns and would not dissipate for about 10 years. Now, a
new report based on some very sophisticated studies reveals the crop losses that would result and the number of
people who would be put at risk for malnutrition and starvation. The computer models show declines in wheat, rice, corn, and
soybeans. Overall production of crops would fall, hitting their low in year five and gradually recovering by year ten. Corn and soybeans in Iowa,
Illinois, Indiana and Missouri would suffer an average of 10 percent and, in year five, 20 percent. In China, corn would fall by 16 percent over the
decade, rice by 17 percent, and wheat by 31 percent. Europe would also have declines. Making the impact even worse, there are already almost
800 million malnourished people in the world. A mere 10 percent decline in their calorie intake puts them at risk for starvation. And we will add
hundreds of millions of people to the world population over the next couple of decades. Just to stay even with we will need hundreds of millions
more meals than we now produce. Second, under the conditions of a nuclear war-induced winter and severe food shortages, those who have will
horde. We saw this when drought depressed production a couple of years ago and several food exporting nations stopped exporting. The
economic disruption to the food markets would be severe and the price of food will go up as it did then, placing
what food is available out of reach for millions. And what follows famine is epidemic disease.
Indian courts model US privacy jurisprudence – the aff DIRECTLY spills over to help constrain CMS
surveillance developments
Bhatia 14 (Gautam, Advocate @ Delhi High Court. He is also practicing law in Delhi. The author studied Law,
philosophy, history, political theory at Yale. Graduated Yale Law School and was also a Recipient of the Rhode
Scholarship. “STATE SURVEILLANCE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INDIA: A CONSTITUTIONAL
BIOGRAPHY” - 26 NLSI Rev. (2014) – posted May 12, 2015. (2014) 26(2) National Law School of India Review.
Note the term “CMS” – internally referenced – is an acronym that stands for “Centralized Monitoring System”, a
government metadata surveillance system that’s in its infancy in India, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605317)
It is Gobind v. State of M.P.30, decided in 1975, that marks the watershed moment for Indian privacy law in the Constitution. Like
Kharak Singh31, Gobind32 also involved domiciliary visits to the house of a history-sheeter. Unlike Kharak Singh33, however, in Gobind34 the Court found that the
Regulations did have statutory backing – Section 46(2)(c) of the Police Act35, which allowed State Government to make notifications giving effect to the provisions
The surveillance provisions in the impugned regulations,
according to the Court, were indeed for the purpose of preventing offences, since they were specifically aimed at
repeat offenders. To that extent, then, the Court found that there existed a valid ‘law’ for the purposes of Articles 19 and 21. By this time, of course,
American constitutional law had moved forward significantly from eleven years ago, when Kharak Singh36 had been decided. The
Court was able to invoke Griswold v. Connecticut37 and Roe v. Wade38, both of which had found ‘privacy’ as a n “interstitial” or
“penumbral” right in the American Constitution – that is, not reducible to any one provision, but implicit in a number of separate
provisions taken together. The Court ran together a number of American authorities, referred to Locke and Kant, to dignity, to liberty and
of the Act, one of which was the prevention of commission of offences.
to autonomy, and ended by holding, somewhat confusingly: “… the right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family
marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give analytical picture of
that distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the
assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty… there are two possible theories for protecting privacy of home.
The first is that activities in the home harm others only to the extent that they cause offence resulting from the mere thought that individuals might he engaging in such
activities and that such ‘harm’ is not Constitutionally protective by the state. The second is that individuals need a place of sanctuary where they can be free from
societal control. The importance of such a sanctuary is that individuals can drop the mask, desist for a while from projecting on the world the image they want to be
accepted as themselves, an image that may reflect the values of their peers rather than the realities of their natures… the right to privacy in any event will necessarily
have to go through a process of case-bycase development.”39 (emphasis supplied) But if no clear principle emerges out of the Court’s elucidation of the right, it was
fairly unambiguous in stressing the importance of the right itself. Interestingly, it grounded the right within the context of the freedom struggle. “Our founding
The
parallels to the American Fourth Amendment are striking here: in his historical analysis Akhil Amar tells us that the Fourth
Amendment was meant precisely to avoid the various abuses of unreasonable searches and seizures that were common in England at the time.41 The parallels
with the United States become even more pronounced, however, when the Court examined the grounds for limiting
the right to privacy . It held: “Assuming that the fundamental rights explicitly guaranteed to a citizen have penumbral zones and that the right to
privacy is itself a fundamental right, that fundamental right must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public
interest.”42 (emphasis supplied) “Compelling public interest” is an interesting phrase, for two reasons. First, ‘public interest’ is a ground for
fathers,” it observed, “were thoroughly opposed to a Police Raj even as our history of the struggle for freedom has borne eloquent testimony to it.”40
fundamental rights restrictions under Article 19 (see, e.g., Article 19(6)), but the text of the Article 19 restrictions do not use – and the Court, in interpreting them, has
not held – that the public interest must be “compelling”. This suggests a stricter standard of review for an Article 21 privacy right violation than Article 19 violations.
