****No Terror****
Groups
General
No Terrorism
No risk of terrorism – threat overblown
Mueller, Professor PolSci Ohio State, and Stewart, Professor Infrastructure Performance at U
of Newcastle, ’12 (John- Senior Research Scientist Mershon Center for International Security
Studies, Mark- Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow, Summer, “The Terrorism Delusion:
America’s Overwrought Response to September 11” International Security, Vol 37 No 1,
ProjectMuse)
On November 22, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald, a deluded little man with grandiose visions of his own importance, managed, largely because of luck, to
assassinate President John F. Kennedy. Since then, many people have contended that such a monumental event could not have been accomplished by such a
On September 11,
a tiny group of deluded men—members of al-Qaida, a fringe group of a fringe group with grandiose visions of its own importance—
managed, again largely because of luck, to pull off a risky, if clever and carefully planned, terrorist act that became by far
trivial person. Some of these disbelievers have undertaken elaborate efforts to uncover a bigger conspiracy behind the deed. ¶
2001,
the most destructive in history. As with the assassination of President Kennedy, there has been great reluctance to maintain that such a monumental event—
there has been a
consequent tendency to inflate al-Qaida’s importance and effectiveness. At the extreme, the remnants of this
however counterproductive to al-Qaida’s purpose—could have been carried out by a fundamentally trivial group, and
tiny group have even been held to present an “existential” threat to the very survival of the United States.1 ¶ In the wake of September 11, recalls Rudy
Giuliani, mayor of New York at the time of the attacks, “[a]nybody, any one of these security experts, including myself, would have told you on September 11,
2001, we’re looking at dozens [End Page 81] and dozens and multiyears of attacks like this.” Journalist Jane Mayer observes that “the only certainty shared by
virtually the entire American intelligence community” in the months after September 11 “was that a second wave of even more devastating terrorist attacks on
America was imminent.”2 Under the prevailing circumstances, this sort of alarm was understandable, but it does not excuse the experts from dismissing an
on May 1, 2012, nearly ten years after the September
2001 terrorist attacks, the most costly and determined manhunt in history culminated in Pakistan when a team of U.S. Navy Seals killed
Osama bin Laden, a chief author of the attacks and one of history’s most storied and cartooned villains. Taken away with bin Laden’s bulletalternative hypothesis—that the attacks that occurred on that day were an aberration.3¶ Finally,
shattered body were written documents and masses of information stored on five computers, ten hard drives, and one hundred or more thumb drives, DVDs,
and CD-ROMs. This, it was promised, represented a “treasure trove” of information about al-Qaida—“the mother lode,” said one U.S. official eagerly—that
a task force soon discovered that
al-Qaida’s members were primarily occupied with dodging drone missile attacks,
complaining about the lack of funds, and watching a lot of pornography.5¶ Although bin
Laden has been exposed mostly as a thing of smoke and mirrors, and although there has been no terrorist
destruction that remotely rivals that inflicted on September 11, the terrorism/counterterrorism saga persists determinedly,
doggedly, and anticlimactically onward, and the initial alarmed perspective has been internalized. In the process, suggests
might contain plans for pending attacks.4 Poring through the material with great dispatch, however,
Glenn Carle, a twenty-three-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency where he was deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats,
Americans have become “victims of delusion,” displaying a quality defined as “a persistent false belief in the face of strong
contradictory evidence.”6 This condition shows [End Page 82] no sign of abating as trillions of dollars have been expended and tens of thousands of lives have
been snuffed out in distant wars in a frantic, ill-conceived effort to react to an event that, however tragic and dramatic in the first instance, should have been
seen, at least after a few years had passed, to be of limited significance. ¶ This article is a set of ruminations on the post–September 11 years of delusion. It
reflects, first, on the exaggerations of the threat presented by terrorism and then on the distortions of perspective these exaggerations have inspired—
distortions that have in turn inspired a determined and expensive quest to ferret out, and even to create, the nearly nonexistent. It also supplies a quantitative
assessment of the costs of the terrorism delusion and concludes with a discussion of how anxieties about terrorism persist despite exceedingly limited evidence
that much fear is justified.
Prefer our evidence – theirs is fear-mongering
Walt, Professor IR at Harvard, 7-25-’13 (Stephen, “Why We Don't Need to Worry About a
'Nuclear Handoff'” Foreign Policy,
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/25/why_we_dont_need_to_worry_about_a_nuclear_
handoff)
After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. national security establishment started focusing on the various ways that
"international terrorism" might pose a threat to U.S. interests or the United States itself. Unsurprisingly, experts began to
dream up all sorts of frightening scenarios and worry about all sorts of far-fetched scenarios . I remember this period well, and I recall sitting
through seminars and workshops at which lots of very smart and creative people were imagining various nasty things that
groups like al Qaeda might try to do. Hijack gas trucks and blow up the Lincoln Tunnel? Take over the Mall of America and create carnage on a big shopping day?
Commandeer a supertanker and smash it into the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge? Wait until summer and then set forest fires all over the American West? The list of conceivable dangers
you could easily become convinced that it was only a matter
of time before somebody did something really nasty to you or your loved ones. Imagination is one thing,
was infinitely long, but if you sat in enough of those seminars,
but disciplined risk assessment is another. It's easy to dream up bad things that could
conceivably happen, but intelligent public policy should rest on a more careful and sustained
appraisal of how likely those various scary things are. And that's why I suggest you read Keir Lieber and Daryl Press's recent article in
the journal International Security on "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists." The fear that nuclear-armed states would hand
weapons to terrorists has been a staple of U.S. threat-mongering ever since 9/11. It was a key part of the
justification for invading Iraq in 2003, and it forms part of the constant drumbeat for military action against Iran. But it never made much sense for two
reasons. First, a nuclear-armed state has little incentive to give up control over weapons it has
labored long and hard to acquire, for what could the state possibly gain from doing so? Second, a state giving nuclear
weapons to terrorists could never be sure that those weapons would not be traced back to it
and thereby invite devastating retaliation. Lieber and Press examine the historical record and show that it is almost
impossible to conduct a major terrorist operation and not be blamed for it. Here's the abstract for their article:
Many experts consider nuclear terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more recently, for a strike against Iran's nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear
terror attack, it could destroy an enemy yet avoid retaliation. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous? Data culled from a decade of
terrorist incidents reveal that attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S.
ally -- 97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because
few countries sponsor terror; few terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear weapons or enough material to manufacture
them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both actions would invite devastating retaliation. I might add
this is the kind of important, nonpartisan, policy-relevant work that more social scientists
ought to be doing. It is also important to disseminate these findings widely, so that 1) U.S. policymakers won't keep chasing phantom dangers, 2) the leaders of nuclearthat
armed states understand that their arsenals are good for deterrence and not much else, and 3) said leaders also understand the need to keep whatever weapons they might have under very
reliable control.
Terrorism overblown by media and gets disproportional attention
Walt, professor of International Affairs at Harvard, 4/22/13
(Stephen M., 4/22/13, “America the skittish”)
The more I think about the events that transfixed Boston and the nation last week, the more troubled I am. Not by what it says
about the dangers we face from violent extremists (aka "terrorism"), but for what it says about our collective inability to keep these dangers in
perspective and to respond to them sensibly. I am beginning to wonder if our political and
social system is even capable of a rational response to events of this kind.¶ Don't get me wrong: The speed with
which the Tsarnaev brothers were identified was remarkable, and citizens at the scene of the bombing showed resolution and humanity in helping the victims. Here in Boston, a great
many people worked with energy, courage, and effectiveness to identify and apprehend the perpetrators. And one can only feel a sense of heartache and tragedy when reading about each
Barack Obama to Deval
Patrick offered up the usual defiant statements about America's toughness and resilience in the face of
terror, the overall reaction to the attacks was anything but. Public officials shut down the entire city of
Boston and several surrounding suburbs for most of the day, at an estimated cost of roughly $300 million. What did this accomplish? It showed
that a 19 year-old amateur could paralyze an entire American metropolis. As numerous commentators have already pointed out, a city-wide
of the victims, senselessly murdered before their time. ¶ It's the larger response to the tragedy that worries me. Although politicians from
lockdown is not what public officials have done in countless other manhunts, such as the search for rogue cop Christopher Dorner in Los Angeles. And Dorner was a former Navy
this is not the attitude that
tamed the West, stopped the Third Reich, or won the Cold War.¶ The media frenzy that accompanied
these events was equally disturbing. If terrorists "want a lot of people watching," then that's precisely
what the American media gave them. It is probably unrealistic to hope that today's hydra-headed and commercially voracious media would respond
reservist who had killed four people and who was at least as "armed and dangerous" as the Tsarnaevs. Ladies and gentlemen,
to an event like this with even a modicum of restraint, but the feeding frenzy that CNN, Fox, and many other outlets engaged in must have been deeply gratifying to America's enemies.
Television networks have learned not to train their cameras on the lunkheads who sometimes jump out of the bleachers and race across a baseball field. In a perfect world, these same
organizations would act with similar wisdom when terrorists strike. In particular they would tell the public what it needed to know for the sake of safety, but they would spare us the
As Boston shut down and the world watched,
fourteen Americans were killed and more than 200 were injured in a factory explosion in Texas. Those people are just as
dead as the four victims in Boston, yet their story is already fading to the back pages of the major papers. Meanwhile, the Tsarnaevs remain the Big
round-the-clock, obsessive-compulsive, and error-ridden blather that merely gives extremists the publicity they seek.¶
Story and got profiled on 60 Minutes last night. As I write this, the death toll from last week's earthquake in China nears 200 -- with thousands injured -- but it barely rates a passing
glance. And the week before the Marathon bombing, those courageous members of our bought-and-paid-for Senate rejected the very mildest of efforts to reduce the danger from guns,
As Michael Cohen noted in the Guardian, we fear that which scares us,
but not the things that actually threaten us. ¶ What is it about terrorism that terrorizes? Is the
even though firearms kill over 30,000 Americans every year.
disproportionate attention it receives due to its seemingly random nature? The sense that it could strike any of us without warning? That explanation seems unlikely, given that other
equally random dangers pose a greater risk.
Is it because terrorism is the product of human volition, an explicit act of
yet other equally heinous acts don't seem to transfix
malevolence? This may have something to do with our tendency to overreact,
society in the same way. ¶ Or was it the intrusion of an act of wanton violence into an event -- the Boston Marathon -- that is supposed to be celebratory and fun? Or do we react
viscerally to terrorism because such acts force us to think -- however reluctantly -- about the rage, animosity, and alienation that others feel towards us?¶ I don't know. But I cannot help
ur political leaders have been letting us down ever since 9/11. Instead of teaching
Americans that the actual risk from terrorism was minimal, they have kept us disrobing in security lines, obsessing over every bizarre
but think that o
jihadi utterance, and constantly fretting about the Next Big One. An entire industry of "terrorism experts" has arisen to keep us on the edge of our seats, even though many other dangers
. The result of this obsession has been catastrophic: a failed effort to nation-build in
Afghanistan, a wholly misbegotten war in Iraq, and an enormous distraction from any number of other issues -- education,
climate, energy, the economy -- whose mismanagement will ultimately claim far more lives and create far more immiseration than those
pose a far greater risk
two misguided and angry young brothers did.¶ I do not mean to trivialize what happened last week. Four innocent people died, and many more were grievously hurt. Finding the persons
responsible was necessary, and I'm as happy as anyone else that they are no longer at large. But
the brutal reality of human existence is that it
is fragile, and there are no guarantees. Bad things do happen to good people, and it is the task of our political leaders to help us keep our heads even when awful things occur.
The grossly disproportionate reaction to the Marathon attacks tells me that our political system is increasingly incapable of
weighing dangers intelligently and allocating resources in a sensible manner. Unless we get better at evaluating
dangers and responding to them appropriately, we are going to focus too much time and attention on a few bad things because they happen to be particularly vivid, and not enough on
the problems on which many more lives ultimately depend.
Terrorism not a threat– 1 in 4 million chance per yr
Mueller and Steward, leading experts on terrorism at the Cato Institute, 4/22/13
(John, Mark G., 4/22/13, “Hapless, Disorganized, and Irrational”)
52 cases came to light in which the United States itself has been, or apparently has been,
targeted for terrorism by Islamist extremists, whether based in the United States or abroad.¶ By far the most striking difference between
the Boston Marathon killings and these earlier cases is that, for the first time, terrorists actually were able to assemble and detonate
bombs. Many previous plotters harbored visions of carrying out bombings, and in 10 of the cases, they were supplied with fantasy-fulfilling, if bogus, bombs by obliging FBI
Between Sept. 12, 2001, and last Monday, some
informants. But until Boston, no would-be terrorists had been able to make and set one off on their own. And, except for four bombs detonated on the London transport system in
2005, nor has any terrorist in the United Kingdom. This is surprising in part because in the 1970s there were hundreds of terrorist incidents on U.S. soil, most of them bombings, killing
72 people.¶ In many other respects, however, the Boston Marathon bombing is quite similar to the other 52 cases. For example, the Boston perpetrators were clearly not suicidal, which
is the standard in American cases. In only six of the earlier plots were the perpetrators clearly willing to die in their terrorist effort.¶ “Except for their ability to fabricate and detonate
the Boston terrorists do not seem to have been any more competent than most of their
predecessors.Ӧ And except for their ability to fabricate and detonate bombs, the Boston terrorists do not seem to have been any more competent than most of their
bombs,
predecessors. The Department of Homeland Security, in assessing what it ominously calls “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” is fond of stressing their determination, persistence,
relentlessness, patience, and flexibility. This may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the Sept. 11 attacks. But it scarcely describes the vast
majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks.¶ In describing the “adversary,” the case studies far more commonly use words like
incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, foolish, and gullible. Many of
the
Boston perpetrators apparently thought they could somehow get away with their deed even though they chose to set their bombs off at the most-photographed spot
on the planet at the time. Moreover, although they were not prepared to die with their bombs, they do not seem to have had anything that could be
considered a coherent plan of escape. This rather bizarre inability to think about the aftermath of the planned deed
is quite typical in the case studies. (Also commonly found: an inability to explain how killing a few random people would advance their cause.)¶ The Boston perpetrators seem
never to have ventured much more than a few miles from the bombing location, and they appear to have had no reliable means of transport and no money. Then, when the
police published their photographs, they mindlessly blew whatever cover they had by killing a campus cop,
hijacking a car, stealing money, trying to run a police blockade, and engaging in a brief Hollywood-style car chase and shootout.
the cases suggest that there is little exaggeration in the 2010 film, Four Lions, the impressive dark comedy about a band of hapless home-grown British terrorists.¶ Amazingly,
Surveillance imagery played an important role in identifying the terrorists (as it did in terrorist events in London in 2005), but the key breakthrough appears to have come when the
culprits decided to leave their lair, after which the police applied standard killer-on-the-loose methodology.¶ And while the scope of the tragedy in Boston should not be minimized, it
if the terrorists’ aim was to kill a large number of people, their bombs failed
miserably. As recent cases in Colorado and Connecticut sadly demonstrate, far more fatalities have been inflicted by gunmen.¶ Concern
should also be noted that,
about “lone wolf” attacks has grown in recent years, and a 2011 DHS assessment concluded that “lone offenders currently present the greatest threat.” This is a reasonable observation,
but those concerned should keep in mind that, as Max Abrahms has noted, while lone wolves may be difficult to police, they have carried out only two of the 1,900 most deadly terrorist
an American’s chance of
being killed by any kind of terrorist, even with 9/11 included in the count, remains about one in 3 million or 4
million per year.)¶ It is still unclear what motivated the Boston bombers. We are hearing a lot about “radicalization,” a concept that is not only
vague but also questionably suggests, as Arun Kundnani has pointed out, that violence is inherent or implied in Muslims who become
deeply religious.¶ Evidence from the 52 cases strongly indicates that assuming an ideological motivation for terrorism is not useful. In almost all the cases, the
overwhelming driving force was not something that could be called ideology, but rather a simmering,
and more commonly boiling, outrage at U.S. foreign policy — the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular, and the country’s support for Israel in the
attacks over the last four decades. They may be harder to stop, but they are also less lethal. (It should also be kept in mind that
Palestinian conflict. Religion was a part of the consideration for most, but not because they wished to spread Sharia law or to establish caliphates (few of the culprits would be able to
spell either word). Rather they wanted to protect their co-religionists against what was commonly seen to be a concentrated war upon them in the Middle East by the U.S. government.¶
none of the 52 cases after 9/11 has inspired much in the way of continued interest from the public and
the media. After some days of coverage — or weeks in a very few instances — they largely faded from attention. This is impressive because some were actually
Rather remarkably,
rather threatening, and many were populated by colorful characters and involve interesting law-and-order issues. Books have been written about only two of the cases, and neither
appears to have sold very well. Whether the Boston Marathon case will prove to be an exception — perhaps because of its venue and the manhunt — is yet to be seen, of course.¶
Boston might trigger some panicky and costly security measures, just as past terrorist efforts have inspired wars on shoes,
liquids, and underwear at airports. In this case, the surveillance camera market is likely to experience a windfall, and we can expect a fair amount of heightened security at sporting events
and a whole lot of hand-wringing about the immigration system. But,
new measures will be limited.
given budget difficulties, there is a distinct prospect that the
AT: State Dept. Reports
Don’t trust State Department data—inconsistent and lacks verification
Cordesman 15- Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) (Anthony, “The Critical Lack of Credibility in State Department Reporting on the
Trends in Global Terrorism: 1982-2014”, CSIS, June 2015,
http://csis.org/files/publication/150623_Comparing_State_Department_Reporting_on_the_Trends
_in_Global_Terrorism.pdf)//WK
Unfortunately, the problems in the Stated Department’s data on terrorism data –which are the
principal U.S. government unclassified source of such data -- go far deeper than a lack of
“full context,” or the politics of whether the US is or is not winning the war on terrorism. They
involve critical problems in the way the state Department has chosen to report on terrorism
over the period from1982 to the present, and in the credibility of the State Department report. The
U.S., government has provided three radically different estimates of the trends in global terrorism
over the period since 1982. These have been presented each year in the Statistical Annexes to the
State Department’s annual reports on terrorism. As Figure One shows, the data in these annexes
are divided into three different sets of trend estimates that are not are not comparable in any
way
-2003 shows low to negligible levels of terrorist activity, with a
maximum number of terrorist incidents of 665 in 1987, although the number killed did reach a peak
of 6,695 in 1998 – th
2005-2011—suddenly lead to the point where the number of incidents rise to 11,153 in 2005 and
peak at 14,338 in 2006, and never drop below 10,000 in any year. The number of killed leap to 14,618
in 2005, peak at 22,720 in 2007, and never drop below 12,000. A new type of START estimate for
2012-2014 again creates a radically different pattern. The number of incidents suddenly drops to
6,771 in 2012, but leaps to13,463 in 2014. The number killed is more consistent at 11,098 in 2012,
but leaps to 18,066 in 2013 and 32,727 in 2014 What is particularly critical in terms of U.S.
government transparency and credibility is that the most recent figures for 2012-2014 show a
radical increase in the rate of terrorism, the figures for 2005-2011 do not show any such
increase, and are more than 40 times on average the totals used in an earlier methodology
covering the period from 1982-2003. The resulting lack of transparency and credibility is
further complicated by the fact the START database used since 2012 does provide trend data
by country in graphic form on charts that appear to going back go back to 1970 without any
clear explanation. As Figure Two shows, the country graphs on past trends seem to directly
contradict the previous two sets of State Department estimates for the period from 1982 to
2011. Unfortunately, the START database does not appear to provide a way of obtaining the precise
global totals for these years. Moreover, it is unclear in all three sets of estimates how it is
possible for any such estimate to have distinguished between acts of terrorism and the
violence coming out of counterinsurgencies and civil war. Further, no effort is made to
estimate acts of State Terrorism by the military forces, law enforcement, and internal security
forces of the many states cites for such actions in the annual State Department human rights
reports and many other sources. This not only makes it impossible to have any clear metric for
knowing the official U.S. estimate of trends in terrorism, and whether there is any form of
“victory” in reducing the level of violence, it creates a massive credibility problem for the
State Department and for U.S. efforts to communicate the threat and the effectiveness of its
counter terrorism efforts. There is a clear need to correct this situation, and provide the kind of
data and explanation that restores the credibility of the U.S. government. It does seem all too likely
that there was very real rise in the level of global terrorism from 2011 onwards, but at this
point in time, there seems to be no way to either understand or trust the estimates being
issue by the Sate Department.
Al Qaeda (Middle East)
Not A Threat
Al Qaeda’s done – lack of recruitment, resource scarcity, and ISIS
Malik et al 15 (Shiv Mailk, investigative journalist and the co-author of Jilted Generation: How
Britain Has Bankrupted Its Youth, Ali Younes, writer and news editor based in Washington, DC,
Spencer Ackerman, national security editor for Guardian US and winner of the 2012 National
Magazine Award for Digital Reporting, Mustafa Khalili, multimedia editor for news at the Guardian,
6/10/15, the Guardian, “Al-Qaida ‘cut off and ripped apart by Isis,”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/isis-onslaught-has-broken-al-qaida-its-spiritualleaders-admit, JHR)
Two of al-Qaida’s most important spiritual leaders have told the Guardian that the terror group is no
longer a functioning organisation after being ripped apart by Isis. In a wide-ranging interview, Abu Qatada, a Jordanian preacher
who was based in London before being deported in 2013, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, regarded as the most influential jihadi scholar alive, say the al-Qaida leader, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, is cut off from his commanders and keeping the group afloat through little more than
appeals to loyalty. Senior insiders in Jordan add that al-Qaida around the Middle East has been drained of recruits
and money after losing territory and prestige to its former subordinate division. The ongoing war between alQaida and Isis has left the US struggling to catch up with the tectonic shifts within the global jihadi movement, intelligence insiders told the Guardian. Maqdisi, who Zawahiri counts as a
close friend, is frank about the 63-year-old Egyptian’s situation
. “He operates solely based on the allegiance. There is no organisational
structure. There is only communication channels and loyalty,” Maqdisi said. Qatada, who was born Omar Mahmoud Othman and has been described by the British government as a
“truly dangerous individual”, also says Zawahiri is “isolated” and admits that Isis have been winning the propaganda and ground war against al-Qaida. Qatada was deported from the UK
to Jordan to face terror charges after a court battle lasting nearly 10 years with a series of British home secretaries. Last summer he was released from custody after being acquitted of all
charges. Since his release, he has become an increasingly vocal critic of Isis. He told the Guardian its members were extremists and a “cancer” growing within the jihadi movement
“[Isis] don’t respect anyone,” he said. Isis was al-Qaida’s branch in the heart of the Middle East until
jihadists in Syria
which left thousands dead on both sides. Today that fight continues and has expanded across Eurasia
and the Mediterranean. Since declaring the establishment of its so-called Islamic State a year ago, Isis has gone on to build a global network of affiliates and
branches that now stretches from Afghanistan to west Africa and competes with al-Qaida in its scale. Isis leaders, who described alQaida as a “drowned entity” in issue six of their official English-language publication, Dabiq, have declared that they will not tolerate any other jihadi group
following their assault on al-Qaida over the last two years.
the group was excommunicated from the network in 2014 after disobeying commands from Zawahiri and starting an internecine war with fellow
in territory where they are operating. They have readily delivered on that statement. Last week, Isis fighters in Afghanistan werereported to have beheaded 10 members of the Taliban,
al-Qaida in Libya vowed retaliation after blaming Isis for the death of one of its leaders.
and on Wednesday
But
the US has been slow to grasp the implications of al-Qaida’s decline and possible collapse despite extensive study of Isis, according to intelligence community insiders. “There’s such a
cadre of people so closely tied to the al-Qaida brand within the IC [intelligence community] that I think they don’t see what else is going on outside the organisation,” said Derek Harvey,
, a group of junior and mid-level analysts
have concluded that Isis advances have pushed al-Qaida to the margins of global jihad. A former
a former intelligence analyst who predicted how resilient the Iraq insurgency would be. Over the past year
senior intelligence official who did not want to speak on the record said they had been tracking the split between the two groups with great attention. Against them is what Harvey
described as “the overwhelming majority of senior intelligence officials looking at this” who he said considered the enmity between Isis and al-Qaida as little more than “a squabble
within”.
Al Qaeda’s collapsing – ISIS coup
Malik et al 15 (Shiv Mailk, investigative journalist and the co-author of Jilted Generation: How
Britain Has Bankrupted Its Youth, Ali Younes, writer and news editor based in Washington, DC,
Spencer Ackerman, national security editor for Guardian US and winner of the 2012 National
Magazine Award for Digital Reporting, Mustafa Khalili, multimedia editor for news at the Guardian,
6/10/15, the Guardian, “How Isis crippled al-Qaida,”
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/how-isis-crippled-al-qaida, JHR)
Maqdisi’s war of words with Isis is emblematic of the new fratricidal split within violent Islamic radicalism – but it is also a sign that al-Qaida, once the world’s
most feared terrorist network, knows it has been surpassed. Isis has not simply eclipsed al-Qaida on
the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, and in the competition for funding and new recruits. According to a series of
exclusive interviews with senior jihadi ideologues, Isis has successfully launched “a coup” against al-Qaida to destroy it
from within. As a consequence, they now admit, al-Qaida – as an idea and an organisation – is now on the verge of collapse.
Can’t conduct regular attacks
Watts, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy Research Institute, ’12 (Clint, July, “What if There is No Al
Qaeda? Preparing for Future Terrorism” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201207.watts.al-qaeda.pdf)
UNDERSTANDING AL-QAEDA’S PACE OF VIOLENCE: HOW SIZE MATTERS Research on terror groups suggests that on any
given day five trained al-Qaeda operatives are as likely as 5000 members of the group to successfully execute a massive attack on the U.S.
Essentially, the
size of al-Qaeda does not matter with regards to the scale of any given al-Qaeda
attack. 4 However, size does matter when it comes to the pace of attacks. For al-Qaeda to
remain relevant, the terror group must execute violent attacks against the West on a regular
basis. Mass, one of the key principles of warfare, provides terror groups the ability to recruit new members, train cadres, and plan and
execute attacks on a routine basis. Today, in comparison to ten years ago, al-Qaeda does not have the
ability to execute attacks on a regular basis due to its declining mass—a function of limited
safe havens, dwindling recruits, loss of critical human capital (leaders and technical experts), and a
reduction in financial support. Al-Qaeda has not executed a successful attack on the West in
the West since the London subway bombings of 2005. Three of the most credible al-Qaeda plots in recent years
have arisen from an affiliate, AQAP in Yemen, rather than the group’s central leadership in Pakistan. 5 Does this mean that al-Qaeda will
dry up and never attack the U.S. again? Absolutely not! But the
decline in the pace of al-Qaeda’s attacks
illustrates the group’s broader struggles to recruit foreign fighters, prepare operations, and
effectively resource missions.
Al Qaeda has no money
Watts, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy Research Institute, ’12 (Clint, July, “What if There is No Al
Qaeda? Preparing for Future Terrorism” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201207.watts.al-qaeda.pdf)
FINANCING: WHERE’S AL-QAEDA’S MONEY? Financing
problems quite likely represents the most
overlooked and potentially significant factor contributing to alQaeda’s decline in recent years. A
fundamental misperception after 9/11 was that al-Qaeda’s brand of terrorism was “cheap.” Citing the relatively small expense of a singular
attack, analysts
concluded that al-Qaeda could operate on a shoestring budget. However, Bin
Laden’s documents and reports from Pakistan suggest that, prior to Bin Laden’s death, it was hurting for cash.
Analysts of al-Qaeda have understated: 1) the importance of Bin Laden for keeping the terror
group afloat financially and 2) the significant recurring operational costs for the group to sustain
its safe havens and personnel. While al-Qaeda did have some legitimate and illegitimate fronts through which it gained resources
during the group’s first 15 years, it largely operated on donor funds—money and resources given in pursuit of its global
agenda. This donor stream depended largely on Bin Laden’s personal network and represented a critical factor in the terror group’s
operational independence. Donor support to terror groups provides many times the value of funds generated from legitimate and
illegitimate schemes. Donor funds provide al-Qaeda with -- 1. the ability not to be fixed geographically and dependent on a specific
population for generating revenue; 2. increased time for planning and executing attacks rather than expending effort to secure the next
round of funds to sustain operations; 3. the ability to avoid having to pursue illegitimate fundraising operations—extortion, drug
smuggling, kidnapping -- that undermine the organization’s ideological pronouncements and can alienate popular support; and 4. assistance
in disguising operations from Western counterterrorism efforts. Illicit and even licit activities broadcast a series of signatures more easily
identified by those pursuing al-Qaeda. With
Bin Laden dead, funding for al-Qaeda in Pakistan appears to
be drying up. Locals in Pakistan note that donors have shifted their funds to more profitable
endeavors—particularly promising groups among the Arab Spring. 8 Vendors in Pakistan’s frontier regions selling Middle Eastern
goods have closed up shop and al-Qaeda operative transportation has shifted from armed motor caravan to motor scooters. Ayman alZawahiri, an Egyptian, likely commands far lower levels of donor support than his predecessor. Possibly, the strongest indicator for where
al-Qaeda might emerge in the future will be revealed in the tracking and analysis of donor funds from the Persian Gulf. News reporting
suggests that the largest portion of donations have shifted to the Arab Spring. If any al-Qaeda affiliate were to be receiving support in the
wake of Bin Laden’s death, one might hypothesize AQAP as the preferred al-Qaeda outlet—although this theory needs closer examination
and research. If AQAP proves to be operating largely from donor financing, the affiliate may well assume the role of alQaeda’s central
leadership globally. As
money transfers shift, influence, authority and strategic direction will drift.
Lack of safe havens prevents attack on the US
Watts, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy Research Institute, ’12 (Clint, July, “What if There is No Al
Qaeda? Preparing for Future Terrorism” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201207.watts.al-qaeda.pdf)
SAFE HAVENS: A DWINDLING COMMODITY Conducting
attacks of a significant scale on a routine
basis requires a substantial safe haven for al-Qaeda. Today, remaining al-Qaeda members reside in many locations
in Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. Some have suggested that this geographical dispersion of al-Qaeda members is emblematic of
the terror group’s increased strength. However, none
of these current environments offer al-Qaeda members
the safe haven needed to repeat September 11-style attacks. A quick assessment of alQaeda’s primary safe havens (Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Sahel) illustrates the group’s particularly
vulnerable position. The U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan makes the safe haven there an
inhospitable location for al-Qaeda to plan, train, and deploy terrorists. Bin Laden himself noted in the Abbottabad
documents the need for a new safe haven and specifically mentioned Yemen as a potential alternative. 9 Yemen provides a natural safe
haven physically, a proximate location to Persian Gulf donors and a hospitable population in which al-Qaeda can enmesh its ideology.
AQAP and its parallel insurgent group, Ansar al Sharia, have made gains at times controlling large swathes of territory. However, U.S.
counterterrorism operations along with Yemeni military efforts have begun to erode this
sanctuary as well. The real debate over AQAP rests now on their long-run intentions to attack the U.S. or focus on governing rural
Yemen. If the former, the U.S. must continue its reallocation of counterterrorism effort to dismantle this al-Qaeda affiliate and deny
Yemen as a safe haven. If the latter, the U.S. must delicately balance its level of counterterrorism effort to contain but not antagonize an
insurgent group (Ansar al-Sharia) that may best be disrupted through non-kinetic influence. As a safe haven, Somalia
presents al-
Qaeda an unsettling amount of local clan conflict. The al-Shabaab—al-Qaeda merger may have initially appeared
as a sign of both groups’ growing strength. However, less than six months after the announced merger, al-Shabaab has crumbled from
internal disunity, showing the naivety of al-Qaeda for again getting involved in unstable clan fighting. The Sahel has recently shown
glimpses of hope as jihadist groups have overtaken northern sections of Mali in the wake of Libya’s collapse. Despite the upheaval in Mali,
disparate groups appear to be contesting each other’s claims to the desert. Isolated in remote portions of the Sahara and almost entirely
dependent on illicit funding streams, the Sahel offers few advantages as an enduring global safe haven for al-Qaeda and many logistical
burdens. Positioned next door to the Free Syrian Army and rife with sectarian conflict, al-Qaeda in Iraq, once defeated by U.S. forces, may
provide a small glimmer of safe haven hope for al-Qaeda. Ultimately, aside from Yemen, a resurgent AQ-Iraq, or an emerging safe haven
in North Africa or Syria, al-Qaeda
has few options during the drone era to create a safe haven on par
with its late 1990s base in Afghanistan.
AT: Pakistan Support
Pakistan won’t sponsor nuclear terrorism – rhetoric proves
DT 15 (citing the current Foreign Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 6/6/15, Daily
Times, “’No One is getting our nukes, not even Saudis’,”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/06-Jun-2015/no-one-is-getting-our-nukes-not-even-saudis,
JHR)
WASHINGTON/ISLAMABAD/ NEW YORK: Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry on Thursday denied
speculations that Pakistan could sell Saudi Arabia an “off-the-shelf” nuclear weapon. After meetings at the White House, Pentagon and State Department, Chaudhry
described the suggestions Pakistan could sell a weapon as “unfounded, baseless and untrue”.
“Pakistan’s nuclear programme has nothing to do with any other country,” he told reporters. “This is
a deterrence that we developed in response to a threat perception that we have from our east. That’s it.”
“Pakistan is not talking to Saudi Arabia on nuclear issues, period,” Chaudhry insisted. The arsenal, believed to be in excess of 100
weapons, is focused only on Pakistan’s threat perception from “the East” Chaudhry said, a clear reference to long-standing rival and fellow nuclear power India. Chaudhry
said his country has significantly cracked down in recent years on proliferation, improving its export controls and
providing UN nuclear monitors with all necessary information . Pakistan also won’t allow any weapons to reach terrorists, he
said.
AQAP (Arabian Peninsula)
Fails
AQAP empirically fails at targeting attacks
Rich 15 (Ben, PhD Candidate in Middle East Politics at the School of Social Sciences at Monash
University, 1/11/15, The Conversation, “Explainer: what is al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?,”
http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-al-qaeda-in-the-arabian-peninsula-36103, JHR)
AQAP initially enjoyed a degree of local support inside Saudi Arabia thanks to its declared goal of ridding the holy land of “infidel invaders”. But this support largely
collapsed after the group committed a major blunder in November 2003 in Muhayya. AQAP attempted to reproduce the
success of its first signature attack – detonating a vehicle in the centre of a residential compound. This time, however, the targeting went awry. Rather than
slaughtering Western foreigners, the Muhayya incident mostly killed Arab Muslims. This
immediately undermined AQAP’s message of protecting the Islamic community. While AQAP was to stumble on
for several years, its waning local support, combined with the increasing efficacy of Saudi counterterrorism policies, saw it ultimately flee Saudi Arabia south to Yemen and merge with a smaller AQ affiliate in 2009. While the group had managed to kill several
hundred civilians during its time inside Saudi Arabia, it had completely failed to credibly challenge Saudi rule or remove
outsiders from the country.
AQAP’s on the decline
Watts 15 (Clint, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2/4/15, Foreign Affairs, “Al
Qaeda Loses Touch,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-02-04/al-qaedaloses-touch, JHR)
If al Qaeda were a corporation today, it would be roughly equivalent to Microsoft: A big name but an
aging brand, one now strikingly out of touch with the 18–35-year-old-demographic. The group made its way back
into the headlines this past January, after its affiliate—al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP—took credit for a deadly attack on the Paris offices of the French magazineCharlie
Hebdo. But the claim of responsibility came a week after the fact, and lacked the sort of insider accounts or video footage that typically accompany such announcements, leading some to
, al Qaeda’s traditionally preeminent position in the
jihadi hierarchy, long on the wane, is slipping still further. U.S. officials, for their part, are increasingly focused on the Islamic State, or
conclude that al Qaeda may not have known about the attackers’ intentions. Put simply
ISIS, which continues to deliver a steady flow of battlefield victories and brutal beheadings. Yet al Qaeda has a clear path back to contention: a dramatic follow-up to the Hebdo attack.
And with the group’s need for a win so great, Washington would be mistaken to count it out. CONTROL KEY Al Qaeda’s latest chapter began with the death of Osama bin Laden in
May 2011. Shortly thereafter, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor as al Qaeda’s global leader, found himself facing numerous constraints. Aggressive U.S.-led counterterrorism
efforts, buoyed by a deadly drone campaign, forced top al Qaeda commanders into hiding, limiting Zawahiri’s ability to communicate with al Qaeda’s affiliates. Based in Pakistan rather
Al Qaeda’s affiliates,
which were now receiving less guidance and fewer resources from al Qaeda central, took on a new level of
than in Iraq, Zawahiri and his senior commanders lost touch with many fighters in Iraq. And with bin Laden dead, resources became tighter.
independence. Some four years later, al Qaeda is essentially a collection of relatively small, though still capable, affiliates. AQAP, under the leadership of Nasir Wuhayshi, remained loyal
to Zawahiri after bin Laden’s death. But with Zawahiri and al Qaeda’s senior leadership under siege from the drones in Pakistan, AQAP effectively became al Qaeda central. AQAP came
close to executing three plots against Western targets, in 2009, 2010, and 2011. And it became the first affiliate to build its own insurgent force, Ansar al Sharia, which aimed to establish
an Islamist emirate in Yemen. In Zawahiri’s absence, other affiliates began to look to AQAP for guidance. Among them was al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM, which was
making a separate push for an Islamic emirate in northern Africa. By the spring of 2012, AQAP had sent the group’s leaders two instructional letters, one in May and another in August,
covering both tactics and strategy. AQAP further cemented its role by essentially creating its own affiliate, al Shabaab, in Somalia. Zawahiri confirmed al Shabaab’s membership in al
Qaeda in February 2012, but evidence suggests that the group had little interaction with al Qaeda central. Omar Hammami, an American member of the group, noted in his biography
that al Shabaab’s al Qaeda contacts came from Yemen rather than Pakistan. And even a senior al Shabaab leader, Sheikh Ali Muhamud Raage, seemed confused, at one time publicly
Al Qaeda central, meanwhile, has continued to struggle. In Pakistan, the U.S.
drone program has kept Zawahiri tied down and led to an exodus of his senior deputies to Egypt, Libya, and Syria in search of refuge and new
stating that the group was joining AQAP.
opportunities. Despite the overthrow of a democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt—a confirmation of al Qaeda’s narrative—the group has failed to gain traction
there. Its so-called Nasr cell, which has allegedly plotted various attacks in the country, was disrupted in 2013, and its operatives in the Sinai have suffered losses at the hands of the
Egyptian military and an attrition of followers to ISIS.
Not A Threat
AQAP’s done – Wuhayshi’s death seals the deal
Mullen 15 (Jethro, writes and edits for CNN Digital out of Hong Kong with a focus on news in the
Asia-Pacific region, 6/16/15, CNN, “Al Qaeda's second in command killed in Yemen strike;
successor named,” http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/middleeast/yemen-aqap-leader-killed/, JHR)
(CNN)Al Qaeda's second in command, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, has been killed in a drone strike in
Yemen, dealing a heavy setback to the leadership of the international terrorist group. Al-Wuhayshi was the top leader of
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, one of the most dangerous and dynamic branches of the jihadist network. His death
is "the biggest blow against al Qaeda since the death of (Osama) bin Laden," said CNN terrorism analyst Paul
Cruickshank. Al-Wuhayshi was al Qaeda's "leading light" and was one day expected to take over from its current global chief, Ayman al-Zawahiri,
said Cruickshank. Two Yemeni security officials told CNN on Monday that al-Wuhayshi was killed Friday in a suspected U.S. drone strike in Yemen's Hadhramaut region.On Tuesday,
AQAP released a video statement announcing that its leader and two aides had died. The speaker said that al-Wuhayshi would be succeeded by the group's military chief, Qasm al-Rimi,
The U.S. government confirmed alWuhayshi's fate Tuesday, calling his death "a major blow to (al Qaeda's) most dangerous affiliate and to al Qaeda more broadly." AlWuhayshi "was responsible for the deaths of innocent Yemenis and Westerners, including Americans," U.S. National Security Council
spokesman Ned Price said. "While AQAP, al Qaeda and their affiliates will remain persistent in their efforts to threaten the United States, our partners and our interests , (alWuhayshi's) death removes from the battlefield an experienced terrorist leader and brings us
closer to degrading and ultimately defeating those groups." Al-Wuhayshi, known as al Qaeda's crown prince,
was a charismatic figure who was adored by many of the terrorist group's jihadist fighters. In a video that
also known as Abu Hureira al-Sanaani. Opinion: A death trap for al Qaeda leaders? 'Leadership matters'
surfaced in April of last year, al-Wuhayshiappeared brazenly out in the open, greeting followers in Yemen, the impoverished nation that the organization uses as a base. In a speech to the
group, he makes it clear that he's going after the United States, saying: "We must eliminate the cross. ... The bearer of the cross is America!" The video showed what looked like the
Al-Wuhayshi's death deprives al Qaeda of a dynamic heavyweight
Successor seen as 'brains of the operation' Originally from Yemen, al-Wuhayshi assumed command of AQAP in 2009. He'd escaped a Yemeni
largest and most dangerous gathering of al Qaeda in years.
prison in 2006 and had previously worked as a personal secretary for Osama bin Laden.
AQIM (North Africa)
Won’t Attack
AQIM won’t attack the US – it’s focused on in Africa
Humud et al 14 (Carla E. Humud, analyst in Middle Eastern and African affairs, Alexis Arieff,
Africa policy analyst and Yale graduate, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African affairs and
Georgetown graduate, Christopher M. Blanchard, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Jeremy M.
Sharp, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Kenneth Katzman, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
10/10/14, report from the Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle
East and Africa, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf, JHR)
AQIM’s rhetoric broadly focuses on achieving an Islamic caliphate in Algeria and throughout
North Africa, and on countering Western influence, notably that of former colonial power France. Areas of Operation. AQIM
has claimed responsibility for attacks, kidnappings, and other activities in Algeria, Mauritania,
Niger, and Mali. AQIM has also pursued ties to groups in Tunisia and Libya, and elements of the group are reported to have moved to southwestern Libya since
2013.
AQIM won’t attack the US – empirics
Laub 15 (Zachary Laub, online writer and editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, updated
3/27/15, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghred (AQIM),” Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/terrorist-organizations-and-networks/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717,
JHR)
What are AQIM's objectives? According to West Point's Combating Terrorism Center, AQIM's objectives include ridding North Africa of
Western influence; overthrowing governments deemed apostate, including those of Algeria, Libya,
Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia; and installing fundamentalist regimes based on sharia. Analysts say AQIM's
ideology blends global Salafi-jihadist dogma with regionally resonant elements, including references to the early Islamic conquest of the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula. While these
states of the Maghreb and Sahel are AQIM's “near enemy,” the group has declared Spain and France its foremost “far enemies.” France, in particular, has a long history as the region's
colonial heavyweight, and its government continues to provide political and military support to local regimes AQIM opposes. AQIM leaders regularly threaten to stage attacks in France,
Where does AQIM operate? A successful Algerian
counterterrorism campaign forced AQIM from its operational base near the Mediterranean to the
Sahel region that includes Niger, Mauritania, and Mali, where the group has established footholds. AQIM's members also joined the ranks
and praised the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris in January 2015.
of the insurgency in Iraq during the 2003–2011 war with the United States. The group has about one thousand members in Algeria, according to the State Department, and smaller
numbers in the Sahel region, which includes areas in Chad, Mali, and Mauritania. It also has cells in Libya, Nigeria, and Tunisia. The group claimed responsibility for killing four
policemen outside the home of Tunisia's interior minister in May 2014. It isn't clear if AQIM or affiliated fighters were involved in the attack on tourists in Tunis in March 2015 or the
. AQIM has not
attacked Europe or the United States, although individuals suspected to have ties to the group have been arrested in Germany, Italy, the
killing of Egyptian Christian hostages in Libya earlier that year. Groups professing links to the Islamic State claimed responsibility for both of those attacks
Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK. The UN Security Council's al-Qaeda sanctions committee says European cells are a source of the group's funding.
Al-Shabaab (Somalia)
Not A Threat
Al-Shabaab is not a threat—focusing on Somalia and lacks internal structure
Cordesman 4/2- Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic & International Studies
(Anthony, “The Changing Security Balance in the Gulf: Joint and Asymmetric Warfare, Missiles and
Missile Defense, Civil War and Non-State Actors, and Outside Powers”, CSIS,
http://csis.org/files/publication/150401_gulf_military_balance.pdf)//WK
The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin—also known as al-Shabaab, Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin alShabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, and many other names and variations—was the
militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the
second half of 2006. Although the Somali government and Ethiopian forces defeated the group in a
two-week war between December 2006 and January 2007, al-Shabaab—a clanbased insurgent
and terrorist group—has continued its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia.
The group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in
those areas by recruiting, sometimes forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using
guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia and its allies, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers, and
nongovernmental aid organizations. However, the group’s insurgency has been challenged over
the past year by in-fighting and military pressure that has liberated key towns from al-Shabaab. AlShabaab is not centralized or monolithic in its agenda or goals. Its rank-and-file members
come from disparate clans, and the group is susceptible to clan politics, internal divisions,
and shifting alliances. Most of its fighters are predominantly interested in the nationalistic
battle against the TFG and not supportive of global jihad. Al-Shabaab’s senior leadership is
affiliated with al-Qa‘ida and is believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan. The merger of the
two groups was publicly announced in February 2012 by the al-Shabaab amir and Ayman alZawahiri, leader of al-Qa‘ida.
Boko Haram (Nigeria)
Weak/Not A Threat
Boko Haram running out of arms and ammunition now – Nigerian army
advancement
Winsor 15
/23 April 2015, Morgan Winsor is a Breaking News Reporter for International Business Times
covering Africa and the Middle East. She was previously a News Assistant for CNN, where she
worked alongside producers and wrote articles online. Prior to CNN, she was archaeological digging
in Romania, Boko Haram In Nigeria Runs Out Of Weapons, Ammunition As Nigerian Army Advances On
Sambisa Forest, http://www.ibtimes.com/boko-haram-nigeria-runs-out-weapons-ammunitionnigerian-army-advances-sambisa-forest-1893764, spark/
The Boko Haram insurgents in northern Nigeria have run out of weapons and
ammunition, and the Nigerian army is advancing on the militant group’s remaining
territory in Borno state’s Sambisa Forest , military sources and residents told local reporters Thursday. The
intensified military operation by Nigerian and coalition forces has reportedly weakened
the Islamic militant group and cut off their arms supply. “The Boko Haram terrorists
have run out of arms and ammunitions as the military intensify attacks on Sambisa
Forest ,” a resident of Tabe village of Damboa who narrowly escaped from the area, told Vanguard news in Abuja. “You can
find more than 500 members of the insurgents, with only a few of them having rifles and
even when one or two of them have rifles, it is like a stick, as they have run out of
ammunitions, because the usual supplies they get are not forthcoming.” Coalition airstrikes and
ground troops have stormed the Sambisa Forest, which covers more than 23,000 square miles across mostly Borno, Yobo, Gombe
and Bauchi states in Nigeria’s northeast. Nigeria’s defense headquarters spokesman, Major General Chris Olukolade, told Vanguard
news Thursday the operation has pushed out many Boko Haram fighters. Residents told Leadership newspaper in Abuja some
militants have fled into the nearby woods of Yamtake, Tabe and Jangoro villages in the Damboa local government area of Borno state.
Since the military offensive has reportedly severed Boko Haram’s access to their main arms suppliers, witnesses said the insurgents
have resorted to less sophisticated weaponry. “The
Boko Haram terrorists have only bow and arrows,
machetes, daggers and other local weapons, as they have run out of arms and
ammunitions and were roaming about in the bushes of the villages along the fringes of
the Sambisa Forest,” another resident of nearby Yamtake village told Vanguard news Thursday. Although the group has
fled much of Borno state, a former stronghold, the militants have left behind devastating destruction in
northeast Nigeria. Entire towns were razed, with homes destroyed and corpses scattered in the empty streets. A security
source from Bama said Boko Haram has nearly demolished the town in Borno. “Only a few structures
still standing, as the terrorists have virtually destroyed all structures in the town. Very
soon we are also going to the Sambisa Forest for mop-up operations, as we have been
directed to clear the Sambisa before the May 29 handing over [deadline],” a security source told
Vanguard news.
Amount of Boko Haram-controlled areas decreasing now – Nigerian army
mobilization and operational effectiveness
Ejiofor 15
/28 February 2015, Clement Ejiofor, NAIJ, Boko Haram Has Become Weak,
http://www.naij.com/396418-boko-haram-has-become-weak.html, spark/
The experts says that this offensive push is the first major success since minor operations in northern Adamawa state last year. Boko
Haram Has Become Weak However, they note that the operations have recovered only some Boko Haram terrain. “So far, the
operation has pushed Boko Haram forces out of population centers in a substantial
portion of northern Borno state, the most recent area of expansion by the Islamist militant
group. The group still controls a large part of Borno state along the mountainous Cameroonian border. It also controls areas of
Sambisa Forest and parts of southern Yobe state,” state the analysts. Stratfore is sure that these areas are likely next for
Nigerian military operations . Airstrikes have already been launched against Boko Haram
positions around Gwoza and Bama, near Cameroon’s border . Military operations north of
Maiduguri could defeat Boko Haram’s attempt to establish territorial control and carve
out its own caliphate. However, since August 2014, the group has been able to consistently expand
its control over localities within northeastern states while withstanding disastrous
offensives attempting to liberate areas and defend military positions. The Nigerian military’s current
success stands in stark contrast with earlier efforts mostly because of new support. First, forces from Chad, Niger and
Cameroon have assisted the Nigerian offensive on their respective sides of the border.
The countries have increased efforts to close their borders to Boko Haram movement. Chad
has even deployed forces to support Niger and Cameroon. This activity increases operational effectiveness
inside Nigeria and prevents Boko Haram fighters from relocating to new sanctuaries.
Niger has tried to cut Boko Haram off from its financial resources, reportedly bombing
two separate convoys of Nigerien traders carrying smoked fish into Nigeria, where Boko Haram
taxes traders or seizes their goods. Chadian troops have led some incursions into Nigeria, but always in proximity to the border.
Assistance goes beyond Nigeria’s immediate neighbors, too. Both the United States and France have supported the efforts in some
capacity.
Boko Haram’s pledge to the Islamic State replicates weakness of the militant
group
Adegoke 15
/9 March 2015, Yinka Adegoke is Africa editor for Quartz where he oversees and coordinates
coverage of the news and ideas in partnership with writers across the continent, Boko Haram’s pledge of
allegiance to ISIL is a symptom of weakness, not strength, http://qz.com/358264/why-boko-haramspledge-of-allegiance-to-isil-is-a-symptom-of-weakness-not-strength, spark/
The Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group this
weekend, just hours after it set off five bombs in busy areas of Maiduguri, northeast Nigeria’s largest
city, killing 54 people and injuring 146, according to local authorities. Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged
allegiance to ISIL through a video shared on a Twitter account that has since been suspended. The news was immediately picked up by
international media, with much speculation about what the news could mean. Was one of the West’s greatest fears was nearing
reality—that two of the world’s most dangerous and fervent Islamic militants are beginning to work together, potentially creating a
global Islamic caliphate spreading from Iraq through the Middle East to northern and western Africa? Not so fast. While
it is
true that Boko Haram is still dangerous, as evidenced by the latest attack, teaming up with ISIL will not necessarily
make them stronger or more effective, according to analysts. “ It’s a sign of weakness and desperation and an
attempt to boost their members’ morale, image and attract local support ,” says Scott Stewart of
Stratfor, a global intelligence and advisory firm. “I really don’t see it as being a big deal changer—no matter what they call themselves,
they’re still the same guys. They’ve clearly always been influenced by ISIS [as ISIL is also known].” “It’s
not the first time
Abubakar Shekau has done this—remember, when they started taking parts of Nigeria
last year, he did proclaim support for ISIL,” Aliyu Musa, an expert on Boko Haram, told Al Jazeera. In recent
weeks, under major pressure from the combined armed forces of Chad, Niger, Cameroon,
and a rejuvenated Nigerian Army, Boko Haram’s ambitions as a standalone “caliphate”
have been severely curtailed . The Nigerian Army has reclaimed several major towns in
the northeast, and has claimed the lives of over 100 Boko Haram members . In the past there
were questions about the Nigerian army’s credibility says Stewart. “But it really does seem they’re getting help with logistics from
outside advisors,” he said, “which was a critical issue in previous months.” That drive by the Nigerian military was significantly
bolstered by the addition of troops from neighboring countries. The Chadians in particular has been very vocal about their successes,
including winning back the key Nigerian town of Dikwa last week (though their pronouncements of success has ruffled feathers in the
Nigerian military brass). The involvement of the neighboring countries means there are fewer obvious escape routes for Boko Haram
fighters. With every passing day it appears Boko Haram is on the run, but no one in any position of authority or indeed ordinary
citizens in the affected areas should let their guard down anytime soon.
The immediate positive effect of the
military’s successes will mean more towns will return to their usual leadership structures
under the auspices of the Nigerian government. But people in northeast Nigeria will remain vulnerable to
violent acts of insurgency by Boko Haram on so-called soft targets for a while to come.
FARC (Columbia)
Not A Threat
FARC is not a threat—focusing on social services within Columbia
Goodell 14- BA, Washington and Lee University (Elizabeth, ““Narcoterrorism: The Growing
Threat in Latin America””, Washington and Lee University, Winter 2014,
https://repository.wlu.edu/bitstream/handle/11021/27299/RG38_Goodell_LACS_2014.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y)//WK
The FARC works to obtain and maintain local power and operate as a de facto government
in these regions in order to destabilize the Colombian state. The group uses military force to
conquer an area, expelling the government when and if there is a state presence. Once the
group has taken over a region, social services and a judicial system are put into place. The
FARC establishes a complex tax system within class framework in order to fund their social
programs. This tax system does not tax the poor, but is aimed at taxing only those who have
the means and ability to pay, thus the peasants are not subject to taxation, but receive benefits
from FARC social programs (Brittain, 100). The collected tax revenue then is given to the JAC
(Juntas Acción Comunal) – a type of “locally elected neighborhood council” – and used to fund
social projects including schools, infrastructure, and even bringing electricity to the more
rural, cut-off sections of Colombia (Brittain, 99). For example, in the town of La Cooperativa, the
FARC and JAC were responsible for the creation and maintenance of an electricity grid that provided
power for four hundred homes (Leech, 42). However, when the Colombian government regained
control of the region and expelling the FARC, thus ending the coca economy, they displaced
80% of the town and surrounding villages. There was not enough money from tax revenue for
the JAC to continue running the electricity grid and the government refused to fund it, leaving the
remaining resides without electricity once again (Leech, 45). The social programing that the FARC
had established in regions ignored by the state helped the organization gain popularity among the
people, but their justice system was another area that helped garner support. The FARC instituted
their own judicial system, and people generally preferred this institution to the government’s
solution. A “makeshift rebel courtroom” is constructed in the new rebel territory with a FARC
appointed judge (Leech, 43). Formal complaints would be taken up here with the FARC judge. The
judge would then summon the other party, hear both sides, and moderate a discussion between the
two parties. If the two parties cannot come to a solution, then the judge issues one. If this
ruling is not obeyed, it results in expulsion of the disobedient party from the FARC
controlled region. The judge even has the power to give the death penalty in murder and rape cases.
This judicial institution of the rebels gave women rights as well. For example, a woman could
complain about her husband to the judge if he was using the family’s income for alcohol rather than
bills. The FARC judicial system is preferred over the state’s system because it was better,
easier, faster, and considered less corrupt (Leech, 43). With the people preferring the FARC’s
system of justice, and getting so many social programs from them, it is easy to see the
group’s appeal to and support from the peasants, creating the ability to undermine the
government and established a de facto one in the state’s absence. While the FARC has
participated in several peace conferences, it does not appear that peace will be a viable option any
time soon as the group has ideological, political, economic, and social differences with the
Colombian state. Although the group is currently involved in peace talks with the Colombian
government in Cuba, only two of the six issues (land reform and political participation) have been
agreed upon. The issues of disarmament, illicit drugs, rights of victims, and peace deal implications
have still not reached agreements (BBC, Colombia Agrees FARC Political Participation). The group
continues to be militarily active during the peace talks as well. For example, Colombian
security recently discovered a FARC plot to have former president Alvaro Uribe assassinated (BBC,
Colombia Uncovers FARC Plot to Kill Ex-president Uribe).
Hamas (Palestine)
Not A Threat
Hamas solely focused on Israel—no risk of domestic attacks
Carafano 14- Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W.
Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies (James Jay, “The U.S. Must Do Everything Possible to Undermine Hamas”, The Daily Signal,
7/15/14, http://dailysignal.com/2014/07/15/silencing-hamas-voice-violence/)//WK
Similarly, Hamas defines its raison d’etre as fighting Israeli occupation. That is a worldview
without end as long as Israel exists—and even then, one wonders if Hamas would not turn
on its Arab neighbors as the next oppressors. From the Hamas perspective, not fighting is not
an option. The struggle is not about winning and losing, it’s what justifies the group’s existence. The
casualties, the destruction, the deaths of innocents on both sides, all are secondary in the group’s
strategic calculus. At its core, the Hamas strategic culture calls for constant conflict. India and
Pakistan share a subcontinent. Their endless struggle can go on forever, and both states can still—
maybe—go about their business. Palestine is a very different place. Hamas can’t have its wars
without outsized human tragedy for the size of the ground that lives under its shadow. Israel
can defend itself. It can punish Hamas. But Israel can no more win its war with Hamas than
India could force the Pakistani army to play nice. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear
weapons—a reality that effectively constrains the scope of direct confrontation. Hamas has no
nukes. But Israel could not root out Hamas without leveling Gaza and salting the earth. And,
Hamas knows that Israel’s humanity will constrain them the way nuclear weapons hold back
other states. The Gaza Wars will continue until the Palestinian people purge themselves of the
Hamas regime, throwing off the yoke of corruption, hate and economic repression. The United
States can best help not by brokering another deal, but by doing everything possible to undermine
Hamas. This means cutting off its sources of funding and support, attacking its legitimacy, and
publicizing its abuses and outrages. The end of this constant voice for violence is the truest path to
peace.
Hamas is focusing on procuring drones—not WMDs
Shani 6/21- correspondent for Haaretz, interviewing Liran Antebi, research fellow at the Institute
for National Security Studies and a doctoral candidate at Tel Aviv University (Ayelett, “How
terrorists and technology will shape future wars”, Haaretz, 6/21/15,
http://www.haaretz.com/news/features/.premium-1.661771)//WK
Instead of exploiting its power on the battlefield, it employs it in other areas. Can you illustrate how
this advantage is expressed in Israel’s war with Hamas? Yes. In the 1990s, suicide bombers
appeared on the scene. Israel used its technological superiority to locate, warn against and
eventually stop these attacks before they took place. The next phase was rocket fire. This
also led to a solution. The Iron Dome system? Correct. As it stands now, Hamas continues firing
rockets, but without making significant gains. One can see them searching for new methods,
probably via underground tunnels. Estimates are that this will also happen in the north, in the
next round of fighting in Lebanon. Hezbollah is also preparing the next thing. What is the next
thing? My assessment is that they will use technologies that used to be available only to
democracies, but are now easily obtainable by anyone, such as unmanned aerial vehicles.
This isn’t just limited to what they get from Iran, the Ababil drones, which are nothing more than
flying barrels of explosives, but also a lot more sophisticated yet cheap equipment. We see this
happening with Islamic State, which is making widespread use of drones that cost only $1,400
each. Anyone can purchase those on the Internet without being monitored.
No Israeli Nuke Lashout
No Israeli nukes—too casualty sensitive
Byman 14- director of research and a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at
Brookings (Daniel, “An Eye for a Tooth”, Brookings Institute, 7/24/14,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/07/24-israel-gaza-deterrence-byman)//WK
Despite Israel's efforts, the difficulties in harmonizing proportionality and deterrence are
many, and often it is impossible. Terrorist groups like Hamas do not wear uniforms. They hide
their fighters and weapons among the general population, launching rockets from hospitals and
hiding munitions in schools -- explicitly to make it difficult to target combatants and the supplies
they need without hitting civilians. Moreover, the media environment in Israel and Gaza is
intense and passionate: Millions can die in Congo with few noticing, but death and destruction
in the Promised Land is chronicled in minute detail. Because Israel is arguably the most
casualty-sensitive country in the world, deterrence is even harder. With nuclear weapons and
carpet-bombing off the table, Israel needs to go in on the ground to achieve its objectives -but ground operations can lead to Israeli casualties that actually undermine its deterrence. In
2011, it traded over 1,000 prisoners for Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas in 2006.
Israel has even traded high-level prisoners for the bodies of its dead soldiers. As a result, the body
counts for successful deterrence are often staggering and highly disproportionate: In the 2008-2009
Cast Lead operation, Israel killed more than 1,200 Palestinians and suffered only 13 losses of its own
-- roughly a 100-1 ratio. This, of course, makes Israel look even more callous. Even minor Hamas
victories complicate deterrence. In the first days of the current conflict, before Israel launched its
ground offensive, Hamas fired over 1,000 rockets, but the Iron Dome missile-defense system
prevented casualties on the Israeli side -- a one-sided outcome that made Israel look like the
only winner. The ground campaign, however, has so far led to 35 deaths on the Israeli side -- a
fraction of the estimated 700 in Gaza. That said, it's still a significant number for Israel, and Hamas
can claim it is making Israel pay in blood. Adding to the credibility of Hamas's claim, it continues
its rocket attacks, it may have captured an Israeli soldier (or at least his remains), and it temporarily
shut down Israel's international airport. These are victories -- at least political ones -- that allow
Hamas to claim that "resistance" is worthwhile and that make it less likely to be deterred than the last
time. Particularly because Hamas has been weakened from the Egyptian crackdown on its tunnel
network, such victories are necessary for the movement to sustain its authority.
Haqqani (Pakistan)
Not A Threat
Pakistan outlawed Haqqani after US pressure
Mehreen Zahra-Malik ’15, Reuter’s Pakistan correspondent (1/16, “Pakistan bans Haqqani network
after security talks with Kerry,” Reuter’s, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/16/us-pakistanmilitants-haqqani-idUSKBN0KP1DA20150116, lpc)
Pakistan has outlawed the Taliban-linked Haqqani network, officials said on Friday, days after
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry urged Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government to fight
groups that threaten Afghan, Indian and U.S. interests. American officials blame high-profile
attacks in Afghanistan on the powerful Haqqani network, which mainly operates out of
Pakistan's border areas, and say it has ties to the Pakistani state. Senior Pakistani government
officials told Reuters a formal announcement of the ban would be made "within weeks".
"We have decided to ban the Haqqani network as a step in implementing the National
Action Plan devised after the (Peshawar) school attack," said a cabinet member, referring to a
massacre of 134 children by Taliban gunmen last month. "The military and the government are on
the same page on how to tackle militancy. There is no more 'good' or 'bad' Taliban. "Kerry
specifically pressed for action against the Haqqanis, including banning the group," the official added.
A second official, a minister who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed the decision to
outlaw the Haqqani group.
Banning an organization means blocking their funding, offices, infrastructure
and communication – it’s significant
Zahid Gishkori ’15, US/Pakistan correspondant (1/15, “Revealed: Govt decides to ban Haqqani
Network, JuD,” The Express Tribune, http://tribune.com.pk/story/822087/revealed-govt-decidesto-ban-haqqani-network-jud/, lpc)
The executive director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Amir Rana, also called it a
‘significant move’. “This shows the civilian and military leadership are serious to choke militants
operating from Pakistan’s territory,” he told The Express Tribune. Banning an organisation
means freezing its assets, blocking funding sources and monitoring them properly, he said. In
the next move, the offices, infrastructures and networks of the proscribed groups will be
banned, he added. Though there is no specific mechanism of banning any organisation, the
government can review its policy towards banned outfits if they change their behaviour.
Hezbollah (Lebanon)
Not A Threat
International perception and cooperation has curbed Hezbollah’s divergence
from LAF
Anne Barnard ’14, New York Time’s Beirut correspondent (9/21, “Though Adversaries on the
Surface, U.S. and Hezbollah Share a Goal,” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/world/middleeast/though-adversaries-on-the-surface-usand-hezbollah-share-a-goal-.html, lpc)
BEIRUT, Lebanon — They are sworn enemies who insist they will never work together, but in
practice, Hezbollah and the United States are already working — separately — on a common
goal: to stop the extremist Islamic State from moving into Lebanon, where Hezbollah is the
most powerful military and political player and currently shares with Washington an interest in
stability. Weeks after Hezbollah, the Shiite militant group and political party, helped repel an Islamic
State attack on the town of Arsal on the Syrian border, new American weapons are flowing to
help the Lebanese Army — which coordinates with Hezbollah — to secure the frontier.
American intelligence shared with the army, according to Lebanese experts on Hezbollah,
has helped the organization stop suicide attacks on its domain in southern Beirut. A Turkish
soldier at the border in Suruc, Turkey, threw a pack of water Sunday to Syrian refugees fleeing
Islamic State militants. “The international community has an interest in isolating the Syria
crisis,” Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah’s newly appointed head of public relations and a media
adviser to its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said last week in a rare conversation. In the course of the
informal hour long meeting, he shed light on how the party views the often contradictory
tangle of alliances and interests in Syria’s civil war, many of them in flux as President Obama
contemplates expanding his military campaign against the Islamic State from Iraq into Syria. “All
have an interest to keep the peace” in Lebanon, Mr. Afif said, but added, “Everyone has their own
ways.” There are signs that Hezbollah, which the United States lists as a terrorist
organization, may see the fight against the Islamic State as an opportunity to gain legitimacy
by making the case that it is standing against terrorism . “We need to open up a new page
with the world media, with the Arabs and internationally,” declared Mr. Afif, a former director
of Hezbollah’s Al-Manar channel. He seemed to be starting the process by becoming the first senior
Hezbollah official in years to speak at length with The New York Times, in the party’s bright, airy,
new external media relations office.
US and British cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces checks
Hezbollah escalation
Lawrence Silverman ’14, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, UK (2/24,
“Lebanon at the Crossroads,” http://london.usembassy.gov/midest450.html, lpc)
Hezbollah's posture of acting inside the state when it is convenient, but stepping outside the
state to use arms and violence when it wishes, is deeply threatening. And now, extremists
fighting the Assad regime and Hezbollah backers have brought their fight inside Lebanon
through a wave of reprehensible terrorist attacks that have killed and injured scores in Beirut
and other cities. Amidst this, the Lebanese armed forces have acted to maintain internal security.
Just three days ago, two Lebanese armed forces soldiers were killed in a terrorist suicide
bombing. As you know, the LAF has had recent counterterrorism successes, capturing some
high-profile terrorists, including a facilitator for an al-Qaeda affiliate -- for al-Qaeda affiliated
groups responsible for several suicide bombings. These incidents highlight the ongoing dangers
from Hezbollah's support for the Assad regime and the flow of violent extremists, whether they
be from the al-Nusra front version in Lebanon, the Islamic state of Iraq in the Levant and the
Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which -- the last of which claimed responsibilities for the most recent
bombings. The critical material and training we provide to the LAF and the internal security
forces, builds their capacities to conduct operations against extremists, terrorists and criminal
organizations. My colleague, General Plehn, will offer details on this. We are trying to increase
our foreign military financing through the LAF in order to modernize it and build its
capabilities, particularly to secure its borders -- and its border with Syria. We need to maintain -Mr. Chairman, we need to maintain our strong partnership we have built with the LAF. We -and we appreciate Congress for its continued support for State and Defense programs that enhance
Lebanon's security and economic development. Mr. Chairman you -- you saw that -- and you said
that Lebanon hosts more Syrian refugees than any other country in the region, nearly 940,000 or
more. There is no a single Lebanese community that has not been affected by the refugee crisis. The
United States is doing its part to help Lebanon deal with the burden, providing over $340
million in assistance. We urge other countries to meet the pledges that they have made. There's
also a very damaging economic spillover through the tourism sector to investment and trade. The
World Bank has estimated that the crisis will cut real GDP growth by 2.9 percent this year. And
losses from the conflict would reach $7.5 billion.
Hezbollah popularity tanked – Syrian war and a series of indictments
weakened their reputation with Lebanon and radical Islamist groups
Sarah Schiesz ’14, Henley-Putnam University (“Hezbollah: Before and after the Syrian War,” pp. 4647, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2436197, lpc)
Hezbollah was attempting their political rebound in Lebanon when another series of events
setback their popularity even further. First, the UN indicted several top Hezbollah officials in the
assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005. Hezbollah condemned these indictments. Second, a series of
political revolutions, known as the Arab Spring, began to occur in North Africa and then swept
into the Middle East. Hezbollah initially was pragmatic in its approach to the unrest; the
Hezbollah plan appeared in part to stem from not wanting to alienate further the Lebanese
populace who had already been unsettled twice in five years by Hezbollah actions (Stratfor,
2012). Hezbollah gradually began supporting the Shiites in these nations that were experiencing
revolution; but it did not matter if the Shiites were the oppressed or the oppressors. (Alagha, 2013).
When Syria began to experience the tremors of revolution, Lebanese politicians began to
become concerned both because of its proximity to Syria and because of potential Hezbollah
reaction. Hezbollah had stated that it would not interfere in any military attack targeting Syria and
Iran unless there was an existential threat facing either regime. (Alagha, 2013). Najib Mikati, the
current Sunni Prime Minister of Lebanon, specifically stated when the Syrian revolution began
"the Lebanese government will pursue a line of "dissociation" from either side of the Syrian
conflict to keep the fighting from spilling across the border." (Saad, et al, 2013). Hezbollah
Secretary-General Nasrallah, however, opined that the Lebanese government needed to take a
more active role in finding a resolution to the Syrian conflict and to open the border between
Syria and Lebanon. Iran, meanwhile, began sending weapons, supplies and IRGC members
into Syria to help shore up the regime in order to protect the only ally that Iran has had for the last
forty years. (Rabil, 2013). It seemed to be a matter of not 'if' but 'when' Iran would call upon
Hezbollah to assist with Syria. Hezbollah officials, again trying to take a moderate approach,
denied that they would help Syria; that the main objective of Hezbollah was to protect Lebanon
from Israel (Daily Star, 2012). However, flare-ups began to occur on the border that Lebanon
shares with Syria, specifically in the Beka'a Valley, a Hezbollah stronghold (Hezbollah calls for Syria
Solution, 2013). Hezbollah militants began disappearing, followed soon after with funerals for
these militants to honor their 'martyr operations', without revealing just what these militants had
done that earned them the designation of 'martyr' (Yacoubian, 2013).
Integration with the Lebanese parliament signals a willingness to compromise
Filippo Dionigi ‘14, Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science, (December
“Hezbollah, Islamist Politics, and International Society,” Proquest, pp. 117, lpc)
Qāsim reports that a commission of notables within Hezbollah was asked to discuss various
questions in this respect. One of the fundamental issues was: “would participation be considered
a form of acquiescence to the political system’s reality, including the responsibility of adopting
and defending such a system and abandoning the Islamic vision?” Another question was: “would
participation lead to a reorganization of priorities of the type that would result in abandoning
the cause of the resistance in favour of taking part in the internal political game?”5Hezbollah
was fully aware of the impact that integration within Lebanese politics may have had over its
Islamic identity and, consequently, adopted measures to contain these effects. Eventually, the
decision to take part in politics was granted by a taḥkῑm (ruling) of the then Walῑ al-Faqῑh
Khamenei.6 A central concern in the debate was whether a political actor, whose legitimacy was
derived from the interpretation of Islamic principles, can become part of a non-Islamic political
system. The moral integrity of the movement could have been undermined by the secular
nature of the state as well as by the malpractices diffused in its administration, such as its
symptomatic corruption7 and its patron-client relations. To tackle this issue, Hezbollah reconfigured
its internal hierarchical structure, to which it added a Council of Parliamentary Activity (Majlis alʿAml al-Nῑābī) distinguished from the Political Council (Majlis al-Siyasī) of the party.8 The Council
of Parliamentary Activity was subordinate to the Shūrā Council (Majlis al-Shūrā), the top decisionmaking assembly of the movement that obeys the authority of the Walῑ al-Faqῑh. Any decision
taken by the Council of Parliamentary Activity is then under the scrutiny of an Islamic
authority and the same, in turn, happens with the decisions of the members of Hezbollah’s
parliamentary delegation whose members are nominated by the Shūrā Council.9 It is through this
mechanism that Hezbollah tried to contain the effects of its inclusion in the parliament.
Another measure of self-restraint to avoid contamination with Lebanese institutions was to limit
participation only to the legislative activity not taking part in the government, at least until 2005.
Whether these adjustments were effective remains disputed. In fact, Hezbollah’s participation
in parliamentary activity exposed it considerably to external influence. Ghorayeb argues that
Hezbollah’s participation in parliamentary politics represents a major shift in its relations
with the Lebanese state. Until the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1989, Hezbollah considered the state to be
illegitimate in many respects. Among these, there was the predominant role of the Maronite
community, its sectarian system, and the ambiguous stance of the Maronite-led state toward Israel.10
These points were made clear in the 1985 Open Letter, which defined the Lebanese state as
“rotten” and condemned it harshly as illegitimate. More generally (as observed previously),
Islamist political theory does not recognize the legitimacy of institutions that are not entirely founded
on Islamic principles and Lebanese institutions are certainly not among these.
Hezbollah adhering to UN rules signals ideological shift – their role is to deter
the further expansion of Israel
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 10-11, lpc)
If these elements constitute the foundations of a potential deterrence strategy of Hezbollah, this
latter grew in earnest only after the IDF withdrawal of South Lebanon in 2000. At first, Hezbollah
refused to recognize the new border circumscribed by the United Nations (UN) as the so-called
“blue line” in Resolution 425. But 2 years later, Nasrallah announced that the organization
would respect the demarcation. Meanwhile, Hezbollah made claims concerning the occupied
territories of the Shebaa Farms, and only engaged in low-intensity operations against Israel. This led
Israeli thinkers to consider that Hezbollah may accept certain rules of the games. In 2004, Daniel
Sobelman was optimistically evaluating for the Tel Aviv based Jaffee Center that “the creation of
‘rules of the game’ increases the chances that relative quiet will be preserved for a longer
period.”16 One could argue that after 2000, apart from the Shebaa theater, Hezbollah became a
status quo force. Only since then, has the rhetoric of deterrence progressively entered into
the discourse of Hezbollah’s militants and strategists. Today, the shelves of the bookstores in
the Dahya Janoubia of Beirut are filled with hagiographic books about the movement that detail the
military thinking of the Party. This literature, which proliferated after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal,
typically looks like propaganda documents masked into phony academic studies. But beyond the
bravado that may annoy readers not acquainted with Hezbollah’s rhetoric, these documents
sometimes contain elements that altogether constitute a coherent body of strategic thought.
Hezbollah has indeed produced a vast amount of strategic thinking since the end of the Israeli
occupation, either on the strategic values of its missiles or on the practice of psychological warfare.17
For instance, in his study on Hezbollah’s psychological warfare strategy, Lebanese political writer
Youssef Nasrallah uses a famous quote from Hassan Nasrallah, who back in 2000 portrayed Israel as
“a spider’s web” due to its aversion for protracted conflict and explains how this metaphor captures
the whole strategy of Hezbollah.18 There is explicit linkage in the Hezbollah literature between this
idea of Israel being a spider’s web and its rocket strategy. Specifically the arsenal plays a role
which transcends mere warfighting purpose; it is part of a mental bargain with Israel. In
other words, it is a tool of deterrence. As we will see in the next two sections, these
developments on both sides about deterrence did not stop after 2006, they actually grew
more sophisticated.
Hezbollah’s leadership is pragmatic - they won’t attack Israel unless provoked
or well equipped
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 8-10, lpc)
It can be argued that until the mid-1990s, the strategic culture of Hezbollah remained one of a
classic militia that relied on suicide attacks against military convoys as its primary tactics. The
political thinking within the Party of God in general, and vis-à-vis Israel in particular, evolved
dramatically in the aftermath of Lebanon’s civil war. In 1992, the accession of Hassan
Nasrallah to the position of secretary general following the assassination of Abbas Mussawi was
the starting point of a process of Lebanonization that eventually changed both political and
military cultures of the organization. The political strategy of Hassan Nasrallah is well known.
As Hezbollah became a player in postcivil war Lebanon, the new secretary general balanced
revolutionary rhetoric with electoral pragmatism.13 The military views of Nasrallah are less
documented. In response to Mussawi’s assassination on February 16, 1992, Hezbollah fired
the first katyusha rockets at Northern Israel. In the days that followed, Nasrallah delivered an
interview to Lebanese newspaper, As Safir, to discuss this new tactic. The interview can be identified
as a turning point in Hezbollah’s military strategy vis-à-vis Israel. True the revolutionary message of
the 1980s is still palpable: The long-term strategy of the Islamic Resistance is clear and does
not require additional explanation. It involves fighting against Israel and liberating
Jerusalem . . . namely, ending Israel as a state. But if Nasrallah qualifies this conflict with Israel
as an existential one, he also concedes later in the interview: We are not unrealistic. We do not
pretend that our military capabilities and the numbers of our mujahidin would be enough to
regain Jerusalem. . . . We do, however, believe that the resistance has to finish the job it started.14
This conclusion of Nasrallah on the military imbalance between his movement and the IDF is a
precious one as it paved the way to its strategy for the last 2 decades: We have to work instead
toward creating a situation in which the enemy is subject to our conditions. We should tell him: ‘If
you attack us, we will use our katyushas; if you do not attack us, we will not use our
katyushas’.15
Past disputes prove that Israel has the upper hand – Hezbollah won’t provoke
an attack
Jeffrey Goldberg ‘6, Jeffrey Goldberg is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a recipient of
the National Magazine Award for Reporting (“The Forgotten War, The New Yorker,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2006/09/11/the-forgotten-war, lpc)
Summer Rains is the forgotten Middle East war. Israel’s war in Lebanon, Operation Change of
Direction, dominated the world’s attention this summer. The Lebanon campaign was also set off
by a cross-border abduction—in this case, of two Israeli soldiers. Six years ago, under chronic
pressure from Hezbollah guerrillas, the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, unilaterally withdrew
his forces from south Lebanon, which Israel had occupied as a buffer zone since its invasion in
1982. Hezbollah exploited the 2000 withdrawal by entrenching guerrillas along the border,
and by importing, by some estimates, as many as thirteen thousand short- and mediumrange rockets from Syria and Iran. In this latest round of fighting, Hezbollah fired four
thousand rockets into Israel. The rockets reached targets thirty miles south of the border, but they
killed relatively few civilians—thirty-nine, eighteen of whom were Arabs. The Israeli counterattack
left more than a thousand Lebanese civilians dead; killed an unknown, but significant,
number of Hezbollah fighters; and inflicted serious damage in south Lebanon, the Bekaa
Valley, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Still, when a ceasefire was reached, last month, it
appeared as if the Israelis had been bested. Hezbollah had fought the Israeli Army to a nearstandstill, which on the organization’s terms represents a triumph. Hassan Nasrallah, the
Hezbollah chief, had become, in a matter of weeks, the most popular political figure in the Arab
world, even though he has since admitted that he underestimated the Israeli response to the
kidnapping that he ordered.
No Latin American Presence
Hezbollah’s role in Latin America is declining – thawing US/Venezuela
relations
Ben Cohen ’15, senior editor of The Tower, middle-eastern politics (1/6, “Hezbollah’s ‘Golden
Days’ in Latin America are Coming to an End, Experts Say,” The Algemeiner,
http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/01/06/hezbollahs-golden-days-in-latin-america-coming-to-anend-expert-says/, lpc)
The rapidly changing diplomatic and political circumstances in Latin America mean that
“Hezbollah’s golden days” in the region are coming to an end, an expert on the Lebanese
Islamist terrorist organization has asserted. Writing on the NOW-Lebanon website, journalist Ana
Maria Luca observed that “things are changing drastically in the region. The late President Hugo
Chavez, America’s most ostentatious enemy in the region, is gone. The times when Hezbollah
members got Venezuelan papers to travel to the United States and Canada are probably over.
Cuba — another country warmly disposed towards Iran, has recently seen an unprecedented thawing
of relations with the US.” Luca noted that Hezbollah was perturbed by the thawing of US-Cuba
relations announced last month by President Obama. “This is how Hezbollah’s international
relations official, Ammar Mousawi, congratulated Cuba,” she wrote. “‘The achievements of
Cuba, which was firm in its principles, are a lesson for all peoples of the world who suffer from
American hegemony,’ calling on the regime in Havana to ‘thwart the political, economic and
military siege of Washington against Cuba for over half a century.'”
Houthis (Yemen)
No Impact on Bab al-Mandab
Houthis have no impact on shipping—Kuwaiti oil proves
Young 3/29- correspondent for the International Business Times, internally cites Sheikh Talal
Khaled al-Sabah, spokesman for the Kuwaiti government (Angelo, “War In Yemen: Tankers Moving
Unimpeded Through Bab Al-Mandeb Oil Shipment Choke Point, Says Kuwait Petroleum
Corporation”, International Business Times, 3/29/15, http://www.ibtimes.com/war-yemen-tankersmoving-unimpeded-through-bab-al-mandeb-oil-shipment-choke-point-1863060)//WK
Kuwaiti oil tankers have had no problem passing through a narrow strait between war-torn
Yemen and Djibouti, one of seven so-called choke points in the worldwide delivery of oil, the stateowned Kuwait Petroleum Corp. (KPC) said Sunday. Yemen’s strategic location for the
movement of crude from the Middle East to Europe and the U.S. has raised concerns that
the unrest in Yemen could endanger tankers passing through the strait. “Kuwait oil tankers are
smoothly navigating through Bab Al-Mandeb Strait and the region has not been affected by
the Saudi-led military operations against the Houthi militias in Yemen,” said a statement
published Sunday by the official Kuwait News Agency, citing KPC spokesman Sheikh Talal Khaled
Al-Sabah. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that 3.8 million barrels of oil
passed through the strait every day in 2013, making it the fourth-largest choke point after the Strait
of Hormuz, between the United Arab Emirates and Iran; the Strait of Malacca, between Malaysia and
Indonesia; and Egypt’s Suez Canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Bab Al-Mandeb
Strait is typically heavily guarded because of persistent attempts by pirates from nearby
Somalia to hijack oil tankers and hold them for ransom. In 2008, pirates seized Saudi Arabia’s
massive Sirius Star supertanker and held it for months before a $3 million ransom was paid. Navies
from Russia, Ukraine, India, the U.S., Britain and France routinely patrol the waters.
Not Seeking Control of Bab al-Mandab
Houthis won’t seize Bab al-Mandab—Egyptian and Saudi intervention, lack
of domestic and Iranian support
Salisbury 14- New York-based British journalist and analyst covering issues of politics, economics
natural resources, diplomacy and humanitarian affairs, mainly in the Middle East and North East
Africa. Former energy editor, Middle East Economic Digest (Peter, “Houthi expansion threatens
Yemen’s strategic Bab al-Mandab strait”, Financial Times, 10/23/14,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/444765c0-59dc-11e4-978700144feab7de.html#axzz3eNdnCa00)//WK
A Yemeni government official said talks with Egypt over the incident were continuing, without
giving further details. Egyptian diplomats are said to be furious and Cairo has already warned
that it may intervene militarily if the Houthis take control of Bab al-Mandab. But Hussein alBokhaiti, a pro-Houthi activist, said concerns the Yemeni group would seek to take control of
Bab al-Mandab were overplayed. “This is just propaganda against us, to make the international
community and Egypt fear us. All the areas we are in Yemen is where we have a popular base.
We do not have support around Bab al-Mandab so we would not go there.” Developments on
the strait are also unnerving Saudi Arabia. Riyadh believes the Houthis are backed by Iran, and
worries that its regional rival could be using its influence to disrupt Red Sea trade. Tehran has
threatened in the past to block the Straits of Hormuz, the region’s other chokepoint, through which a
fifth of global oil supply passes on a daily basis. Richard Dalton, a former UK ambassador to Iran
and an associate fellow at the UK think-tank Chatham House, said it was unlikely Tehran would
seek to work with the Houthis to disrupt trade, as it would not take the risk of provoking a
wider conflict in the region. “[The Iranians] are very pro-free passage for everyone in their
waterways. They only get bellicose when people threaten to make the Gulf, which is their
lifeline, unusable by them, especially for oil exports.”
ISIS (Greater Syria/Iraq)
No Chem Weapons
Low threat – loss of expertise
Kumar 15
/31 January 2015, Anugrah Kumar is a Christian Post Contributor, ISIS Chemical Weapons Expert
Killed in US Airstrike; Al-Qaeda Grew 'Fourfold in 5 Years,' Former General Says,
http://www.christianpost.com/news/isis-chemical-weapons-expert-killed-in-us-airstrike-al-qaedagrew-fourfold-in-5-years-former-general-says-133384, spark/
The Islamic State terror group's chemical weapons specialist who once worked for
Saddam Hussein has been killed in a U.S.-led airstrike in Iraq, but a former vice chief of staff of
the U.S. Army warns that al-Qaeda has "grown fourfold in the last five years." The suspect, identified as Abu Malik, was
reportedly killed in an airstrike near Mosul last Saturday, the US Central Command said Friday, according to Agence France
Presse. Malik
was a chemical weapons engineer for Saddam Hussein, but supposedly
sided with al-Qaeda after Iraq's invasion and then joined ISIS, or Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria which is also known as ISIL. " His death is expected to temporarily degrade
and disrupt the terrorist network and diminish ISIL's ability to potentially produce
and use chemical weapons against innocent people," the Command said in a
statement.
No Attacks on West
ISIS won’t attack the west—smuggling routes are too risky
Su 14- correspondent for the International Business Times, internally cites UN Ambassador to Iraq
Mohamed Ali Alhakin (Reissa, “ISIS Threatens Use of Nuclear Bomb in London; UN Ambassador
Warns of 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'”, International Business Times, 12/2/14,
http://www.ibtimes.com.au/isis-threatens-use-nuclear-bomb-london-un-ambassador-warnsweapons-mass-destruction-1393880)//WK
In what may be viewed as a veiled threat, the British ISIS supporter added that it would be
"terribly destructive" if it exploded in London. His account on Twitter has since been suspended
after posting his comments. As a show of support, other ISIS fighters also posted on Twitter to
confirm that militants have in their possession a bomb from radioactive material in Mosul. Reports
of ISIS having a nuclear device have alarmed the UN Ambassador to Iraq Mohamed Ali
Alhakin. He wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and revealed that ISIS has
been taking nuclear material from areas where the group has taken over. The ambassador
informed the UN that such material can be used to manufacture "weapons of mass destruction."
Alhakin warned that nuclear materials, even in limited quantities, can enable terrorist groups
like ISIS to use it in the militants' terror campaign with the help a weapons expert. The
Mirror speculates that if ISIS has a nuclear bomb, the group would more likely use it in Iraq or
Syria rather than risk being caught when smuggling it into a Western country. Previous
reports indicate that if ISIS was confirmed to have weapons of mass destruction or a nuclear bomb,
U.S. President Barack Obama would not hesitate to send ground troops to destroy ISIS.
Surveillance Doesn’t Solve
ISIS is more difficult to track than past terror groups – its small, random
targets and untrained, local recruits make it harder to predict
Max Fisher ’15, content director at vox (6/26, “A day of global terror: horrifying attacks strike
France, Tunisia, and Kuwait,” Vox World, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/26/8851221/terror-isisfrance-kuwait-tunisia, lpc)
Someone who works on Middle Eastern security issues recently remarked to me that one of the
things that kept us safest from al-Qaeda was the group's own tactical shortsightedness. AlQaeda's obsession with symbolically rich targets and with spectacular, centrally planned
attacks made its plots difficult to execute and, after 2001, easier to track and to stop. If alQaeda had ever figured out how much terror it could sow by attacking smaller targets like shopping
malls or public parks, he pointed out, the group would have been far harder to stop — and its
psychological toll on Americans would have been far greater. ISIS, he worried, may be the threat
that we always worried al-Qaeda would become. Its focus on small-scale violence against
more modest targets is much harder to defend against. Its strategy of indirectly "inspiring" local
recruits makes those recruits less capable, as they lack training, but also harder to spot. And now,
as ISIS veterans of Syria and Iraq return home, the group's reach and its members' expertise will both
deepen. It is the group's embrace of random violence for the sake of little more than random
violence, at times too extreme even for al-Qaeda, that is perhaps most disconcerting of all.
How are counterterrorism officials supposed to anticipate the next moves of a disparate and
disorganized group far more nihilistic than al-Qaeda? How are citizens in targeted countries
supposed to absorb this new danger, however remote, into their understanding of when, and where,
they are safe? The senseless and seemingly meaningless violence we saw unfold today on three
difference continents may yet just be a dark coincidence. But it bears striking resemblance to the
predictions of a new phase of global terrorism, one ushered in both by ISIS and its battlefield
decline, that is fundamentally different from al-Qaeda in ways we are still only coming to
understand.
AT: Pakistan Support
Pakistan won’t help ISIS – it’s all rhetoric
Nanjappa 15 (Vicky, special correspondent in OneIndia’s news channel,/1/15, One India, “Pakistan
nukes for ISIS: Should India be concerned,” http://www.oneindia.com/international/nukes-for-isisshould-india-be-concerned-1763993.html, JHR)
New Delhi, June 1: Last week an in-house magazine of the ISIS claimed that it would obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan.