This is buttressed by the fact that in the same paragraph, the Court ended by observing: “even if it be assumed that Article 19(5) [restrictions upon the freedom of
a law imposing reasonable restriction upon it for
compelling interest of State must be upheld as valid.”43 (emphasis supplied) The Court echoes the language of 19(5), and adds the word
“compelling”. This surely cannot be an oversight. More importantly – the compelling State interest is an American test, used
movement] does not apply in terms, as the right to privacy of movement cannot be absolute,
often in equal protection cases and cases of discrimination, where ‘suspect classes’ (such as race) are at issue. Because of the importance of the right at issue, the
compelling state interest test goes hand-in-hand with another test: narrow tailoring.44 Narrow tailoring places a burden upon the State to demonstrate that its
The statement of the rule may be
found in the American Supreme Court case of Grutter v. Bollinger: “Even in the limited circumstance when drawing racial distinctions is
restriction is tailored in a manner that infringes the right as narrowest manner that is possible to achieve its goals.
permissible to further a compelling state interest, government is still constrained under equal protection clause in how it may pursue that end: the means chosen to
accomplish the government’s asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.”45 To take an extremely trivial example that will
illustrate the point: the State wants to ban hate speech against Dalits. It passes legislation that bans “all speech that disrespects Dalits.” This is not narrowly tailored,
because while all hate speech against Dalits necessarily disrespects them, all speech that disrespects Dalits is not necessarily hate speech. It was possible for the
government to pass legislation banning only hate speech against Dalits, one that would have infringed upon free speech more narrowly than the “disrespect law”, and
still achieved its goals. The law is not narrowly tailored. Crucially, then, the Court in Gobind46 seemed to implicitly accept the narrow- tailoring flip side of the
compelling state interest coin. On the constitutionality of the Police Regulations itself, it upheld their constitutionality by reading them narrowly. Here is what the
Court said: “Regulation 855, in our view, empowers surveillance only of persons against whom reasonable materials exist to induce the opinion that they show a
determination, to lead a life of crime – crime in this context being confined to such as involve public peace or security only and if they are dangerous security risks.
Mere convictions in criminal cases where nothing gravely imperiling safety of society cannot be regarded as warranting surveillance under this Regulation. Similarly,
domiciliary visits and picketing by the police should be reduced to the clearest cases of danger to community security and not routine follow-up at the end of a
conviction or release from prison or at the whim of a police officer.”47 (emphasis supplied) But Regulation 855 did not refer to the gravity of the crime at all. Thus,
the Court was able to uphold its constitutionality only by narrowing its scope in a manner that the State’s objective of securing public safety was met in a way that
minimally infringed the right to privacy. Therefore, whether the Gobind48 bench was aware of it or not, its
holding incorporates into Indian
constitutional law and the right to privacy, not just the compelling State interest test, but narrow tailoring as well. The implications for
surveillance systems such as the CMS and Netra are obvious. Because with narrow tailoring, the State must demonstrate that
bulk surveillance of all individuals, whether guilty or innocent, suspected of crimes or not suspected of crimes (whether reasonably or otherwise), possessing a
past criminal record or not, speaking to each other of breaking up the government or breaking up a relationship – every bit of data must be collected to
achieve the goal of maintaining public security, and that nothing narrower will suffice. Can the State demonstrate this?
Perhaps it can; but at the very least, it should be made to do so in open Court.
***OR Insert favorite Indo-Pak impactage
Squo Judicial Deference Upholds CMS
Squo Indian constitutional jurisprudence upholds CMS surveillance – constitutional protections of privacy
are vital
ICLP 13 (Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, blog specializing in Indian legal developments, 12/15,
"Surveillance and Privacy in India – I: Foundations," https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2013/12/15/surveillanceand-privacy-in-india-i-foundations/)
On previous occasions, we
have discussed the ongoing litigation in ACLU v Clapper in the United States, a challenge to the
constitutionality of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) bulk surveillance program. Recall that a short while after the initial
Edward Snowden disclosures, The Hindu revealed the extent of domestic surveillance in India, under the aegis of the Central
Monitoring System (CMS). The CMS (and what it does) is excellently summarized here. To put thing starkly and briefly: “ With the C.M.S.,
the government will get centralized access to all communications metadata and content traversing through all
telecom networks in India. This means that the government can listen to all your calls, track a mobile phone and its user’s location, read all
your text messages, personal e-mails and chat conversations. It can also see all your Google searches, Web site visits, usernames and passwords if
your communications aren’t encrypted.” The
CMS is not sanctioned by parliamentary legislation. It also raises serious
privacy concerns . In order to understand the constitutional implications, therefore, we need to investigate Indian
privacy jurisprudence. In a series of posts, we plan to discuss that. — Privacy is not mentioned in the Constitution. It plays no
part in the Constituent Assembly Debates. The place of the right – if it exists – must therefore be located within the structure
of the Constitution, as fleshed out by judicial decisions . The first case to address the issue was M. P. Sharma v Satish Chandra, in
1954. In that case, the Court upheld search and seizure in the following terms: “A power of search and seizure is in any system of jurisprudence
an overriding power of the State for the protection of social security and that power is necessarily regulated by law. When the Constitution
makers have thought fit not to subject such regulation to Constitutional limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to privacy, analogous to
the American Fourth Amendment, we have no justification to import it, into a totally different fundamental right. by some process of strained
construction.” The right in question was 19(1)(f) – the right to property. Notice here that the Court did not reject a right to privacy altogether – it
only rejected it in the context of searches and seizures for documents, the specific prohibition of the American Fourth Amendment (that has no
analogue in India). This specific position, however, would not last too long, and was undermined by the very next case to consider this question,
Kharak Singh. In Kharak Singh v State of UP, the UP Police Regulations conferred surveillance power upon certain
“history sheeters” – that is, those charged (though not necessarily convicted) of a crime. These surveillance powers included secret picketing
of the suspect’s house, domiciliary visits at night, enquiries into his habits and associations, and reporting and verifying his movements. These
were challenged on Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement) and Article 21 (personal liberty) grounds. It is the second ground that
particularly concerns us. As a preliminary matter, we may observe that the Regulations in question were administrative – that is, they did not
constitute a “law”, passed by the legislature. This automatically ruled out a 19(2) – 19(6) defence, and a 21 “procedure established by law”
defence – which were only applicable when the State made a law. The reason for this is obvious: fundamental rights are extremely important. If
one is to limit them, then that judgment must be made by a competent legislature, acting through the proper, deliberative channels of lawmaking –
and not by mere administrative or executive action. Consequently – and this is quite apart from the question of administrative/executive
competence – if the Police Regulations were found to violate Article 19 or Article 21, that made them ipso facto void, without the exceptions
kicking in. (Paragraph 5) It is also important to note one other thing: as a defence, it was expressly argued by the State that the police action was
reasonable and in the interests of maintaining public order precisely because it was “directed only against those who were on proper grounds
suspected to be of proved anti-social habits and tendencies and on whom it was necessary to impose some restraints for the protection of society.”