While there is not an iota of doubt that rogue scientists in Pakistan are capable of selling
nuclear technology to terrorist groups, it still is a difficult proposition, security experts in India say. India has,
however, expressed a great deal of concern and at an event in Singapore, India's Minister of State for Defence, Rao Inderjit Singh said that ISIS could obtain a
nuclear weapon from states like Pakistan. "With the rise of the ISIS in West Asia, one is afraid to an extent that perhaps they might get access to a nuclear
The ISIS has termed the
purchasing of nuclear weapons as a "hypothetical operation." It had stated last week in an in-house magazine that it could procure
nuclear weapons from corrupt officials and scientists in Pakistan . While there is no doubt that there are rogue officials in Pakistan
who could sell nuclear weapons to the ISIS, the other issue on hand is how much is the terror group
willing to shell out. The group is worth 2 billion dollars in terms of assets and has 400 million dollars in cash. This would mean that they would buy the smaller nuclear
arsenal from states like Pakistan," the minister also pointed out. Can the ISIS really buy nuclear weapons?
weapons. It would also largely depend on how they will be able to strike a deal with the rogue scientists and corrupt officials in Pakistan. More propaganda: The ISIS, like the Taliban in
They want to rule a country and not sit on the sidelines like the Al-Qaeda
and carry out specific attacks. Hence for an ISIS or a Taliban it becomes all the more necessary to talk big and as part of its propaganda claim that it can access
nuclear weapons too.
Afghanistan, seeks to go beyond a terrorist group.
Jabhat Al-Nusra (Syria)
Weak/Not A Threat
al-Nusra took a blow from the death of their senior commander
Gannon 15
/17 March 2015, Derek Gannon, SOFREP Radio, Jabhat al-Nusra Senior Leader Killed in Syria, Gulf
States Seek Deal, http://sofrep.com/40241/jabhat-al-nusra-senior-leader-killed-syria-gulf-states-seekdeal, spark/
On Friday, March 6th, the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) announced the death of an
important senior commander within the rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra, General Abu
Hammam al-Shami, also known as Abu al-Farouq al-Suri. Al-Shami was a prominent
figure in the command structure of al-Nusra and influential within al-Qaeda central
command . The Syrian government confirmed SANA reporting by claiming to have conducted
an air strike that targeted a high-level rebel forces meeting in Idlib, just 50 kilometers southwest of Aleppo.
A Syrian spokesperson went on to state the air strike was in retaliation for the swift and
bloody attack on the intelligence headquarters of Syria’s air force on March 4th, which claimed 20
members of the Syrian security force. The degree of the air strike’s success is becoming more apparent; news reports flowing in are
providing confirmation that not only did al-Shami meet his demise, but several other al-Nusra commanders met theirs as well.
Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia)
Not A Threat
Even if some threats persist—JI is significantly weakened
Liepman and Mudd 14- *senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and former deputy
director of the National Counterterrorism Center, **former deputy director of the CIA's
Counterterrorist Center (Andrew and Philip, “War with ISIS: What does victory look like?”, CNN,
9/25/14, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/25/opinion/liepman-mudd-isis/)//WK
We know by now that in no cases have the adversary's radical ideology been defeated. The
most striking successes, such as Indonesia's evisceration of the Jemaah Islamiya
organization and African forces' push against Al-Shabaab in Somalia, have only limited the reach
of al Qaedism but failed to fully stem the flow of recruits to al Qaeda affiliates or squelch the
ideology that underpins its festering. We have too many reminders of the resilience of this
particularly violent ideology to think that it can be eliminated. Despite counterterrorism successes,
Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia still lies dormant and remains potentially dangerous, as recent
Indonesian arrests show.
Structure is too centralized—JI is incredibly vulnerable
Morehouse 14- Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska–Lincoln (Matthew, “It's
Easier to Decapitate a Snake than It Is a Hydra: An Analysis of Colombia's Targeted Killing
Program”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 37, Issue 7, 6/9/14, Taylor and Francis)//WK
The literature on the organizational structure of militant groups suggests that centralized
organizations are likely to be harmed by the loss of their leaders. Marc Sageman has argued that
centralized, hierarchical militant groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, are
particularly vulnerable to being harmed by the loss of their top leadership due to their
reliance on the highest commanders for the control of the day-to-day operations and
planning for the organization. Audrey Cronin discusses the case of Sendero Luminoso, a highly
centralized Peruvian militant organization, which essentially fell apart after the arrest of its founder
and top leader. Anthony Celso has examined Al Qaeda’s shift from a centralized to a decentralized
organization, finding that Al Qaeda changed its organizational structure in response to the U.S.
occupation of Afghanistan and the deaths of many members of its mid-level leadership. This
suggests that centralized groups may see themselves as being vulnerable to such operations.
Hence, it is reasonable to hold that decentralized groups are not as badly harmed by leadership
deaths as would be centralized groups.
AT: Southeast Asian Stability
No impact—ASEAN co-op checks, and JI is far too weak
Storey 1/23- Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) (Ian, “The United
States and ASEAN-China Relations: All Quiet On The Southeast Asian Front”, Maroon Ebooks,
1/23/15, pg. 1-2)//WK
Depending on one’s perspective, Southeast Asia in the early 21st century is either a glass half full or a
glass half empty. The glass is half full in the sense that for the majority of countries in
Southeast Asia, these are relatively stable, peaceful, and prosperous times. The economies of
the region have either recovered fully, or are well on their way to full recovery, from the
disastrous 1997-1998 Asian Financial Crisis, Singapore and Malaysia have registered strong economic
growth, while Vietnam has become the darling of foreign investors, and in 2006 its gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate was second only to the PRC in Asia. Indonesia and the Phillippines
are experiencing good levels of growth (506 percent), while even Laos and Cambodia are
achieving respectable levels of GDP growth. At the political level, the region has witnessed
smooth leadership transition in several countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Vietnam) and, most importantly, democracy is being consolidated in Indonesia, Southeast
Asia’s largest, and arguably most important, country. Indonesia is also witnessing perhaps the
world’s most successful peace process in Aceh. At the security level, although territorial disputes
continue to simmer, there is no danger that any of these will result in outright conflict.
Indeed the chance of interstate conflict between the ASEAN states is almost (but not
entirely) unthinkable. Transnational networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah have been
disrupted (but not destroyed); piracy attacks are down thanks partly to the cooperative efforts
of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; and in the Philippines, there are cautious grounds for
optimism that a peace deal for Mindanao can be concluded in 2007. At the corporate level, ASEAN
has embraced a vision for the future—the ASEAN Community 2015—and efforts are underway to
frame a charter for the next ASEAN summit in November 2007 which will give the organization
legal underpinnings for the first time ever.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Kashmir)
Not A Threat
No threat – LeT hasn’t waged a successful terrorist attack in 10 years
Stephen Tankel ‘9, Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and
(April/May, “Political Violence Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai,” The International Centre
for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence,”
http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/Tankel_01.pdf,
lpc)
Al-Qaeda Central has not managed a successful attack against Western targets outside of
Pakistan since at least 2005, when it is alleged to have been involved in the London tube
bombings. Despite its global jihadi rhetoric the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb –
alQaeda Central’s most prolific branch – has not successfully perpetrated a single attack outside
of Algeria since joining al-Qaeda Central. Its high-profile bombing of the headquarters of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Algiers in December 2007 killed only one
Westerner. In the last three years, the most successful ‘terrorist spectacular’ against Western targets
outside of Afghanistan, Iraq or Pakistan was Lashkar-e-Taiba’s sixty-hour operation in Mumbai
during the final days of November 2008. Those sixty hours brought Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT or
Lashkar) to the attention of the world, but the group has played a role in threatening the West
for a number of years. Since 2001, LeT has remained primarily focused on liberating Kashmir
and waging a wider war against India. However, during that time it has also waged a peripheral
campaign against the West. In the early part of the decade, this was mainly in the form of
training and logistical support to al-Qaeda and others in Pakistan who were actively waging a
global jihad. Weakened by the West’s War on Terror, al-Qaeda and its allies needed the assistance.
Over time, as al-Qaeda and the Taliban grew stronger and more prolific in Pakistan, LeT’s role and
relevance within the jihadi movement diminished.
No threat to the US – LeT is ideologically anti-American but they haven’t
developed any strategies
Mohammad Waqas Sajjad and Jawad Ahmad ’11, *PhD candidate, Theological Union at UC
Berkeley ** Department of Electrical Engineering, HITEC University, Pakistan (9/30, “Lashkar-eTayyiba and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa: the case for a Pakistani narrative,” Strategic Studies, vol. 33,
ProQuest, lpc)
Hafiz Saeed, the erstwhile leader of LeT who now heads JuD and constantly denies any links
between the two, commands respect and wields significant power. While strong anti-Indian
sentiments are part of his message, focused attention on a global jihad has not emerged.
Indeed, there are comments against the West – but that has not been adopted in the modus
operandi specifically of Hafiz Saeed, JuD or LeT. Rather, such anti-Americanism is pervasive in
society25 and finds outlets through many religious and non-religious groups. It becomes a
self-legitimising trademark of conservatism against liberalism of the West and should be seen in the
same context. Is it dangerous – yes; but is it showing a „global‟ role for the LeT or Hafiz
Saeed – not more so than it is doing the same for hundreds of other political, social and
religious organizations and individuals in Pakistan and all over the world. That said, the
Lashkar‟s image as having a „maximalist agenda for global jihad‟26 is enhanced through its own
rhetoric. In a Markaz publication explaining its jihad, the United States, India and Israel are seen as
enemies. Reasons put forward include the need to „eliminate evil and facilitate conversion to Islam‟,
to „avenge the blood of Muslims‟ and „liberate Muslim territories under non-Muslim occupation‟.27
PKK (Turkey)
No Attacks
PKK goal is democracy in Turkey - no international objectives
International Crisis Group ’14, co-chaired by Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown, former UN Deputy
Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
(11/6, “Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process,”
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/234-turkey-and-the-pkksaving-the-peace-process.pdf, lpc)
The PKK’s official goal is “democratic autonomy” for Kurds, a vague concept that it says is
firmly situated within Turkey’s borders. Nonetheless, the government and many Turks remain
suspicious that the PKK is merely concealing the old aim of an independent state.69 Published
reports of parades of local “self-defence” militias and the way local PKK units sometimes
behave as impromptu courts show how the PKK is using the ceasefire to build up parallel
structures to the state in the south east.
No Threat
Peace building process is underway – negotiations prove
Andolu Ajansi ’15, press agency in Turkey (6/3, “'Solution process' opened new era in Turkey:
Erdoga,” Lexis Nexis, lpc)
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the "solution process" with the banned
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) will continue irrespective of Turkey's upcoming June 7 election
result. Addressing a rally in Turkey's eastern Bingol province Wednesday, Erdogan said: "We
initiated the solution process with our people and for the sake of our people. We will sustain
it likewise." He added: "There is no relation between the solution process and election results."
The president again slammed the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP) for its alleged
collaboration with the PKK. "They are trying to threaten the people and [are doing] politics by
saying: 'If we do not enter the parliament, there will be chaos.' They cannot do anything. The
government stands by our citizens with all its power and opportunities. We did not initiate the
solution process with them [the HDP]," Erdogan said. The "solution process" refers to the 2013
initiative of the AK Party government that aims to end the decades-old conflict with
the PKK, which has claimed the lives of more than 40,000 people. The PKK is listed as a terrorist
group by Turkey as well as by the U.S. and the European Union. "We opened doors to a new era
via the solution process in our country," Erdogan said. He added that Turkey would realize
the "solution process" despite the "parallel state".
Kurdish national movement and PKK are negotiating
International Crisis Group ’14, co-chaired by Lord (Mark) Malloch-Brown, former UN Deputy
Secretary-General and Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme
(11/6, “Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process,”
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/234-turkey-and-the-pkksaving-the-peace-process.pdf, lpc)
As spillover from Middle East conflicts open up dangerous old ethnic, sectarian and political fault
lines in Turkey, the government and the PKK must seek a common end goal that goes beyond
a mere maintenance of a peace process. The government must create the legal and political
conditions, process and context that will build confidence. But the PKK also needs to convince
Turkish, Kurdish and international opinion that it can be a democratic actor, ready to disarm
and transform into a political group. If it desires peace, the Kurdish national movement in
Turkey cannot continue to be both an armed opposition force and a candidate for
governmental responsibility, and must be clear on what kind of decentralisation it seeks. This
deal will need compromise from both sides. Only in this way can Turkey shift a longstanding
burden of civil conflict off the back of its armed forces, its economy, democratisation efforts and the
security of its borders. Likewise, an end of the insurgency is the only way the
PKK will be able to come home to represent its Kurdish constituency inside Turkey’s legal
political system, and achieve its stated goal of democratic rights for all in the country.
Taliban (Afghanistan)
Not A Threat
Taliban undermined by Afghan elections – no longer powerful enough to pose
an existential threat
Kevin Sieff ‘14, post’s Nairobi chief (6/15, “Taliban’s existential threat to Afghanistan wanes, but
next president faces big problems,” Washington Post
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/talibans-existential-threat-to-afghanistan-wanes-but-nextpresident-faces-big-problems/2014/06/15/fc8d49c7-8029-4a79-8d1e-5ed3396aab72_story.html, lpc)
KABUL — As Afghans wait for the results from this weekend’s presidential election, it is
becoming increasingly clear that the Taliban — which failed to undermine the vote — no
longer represents an existential threat to the country’s government. But that is of little solace
to the millions of Afghans who may face a graver enemy in the government itself — a bundle
of inept and corruption-plagued institutions whose actions could threaten the gains of the past
decade. About 7 million voters turned out Saturday, a showing some Afghans read as a repudiation
of the Taliban and others saw as a sign of the electorate’s desperation to reform a host of public
institutions.
Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka)
Not A Threat
Tamil Tigers are no longer a threat—eviscerated by Sri Lankan government
Gupta 14- Distinguished Professor in the Department of Political Science at San Diego State
University (Dipak, “Ahmed S. Hashim. When
Counterinsurgency Wins? Sri Lanka's
Defeat of the Tamil Tigers”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 3/10/14, Vol. 26 Issue 2, Taylor and
Francis)//WK
While the last standing superpower is still mired in a fight with al-Qaeda and its affiliates from
Boston to Benghazi, China is still fighting the Uighurs, Burma, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen are awash
with their own insurgencies, and Sri Lanka serves as the shining star of counterterrorism
policies. What is most surprising is that it had defeated the most implacable foe, which was
able to transform a terrorist movement into a full-scale insurgency with astounding speed. In
the contemporary annals of terrorist groups, the Tamil Tigers stood at the top. Within a decade of its
formation, it not only held a definite territory, it had a trained army and even had a
rudimentary air force and a navy. It had reinvented suicide bombing and was able to use it as
one of its most lethal weapons. In all, the LTTE had all the credentials to be considered the most
formidable enemy of a nation, which did not even have a formal defense force, since it did not
anticipate any attacks from the outside. After nearly two decades of fighting for an independent
Tamil state (Eelam), 2001 saw the end of the third phase of the war. Although both sides were
exhausted, at the time, it seemed that the Tigers had the upper hand in the fight. The Sri Lankan
military was demoralized by its remarkable defeat at the Elephant Pass. Yet, in a matter of eight
years, the Sri Lankan military achieved a nearly impossible goal when in May 2009, they
achieved a total victory over the insurgent group. Instantly, as the news spread of the demise of
the LTTE, the tearshaped island nation located at the foot of India turned into a superstar among
those nations bogged down in their own asymmetric warfare.
US-Based
No Terror
No risk of homegrown terrorism
Friedman, Fellow Defense Studies at Cato, 7-17-’12 (Benjamin, “Homegrown Failure: Why the
Domestic Terror Threat Is Overblown” Nato Review,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/homegrown-failure-why-domestic-terror-threat-isoverblown)
Homegrown terrorism is not becoming more common and dangerous in the United States,
contrary to warnings issuing regularly from Washington. American jihadists attempting local attacks are predictably
incompetent, making them even less dangerous than their rarity suggests.¶ Janet Napolitano, Secretary of
Homeland Security, and Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, are among legions of experts and officials who have recently warned
of a rise in homegrown terrorism, meaning terrorist acts or plots carried out by American citizens or long-term residents, often without guidance from foreign
organisations.¶ But homegrown American terrorism is not new.¶ Leon Czolgosz, the anarchist who assassinated President McKinley in 1901, was a native-born
American who got no foreign help. The same goes for John Wilkes Booth, Lee Harvey Oswald and James Earl Ray. The deadliest act of domestic terrorism in
U.S. history, the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, was largely the work of New York-born Gulf War vet, Timothy McVeigh.¶ As Brian Michael Jenkins of
there is far less homegrown terrorism today than in the 1970s
RAND notes,
, when the Weather Underground, the
Jewish Defense League, anti-Castro Cuban exile groups, and the Puerto Rican Nationalists of the FALN were setting off bombs on U.S. soil. ¶ There was an
increase in homegrown terrorism arrests in the late 2000s, with the decade's high coming in 2009. That year saw the decade's deadliest act of homegrown
terrorism when Nidal Hasan killed thirteen people at Ft. Hood. Homegrown terrorism has declined since. According a report published earlier this year by
Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina, arrests of homegrown terrorists fell from 47 in 2009 to 20 in 2011. No more successful plots have
doubt that the recent increase in homegrown terrorism arrests reflected
an increase in actual terrorism. One reason is random variation. Because a run of aces may be due to chance, it does make the next
gamble is good one. Similarly, a spate of homegrown terrorism does not necessarily indicate a continuing trend. ¶ Second, as Jenkins notes, a sizeable
minority of those arrested for terrorism in the late 2000s were U.S. nationals trying to help
the al-Shabaab group in Somalia, either by recruiting, fundraising or joining its ranks. That counts as terrorism because the U.S.
occurred.¶ There are reasons to
government categories al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation and criminalises support for it. But it is an insurgent organisation chiefly interested in Somalia
politics that has not attempted terrorism in the United States. With Ethiopian forces occupying parts of Somalia from 2006-2009, many in the Somali diaspora
saw support for al-Shabaab as a defense of their homeland. Those that aid or join it are not necessarily interested in terrorism, let alone terrorism against
Americans.¶ Third, U.S. authorities began to search harder for terrorists at home. After the September 11, the FBI received a massive boost in
counterterrorism funding and shifted a small army of agents from crime-fighting to counterterrorism. Many joined new Joint Terrorism Task Forces.
Ambitious prosecutors increasingly looked for terrorists to indict. Most states stood up intelligence fusion centers, which the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) soon fed with threat intelligence.¶ The intensification of the search was bound to produce more arrests, even without more terrorism, just as
the Inquisition was sure to find more witches. Of course, unlike the witches, only a minority of those found by this search are innocent. But many seem like
suggestible idiots unlikely to have produced workable plots without the help of FBI informants or undercover agents taught to induce criminal conduct
without engaging in entrapment.¶ Take Rezwan Ferdaus, the 26-year-old who lived with his parents outside Boston before his arrest last fall. He allegedly
planned to fly small remote-controlled airplanes carrying a few pounds of explosives into the Pentagon and Capitol dome, assuming they would easily collapse.
A second attack would somehow destroy the bridges at the Pentagon complex, before a six-man team armed with AK-47s attacked the survivors. Happily,
Ferdaus had no accomplices, aside from those provided by the FBI, no money for the planes, other than what the FBI loaned him, and no explosives, beyond
fakes sort that the FBI provides.¶ The officials and pundits most worried about homegrown terrorists claim that Americans are lucky to have enemies like
Ferdaus. They say the same of Faizal Shahzad, whose car bomb failed to explode in Times Square, Nazibullah Zazi, who could not make a working bomb
despite the training he got on the subject in Pakistan, and the many other incompetents that have lately attempted terrorism in the United States. ¶
Homegrown American jihadists cannot acquire the funds and training needed for terroristic
expertise. Most would quickly kill themselves once they achieved it despite their serial failure, U.S. leaders describe homegrown terrorists as cunning and
their threat as great. Napolitano says they are especially dangerous because they can come from "any direction, and with little or no warning." Mueller warns
that they "understand our culture, our security protocols, and our vulnerabilities. They use the Internet, social media, and marketing skills to influence like-
The failure of U.S.-born jihadists, however, reflects more than luck. There are at least two good
reasons for it. The first is al Qaeda's ideology. By supporting the murder of most people, including most
Muslims, al Qaeda ensures that it remains wildly unpopular in most places. Their ideology is especially
minded individuals."¶
noxious to those living in coherent, liberal societies like the United States. Americans drawn to al Qaeda are likely to be a troubled and disaffected lot, lacking
A more important reason source of failure is organisational
weakness. Mass violence has historically been the product of bureaucratic, hierarchical organisations that belong to states or insurgencies resembling
traits that most organisations value in recruits.¶
them. Only bureaucratic organisations who have the tools train and motivate many to act on the orders of a few, which is historically how mass violence with
bureaucratic organisations alone have
got the physical security, expertise and capital need to manufacture mass killing weapons like
artillery, strike aircraft, and nuclear weapons.¶ Because they are generally clandestine,
terrorist groups usually lack these attributes. They struggle to gain and transfer deadly knowledge, amass wealth, build the
small arms occurred. As agents of states or other organisations that monopolise violence,
physical plants needed to make sophisticated weapons or mass enough manpower to sustain attacks on populations. Those flaws are especially evident in al
Homegrown American
jihadists, who generally lack guidance even from al Qaeda's withering core, are about the
Qaeda, which has always been more a loosely linked set of radicals than an organisation that commands adherents. ¶
least organised terrorists imaginable. They cannot acquire the funds and training needed for
terroristic expertise. Most would quickly kill themselves once they achieved it.¶ Contrary to much recent analysis, the internet does
not solve these problems. As Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has shown, online guides to
bomb-making, poison manufacture and other tools of mayhem provide unreliable
information. Authorities can monitor such sites or set up their own to mislead or trap malfeasants.¶ Moreover, internet-based instruction does not
provide the sort of rapid interaction between trainer and trainee that characterises most successful training in complex tasks. The internet is an even more
useless for mastering acts of violence that require teamwork. There is a reason why organisations that effectively coordinate activity, whether it is the Marines
Corps or Real Madrid, avoid virtual training.¶ If DHS is right that homegrown terrorists are now a bigger threat than the international variety, we should
Even if American-born jihadists grow more numerous and skilled, which now seems
unlikely, they will remain far less deadly than the terrorist supervillains we have been taught
to expect. They will never compare to big risks to American longevity like heart disease and depression.
celebrate.
Types
Agroterrorism
Agroterrorism unlikely
Chalk, Rand, ‘7 (Peter, “Agroterrorism What Is the Threat and What Can Be Done About It?”
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB7565/index1.html)
Despite the ease and implications of a successful attack, agroterrorism is unlikely to
constitute a primary form of terrorist aggression because it lacks a single, highly visible point
of focus for the media (a primary consideration in any terrorist attack). However, disrupting
the food sector could well emerge as a viable secondary modus operandi to further destabilize an
already disoriented society after a conventional terrorist campaign. Being able to use cheap and
unsophisticated means to undermine a state’s economic base gives this form of aggression a high
cost/benefit payoff that would be very useful to groups faced with overcoming significant power
asymmetries.
No risk of agroterrorism
Adam, Institut für Angewandte Botanik, ‘6 (Gunter, “Significant Ways to Spread Plant Virus
Diseases in Agricultural Ecosystems: is Agroterrorism Possible?” Virus diseases and crop biosecurity,
p 53-54
Considering the arguments given above, it appears that plant viruses are suitable agents for terroristic
activities against agro-industry. I have tried to list the advantages and disadvantages from a terrorist's
point of view. It becomes quite clear that the successful use of plant viruses as a terror agent
against agro-industry requires quite a bit of effort, not only financial but also scientific input
and it has definitely not the same frightening effects as explosives or bloodshed in a civilian
surrounding. In summary of what has been said about the suitability of plant viruses in Table 2it can
be stated that yes, plant viruses are suitable and have many features that might make them
attractive especially for low technology groups. However, the scientific knowledge about the
target, the compatibility of the agents with the target, besides the capability to obtain,
propagate and deliver it appropriately are no trivial factors and might rather lead to the
opinion they have no practical terroristic value. If however, a decision is made for plant viruses
to be used as agents, what possible choices are to be expected and what do we need to do in order to
avoid success? I have listed in Table 3qualities and features of plant viruses that might favor their
choice as agents. I, at least at the moment, do deny any importance for genetically designed plant
viruses since this is definitely no low technology and in my opinion wasted money and time, with
almost no guarantee for success. Not necessarily the unknown or absent plant viruses, normally listed
as regulated pathogens, arc the interesting agents, at least for terrorist usage. Rather, the already
indigenous ones are dangerous when introduced into modern production conditions, especially if
new isolates with altered properties can be selected like resistance breaking isolates or with altered
virulence (see also van dcr Vlugt in this volume). It will be extremely difficult to guard the production
sites of our cash crops, may they be cereals, vegetables or fruits, against deliberate delivery into
distribution sites like irrigation or hydroponic systems. It may also be difficult to monitor
mothcrgardens from where the scions for grafting or rootstocks arc obtained against deliberate
inoculations or even delivery with in vitro propagated material that is contaminated with unknown
ordifficult to diagnose viruses. This means, the risks associated with plant viruses arc real. However. I
would indicate that the lists do not point into the right direction. It is in most cases not the
regulated pathogen, i.e. the unknown, for which we should watch out in the first place, but
rather the already present pathogens for which the infection pressure is merely raised by an
attack. This would have the additional advantage, that the pathogens arc already adapted to the
ecosystem and failures due to incompatibilities are excluded. Of course the unknown should not be
neglected, but to detect an unusual behavior of already present viruses you need other precautious
elements.
Bioterror
No Bioterror
Bioweapons are ineffective – psychological preference and technical concerns
Peter Anderson ’12, professor, department of pharmaceutical sciences, University of Colorado
(April, “Bioterrorism: Toxins as Weapons,” Journal of Pharmacy Practice, Sage Journals, lpc)
Biological toxins include some of the most potent poisons known for humans and animals, yet
their application as biowarfare agents so far has been limited to some extent by a number of
practical and technical issues (Madsen 2001; Henghold 2004; Bigalke and Rummel 2005; Anderson
2012), which make conversion into a bioweapon of mass destruction problematic to
implement. Layered onto this are some psychological and political–cultural aspects that
appear to have terrorists opting for more immediate and spectacular demonstration of
violence as terror agents, such as use of incendiary devices or bombs (Crenshaw 2011).
Nevertheless, there are a few notable biotoxins that have been developed in the past as
bioterror agents (or bioweapons), most notably the botulinum neurotoxins (BoNTs), ricin,
saxitoxin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB) (Salem 2003; Szinicz 2005). Importantly, the
formidable arsenal of biological toxins that modulate human/ animal–pathogen or predator–prey
interactions has grown tremendously over the last few decades (Table 1). As can be seen clearly
from this long list, the diversity of biotoxins that might be used as bioterror agents consequently has
also expanded. Moreover, the potential for rapid discovery and development of toxic bioactive
molecules has likewise increased exponentially with new advances in synthetic biology-related
technologies, including metagenomics, functional genomics, recombinant molecular biotechnologies,
protein engineering, as well as highthroughput combinatorial approaches for metabolite isolation,
identification, puri- fication and activity screening, and new formulation matrices and protocols.
These enabling technologies lend special urgency to intensify our efforts toward
understanding toxin-mediated disease processes and developing alternative antitoxin
strategies and treatment modalities that are more universally applicable and more rapidly
and effectively deployed.
No bioterror—can’t mass produce, and no motivation
McComb 13- School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy Norwich University
(Jonathan, “Closing Pandora’s Box: The Threat of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction”, Global Security Studies, Winter 2013, Volume 4, Issue 1,
http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McComb%20WMD.pdf)//WK
The CIA opined in 1983 that increasing state use of chemical and biological weapons had the
potential to influence the attitudes of terrorists toward use of WMDs. The agency stated that
production of chemical or biological weapons for a small-scale attack was technologically no more
difficult than the production of narcotics or heroin, finding instead that the volume production
required to inflict mass casualties would be much more formidable, citing considerable
increase in safety requirements, cost, and the risk of discovery. (CIA, 1983). Japanese terrorist
group Aum Shinrinkyo would test that theory in detail less than a decade later. The CIA
found motivational and practical considerations, rather than technical obstacles, had to that
point accounted for the lower levels of terrorist use of WMDs, citing accessibility, flexibility,
and control considerations, as compared to conventional small arms and explosives. The agency
additionally cited the potential for increased public alienation as a result of widespread
indiscriminate killing by WMDs.
Cyberterror
Squo Solves
Deterrence solves
Birch, Foreign Correspondent Associated Press, 10-1-’12 (Douglas, “Forget Revolution: What
would really happen if the lights went out” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution)
There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report
on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional
military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the
right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall
If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a
missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because
hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects,
if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United
States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in
potential retaliation when planning their operations. None of these considerations is an argument for
dismissing the risk of cyber attacks. However, they do suggest the need to keep the degree of risk in perspective. In an
Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "
op-ed last year in The Hill, the Center for a New American Security's Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp warned the United States to avoid "billion dollar
needed about the growing threats in cyber space," they wrote. "But so too is
pragmatic levelheadedness expressed through a U.S. cyber security strategy that prioritizes
intelligently. Such a strategy will enable the U.S. government to craft policies that ensure safe access to the Internet without breaking the bank."
solutions to million dollar problems." "A collective sense of urgency is
Strengthening U.S. cyber security is common sense, like locking your door at night. But it's one thing to turn the lock -- and another to spend the night
hunched in your living room with a shotgun.
No cyber impact
Healey 13
No Impact
/30 March 2013, Jason Healey is the Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic
Council, No, Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us, spark//
America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite recent warnings. Our
cybervulnerabilities are undoubtedly grave and the threats we face are severe but far from comparable
to nuclear war. ¶ The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems
more resilient against advanced threats (in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential
consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen,
then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The single biggest existential threat that's out there" because
"cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems."¶ While
it is true that
cyber attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not only never happened
but are far more difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking believes. The
consequences from cyber threats may be similar in some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board
concluded, but mostly, they are incredibly dissimilar. ¶ Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air
Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and cause their populations to panic, claims which did not
stand up to reality. A
study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by the Atlantic Council and Cyber
shown a similar dynamic where the impact of disruptive cyberattacks
has been consistently overestimated. ¶ Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating from
Conflict Studies Association, has
today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have
effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused. No
attacks, so far, have been
both widespread and persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of anyone
dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia,
have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss. ¶ Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can
take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined defenses has so far been out of the range of
all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in a conflict with those nations,
cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers should be worrying about. Plutonium
trumps
bytes in a shooting war.¶ This is not all good news. Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998
with little significant progress. Worse, the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily more worrying. Still, experts have
been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of the 70 years since the actual Pearl
Harbor. ¶ The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber espionage could someday
accumulate into an existential threat. But it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only
handwaving estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it
doesn't add up to an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."
No extinction risk
Singer, Director 21st Century Defense Initiative, ’12 (Peter, November, “The Cyber Terror
Bogeyman” Armed Forces Journal, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/11/cyberterror-singer)
what terrorists have accomplished in the cyber realm doesn’t match our fears
But so far,
, their dreams or
even what they have managed through traditional means. But so far, what terrorists have accomplished in the cyber realm doesn’t match our fears, their dreams or even what they have
managed through traditional means. The only publicly documented case of an actual al-Qaida attempt at a cyber attack wouldn’t have even met the FBI definition. Under questioning at
Guantanamo Bay, Mohmedou Ould Slahi confessed to trying to knock offline the Israeli prime minister’s public website. The same goes for the September denial-of-service attacks on
five U.S. banking firms, for which the Islamist group “Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters” claimed responsibility. (Some experts believe the group was merely stealing credit for
someone else’s work.) The attacks, which prevented customers from accessing the sites for a few hours, were the equivalent of a crowd standing in your lobby blocking access or a gang
of neighborhood kids constantly doing “ring and runs” at your front doorbell. It’s annoying, to be sure, but nothing that would make the terrorism threat matrix if you removed the word
“cyber.” And while it may make for good headlines, it is certainly not in the vein of a “cyber 9/11” or “digital Pearl Harbor.” Even the 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, the most-discussed
incident of its kind, had little impact on the daily life of the average Estonian and certainly no long-term effect. Allegedly assisted by the Russian government, and hence well beyond the
capacity of most terror organizations, the attacks merely disrupted public-facing government websites for a few days. Compare that with the impact of planes crashing into the center of
the U.S. financial system, the London subway attacks or the thousands of homemade bomb attacks that happen around the world each year. Even when you move into the “what if” side
the damage potential of cyber terror still pales compared with other types of potential terror
attacks. A disruption of the power grid for a few days would certainly be catastrophic (though it’s something that Washington, D.C., residents have lived through in the last year.
Does the Pepco power company qualify as a cyber threat?). But, again, in strategic planning, we have to put threats into context. The explosion of just one nuclear bomb, even a juryrigged radiological “dirty bomb,” could irradiate an American city for centuries. Similarly, while a computer virus could wreak havoc in the economy, a biological attack could change our
There are [cyber] threats out there, but there are no threats that
threaten our fundamental way of life.”
very patterns of life forever. As one cyber expert said, “
No domestic disruption
Birch, Foreign Correspondent Associated Press, 10-1-’12 (Douglas, “Forget Revolution: What
would really happen if the lights went out” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution)
But the scenarios sketched out above are not solely the realm of fantasy. This summer, the United States and India were hit by two massive electrical outages -caused not by ninja cyber assault teams but by force majeure. And, for most people anyway,
the results were less terrifying than
imagined. First, the freak "derecho" storm that barreled across a heavily-populated swath of the eastern United States on the afternoon of June 29
knocked down trees that crushed cars, bashed holes in roofs, blocked roads, and sliced through power lines. According to an August report by the U.S.
Department of Energy, 4.2 million homes and businesses lost power as a result of the storm, with the blackout stretching across 11 states and the District of
Columbia. More than 1 million customers were still without power five days later, and in some areas power wasn't restored for 10 days. Reuters put the death
toll at 23 people as of July 5, all killed by storms or heat stroke. The second incident occurred in late July, when 670 million people in northern India, or about
10 percent of the world's population, lost power in the largest blackout in history. The failure of this huge chunk of India's electric grid was attributed to
higher-than-normal demand due to late monsoon rains, which led farmers to use more electricity in order to draw water from wells. Indian officials told the
media there were no reports of deaths directly linked to the blackouts. But this cataclysmic event didn't cause widespread chaos in India -- indeed, for some, it
"[M]any people in major cities barely noticed the disruption because
localized blackouts are so common that many businesses, hospitals, offices and middle-class
homes have backup diesel generators," the New York Times reported. The most important thing about both events is what
didn't happen. Planes didn't fall out of the sky. Governments didn't collapse. Thousands of
people weren't killed. Despite disruption and delay, harried public officials, emergency
workers, and beleaguered publics mostly muddled through. The summer's blackouts strongly suggest that a
cyber weapon that took down an electric grid even for several days could turn out to be little
more than a weapon of mass inconvenience . "Reasonable people would have expected a lot
of bad things to happen" in the storm's aftermath, said Neal A. Pollard, a terrorism expert who teaches at Georgetown University and has
served on the United Nation's Expert Working Group on the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. However, he said, emergency
services, hospitals, and air traffic control towers have backup systems to handle short-term
disruptions in power supplies. After the derecho, Pollard noted, a generator truck even showed up in the parking lot of his supermarket.
didn't even interrupt their daily routine.
Their impacts are all hype
Walt 10
/3 March 2010, Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of international relations
at Harvard University, Is the cyber threat overblown?,
walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/30/is_the_cyber_threat_overblown, spark/
Am I the only person -- well, besides Glenn Greenwald and Kevin Poulson -- who thinks the "cyber-warfare" business may
be overblown? It’s clear the U.S. national security establishment is paying a lot more attention to the issue, and colleagues of mine
-- including some pretty serious and level-headed people -- are increasingly worried by the danger of some sort of "cyberKatrina." I don't dismiss it entirely, but this sure looks to me like a
classic opportunity for threatinflation.¶ Mind you, I'm not saying that there aren't a lot of shenanigans going on in cyber-space, or that various forms of
cyber-warfare don't have military potential. So I'm not arguing for complete head-in-the-sand complacency. But here’s what
makes me worry that the threat is being overstated.¶ First, the whole issue is highly esoteric -you really need to know a great deal about computer networks, software, encryption, etc., to know how serious the danger might
be. Unfortunately, details
about a number of the alleged incidents that are being invoked to
demonstrate the risk of a "cyber-Katrina," or a cyber-9/11, remain classified, which makes it hard
for us lay-persons to gauge just how serious the problem really was or is. Moreover, even when we
hear about computers being penetrated by hackers, or parts of the internet crashing, etc., it’s hard
to know how much valuable information was stolen or how much actual damage was
done. And as with other specialized areas of technology and/or military affairs, a lot of the experts have a clear
vested interest in hyping the threat, so as to create greater demand for their services. Plus,
we already seem to have politicians leaping on the issue as a way to grab some pork for their states.¶
Second, there are lots of different problems being lumped under a single banner, whether
the label is "cyber-terror" or "cyber-war." One issue is the use of various computer tools to degrade an enemy’s military
capabilities (e.g., by disrupting communications nets, spoofing sensors, etc.). A second issue is the alleged threat that bad guys
would penetrate computer networks and shut down power grids, air traffic control, traffic lights, and other important elements of
infrastructure, the way that internet terrorists (led by a disgruntled computer expert) did in the movie Live Free and Die Hard. A
third problem is web-based criminal activity, including identity theft or simple fraud (e.g., those emails we all get from someone in
Nigeria announcing that they have millions to give us once we send them some account information). A fourth potential threat is
“cyber-espionage”; i.e., clever foreign hackers penetrate Pentagon or defense contractors’ computers and download valuable
classified information. And then there are annoying activities like viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and other things that affect the
stability of web-based activities and disrupt commerce (and my ability to send posts into FP).¶ This
sounds like a rich
menu of potential trouble, and putting the phrase "cyber" in front of almost any noun
makes it sound trendy and a bit more frightening. But notice too that these are all somewhat different
problems of quite different importance, and the appropriate response to each is likely to be different too. Some issues -such as the danger of cyber-espionage -- may not require elaborate technical fixes but
simply more rigorous security procedures to isolate classified material from the web. Other problems
may not require big federal programs to address, in part because both individuals and
the private sector have incentives to protect themselves (e.g., via firewalls or by backing up critical
data). And as Greenwald warns, there may be real costs to civil liberties if concerns about vague cyber dangers lead us to grant the
NSA or some other government agency greater control over the Internet. ¶ Third, this is another issue that cries out for some
comparative cost-benefit analysis. Is
the danger that some malign hacker crashes a power grid
greater than the likelihood that a blizzard would do the same thing? Is the risk of
cyber-espionage greater than the potential danger from more traditional forms of
spying? Without a comparative assessment of different risks and the costs of mitigating each one, we will allocate resources
on the basis of hype rather than analysis. In short, my fear is not that we won't take reasonable precautions against a potential set
of dangers; my concern is that we will spend tens of billions of dollars protecting ourselves against a set of threats that are not as
dangerous as we are currently being told they are.
No cyberterror – empirics, hollow threats, no capabilities, no motive,
disincentives, and focus on other strategies
Healey 11
/3 October 3 2011, Jason Healey is the Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic
Council of the United States, Cyberterror is Aspirational Blather,
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/cyberterror-aspirational-blather, spark/
The Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative recently hosted a conference call to discuss the terrorist use of the Internet and
how it has evolved in the ten years since 9/11. The call featured Matt Devost of FusionX, Neal Pollard of
PriceWaterhouseCooper and Rick Howard of VeriSign/iDefense – who have been tracking this and many other online threats for
years. While this conversation was off the record, this blog attempts to capture the spirit. Terms such as “cyber 9/11” and “cyber
terrorism” have been used frequently to describe the security threats posed by terrorists online. Cyber technologies, like any other,
enable terrorist groups to do their terrorizing more effectively and efficiently. In the past few years it is increasingly common for
them to use the Internet for propaganda, fundraising, general support, and convergence. Videos and anonymous discussion
forums allow for the dissemination of training information and the call to arms for more individuals to participate and join
groups. Importantly, the panelists agreed that these groups
have not yet used cyber attack capabilities in
any significant way to cause casualties or actually terrorize anyone. While Ibrahim Samudra or Irahabi 007 hacked to
raise funds through credit-card fraud, this is a traditional support activity, not “cyber terror”. The US government was a relatively
early advocate of a strict definition of cyber terrorism, as nearly a decade ago they were calling it as “a criminal act perpetrated
through computers resulting in violence, death and/or destruction, and creating terror for the purpose of coercing a government
to change its policies.” Not defacing a webpage, not flooding a website (even of the South Korean president) and not stealing
credit card information. Some
terrorists groups may talk about waging an e-Jihad, but such talk
remains, for now, aspirational blather. For decades, the rule of thumb for intelligence analysts has been that
adversaries with motives for damaging cyber attacks do not have the capabilities, while
those with the capabilities do not yet have the motives. A large-scale cyber attacks is more
difficult than is generally believed and few adversaries have both the motive and capability. Additionally, terrorist
groups have many disincentives for pursing cyber capabilities. For example, their leadership tends
to be conservative and they tend to stick with what they know will work – suicide bombers, road-
side bombs, and kinetic assaults. These actually kill and terrorize people which, as yet, no cyber attack has
accomplished. The Congressional Research Service summed this up as “lower risk, but less drama.”
Too Difficult
No cyberterror – discount evidence from the new Pentagon report**
Rid, Reader War Studies at King’s College, 3-13-’13 (Thomas, “The Great Cyberscare” Foreign
Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare)
Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an
impending "cyber Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems
The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon
and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential
consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully
The world has yet to
witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as a result of a computer attack. Such statements
are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of the Pentagon document offer
such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA dissertation
in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim -acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order:
or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting
nuclear weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms,
naturally, are keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and
coherent campaign of espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on
attributing attacks to the Chinese than the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and
over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's
conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are
allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398 of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists
concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not
mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and
the company should have been more careful in its overall assessment
of the available evidence, as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report.
many attacks indeed originate in China. But
My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York Times didn't. Which leads to the next point:
The media want to sell copy through threat inflation. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at the Times intoned in
late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper actually
published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post
the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical
damage -- Stuxnet -- was actually executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some
of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report; instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the
nation's fiercest watchdogs too often look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories
from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the security establishment. Finally, the
intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and CIA are still
traumatized by missing 9/11. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational
should have reminded its readers that
choice. Yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's recent testimony was more nuanced than reported and toned down the threat of a very serious cyberattack. But at the same
the intelligence community, especially in the
has far better information, better sources, better expertise, and better analysts than private companies like Symantec,
McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab. But for a number of reasons they keep their findings and their analysis classified. This means that
the quality of the public debate suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to
rely on industry reports of sometimes questionable quality or anonymous informants whose
veracity is hard to assess.
time America's top spies are not as forthcoming with more detailed information as they could be. We know that
United States,
No risk – won’t be successful
Bambauer, Professor Internet Law Brooklyn Law School, 10-17-’11 (Derek, “The Myth of
Cyberterror” http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/10/the-myth-of-cyberterror.html)
UPI's article on cyberterrorism helpfully states the obvious: there's no such thing . This is in sharp contrast to the
rhetoric in cybersecurity discussions, which highlights purported threats from terrorists to the power grid, the
transportation system, and even the ability to play Space Invaders using the lights of skyscrapers. It's all quite entertaining, except for 2 problems: 1) perception frequently drives policy,
all of these risks are chimerical. Yes, non-state actors are capable of defacing Web sites and
but that's a far cry from train bombings or shootings in hotels. The
response from some quarters is that, while terrorists do not currently have the capability to execute devastating cyberattacks, they will at
some point, and so we should act now. I find this unsatisfying. Law rarely imposes large current costs, such as changing
and 2)
even launching denial of service attacks,
how the Internet's core protocols run, to address remote risks of uncertain (but low) incidence and uncertain magnitude. In 2009, nearly 31,000 people died in highway car crashes, but
we don't require people to drive tanks. (And, few people choose to do so, except for Hummer employees.) Why, then, the continued focus on cyberterror? I think there are four reasons.
First, terror is the policy issue of the moment: connecting to it both focuses people's attention and draws funding. Second, we're in an age of rapid and constant technological change,
which always produces some level of associated fear. Few of us understand how BGP works, or why its lack of built-in authentication creates risk, and we are afraid of the unknown.
terror attacks are like shark attacks. We are afraid of dying in highly gory or horrific
fashion, rather than basing our worries on actual incidence of harm (compare our fear of terrorists versus our fear of
Third,
bad drivers, and then look at the underlying number of fatalities in each category). Lastly, cybersecurity is a battleground not merely for machines but for money. Federal agencies,
what
should we do at this point? For cyberterror, the answer is "nothing," or at least nothing that we wouldn't do anyway. Preventing
defense contractors, and software companies all hold a stake in concentrating attention on cyber-risks and offering their wares as a means of remediating them. So
cyberattacks by terrorists, nation states, and spies all involve the same things, as I argue in Conundrum. But: this approach gets called "naive" with some regularity, so I'd be interested in
your take...