The Court agreed, observing that this would have “an overwhelming and even decisive weight in establishing that the classification was rational
and that the restrictions were reasonable and designed to preserve public order by suitable preventive action” – if there had been a law in the first
place, which there wasn’t. Thus, this issue itself was hypothetical, but what is crucial to note is that the State argued – and the Court endorsed –
the basic idea that what makes surveillance reasonable under Article 19 is the very fact that it is targeted – targeted at individuals who are
specifically suspected of being a threat to society because of a history of criminality. Let us now move to the merits. The Court upheld secret
picketing on the ground that it could not affect the petitioner’s freedom of movement since it was, well secret – and what you don’t know,
apparently, cannot hurt you. What the Court found fault with was the intrusion into the petitioner’s dwelling, and knocking at his door late at
night to wake him up. The finding required the Court to interpret the meaning of the term “personal liberty” in Article 21. By contrasting the very
specific rights listed in Article 21, the Court held that: “Is then the word “personal liberty” to be construed as excluding from its purview an
invasion on the part of the police of the sanctity of a man’s home and an intrusion into his personal security and his right to sleep which is the
normal comfort and a dire necessity for human existence even as an animal? It might not be inappropriate to refer here to the words of the
preamble to the Constitution that it is designed to “assure the dignity of the individual” and therefore of those cherished human value as the
means of ensuring his full development and evolution. We are referring to these objectives of the framers merely to draw attention to the concepts
underlying the constitution which would point to such vital words as “personal liberty” having to be construed in a reasonable manner and to be
attributed that these which would promote and achieve those objectives and by no means to stretch the meaning of the phrase to square with any
preconceived notions or doctrinaire constitutional theories.” (Paragraph 16) A few important observations need to be made about this paragraph.
The first is that it immediately follows the Court’s examination of the American Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, with their guarantees of “life,
liberty and property…” and is, in turn, followed by the Court’s examination of the American Fourth Amendment, which guarantees the protection
of a person’s houses, papers, effects etc from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court’s engagement with the Fourth Amendment is
ambiguous. It admits that “our Constitution contains no like guarantee…”, but holds that nonetheless “these extracts [from the 1949 case, Wolf v
Colorado] would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person’s home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation
of a common law right of a man – an ultimate essential of ordered liberty”, thus tying its own holding in some way to the American Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. But here’s the crucial thing: at this point, American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was propertarian based – that
is, the Fourth Amendment was understood to codify – with added protection – the common law of trespass, whereby a man’s property was held
sacrosanct, and not open to be trespassed against. Four years later, in 1967, in Katz, the Supreme Court would shift its own jurisprudence, to
holding that the Fourth Amendment protected zones where persons had a “reasonable expectation of privacy”, as opposed to simply protecting
listed items of property (homes, papers, effects etc). Kharak Singh was handed down before Katz. Yet the quoted paragraph expressly shows that
the Court anticipated Katz, and in expressly grounding the Article 21 personal liberty right within the meaning of dignity, utterly rejected the
propertarian-tresspass foundations that it might have had. To use a phrase invoked by later Courts – in this proto-privacy case, the Court already
set the tone by holding it to attach to persons, not places. While effectively finding a right to privacy in the Constitution, the Court expressly
declined to frame it that way. In examining police action which involved tracking a person’s location, association and
movements, the Court upheld it, holding that “the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution
and therefore the attempt to ascertain the movements of an individual which is merely a manner in which privacy is
invaded is not an infringement of a fundamental right guaranteed by Part III.” The “therefore” is crucial. Although not expressly,
the Court virtually holds, in terms, that tracking location, association and movements does violate privacy, and only finds that constitutional
because there is no guaranteed right to privacy within the Constitution. Yet. In his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, Subba Rao J.
went one further, by holding that the idea of privacy was, in fact, contained within the meaning of Article 21: “it is true our Constitution does not
expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right, but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty.” Privacy he defined as
the right to “be free from restrictions or encroachments on his person, whether those restrictions or encroachments are directly imposed or
indirectly brought about by calculated measures.” On this ground, he held all the surveillance measures unconstitutional. Justice Subba Rao’s
opinion also explored a proto-version of the chilling effect. Placing specific attention upon the word “freely” contained within 19(1)(d)’s
guarantee of free movment, Justice Subba Rao went specifically against the majority, and observed: “The freedom of movement in clause (d)
therefore must be a movement in a free country, i.e., in a country where he can do whatever he likes, speak to whomsoever he wants, meet people
of his own choice without any apprehension, subject of course to the law of social control. The petitioner under the shadow of surveillance is
certainly deprived of this freedom. He can move physically, but he cannot do so freely, for all his activities are watched and noted. The shroud of
surveillance cast upon him perforce engender inhibitions in him and he cannot act freely as he would like to do. We would, therefore, hold that
the entire Regulation 236 offends also Art. 19(1)(d) of the Constitution.”
This early case , therefore, has all the aspects that plague
the CMS today . What to do with administrative action that does not have the sanction of law? What role does targeting play in
reasonableness – assuming there is a law? What is the philosophical basis for the implicit right to privacy within the
meaning of Article 21’s guarantee of personal liberty? And is the chilling effect a valid constitutional concern?
Zero independent oversight of CMS surveillance now – enshrining privacy protections are vital
Parthasarathy 13 (Suhrith, Advocate @ Madras High Court of India, "Surveillance and its privacy pitfalls," 11/23,
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/surveillance-and-its-privacy-pitfalls/article5376464.ece)
In April, the
Union government craftily trundled out the Central Monitoring System (CMS), amid almost no uproar, giving itself
the absolute power to monitor all phone and online communication in the country. The CMS provides the government
direct access to every one of India’s telecommunication networks; it has removed the earlier obstacle of having to rely on the
service providers for such information. But there is little in the public domain indicating the complete nature and scope of this programme. The
absence of a facilitating law, providing legislative backing to the CMS, only makes matters worse; much like India’s chief investigative agencies,
the programme is a creature of the executive. In other words, there is no procedure established by law to lend any credibility to what is
an unquestionable transgression of our personal liberty. The CMS is a distinctly anti-libertarian measure adopted by distinctly anti-democratic
means. In June 2013, The Hindu revealed that the CMS would substantially enhance the government’s surveillance and
interception capabilities. The programme, contrary to initial expectations, does not replace the existing surveillance equipment deployed by
mobile operators and Internet Service Providers, but rather multiplies the government’s forensic capabilities. The state can today navigate through
every telecommunication network in the country, and it possesses the unique power to read all our personal messages, whether communicated by
email, text or other online means. The government, as The Hindu reported, can, in fact, access your search history and the websites that you visit.
It can even go through partially written emails floundering in your drafts. As things stand , two primary laws control access to
communication data in India. But neither expressly authorises surveillance nor does enough to protect privacy . It
effectively only adds to the vacuum . The Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, a colonial-era law that continues to govern
telecommunication law, gives the government the power to access information in the interest of public safety or in a public emergency — neither
of which has been defined with any level of precision. The Information Technology Act of 2000, as amended in 2008, permits the government to
intercept, monitor or decrypt information in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the state, friendly
relations with foreign states, or public order, or to prevent incitement to the commission of any offence. The lack of adequate safeguards
to our privacy in both of these laws is telling — the intention in these laws, if anything, appears to be to strengthen the government’s
prying powers as opposed to protecting civil liberties. The recent snooping incident in Gujarat might have emanated out of a multitude of factors
that are not yet directly apparent. But the wanton ease with which it was ordered speaks to a deeper rot. We should use this as an
opportunity to ask ourselves why we value our privac y. And to question how the government has assumed —
almost stealthily, and without the approval of the legislature —
the power to conduct wide-ranging surveillance unchecked
by any independent authority . To allow programmes such as the CMS to be piloted without due process of law
would amount to a renunciation of our most fundamental freedoms . It would grant the government, as the Professor of Law,
Daniel J. Solve wrote, not merely Orwellian control over our lives, but would also lead to a corresponding Kafkaesque problem: “a suffocating
powerlessness and vulnerability created by the court system’s use of personal data and its denial to the protagonist of any knowledge of or
participation in the process.”