Too hard to pull off
Birch, Foreign Correspondent Associated Press, 10-1-’12 (Douglas, “Forget Revolution: What
would really happen if the lights went out” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution)
pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on
inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of
inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is
But
believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among
the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's
Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000
uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals
like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile
states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of
similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California,
in order to create a cyber
weapon capable of crippling a specific control system -- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders
might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA
system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside
knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack.
"Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols,"
wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more costefficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system,
used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to
Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities
and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of
armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United
States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure."
Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that
Exaggerated
Their evidence is “aspirational blather”
Healey, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the US, 10-3-’11
(Jason, “Cyberterror is Aspirational Blather” http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/cyberterroraspirational-blather)
Terms such as “cyber 9/11” and “cyber terrorism” have been used frequently to describe the security threats posed by terrorists online. Cyber technologies, like any other, enable
terrorist groups to do their terrorizing more effectively and efficiently. In the past few years it is increasingly common for them to use the Internet for propaganda, fundraising, general
support, and convergence. Videos and anonymous discussion forums allow for the dissemination of training information and the call to arms for more individuals to participate and join
groups have not yet used cyber attack capabilities in any significant
way to cause casualties or actually terrorize anyone. While Ibrahim Samudra or Irahabi 007 hacked to raise funds
through credit-card fraud, this is a traditional support activity, not “cyber terror”. The US government was a
groups. Importantly, the panelists agreed that these
relatively early advocate of a strict definition of cyber terrorism, as nearly a decade ago they were calling it as “a criminal act perpetrated through computers resulting in violence, death
and/or destruction, and creating terror for the purpose of coercing a government to change its policies.” Not defacing a webpage, not flooding a website (even of the South Korean
Some terrorists groups may talk about waging an e-Jihad, but such
talk remains, for now, aspirational blather . For decades, the rule of thumb for intelligence analysts has been that adversaries
with motives for damaging cyber attacks do not have the capabilities, while those with the
capabilities do not yet have the motives. A large-scale cyber attacks is more difficult than is
generally believed and few adversaries have both the motive and capability. Additionally, terrorist
groups have many disincentives for pursing cyber capabilities. For example, their leadership tends to
be conservative and they tend to stick with what they know will work – suicide bombers, road-side bombs, and
kinetic assaults. These actually kill and terrorize people which, as yet, no cyber attack has
accomplished. The Congressional Research Service summed this up as “lower risk, but less drama.” One day, though, a terrorist group could
overcome the barriers and their own reservations to innovate. It is unlikely to happen this week, or even this year. Skepticism, however, has been an
excellent analytical tool for two decades and will remain a healthy response when anyone,
whether your local newspaper or a religious extremist, blathers about cyber terrorism.
president) and not stealing credit card information.
Hyping the cyber threat makes it more difficult to address**
Rid, Reader War Studies at King’s College, 3-13-’13 (Thomas, “The Great Cyberscare” Foreign
Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare)
Washington's high-octane mix of profiteering, protectiveness,
and politics is sadly counterproductive for four reasons: First, the hype actually makes it harder to focus on crucial
engineering details. Security standards in industrial control systems and SCADA networks -- the networks that control stuff that physically moves around, from trains
The tragedy is that Obama actually has it right: Something needs to be done, urgently. But
to gas to elevators -- are shockingly low. The so-called Programmable Logic Controllers widely used in critical infrastructure are designed to be safe and reliable in tough factory-floor
conditions and harsh weather, not secure against outside attack. This year's S4-conference in Miami Beach, organized by the small and specialized security outfit Digital Bond, again
Washington is too busy screaming havoc and too ill-informed to do
something meaningful about concrete engineering issues. Just sharing information, as the inspector
general of the Department of Homeland Security recommended in a report last month, is useful but it will not deliver security. Connecting critical infrastructure
showcased how vulnerable these systems are. But
that was never designed to be linked to the Internet is also not the root of the problem -- the built-in security flaws and fragility of these systems needs to be fixed, as Digital Bond's Dale
Peterson pointed out last week in response to the timid DHS report. The political dynamic behind this logic is clear: The more is declared critical, the harder it becomes to act on the
the hype clouds badly needed visibility
really critical. Second,
. A fascinating project at Free University Berlin has produced a vulnerability map. The
map uses publicly available data from Shodan, the Google for control system hackers, and adds a layer of information crawled from the web to geo-locate the systems that often should
not be connected to the Internet in the first place. Red dots on the map show those systems. The United States looks as if it has the measles. But note that the map is incomplete: It is
biased towards German products, the project's founder told me. If that flaw can be fixed, the United States and other countries would look as bloody red as Germany does already.
The U.S. government's attention-absorbing emphasis on offensive capabilities means it has
very little visibility into what this vulnerability map would actually look like. Third, sabotage and espionage are
rather different things -- technically as well as politically. SCADA systems are highly specific kit, often old and patched together over years, if not decades. That means these systems are
highly specific targets, not generic ones. Affecting critical operations requires reprogramming these systems, not just disrupting them; the goal is modifying output parameters in a subtle
way that serves the saboteur's purpose. With Stuxnet, the U.S. government provided the -- so far -- most extreme and best-documented case study. The operation showed that successful
sabotage that goes beyond just deleting data is far more difficult than successful espionage: It requires testing and fine-tuning an attack over many iterations in a lab environment, as well
as acquiring highly specific and hard-to-get target intelligence. Stealing large volumes of intellectual property from a commercial competitor, by contrast, is a technically rather different
operation -- there is little to no valuable IP hidden inside control systems. To put it bluntly: China and others have a high commercial incentive to steal stuff, but they have no
All threats are not created equal. What's needed is nuance, surgical
precision, differentiation, and sober analysis -- not funk, flap, and fluster. Finally, hype favors the
offense over the defense. The offense is already sexier than the defense. Many software engineers who consider a
commercial incentive to break stuff.
career in public administration want to head north to the dark cubicle at Fort Meade, not bore themselves in the Department of Homeland Security -- if they are not working happily in
the Googleplex on bouncing rubber balls already. If the NSA sucks up most of the available talent and skill and puts it to work on the offense, the defense will continue to suffer.
By
overstating the threat, and by lumping separate issues into one big bad problem, the
administration also inadvertently increases the resistance of powerful business interests
against a regulatory over-reaction. As President Obama mentioned in his State of the Union address, if we look back years
from now and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats, the answer may be
straightforward: too much bark, not enough bite.
No foreign threat
Singer, Director 21st Century Defense Initiative, ’12 (Peter, November, “The Cyber Terror
Bogeyman” Armed Forces Journal, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/11/cyberterror-singer)
Zero. That is the number of people
that who been hurt or killed by cyber terrorism at the time this went to press. In many ways, cyber terrorism is like the
Discovery Channel’s “Shark Week,” when we obsess about shark attacks despite the fact that you are roughly 15,000 times more likely to be hurt or killed in an accident
About 31,300. That is roughly the number of magazine and journal articles written so far that discuss the phenomenon of cyber terrorism.
involving a toilet. But by looking at how terror groups actually use the Internet, rather than fixating on nightmare scenarios, we can properly prioritize and focus our efforts. Part of
the problem is the way we talk about the issue. The FBI defines cyber terrorism as a
“premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer
programs and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” A key word there is “violence,” yet many discussions
sweep all sorts of nonviolent online mischief into the “terror” bin. Various reports lump together everything from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent statements that a terror group
might launch a “digital Pearl Harbor” to Stuxnet-like sabotage (ahem, committed by state forces) to hacktivism, WikiLeaks and credit card fraud. As one congressional staffer put it, the
we often mix up our
fears with the actual state of affairs. Last year, Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn, the Pentagon’s lead official for cybersecurity, spoke to the
way we use a term like cyber terrorism “has as much clarity as cybersecurity — that is, none at all.” Another part of the problem is that
top experts in the field at the RSA Conference in San Francisco. “It is possible for a terrorist group to develop cyber-attack tools on their own or to buy them on the black market,” Lynn
was conflating fear
and reality, not just about what stimulant-drinking programmers are actually hired to do, but also what is needed to pull off an attack
that causes meaningful violence. The requirements go well beyond finding top cyber experts. Taking down
hydroelectric generators, or designing malware like Stuxnet that causes nuclear centrifuges to spin out of sequence doesn’t just require the
skills and means to get into a computer system. It’s also knowing what to do once you are in. To cause true damage requires an understanding of the
warned. “A couple dozen talented programmers wearing flip-flops and drinking Red Bull can do a lot of damage.” The deputy defense secretary
devices themselves and how they run, the engineering and physics behind the target. The Stuxnet case, for example, involved not just cyber experts well beyond a few wearing flip-flops,
but also experts in areas that ranged from intelligence and surveillance to nuclear physics to the engineering of a specific kind of Siemens-brand industrial equipment. It also required
expensive tests, not only of the software, but on working versions of the target hardware as well. As George R. Lucas Jr., a professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, put it, conducting a truly
mass-scale action using cyber means “simply outstrips the intellectual, organizational and personnel capacities of even the most well-funded and well-organized terrorist organization, as
well as those of even the most sophisticated international criminal enterprises.” Lucas said
overblown.
the threat of cyber terrorism has been vastly
A2: China
No Chinese cyberterror – no incentive
Lewis, Senior Fellow Tech and Public Policy at CSIS, 3-22-’13 (James, “Five myths about Chinese
hackers” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-chinesehackers/2013/03/22/4aa07a7e-7f95-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_story.html)
3. China is poised to launch crippling attacks on critical U.S. infrastructure. Obama’s State of the Union address included a line about how “our enemies are also seeking the ability to
sabotage our power grid, our financial institutions and our air-traffic-control systems.” Similarly, a recent report by the security firm Mandiant suggested that China’s hackers are
In peacetime, however, China is no more likely to launch a
cyberattack on American infrastructure than it is to launch a missile at us. It has no interest
in provoking a war it couldn’t win or in harming an economy it depends on. Even in
wartime, China would want to avoid escalation and would be more apt to launch cyberattacks on the Pacific Command or other deployed
U.S. forces than on domestic American targets. China would attack civilian infrastructure only in extremis — if the survival of
increasingly focused on companies with ties to U.S. critical infrastructure.
its regime were threatened.
A2: Heg Impact
Cyberterror poses no threat to hegemony
Arquilla, Professor Defense Analysis U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 11-19-’12 (John, “Panetta's
Wrong About a Cyber 'Pearl Harbor'” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/19/panettas_wrong_about_a_cyber_pearl_harbor)
the specter of a looming cyber "Pearl Harbor" has reappeared -- the phrase having first come into use in
But it is the wrong metaphor
In recent months,
the 1990s.
. Given the surefire emotional effect evoked by memories of the "day of infamy," how can this be? How are good
cyber security legislation and regulations to be enacted and pursued in the absence of such galvanizing imagery? Clearly, the Obama administration thinks that trotting out the Pearl
There is
no "Battleship Row" in cyberspace. In December 1941, a great deal of American naval power was concentrated at Pearl Harbor and Japan dealt it a
Harbor metaphor is essential, and so a range of officials, right up to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, have been using it recently. But there is a fundamental problem:
sharp blow, enabling Imperial forces to pursue their expansionist aims for a while. Of the eight U.S. Navy battleships that were there, four were sunk and the other four were seriously
damaged. And if the Kido Butai, the Japanese carrier strike force, had caught the three American aircraft carriers deployed to the Pacific in port -- they were out to sea at the time of the
attack -- or had blown up the base's massive fuel storage tanks, the damage would have been catastrophic. Pearl Harbor was a true "single point of failure." Nothing like this exists in
cyberspace. Indeed, part of the logic behind the creation of the Internet, going back more than 40 years now, was to ensure continued communications even in the wake of a nuclear war.
Redundancy and resilience are the key notions that shaped the structure of cyberspace. Yes, there
are very important nodes here and there; but workarounds and fallbacks abound. Cyberspace is more like the oceans that cover two-thirds of the
world: it has its choke points, but there are always alternate routes.
Nuclear Terror
AT: Turns Econ
Large economies recover from terror attacks – no tangible economic impact
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay et al ’15, research officer, St. Louis Federal Reserve (Todd Sandler, and
Javed Younas, June, “The Toll of Terrorism,” Finance and Development Journal, lpc)
Economic researchers have found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that rich, large, and diversified
economies are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist attacks than small, poor, and
more specialized economies. If terrorism disrupts productive activities in one sector in a diversified
economy, resources can easily flow to another unaffected sector. In addition, richer economies
have more and better resources to devote to counterterrorism efforts, which presumably
reduces the number of terrorist activities with which they must cope. In contrast, small
developing economies, which are specialized in a few sectors, may not have such resilience.
Resources such as labor or capital may either flow from an affected sector to less productive
activities within the country or move to another country entirely. Moreover, developing economies
are likely to lack specialized resources—such as surveillance equipment or a technologically
advanced police force or army—that can be employed in counterterrorism. This allows the
terrorist threat to persist, which can scare away potential investors. A terrorist attack against
such a nation is likely to impose larger and more lasting macroeconomic costs. The dramatic
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, for example, caused an estimated $80
billion in losses. Large as they were, however, the losses were a tiny fraction (less than 0.1
percent) of the nearly $10.6 trillion 2001 U.S. GDP. Similarly, Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides
(2004) found rather modest effects on average in 177 nations from transnational terrorist attacks
during 1968–2000. Per capita GDP growth was reduced by 0.048 percent on an annual basis.
Impact Defense—Generic
Terrorists couldn’t do anything with material they stole***
Michael, Professor Nuclear Counterprolif and Deterrence at Air Force Counterprolif Center, ’12
(George, March, “Strategic Nuclear Terrorism and the Risk of State Decapitation” Defence Studies,
Vol 12 Issue 1, p 67-105, T&F Online)
Despite the alarming prospect of nuclear terrorism, the obstacles to obtaining such
capabilities are formidable. There are several pathways that terrorists could take to acquire a nuclear device. Seizing an intact nuclear weapon would be the most
direct method. However, neither nuclear weapons nor nuclear technology has proliferated to the degree
that some observers once feared. Although nuclear weapons have been around for over 65 years, the so-called nuclear club stands at only nine members.
72 Terrorists could attempt to purloin a weapon from a nuclear stockpile; however, absconding with a nuclear weapon would be
problematical because of tight security measures at installations.¶ Alternatively, a terrorist group
could attempt to acquire a bomb through an illicit transaction, but there is no real welldeveloped black market for illicit nuclear materials. Still, the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons around the world presents the risk
of theft and diversion. 73 In 1997, the Russian General, Alexander Lebed, alleged that 84 ‘suitcase’ bombs were missing from the Russian military arsenal, but later recanted his
the financial
requirements for a transaction involving nuclear weapons would be very high, as states have
spent millions and billions of dollars to obtain their arsenals. 76 Furthermore, transferring such sums
of money could raise red flags, which would present opportunities for authorities to uncover
the plot. When pursuing nuclear transactions, terrorist groups would be vulnerable to sting operations. 77¶ Even if terrorists acquired an intact
nuclear weapon, the group would still have to bypass or defeat various safeguards, such as
permissive action links (PALs), and safing, arming, fusing, and firing (SAFF) procedures. Both US and Russian nuclear
weapons are outfitted with complicated physical and electronic locking mechanisms. 78
Nuclear weapons in other countries are usually stored partially disassembled, which would
make purloining a fully functional weapon very challenging. 79¶ Failing to acquire a nuclear weapon, a terrorist group could
statements. 74 American officials generally remain unconvinced of Lebed’s story insofar as they were never mentioned in any Soviet war plans. 75 Presumably,
endeavor to fabricate its own Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). For years, the US government has explored the possibility of a clandestine group fabricating a nuclear weapon. The socalled Nth Country Experiment examined the technical problems facing a nation that endeavored to build a small stockpile of nuclear weapons. Launched in 1964, the experiment sought
to determine whether a minimal team –in this case, two young American physicists with PhDs and without nuclear-weapons design knowledge –could design a workable nuclear weapon
with a militarily significant yield. After three man-years of effort, the two novices succeeded in a hypothetical test of their device. 80 In 1977, the US Office of Technology Assessment
concluded that a small terrorist group could develop and detonate a crude nuclear device without access to classified material and without access to a great deal of technological
equipment. Modest machine shop facilities could be contracted for purposes of constructing the device. 81¶ Numerous experts have weighed in on the workability of constructing an
Bethe, the Nobel laureate who worked on the Manhattan Project, once calculated that
a minimum of six highly-trained persons representing the right expertise would be required
to fabricate a nuclear device. 82 A hypothetical scenario developed by Peter Zimmerman, a former chief scientist for the Arms Control and Disarmament
IND. Hans
Agency, and Jeffrey G. Lewis, the former executive director of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, concluded that
The most crucial step in the IND pathway is
acquiring enough fissile material for the weapon. According to some estimates, roughly 25 kilograms of
weapons-grade uranium or 8 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium would be required to
support a self-sustaining fission chain reaction. 84 It would be virtually impossible for a terrorist group to create its own fissile material.
a team of 19 persons could build a nuclear device in the United States for about $10 million. 83¶
Enriching uranium, or producing plutonium in a nuclear reactor, is far beyond the scope of any terrorist organization. 85 However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
which maintains a database, confirmed 1,562 incidents of smuggling encompassing trade in nuclear materials or radioactive sources. Fifteen incidents involved HEU or plutonium. 86 Be
the total of all known thefts of HEU around the world between 1993 and
2006 amounted to less than eight kilograms, far short of the estimated minimum 25
kilograms necessary for a crude improvised nuclear device. 87 An amount of fissile material adequate for a workable nuclear
that as it may, according to the IAEA,
device would be difficult to procure from one source or in one transaction. However, terrorists could settle on less demanding standards. According to an article in Scientific American, a
nuclear device could be fabricated with as little as 60 kilograms of HEU (defined as concentrated to levels of 20 percent for more of the uranium 235 isotope). 88 Although enriching
uranium is well nigh impossible for terrorist groups, approximately 1,800 tons of HEU was created during the Cold War, mostly by the United States and the Soviet Union. 89 Collective
efforts, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the G-8 Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, have done much
to secure nuclear weapons and fissile materials, but the job is far from complete. 90 And other problems are on the horizon. For instance, the number of nuclear reactors is projected to
double by the end of the century, though many, if not most, will be fueled with low-enriched uranium (LEU). With this development, comes the risk of diversion as HEU and plutonium
stockpiles will be plentiful in civilian sectors. 91¶ Plutonium is more available around the world than HEU and smuggling plutonium would be relatively easy insofar as it commonly
Constructing an IND from plutonium, though, would be much more
challenging insofar as it would require the more sophisticated implosion-style design that
would require highly trained engineers working in well-equipped labs. 93 But, if an implosion device does not
comes in two-pound bars or gravel-like pellets. 92
detonate precisely as intended, then it would probably be more akin to a radiological dispersion device, rather than a mushroom. Theoretically, plutonium could be used in a gunassembly weapon, but the detonation would probably result in an unimpressive fizzle, rather than a substantial explosion with a yield no greater than 10 to 20 tons of TNT, which would
even assuming that fissile material could be acquired, the
terrorist group would still need the technical expertise to complete the required steps to
assemble a nuclear device. Most experts believe that constructing a gun-assembly weapon would pose no significant technological barriers. 95 Luis Alvarez once
still be much greater than one from a conventional explosive. 94¶ But
asserted that a fairly high-level nuclear explosion could be occasioned just by dropping one piece of weapons-grade uranium onto another. He may, however, have exaggerated the ease
the hurdles that a terrorist group would have to overcome
to build or acquire a nuclear bomb are very high. If states that aspire to obtain nuclear
capability face serious difficulties, it would follow that it would be even more challenging for
terrorist groups with far fewer resources and a without a secure geographic area in which to
undertake such a project. The difficulty of developing a viable nuclear weapon is illustrated by the case of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which after 20 years of effort
with which terrorists could fabricate a nuclear device. 96¶ In sum,
and over ten billion dollars spent, failed to produce a functional bomb by the time the country was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War. 97 Nevertheless, the quality of a nuclear device for a
non-state entity would presumably be much lower as it would not be necessary to meet the same quality standards of states when fabricating their nuclear weapons. Nor would the device
In order to be successful, terrorists must succeed at each stage
of the plot. With clandestine activities, the probability of security leaks increases with the
number of persons involved. 98 The plot would require not only highly competent technicians, but also unflinching loyalty and discipline from the
participants. A strong central authority would be necessary to coordinate the numerous operatives
involved in the acquisition and delivery of the weapon. Substantial funding to procure the
materials with which to build a bomb would be necessary, unless a weapon was conveyed to the group by a state or some
have to be weaponized and mated with a delivery system.¶
criminal entity. 99 Finally, a network of competent and dedicated operatives would be required to arrange the transport of the weapon across national borders without detection, which
could be challenging considering heightened security measures, including gamma ray detectors. 100 Such a combination of steps spread throughout each stage of the plot would be
in setting the parameters of nuclear terrorism, the laws
of physics are both kind and cruel. In a sense, they are kind insofar as the essential ingredients for a bomb are
very difficult to produce. However, they are also cruel in the sense that while it is not easy to make a nuclear bomb, it is not as difficult as believed once the
daunting. 101¶ As Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier once pointed out,
essential ingredients are in hand. 102 Furthermore, as more and more countries undergo industrialization concomitant with the diffusion of technology and expertise, the hurdles for
acquiring these ingredients are now more likely to be surmounted, though HEU is still hard to procure illicitly. In a global economy, dual-use technologies circulate around the world
along with the scientific personnel who design and use them. 103 And although both the US and Russian governments have substantially reduced their arsenals since the end of the Cold
War, many warheads remain. 104 Consequently, there are still many nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands.
Terrorists have given up trying to get a nuke
Mueller, Professor PolSci Ohio State, and Stewart, Professor Infrastructure Performance at U
of Newcastle, ’12 (John- Senior Research Scientist Mershon Center for International Security
Studies, Mark- Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow, Summer, “The Terrorism Delusion:
America’s Overwrought Response to September 11” International Security, Vol 37 No 1,
ProjectMuse)
an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001
indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on
primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many
more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group
had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing
operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a
process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining
and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top
scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product
into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from
outsiders.50¶ If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off
even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close
to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological,
radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the
prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse
Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that
radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge
Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought
into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity
to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent
pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.
by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 [End Page 98] ¶
Even if there is a risk, international cooperation will solve it
Mueller, Professor PolSci Ohio State, and Stewart, Professor Infrastructure Performance at U
of Newcastle, ’12 (John- Senior Research Scientist Mershon Center for International Security
Studies, Mark- Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow, Summer, “The Terrorism Delusion:
America’s Overwrought Response to September 11” International Security, Vol 37 No 1,
ProjectMuse)
No matter how much states around the world might disagree with the United States on
other issues (most notably on its war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for them to cooperate to
confront any international terrorist problem emanating from groups and individuals
connected to, or sympathetic with, al-Qaida. Although these multilateral efforts, particularly by such Muslim states as Libya, Pakistan, Sudan,
Syria, and even Iran, may not have received sufficient publicity, these countries have felt directly threatened by the
militant network, and their diligent and aggressive efforts have led to important
breakthroughs against the group.27 Thus a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the Indonesian government into action and into
making extensive arrests and obtaining convictions. When terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, the government became considerably more
serious about dealing with internal terrorism, including a clampdown on radical clerics and preachers. The main result of al-Qaida-linked suicide terrorism in
In polls conducted in thirty-five
predominantly Muslim countries by 2008, more than 90 percent condemned bin Laden’s
terrorism on religious grounds.28¶ In addition, the mindless brutalities of al-Qaida-affiliated
combatants in Iraq—staging beheadings at mosques, bombing playgrounds, taking over hospitals, executing ordinary citizens, performing forced
marriages—eventually turned the Iraqis against them, including many of those who had previously been fighting the U.S.
occupation either on their own or in connection with the group.29 In fact, they seem to have managed to alienate the entire
population: [End Page 92] data from polls in Iraq in 2007 indicate that 97 percent of those surveyed opposed efforts to recruit foreigners to fight in
Jordan in 2005 was to outrage Jordanians and other Arabs against the perpetrators.
Iraq; 98 percent opposed the militants’ efforts to gain control of territory; and 100 percent considered attacks against Iraqi civilians “unacceptable.”30 ¶ In Iraq
al-Qaeda is its own worst enemy
as in other places, “
,” notes Robert Grenier, a former top CIA counterterrorism official. “Where they
have succeeded initially, they very quickly discredit themselves.”31 Grenier’s improbable company in this observation is Osama bin Laden, who was so
Al-Qaida
has also had great difficulty recruiting Americans. The group’s most important, and perhaps only, effort at this is the
concerned about al-Qaida’s alienation of most Muslims that he argued from his hideout that the organization should take on a new name.32¶
Lackawanna experience, when a smooth-talking operative returned to the upstate New York town in early 2000 and tried to convert young Yemini-American
men to join the cause (case 5). In the summer of 2001, seven agreed to accompany him to an al-Qaida training camp, and several more were apparently
planning to go later. Appalled at what they found there, however, six of the seven returned home and helped to dissuade those in the next contingent.
No WMD acquisition
Chapman 8 — (Steven, columnist and editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune ,“Who’s Still Afraid
of Osama?”, 2/8/2008, http://reason.com/news/show/124874.html, JHR)
Ever since Sept. 11, 2001, Americans have had to live with the knowledge that the next time the terrorists strike, it could be not with airplanes capable of killing thousands but atomic
bombs capable of killing hundreds of thousands. The prospect has created a sense of profound vulnerability. It has shaped our view of government policies aimed at combating terrorism
(filtered through Jack Bauer). It helped mobilize support for the Iraq war. Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of
Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass.
Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable." But remember:
After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet Al Qaeda and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do
something simple—say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask if they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible,
argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a recent presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that
a terrorist group will come up with
an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small ." (http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/ APSACHGO.PDF) The
events required to make that happen include a multitude of herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a
bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would
have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not
scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal ." If
terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to
prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians
can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government
who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it
"hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces." Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's
not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe
haven and advanced equipment—plus people with lots of time and a willingness to die for the
cause. And if Al Qaeda could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no
guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they
would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all
the time—but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This,
like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on,
multiplying the chance someone will blab , back out or screw up . Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in
an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al Qaeda, he says, faces a
very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape,
only one thing has to go wrong. That has heartening implications. If Osama bin Laden embarks on the project, he has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear
fruit. Given the formidable odds, he probably won't bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist
communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.
No risk of nuclear terror
Mueller 10 (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in
Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html, JHR)
Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama,
proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert
Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned
that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression
of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius,
the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area —a tragedy, of course, but not the
same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear
material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.”
we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these
predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going
atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is
scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material
(plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft
of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but
because chase would be immediate . A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires
the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could
turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was
accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were
somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a
long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces .
Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often
under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of
them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once
outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine
shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled
scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the
monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence
from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to
be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense
Three decades after Taylor,
worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior
the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational
group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required , not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the
terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and
extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible . Stephen
Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to
machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly
how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group,
working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies”
physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that
could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a
bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition,
people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a
bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to
and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators
who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The
financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental.
There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some
operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals
and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any
criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit
although
it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could
surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the
scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and
when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting.
It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’
favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be
successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three,
the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion.
Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are
unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a
country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the
donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign
intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable
that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory
because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that
trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs
can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not
only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an
unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in
this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who
know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would
be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued
or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated . The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has
them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But
tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may
have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing
the
uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that
$110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl,
two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was
scientists probably were incapable of providing truly
helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost
certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al
Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the
wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the
Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile
material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts
about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or
nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of
the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate
bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an
interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear
weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat
we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional
weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of
more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for
the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program,
weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key
portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are
Any
“threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who
fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may
even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous
than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al
Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the
extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding
thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something.
the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact,
history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not
new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the
specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and
miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group
has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires .” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed
to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly
likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must
be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities
become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk
becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most
monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather
strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and
current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years
and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down
with odds like that. But
there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels
one in three billion per attempt.
suggested above: one in a million or
No Attribution
No attribution – tech limitations make certainty impossible
Levi 8 (Michael, the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the
Council on Foreign Relations, MA in physics from Princeton University and a PhD in war studies
from the University of London, September 2008, Council Special Report No. 38, Council on Foreign
Relations, “Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism,”
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCkQFjAC&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FNuclear_Deterre
nce_CSR39.pdf&ei=1Z6SVa2DFoWssAGNhIboDA&usg=AFQjCNHNkfOcRpegGIm1waFzfls15
haMxw&sig2=mhibBXN3j-HV2TETc-AVKA, JHR)
First, the United States has substantial attribution capabilities. It has invested in nuclear forensics—the science of extracting identifying information from nuclear materials—for roughly
two decades. And it has significant information regarding the characteristics of foreign nuclear weapons and materials—so-called signatures—that, combined with technical and
, U.S. attribution capabilities are and
will always be limited. A series of authoritative reports have called for increased investment in nuclear
forensics, and, more importantly, have flagged incomplete signature databases as a fundamental
limitation to U.S. capabilities.11 While those reports have also identified opportunities for improving 11 attribution (through improvements in both technical
traditional forensic information, might be used to attribute nuclear weapons or materials to their sources. Second
capabilities and traditional means), they admit that anything close to perfection is an unreasonable goal. No future U.S. deterrence strategy can be based on the potential of near-perfect
, one of the most critical areas for improved attribution capabilities is an enhanced database
of nuclear signatures. Creating that would require strong international cooperation, in which states would contribute information about their own nuclear assets as well
as about others’ stockpiles. Fourth, even with perfect physical attribution, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the United States
would be able to determine with certainty whether a given nuclear transfer was authorized by
state leaders. Circumstantial evidence would help—for example, a transfer during a time of high tension is more likely to be intentional than one during peacetime—but no
attribution. Third
deterrence strategy should be based on an assumption that the United States will be able to confidently determine intent.
No Retaliation
Retaliation wouldn’t be nuclear
Levi 8 (Michael, the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment at the
Council on Foreign Relations, MA in physics from Princeton University and a PhD in war studies
from the University of London, September 2008, Council Special Report No. 38, Council on Foreign
Relations, “Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism,”
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CCkQFjAC&ur
l=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fcontent%2Fpublications%2Fattachments%2FNuclear_Deterre
nce_CSR39.pdf&ei=1Z6SVa2DFoWssAGNhIboDA&usg=AFQjCNHNkfOcRpegGIm1waFzfls15
haMxw&sig2=mhibBXN3j-HV2TETc-AVKA, JHR)
Threatening retaliation against countries like Russia and Pakistan in response to terrorist attacks stemming from lax security
practices is unwise. It undercuts efforts to work cooperatively with those states to improve their
nuclear security; dissuades those states from informing others if they discover that their nuclear weapons or materials are ever stolen,
thus undermining any efforts to recover them; and makes it difficult to work with those states in the aftermath of an
attack to prevent further detonations. At the same time, U.S. threats are likely to do little to actually encourage many
critical states to take nuclear terrorism more seriously—Russia and Pakistan, in particular, face terrorist threats of their own, and
the prospect of nuclear attacks on Moscow or Islamabad by Chechen separatists or Islamist radicals is surely greater motivation for strengthened nuclear security than the possibility that,
(To the extent that retaliatory threats are military in
nature, they will also often be incredible; it is implausible, for example, that the 5 United States
would retaliate militarily against Russia. On the other hand, more plausible threats, such as economic
or political ones, are far weaker.) Adapting deterrence to cases of lax security is likely to increase, rather than decrease, the nuclear terrorist threat. The United
following an attack on Washington, the United States might somehow retaliate.
States should, in most cases, emphasize cooperation instead while explicitly ruling out retribution.
No retaliation – Russia and China won’t get drawn in
Ayson 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in
New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging
Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, InformaWorld,
JHR)
It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of
nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist
nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be
brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state
sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting
that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.
No retaliation – delay and ambiguity
Neely 13 (Meggaen, a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues
3/21/13, Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/blog/doubting-deterrencenuclear-terrorism, JHR)
Yet, let’s think about the series of events that would play out if a terrorist organization detonated a
weapon in the United States. Let’s assume forensics confirmed the weapon’s origin, and let’s assume,
for argument’s sake, that country was Pakistan. Would the United States then retaliate with a nuclear
strike? If a nuclear attack occurs within the next four years (a reasonable length of time for such predictions concerning current international and domestic politics), it
seems unlikely. Why? First, there’s the problem of time. Though nuclear forensics is useful, it takes
time to analyze the data and determine the country of origin. Any justified response upon a state sponsor would not be swift.
Second, even if the United States proved the country of origin, it would then be difficult to
determine that Pakistan willingly and intentionally sponsored nuclear terrorism. If Pakistan did, then
, nuclear retaliation over unsecured nuclear materials would be a
disproportionate response and potentially further detrimental. Should the United States launch a nuclear strike at Pakistan, Islamabad could see
this as an initial hostility by the United States, and respond adversely. An obvious choice, given current tensions in South Asia,
nuclear retaliation might be justified. However, if Pakistan did not
is for Pakistan to retaliate against a U.S. nuclear launch on its territory by initiating conflict with India, which could turn nuclear and increase the exchanges of nuclear weapons. Hence, it
, the United States would attempt to stop the
bleeding without a nuclear strike. Instead, some choices might include deploying forces to track down
those that supported the suicide terrorists that detonated the weapon, pressuring Pakistan to exert its sovereignty over fringe
regions such as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and increasing the number of drone strikes in Waziristan. Given the initial attack, such measures
might understandably seem more of a concession than the retaliation called for by deterrence models, even more so by the American
seems more likely that, after the international outrage at a terrorist group’s nuclear detonation
public. This is not an argument against those technologies associated with nuclear forensics. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should continue their
development and distribution. Instead, I question the presumed American response that is promulgated by deterrence advocates. By looking at possibilities for a U.S. response to nuclear
terrorism, a situation in which we assume that deterrence has failed, we cast doubt on the likelihood of a U.S. retaliatory nuclear strike and hence cast doubt on the credibility of a U.S.
retaliatory nuclear strike as a deterrent. Would the United States launch a nuclear weapon now unless it was sure of another state’s intentional sponsorship of nuclear terrorism? Any
. Given the opaqueness of countries’ intentions,
reasonable doubt over sponsorship is inevitable to some degree. Other countries are probably
aware of U.S. hesitance in response to terrorists’ use of nuclear weapons. If this thought experiment is true, then
reasonable doubt of sponsorship might stay the United States’ nuclear hand
the communication required for credible retaliatory strikes under deterrence of nuclear terrorism is missing.
No retaliation – cooperation not retaliation is the right response
Carter et al 7 (Ashton, professor at Harvard University, served as assistant secretary of defense in
the Clinton administration, Michael M. May, a professor at Stanford University, William J. Perry,
professor at Stanford University, served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration,
Autumn 2007, Washington Quarterly, by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S.
City,” p. 27, http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/The%20Day%20After%20Action%20Following%20a%20Nuclear%20Blast%20in%20a%20U.S.%20City.pdf, JHR)
Although there will be a strong urge to punish the government responsible for the leak, on the day of the attack it will probably be more in the U.S.
interest to seek its cooperation than to punish it unless the leakage was deliberate. It is unlikely that the leaders
of Russia or Pakistan, for example, will have deliberately transferred fissile materials or nuclear weapons to terrorists. If they did so deliberately, retaliation would obviously be justified.
The threat of such retaliation might in fact deter North Korea or, in the future, perhaps Iran from using terrorists as a way to deliver nuclear weapons to U.S. soil.
In the
more likely case in which the nuclear weapon or material was stolen or bought from a
government’s stockpile without its knowledge, the United States will need the full cooperation of
that government to find out how many more nuclear weapons the terrorists might have, where they
are, and who the terrorists are. Threatening to attack the country that was unwittingly the source of the nuclear weapon will be an
understandable but counterproductive urge on the part of a U.S. population angered and frightened by the first detonation.
Too Difficult
No Risk Of Nuclear Terrorism –Too Many Obstacles
Mearsheimer 14 [January 2nd, John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”,
nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show]
Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at
all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell
victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful
way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there
has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization
exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising
from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since
the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a
nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are
virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because
it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a
nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United
States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists
might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is
extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and
even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every
country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon,
because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another
country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we
should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.
A2: Loose Nukes
There’s no loose material on the market
Tobey, Senior Fellow Belfer Center for International Affairs Harvard Winter ’11 (William H- Fmr.
Deputy Administrator National Nuclear Security Administration, Winter, “Doomsday Deferred” City
Journal, Vol. 21 #1)
Experts warn that the proliferation of nuclear material and expertise has put the world at the brink of what Paul Bracken, a professor at Yale’s School of Management, has called a
Allison, a former Pentagon official now at Harvard, says that, absent an abrupt change of course, a nuclear terrorist
attack on America in the coming decade “is more likely than not.” Billionaire investor Warren Buffett, experienced at assessing risk, has called an atomic attack on the U.S.
“second nuclear age.” Graham
by mid-century “virtually a certainty.” Even the publishers of the prestigious Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, keepers of the “Doomsday Clock,” have chimed in. The Clock’s first setting, in
Are the fears of Armageddon
justified? Only if Washington fails to continue the extraordinary progress that Republican and Democratic
administrations have made to complicate terrorists’ ability to acquire nuclear devices. Despite the
continuing spread of nuclear expertise and efforts by Iran to become a nuclear power, the battle to limit the spread
of destructive weapons and fissile material has been hugely successful—so far, at least—and Americans are safer
from a nuclear strike today than when the Berlin Wall fell. One of the nation’s most important moves to prevent nuclear
terrorism has been reducing the number of nuclear weapons that terrorists or rogue states
might buy or steal. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has cut its nuclear arsenal by 80 percent. Though American nukes are so well guarded that
terrorists would be unlikely to steal them, the great advantage of reducing our own stockpiles is that it has led Russia to follow suit. And Russian weapons—and the
fissile material that fuels them—were far less secure, at least until recently. At its peak, the Soviet Union’s arsenal may have totaled more than 45,000
1947, was seven minutes to “midnight,” which signified global nuclear war; today, the Clock stands at six minutes to midnight.
nuclear weapons, with hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium stored at dozens of facilities across 11 time zones. But when the USSR collapsed, security for its
nuclear weapons collapsed, too. When American experts first arrived at Russian nuclear sites in the early 1990s, they found fallen fences, decrepit buildings, and broken morale. Young,
underpaid, ill-trained, bored, and often drunk, Russian guards were said routinely to ignore the “two-man rule,” which forbids single individuals from accessing fissile material and is
intended to prevent a lone thief from stealing it. At one nuclear-material storage facility, according to a Russian general’s published account, “a resourceful conscript, who was serving
without ammunition, was asked what he would do if he saw 5–6 unknown persons with assault rifles approaching from a wooded area. He vowed to . . . ‘defend my post with a
bayonet!’” Reducing stockpiles is just one way that America has countered the danger posed by such carelessly guarded sites. Since 1992, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
CTR), based on legislation cowritten by Republican senator Richard Lugar of Indiana and former Democratic senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, has spent over $2
billion to dismantle thousands of Moscow’s nuclear weapons and to secure the remaining
weapons and fissile material at nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union. Beginning in 1992, American technicians
installed cameras that, for the first time, provided the Russians with constant remote monitoring of the most sensitive materials. Also installed were metal and
radiation detectors, stronger locks, reinforced doors and windows, bulletproof guard facilities, perimeter fences with intrusion detectors, robust barriers at vehicle entry
points, and “man traps”—heavy turnstiles that require authorized access and proper identification before
they permit entry. The work was hard and conditions difficult. The temperature at one facility in Siberia dropped below -65 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter and rose
(
above 100 degrees in the summer. That facility alone required some 3.6 miles of fencing, some of it installed through dense forest and bogs. Such security improvements accelerated after
9/11, but by the summer of 2004, the energy department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Pentagon’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency—the agencies that
oversee security at nuclear-weapons sites—were frustrated with the pace of progress. Whether from inertia or from reflexive secrecy about opening some of its most sensitive sites,
Russia had excluded many of its warhead storage facilities from the CTR program, and even at sites with ongoing work, there were no firm
schedules or deadlines; time and money were being squandered. Worse, the security situation in Russia was deteriorating: on September 1, 2004, Chechen terrorists attacked a school in
In
2005
the North Ossetian town of Beslan and slaughtered more than 300 hostages, many of them children.
early
, the George W. Bush White House, recognizing the
ruthlessness of terrorists operating within Russia, urged his national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, and her deputy, Stephen Hadley, to convince the Russians of the urgency of
securing their nuclear facilities. Not long after, Rice and Hadley met with the Russian defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, at the White House, offering him a briefing (presented by coauthor
Tobey) that included overhead photography of Russia’s dilapidated nuclear sites and idle American security equipment, contrasting them with state-of-the-art American sites. Ivanov,
seemingly genuinely concerned, agreed to investigate the matter when he returned to Moscow. Six weeks later, Bush and Russian president Vladimir
Putin, meeting in Slovakia,
agreed to expand the scope and pace of nuclear-security cooperation in what became known as the Bratislava
Initiative. The new deadline to complete the job was tight—the end of 2008—and only a few contractors in Russia had the skills and clearances needed to perform such sensitive
tasks. Nonetheless, American program managers pushed, cajoled, and lobbied their Russian counterparts, constantly invoking the agreement by the two presidents. In the end, the
148 Russian nuclear-weapons and nuclear-material sites—essentially all of them—were
secured. The gaping security holes from the 1990s were plugged, dramatically reducing the
risk that nuclear material might fall into the hands of terrorists. Another area in which enormous progress has been made is
deadline was met. A total of
detecting and combating nuclear smuggling. The world’s premier nuclear smuggler is Pakistan’s notorious Abdul Qadeer Khan, who ran an international trading ring that spanned several
continents for over a decade. In a dramatic televised confession in early 2004, he admitted to selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. He later recanted his confession;
Pakistan has refused to provide direct access to Khan, who is now living comfortably in Islamabad; and to this day, Washington remains uncertain of what he sold to whom. But Khan is
In 2003, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
which encourages nations to allow their ships to be boarded and inspected for illegal cargo.
Since then, some 90 states have joined the initiative. In one signal success, counterproliferation officials in the Bush administration relied on techniques at the heart of PSI to
a poster boy for the need to fight nuclear smuggling.
seize nuclear-related cargo aboard a German cargo ship headed for Libya, adding to pressure on Libyan leader
Muammar el-Qaddafi to renounce and dismantle his secret effort to join the nuclear club. American experts would eventually remove nuclear technology and materials from Libya.
Washington also championed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004. The resolution requires all nations
to enact and enforce effective export controls; prohibit the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technologies by private
citizens; and secure proliferation-sensitive materials. The measure binds all states—a rare instance of Security Council action tantamount to
international legislation. But American officials knew that a UN resolution would not suffice, as the Khan case had shown. A Khan factory that made centrifuge parts was located in
Malaysia, but the Malaysian government was unaware that the plant posed a proliferation risk. Other nations also lacked the means to detect and prevent illicit activities. So in 2006,
the U.S. and Russia launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which now numbers more than 80 members. Aimed at helping states
implement UNSCR 1540, it encourages states to share best practices, train and engage in joint exercises, and share intelligence, law
enforcement, and border-security work. In 2007, for example, China, a Global Initiative member, quietly hosted an exercise to practice tracking and recovering stolen radiological
The National Nuclear Security Administration, meanwhile, is fighting smugglers by bolstering security at
border crossings all over the world. The beefed-up security includes radiation detectors,
which demonstrated their effectiveness on June 26, 2003, when Garik Dadayan was arrested in Sadakhlo, Georgia,
carrying six ounces of highly enriched uranium. He had set off a radiation detector that the NNSA had installed in an area rife with smuggling near the borders between
Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Dadayan was carrying the material in a cellophane bag inside a tea tin in the trunk of his car. While the quantity of material
material.
was not nearly enough to build a weapon, the material was weapons-grade. Georgian authorities told the New York Times that Dadayan had twice before traveled between Moscow and
Novosibirsk, the site of a major Russian nuclear complex, where Dadayan said he had gotten the material. Dadayan’s motives remain obscure. Radiation detectors aren’t perfect; a nuclear
to shield emissions from fissile material with lead. But that tactic, aside from being costly, yields suspiciously heavy packages and risks
setting off metal detectors and X-ray sensors, which are also deployed at border crossings. So Russia and the United
States have agreed to equip nearly 450 Russian border crossings with radiation detectors by
the end of 2011, half of which will be financed by the United States. Washington has also helped equip more than 300 border crossings, ports, and airports in 18
other countries with radiation detectors. In addition, 34 “megaports”—high-volume, containerized shipping facilities—now scan all inbound
and outbound cargo for nuclear and radiological material, with American cooperation and funding. And the NNSA has
smuggler might be able
trained thousands of frontline personnel at the borders of some 50 countries to identify fissile and other sensitive materials. The goal is not to inspect every container capable of
transporting nuclear material—with some 17 million shipping containers in use around the world, that would be impossible—but to make it harder for smugglers to operate with
impunity. One more component of the nation’s counter-proliferation strategy is disposing of fissile material that can be used in weapons—or preventing it from being produced in the
first place. Until recently, for example, three pre-Chernobyl plutonium-production nuclear reactors were operating in Russia. Located in frigid Siberia, they provided not only electrical
power but also steam heat for the surrounding area. While all nuclear reactors produce plutonium, the Siberian reactors were built to do so for the Russian weapons program and
therefore were especially proficient at it. Though no longer intended for that purpose, they continued to churn out plutonium simply by operating. Moreover, their designs were among
the world’s least safe. So both American and Russian officials wanted to close them as quickly as possible. Under the Clinton administration, the United States agreed to fund two coalfired power plants to replace the three dangerous reactors. One of the replacement projects employed about 2,000 people at its peak, during the Russian oil and construction boom of the
2000s, when labor was tight. Work had to stop when temperatures fell below -40—cold enough, in one case, for a crane’s frozen axles to snap. Nevertheless, the NNSA persevered. The
third and last of the reactors was closed last April, almost nine months ahead of schedule. Though few Americans know it, the project has prevented the production of one and a half
metric tons of plutonium annually—enough for more than 180 nuclear weapons.