CMS = Cyber-Vulnerability
Lack of judicial oversight ensures the continuation of Indian bulk surveillance programs – those
EXACERBATE cyber-vulnerabilities
Raza 13 (Columnist @ Tech2, "India’s Central Monitoring System: Security can’t come at cost of privacy,"
http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/indias-central-monitoring-system-security-cant-come-at-cost-of-privacy214436.html)
There is also no legal recourse for a citizen whose personal details are being misused or leaked from the central or regional
database. Unlike America’s PRISM project under which surveillance orders are approved by courts, CMS does not have any judicial
oversight . “This means that the larger ecosystem of checks and balances in which any surveillance should be
embedded in a democratic country is lacking. There is an urgent requirement for a strong legal protection of the
right to privacy; for judicial oversight of any surveillance; and for parliamentary or judicial oversight of the
agencies which will do surveillance. At the moment, all three are missing.” said Kovacs. Given the use of technology by
criminals and terrorists, government surveillance per se, seems inevitable. Almost in every nation, certain chunk of population is always under the
scanner of intelligence agencies. However, mass-scale tracking the data of all citizens – not just those who are deemed persons of
interest -enabled
by the CMS has sparked a public furor. Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet &
Society, Bangalore, compared surveillance with salt in cooking. “ A tiny amount is essential but any excess is
counterproductive ,” he said. “Unlike target surveillance, blanket surveillance increases the probability of false
positives. Wrong data analysis will put more number of innocent civilians under suspicion as, by default, their number in
the central server is more than those are actually criminals.” Such blanket surveillance techniques also pose a threat to online business. With all
the data going in one central pool, a competitor or a cyber criminal rival can easily tap into private and sensitive
information by hacking into the server . “As vulnerabilities will be introduced into Internet infrastructure in order
to enable surveillance, it will undermine the security of online transactions,” said Abraham. He notes that the project also can
undermine the confidentiality of intellectual property especially pre-grant patents and trade secrets. “Rights-holders will never be sure if their IPR
is being stolen by some government in order to prop up national players.”
Indo-Pak War = Extinction
Indo-Pak war causes extinction – smoke and yields prove
Toon et al 7 (et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric
and Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of
regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism” – Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics –
April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)
We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear weapons in
modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of
nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear
weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield
(Hiroshima-sized) explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be
targeted in a nuclear conflict. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can
produce 100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in
analyses for full scale nuclear wars using high-yield weapons , if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single
“small” nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major
historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less
could produce direct fatalities
comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between
the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe
national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into
the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere
due to atmospheric heating, and then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales . We also anticipate
substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns
are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat
to the global community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific
than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange
community, as well as widespread public debate. In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the
superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock
et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing
reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a
single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict
involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate changes that might occur due
to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to
those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries
are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and
Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor to weapons construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now
have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these
nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause
casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival
previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt)
of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively
uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation unless it is raining.
They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons
used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock et al., 2007). An
individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack.
Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by
thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected
arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the
amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties.
We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans of any
countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There are
obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from
highly improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible scenarios be considered, given the availability
of weapons hardware and the history of regional conflict. In the present analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear
device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a
total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that most citizens and politicians today
are aware of the potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial
confrontation . Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the possible number and combinations of flash
points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the idea that such
scenarios as we propose are executable.
Court Action Solves India CMS
Judicial oversight and enforcement of privacy rights is vital in curbing Indian mass surveillance
Prakash 13 (Pranesh, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society, "Can India Trust Its Government on
Privacy?" 7/11, http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/can-india-trust-its-government-on-privacy/?_r=0)
In response to criticisms of the Centralized Monitoring System, India’s new surveillance program, the government could
contend that merely having the capability to engage in mass surveillance won’t mean that it will. Officials will argue that
they will still abide by the law and will ensure that each instance of interception will be authorized. In fact, they will argue that the program, known as C.M.S., will
better safeguard citizens’ privacy: it will cut out the telecommunications companies, which can be sources of privacy leaks; it will ensure that each interception
request is tracked and the recorded content duly destroyed within six months as is required under the law; and it will enable quicker interception, which will save more
lives. But there are a host of reasons why the citizens of India should be skeptical of those official claims. Cutting out telecoms will not help protect citizens from
electronic snooping since these companies still have the requisite infrastructure to conduct surveillance. As long as the infrastructure exists, telecom employees will
misuse it. In a 2010 report, the journalist M.A. Arun noted that “alarmingly, this correspondent also came across several instances of service providers’ employees
accessing personal communication of subscribers without authorization.” Some years back, K.K. Paul, a top Delhi Police officer and now the Governor of Meghalaya,
drafted a memo in which he noted mobile operators’ complaints that private individuals were misusing police contacts to tap phone calls of “opponents in trade or
estranged spouses.” India
does not need to have centralized interception facilities to have centralized tracking of
interception requests. To prevent unauthorized access to communications content that has been intercepted, at all points of time, the files should be encrypted
using public key infrastructure. Mechanisms also exist to securely allow a chain of custody to be tracked, and to ensure the timely destruction of intercepted material
after six months, as required by the law. Such technological means need to be made mandatory to prevent unauthorized access, rather than centralizing all interception
capabilities. At the moment, interception orders are given by the federal Home Secretary of India and by state home secretaries without adequate consideration. Every
month at the federal level 7,000 to 9,000 phone taps are authorized or re-authorized. Even if it took just three minutes to evaluate each case, it would take 15 hours
each day (without any weekends or holidays) to go through 9,000 requests. The numbers in Indian states could be worse, but one can’t be certain as statistics on
surveillance across India are not available. It indicates bureaucratic callousness and indifference toward following the procedure laid down in the Telegraph Act. In a
1975 case, the Supreme Court held that an “economic emergency” may not amount to a “public emergency.” Yet we find that of the nine central government agencies
empowered to conduct interception in India, according to press reports — Central Board of Direct Taxes, Intelligence Bureau, Central Bureau of Investigation,
Narcotics Control Bureau, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Enforcement Directorate, Research & Analysis Wing, National Investigation Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency — three are exclusively dedicated to economic offenses. Suspicion of tax evasion cannot legally justify a wiretap, which is why the government
said it had believed that Nira Radia, a corporate lobbyist, was a spy when it defended putting a wiretap on her phone in 2008 and 2009. A 2011 report by the cabinet
secretary pointed out that economic offenses might not be counted as “public emergencies,” and that the Central Board of Direct Taxes should not be empowered to
India has arrived at a scary
juncture, where the multiple departments of the Indian government don’t even trust each other. India’s Department of Information Technology recently
intercept communications. Yet the tax department continues to be on the list of agencies empowered to conduct interceptions.
complainedto the National Security Advisor that the National Technical Research Organization had hacked into National Informatics Center infrastructure and
extracted sensitive data connected to various ministries. The National Technical Research Organization denied it had hacked into the servers but said hundreds of email accounts of top government officials were compromised in 2012, including those of “the home secretary, the naval attaché to Tehran, several Indian missions
abroad, top investigators of the Central Bureau of Investigation and the armed forces,” The Mint newspaper reported. Such incidents aggravate the fear that the Indian
government might not be willing and able to protect the enormous amounts of information it is about to collect through the C.M.S. Simply put, government
entities have engaged in unofficial and illegal surveillance, and the C.M.S. is not likely to change this. In a 2010 article in
Outlook, the journalist Saikat Datta described how various central and state intelligence organizations across India are illegally
using off-the-air interception devices. “These systems are frequently deployed in Muslim-dominated areas of cities
like Delhi, Lucknow and Hyderabad,” Mr. Datta wrote. “The systems, mounted inside cars, are sent on ‘fishing expeditions,’ randomly tuning into conversations of
citizens in a bid to track down terrorists.” The National Technical Research Organization, which is not even on the list of entities authorized to conduct interception, is
one of the largest surveillance organizations in India. The Mint reportedlast year that the organization’s surveillance devices, “contrary to norms, were deployed more