Moscow and Washington are also cooperating on
programs to dispose of nuclear material, particularly highly enriched uranium, or HEU. HEU is a severe proliferation risk because—unlike
plutonium in spent fuel—it doesn’t require difficult chemical processing to be used in a bomb. A mere 55 pounds of HEU is enough to make an atomic weapon. Luckily, HEU can be
“down-blended” into a safer substance used to fuel nuclear reactors. Under the 1993 Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, Washington is in the process of buying 500 metric
tons of down-blended HEU that once armed Russian nuclear weapons. In fact, of the 20 percent of American electricity generated by nuclear power, half is currently fueled by this
Russian uranium—meaning that one of every ten homes in America is illuminated by material from the very missiles that once targeted them
****Yes Terror****
Groups
Al Qaeda (Middle East)
Has Weapons
Al Qaeda possesses chemical and biological weapons
Adam Dolnik ’11, Professor of Terrorism Studies at the University of Wollongong in Australia,
Terror Studies PhD from Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (1/07, “Die and Let Die:
Exploring Links between Suicide Terrorism and Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Weapons,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Taylor and Francis, lpc)
Much has been written in recent months about the CBRN activities of Al Qaida. According to media
reports and trial testimonies of Al Qaida operatives, the group tried to purchase uranium for $1.5
million in 1993.72 Al Qaida reportedly also made attempts to obtain ready-made nuclear
warheads from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine.73 It has been confirmed by the
U.S. intelligence community that the group possesses unspecified chemical agents as well.74
Furthermore, the network’s members have allegedly purchased anthrax from Indonesia and
botulinum toxin from a laboratory in the Czech Republic.75 Plague and anthrax bacteria have
reportedly also been bought from arms dealers in Kazakhstan.76 On the declaratory level, Al
Qaida’s head Osama bin Laden has stated an interest in obtaining CBRN weapons to kill Americans
indiscriminately. However, in an interview conducted on 7 November 2001, he claimed to have
nuclear and chemical weapons for purposes of deterrence.77 In the case of Al Qaida, it seems
that the group’s CBRN involvement so far has been motivated by the desire to spread fear
and to generate publicity as opposed to mass killing.
Al Qaeda is pursuing WMDs – large scale attacks are likely and troubling
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen ’10, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, served
over three years as the Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of
Energy (January, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Belfer Center,
lpc)
There are many plausible explanations for why the world has not experienced an al Qaeda
attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, but it would be foolish to
discount the possibility that such an event will occur in the future. To date, al Qaeda's WMD
programs may have been disrupted. This is in fact one likely explanation, given a sustained and
ferocious counterterrorist response to 9/11 that largely destroyed al Qaeda as the organization that
existed before the fateful attack on the US. If so, terrorists must continue to be disrupted and
denied a safe haven to reestablish the ability to launch a major strike on the US homeland, or
elsewhere in the world.
Or perhaps, al Qaeda operational planners have failed to acquire the kind of weapons they
seek, because they are unwilling to settle for anything other than a large scale attack in the
US. It would surely be hard for al Qaeda to lower the bar they set on 9/11: what would constitute a
worthy follow-up to 9/11, on their terms? What would they achieve through another attack? There
are few weapons that would meet their expectations in this regard. It is extremely difficult to acquire
a functioning nuclear bomb, or to steal enough weapons usable material to build a bomb. And as al
Qaeda probably learned in trying to weaponize anthrax, biological pathogens may seem simple
enough to produce, but such weapons are not easy to bottle up and control. To complicate matters
further, an attack on the scale of 9/11 is more difficult to accomplish in an environment of
heightened security and vigilance in the US.
But if Osama bin Ladin and his lieutenants had been interested in employing crude
chemical, biological and radiological materials in small scale attacks, there is little doubt
they could have done so by now. However, events have shown that the al Qaeda leadership does
not choose weapons based on how easy they are to acquire and use, be they conventional or
unconventional weapons. They choose them based on the best means of destroying the specific
targets that they have in mind. Al Qaeda's reasoning thus runs counter to analytic convention
that equates the ease of acquisition of chemical, biological or radiological weapons with an
increasing likelihood of terrorist use -- i.e., a terrorist attack employing crude weapons is therefore
more likely than an attack using a nuclear or large scale biological weapon. In fact, it is the opposite:
If perpetrating a large- scale attack serves as al Qaeda's motivation for possessing WMD, not
deterrence value, then the greatest threat is posed by the most effective and simple means of
mass destruction, whether these means consist of nuclear, biological, or other forms of
asymmetric weapons.
An examination of the 9/11 attack sheds light on al Qaeda's reasoning behind the selection of
specific weapons, and how that may apply to the role WMD plays in their thinking. Al Qaeda opted
to pursue a highly complex and artfully choreographed plot to strike multiple targets requiring the
simultaneous hijacking of several 747 jumbo passenger aircraft, because using airplanes as weapons
offered the best means of attacking the targets they intended to destroy. If conventional wisdom
on assessing WMD terrorism threats had been applied to considering the likelihood of the
9/11 plot, analysts may well have concluded it never would have happened; at the time, it
was simply hard to believe any terrorist group could pull off such an elaborate plot utilizing
novel, unpredictable weapons that were so difficult to acquire.
Yes Bio Acquisition
AQ has bioweapons—looting
Bellamy 14 (Jill Bellamy, a listed bio-security expert with the U.S. Department of Defence, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Information Analysis Center and a recognized
international expert on biological warfare and defense, Summer 2014, RubinCenter, “Syria’s Silent
Weapons,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No.2,
http://www.rubincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/v18n02a01_bellamy_PDF.pdf, JHR)
The decommissioning of Syria’s vast chemical weapon arsenal has brought its weapons of mass destruction into the media spotlight. Far
less attention has been paid to Syria’s admitted biological warfare program, one of the largest in the Middle East today. While Asad’s
chemical weapons have been monitored for decades, biological weapons are silent weapons. There are no identifying heat signatures, no
activities such as mixing precursor materials for loading into conventional warheads, which could be indicative of a chemical weapon
facilities and few observable activities by which to identify a biological weapons laboratory. Biological weapons usually exhibit a
combination of selected characteristics: they are highly infective, highly transmissible, have lengthy incubation periods and are untreatable
(no vaccines or medical counter-measures available), among other desired attributes. Above all, they are silent weapons, in some instances
deniable until noted epidemics and pandemics occur. A primary concern for this weapons class is continuity of command and control over
the laboratory infrastructure required to support it. The looting of Asad’s laboratory infrastructure which supports this weapon complex,
due to internal fighting and Syria’s ongoing civil war, is of extreme concern for international public health security. The potential
that the looting of dual-use technologies and weaponized agents may have allowed Al Qaeda to
fulfill their decades-long quest for a biological weapon capability makes the security of Syria’s
biological weapon infrastructure critical. This paper explores the possibility that Al Qaeda has looted Syria’s laboratory
infrastructure and the consequences such an acquisition may mean to the international community as whole.
Al Qaeda has bio weapons – Syrian weapons thefts prove
Bellamy 14 (Jill Bellamy, a listed bio-security expert with the U.S. Department of Defence, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Information Analysis Center and a recognized
international expert on biological warfare and defense, Summer 2014, RubinCenter, “Syria’s Silent
Weapons,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No.2,
http://www.rubincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/v18n02a01_bellamy_PDF.pdf, JHR)
In contrast to the fortress-like security of the SSRC itself, the viability of Syria’s pharmaceutical infrastructure and
specifically veterinary vaccine and agricultural research facilities in Hama, Homs, Latakia, Cerin, Aleppo and
Damascus, are of grave concern to analysts in light of recent looting. Given Al Qaeda’s ongoing efforts
to acquire biological weapons capability, this theft cannot be seen as coincidental. Syria’s biopharmaceutical infrastructure and its dual-use equipment have experienced looting in areas where heavy fighting by Islamic State of Iraq
Al Qaeda has been vocal about its intent to acquire
bioweapons capability, the recent arrest of the former head of Al Qaeda’s “WMD Directorate,”
Yazid Sufaat must be seen as an alarming development. Sufaat is tied to al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, both of whom were
and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) forces has occurred. Since
part of the team responsible for hijacking American Airlines Flight 77 and crashing it into the Pentagon.14 Sufaat was Al Qaeda’s anthrax
expert and established a number of labs in Afghanistan prior to the entry of the Northern Alliance. Although it is mildly disturbing to
consider that Yazid Sufaat is again under ISA (Internal Security Act) detention, having previously been held for 7 years in Malaysia, and was
charged in 2013 under section 130G (a) of the Penal Code for promoting terrorism in Syria, along with Muhammad Hilmi Hassim and his
wife, Halimah Hussin.15 Sufaat’s intended role in Syria may well have been an advisory one. Further alarm bells were rung when another
Al Qaeda operative trained in microbiology, Samer al-Barq, was detained by Israeli security forces in 2010 when he attempted to enter
Israel from Jordan. According to an article on the Global Security Newswire, “Al-Qaida’s interest in biological weapons is
well documented and dates back to at least the late 1990s, according to Western issue experts. More recently, the
international terrorist network’s Yemeni branch in the last year has been attempting to stockpile the lethal
poison ricin for use in possible large-scale attacks in the United States, some intelligence sources have said.” 16
There are grounds for concern whenever high profile arrests and detentions are conducted with
regard to terrorists highly educated in the life sciences, specifically in connection with Syria. The looting
of Syria’s pharmaceutical laboratories (which would mainly have been Biological Safety Level (BSL) 1 or 2), estimated at around 70 percent,
of which probably 20 to 30 percent are likely contributors to Asad’s bioweapons programs, should not be seen as a series of random
incidents. 17 Looting a pharmaceutical firm or research facility means divesting it of bio-reactors, laminar flow hoods, centrifuges,
incubators, refrigerators etc. and since the laboratories would possibly be in-volved in research on highly pathogenic agents, such as rabies,
cholera, botulism, ricin, any looting would need to be orchestrated with care and precise timing. It’s not like walking off with a TV set from
a city shop during a riot, when looting would be haphazard and looters would grab what they can on the go. There is a moderate
the looting of Syrian pharmaceutical facilities has been orchestrated by Al Qaeda,
who may have retained highly-skilled, Western-educated biological and chemical experts for
this purpose. Certainly, the reported looting of these facilities has occurred in sectors where Al Qaeda has been fighting.18
probability that
Al Qaeda bioweapons is a reality and existential threat
Bellamy 14 (Jill Bellamy, a listed bio-security expert with the U.S. Department of Defence, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Information Analysis Center and a recognized
international expert on biological warfare and defense, Summer 2014, RubinCenter, “Syria’s Silent
Weapons,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No.2,
http://www.rubincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/v18n02a01_bellamy_PDF.pdf, JHR)
The situation on the ground in Syria today affords Al Qaeda an opportunity to acquire the
bioweapons capability they have sought for the last 15 or more years. Al Qaeda has been consistently clear in its continuous
calls to acquire and use biological weapons against the “infidel.” While it is prudent to treat such looting with caution, the global
community cannot afford to err on the side of risk where Asad’s biological weapon programs and
the looting of its supporting infrastructure is concerned . The potential consequences to
international health security are too great. Should Al Qaeda acquire bioweapons capability, they
will use it. As biological weapons are, in many instances, highly transmissible and given the advanced nature of Asad’s bioweapons programs, the expression “it’s the pace, not
the space” truly applies here: since biological weapons are designed not only to be highly infective but highly
transmissible, it is therefore the pace of disease transmission, not the location of deployment, that is significant. With modern air travel and public
transport--even the movement of refugees--the pace of outbreak is the most important factor as it presents
significant obstacles to containing deliberate mass casualty pandemics. Should Al Qaeda deploy a biological weapon in regions lacking well-developed public health infrastructures, the
risk of pandemic would be high. While securing Syria’s bioweapons facilities and preventing looting of these facilities and laboratories is critical to global public health safety, it is a nearly
impossible task. For the near future, it’s essential to maintain intensive MEDINT and HUMINT capabilities in addition to appropriate technical (geospatial) assets already in place.
Yes Nuclear Motivation
Al Qaeda wants nukes – empirics
Wellen 14 (Russ Wellen, edits the Foreign Policy in Focus blog Focal Points for the Institute of
Policy Studies, writer about disarmament for theAsia Times Online, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
and the Journal of Psychohistory, 10/21/14, Foreign Policy in Focus, “Is the Islamic State Capable
of Nuclear Terrorism,” http://fpif.org/islamic-state-capable-nuclear-terrorism/, JHR)
After 9/11, many feared that Al Qaeda would get its hands on nuclear weapons. Such fears were stoked by the far right, especially the
books of journalist Paul Williams with their provocative titles: Osama’s Revenge: The Next 9/11 and The Al Qaeda Connection:
International Terrorism, Organized Crime, And the Coming Apocalypse. (Yes, I read them at the time; ate them up even.) In fact, Al
Qaeda had made attempts to obtain nuclear materials. In 2007 at the New Yorker,Steve Coll asked: Can the
United States be made safe from nuclear terrorism? Even the Belfer Center of the Harvard Kennedy School issued a report in 2010. Key
excerpt: Al Qaeda’s patient, decade-long effort to steal or construct an improvised nuclear device
(IND) flows from their perception of the benefits of producing the image of a mushroom cloud
rising over a US city, just as the 9/11 attacks have altered the course of history. This lofty aim helps
explains why al Qaeda has consistently sought a bomb capable of producing a nuclear yield, as
opposed to settling for the more expedient and realistic course of devising a “dirty bomb,” or a
radiological dispersal device.
Al Qaeda is committed to a nuclear attack
Lalbiakchhunga 15 (K. Lalbiakchhunga, Research scholar, School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University of New Delhi, February 2015, “Nuclear Terrorism and the Threat of
Dirty Bomb,” Global Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, Volume 4, Issue 03,
http://www.gjms.co.in/index.php/gjms/article/view/656/579, JHR)
Terrorist Groups and Nuclear Ambition Allegations or indications that various terrorist/non-state groups have tried in the
past to acquire nuclear and other radioactive material have been widely reported and indictments in criminal
prosecutions of alleged members of terrorist groups have, in several cases, included such charges (IAEA: 2014). According to Lee (2003),
accounts of varying credibility also point to efforts by terrorists to purchase finished nuclear weapons
from inside the former USSR and apparently, the Aum Shinrikyo cult apparently harbored such intentions which is evident in
the documents seized from the cult‟s “construction minister,” who had visited Russia extensively in the early 1990s, contained the
ominous notation, “How much is a nuclear warhead?” and listed several prices, though whether these references reflected actual
negotiations was not clear (Lee, 2003). Osama
bin Laden's assertion in 1998 that it was his Islamic duty to
acquire weapons of mass destruction ensured that the fulfillment of this intent would become a
top priority for his lieutenants in the ensuing years (Mowatt-Larssen, 2010). The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan‟s (TTP‟s) is another potential
group that might have intention to acquire nuclear or radiological capability. Operating in Pakistan which is the hotspot of nuclear insecurity, this group may have been want to use
nuclear or radiological weapon to fulfill their avowed objective of establishing an Islamic state. Finally, the most potent terrorist group ISIS pose the gravest danger to proliferation of
nuclear and fissile material. In June 2014, the ISIS capture Mosul city in Iraq and took possession of about 40 kilograms radiological materials from Mosul University. Since then they
started threatening countries like Israel and Britain with nuclear attack (Cefaratti, 2014; Su, 2014). For example, in 1995, Chechen extremists threatened to bundle radioactive material
with explosives to use against Russia in order to force the Russian military to withdraw from Chechnya. While no explosives were used, officials later retrieved a package of cesium-137
the rebels had buried in a Moscow park (USNRC: 2014).
Al Qaeda is determined to get nuclear weapons – experts go neg
Bellamy 14 (Jill Bellamy, a listed bio-security expert with the U.S. Department of Defence, Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Information Analysis Center and a recognized
international expert on biological warfare and defense, Summer 2014, RubinCenter, “Syria’s Silent
Weapons,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No.2,
http://www.rubincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/v18n02a01_bellamy_PDF.pdf, JHR)
Within the U.S. intelligence community, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen is widely acknowledged as the leading analyst of
WMD terrorism. In Graham Allison’s introduction to “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction threat: hype or reality?” published by the Belfer Center for International
Studies in January 2010, he wrote, “After more than three decades in public service in CIA operations, and most recently, Director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S.
, Mowatt-Larssen has compiled a comprehensive chronology that addresses the
skeptics head on, by presenting in unclassified form, Al Qaeda’s roughly 15 year quest to acquire
Department of Energy
WMD.” 24 Allison continues, in his summary of Mowatt-Larssen’s chronology: “…[A] clear hallmark of al Qaeda’s approach is to
pursue parallel paths to procure these deadly materials. Multiple nodes of the network were assigned to different tasks of the overall WMD
effort, acting and reporting independently, ensuring that failure in one cell did not jeopardize the entire operation. By taking into account possible
operational set-backs and intelligence breaches, al Qaeda has displayed deliberate, shrewd
planning to acquire WMD.” 25 Unfortunately, analysts face overwhelming criticism in relating bioweapons events, such as the looting of laboratories to the
public, due to what has been perceived as faulty intelligence on Iraq. As Mowatt-Larssen himself concisely notes: “WMD terrorism skeptics abound, and for understandable reasons.
There is widespread suspicion in America and abroad that WMD terrorism is another phony threat
being hyped for political purposes, and to stoke fears among the public. The case that the WMD
terrorism threat is real bears no association with the Iraq intelligence failure whatsoever, in
terms of the reliability of the sources of intelligence, the quality of the information that has been
collected, and the weight of the evidence that lies at the heart of our understanding of the threat. If anything the biases in WMD
terrorism analysis tilt toward treating the absence of information as an absence of threat; this could
become a vulnerability in the defenses considering the very real possibility that there may be a
terrorist plot in motion that has not been found.” 26
Attack Coming
Al-Qaeda’s plotting a big attack – Zawahri’s silence proves
Riedel 15 (Bruce Riedel, Columnist for AL-Monitor, 5/12/15, US News, “Al –Qaeda Emir’s Silence
Prompts Suspicion,” http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/05/12/al-qaeda-emirs-silenceprompts-suspicion, JHR)
Ayman al-Zawahri, the emir of al-Qaeda since 2011, has not spoken publicly since September. This is
his longest absence from the public stage since the fall of Kabul in 2001. It is likely he is biding his
time for a special purpose. The 63-year old Egyptian has been a jihadist fighter and plotter since 1981 when he was part of
the conspiracy that assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. He has been a brutally tortured prisoner, a fugitive for decades wanted by
dozens of intelligence services and a prolific writer of books about the global jihad. Zawahri has been a constant on al-Qaeda's al-Sahab
propaganda media arm for a dozen years, through scores of taped messages. On Sept. 4, Zawahri announced the formation of a new alQaeda branch, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). He said it had been in development for years and would seek to intensify
jihadist activity in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and the Maldives. Within days, the new group took credit for an attempt to hijack a
Chinese-built Pakistani frigate equipped with ship-to-ship missiles, named the Zulfiqar, from a naval base that houses nuclear weapons in
Karachi. The plot was spearheaded by al-Qaeda-recruited Pakistani navy personnel. The goal was to use the hijacked Zulfiqar to attack US
Navy and allied ships in the Arabian Sea but it was foiled before the ship left Karachi harbor. Al-Qaeda had wanted to attack a US aircraft
carrier, its most audacious plot since 2006. Since then the new al-Qaeda group has taken credit for a wave of assassinations of secular
opponents of jihadism in South Asia. But Zawahri has been uncharacteristically silent. He did not comment when al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) took credit for attacking Paris in January 2015, an attack AQAP said Zawahri had ordered. Zawahri had been calling for
an attack in France for a decade, so his silence is all the more notable. It was a triumph, yet the emir said nothing. Nor has the emir
commented on developments like the wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, the succession in Saudi Arabia
or jihadist attacks in Australia, Canada and elsewhere. In the past, such events routinely got detailed commentary from
Zawahri. Nor has he eulogized al-Qaeda's recent martyrs. The drone mission that inadvertently killed an American and
Italian hostage in Pakistan in January also killed Ahmed Farouq, who was the second-in-command of AQIS. Farouq was in charge of
operations in Pakistan and presumably behind the Zulfiqar plot. Zawahri would usually have issued his own eulogy for a martyr of this
stature. Nor has he praised the years of jihadist service of AQAP leader Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi, who issued the claim for the "Blessed Battle
of Paris" when a drone strike killed him in Yemen this month. Zawahri is almost certainly not a martyr himself. Al-Qaeda has never failed
to announce the death of its leaders, since it takes great pride in its martyrdom. Al-Qaeda has already named Zawahri's heir, AQAP leader
Zawahri is biding his time for reasons unknown. He may have
plots in the works even more audacious than the Zulfiqar one. He may be waiting to strike the
match for some spectacular operation. Perhaps he is waiting for the demise of his nemesis, Caliph Ibrahim of the
Nasir al-Wuhayshi, so there is no succession issue.
Islamic State. It is safe to conclude Zawahri has his reasons for his silence.
Lalbiakchhunga Method
Prefer our method – the best sources prove terror threats are real
Lalbiakchhunga 15 (K. Lalbiakchhunga, Research scholar, School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University of New Delhi, February 2015, “Nuclear Terrorism and the Threat of
Dirty Bomb,” Global Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, Volume 4, Issue 03,
http://www.gjms.co.in/index.php/gjms/article/view/656/579, JHR)
The present research paper adopted deductive and inductive method in analyzing the issue. It relies
on primary sources which include government publication and publication by international organizations as well as
secondary sources like newspapers, magazines, books and internet materials in order to arrived conclusion.
Yes Pakistani Support
Al Qaeda’s on the brink of getting nukes – increased recruitment and
Pakistani corruption
Nanjappa 15 (Vicky, special correspondent in OneIndia’s news channel, 3/20/15, One India,
“Pakistan incorrigible nuclear staff; Is Al-Qaeda targeting them,”
http://www.oneindia.com/feature/pakistan-s-incorrigible-nuclear-staff-is-al-qaeda-targeting-them1689966.html, JHR)
However, the danger is that these persons who have some information could be tapped by terrorist groups and this is
something that Pakistan needs to watch out for. The danger is even more grave with the Al-Qaeda now making
fresh attempts at a massive recruitment drive targeting ex army personnel and officers who were
part of the Pakistan establishment. Officers part of the nuclear programme were incorrigible: In an event
held recently Brig (retd) Tahir Raza had said that Pakistan sacked several persons part of the nuclear programme who had
negative tendencies. He said that those working for the programme were incorrigible and they were unable to clear the personnel reliability programme. He also added
that the checks and measures are extremely stringent in nature. He added that they regularly check officers for their political and religious leanings and then screen them out.
Pakistan's nuclear scandal not new: One must recollect the Nuclear proliferation scandal that broke out in 2003. In this case 12 persons were removed from
office after they were found to be directly linked with Dr Abdul Khan a nuclear scientist. It was found that several nuclear scientists in Pakistan
were working for vested interests and a lot of information may have been leaked during that
time. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities have always been a matter of concern and doubts have been
raised about their safety. The world has constantly said that there is a good chance of it falling into the wrong hands. It was also said that if it falls into wrong hands
they would ideally target India and this could lead to unimaginable chaos in the region. Since the Abdul Khan incident, Pakistan has improved its checks and balances and even
introduced the personal reliability programme. The Al-Qaeda is knocking: Latest Intelligence Bureau reports suggest that the Al-Qaeda has been knocking the doors of disgruntled and
they want former and sacked officers who could
provide them with information and expertise in waging a war. The Al-Qaeda has last year attempted to take over a naval ship in
former officers. There is a major recruitment drive on in Pakistan led by the Al-Qaeda where
Pakistan and use it to stage attacks on Indian and US naval ships. However, this attempt was thwarted and during the investigation it was found that several persons who died during the
counter terrorism exercise were former navy personnel from Pakistan. Pakistan must be careful says India: India has constantly expressed concern over Pakistan's nuclear programme.
There is a need to keep a close tab on all those working on the nuclear programme. Moreover, those officers who have been sacked also need to be monitored at all times, India has also
told Pakistan. Although Pakistan claims to be taking steps to secure their 120 off nuclear warheads, the danger of it falling into the hands of militants is something that would continue to
nag India and the rest of the world.
Pakistani scientists will support Al Qaeda – empirics
Appel 14 (Henry E. Appel, student at Claremont McKenna College, April 27, 2014, CMC Senior
Theses, “U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan Bringing Pakistan Into Line with American
Counterterrorism Interests,”
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2210&context=cmc_theses, JHR)
Religious extremism among empowered individuals in Pakistan’s government poses a major barrier to U.S. efforts to ensure
nonproliferation. A grave example is that of Pakistani nuclear scientist Bashiruddin Mahmood, who formed a
“humanitarian NGO” called Umma Tameer e Nau (UTN) in January 2001. UTN has been implicated in offering
to share nuclear technology with al-Qaeda and the Taliban; Mahmood has been quoted as saying that
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should be “the property of a whole Ummah (the global Muslim
community).” 158 The Islamic piety of Pakistan’s armed forces, nuclear infrastructure, and government as a whole can here be seen as having a major filter effect on U.S.
nonproliferation policy in Pakistan. U.S. policy that fails to take into account the religious and financial incentives of
empowered Pakistanis will fail to satisfactorily address nuclear nonproliferation security priorities of the United States.
Perhaps the greatest filter arising from Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons is the reduction in leverage available to U.S. policymakers, military officials and diplomats that can be
used to influence Pakistan’s national security policies. The unspoken understanding beneath the billions of dollars in aid provided annually to the Pakistani military is that the nucleararmed army is “too big – and too important – to fail.” The leadership of the Pakistani military understands that its nuclear weapons program is a major bargaining tool that prevents the
preventing Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal or nuclear technology from falling into the wrong hands is a critical U.S. national
security priority that outweighs all other concerns.
United States from revoking assistance. The United States cannot allow the Pakistani military to fail or fall into dire financial straits, because
Yes Pakistani Nukes
Al Qaeda can get nukes through Pakistan – they have the support
Chossudovsky 15 — (Michel, Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and Director of
the Centre for Research on Globalization, Center for Research on Globalization, 5/27/15, “The
Threat of Al Qaeda as a Justification to Wage War,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/fabricating-anenemy-the-threat-of-al-qaeda-as-a-justification-to-wage-war/5451343, JHR)
Ties to Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s Military Intelligence (ISI) It is indeed revealing that in virtually all post 9/11 terrorist
occurrences, the terrorist organization is said to have “ties to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda”. This in itself is a
crucial piece of information. Of course, the fact that Al Qaeda is a creature of the CIA is neither mentioned in the press
reports nor is considered relevant. The ties of these terrorist organizations (particularly those in Asia) to Pakistan’s military intelligence (ISI)
is acknowledged in a few cases by official sources and press dispatches. Confirmed by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), some of
these groups are said to have links to Pakistan’s ISI, without identifying the nature of these links. Needless to say, this
information is crucial in identifying the sponsors of these terrorist attacks. In other words, the ISI is
said to support these terrorist organizations, while at same time maintaining close ties to the CIA.
AQAP (Arabian Penisula)
Yes Threat
AQAP is the deadliest terror threat to US interests – they’ll strike again
Humud et al 14 (Carla E. Humud, analyst in Middle Eastern and African affairs, Alexis Arieff,
Africa policy analyst and Yale graduate, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African affairs and
Georgetown graduate, Christopher M. Blanchard, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Jeremy M.
Sharp, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Kenneth Katzman, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
10/10/14, report from the Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle
East and Africa, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf, JHR)
According to U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials, the threat posed by Al Qaeda affiliates to the United
States varies widely across groups. AQAP has launched at least two failed attacks on U.S. soil, and
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in early 2014 described it as the affiliate posing the
most immediate threat to the U.S. homeland.36 Clapper also stated that the Nusra Front has aspirations to launch
an attack against the United States.37 Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in a 2014 audio statement warned the United States of an
impending “direct conflict,”38 and U.S. officials interviewed by the New York Times expressed concern that Al Qaeda affiliates or
like-minded groups in Syria could recruit individuals capable of traveling to the United States
to conduct attacks.39
AQAP’s determined to strike and has support to do it
CFR 15 (Council on Foreign Relations staff, 6/19/15, “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP),” Council of Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsulaaqap/p9369, JHR)
AQAP-linked operatives have also attempted, unsuccessfully, to strike the U.S. homeland: Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab attempted to bomb (PDF) a Detroit-bound jet on Christmas Day, 2009, but failed
due to a technical malfunction; two attempts to down Chicago-bound cargo planes with bombs disguised as printer cartridges were intercepted in October
2010 based on Saudi intelligence; and a May 2012 attempted bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner was foiled by a double agent. The group claimed responsibility for the January 2015 attack
on Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris that killed twelve people, but experts question whether AQAP directed or inspired the massacre. More than half of the 166 prisoners held in the U.S.
military prison at Guantanamo Bay are Yemeni, and President Barack Obama's long-standing pledge to shut down the facility is contingent on repatriating them. But some U.S.
The primary
goals of AQAP are consistent with the principles of militant jihad, which aims to purge Muslim countries of Western influence
and replace secular "apostate" governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes observant of sharia. AQAP objectives include overthrowing the regime in Sana'a;
lawmakers have objected, raising concern about the prisoners' return to the battlefield through detention and reintegration programs. An Effective Propaganda
assassinating Western nationals and their allies, including members of the Saudi royal family; striking at related interests in the region, such as embassies and energy concerns; and
attacking the U.S. homeland. The group has also mastered recruitment through propaganda
and media campaigns. A bimonthly AQAP magazine in Arabic, Sada al-Malahim ("The Echo of
Battles"), is tailored to a Yemeni audience and offers theological support and praise for jihadists. The
U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki and Pakistani-American Samir Khan were central figures in AQAP's production of propaganda aimed at Western audiences. Though they were killed in an
October 2011 U.S. drone strike, their English-language propaganda magazine. Inspire continues to be published. U.S. Major Nidal Hasan exchanged emails with Awlaki prior to Hasan’s
shooting rampage at the U.S. Army's Fort Hood in 2009. Analysts say that AQAP's messaging attracts recruits by "emphasizing national struggle," focusing on jihad as an answer to local
grievances while remaining focused on what jihadists call the "far enemy"—the United States, particularly for its unholy alliance with Saudi Arabia
.
AQAP continues to target the US
Seth G. Jones ’14, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center, adjunct
professor at Johns Hopkins (January, “The Extremist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” RAND
Corporation, lpc)
2. Affiliated Groups: The next tier includes affiliated groups that have become formal branches of al
Qa’ida. What distinguishes “affiliates” from other types of Salafi-jihadist groups is the
decision by their leaders to swear bay’at (allegiance) to al Qa’ida leaders in Pakistan. These
organizations include Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) based in Iraq, al Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen, al Shabaab based in Somalia, al Qa’ida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) based in Algeria and neighboring countries, and Jabhat al-Nusrah based in
Syria. All of the groups became formal affiliates within the past decade: ISIS in 2004, initially as al
Qa’ida in Iraq; AQIM in 2006; AQAP in 2009; al Shabaab in 2012; and Jabhat al-Nusrah in 2013
after breaking away from ISIS. Figure 1 highlights the number of attacks by al Qa’ida core and
affiliates since 1998. The data indicate a substantial rise in the number of attacks over time.
Most of these attacks have occurred in “near enemy” countries and against local targets. A further
breakdown of the data shows that violence levels are highest in Yemen (from AQAP), Somalia
(from al Shabaab), Iraq (from ISIS), and Syria (from ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusrah). These attacks
include a mixture of suicide attacks, complex attacks using multiple individuals and cells,
assassinations, and various types of improvised explosive devices against local government
targets and civilians. In Yemen, for example, AQAP retains a sanctuary in several governorates,
including in southern Hadramawt, Shabwah, and Abyan along the Gulf of Aden – as well as around
such cities as Rada’ (in Al Bayda’ governorate), Sana’a (Sana’a), Wadi Abidah (Ma’rib), and Yatamah
(Al Jawf). The group has demonstrated an ability to mount large-scale, mass-casualty attacks across
Yemen, especially in southern Yemen. AQAP has also benefited from limited Yemeni
government operations. Since mid-2012, President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has avoided major
ground offensives in favor of airstrikes and small-scale raids against al Qa’ida sanctuaries, perhaps to
minimize government casualties. On September 30, 2013, for instance, al Qa’ida operatives
overran the military’s regional headquarters in Mukallah, Hadramawt governorate, killing at least
six. On September 20, al Qa’ida conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and
small arms to attack military facilities in Shabwah Governorate, killing as many as 56 Yemeni
security personnel. On December 5, al Qa’ida operatives launched a complex attack against the
Yemeni Ministry of Defense complex in Sana’a, killing 40 Yemeni personnel and civilians, and
wounding dozens more. They detonated a suicide vehicle bomb that breached a fence inside
the compound, which allowed six or more militants to attack the military leadership hospital on the
compound.14 And on January 2, 2014, AQAP operatives were responsible for the assassination
of a senior Yemeni security official in Aden. Most concerning, however, AQAP continues to
plot attacks against the United States and American targets overseas.
AQAP threat outweighs other terror groups – they’re targeting the US
Seth G. Jones ’14, director of the International Security and Defense Policy Center, adjunct
professor at Johns Hopkins (January, “The Extremist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” RAND
Corporation, lpc)
Not all Salafi-jihadist groups present a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. In the near term, Al
Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula likely presents the most immediate threat, along with inspired
individuals and networks like the Tsarnaev brothers that perpetrated the April 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings. The growth in social media and the terrorist use of chat rooms, Facebook,
Twitter, YouTube, and other sites has facilitated radicalization inside the United States. While al
Qa’ida leaders did not organize the Boston attacks, they played a key role by making available
the propaganda material and bomb-making instructions utilized by the Tsarnaevs. Other
affiliates do not appear to pose an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland. Al Qa’ida in the
Islamic Maghreb is focused on overthrowing regimes in North Africa, including Algeria. Al
Shabaab’s objectives are largely parochial, and it has conducted attacks in Somalia and the region. But
al Shabaab possesses a competent external operations capability to strike targets outside of
Somalia. The Westgate Mall attack was well-planned and well-executed, and involved sophisticated
intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance of the target. These skills could be used for
other types of attacks directly targeting the United States and its citizens. In addition,
Americans from cities like Phoenix and Minneapolis have traveled to Somalia over the past several
years to fight with al Shabaab. Between 2007 and 2010, more than 40 Americans joined al Shabaab,
making the United States a primary exporter of Western fighters to the al Qa’ida-affiliated
group.35And the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, along with Jahbat al-Nusrah, are primarily
interested in establishing Islamic emirates in Iraq, Syria, and the broader region.
US Surveillance Key
AQAP relies on American extremists for effective overseas attacks
Humud et al 14 (Carla E. Humud, analyst in Middle Eastern and African affairs, Alexis Arieff,
Africa policy analyst and Yale graduate, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African affairs and
Georgetown graduate, Christopher M. Blanchard, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Jeremy M.
Sharp, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Kenneth Katzman, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
10/10/14, report from the Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle
East and Africa, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf, JHR)
Attacks against U.S. interests. AQAP has attempted on several occasions to bomb U.S. commercial aircraft
and indoctrinate what the intelligence community refers to as “homegrown violent extremists” or HVEs. Its most
high-profile attempted attack to date was the failed bomb attack against Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009. Before
2009, militants in Yemen targeted Western embassies in Sana’a, foreign oil companies and their facilities, and tourists.
Two attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Sana’a in 2008 killed 17 people, including one U.S. citizen, and injured
dozens of Yemenis. In October 2010, AQAP, through its U.S.-designated terrorist bombmaker, Ibrahim
Hassan al Asiri, again attempted to attack the United States–in this case using explosives hidden inside parcel
packages addressed to fictitious people in Chicago associated with Jewish synagogues.
AQIM (North Africa)
Will Attack
AQIM will attack – rhetoric proves they’ll expand globally
Humud et al 14 (Carla E. Humud, analyst in Middle Eastern and African affairs, Alexis Arieff,
Africa policy analyst and Yale graduate, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African affairs and
Georgetown graduate, Christopher M. Blanchard, analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Jeremy M.
Sharp, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Kenneth Katzman, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs,
10/10/14, report from the Congressional Research Service, “Al Qaeda-Affiliated Groups: Middle
East and Africa, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43756.pdf, JHR)
Other Al Qaeda affiliates are seen by intelligence officials primarily as a potential danger to U.S. interests abroad, rather than direct threats to the U.S. homeland. U.S. officials have
AQIM and Boko Haram also
have been described as primarily regional threats. However, while these groups to date have
conducted only local or regional attacks, most have stated aspirations of attacking the West. In addition,
the majority of these groups also seek to destabilize countries that the United States considers
key to regional security; to disrupt regional commerce; or to conduct sectarian attacks that could be widely
described Al Shabaab and Al Murabitoun as the greatest threats to U.S. interests in East Africa and the Sahel, respectively.40
destabilizing.
Al-Shabaab (Somalia)
Horn of Africa Impact
Kenyan retaliation against al-Shabaab strengthens terror and decks regional
stability
Mann 13- research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He holds
an MA in International Affairs from George Washington University where he focused on
international security and conflict (Scott F., “Tit-For-Tat: Kenya, Somalia, and the Resurgence of alShabaab”, Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tit-for-tat-kenya-somalia-andthe-resurgence-of-al-shabaab)//WK
The rivalry between Kenya and al-Shabaab is not new. Kenya has long been active in
Somalia’s internal politics, sponsoring a peace process that lasted from 2002-2004 and yielded the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). As Ken Menkhaus notes, Kenya’s support for the TFG
“earned it Shabaab’s wrath.” More recently, following an upsurge in attacks in 2010 and 2011
along the Kenyan border, including a number of high profile kidnappings, Kenya launched a
military invasion to push al-Shabaab back from the border. Kenya’s presence in Somalia persists
to this day as part of the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Al-Shabaab, for its part,
has been conducting raids, small-scale attacks, smuggling operations, and fundraising inside Kenya.
al-Shabaab has also aggressively sought to recruit new membership from Kenya’s roughly
2.4million politically marginalized ethnic Somalis, in Kenya’s North Eastern Province and
elsewhere. There have also been worries about potential for radicalization among the roughly
500,000 Somali refugees in Kenya. In 2010 and 2011, according to the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism several low-casualty shootings and small bombings,
attributed to al-Shabaab, occurred in Nairobi. These activities in Kenya, while worrying, have
always been peripheral to the group’s central aims. Indeed, the list of activities does not suggest
that Kenya is a core area of strategic focus for al-Shabaab, but rather a secondary resource and
support base. Al-Shabaab has always remained a Somalia-centric and focused group. Seen
from this perspective, the Westgate attack is just the latest volley in an ongoing exchange between
Kenya and al-Shabaab. As with all of al-Shabaab’s past violence, this act is fundamentally
about power in Somalia. The group’s statements have confirmed its actions in Nairobi were in
direct response to Kenya’s soft and hard power interventions. Quotes from al-Shabaab’s Twitter
account directly tied its actions to those of Kenya. “Kenyans were relatively safe in their cities before
they invaded us and killed Muslims #Westgate.” Thus, Kenya is a target because it has become a
party in Somalia’s ongoing internal conflict. So while this attack might represent an escalation in
the conflict between al-Shabaab and Kenya, the attack in Kenya is still an extension of al-Shabaab’s
fight in Somalia, rather than a deviation from it. With this in mind, how should the attack be
addressed, first, by regional actors, and second, by the United States? Kenya has pledged a swift
and painful response to the attack. While such a response is understandable, it will prove a
difficult road, and may not yield the results Kenya desires. Indeed, since the collapse of the
central government in 1991, Somalia has repeatedly proven itself to be a quagmire of the first
order. Recent gains in stability made by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces,
while promising, have been geographically limited, and have not been solidified sufficiently to be
considered permanent. Ironically, for all of their internal divisions, Somalis have historically found
some semblance of unity in their opposition to the presence of external actors. While Kenya
may seek to devastate al-Shabaab through some sort of military offensive, it may instead
strengthen al-Shabaab by driving more Somalis to the group. Some have even suggested that
the Westgate mall attack was part of deliberate strategy on the part of al-Shabaab to provoke
a reprisal from Kenya as the basis for a recruitment drive. That would be a risky strategy, but
possible nonetheless. Kenya, then, must proceed carefully. Its operations must balance the
nation’s counterterrorism aims with the need to find viable, trustworthy allies within
Somalia. Unless Kenya can garner the support of the Somali population, the Kenyan response will
perpetuate the threat rather than eliminate it. Kenya must also cleverly balance Somalia’s
complex clan politics. Rushing to pick winners in the aftermath of any operation will just as
quickly create new opposing alliances, likely favoring al-Shabaab. More importantly, Kenya
could also benefit from some self-reflection, and look internally for persistent sources of
insecurity. For example, radical Islam has increasingly found traction among the sizeable population
of politically marginalized ethnic Somalis. Its broader Muslim religious minority of roughly to
4.3 million people represents another point of weakness for the country. The October 4th
killing of a Muslim cleric with purported ties to al-Shabaab, and the subsequent riots in Mombasa
show the high level of tension, and potential combustibility of the internal security situation. In order
to counteract the temptations of al-Shabaab’s militant message, Kenya must seek dialogue with, and
inclusion of, its ethnic and religious minorities, while simultaneously avoiding indiscriminate and
draconian security measures. The United States would do well to remain on the periphery of
any response. Direct US involvement would be the quickest way to provide al-Shabaab with
the propaganda bonanza it needs to recruit a new generation of jihadists. Luckily, a hands-off,
back-room approach seems to be the Obama Administration’s current strategy regarding regional
conflicts (i.e. Syria). Thus, while the administration’s pledge of support for Kenya is important,
it is even more important for regional actors to take the initiative to improve stability. AlShabaab has proven its resilience and ambition, as well as the tremendous growth in its capabilities.
There are many unanswered questions about the Westgate Mall attack, such as the extent of alShabaab’s coordination with, and the degree of involvement of, Kenya’s al-Hijra group. If true, alShabaab’s use of sophisticated, high-level transnational coordination may not bode well for
the region, especially if the group decides to replicate its success, both in Kenya and with
extremist groups based elsewhere. Nevertheless, despite its dramatic – and tragic – extraterritorial
attack, al-Shabaab remains a Somali group focused on power within Somalia. Its actions may require
a robust response, but such a reaction must be carefully calibrated to bring the Somali population
along in support. Ultimately, this situation presents opportunities for both al-Shabaab, as well as
those who desire regional stability. While the situation is ripe for transformation, it remains unclear
who will benefit.
Causes major power wars
Glick 7- [Dec. 10, 2007 Caroline Glick , THE JERUSALEM POST]//twemchen
The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place. Small wars, which rage continuously, can
easily escalate into big wars . Local conflicts have regional and global aspects . All of the conflicts in this
tinderbox, which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially give rise
to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers.
The Horn of Africa includes the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from
Ethiopia in 1993 after a 20-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a hot border dispute with Ethiopia
which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme.
Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so
the conflict festers. Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia,
Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November
2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded to restore the recognized
Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed. Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from
power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged
a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year. THE SENIOR ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan
Dahir Aweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day
conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed. Eritrean
President-for-life Isaias Afwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali
people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation." Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly
supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role
in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in
Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden
National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces
and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In
their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and
65 Ethiopians
Launching Kenyan Attacks
Al-Shabaab launching Kenyan attacks—decimates Kenyan stability
Hayward 6/15- national security correspondent for Breitbart News (John, “AL-SHABAAB
THREATENS RAMADAN ATTACK; TERRIFIED CHRISTIANS CONVERT TO ISLAM”,
Breitbart, 6/15/15, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/06/15/al-shabaab-threatensramadan-attack-terrified-christians-convert-to-islam/)//WK
The militants say they have an even bigger operation in mind for the coming days, timed to
coincide with the beginning of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan on June 17. “We are
planning to give Kenyan non-believers a true taste of jihad in the next few days and weeks,” a
senior al-Shabaab commander is quoted by AllAfrica. According to this report, the terrorist group
claims to have already infiltrated the northeastern region of Kenya, where it threatens to
“keep targeting and destroying Kenya’s education sector and business sector,” along with
attacks on Kenyan troops participating in peacekeeping operations in Somalia. Daniel Pipes
quotes the governor of Kiambu County in Kenya, William Kabogo, saying that “Christians are now
converting to Islam in large numbers just to be safe, in case al-Shabaab strikes, while those who have
not converted fully are attending madrassas to learn the Koran and Muslim prayers just in case.”
Pipes reports this tactic of learning to “pass as Muslim” has become common among Christians
threatened by al-Shabaab and ISIS. In both the Garissa University massacre and the 2013 atrocity at a
shopping mall in Nairobi, al-Shabaab killers notoriously asked prospective victims whether they were
Muslims and demanded they recite Islamic prayers or details from the Koran as proof before
deciding whether to spare their lives. As Governor Kabogo asserted, “If students in Garissa
University knew the Quran and how to pray in Arabic, they would be alive today. That is the fear
the Al Shabaab has instilled in Christians who are now becoming Muslims as a matter of
necessity.” Kenyan villagers living along the Somali border have complained, with support
from international organizations such as Human Rights Watch, that their government’s
forces don’t exactly rush into battle with al-Shabaab to protect them. A recent report alleges
that “Kenyan police repeatedly ignored besieged villagers’ pleas for help and allowed Islamist
jihadists to rampage unchecked in a killing spree that claimed 87 lives last summer,”
according to the UK Independent. The report says the police didn’t arrive on the scene until fully 12
hours after al-Shabaab fired the first shots, giving the militants plenty of time to escape and stage
further attacks. Al-Shabaab’s recruiting efforts might not be on par with ISIS, but they’re
distressingly successful nonetheless. One of the militants killed in this weekend’s attack on
northern Kenya was a British Muslim convert named Thomas Evans, just 25 years old. According to
the BBC, his family learned of his death from journalists and were swiftly able to find photos of his
corpse on Twitter.
Boko Haram (Nigeria)
Goal
FYI about what Boko Haram wants
Dorsey 15
/19 April 2015, Steve Dorsey, Fox News, Boko Haram adopts ISIS' bloody religious cleansing strategy,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/04/19/boko-haram-adopts-isis-bloody-religious-cleansingstrategy, spark/
The Islamic militant group Boko Haram is adopting ISIS' bloody strategy of stamping out
Christianity with a frightening fervor, putting Nigeria's 70 million followers of Jesus in
danger for their lives, fearful human rights advocates say. Boko Haram leaders vowed
their formal allegiance to IS in an audio message in Arabic posted to Twitter last month, according to
intelligence analysts. The militant group has launched murderous rampages across northeastern
Nigeria, and into neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger. In an attack April 7, Islamist
extremists disguised themselves as preachers and killed at least 24 people in Nigeria’s
Borno state. Meanwhile, the United Nations has condemned the attack and is calling for a multinational strategy to fight the
group. Experts worry the attacks are part of a rising trend by the group to target Christians and other non-Muslims as it works to gain
control of territories in West Africa. “That is the strategy of Boko Haram,” according to David Curry, head of non-profit Open Doors
USA which works with Christian refugees around the world. “These
attacks are escalating.” The group also
kidnapped more than 200 girls last year and continues to target schoolchildren. Religious
freedom advocates say Boko Haram is now working to mirror efforts by IS in Syria and Iraq to
execute Christians and others who fail to accept their extremist ideology . Boko Haram
has been successful in killing thousands of its opponents and targeted victims, along with
displacing more than a million people. “Boko Haram is probably the most lethal Islamic
extremist group in the world,” said Nina Shea, director of the Center for Religious Freedom at the Hudson Institute.
“ They want a pure Islamic State .” Observers say the group presents a long-term challenge to peace and stability in the
region. Activists and international organizations have long called for a strategic intervention from the U.S. and its allies to fight back
against Boko Haram insurgents in coordination with local troops. “There’s more that we can do to help these partners,” Curry said.
The U.S. has offered limited assistance. In February, the commander of U.S. Special Forces in Africa said the American military would
share communications and intelligence equipment. But Shea believe the U.S. and its allies should do more. “We have to find, and a
train an elite force to tackle these groups,” she said. Meanwhile, Nigeria’s newly-elected president Muhammadu Buhari says he’ll ‘spare
no effort’ to defeat Boko Haram. Buhari’s March 28 election became a referendum on deteriorating security in the country. Voters
went to ballot boxes even as Boko Haram pledged more violence to disrupt the election.
Threat
Boko Haram is something serious
Goerg & Dembinski 15
/19 March 2015, Madeleine Goerg is a program officer for The German Marshall Fund of the
United States, and Sophie Dembinski is a program coordinator for The German Marshall Fund of
the United States, Boko Haram Is Now a Global Threat,
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2015/03/19/boko_haram_is_now_a_global_threat_11105
9.html, spark/
Boko Haram remained a purely Nigerian issue for years, but that is changing fast . The
group's aspirations, and its pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, are broadening the
scope of the global jihadist threat . That threat is one the United States cannot overlook especially as Boko Haram destabilizes West and Central Africa, a region that remains a significant exporter of raw materials but also a
hub for trafficking of all kinds. The
group, whose name is often translated as "Western education is forbidden," launched
an insurgency in 2009 following violent clashes with Nigerian police forces. The conflict
has since displaced and killed thousands of people and has ground northern Nigeria's
economy to a halt. Nigeria's own government grossly underestimated the threat posed by
Boko Haram. The group has proven to be highly flexible, both in its ideology and in its use of
tactics, and Boko Haram now reaches far beyond the confines of Nigeria. In the past 12 months,
the group has perpetrated large-scale kidnappings that garnered it international
notoriety; declared a caliphate spanning significant parts of the northeastern Nigerian
states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe; and attacked urban centers in Cameroon and
Niger . The group's use of children as suicide bombers and its scorched-earth attack on
the remote city of Baga in January 2015, in which Amnesty International estimates 2,000 lives were lost, demonstrate
Boko Haram's growing propensity for large-scale violence. In reaction to Boko Haram's attacks on Chad,
Niger, and Cameroon, the outlines of a more coherent regional response have emerged. No longer able to stand back and simply
defend their borders, Nigeria's neighbors - with Chad in the lead - launched a ground and air offensive from Niger, effectively opening
up another front in the fight against Boko Haram. Although Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon have registered some advances, their
offensives have been reactive and uncoordinated - a mid-term, proactive strategy is needed. More important, while the armies of Chad
and Niger are pushing forward, Cameroon is running low on funds for its operations, and Benin, the fifth regional partner in the push
against Boko Haram, has yet to send any troops. Multilateral security efforts have been found wanting. The
African Union
sanctioned an 8,700-strong regional force to combat Boko Haram, but for now it exists
only on paper. This crisis will not be solved within the region, with only nominal support
from the United States and France. Despite talk of regional mobilization and of cooperation between West and
Central Africa's main regional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), regional actors won't provide the necessary support to deal Boko Haram a permanent
defeat. After political crises in Mali and the Central African Republic, and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, the region's militaries are
overstretched. Furthermore,
2015 is a year of elections, which add a dose of uncertainty and
instability at the national level. West African countries, particularly those with significant
Muslim populations, are deeply worried about the possible knock-on effects of Boko
Haram . Yet recent conversations with officials in Senegal, Burkina Faso, and Cote d'Ivoire - key members of ECOWAS - did not
point toward any imminent regional effort against Boko Haram, nor toward a significant allocation of resources to end the conflict.
The opportunistic nature of Boko Haram should also be cause for concern for the United
States . In a bid to embed the group in global jihadist movements, Boko Haram recently pledged allegiance
to the Islamic State, becoming the fourth group to do so in Africa, and the first south of the Sahara.
Boko Haram has also taken on the symbols and messaging techniques of the Islamic
State, translating its videos into English, French, and Arabic to reach a global audience. The international
community needs to place a greater priority on stemming extremism in Sub-Saharan
Africa . Efforts to build a coalition to fight the Islamic State need to be extended to Boko
Haram . Engaging civilians largely marginalized in the fight against violent extremists will also be key in addressing the economic,
social, and political dimensions of the conflict. France has close to 9,000 troops on the continent, as well as eight permanent or
temporary military bases in West and Central Africa, and it has intervened in Mali and the Central African Republic in the past two
The United States will need to work with France
and other international actors to provide the logistical support the region's forces require
to fight Boko Haram . Washington and Paris could also do much more to push the
Nigerian government to counter Boko Haram, to better protect civilians in the northern
states, and to avoid further delays in the electoral process, which would only stoke further
instability in Nigeria . As defense budgets decrease in the United States and Europe, and as crises in other parts of the globe
take precedence, it is perhaps no surprise that Boko Haram is a low priority in Western capitals.
But the severity of the conflict now requires decisive political, military, and diplomatic
action by regional and international actors, as well as a long-term plan for Nigeria to
address the internal tensions at the core of the crisis.
years. Regional actors cannot solely rely on French support.
US troops mobilizing now but threats are still high
CBS 15
/18 February 2015, CBS News, U.S. launches Africa military exercises amid Boko Haram threat,
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-launches-africa-military-exercises-amid-boko-haram-threat,
spark/
The U.S. military is launching its annual training exercise with armies from across Africa
this week in Chad, as the countries of the region battle a growing threat from the Nigerian Islamic extremist group Boko Haram.
Some 1,300 participants from 28 countries are joining in the Flintlock exercise that lasts until
March 9. It includes counter-terrorism forces not only from the U.S. but from other Western
countries and a number of African militaries including several of the armies who have
pledged to support Nigeria in its battle against the jihadists. Flintlock is "designed to foster regional
cooperation to enable our African partners to stabilize regions of North and West Africa, reducing sanctuary and support for violent
extremist organizations," according to the U.S. African Command website. The annual
exercise first began in 2006
in part to counter the rise of al Qaeda-linked militants in the Sahel region. Now the most
imminent danger to regional security is Boko Haram, which killed at least 10,000 people
in Nigeria last year and is now staging cross-border attacks in Cameroon, Niger and
Chad. "We must respond to this immense security challenge, which is a major concern.
You will agree that this is a difficult task, because terrorism has no face and no
jurisdiction ," Chadian Gen. Brahim Seid Mahamat said at an opening ceremony Monday, according to comments published by
the U.S. military. Col. George Thiebes, commander of special operations with Command Forward-West Africa, which leads the
Flintlock exercise, said one of the challenges is helping armies from different countries to work together. While
the
upcoming multinational force against Boko Haram is not a specific focus of Flintlock, the
training is aimed at broader themes that will apply to that mission. "We look at how we can get the
nations to work together against a common threat," Thiebes told The Associated Press. Among the obstacles: Disparate radio systems,
harsh terrain and finding common vocabulary even when troops speak the same language, he said. Chad is the host country, though
other planned stations are Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Tunisia. Thiebes said the
training is going ahead despite a
recent series of Boko Haram attacks on Niger and Cameroon. Last month, the African Union
chairwoman called for deployment of 7,500 African troops to fight the spreading Islamic uprising by Nigeria's home-grown extremists.
A senior U.S. official told reporters that
the United States government would take a role in the fight
against Boko Haram . "We are prepared to provide technical support, training and equipment to fight the Boko Haram
The group's activity in the region has clearly affected our attention in Africa away
from development ," said Linda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa.
group.
Boko Haram-lead violence increasing now – a concrete strategy necessary
Meehan 15
/14 January 2015, Patrick Meehan is a Member of Congress and the Vice President and Research
Director in Gartner's CIO Research group, Meehan, King: U.S. Needs "Comprehensive Strategy" to Address
Boko Haram, ProQuest, spark/
Congressman Patrick Meehan (PA-07) and Rep. Peter King (NY-02) this week wrote Secretary of State John Kerry and
Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel urging the United States government to adopt a comprehensive
strategy to address the rise of West African terrorist group Boko Haram. "We write to you today with
grave concerns about the escalation in violence by Boko Haram, the Islamic extremist
group active in West Africa and an officially designated foreign terrorist organization ,"
Meehan and King wrote. "As you know, Boko Haram has become increasingly aggressive and lethal
in recent months." " Boko Haram earned global headlines last year when it abducted some
200 young Nigerian women. Its campaign of terror has continued since. Reports indicate
that the group was responsible last week for the massacre of some 2,000 innocent
civilians in several villages in northern Nigeria. Most recently, Boko Haram is apparently
responsible for a suicide bombing in northeast Nigeria that utilized 10-year old girls as the
bombers." " It is clear that the United States needs a comprehensive strategy to address Boko
Haram's growing lethality ," Meehan and King wrote. In the 112th Congress, King, the Chairman of the House
Homeland Security Committee and Meehan, Chairman of the Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee, held the first-ever
hearing on the threat posed by Boko Haram. The committee's work resulted in the publication of "Boko Haram - Emerging Threat to
the U.S. Homeland", a bipartisan report that detailed the group's rise and the danger it poses. Meehan and King repeatedly urged the
State Department to designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Boko Haram is necessary for the Islamic State’s weapon smuggling operations
to the US border
Sidway 15
/4 June 2015, Ralph Sidway is an Orthodox Christian researcher and writer, and author of Facing
Islam, DABIQ: ISIS could transport nuke from Nigeria into U.S. through Mexico,
http://www.jihadwatch.org/2015/06/dabiq-isis-could-transport-nuke-from-nigeria-into-u-sthrough-mexico, spark/
The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL), in the latest edition of its propaganda magazine, indicated that it could purchase a
nuclear weapon in Pakistan, take it to Nigeria, and then smuggle it into the U.S. through
Mexico by using existing trafficking networks in Latin America. In an op-ed article published in the
ninth edition of ISIS’ Dabiq magazine released in late May, the jihadist group claims it could transport a
nuclear device in the same way illicit drugs are smuggled into Europe through West
Africa, adding that Boko Haram’s presence in Nigeria could facilitate the transaction .
The Nigeria-based Islamic terrorist group, Boko Haram, pledged allegiance to ISIS in
March. In March, Gen. John Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), warned that Islamic terrorist groups such
as ISIS could exploit the capabilities and knowledge of Latin American smuggling
networks to infiltrate the U.S. through Mexico and possibly bring in weapons of mass
destruction . The general, in October 2014, acknowledged that illegal drugs from South America move “through West Africa, up
the Maghreb and into Western Europe,” adding that ISIS enemy al Qaeda and its affiliates take “a lot of money to allow it to flow.”
According to the alleged author of the Dabiq op-ed article, kidnapped British photojournalist John Cantlie, ISIS
could
smuggle a nuke into the U.S. by using the same route and reversing the flow— moving
the nuke from West Africa into South America, from where it could be transported into
the United States through Mexico. “Let me throw a hypothetical operation onto the table,” Cantlie wrote in the
article entitled “The Perfect Storm.” “The Islamic State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call
on their wilāyah [province] in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons
dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region.” He addded: The weapon is then transported over land
until it makes it to Libya, where the mujāhidīn [fighters] move it south to Nigeria. Drug shipments from Columbia bound for Europe
pass through West Africa, so moving other types of contraband from East to West is just as possible. The
nuke and
accompanying mujāhidīn arrive on the shorelines of South America and are transported
through the porous borders of Central America before arriving in Mexico and up to the
border with the United States. “From there it’s just a quick hop through a smuggling tunnel and hey presto, they’re
mingling with another 12 million ‘illegal’ aliens in America with a nuclear bomb in the trunk of their car,” he also wrote. If not a nuke,
ISIS could easily smuggle in “a few thousand tons of ammonium nitrate explosive” that is easy to manufacture, said the article. Cantlie
wrote that ISIS, which started as a movement in Iraq, has suddenly morphed into a global phenomenon that the West and the
Boko Haram controls most of Nigeria, home
to “an exhausted and smashed national army that is now in a virtual state of collapse”.
While testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March, Gen. Kelly noted, “Last year, ISIS adherents
posted discussions on social media calling for the infiltration of the U.S. southern border.
democratic world as a whole is ill-prepared to handle. He said that
Thankfully, we have not yet seen evidence of this occurring, but I am deeply concerned that smuggling networks are a vulnerability
that terrorists could seek to exploit.” “While there is not yet any indication that the criminal networks involved in human and drug
trafficking are interested in supporting the efforts of terrorist groups, these
networks could unwittingly, or even
wittingly, facilitate the movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of mass destruction
toward our borders, potentially undetected and almost completely unrestricted,” he added.
FARC (Columbia)
Threat Increasing
FARC threat increasing—temporary cease fire just ended
BAH 6/29- (Buenos Aires Herald, “Colombia’s FARC rebels suspend ceasefire”, 6/29/15,
http://buenosairesherald.com/article/189846/colombia%E2%80%99s-farc-rebels-suspendceasefire)//WK
Colombia’s largest rebel group yesterday called off a unilateral ceasefire in reaction to a
military raid on a guerrilla camp that killed 26 of its fighters, further straining negotiations to
end the country’s half-century-old conflict. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia said
in a statement yesterday that it felt obliged to end the five-month-old truce aimed at
facilitating the peace talks because of the constant pursuit of its fighters by the military. The
Thursday attack on the guerrilla camp in Cauca province, which President Juan Manuel Santos called
a major blow against the FARC, appears to have been in retaliation for the rebels’ own stealth raid
last month, also in Cauca, on an Army patrol. Ten soldiers were killed in that attack, which led
Santos to scrap his own confidence-building gesture: a ban on launching air raids against
guerrilla camps. The FARC commander known by his alias Pastor Alape, one of the group’s chief
envoys to peace talks taking place in Cuba, denounced the attack on Twitter as a “treacherous and
degrading act” carried out in the dead of night. “It was not in our thinking to suspend the decision to
call a unilateral and indefinite ceasefire on December 20, 2014 as a humanitarian gesture and to help
de-escalate the conflict, but the incoherence of the Santos government has brought it about,” the
group said in a short statement read by chief FARC negotiator Iván Márquez in Cuba, where peace
talks between the rebels and the Colombian government are taking place. Meanwhile Santos urged
the FARC to accelerate negotiations if it wants to prevent further bloodshed. Speaking
alongside the visiting Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, he said the armed forces are ready to combat any
new FARC offensive. “From the day the conversation in Havana started I’ve been clear,” Santos, a
former defence minister, said in televised remarks earlier yesterday. “Operations by our armed forces
against the insurgents will not be detained, they won’t be detained. Nobody should fool themselves.”
Hamas (Palestine)
Terror Tunnels
Hamas focusing on terror tunnels and missile strikes
Yarom 6/2- correspondent for the Jerusalem Post (Johnny, “Tunnel Funds”, The Jerusalem Post,
6/2/15, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Tunnel-funds-404841)//WK
Accelerated globalization has constituted a force of significant weight in a variety of realms in recent
years. One of the most prominent has been the realm of finances. A good illustration is the current
ability of any individual, located almost anywhere in the world, to transfer a sum of money to
another individual located on another continent by means of the Hawala system – using
nothing more than a courier and a password. Iran appears to have used a similar method to
transfer tens of millions of dollars to Hamas in an effort to help it dig new terror tunnels to
replace the tunnels that were destroyed by Israel during Operation Protective Edge. According to
published information, Tehran is also helping fund the replenishment of Hamas’s stock of
missiles. The method of money transfer may not be well known, but anyone who is well versed in
finances knows that there is more than one way of doing it. Money transfer is of critical
importance to terrorist organizations, as without it they cannot exist. The banking system
offers various methods of money transfer (transfers between computers), the most prominent of
which is the international SWIFT system. But transfers can also be made via less technologically
sophisticated non-bank systems, such as Western Union. The non-bank systems are not subject to
international money transfer standards such as the recording of payment and defrayal,
documentation and the ability to trace prohibited transfers. One of the most prevalent systems of
money transfer in the Muslim world is the hawala (“transfer” in Arabic) system. This network is
based on trust and connections between many different brokers around the world. Each broker of
this kind is called a hawaladar, or a hawala courier. The money transfer system is extremely
simple; it involves no computers and no documentation and is performed in the blink of an
eye, all based on trust. The cost of transferring money using this system is less than the bank-based
system, as it requires neither currency conversion nor opening a bank account. Hawala couriers are
located everywhere and necessitate no advanced technology. They can operate in remote
villages that have no banking infrastructure whatsoever. The system is widespread among
expatriates working in host countries who transfer money back to their families in remote villages in
Third World countries. Despite widespread legal money transfer activity, the special nature of
the hawala system – in which no receipt is provided for the transaction, for which there is no
documentation – makes it especially conducive to illicit activity. The network is believed to be
used for drug transactions, money laundering, terrorism, smuggling, bypassing local
currency conversion laws, tax evasion and other such purposes. As evidence, the American
government has focused special, systematic attention on the hawala system since the attacks of
September 11, 2001, and has instructed countries to regulate the network’s activity by requiring state
licensing of all money transferring businesses. Only recently, the US Treasury imposed sanctions
against the Taliban and hawala network operators in Pakistan and Afghanistan. For some time now,
Iran has also been making use of this network. According to a January 2013 assessment of the
US Treasury, the informal money transfers conducted via the hawala system helped enable
the Iranians to bypass the international sanctions. This was achieved through use of private
clearing houses and trading companies in other countries, fabricated identities and the hawala system.
According to a 2014 US State Department report on the war on drugs which also relates to the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian economy is financially based primarily on cash. In
light of the impossibility of transferring millions of dollars in cash from Iran to the Gaza Strip
in suitcases, the easiest method of actualization is the hawala system. We must also not rule
out the possibility that Iran and Hamas are currently making use of this system for the
transfer of funds to finance the digging of tunnels.
Hamas-Israel War Impact
Hamas attacks on Israel escalate to regional nuclear use
Oren 8- Senior Fellow Shalem Center, (Michael, “Next Mideast War Just a Rocket Away” Kitsap
Sun, 3/16/08 http://www.kitsapsun.com/news/2008/mar/16/michael-oren-next-mideast-war-justa-rocket-away/)
It begins with a single Qassam rocket, one of the thousands of homemade projectiles fired in recent years by the Islamic radicals of
Hamas from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel. The rockets have made life nightmarish for many Israelis but have largely missed their
targets. But this one gets "lucky": It smashes into an elementary school, wounding 40 children and killing 15. The Israeli government, which
had heretofore responded to the Qassams with airstrikes and small ground raids, cannot resist the nationwide demand for action.
Within hours, tens of thousands of Israeli troops and hundreds of tanks are rushing into
Gaza, battling house-to-house in teeming refugee camps. Just as swiftly, Palestinian officials accuse Israel of
perpetrating a massacre and invite the foreign press to photograph the corpse-strewn rubble. The images flash around the Middle East on al-Jazeera TV and
trigger violent demonstrations in Arab capitals. Hezbollah, the radical Lebanese Shiite militia, then gets into the act, raining Katyusha
rockets on northern Israel. But when Israeli warplanes bomb the Katyusha batteries, Syria
leaps in, sending its commandos to retaliate by capturing key Israeli bunkers atop the
Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Israel's counterattack succeeds only in precipitating a
hailstorm of Syrian Scud-D missiles, some armed with chemical warheads, into Israeli cities.
Then, just as Israeli planes are incinerating the main electrical plant in Damascus, the first of hundreds of Shehab-3 rockets, pretargeted at Tel Aviv, lift off from Tehran. Sound fantastical or too horrific to ponder? Not to Israeli
intelligence analysts it doesn't. The Israeli military recently conducted a round of large-scale
war games based precisely on this scenario. In some rounds, Israel managed to humble Hamas and Hezbollah while shooting down most of
the Iranian and Syrian rockets with its own Arrow and Patriot antimissile systems. But other forecasts went far less well: Israel survives but barely, with its cities devastated and countless
This is the mess that will soon land in the lap of
Obama
civilians killed.
President Clinton, President
or President McCain. Despite
the shadows of 9/11 and Iraq, the U.S. primary season thus far has been dominated by the economy. But it's a mistake to assume that the next presidency will be. Instead of a
the new president could inherit a brush fire raging out of control in a volatile region
where U.S. involvement has never been deeper. Would he or she merely convene the U.N. Security Council, or rush to Israel's defense?
And how, in the event of a general Middle East war, would the president safeguard the woefully exposed U.S. forces in Iraq? The Middle East will
continue to be the source the gravest threats to U.S. security, whether in the long-term form
of a nuclear-armed Iran or the short-term one of an unforeseen multistate war. So the candidates must be
pressed about how they would handle a chain reaction in which events in Gaza suddenly engulf the entire region. To borrow an old slogan: It's the Middle East, stupid. The
possibility that a border scrap between Israelis and Palestinians could ignite a regional
conflagration should not be too surprising. A very similar concatenation of events led to the
most volcanic eruption in the region's modern history, irreparably convulsing the Middle
East and carving many of the furrows that still destabilize it. That conflict, too, began with
Palestinian attacks into Israel, a series of Israeli reprisals and a mass clamoring for revenge. The countdown began just over 44 years ago, on New Year's
honeymoon,
Eve, 1964, when Palestinian guerrillas belonging to the Fatah faction crossed the Lebanese border to attack Israel. Though the infiltrators were intercepted, Fatah's leader, Yasser Arafat,
declared the raid a heroic victory and dared Arab rulers to match his audacity. Few could. The Arab world at the time was split between two warring camps: the socialist, pro-Soviet
dictators in Egypt, Syria and Iraq and the conservative, pro-Western monarchs in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and elsewhere. Egypt's fiery leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, gleefully branded King
Hussein of Jordan a Zionist "whore," ratcheting up the tension by hinting that the kings were American lackeys. Despite the rhetoric, Arab rulers did not really want war with Israel. But
Arafat's challenge left them little choice. Nasser responded by ordering the Palestine Liberation Organization, originally established as an Egyptian propaganda tool, to launch its own
cross-border attacks. The Israelis lashed back, blowing up Fatah's West Bank headquarters. Jordan accused Nasser of "hiding behind the skirts" of the U.N. peacekeepers deployed in the
Sinai to separate Egypt and Israel. Mortified, Nasser ousted the U.N. forces on May 15, 1967, and closed a strategic Red Sea shipping route to Israeli vessels. Suddenly, Nasser was the
champion of the Arab "street," hailed by huge demonstrations that demanded Israel's destruction. The Arab world closed ranks behind him. Shorn of international allies, Israelis were
convinced they faced annihilation. But then Israel struck first. On the morning of June 5, Israeli warplanes obliterated almost the entire Egyptian air force, and Israeli tanks rumbled
through Gaza and Sinai. At the end of six days of fighting, Israel had nearly quadrupled the territories under its control, among them the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Gaza. A new
The Middle East remains the same explosive context of
conflict it was in the 1960s. The region is still bitterly divided — not between Arab nationalism and conservatism but
between religious moderation and the surge of Islamist extremism spurred, in part, by the Six-Day War. If anything, the Middle East is even more
flammable today than in the 1960s because of the countless thousands of short- and longrange missiles in its armies' arsenals. These weapons vastly amplify the potential destruction
of any military confrontation while slashing the amount of decision-making time that might
be needed to avert all-out war. And modern weapons, including unconventional ones, make everything scarier. A
conflict between Israel and Iran might not last six days but six hours, unleashing shock
waves even more seismic than those of 1967. Contemporary Middle Eastern leaders cannot afford to ignore these lessons. Neither can
decision-makers — and would-be ones — in the United States. Though the waning Bush administration is focused on trying to reach an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty,
era — and new sources of Middle East bloodshed — had emerged.
should not downplay the danger that a seemingly limited border
skirmish could rapidly escalate into a regional catastrophe. Nor should Bush's heir. The next
commander in chief may have to proceed directly from the inauguration to the Situation
Room to try to defuse a Middle Eastern crisis of monumental dimensions. That moment could be a single
shore up Iraq and flex its muscles at Iran, it
Qassam away.
Extinction
Beres 11 Professor PolSci Purdue (Louis Rene, “Israel, Anarchy, and Global Chaos” JPost,
8/17/11, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=234092)
In history, there is a powerful difference between anarchy and chaos. Watching different forms of
violence erupt across Northern Africa and the Middle East, a core observation should spring to
mind: Chaotic disintegration is already well underway in parts of the world. Significantly,
substantial and possibly sudden extensions of this condition to other parts of our planet are
now plausible. For the United States, facing both military limitations and further financial crises, the
implications are worrisome. For Israel, an increasingly- beleaguered mini-state, they are existential.
International law will not save Israel. Nor will the United States, even under a different president.
Assorted treaties notwithstanding, including the New Start agreement between the US and Russia,
nuclear and biological weapons may still spread. These “unthinkable” devices could soon
become all too thinkable. There are foreseeable interactions between individual catastrophic
harms that could make the overriding risk of global chaos still more pressing. For Israel, a
country smaller than Lake Michigan, the dangers are both particular and unique. Facing not
only an unprecedented nuclear threat from Iran, but also the more-or-less simultaneous appearance
of “Palestine,” the Jewish state could quickly find itself engulfed in mass-casualty terrorism,
and/or unconventional war. The probability of expanding Middle East chaos could be
enlarged by enemy irrationality. If, for example, Israel should face a jihadi adversary that
would value certain religious expectations even more highly than its own physical survival,
any deterrent threat could be neutralized. Such paralysis could mean a heightened threat of
nuclear and/or biological war. It could also place Israel in the cross hairs of massdestruction terrorism. In world politics, irrationality is not the same as madness. An
irrational adversary is one that values certain goals more highly than even its own selfpreservation. A mad adversary would display no preferred ordering of goals or values. It
follows, at least from the standpoint of successful Israeli deterrence, that enemy irrationality
would be “better” than enemy madness. But a choice is unavailable. Whether Israel or America
face irrationality, madness, neither or both is not up to us. “The blood-dimmed tide is loosed,” wrote
Yeats, “and everywhere the ceremony of innocence is drowned.” Now, assembled in almost 200
armed tribal camps called nation-states, humanity coexists uneasily and insecurely. The origins of
this radically decentralized world lie discernibly in the Peace of Westphalia – a major treaty that put
an end to the Thirty Years War back in 1648. Now, chaos is more portentous than ever. This
owes largely to the fusion of anarchy with authentically apocalyptic weaponry. In time, even
with the UN and its vaunted “international community,” there may be no safety in arms, no rescue
from political tyranny, and no answers from science. New wars could rage until every flower of
culture is trampled, and until all things human are leveled. How shall such circumstances be averted?
Before answering, we must first acknowledge that chaos and anarchy represent opposite ends of the
same global continuum. “Mere” anarchy, or the absence of central world authority, has always been
“normal.” Chaos, however, is unique. It is thoroughly “abnormal.” Since the seventeenth century,
our anarchic world can be best described as a system; what happens in any one part necessarily
affects the other parts. When deterioration is marked, and begins to spread from one nation to
another, the effects can undermine international stability. When this deterioration is rapid and
catastrophic, as it would be following the start of any unconventional war and/or unconventional
terrorism, the corollary effects would be correspondingly immediate and overwhelming. These
effects would be chaotic. Aware that even an incremental collapse of remaining world authority
structures will affect its many enemies, leaders of Israel quickly need to advance precise and
plausible safeguards against collapse and chart durable paths to survival. Such indispensable
considerations are likely not yet seriously underway. Israel’s leaders are wasting precious time with
their ritualistic considerations of assorted “peace plans.” Soon, in consequence, they may need to
consider just how they should respond to life in a global ‘state of nature.’ The triggering
mechanism of a global descent into chaos could be a variety of mass-casualty attacks against
Israel, or against other western democracies. Even the traditionally “powerful” United States
would not be immune. For that matter, Israel’s own largely middle-class demonstrations this
summer against the “oligopoly” reveal a previously unrecognized internal vulnerability. Any further
chaotic disintegration of the world system would fundamentally transform the Israeli system.
Such a transformation could involve total or near-total destruction. In anticipation, Israel will
have to orient its strategic planning to an assortment of worst-case prospects, focusing on a
wide range of primarily self-help security options. Israel’s persistently one-sided surrender of
territory, its mistaken reluctance to accept certain critical preemption options, and its periodic
releases of live terrorists in exchange for slain Jews may never bring direct defeat. Taken together,
however, these policy errors will have a weakening effect on Israel. Whether the principal
result here will be a “mere” impairment of the Jewish state’s commitment to endure, or a
devastating missile attack and/or major acts of terror is still not clear. The fragmentation of
the Middle East and North Africa is just the beginning. For Israel, wider patterns of anarchy are
inevitable. What might still be avoided, however, are chaos, mega-destruction and an
unendurable sorrow. This avoidance will require early awareness in Jerusalem that, as in any
primordial state of nature, survival demands resolute courage, intellectual imagination, and a
willingness to suffer even huge short-term harm to prevent a much longer-term collective
disappearance.
Hamas Tunnels=Israel Lashout
Rebuilding of tunnel infrastructure leads to Israeli invasion of Gaza
Sachs 14- Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute
(Natan, “What Hamas Wants, What Israel Needs”, Brookings, 7/11/14,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/07/11-hamas-wants-israel-needs-sachs)//WK
The modest Israeli goal of restoring calm may now evolve into something wider and more
deadly. With no end in sight to the fighting, Israel is now contemplating entering Gaza with
ground forces. Israel would likely aim to sever the Strip in two or three parts, limiting Hamas's
freedom of action while degrading weapon stockpiles. Israel has -- and will continue to -- try to
strike at the Hamas tunnel infrastructure. While the Egyptian military has dealt a heavy blow to
the tunnels between the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai, there are continued attempts by Hamas
to dig beneath the Israel border. (One such tunnel was targeted early in the fighting, when Israel,
which had intelligence on the its construction, feared the passageway would be used to infiltrate and
attack Israeli troops or civilians.) An Israeli ground incursion risks far greater casualties,
however, especially on the Palestinian side. In Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), Israel, then led
by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, entered Gaza in what became, predictably, a gruesome and
internationally condemned operation. In 2012, during Operation Pillar of Defense, led by
Netanyahu, Israel called up very large numbers of reservists, signaling its readiness to enter Gaza, yet
refrained from doing so. Despite criticism from the right and frustration by thousands of reservists
for being used in the bluff, Netanyahu chose caution. As many have noted, Netanyahu, Israel's
second longest-serving prime minister (after the founder of the state, David Ben-Gurion), has
only engaged in two relatively small military operations: the air operation in 2012 and the
current one. Despite his hawkish rhetoric, Netanyahu is actually a cautious, conservative leader -- in
war as well as in peace. This operation may turn out to be his first major use of ground forces
across Israel's borders.
Yes Threat
Hamas military training is cause for concern
Avi Issacharoff ’15, MA in Middle Eastern studies, Middle East analyst, was a reporter and
commentator on Arab affairs for the Haaretz newspaper
(“Hamas masses troops on Israeli border, trains for new round of fighting,” The Times of Israel,
http://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-masses-troops-on-border-trains-for-new-round-of-fighting/,
lpc)
Whatever the purpose may be, it is clear that Hamas has been training its troops recently for
more than launching rockets or carrying out commando attacks from the sea, as they did
during last summer’s war. Hamas’s military wing has been conducting infantry and urban
warfare exercises at the levels of platoon, company and even division. In other words, it is
possible that together with its operating methods during the war — commando raids from tunnels,
sea and air — Hamas will attempt in the next war to raid an Israeli community or army base,
killing as many civilians or soldiers as possible. The training in urban warfare that its troops are
undergoing — throwing grenades into buildings, then shooting — is similar to the exercises
of Israel’s own infantry troops. We can only guess Hamas’s intentions regarding these urban
warfare drills. Its goal may be no more than to deter Israel from fighting in Gaza, since it is well
aware that a raid by one of its companies on an Israeli community could end in dozens of dead on
the Palestinian side.
AT: MAD
MAD doesn’t check—Israel is committed to asymmetric deterrence
Adamsky 12- Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy
at the IDC Herzliya, Fellow at International Policy Institute For Counter Terrorism(Dmitry, “Why
Israel Should Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”, Foreign Affairs, 3/31/12,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2012-03-31/why-israel-should-learn-stop-worryingand-love-bomb)//WK
The debate over Iran’s nuclear program has made clear that when it comes to nuclear
deterrence, Israeli strategic thinking is flawed. In the 1960s, Israel developed a nuclear
capability as the ultimate security guarantee, a last resort to be used if the country’s very
existence was threatened. This capability became popularly known as the “Samson Option,”
after the Jewish biblical hero who, rather than face death alone, brought down the roof of a Philistine
temple, killing both himself and his enemies. At the same time, Israeli strategy has been guided by
a belief that any adversary developing weapons of mass destruction is an existential threat
that must be stopped. This belief came to be known as the Begin Doctrine, after Prime Minister
Menachem Begin used force to stop the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981. This leads to a paradox:
the basic potential advantage of the “Samson Option” is that it could deter a nuclear-armed
foe. But the Begin Doctrine prevents Israel from benefiting from the “Samson Option,” as it
seeks to ensure that the situation in which a nuclear capability would be most useful will
never come to pass. Today, the majority of Israel’s strategists promote some kind of a
preventive attack on Iran, as they do not believe a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred and
reject the notion of stability based on mutual assured destruction (MAD). Some suggest that
Iranian leaders, driven by messianic religious ideology, would use their weapons to destroy
Israel, regardless of the costs. Others argue that even if Iranian decision-makers were
rational, Iran’s conspiratorial worldview and lack of direct communications with Jerusalem
could lead Tehran to misread Israeli signals and to miscalculate, triggering unintended nuclear
escalation. Another common argument against MAD is that Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon
would result in a dangerous proliferation cascade across the Middle East. But these attitudes
obscure the real reason that Israel refuses to live with an Iranian bomb. Israel’s intolerance
of MAD is not limited to any particular adversary or set of circumstances, but, rather, derives
from its paradoxical nuclear strategy. The “Samson Option” is by nature an asymmetrical
deterrence model: Israel seeks to deter without being deterred. Maintaining asymmetrical
deterrence would be impossible if Iran did ultimately develop a nuclear weapon. But Israel
need not see that outcome as the end of the world. If anything, deterring a nuclear-armed
adversary is exactly what Israel’s nuclear capability is good for. But in order to make the best
use of its “Samson Option,” Israel needs to start thinking about and publicly debating how it would
position itself against a nuclear-armed Iran. In short, Israel needs a new nuclear strategy.
Haqqani (Pakistan)
Threat
Haqqani enables al-Qaeda and has empirically led successful attacks
Dan Lamonth ’15, (6/16, “Pentagon: Islamic State to continue looking for ways to expand in
Afghanistan,” Washington Post,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/06/16/pentagon-islamic-statesactions-in-afghanistan-may-lead-to-more-bloodshed-with-taliban/, lpc)
The potential expansion of the Islamic State into Afghanistan has prompted broad and concern
and spawned militias operating on their own. None of them at this time pose an existential
threat to the government in Kabul, but the Afghan military and police will likely be tested again
this year in fighting that killed thousands of Afghan troops last year, the Pentagon report said.
Despite the buzz created by the rift, it’s actually the Haqqani network that remains the greatest
threat to U.S., coalition and Afghan forces, the Pentagon report said. Based in Pakistan, it
continues to be a “critical enabler” of al-Qaeda. “The Haqqani Network and affiliated
groups share the goals of expelling U.S. and coalition forces, overthrowing the Afghan
government, and re-establishing an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the report said. “The Haqqani
Network led the insurgency in the eastern Afghan provinces of Paktika, Paktiya, and Khost, and
demonstrated the capability and intent to support and launch high-profile, complex attacks
across the country and in the Kabul region.”
Pakistan’s cooperation with the terrorist group Haqqani threatens USPakistan relations and escalates diplomatic tension
Michael Kugelman ‘14, the senior program associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars (7/31, “The Haqqani Threat to the US-Pakistan Détente,” The
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/the-haqqani-threat-to-the-us-pakistan-detente/, lpc)
So, despite all the spin about taking definitive action against militants of all stripes, Pakistan may have
more nefarious objectives in North Waziristan: Smash the sanctuaries of anti-state militants such as
the TTP, but shield the Haqqani network by sending it to Afghanistan (and to other Pakistan tribal
areas), where the group can exploit rising political instability (stemming from an ongoing election
crisis) and aid an increasingly emboldened Afghan Taliban. Then, when the offensive in North
Waziristan has ceased, the organization can return to its Pakistani sanctuary and resume its crossborder strikes on Afghanistan.
This all has troubling implications for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Washington can’t be happy that
Pakistan is merely displacing, rather than destroying, the Haqqani network — and especially
into Afghanistan at such a delicate time. If the Haqqani network returns to its North
Waziristan sanctuary and resumes attacks on Afghanistan, threats will likely intensify on Capitol
Hill to reduce military aid to Pakistan. After all, a recent U.S. defense spending bill calls for
$300 million in military aid to be withheld from Pakistan if the country has not “significantly
disrupted” the Haqqani network’s “safe haven and freedom of movement.”
Such warnings won’t be received well in Islamabad, where officials often (and justifiably) note
that Pakistan’s military has lost scores of soldiers fighting militant groups in the tribal belt,
and complain that U.S. forces have failed to disrupt Pakistani Taliban safe havens in Afghanistan,
which are used to mount attacks on Pakistan. Indeed, some of the TTP’s most vicious and hardline
leaders — including supreme leader Mullah Fazlullah, who orchestrated the brief takeover of the
Swat region in 2009, and TTP Mohmand tribal agency chief Omar Khalid Khorasani, who earlier this
year ordered the execution of 23 Pakistani soldiers held in captivity — are reportedly based in
Afghanistan.
The upshot? The current period of preternaturally placid U.S.-Pakistan relations could soon
be shattered, thanks to the militant organization that so often bedevils them.
Hezbollah (Lebanon/Latin America)
Goal
Hezbollah’s goals
Judith Palmer Harik ‘5, Professor of Political Science, American University of Beirut, (10/7,
“Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism,” Google Books, lpc)
Hezbollah, the Shiite Muslim ‘Party of God,’ has transformed itself from a radical, clandestine
militia to a moderate, mainstream political party with a resistance wing in the 17 years since its
activities against the Israelis began. Underlying all of Hezbollah’s actions are its claims of deep
faith and a literal interpretation of God’s words as expressed in the Koran. This has resulted in
the pursuit of objectives ‘sanctioned’ by Islam such as waging war against the usurpers of
Muslim lands and serving the public and their community, and has made Hezbollah a formidable
opponent on the battlefield and in the political arena. Yet Hezbollah’s successes on both fronts
still clash with the terrorist label that has been applied to it by its adversaries – most notably
Israel and the United States of America. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism is
specifically concerned with the dynamics and outcomes of the terrorist/resistance controversy and
whether American anti-terrorist policies will succeed in settling old scores with the Party of God and
tipping the strategic balance at the Lebanese/Israeli frontier in favor of its ally.
Threat
Hezbollah is developing weapons; Syria gave them powerful missiles
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 28, lpc)
Today, the number of rockets and missiles under the control of Hezbollah is difficult to
know. In September 2008, Israeli Minister of Defense Ehud Barak estimated that they counted
40,000 rockets. One year later, President Shimon Peres suggested that the figure was close to
80,000.56 IDF officials interviewed for our research stated that the number was approximately
42,000 rockets plus 4,000 short- to mid-range missiles.57 The quality of the arsenal
dramatically improved as Hezbollah acquired rockets using guidance systems and with
extended range. During that same period, the arms race crossed a new threshold as Hezbollah
started acquiring ballistic missiles. It is believed that, through Syria, the Party acquired M600 short-range ballistic missiles, a variant of the Fateh-110, which can carry a 1,100-pound
warhead and has a range of 210 kilometers (km).58 According to weapon engineers, the inertial
guidance system of the M-600 enables the missile to strike within 500 yards of a target at maximum
range.
Deterrence is contingent upon stability – changing conditions in the Middle
East wreck equilibrium
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 1, lpc)
Against all odds, the area comprising north Israel and south Lebanon remained very quiet
these last months. This monograph argues that the key to understand this paradox is the
game of deterrence played by both Israel and Hezbollah. Specifically, an informal deterrence
dialogue has been developing be- tween Israel and Hezbollah and that strategic stability
prevailed because of this indirect exchange. Because both sides understood that a next round
would be devastating and that each could not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a
first wave the solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to deter the other party from
attacking its homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation. But to say that stability has been
preserved between Israel and Hezbollah thanks to deterrence does not mean that this is a
perennial state. This monograph also stresses the precariousness of such deterrence system. The
stand-off between Israel and Hezbollah reached this level only through specific measures and
condi- tions that can be reversed in the future. In particular, exogenous factors such as the
unraveling of the Syrian civil war or the developments of the Iranian nuclear issue can
jeopardize the equilibrium. Moreover, the study of Lebanese politics emphasizes the uncertainties related to the logic of deterrence with a nonstate actor like Hezbollah. This is why this
analysis offers a cautious look at deterrence theories in the Middle East and reminds that such
situations are neither naturally engendered nor eternally established.