often in the national capital than in border areas” and that under new standard operating procedures issued in early 2012, the organization can only intercept signals at
the international borders. The organization runs multiple facilities in Mumbai, Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Lucknow and Kolkata, in which monumental amounts of
Internet traffic are captured. In Mumbai, all the traffic passing through the undersea cables there is captured, Mr. Datta found. In the western state of Gujarat, a recent
investigation by Amitabh Pathak, the director general of police, revealed that in a period of less than six months, more than 90,000 requests were made for call detail
records, including for the phones of senior police and civil service officers. This high a number could not possibly have been generated from criminal investigations
alone. Again, these do not seem to have led to any criminal charges against any of the people whose records were obtained. The information seems to have been
collected for purposes other than national security. India is struggling to keep track of the location of its proliferating interception devices. More than 73,000 devices
to intercept mobile phone calls have been imported into India since 2005. In 2011, the federal government asked various state governments, private corporations, the
army and intelligence agencies to surrender these to the government, noting that usage of any such equipment for surveillance was illegal. We don’t know how many
devices were actually turned in. These kinds of violations of privacy can have very dangerous consequences. According to the former
Intelligence Bureau head in the western state of Gujarat, R.B. Sreekumar, the call records of a mobile number used by Haren Pandya, the former Gujarat home
minister, were used to confirm that it was he who had provided secret testimony to the Citizens’ Tribunal, which was conducting an independent investigation of the
2002 sectarian riots in the state. Mr. Pandya was murdered in 2003. The
limited efforts to make India’s intelligence agencies more
accountable have gone nowhere . In 2012, the Planning Commission of India formed a group of experts under Justice A.P. Shah, a retired Chief Justice
of the Delhi High Court, to look into existing projects of the government and to suggest principles to guide a privacy law in light of international experience. (Centre
for Internet and Society, where I work was part of the group). However, the
government has yet to introduce a bill to protect citizens’
privacy, even though the governmental and private sector violations of Indian citizens’ privacy is growing at an
alarming rate. In February, after frequent calls by privacy activists and lawyers for greater accountability and parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies,
the Centre for Public Interest Litigation filed a case in the Supreme Court. This would, one hopes, lead to reform. Citizens must also demand that a strong Privacy Act
be enacted. In 1991, the leak of a Central Bureau of Investigation report titled “Tapping of Politicians’ Phones” prompted the rights groups, People’s Union of Civil
Liberties to file a writ petition, which eventually led to a Supreme Court of India ruling that recognized the right to privacy of communications for all citizens as part
of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and of life and personal liberty. However, through the 2008 amendments to the Information Technology Act, the IT
Rules framed in 2011 and the telecom licenses, the government has greatly weakened the right to privacy as recognized by the Supreme Court. The damage must be
undone through a strong privacy law that safeguards the privacy of Indian citizens against both the state and corporations. The law should not only provide legal
procedures, but also ensure that the government should not employ technologies that erode legal procedures. A strong privacy law should provide strong grounds on
which to hold the National Security Advisor’s mass surveillance of Indians (over 12.1 billion pieces of intelligence in one month) as unlawful. The law should ensure
that Parliament, and Indian citizens, are regularly provided information on the scale of surveillance across India, and the convictions resulting from that surveillance.
Individuals whose communications metadata or content is monitored or intercepted should be told about it after the passage of a reasonable amount of time. After all,
the data should only be gathered if it is to charge a person of committing a crime. If such charges are not being brought, the person should be told of the incursion into
his or her privacy. The privacy
law should ensure that all surveillance follows the following principles: legitimacy (is the surveillance
proportionality and harm
minimization (is this the minimum level of intrusion into privacy?), specificity (is this surveillance order limited to a specific case?) transparency (is
this intrusion into privacy recorded and also eventually revealed to the data subject?), purpose limitation (is the data collected only used for the stated
purpose?), and independent oversight (is the surveillance reported to a legislative committee or a privacy commissioner, and are statistics kept on
surveillance conducted and criminal prosecution filings?). Constitutional courts such as the Supreme Court of India or the High Courts
in the Indian states should make such determinations . Citizens should have a right to civil and criminal remedies for
violations of surveillance laws.
for a legitimate, democratic purpose?), necessity (is this necessary to further that purpose? does a less invasive means exist?),
A2 Surveillance Solves Terrorism in India
Bulk surveillance is counterproductive in the fight against Indian terrorism – target approaches superior
The Hindu 14 ("Targeting surveillance," 12/28, http://www.thehindu.com/sunday-anchor/targetingsurveillance/article6731202.ece)
As Indian agencies gear up to respond to similar online threats in this part of the world, Mr. Abraham says India
should not repeat the mistakes made by the West over the previous decade. “We should not get caught up in big data
surveillance,” he says. “Surveillance is like salt. It could be counter-productive even if slightly in excess. Ideally,
surveillance must be targeted. Indiscriminate surveillance just increases the size of the haystack, making it
difficult to find the needles,” Mr. Abraham says.