Syria/Iran Key
Syria key to development of Hezbollah’s weapons
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 30, lpc)
On top of this political support, Syria has lent considerable logistical support to the Party of
God’s military structure, particularly by maintaining the supply corridors used by Iran to
supply missiles and other arms to Hezbollah. If Hezbollah’s current missile strike force
constitutes a real tool of dissuasion to the Jewish state rather than a simple nuisance to northern
Israel, it is largely thanks to Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime. This was explicitly acknowledged
by Nasrallah in 2012 during a speech he gave on the 6th anniversary of the July War: Syria is
a path for the Resistance and a bridge of communication between the Resistance and Iran. . .
. I have two [proofs] for Syria’s role [in supporting the Resistance]. The first one is that the most
important rockets that targeted Haifa and the center of ‘Israel’ were made by Syrian military and
given to the Resistance. Syria was an aid to the Resistance and gave weapons that we used in
the July War.61
Syria and Iran instability influence Hezbollah
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 39, lpc)
Scholarship in security studies shows that deterrence remains a stable system as long as each of
the competitors maintains a robust chain of command which strictly controls its means of
deterrence.75 However, Hezbollah has never been an autonomous actor which indigenously
built its deterrent. It relied and still relies substantially on the regimes in Syria and Iran.
Moreover, even though the Party remains the biggest security actor in Lebanon, it does not
specifically control its territory. In fact, the most interesting paradox may be that the more
Hezbollah becomes a military power able to deter Israel, the more it depends on external
actors and the more it puts the domestic stability in Lebanon at risk. The spreading of
Hezbollah’s military posts deep inside the country changes the internal equation between the Party
and the Lebanese forces. More precisely, it exacerbates the ascendant of the former on the
latter. It gives even more relevance to the Israeli for Hezbollah’s operations against Israel.
This also reveals the fundamental caveat in the deterrence game between Hezbollah and Israel. The
very fact that even though Hezbollah is a well-structured, well-trained military organization, it still
remains a nonstate actor competing with regular forces on the same territory.
Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would disrupt deterrence
Jean Loup Samaan ’14, Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris La Sorbonne;
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Project on Nuclear Issues; policy
advisor at the French Ministry of Defense from 2008 to 2011 (“From War to Deterrence? IsraelHezbollah Conflict Since 2006,” Strategic Studies Institute, pp. 54, lpc)
The third trigger for a shift in the Israel-Hezbollah deterrence equation is the acquisition by
the Iranian regime of nuclear weapons. Indeed, as the several rounds of talks between Western
powers and Tehran failed to reach a diplomatic breakthrough, the likelihood of a nuclear-armed
Iran is still significant. As of today, there is no undeniable evidence that Iran is seeking
nuclear weapons, but there are many plausible signs that its program is not serving solely
civilian purposes. Because a nuclear-armed Iran would challenge the military escalation in
the Middle East, it is worth exploring the ramifications of such scenario, in particular with
regards to the Israel-Hezbollah competition. The characteristics of an Iranian nuclear deterrent will
depend, first, on the advent of its nuclear program in the military domain, whether Iran manufactures
deliverable or only unassembled nuclear weapons; second, on the quantity and quality of its delivery
systems; and third, on the inclusion of nuclear weapons in Iran’s strategic culture. Several scholars
interpret the modern Iranian international posture as the expression of Persian history and identity
that combines a sense of superiority over its neighbors with a deep sense of insecurity.94 As a result,
academic studies have usually evoked Iranian strategic culture to argue that Iran is a rational actor
rather than an irrational and unpredictable religiously fanatic state.95 One critical unknown in such
scenario is the role that Iran would confer to nuclear weapons in both its competition with
Israel and its patronage of Hezbollah. The Iranian decision may test the status quo between
the IDF and Hezbollah, providing the latter with a new precious psychological advantage.
Latin American Presence
Hezbollah has gained influence in Latin America
Jordan Schachtel and Edwin Mora ’15, * National Security Correspondent at Breitbart News,
**national security and defense issues at Breitbart (5/27, “Iran Rising: Tehran Using Hezbollah In
Latin American ‘Cultural Centers’ To Infiltrate West,” Breitbart, http://www.breitbart.com/nationalsecurity/2015/05/27/iran-rising-tehran-using-hezbollah-in-latin-american-cultural-centers-toinfiltrate-west/, lpc)
“Iran has expanded its ‘cultural centers’ presence in locations such as Quito [in Ecuador] and
Caracas [in Venezuela] where there is a strong anti-US government sentiment,” Shedd,
currently a visiting distinguished fellow at the Heritage Foundation, told Breitbart News.
“Iran’s overall expanded presence in the Western Hemisphere is troubling,” the former DIA
director added. “The expanded presence in any capacity in the Latin American region should
give the U.S. pause given the profound differences between U.S. values and those of a regime in
Tehran that supports terrorism as an officially sanctioned tool of national power.”
Shedd warned that Hezbollah, which he described as the most prominent global terrorist group in
Latin America, likely has “sleeper cells” in various countries in the Western Hemisphere.
“Hezbollah sympathizers also appear to have a presence in the tri-border area of Paraguay,
Argentina, and Brazil where they are involved in black market commercial activities,” he noted.
The Tri-Border region in South America includes Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. According to the
Treasury Department, the Galeria Page shopping mall in Paraguay– at the heart of the tri-border–
serves as central headquarters and a fundraising source for Hezbollah members in the region.
Members of Congress have also sounded the alarm about Tehran’s growing influence in
Latin America.
Houthis (Yemen)
Iran/Saudi Proxy War Impact
Iran-Saudi proxy war in Yemen causes Middle East nuclear arms race
Haddick 9- Managing Editor Small Wars Journal (Robert, August 28, “This Week at War: The
Middle East's Cold War Heats Up” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/28/this_week_at_war_the_middle_easts_cold_war
_heats_up)
Even if the actual foreign material support in Yemen's civil strife is minimal, the conflict is probably the newest front in a
broadening proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon is one front. Iranian attempts to gain influence over Shiite
populations in eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf is another. Some factions in Iran may feel obligated to support what they believe are oppressed Shiite minorities around
In the case of the rebellion in Yemen, some nervous officials in Riyadh may see
an Iranian plan to achieve control over the Red Sea shipping lane. Now there is another
dimension to Saudi-Iranian competition. Despite having the largest crude oil reserves on the planet, the Saudi government recently
announced plans to build a nuclear power plant. Even though it will take many years for
Saudi Arabia to build up the necessary proficiency in nuclear engineering, Saudi
policymakers must view the establishment of nuclear expertise as an essential strategic
hedge. A nuclear arms race and proxy wars were two prominent features of the Cold War
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. We should not be surprised to
see that pattern of behavior repeat itself with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Compared with Saudi
Arabia, Iran has a large head start. The Saudis will have to rely on their friends for protection while they try to catch up.
the mostly Sunni Middle East.
Nuclear miscalculation makes it impossible to deescalate
Krepinevich 11- President of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Andrew,“The
Dangers of a Nuclear Iran”, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, Vol. 90 Issue 1, p66-81)
Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition
the interaction
among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and
escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an
attack from the other. Multi-polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can
shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important,
emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to
preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge
would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that
that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents' forces and avoid a devastating retaliation.
emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such
as hardened missile silos or submarine-based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability,
the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic
missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to "launch on warning"
of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their
governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening
the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control
systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without
sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed
incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And
this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a
significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional
nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons
from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes
before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or
able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might
lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access
to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for
instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence
However,
compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the
Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a
nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could
influence -- for good or ill -- the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-
transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging
nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power
sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the
technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to
launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers
and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in
the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.
guidance systems, warhead miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such
Saudi Iran proxy war escalates
Issa 12 [Gulf States Consider Political and Military Union to Counter Iranian Elie Issa is a Lebanese
analyst focusing on the Middle East and North Africa regions for the past eight years. His interests
include geopolitical, security and macroeconomic topics,
http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_010_Issue05_03.pdf]//twemchen
With growing talk of a political confederation of the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister,
Prince Salman Bin Abdul Aziz, has raised the possibility of transforming the existing Peninsula Shield Force [PSF] into a “unified Gulf
army” able to respond to external and domestic security threats. The Saudi prince made it clear that inspiration for this suggestion was the
perceived threat from Iran: “Iran is our neighbor, but we draw a line when it comes to intervention in our internal affairs as ‘Gulf
Cooperation Council’ countries. Whenever we feel that anybody is interfering in our internal affairs through internal mercenaries or people
from outside, we will resist it appropriately” (Al-Seyassah [Kuwait], March 3; Arab Times, March 3). The PSF, with a permanent base in
Saudi Arabia, was successfully deployed in March, 2011 to end violent street protests by Bahrain’s Shiite minority (see Terrorism Monitor
Brief, March 24, 2011). The long-strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia resemble an updated
replica of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, including the involvement of both nations in geopolitical and economic
conflicts, proxy military conflicts and covert intelligence operations. Saudi Arabia and Iran currently
leads two ideologically, politically and religiously opposed regional blocs that could at any moment
slip into lethal Sunni-Shiite confrontation, one whose impact would be magnified by the
membership of both nations in larger competing world camps. Sunni Saudi Arabia has close and
long-standing political and economic ties with the United States and most other Western nations.
Shiite Iran has ties with Russia and China despite certain ideological differences. Perhaps the most recent
illustration of the on-going regional geopolitical row is Saudi king Abdullah’s statement that “unnamed hands” targeting Islam and the
Arabs are behind the political turmoil in Sunni-dominated states in the region (Saudi Press Agency [SPA], February 25). Saudi officials have
long accused Iran of meddling in the internal affairs of the GCC and other Arab states without actually naming the Islamic Republic. Saudi
Arabia has already lost one of its long-standing and staunchest allies in the Middle East, meaning former Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak. The Saudi rulers are now facing two key challenges that might impact the kingdom’s near-to-medium term outlook: the so-called
“Arab Spring” and Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions.
And goes global
Goldstein 12 [1/15/12, Proff IR American, The Sunni-Shi’ite Divide,
http://www.internationalrelations.com/]//twemchen
To the south, meanwhile, in Bahrain last year the Shi’ite community rallied for democracy and was violently repressed with help from Saudi
armed forces. The United States, whose Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain, stayed pretty quiet. A quarter of the Saudi population is Shi’ite but
In
Yemen, where Shi’ites make up more than 40 percent of the population, the Shi’ite Houthi tribe in the north has been in
armed conflict with the central government for decades, even as Sunni al-Qaeda radicals wage war in the south. Thus, in recent years
they are in no position to cause trouble and the Saudi royal family has the money to buy out any discontent in the Kingdom.
the Arab side of the Persian Gulf (or is it the Arabian Gulf?) has remained firmly in Sunni control, while across the Gulf four countries in a
line now have Shi’ite-affiliated regimes — Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Of these, Iraq and Lebanon have been relatively neutral on Syria
(mixed interests and their own problems at home), but Iran has been the Assad regime’s most important external backer (along with more
powerful but less enthusiastic Russia). The emergence of a more solid Shi’ite bloc stretching from Iran to Lebanon is not a
positive development in my view. It
tends to polarize the region and to extend the ambitions of Iran, which acts in defiance of
creation of a nuclear weapon in the coming
years would spark a rush by Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The danger of a terrible war between Iran
and Saudi Arabia, with their respective allies, is worth worrying about. In the middle of it all, of course, is oil.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia all share one interest — they are the world’s three top oil exporters. They benefit from
international norms on important issues. It also raises a legitimate concern that Iran’s
reliably high prices for oil on world markets (high price spikes that lead to crashes are less useful). On the other hand, both the
western
powers and China share an interest in a low, stable oil price. And there was China’s prime minister recently visiting Saudi
Arabia, not Iran, for a friendly chat. Turns out that although China is Iran’s largest oil customer, China actually buys twice as much from
Saudi Arabia, whose total oil exports are almost triple the level of Iran’s. China wants assurance, which it no doubt received, that Saudi
Arabia would fill any gap in China’s supply created by new sanctions on Iran. The
U nited S tates supports the Saudi side, and
Russia the Iranian side, but China really just wants oil and doesn’t care where it comes from. The main interest of China
and other consuming nations is political stability in the Middle East, to keep oil prices stable and the spigot turned permanently on. In the
past, although oil is the world’s most traded commodity in terms of value, its price has seen wild swings triggered by political events like
wars and revolutions. A little stability would be a really good thing for the world economy. Saudi Arabia alone has the vast reserves to keep
world supplies steady even if another OPEC member stops exporting. And hence the Chinese prime minister’s visit.
Bab al-Mandab Terminal Impact
Disruption of Bab al-Mandab collapses the global economy
Sheppard 11- Correspondent for NYT and Chicago Tribune, ’ (Nathaniel, “Why pint-sized
Yemen has become a world player” AlArabiya, 11/6/11 lexis)
On the world stage, size often doesn't matter in a country's impact on the course of world events. Realtors'
admonitions that the three most important considerations for buyers are location, location, location seem much more relevant. Take tiny Yemen as a case in point. It is 203,850
square miles in size, only 44,000 square miles larger than California and has a population of 23 million people. It is the poorest country in the Arabian Peninsula and is caught
in the throes of a political upheaval that could very well result in its collapse as a polity.
Therein lies the problem for big industrialized nations who depend on a key product from
the region to keep the wheels of industry turning-oil. It has become a nightmare for President Barack Obama and other western
leaders at wits end over what to do. That Yemen could fall into the abyss is of great geopolitical significance
that has put the bean-size nation at center stage. About 11 percent of the world's seaborne
petroleum passes through the Gulf of Aden en route to the Suez Canal, regional refineries
and points west. It is not the largest shipment by far but enough that disruptions in transit
could spook world markets and set off a new spiral of inflation as the world tries to recover
from four years of economic distress. Yemen occupies the southwestern and southern end of the Arabian Peninsula. It is bordered by Saudi Arabia
to the north, the Red Sea to the west and Oman to the east. West bound oil must transit the Gulf of Aden and Bab el
Mandab, a narrow strait that passes between Yemen and Djibouti then past the pirates' paradise, Somalia before reaching open water. It is one of seven
strategic world oil shipping chokepoints. Moreover, the area may contain significant untapped oil reserves, more reason for US concern since
Saudi reserves may be diminishing and America is doing little to wean itself from fossil fuel. Should Yemen polity fall apart, the country
would be up for grabs. One of the grabbing hands would be that of Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, one of the most notorious of Al Qaeda offshoots. Even before Osama Bin Laden was killed and his body dumped into the sea at the beginning of May, the Al
Qaeda leader and best known symbol of world terror had lost control of Yemen's Al Qaeda warriors. They marched to their own drum. Able to operate freely in this poorest of poor,
barely managed country with rugged, unforgiving terrain, Yemen's Al Qaeda has been able to mount several attacks on the US from here. First there was the suicide bombing of the naval
destroyer USS Cole while it refueled at the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen seamen were killed. Subsequent attacks launched from here included the failed Christmas Day bomb plot in
2009 and the parcel bomb plot of 2010, which also failed. In 2009, Nasir Al Wuhayshi, an Al Qaeda commander who trained under Bin Laden in Afghanistan and served as his secretary,
announced the consolidation of Al Qaeda forces in the region as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, under his command. The US went after Al Qaeda elements in the region that same
year but in lawless Somalia with disastrous consequences. Commander Wuhayshi pledged to take jihad from the Arabian Peninsula to Israel, striking at Muslim leaders he decreed
"criminal tyrants," along the way, such as the Saudi royal, family, Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh and recently deposed Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Once in Israel he would
"liberate" Gaza and Muslim holy sites such as Haram Ash-Sharif, known by Jews as Temple Mount, the holiest of sites in the Old City of Jerusalem. It was here that God chose the
Divine Presence to rest; from which the world we know expanded; and that God gathered the dust to make man. US Navy SEALs would love to meet Mr. Wuhayshi to discuss diabolical
ambitions for any serious attempt to carry out his apocalyptic quest most certainly would plunge the world into war of world proportions. His agenda and the passion and persistence
with which he and his followers pursue it are a reason for stepped up US engagement in Yemen. Before the current uptick in violence as disparate forces seek to send President Saleh
packing for good, the long reigning strongman had begun to cooperate with the US counter terrorism efforts in the region, obliging with a series of air strikes and ground assaults on
suspected Al Qaeda targets in Yemen. That cooperation may now be in tatters and Mr. Wuhayshi stands to gain ground. The US' waltz with the strongman was not by choice. While Mr.
Saleh's cooperation was probably more to save his utterly corrupt regime, he was viewed by the US as the lesser of evils in Yemen. The attitude toward President Saleh was the same as
toward Panamanian strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega, another US criminal client: "He may be an SOB but he's our SOB.' With a bigger footprint and wider control in Yemen in the
it would be as if Al Qaeda had found its
Holy Grail, a potential for disrupting the flow of oil to the west, and what it views as the devil
incarnate, the US. Ships transiting the area already find the waters treacherous. Now it
stands to get worse. They are frequently targeted by pirates from Somalia who kill or demand large ransoms if they are able to successfully board cargo-carrying
vessels. Oil tankers are like crown jewels. International forces, including the US, have treated the Somali pirates like flies at a picnic, swatting them away
unscathed most of the time and sometimes killing them, but not enough times to make their confederates think about new careers. Hijacking or blowing up
oil tankers and messing with the oil that powers the world is a different matter altogether.
There is too much at stake to leave it to Yemen to handle its own affairs but overt meddling from the West would
absence of a strong central authority, outright land grabs and possible alliances with Somalia warlords,
be unwelcome in the region. No Western or Asian oil dependent nation would relish the idea of invading a Muslim nation at a time of such tensions with Muslims. The US is particularly
reluctant, having already done so twice in Iraq and Afghanistan. Oil is oil however. While it might not matter to Muslim fundamentalists who want to turn the hands of time back to the
oil dependent nations would not sit by idly while an already fractured world economy
worsened. The situation would get ugly. Thus the tail wags the dog, the pint-sized nation
that offers so little has forced the powerful behemoths to consider so much, like their limited
options for doing anything about frightening events unfolding before their eyes.
17th century,
Bab al-Mandab closure decimates US hegemony
Mountain 11- 1st US Peace Delegation to Libya (Thomas, “Choke point Bab el-Mandeb;
Understanding the Strategically Critical Horn of Africa” Foreign Policy Journal, 11/17/11,
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/19/choke-point-bab-el-mandeb-understanding-thestrategically-critical-horn-of-africa/)
The Horn of Africa is one of the most strategically critical regions in the world with the narrow
passage where the Red Sea joins the Indian Ocean, the Bab el-Mandeb, being a potential choke point for much of the
worlds commerce. Almost all of the trade between the European Union and China, Japan,
India and the rest of Asia passes through the Bab el-Mandeb everyday. Up to 30% of the
worlds oil, including all of the oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf heading west passes
through the Horn of Africa daily. Who controls the Horn of Africa controls a major chunk of
the worlds economies and whether you and I understand it, the CIA, MI6 and all the western intelligence agencies know all to well just how critical the Horn of
Africa is to their national interests. To make my point, lets say Somalia was a strong, united, independent, well armed Islamic country and in seeing the NATO attack on Libya, declared
that no EU or USA bound shipments of cargo, oil or natural gas would be allowed to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb as long as the NATO bombardment of Libya was continuing.
How long would the EU economies be able to hold out without the energy supplies from the
Persian Gulf or the vital Asian imports? Is it even conceivable that the USA and its NATO allies would allow a scenario such as this to develop?
Understanding this is crucial to understanding why the western powers conduct such a criminal policy in the Horn of Africa. The USA, still the world’s
lone superpower, has a policy of using local enforcers, policemen on the beat, to do its dirty work in areas
of the world of critical importance to its interests. In South America the USA uses Colombia as its local gendarme or strongman to try
and keep the region in line. In West Africa the USA uses Nigeria, in the Middle East, Israel and in East Africa the main USA mafioso enforcer is Ethiopia. Every year the USA and its
western underlings pour some $7 billion into keeping the Ethiopian regime headed by the former Marxist-Leninist guerilla leader Meles Zenawi afloat making Ethiopia one of the most
aid dependent countries in the world and a rival to Israel as the largest recipients of western aid on the planet. For this the USA can order Meles Zenawi to send his army to invade
Somalia in the name of the “War on Terror” in 2006. Earlier, in 2000, Ethiopia invaded Eritrea, again at the urging of the USA. Today, the USA is paying the salaries of some 10,000
Ethiopian Army “peacekeepers” deployed around Abeye, the oil producing region on the border between north and South Sudan. For these and other crimes in the service of Pax
Americana Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has a permanent “get out of jail free” card, or blanket immunity. He has at least a billion dollars stashed in his mainly London bank
accounts for the not so distant day when he boards his final flight out of Addis Ababa. Whether it was former Brit PM Tony Blair anointing Meles Zenawi as chair of the short lived
Africa Commission to the Obama White house arranging for Meles to stride the stage of the latest G-20 meeting of world leaders, Ethiopia must appear for all the world to see to have
the unqualified backing of the western bankster regimes. With the largest, best equipped army in Africa, including weapons from North Korea, Ethiopia has a job to do and first and
he who controls Bab elMandeb has his fingers around the throats of both the EU and Asia’s economies. Today the USA’s grip
foremost it is to make sure that the region surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb choke point remains firmly under western control. For
on the region is increasingly in doubt, for the Ethiopian regime is ever closer to the day of its demise and what comes after Meles Zenawi’s departure could shake the world as we know
Choke Point Bab el-Mandeb is strategically critical in today’s world
it.
and just how important can be judged by how
careful the western media is in covering the region. Almost nothing is allowed in the news that might hasten the day of Meles Zenawi’s departure. Meles must stride the G-20 stage once
again for all the world to see that he remains the anointed defender of western control of the Bab el-Mandeb and Pax Americana must seem to be firmly in control of one of the most
The day the USA loses control of the Bab el-Mandeb may very well
mark the end of the USA’s days as the worlds lone superpower and it’s control of the world
as we know it.
strategically critical maritime passages in the world.
Egyptian Intervention
Egypt will intervene in Bab al-Mandab—reliant on trade income
TCP 4/5- The Cairo Post, internally citing statements from Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, Egyptian President
(The Cairo Post, “Bab al-Mandab Strait ‘life or death for Egypt’: Sisi”, 4/5/15,
http://www.thecairopost.com/news/144853/news/bab-al-mandab-strait-life-or-death-for-egyptsisi)//WK
President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi stated Saturday afternoon that securing Yemen’s strategic Bab
al-Mandeb Strait “is a battle of life or death for Egypt.” Speaking after a meeting with
members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Sisi asserted that “securing
navigation in the Red Sea and protecting Bab al-Mandab Strait is a matter of Egyptian and
Arab national security.” The statement came days after the Egyptian army joined the Resolute
Storm; a Saudi-led offensive against Houthi armed groups in Yemen, which now control most
of the country. Sisi asserted Egypt’s right to intervene military to prevent Houthis from
controlling or closing the strait, adding that such a closure “would have negative effects on
the trade in Egypt’s strategic Suez Canal, one of the country’s main sources of income.”
Around 12 percent of the world’s trade passes through the Suez Canal. Sisi added that Egypt would
not give up its brothers in the Arab Gulf and that his country would “protect them if
necessary.” The SCAF meeting followed the return of Egypt’s Chief of Staff Mahmoud Hegazy
from Saudi Arabia, where he was attending a meeting of chiefs of staff of Arab countries to discuss a
proposed joint Arab force. Hegazy’s meeting comes a week after the closing session of the Arab
League Summit held in Sharm al-Sheikh in which President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi announced
member states agreed to form a joint military force to deal with regional security issues. The
force is expected to be formed within four months.
Yes Seeking Control
Houthis seeking control of Bab al-Mandab—capture of Egyptian fishers prove
Salisbury 14- New York-based British journalist and analyst covering issues of politics, economics
natural resources, diplomacy and humanitarian affairs, mainly in the Middle East and North East
Africa. Former energy editor, Middle East Economic Digest (Peter, “Houthi expansion threatens
Yemen’s strategic Bab al-Mandab strait”, Financial Times, 10/23/14,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/444765c0-59dc-11e4-978700144feab7de.html#axzz3eNdnCa00)//WK
Houthi militants are expanding their presence into western Yemen around a vital maritime
corridor that controls access to the Red Sea, a potential threat for some of the 8 per cent of
global trade that runs through the Suez Canal. The Bab al-Mandab strait separates the Arabian
Peninsula from east Africa and links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
Most ships using the waterway have come from, or are going to, Egypt’s Suez Canal, which connects
the Red Sea with the Mediterranean and which contributes about $5bn a year to the Egyptian
economy. About 4 per cent of the global oil supply, much of it from Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf states, passes through the strait, which is 29km wide at its narrowest point. But
Egyptian and Saudi concerns over Bab al-Mandab have been growing since the increasingly
powerful Houthis took control of the western port of Hodeidah on 15 October and began
increasing its presence in Taiz province bordering the strait. The Houthis have in recent
years been transformed from a revivalist movement for the Zaydi Shia form of Islam into
Yemen’s most powerful militia. Following a series of victories this year the group in
September routed a military unit once seen as the country’s most feared and seized control of
Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. Egyptian worries that the Houthis could interfere with shipping in
Bab al-Mandab were underscored less than a week after Hodeidah was seized when they
insisted 70 Egyptians caught fishing illegally in Yemeni waters be detained and prosecuted.
“Normally the coastguard and local officials would sit with the Egyptians and resolve the issue,” said
a Yemeni ports official, explaining that a bribe would usually be paid to secure their freedom. But
this time, the Houthis insisted the men be prosecuted.
Houthis seizing Ba el-Mandeb with Iranian backing—even perception of a
threat to the strait triggers our impact
Rosen 3/31- Business Insider's defense and military editor (Armin, “Iran-backed Houthi militants
in Yemen just captured a military base along one of the world's major oil lanes”, Business Insider,
3/31/15, http://www.businessinsider.com/houthis-captured-base-on-bab-el-mandeb-20153#ixzz3eNkFw7ay)//WK
Fighters from Yemen's Houthi militia on Tuesday entered a coastal military base overlooking
the Red Sea's strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait, local officials told Reuters. Soldiers of the 17th
Armored Division in the Dabab district in Yemen's southwestern Taiz province opened the gates
to the Houthis, whose military advance has been challenged by six days of Saudi-led air
strikes. This means that Houthi rebels have a foothold along one of the world's crucial oil
chokepoints. According to the US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) fact-sheet on global
oil chokepoints, 3.8 million barrels of oil and "refined petroleum products" passed through the
Bab el-Mandeb each day on its way to Europe, Asia, and the US, making it the world's
fourth-busiest chokepoint. The strait controls access to multiple oil terminals and to a oil pipeline
co-owned by state companies from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar that
transits oil between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, called the Suez-Mediterranean or
SUMED pipeline. The Bab el-Mandeb is 18 miles wide at its narrowest point, "limiting tanker
traffic to two 2-mile-wide channels for inbound and outbound shipments," according to the
Energy Information Administration. "Closure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from the
Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED Pipeline, diverting them around the southern
tip of Africa, adding to transit time and cost," the EIA fact-sheet explains. "In addition, European
and North African southbound oil flows could no longer take the most direct route to Asian markets
via the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb." Recent events in Yemen, where a Saudi-led Arab
military coalition is fighting to restore president Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi against an Iranianbacked insurgent movement, have already jolted global oil prices. Threats to traffic along the
Bab al-Mandeb, or even the perception of such a threat, could lead to additional volatility if
the situation in the country continues to deteriorate.
Houthis seizing Bab el-Mandeb—internal statements and Iranian influence
Madabish 2/1- Yemeni journalist, cites Retired Yemeni brigadier-general Mohsen Khasrouf
(Arafat, “Houthis attempting to control Yemen’s Bab El-Mandeb strait: source”, Asharq al-Awsat,
2/1/15, http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341019/houthis-attempting-to-control-yemensbab-el-mandeb-strait-source)//WK
Recent advances by Yemen’s Houthi movement are part of an attempt to take control of the
strategic Bab El-Mandeb strait off the Yemeni coast, military sources in the country said on
Saturday. This comes as three members of the group and three military personnel were killed on
Friday evening as the armed Houthis attempted an attack on the Al-Khoukha military camp
just south of the coastal city of Al-Hudaydah, close to the strategic waterway. The Bab ElMandeb, which connects the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, is
one of the most important maritime corridors in the world, through which most of Yemen’s oil
exports pass on their way to global markets. Retired Yemeni brigadier-general Mohsen Khasrouf
told Asharq Al-Awsat the group “has its eyes firmly on the Bab El-Mandeb strait” and that
Friday night’s attack represented “the first step on the road to taking control” of the waterway
for the Houthis and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Many in Yemen believe Saleh has been
aiding the Houthis’ recent efforts to strengthen their hold over swaths of Yemen, which have
seen them take control of the capital Sana’a and other parts of the country as well as military and
government buildings and facilities. Khasrouf said Saleh, a former army officer, still enjoyed great
popularity within the Yemeni military, which he said the Houthis were now clearly attempting to
control. “The Bab El-Mandeb strait is not just related to Yemen’s security but to the security
of the whole region,” Khasrouf said, adding that Iran was acting through the Houthis and
attempting to gain control of the strait, which in addition to Iranian control of the strait of
Hormuz, would give the Islamic Republic a strategic maritime advantage on the Arabian
Peninsula’s surrounding waterways. The Houthis deny claims by the Yemeni government
and others that their fighters have been trained and equipped by Tehran. Meanwhile, Abd
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who resigned as president last week when armed Houthi rebels surrounded his
home in the capital, has been meeting with representatives from the group, who continue to
surround his residence. Hadi said on Saturday he would not go back on his decision to resign, despite
pressure from allies in Yemen, the region and the West.
ISIS (Greater Syria/Iraq)
Cyberthreat Risk Increasing
ISIS cyberthreat risk increasing—increased frequency of attacks and technical
capabilities
Brookes 6/27- senior national security fellow for the Heritage Foundation (Peter, “The First Half
of 2015 Was Most Intense Period of Terrorist Plotting Since 9/11”, The Daily Signal, 6/27/15,
http://dailysignal.com/2015/06/27/the-first-half-of-2015-was-most-intense-period-of-terroristplotting-since-911/)//WK
I hate to roust you from your well-deserved summer snooze, but I continue to get a sinking
feeling about the threat of the Islamic State (aka ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) here in the homeland.
Understandably reluctant to lift your head from the hammock in the heat, you ask, “Why?” Well,
pass me your beach shovel and I’ll scribble some statistics here in the sand while you wipe the
“sleepies” from your eyes induced by too many lobster rolls and fried clams. First, we’ve now had
nine—count ’em, nine—terrorist plots this year here in the United States, making the first
nearly-six months of 2015 the most intense period of terrorist plotting since 9/11. That’s not
comforting. To put it into context, by our count at The Heritage Foundation, we’ve had 71 Islamist
plots or attacks here in the United States in the nearly 14 years since Sept. 11, 2001, including the
Fort Hood shooting and the Boston Marathon bombing. Beyond the unprecedented number of
plots so far this year, there’s another troubling trend. It turns out that all of the plots in 2015 so
far have had ties to the Islamic State of seemingly distant Iraq and Syria, whether the plotters’ ties
be direct (recruited by ISIS) or indirect (inspired by ISIS). Moreover, FBI Director James Comey
said in February that his agency is investigating Islamic State-related cases in all 50 states,
noting the power and pull of ISIS propaganda. This number of cases is still being referred to
months later. So it’s not surprising that the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Rep.
Devin Nunes, R-Calif., told CBS’ “Face the Nation” on Sunday: “We face the highest threat level
we have ever faced in this country today … including after 9/11.” That’s chilling coming from
someone clearly in the know. Fortunately, the national and local law enforcement, homeland
security and intelligence communities have done a terrific job in preventing these cold,
killing conspiracies from becoming reality. The down side is that if they don’t continue to “bat a
thousand” as they’ve done so far this year—which in any endeavor is tough—we’ve got a problem,
especially with an iconic American holiday like the Fourth of July coming up. Maintaining that
record of success against ISIS is not going to be easy. Besides the rampant use of social
media, the bad guys are upping their cyber game, using publicly-available encryption found
on the Internet to chit-chat in complete privacy, according to news accounts. The terrorists
are also reportedly hiding their computer IP addresses to mask their identities and moving
over to the so-called “dark web”—a “cyber commons” that lots of bad actors call home. And
so on. The fact is that terrorists are getting harder to identify and track and may even “go
dark”—that is, they’re still out there communicating but we can’t listen in thanks to their
cutting-edge cyber skills. That’s a problem. So despite our success in preventing attacks recently,
we’re facing not only an uptick in plot frequency but an enemy who’s increasingly capable of
reaching, radicalizing and recruiting those here who would do us harm. Unfortunately, it could
be a very hot summer—beyond what the weather brings.
Data Sharing Key
Regional cooperation and online counter terror efforts are necessary to stop
ISIS
House committee on foreign affairs ‘15 (6/26, “Chairman Royce Comments as Terror Attacks
Kill Dozens Across Three Continents,” http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/chairmanroyce-comments-terror-attacks-kill-dozens-across-three-continents, lpc)
Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Rep. Ed Royce (R-CA), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, issued this statement following terrorist attacks in France, Tunisia, and Kuwait:
“These three bloody attacks come just days after ISIS called for such attacks during the Muslim
holy month of Ramadan. Indeed, ISIS has already claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing in
Kuwait. And the attack in Tunisia comes just a few months after a prominent museum in the
country’s capital was targeted.
“These attacks show that the ISIS threat is spreading well beyond Iraq and Syria. A
continued safe-haven there means more attacks across the region, Europe, and even here at
home. We must aggressively deny ISIS an area from which to unfurl their black banners of
hate and death and plot their attacks. This threat demands better regional cooperation and
more targeted air strikes against ISIS. We also must destroy the online messaging that
attracts so many young people with the counter message that ISIS offers no peace, no
community, and no future.”
Defense of Method
Our method is correct—cites variety of governmental and academic sources
Eisenbraun et al. 14- chief editor for the US Dept. of State Report on Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2014 (Stephen, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014”,
US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236536.pdf)//WK
The Department of State prepared this report using information from U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad, foreign government officials, nongovernmental and international
organizations, and published reports. U.S. diplomatic missions abroad prepared the initial drafts of
the individual country reports, using information they gathered throughout the year from a variety
of sources, including government officials, jurists, the armed forces, journalists, human
rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This information gathering can be hazardous,
and U.S. Foreign Service personnel regularly go to great lengths, under trying and sometimes
dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of human rights abuses. Once the initial drafts of
the individual country reports were completed, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
(DRL), in cooperation with other Department of State offices, worked to corroborate, analyze, and
edit the reports, drawing on their own sources of information. These sources included reports
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign government officials,
representatives from the United Nations and other international and regional organizations
and institutions, experts from academia, and the media. Bureau officers also consulted experts
on worker rights, refugee issues, military and police topics, women’s issues, and legal matters, among
many others. The guiding principle was that all information be reported objectively,
thoroughly, and fairly. - See more at:
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper
High Technical Capability
ISIS is something serious – money, nukes, capabilities
Inquisitir 15
/23 May 2015, Inquisitir News, Islamic State Nuclear Weapons: ISIS ‘Infinitely’ Closer To Obtaining Nukes
From Pakistan To Smuggle Into U.S., http://www.inquisitr.com/2113904/islamic-state-nuclearweapons-isis-infinitely-closer-to-obtaining-nukes-from-pakistan-to-smuggle-into-us, spark/
The Islamic State claims that it could have nuclear weapons in as little as a year , thanks
to corrupt Pakistan officials. In a recent article published in the terror group’s magazine, Dabiq, the militants claim
that they are “infinitely” closer to securing nuclear weapons that would be used
against the United States and smuggled by boat or land onto American soil . The Express
Tribune reports that Islamic State officials are boasting in a recent article in the terrorist group’s magazine titled The Perfect
they are increasingly closer to obtaining nuclear weapons from Pakistan . The
group claims to have “billions” in bank accounts that would be used to secure nuclear
weapons. The article was attributed to the British hostage John Cantlie and says that the group plans to be “the most
explosive Islamic movement the modern world has ever seen” in less than 12 months. The group says they currently
have access to “tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, and anti-aircraft systems.”
However, they quickly changed the focus to future ambitious plans of getting a hold of
nuclear weapons thanks to corrupt Pakistani officials. “Let me throw a hypothetical operation onto the table. The
Storm that
Islamic State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call on their wilāyah in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through
weapons dealers with links to corrupt officials in the region.” The Islamic State says that obtaining
such a weapon
would be the “sum of all fears for Western intelligence agencies.” If the Islamic State
can not get their hands on nuclear weapons, they do have an apparent backup plan. The
publication notes that “a few thousand tons of ammonium nitrate explosive” is “easy enough” to make and could be used in the
wake of nukes. According to the Daily Mail, the Islamic State is wanting to do “something big.” They want their next attack to be
on such a large scale that it would make any previous attempts look like a “squirrel shoot.” “ They’ll
be looking to do
something big, something that would make any past operation look like a squirrel
shoot, and the more groups that pledge allegiance the more possible it becomes to pull
off something truly epic.” The Islamic State appears hopeful that in the next 12 months they will have a good
foothold in the United States and the Western world. “As the territory of the Islamic State crosses from
one border to another like a wildfire that is burning out of control, it’ll be only a matter
of time before the Islamic State reaches the western world.”
ISIS is something serious – they have the capability to launch a chemical,
biological or nuclear attack on US soil
Schleifer 15
/12 March 2015, Theodore Schleifer is a CNN Politics Reporter, Former CIA official: ISIS terrorist
attack in U.S. is possible, http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/12/politics/michael-morell-isis-attackosama-bin-laden, spark/
Islamic militants have the ability to direct individuals to conduct small-scale attacks
in the United States and could pose an even greater threat in the future , according to the
former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Michael Morell, a longtime intelligence analyst who served as acting
director of the agency after the resignation of David Petraeus in 2012, warned that if
ISIS was allowed to take
refuge in Iraq and Syria, they could orchestrate an attack in the United States . The
group has claimed responsibility for a recent attack in Garland, Texas, where police killed two
gunmen. "That would be the nightmare scenario: a terrorist attack, here in the United
States, here in New York, another major city, that involved either chemical, biological
or other nuclear weapons ," he said. Morell also disputed a report this week by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist
Seymour Hersh that a walk-in informant tipped the United States off to the location of Osama bin Laden before the American
military killed him. "I
can't tell you that somebody didn't walk into a station somewhere and
say 'I know where Osama bin Laden is.'" Morell said. "But I can guarantee you that no one
walk in ever provided information that actually led us to Osama bin Laden."
ISIS operations increasing in effectiveness—Ramadi proves
Coker 5/25- Middle East correspondent for the Wall Street Journal, internally cites Bill Roggio,
senior fellow at the Defense of Democracies (Margaret, “How Islamic State’s Win in Ramadi Reveals
New Weapons, Tactical Sophistication and Prowess”, Wall Street Journal, 5/25/15,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-states-gains-reveal-new-prowess-on-battlefield1432592298)//WK
In late April, a commander for Islamic State said his forces were ready to launch an offensive
to take Ramadi, and the group called for fighters to redeploy to Iraq from Syria. Three weeks
later, the jihadist group seized the capital of Anbar province after relentless waves of suicide
bombings. U.S. defense chief Ash Carter has blamed Ramadi’s fall mainly on Iraqi forces’ lack of will
to fight. But Islamic State’s battlefield performance suggests the terrorist group’s tactical
sophistication is growing—a development the Iraqis and the U.S.-led coalition have so far
failed to counter, said Iraqi officials, former U.S. officials and military analysts studying the
organization. An examination of how Ramadi fell indicates that Islamic State commanders
executed a complex battle plan that outwitted a greater force of Iraqi troops as well as the
much-lauded, U.S.-trained special-operations force known as the Golden Division, which had
been fighting for months to defend the city. Islamic State commanders evaded surveillance and
airstrikes to bring reinforcements to its front lines in western Iraq. The group displayed a high
degree of operational security by silencing its social media and propaganda teams during the
Ramadi surge. The group also churned out dozens of formidable new weapons by converting
captured U.S. military armored vehicles designed to be impervious to small-arms fire into
megabombs with payloads equal to the force of the Oklahoma City bombing. Over the threeday surge in Ramadi, Islamic State fighters launched at least 27 such vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices, or Vbieds, that destroyed Iraq security forces’ defensive perimeters and
crumbled multistory buildings. Military analysts said the new formidable weapon was the latest
development showing how the group appears to be learning from battlefield defeats like the one
in Kobani, Syria, last summer in pursuit of its goal to control the Sunni-majority areas of Syria and
Iraq. “It’s very frustrating,” said Bill Roggio, senior fellow at the Defense of Democracies think tank
and managing editor of the Long War Journal, which chronicles the U.S. war on terror. “These guys
are showing a good degree of tactical awareness.”
ISIS Iraqi Activity Increasing
ISIS activity in Iraq increasing
Eisenbraun et al. 14- chief editor for the US Dept. of State Report on Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2014 (Stephen, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014”,
US Department of State, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236812.pdf)//WK
Destabilizing violence and fighting between government forces and ISIL escalated in Anbar
Province at the end of 2013 and spread to other provinces during the year. On June 9, ISIL
launched an assault and quickly captured Mosul, the second largest city. Subsequently ISIL
forces took control of large areas of Anbar, Ninewa, Salah ad Din, and Diyala provinces. Armed
clashes between ISIL and the ISF, including the Peshmerga--the armed forces of the Kurdistan
regional government--caused massive internal displacements, with the United Nations
estimating more than two million persons forced to flee their homes nationwide. The
humanitarian crisis worsened in July and August, as ISIL targeted ethnic and religious minorities,
perpetrated gender-based violence, sold women and children off as slaves, recruited child
soldiers, and destroyed civilian infrastructure. Severe human rights problems persisted. Largescale and frequent killings, the vast majority of which ISIL carried out, destabilized the
country. They included the June 10 mass killing of more than 600 inmates, almost all Shia, at
Badoush prison near Mosul. ISIL also killed, abducted, and expelled from their homes
members of religious and ethnic groups, including Christians, Shia Shabak, Shia Turkmen,
and Yezidis. Simultaneously, but on a much smaller scale, there were unverified reports of
government actors and Shia militias killing Sunni prisoners. Widespread corruption at all levels of
government and society exacerbated the lack of effective human rights protections. Terrorist
groups, most notably ISIL, on a mass scale committed acts of violence, including killing by
means of suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices, execution-style shootings, and
beheadings. These groups also engaged in kidnapping, rape, and other forms of violence. Terrorists
targeted fellow citizens, including Shia, Sunni, and members of other religious groups or ethnicities,
as well as security forces, places of worship, religious pilgrims, schools, public spaces, economic
infrastructure, and government officials. The government initiated investigations of ISIL’s human
rights abuses, for instance the massacre of Air Force recruits at Camp Speicher and the targeted
killing of Yezidis in Sinjar, but progress was slow and the status of official prosecutions unknown.
Information about investigations or prosecutions of abuses by government officials and members of
the security forces was not publicly available.
Moral Obligation to Stop ISIS (AT: Ethics First)
ISIS is committing ethnic cleansing—moral obligation to combat them
Sands 4/19- barrister in the Matrix Chambers and a professor of international law at University
College London (Philippe, “In the face of Islamic State’s atrocities, global inaction is not an option”,
The Guardian, 4/19/15, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/19/islamic-stateatrocities-icc-iraq-syria-nuremberg-principles)//WK
Eight mass graves reportedly found in the Iraqi city of Tikrit earlier this month are believed to
hold some of the bodies of 1,700 Shia military cadets who were rounded up by Islamic State in
June 2014 and paraded through the streets, before disappearing. These graves, and surely others in
and around the city, will be subjected to a grim, intimate process followed too often around the
world, a fruit of ethnic and religious strife. As in Rwanda and various parts of former Yugoslavia
with now familiar names – such as Srebrenica and Vukovar– the sites will be mapped and
documented; bodies will be identified, photographed, removed and then minutely analysed
by forensic anthropologists for identity and trauma; full excavation of the site will follow, with
identification and accounting for the moment of mass death. What happens next? These sites are
crime scenes, with a resonance going beyond the local. Their dimension is international because
of their scale, nature and context. Such acts of unlawful killing may be war crimes in armed
conflict, or “crimes against humanity” when occasioned beyond the battlefield. If it can be
established that the killings were motivated by an intention to destroy Shias as a group in
whole or in part (as the UN has intimated in relation to accounts of the murder by Islamic State
forces of members of the Yazidi community in Iraq), then “genocide” may have been
committed. The international dimension means the Iraqi authorities must act, to investigate and
punish. This notion of international crimes came of age exactly seven decades ago, as the
Nuremberg trial of senior Nazi leaders was announced by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. It
took five more decades for countries to agree on a permanent international criminal court: the
statute, adopted in 1998, records the “duty of every state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes”. The ICC, which signals that “the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished”, provides a forum for
international investigation and prosecution if local authorities fail to act, because they cannot or do
not wish to do so. Yet the ICC can only act where it has jurisdiction: in recent days the ICC
prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has said that she lacks authority to investigate accounts of Islamic State
atrocity in Tikrit and elsewhere because Syria and Iraq aren’t members of the ICC. The only real
possibility is for the UN security council to refer the facts to the ICC, as it has done in relation to
Sudan and Libya. An international criminal investigation would have a purpose going beyond
deterrence or prevention Is there any point in subjecting Islamic State to criminal
investigation? It’s a reasonable question, given that its leaders and foot soldiers have, by
their heinous acts, made clear that the prospect of indictment is an irrelevance. Yet an
international criminal investigation would have a purpose going beyond deterrence or prevention. It
would allow a record to be prepared, informing historical accounts and – maybe - offering some
solace to the families of the victims, making it clear that a full blind eye will not be turned. A failure
to investigate would send a different signal: facing an international actor with no regard for
basic international rules, the world would be saying that it considers the principles put in
place over many painful years to have reached their practical limits. Yet even if it is plain – as
the troubled role of the ICC in relation to events in Sudan and Libya has shown – that criminal
investigation alone is not a panacea, or that such investigations don’t offer complete solutions or
even short-term assistance, global inaction in the face of such horrors would serve to reinforce the
sentiment that the rule of law has reached its limits. Doing nothing is not an option. Seventy
years ago the American prosecutor Robert Jackson told the judges at Nuremberg that their
task was “to utilise international law to meet the greatest menace”. The challenge today, in
relation to the crimes of Islamic State, is no less.
Yes Bioweapons
An ISIS laptop exposes some serious secrets of their future plan to launch a
bio-weapon attack
Doornbos & Moussa 14
/28 August 2014, Harald Doornbos is a reporter based in Pakistan covering the greater Middle East
and Jenan Moussa is the roving reporter of Dubai-based Al Aan TV, Found: The Islamic State’s Terror
Laptop of Doom, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-ofdoom, spark/
Abu Ali, a commander of a moderate Syrian rebel group in northern Syria, proudly
shows a black laptop partly covered in dust. “We took it this year from an ISIS
hideout,” he says. Abu Ali says the fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which have since rebranded
themselves as the Islamic State, all fled before he and his men attacked the building. The attack occurred in January in a village in
the Syrian province of Idlib, close to the border with Turkey, as part of a larger anti-ISIS offensive occurring at the time. “We
found the laptop and the power cord in a room,” he continued, “I took it with me. But I have
no clue if it still works or if it contains anything interesting.” As we switched on the Dell laptop, it
indeed still worked. Nor was it password-protected. But then came a huge disappointment: After we clicked on “My Computer,”
all the drives appeared empty. Appearances, however, can be deceiving. Upon closer inspection, the
ISIS laptop wasn’t
empty at all: Buried in the “hidden files” section of the computer were 146 gigabytes of
material, containing a total of 35,347 files in 2,367 folders. Abu Ali allowed us to copy
all these files — which included documents in French, English, and Arabic — onto an external hard drive. The
laptop’s contents turn out to be a treasure trove of documents that provide ideological
justifications for jihadi organizations — and practical training on how to carry out the Islamic State’s deadly
campaigns. They include videos of Osama bin Laden, manuals on how to make bombs, instructions for stealing cars, and lessons
on how to use disguises in order to avoid getting arrested while traveling from one jihadi hot spot to another. But after hours
upon hours of scrolling through the documents, it became clear that the ISIS
laptop contains more than the
typical propaganda and instruction manuals used by jihadists. The documents also
suggest that the laptop’s owner was teaching himself about the use of biological
weaponry, in preparation for a potential attack that would have shocked the world. The
information on the laptop makes clear that its owner is a Tunisian national named Muhammed S. who joined ISIS in Syria and
who studied chemistry and physics at two universities in Tunisia’s northeast. Even more disturbing is how he planned to use that
education: The
ISIS laptop contains a 19-page document in Arabic on how to develop
biological weapons and how to weaponize the bubonic plague from infected animals
A biological-terrorist attack threat is ginormous – laundry list of reasons
#DontSleep #ThisCardIsFire
Vicinanzo 15
/23 April 2015, Amanda Vicinanzo is an Editorial Assistant at Homeland Security Today. She earned
her M.A. in Statecraft and National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in
Washington, DC. Biological Terrorist Attack On US An 'Urgent And Serious Threat',
http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/biological-terrorist-attack-on-usan-urgent-and-serious-threat/0ce6ebf3524d83c537b1f4f0cc578547.html, spark/
In the wake of the recent Ebola crisis, the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response and Communications convened a hearing Wednesday to examine US preparedness for a bioterrorist
attack. “ The
risk of a biological terrorist attack to America is an urgent and serious
threat . A bioattack could cause illness and even kill hundreds of thousands of people,
overwhelm our public health capabilities, and create significant economic, societal
and political consequences ,” said subcommittee chairman Martha McSally (R-Ariz). “Our nation’s
capacity to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the impacts of biological terror incidents
is a top national security priority .” Bioterrorist threat from ISIL and other terrorist organizations In her opening
statement, McSally expressed concern over the possibility that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other jihadi
terrorist organizations could conduct a biological attack on American soil. “ISIL
is better resourced, more
brutal, and more organized than any terrorist group to date,” McSally said. “ We know that
they have an interest in using chemical and biological weapons .” Last year, Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper warned the Syrian government might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and
may have a restricted capacity to manufacture weaponized disease agents. Counterterrorism
officials have
worried for years since the conflict in Syria began that ISIL may be able to get a hold
of these biological weapons . Moreover, last year, a laptop belonging to a Tunisian jihadist
reportedly recovered from an ISIL hideout in Syria contained a hidden trove of secret
plans, including instructions for weaponizing the bubonic plague and a document
discussing the advantages of a biological attack. “ The advantage of biological
weapons is that they do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be
huge ,” stated a document found on the laptop. In October, jihadists and supporters of ISIL stepped up
discussions on jihadist social media websites about the possibility and ease of using
Ebola, as well as other virulent pathogens and poisons, as weapons against the US
and the West, according to reports by the Middle East Media Research Institute. Jim Talent, former Senator from Missouri
and former vice-chair of The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism,
testified that the threat of a bioattack is “one of the greatest and gravest” facing the nation.
Talent said that at the end of 2008, the 9/11 Commission issued the report, World at Risk, which addressed the threat posed by
nuclear and biological weapons. Talent
and former Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) gave the biothreat
greater emphasis, knowing that terrorists have acquired bio-weapons in the past, and
that it’s likely easier for them to secure a bio-weapon than a nuclear weapon . The report
stated, “We accept the validity of current intelligence estimates about the current
rudimentary nature of terrorist capabilities in the area of biological weapons but
caution that the terrorists are trying to upgrade their capabilities and could do so by
recruiting skilled scientists . In this regard, the biological threat is greater than the nuclear;
the acquisition of deadly pathogens, and their weaponization and dissemination in
aerosol form, would entail fewer technical hurdles than the theft of production of
weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and its assembly into an improvised nuclear
device .” In addition, bio-weapons can be easily transported, stockpiled, can cause more
deaths than a tactical nuclear weapon, and, depending on the biological agent used,
the terrorists could launch an attack and escape the area before the authorities even
knew that an attack had occurred , according to Talent. And he's not alone. Seasoned and veteran
counterterrorism officials agree that jihadi organizations appear to have a greater interest in
acquiring and using biological and radiological weapons, and that Al Qaeda is known
to have experimented with trying to weaponize a number of highly virulent pathogens.
In 2005, Homeland Security Today first reported that Al Qaeda had worked on plans to send squads of
"bio-martyrs" who would deliberately infect themselves with a human transmittable
strain of bird flu once such a strain become a human contagion or a human
transmissible form clandestinely bio-engineering to be easily passed between humans,
and then to spread the virus as widely around the world as they could by traveling on
one international flight after another, officials said at the time. During the height of the Ebola outbreak,
intelligence surfaced indicating that jihadi organizations were discussing doing the same thing with the Ebola virus. With
a
long enough period of sanctuary where terrorists can plan, recruit and get together the
necessary lab facilities and experts, they can isolate and weaponize . According to Talent, there
are now areas, including in Iraq and Syria, where jihadists have the time and sanctuary to develop these weapons. Although an
attack using biological agents or weapons is a low probability, high consequence event, “When you keep running risk and the risk
continues to grow, even gradually, eventually the bullet is in the chamber,” Talent said. On August 14, 2013, Homeland Security
Today Editor-in-Chief Anthony Kimery and former CIA WMD counterterrorism unit chief Charles Faddis appeared in
"Biopocalypse," an episode of the SyFy Channel TV series, "Joe Rogan Questions Everything." The
segment dealt
with bio-terrorism, designer-hybrid pathogenic threats and unregulated DIY-bio
genetics labs from out of which could emerge unregulated designer/hybrid
pathogens. US response to Ebola outbreak highlights lack of bio preparedness The
recent Ebola outbreak—the deadliest in history—has claimed the lives of over 10,000
and infected over 26,000 , according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). With no cure and a
mortality rate as high as 90 percent, the Ebola epidemic serves as a grim reminder that even with the advent of modern medicine,
the spread of deadly infectious diseases is not relegated to history. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been criticized for
its slow response in the early months of the outbreak. Recently, WHO admitted to boggling the Ebola response, and released a
list of lessons learned as well as suggested reforms for moving forward. "The
Ebola outbreak that started in
December 2013 became a public health, humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis with a
devastating impact on families, communities and affected countries,” WHO said in a statement.
“It also served as a reminder that the world, including WHO, is ill-prepared for a large
and sustained disease outbreak.” Like WHO, the United States also mishandled the Ebola outbreak, calling into
question US bio preparedness, both for terrorism and pandemics or other emerging infectious diseases. McSally stated that
bureaucracy, as well as a leadership vacuum, prevented an effective response to the crisis. “Even
after the Ebola
response we cannot seem to identify the federal official who has the responsibility and
authority to coordinate the dozen or so senior officials with responsibility for biological
preparedness and defense,” McSally said. “It’s just baffling.” Earlier this month, Homeland Security Today reported
that the post-9/11 Commission Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense arrived at the consensus that the government does not
have a good answer to the question of who would be in charge if America was beset by a biological or chemical weapons attack.
"The federal government has stated that a public health disaster or pandemic is one of the top strategic threats our country faces,"
said Dr. Kenneth Bernard, a former biodefense official in the Clinton and Bush administrations. "Yet, we
were still
largely unprepared for the Ebola outbreak this year. We're not managing our
leadership properly." Panel co-chair Tom Ridge said a “leadership vacuum” plagues response efforts – especially the
response to a large-scale, mass casualty biological or chemical attack, which most public health and emergency public health
authorities agree the US isn't prepared for handling or mitigating. " Biological
and chemical threats are
among the most sinister our nation faces ," Ridge said. " Terrorist groups have voiced their
desire to obtain and use biological and chemical weapons. The Ebola crisis revealed
significant gaps in US public health and medical preparedness. We must consider our
current ability to defend against such threats and provide for the health and welfare of
our citizens ." The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense plans to issue recommendations for changes to US law and
policy later this year. In addition to lack of leadership, the US has also failed to effectively manage and oversee its inventory of
pandemic preparedness supplies, including protective equipment and antiviral drugs. In October, Homeland Security Today
reported that by
failing to implement controls to monitor its stockpiles, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) cannot be certain whether it has too little, too much or
ineffective supplies for its personnel, especially those who will be needed on the front
lines of a large-scale mass casualty attack or event. For example, the stockpile contained 4,982 bottles of
hand sanitizer, 84 percent of which is expired, and the Transportation Security Administration’s stock of pandemic protective
equipment included about 200,000 respirators that are beyond the 5-year usability guaranteed by the manufacturer. The glut in
supplies means millions of dollars wasted on unnecessary drugs and equipment that need to be replaced in order to be
continuously prepared. During a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing, Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.) said,
"We
spent millions of dollars for a pandemic ... We don't know the inventory, we don't
know who's got it, and we don't know who's gonna get it.” Moreover, according to Talent, the lack
of sufficient medical countermeasures (MCMs) in our Strategic National Stockpile, and the lack of a system to quickly develop
and produce MCMs during a crisis is the number one concern in US preparedness for a bio attack. Talent stated, “The
recent Ebola virus outbreak highlighted that unless countermeasures are immediately
available, including diagnostics tests that can be used by clinicians who are evaluating
suspected cases, therapeutics to treat cases and vaccines to protect health care workers
and others at risk, we are left with fairly primitive means to respond to and contain such events.” However, “The list
of bio-threat agents for which we should have diagnostics tests, therapeutics and
vaccines for is about a dozen. To date, our stockpile contains countermeasures for
only three or four,” Talent said. Public health and emergency preparedness As the largest port of entry in the US, New
York City activated “a highly detailed, coordinated and expensive multiagency and multijurisdictional effort” in response to
increasing cases of Ebola in West Africa last year. Preparedness efforts included development of detailed plans for disease
surveillance by the health department, investigation of hundreds of suspect cases, extensive staff training at each of its eleven
hospitals to be prepared to receive and screen individuals potentially exposed to the disease, and the designation and readying of
Bellevue Hospital as the primary New York City Ebola treatment center. New York City also engaged the community by
distributing over 100,000 “Am I at Risk?” palm cards and holding over 115 public events to discuss public health concerns.
Marisa Raphael, deputy commissioner of the Office of Emergency Planning and Response for the NYC Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene, testified that federal funding played a critical role in the success of the city’s response to the Ebola crisis.
Raphael also stated, “The
greatest danger to our progress is the decline in federal emergency
preparedness funding.” Homeland Security Today reported just last week that, as Western counterterrorism and
intelligence officials worry about the increasing potential for an Islamist jihadist group or inspired individual to carry out a
chemical, biological or radiological mass casualty attack in the United States, combined federal, state and local public health
spending has fallen below pre-recession levels at $75.4 billion in 2013 -- or $239 per person ($218 adjusted for inflation)
compared to $241 per person in 2009, according the new Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) report, Investing in America's
Health: A State-by-State Look at Public Health Funding and Key Health Facts. Adjusting for inflation, TFAH said, “public health
spending was 10 percent lower in 2013 than in 2009. Public health and emergency preparedness funding for New York City has
decreased 35 percent from its peak in Fiscal Year 2005, which has led to a 47 percent reduction in our public health preparedness
and response workforce. Raphael said, “The erosion of a skilled, dedicated workforce including epidemiologists, laboratory
technicians, and preparedness planners threatens to compromise our ability to detect and respond to disease outbreaks.” As
Homeland Security Today earlier reported, the federal funding cuts have not affected New York alone. “We
cannot
afford to let our guard down. We must remain vigilant in preparing for any potential
mass casualty event. Yet, year after year, we see less and less funds going to the
people who and departments that are responsible for preparing for a public health
emergency ,” TFAH Deputy Director Rich Hamburg told Homeland Security Today. Although New York demonstrated a
high level of public health and emergency preparedness during the Ebola crisis, other large US cities remain vastly unprepared.
Many do not access to the amount of funding or resources granted to New York. But beyond New York, hospitals in most major
metropolitan cities are inadequately prepared for a surge of people infected with a highly contagious pathogen, a problem
Homeland Security Today has reported since 2004. University of Arizona College of Medicine Interim Dean Dr. Chuck Cairns
said at
the hearing that Tucson and Phoenix could not respond to a biological threat
such as Ebola the way a city like New York can “I don’t think Tucson and Phoenix
would have that same experience or resources," he said. “Generally speaking, federal budgets
designed to support public health and health care system preparedness and response
capabilities must be increased and sustained, this is as true for New York City as it is
for localities nationwide, particularly dense urban centers,” said Raphael.
Yes Dirty Bomb/Chemical
ISIS using chemical weapons on Iraqi forces now – risk of same attack on US
soil high
Ybarra 15
/19 March 2015, Maggie Ybarra is military affairs and Pentagon correspondent for The Washington
Times. Islamic State chemical attack may be possible in U.S.,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/19/islamic-state-chemical-attack-possible-athome-us-, spark/
Lawmakers and municipal officials are growing increasingly concerned about the
Islamic State’s efforts to obtain and use chemical weapons to attack soft targets within
the United States. The extremist group has already been caught working with Abu
Malik, a former chemical engineer who worked for the chemical weapon production
facility of former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein . Members of a U.S.-led multinational operation battling
Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria tracked down Mr. Malik in Iraq in January and killed him in an airstrike — temporarily
disrupting the terrorist group’s ability to potentially produce and use chemical weapons. Now lawmakers
and officials
are beginning to worry that Islamic State supporters could be planning a deadly
chemical strike inside the United States . Oklahoma City Fire Department Chief Keith Bryant told a
congressional hearing Thursday that there is “clear evidence” that the Islamic State, also known as
ISIS and ISIL, has been using roadside bombs with chlorine to try to panic Iraqi
forces . The group has also been discussing on social media sites how its followers can
use cyanide and sulfuric acid to launch potential terror attacks on the American
homeland. “Documents that we’re seeing from extremist websites and so forth
encourage people to actually look at and consider using those facilities, those
chemicals that are out there in communities, as weapons ,” Mr. Bryant said in an interview.
Pentagon officials say that they had no confirmation that the Islamic State has
chemical weapons. Those officials, however, have been tracking the extremist group’s
attempts to develop that capability . Lawmakers took that concern one step further
during the chemical threats hearing, which was hosted by the House Homeland Security Committee
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications. “We find ourselves at a pivotal
time in our fight against terrorists around the world,” said Rep. Martha McSally, the Arizona Republican
who chairs the House Homeland Security subcommittee overseeing emergency preparedness issues. “ISIS is better resourced,
Islamic State militants would like to
launch a psychological attack on the American people , said Dakota Wood, senior research fellow for
more brutal and more organized than any terrorist group to date. “
defense programs at The Heritage Foundation. A conventional attack, such as a car bomb, may offer the terrorists “more bang
for the buck,” but would lack the impact that the extremists want, he said. “ There
is kind of this attraction to
chemical and biological weapons because they’re not used very often, and there’s a
psychological effect that affects populations ,” he said. The Islamic State has already used low-grade
chemical weapons against Kurdish fighters fighting with the U.S.-led alliance in Iraq. Militants paired chlorine gas with a truck
bomb in January and detonated the truck on a road leading from Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, to the border of Syria. Kurdish
fighters said they found about 20 gas canisters, which had been put on the truck prior to its detonation, The Associated Press
reported. The Kurdish government was eventually able to confirm through an independent laboratory that chemicals were used
during the attack. One senior Pentagon official, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the attacks,
played down the threat to the U.S. homeland. “ There
are no preexisting chemical weapons for them
to steal ,” the official said. “So as [Islamic State militants] come into connection with
factories that have the ability to produce chemicals, they then have access to that
chemical .” But lawmakers said the country must be prepared. “We are particularly focused on the threat
to the United States from individuals who have traveled to Iraq and Syria to train and
fight with ISIS and those inspired by their extremist message here at home,” Ms. McSally
said. “ We must ensure we work to prevent any attacks on U.S. soil, but we must also be
prepared should one occur.”
ISIS planning to use chemical or nuclear weapons—have material and
expertise
Carsltrom and Lagan 6/10- correspondents for The Times (Gregg and Bernard, “Dirty bomb
threat escalates as Isis stockpiles radioactive chemicals”, The Times, 6/10/15,
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article4465397.ece)//WK
Islamic State has scavenged radioactive material and chemicals from research facilities and
hospitals, heightening fears that it is trying to build a large "dirty" bomb and weapons of
mass destruction. Nato is deeply worried about the hoarding of radioactive material taken by
Isis fighters from facilities that it has captured in Syria and Iraq, Australia's foreign minister said.
"The insurgents did not just clear out the cash from local banks," Julie Bishop told The Australian.
The warning came as it emerged that Israel has set off radioactive bombs in the Negev desert, to
simulate a terrorist attack. No terrorist group has yet detonated a dirty bomb, a mix of
conventional explosives and radioactive materials that could easily be obtained from medical facilities
or industry. However, Isis claimed in its propaganda magazine last month that it was trying
to acquire a nuclear weapon. Israeli officials acknowledged yesterday that they were
concerned about such an attack. "The nuclear threat is perhaps the greatest threat to Israel,"
Major-General Nimrod Sheffer, head of the army's planning directorate, said at an annual security
conference. Scientists at the Negev nuclear research centre, near Dimona, detonated their own dirty
bombs last year as part of a four-year study, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz disclosed this week. They
built 20 devices, the largest of which contained 25kg of explosives, laced with technetium-99m, an
isotope that is commonly used in medical imaging. Six were detonated in a mocked-up shopping mall
to simulate an attack on a commercial area. The researchers used drones and sensors to monitor the
aftermath. The study found that the devices would cause few deaths because only a small amount
of radiation would spread beyond the centre of the explosion. The impact would be largely
economic: the site would have to be cordoned off while the radiation dissipated. Technetium99m has a relatively short half-life of six hours, but other common medical isotopes take weeks or
even months to decay. The tests also examined what would happen if a dirty bomb were left in a
public place but not detonated. The scientists conducted six tests using radioactive material mixed
with water in the ventilation system of a twostorey building. They found that such an attack would be
ineffective, because air-conditioning filters would absorb most of the radiation. Ms Bishop noted that
by capturing territory, Isis had gained access to chemicals and radioactive material normally
held by governments. In June last year, when Isis captured Mosul in northern Iraq, the militants
took nearly 40kg of uranium from the university. "Terrorist groups have seized control of nuclear
material at the sites that came out of the control of the state," Mohamed Ali Alhakim, Iraq's
UN ambassador, told the United Nations. He warned that such materials "can be used in
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction". Australia has deployed jet fighters to the Middle
East to take part in attacks on Isis forces and has also sent military instructors to train Iraqi forces.
Ms Bishop said her claim that Isis may also be developing chemical weapons was based on
reports from Australia's departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In a speech last week Ms
Bishop said that groups such as Isis were prepared to use any means to advance their cause.
Conventional wisdom, Ms Bishop said, holds that the desire of such forces to weaponise chemical
agents were largely aspirational. However, Isis's use of chlorine and its recruitment of highly
trained professionals - including some from the West - revealed its far more serious efforts to
develop chemical weapons, she said. Isis "was likely to have among its tens of thousands of
recruits the technical expertise necessary to further refine precursor materials and build
chemical weapons", Ms Bishop said, adding that the Australia Group - a bloc of about 40 nations
established to minimise the spread of chemical and biological weapons - was sufficiently concerned
to have dedicated a session to Isis at a meeting in Perth last week. In 2013 Moshe Yaalon, the Israeli
defence minister, claimed at a meeting in Canada that Iran was looking into using terrorists to attack
Western targets with dirty bombs. Israel has never acknowledged having a nuclear weapons
programme, but is believed to possess 80 to 100 nuclear warheads.
ISIS can make chemical weapons – loose materials and increased research
McElroy and Sherwell 14 (*Damien, Foreign Affairs Correspondent for the telegraph, **Phillip,
Chief US Correspondent for the Telegraph, 10/15/14, National Post, “ISIS capable of making dirty
bombs with chemical weapons cache in Iraq, former British colonel warns,”
http://news.nationalpost.com/news/isis-capable-of-making-dirty-bombs-with-abandoned-chemicalweapons-cache-in-northern-iraq-former-british-colonel-warns, JHR)
ONDON and NEW YORK — A former commander of the British Army’s chemical and nuclear weapons protection forces has
warned that the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) has the capability of making battlefield dirty bombs. It
emerged that hundred of shells filled with poison gas are stored unguarded in areas controlled by the jihadists. Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former colonel, issued the warning after it
was found that two large stockpiles of shells filled with mustard and sarin gas had not been made secure, either under the American occupation or when Iraqi forces controlled the areas
ISIS had shown it was determined to use chemical weapons in
Syria and its advance in Iraq had put dangerous material within the group’s grasp. “These materials are not as secure as we had been led
to believe and now pose some significant threat to the coalition in Iraq fighting ISIL,” he said, using another acronym for the terror group. “We
know that ISIL have researched the use of chemical weapons in Syria for the last two years and worryingly there are already
unconfirmed reports that ISIL has used mustard gas as it pursues its offensive against the Kurds in Kobani. “They certainly have access to the AlQaeda research into chemical weapons and will want to use the legacy weapons in Iraq.” ISIS seized the Muthanna State Establishment, where
north of Baghdad before this summer. Mr. Bretton-Gordon said
Iraqi chemical agent production was based in the Eighties, this summer.
Yes Domestic Attacks
ISIS has plans and capabilities to launch domestic attacks—existing
smuggling networks prove
Blosser 6/3- internally cites ISIS magazines and US Gen. John Kelly (John, “ISIS Vows to
Smuggle Nuke Over Mexican Border”, Newsmax, 6/3/15,
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/ISIS-smuggle-nuclearweapon/2015/06/03/id/648560/#ixzz3eC9BinqS)//WK
The Islamic State (ISIS) claims it has plans to buy a nuclear weapon from Pakistan and
smuggle it into the U.S., using drug and human smuggling routes already in use by Mexican
and South American drug cartels. In ISIS's online magazine Dabiq, in an article entitled, "The
Perfect Storm," apparently written and narrated by British captive photojournalist John Cantlie, ISIS
says that using "billions of dollars" it has banked, the group could purchase a nuclear device
from corrupt Pakistani officials and send it on its way to explode in the U.S., the Daily Mail
reports. The bomb could be smuggled overland through Libya into Nigeria along already
active drug smuggling routes into Europe, using the ISIS-allied terrorist group Boko Haram.
After that, the bomb would be transported by boat to Central America and then through
Mexico, Breitbart News reports. From there, Cantlie said, "It’s just a quick hop through a smuggling
tunnel and hey, presto, they’re mingling with another 12 million 'illegal' aliens in America with a
nuclear bomb in the trunk of their car." With eerie prescience, Gen. John Kelly, at the time
commander of the U.S. Southern Command, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee
in March, warned that ISIS could utilize Latin American drug smuggling networks to move
personnel and weapons into the U.S., Breitbart News reported. "I am deeply concerned that
smuggling networks are a vulnerability that terrorists could seek to exploit," Breitbart News reports
Kelly said. "While there is not yet any indication that the criminal networks involved in human and
drug trafficking are interested in supporting the efforts of terrorist groups, these networks could
unwittingly, or even wittingly, facilitate the movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of
mass destruction toward our borders, potentially undetected and almost completely
unrestricted." "Perhaps such a scenario is far-fetched but it’s the sum of all fears for western
intelligence agencies and it’s infinitely more possible today than it was just one year ago," Cantlie
wrote, the Daily Mail reported. He noted that even if a nuclear weapon were not available, ISIS
could use those routes to smuggle tons of conventional explosives into America. "The Islamic
State make no secret of the fact they have every intention of attacking America on its home soil and
they’re not going to mince about with two mujahidin taking down a dozen casualties if it originates
from the caliphate. 'They’ll be looking to do something big, something that would make any past
operation look like a squirrel shoot, and the more groups that pledge allegiance, the more possible it
becomes to pull off something truly epic."
ISIS has plans for moving a WMD through Mexico – Boko Haram will help
Mora 15 (Edwin, BA in Communication (Journalism) from George Mason University
6/3/15, BreitBart, “Dabiq: ISIS Could Transport Nuke From Nigeria Into U.S. Through
Mexico,” http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/06/03/dabiq-isis-could-transportnuke-from-nigeria-into-u-s-through-mexico/, JHR)
In an op-ed article published in the ninth edition of ISIS’ Dabiq magazine released in late May, the jihadist group claims it could transport a
nuclear device in the same way illicit drugs are smuggled into Europe through West Africa, adding
that Boko Haram’s presence in Nigeria could facilitate the transaction. The Nigeria-based Islamic terrorist group, Boko
Haram, pledged allegiance to ISIS in March. In March, Gen. John Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command (Southcom), warned that Islamic terrorist groups such
as ISIS could exploit the capabilities and knowledge of Latin American smuggling networks
to infiltrate the U.S. through Mexico and possibly bring in weapons of mass destruction. The general,
in October 2014, acknowledged that illegal drugs from South America move “through West Africa,
up the Maghreb and into Western Europe,” adding that ISIS enemy al Qaeda and its affiliates take “a lot of money to allow it to flow.” According to
the alleged author of the Dabiq op-ed article, kidnapped British photojournalist John Cantlie , ISIS could smuggle a nuke into the U.S. by
using the same route and reversing the flow— moving the nuke from West Africa into South America, from where it could be transported into the United States
through Mexico.
Yes Nuclear Motive
ISIS has desire to use nukes—US intelligence gathering key to prevent it
Rosen and Stracqualursi 5/24- ABC News Correspondents, internally cites House Armed
Services Committee Chair Rep. Mac Thornberry (Katerina and Veronica, “Armed Services
Committee Chair Thornberry: 'No Doubt' ISIS Would Use Nukes If Obtained”, ABC News,
5/24/15, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/armed-services-committee-chair-thornberry-doubt-isisnukes/story?id=31272356)//WK
ISIS would "of course" use a nuclear weapon if given the chance, House Armed Services
Committee Chair Rep. Mac Thornberry said today, responding to reports of ISIS claiming they
had the resources to acquire a nuclear weapon from Pakistan within a year. Despite the
reports that ISIS hopes to obtain a nuclear weapon, Thornberry, R-Texas, told ABC News' Jonathan
Karl on "This Week" that the jihadist group has not taken steps yet, saying that there is "no evidence
that it has happened." "Would they do it if they had the opportunity? Of course. Would they use it if
they had it? I don't think there's any doubt," Thornberry said. "We don't wait until they get it before
we take action that seriously degrades and destroys ISIS," Thornberry added. "Secondly, we keep
pushing at their finances to lower the amount of money they have." While the White House is
arguing that the U.S. is not losing the war against ISIS even as they gained strongholds in the
cities of Ramadi in Iraq and Palmyra in Syria, Thornberry said that ISIS "has a lot of momentum
on their side." "The president resists saying, 'We're losing it.' Well, we're not winning. We know
that," Thornberry said. "You see not only ISIS gaining territory in Iraq and in Syria and I think the
map, like you showed, gives it very graphically about their territory expanding," he added. While
Thornberry said he would prefer not having U.S. ground troops fight alongside the Iraqi military, he
called for greater intelligence capability and on-the-ground advisers to help combat ISIS. "Some of
our military folks believe, however, if we'd had some advisers on the ground we could have
called in effective airstrikes, that it would have at least made the battle for Ramadi more
competitive," Thornberry said. "But the other thing we've got to do is improve our intelligence
capability," he said. Thornberry voted earlier this month for the USA Freedom Act, which would
have reformed the government's bulk data collection process. The measure was blocked in a latenight vote in the Senate this weekend, leaving the Patriot Act set to expire on June 1. "We passed
what I think is an imperfect bill out of the House, but it's better than letting it expire," he
said. "So we need to have that crucial intelligence capability continue."
Yes Israeli Nuclear Attack
ISIS wants to nuke Israel—internal statements
Maloof 14- former senior security policy analyst in the office of the secretary of defense, internally
cites Franklin Lamb, an international lawyer based in Lebanon and Syria (F. Michael, “Iraq Invaders
Threaten Nuke Attack on Israel”, WND, 6/23/14 http://www.wnd.com/2014/06/iraq-invadersthreaten-nuke-attack-on-israel/#26JrWVkQ3xFOhC0q.99)//WK
The well-organized army of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, claims it has access to
nuclear weapons and a will to use them to “liberate” Palestine from Israel as part of its
“Islamic Spring,” according to a WND source in the region. Franklin Lamb, an international lawyer
based in Beirut and Damascus, said the move is part of the ISIS aim of creating a caliphate
under strict Islamic law, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to Iraq. Lamb, who has access to
ISIS fighters and sympathizers, said ISIS has been working with a “new specialized” unit
organized at the beginning of 2013 to focus “exclusively on destroying the Zionist regime
occupying Palestine.” Lamb added that the ISIS “Al-Quds Unit” is working to broaden its
influence in more than 60 Palestinian camps and gatherings from Gaza, across “Occupied
Palestine,” or Israel, to Jordan and from Lebanon up to the north of Syria “seeking to enlist support
as it prepares to liberate Palestine.” ISIS is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham.
“Sham,” or “Greater Syria,” refers to Cyprus, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and
southern Turkey. ISIS also is known as DAASH, the Arabic acronym for al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi
al-Iraq wa-al Sham. The Sunni militant group, which has taken over much of the Sunni region
of Iraq, could leave the Shiite-dominated region of the country and head toward Jordan and Turkey.
Lamb said that in Iraq alone, some 6 million Iraqi Sunnis recently have become supportive of
the ISIS lightning strikes in the Sunni portion of the country. Some of the Sunni supporters are
secular, such as the Naqshbandia Army of former top officials of executed Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein. As WND reported, the Sunni group may have given ISIS access to its ongoing sarin
production facility in northwestern Iraq. WND also reported ISIS already has captured towns
bordering Iraq and Turkey. The militant group also has steamrolled through the Iraqi desert
in the west and taken over the major al-Walid crossing with Syria and the Turaibil crossing into
Jordan. Lamb said ISIS has established a capital for its caliphate in the Syrian city of Raqqa. “The
Islamist organization believes it currently has massive regional support for its rapidly
expanding ‘revolution of the oppressed,’” Lamb said. ISIS estimates it will take 72 months to
“liberate” “Occupied Palestine,” or Israel, according to Lamb. Lamb quoted an ISIS member as
saying: “Zionists call us masked, sociopathic murderers, but we are much more complicated and
representative of those seeking justice than they portray us. “Are we more barbaric than the Zionist
terrorists who massacred at Dier Yassin, Shatila, twice at Qana, and committed dozens of other
massacres? History will judge us after we free Palestine.” Lamb said ISIS can do what no other
Arab, Muslim or Western backers of resistance have been able to accomplish. He quoted the
ISIS member as saying: “All countries in this region are playing the sectarian card just as they have
long played the Palestinian card, but the difference with ISIS is that we are serious about
Palestine and they are not. Tel Aviv will fall as fast as Mosul when the time is right.” The
WND source said ISIS appears “eager” to fight Israeli armed forces “in the near future
despite expectation that the regime will use nuclear weapons.” “Do you think that we do not
have access to nuclear devices?” Lamb quoted the ISIS member as saying. “The Zionists know that
we do, and if we ever believe they are about to use theirs, we will not hesitate. After the Zionists are
gone, Palestine will have to be decontaminated and rebuilt just like areas where there has been
radiation released.” ISIS access to nuclear weapons could come from Sunni Pakistan, which is
home to more than 30 terrorist groups. Pakistan possibly has transferred nuclear weapons to
the chief bankroller of its nuclear development program, Sunni Saudi Arabia, as WND
previously has reported.
Yes Presence
ISIS increasing Pakistani presence—government reports confirm
Farhan 14- graduate of Kabul University and holds a Master degree from Japan in Public Policy
and Economics, Afghan analyst and commentator on political and socioeconomic affairs in
Afghanistan (Ahmad Hasib, “The World Must Prevent ISIS from Obtaining Pakistani Nukes”,
Khaama Press, 11/20/14, http://www.khaama.com/the-world-must-prevent-isis-from-obtainingpakistani-nukes-8782)//WK
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh, the most extreme among all the terrorist groups,
has arrived in Pakistan. The Pakistani media reported recently that a group of 10 commanders
from ISIS are currently in Baluchistan to seek allegiance of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
and the Baloch freedom movement. This happened just a few weeks after a group of TTP under
Maulana Fazlullah, voiced support for the terror group and swore allegiance to ISIS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi. However, it was not only Maulana Fazlullah who teamed up with ISIS, another
local group called Jamaatul Ahrar, also declared its support for ISIS. Jamaatul Ahrar's leader,
Ehsanullah Ehsan, was quoted by Reuters as saying: "We respect them. If they ask us for help, we
will look into it and decide." According to the Daily Mail, the spokesperson of TTP and six senior
figures have declared loyalty to ISIS. The presence of ISIS was also confirmed by the
Pakistani government. A Pakistani security official was quoted by Pakistani media as saying: "We
came across them 22 days ago and we are aware of their presence here. Pakistani security agencies
are working on the Pakistan-Afghan border and have arrested a number of Taliban fighters
and recovered CDs, maps, literature in Persian, Pashto and Dari. We will not permit them to work in
our country and anyone who is involved in this will be crushed by the government."
ISIS presence in South Asia increasing—Taliban shifting allegiance
PT 5/25- Pakistani newspaper, internally citing John F. Campbell, commander of NATO forces in
Afghanistan (Pakistan Today, “NATO says ISIS in Pakistan”, 5/25/15,
http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/05/25/national/nato-says-isis-in-pakistan/)//WK
General John F Campbell, the commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, has said that the
Islamic State (IS) terrorist group is recruiting fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they
are not yet operational. There have been fears of IS making inroads in Afghanistan since United
States-led NATO forces ended their combat mission late last year, after 13 years of fighting
insurgents. “There’s recruiting going on in Afghanistan, there is recruiting going on in
Pakistan. There is money being passed back and forth,” said General Campbell. The Middle
Eastern group, also known as Daesh, has never formally acknowledged a presence in
Afghanistan and most self-styled IS insurgents in the country are believed to be Taliban
turncoats rebranding themselves to appear a more lethal force. “What we are seeing is that
Taliban are rebranding. They see this is an opportunity to gain resources and attention,”
Campbell said, adding that they were not operational yet. While some Taliban members may be
switching allegiance, the two groups, which espouse different ideological strains of Islam, are
believed to be arrayed against each other in Afghanistan’s restive south, with clashes frequently
reported.
Yes Theft Risk
ISIS can steal Pakistani nukes or bio-weapons—triggers South Asian
instability
Jalalzai 14- Security & Intelligence Analyst/Researcher/Writer on Counter/Cyber Terrorism and
Violent Extremism, author of Nuclear Jihad in South Asia (Musa Khan, “Bioterrorism threat to South
Asia”, Daily Times, 10/9/14, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/09-Oct-2014/bioterrorismthreat-to-south-asia)//WK
The threat of nuclear weapons theft and bioterrorism in South Asia once again came under
discussion in the international press on how terrorist organisations in both Pakistan and India
are trying to retrieve biotechnology and nuclear weapons, and use them against civilians and the
security forces. The recent border skirmishes between Pakistan and India, the cloud of civil war in
Afghanistan and the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorist organisation
in the Persian Gulf and the Arab world further justified the possibilities of the complex threat
of chemical and biological terrorism. As Pakistan and Afghanistan have been the victims of
terrorism and Talibanisation during the last three decades, the establishment of ISIS networks in
South Asia may possibly change the traditional concept of terrorism and insurgency in the
region. There is a general perception that extremist organisations in South Asia could use some
advanced technologies against civilian populations. If control over these weapons is weak, the
possibility of theft increases. The problem of nuclear and biological terrorism deserves special
attention from all South Asian states, including Afghanistan. As nuclear weapons, missile
technologies and bio-weapons proliferate, there is a grave danger that some of them might
fall into the hands of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), ISIS and Indian and Afghani extremist
groups. In South and Central Asia, some states, including Pakistan, have started responding to the
threat of nuclear and biological terrorism with technical means. Each state has its own approach
towards the threat perception. The more recent focus on global terrorism issues is also now
sharpening the focus on non-proliferation activities that do not necessarily apply at the level of the
state. There are speculations that non-state actors might possibly engage in these activities. The
Islamic State that controls parts of Iraq and Syria has established its network in Afghanistan
and Pakistan as the region is already dominated by violent terrorist groups. The New York
Times recently reported that as many as 1,000 Turks joined the ISIS network. The CIA estimated last
week that the group had anywhere from 20,000 to 31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria. South Asian
states are facing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The unending civil war in
Afghanistan and Pakistan has destabilised the whole region. Terrorism in Afghanistan affects
Pakistan and Iran, its heat touches the Iranian border while the flames are clearly seen in China and
Russia as well. As South Asian states have been embroiled in protracted conflicts for decades, the
lack of proper strategies to counter the TTP, ISIS and Indian extremism, and the clash of interests,
have further aggravated the problem. Extremist and terrorist groups in this region are striving
to retrieve nuclear and biological weapons and use them against the government or civilian
population. The issue is further complicated as some secret reports have revealed the use of nuclear
and biological weapons inside Russia. In November 1995, Chechen separatists put a crude bomb in
Moscow's Izmailovsky Park. The debate about bioterrorism is not entirely new in the region because
both Pakistan and India have developed these weapons to use them in a future war. On December 3,
1984, the worst chemical disaster occurred in the city of Bhopal in India, causing the deaths of
thousands of people. If a nuclear war were to break out in South Asia, experts believe that it is most
likely to happen in India and Pakistan. This kind of war would have dire consequences. In the Seoul
Summit, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh warned that South Asia is under threat. Two
incidents in Karachi and another in Balochistan proved that terrorists were trying to retrieve
nuclear weapons to use them against military or nuclear installations. The Indian government
has recognised the threat from bioweapons as real and imminent. Both the ministry of defence
and ministry of home affairs placed high priority on this issue. India understands that Pakistanbased terrorist groups may possibly use these weapons in Kashmir in the near future.
Pakistan too has expressed deep concern about the use of these weapons against its security
forces either by the Taliban or Baloch insurgents. The emergence of recent polio and bird flu
cases in Pakistan is the primary warning of danger. The nucleation of my debate on nuclear
terrorism is that, once the TTP or other terrorist group steals biological and nuclear weapons,
they will use them against the military and nuclear installations. National security experts in the
UK and US believe that the most likely way terrorists will obtain a nuclear bomb will not be to steal
or purchase a fully operational device but to buy fissile material and construct their own. In South
Asia, every state has applied its own classified security measures for nuclear weapons security. In
Pakistan, a nuclear weapons security regime involves human, physical and technical means.
However, there is a general perception that, notwithstanding these technical measures, there
is a danger that nuclear materials may possibly get into the hands of terrorist organisations.
The future of illicit trade of nuclear materials in South Asia by non-state actors and terrorists
may further jeopardise the security of the region. The problem of this trade appears to be
growing worse as technologies proliferate. With the global spread of technologies and rapid
illegal sale of uranium and plutonium, traffickers could find it easier to ply their dangerous
trade. Generally speaking, the absence of available reports in official data does not negate the
fact the terrorist and extremist organisations interact in the smuggling of nuclear materials.
India and Pakistan understand the sensitivity of the protection of these weapons. By analysing the
threat of chemical and bioterrorism in South Asia, I do not want to exaggerate or distort facts. This
analysis is a warning to Pakistan and India that as ISIS has arrived in the region and the TTP and
Mujahideen-e-Hind have announced their allegiance to the terrorist groups, there must be
concordance over responding to this violent threat.
Yes Pakistani Nukes
ISIS can get Pakistani nukes—empirically leaks info and ISIS has monetary
capability
Farhan 14- graduate of Kabul University and holds a Master degree from Japan in Public Policy
and Economics, Afghan analyst and commentator on political and socioeconomic affairs in
Afghanistan (Ahmad Hasib, “The World Must Prevent ISIS from Obtaining Pakistani Nukes”,
Khaama Press, 11/20/14, http://www.khaama.com/the-world-must-prevent-isis-from-obtainingpakistani-nukes-8782)//WK
The global leaders certainly understand that the extreme threat to global security is the risk
that terrorists could get a hold of nuclear weapons and start new terrorism. Although world
leaders especially Americans hold several international conferences on addressing this
immediate and extreme threat, there is no guarantee that terrorist organization such as ISIS
won't acquire nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda struggled for several years to obtain nuclear and
chemical weapons but they failed. However, ISIS is much stronger than Al-Qaeda and was
able to hold some sort of chemical weapons in Iraq which they used against the Kurds. In the
16 years since Pakistan emerged as an active nuclear weapons state in 1998, there has been no reliable
report of a terrorist seizure of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the risk that terrorists
could acquire new weapons in Pakistan cannot be ignored. Among all the new clear stats
Pakistan is the only country that leaked and transferred nuclear technology to the countries
that are still under UN and US sanctions. It is also the only nuclear state that shelters and
protect terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, Haqani Network and many
others. The Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, leaked nuclear secrets to North
Korea, Libya and Iran. Abdul Qadeer Khan not only accepted the full responsibility for
transferring sensitive technology to mentioned stats but he also revealed in 2004, that the former
military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf was involved neck-deep in nuclear proliferation.
However, after that incident Pakistan enhanced protection of its nuclear weapons, but still ISIS will
strive for acquiring nuclear weapons in Pakistan. This means even if ISIS don't fight for it,
there are elements in Pakistan that may sell either nuclear technology or nuclear weapons to
ISIS. If ISIS obtains nuclear weapons in Pakistan a new chapter of terrorism will emerge, and ISIS
will turn into an invincible force. This time the world will have to deal with nuclear terrorism in
Pakistan which will be fueled by drug money from Afghanistan and oil money from Iraq. It
will certainly have severe consequence not only for Pakistan but for the region and international
community. It is important for world leaders to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons and make sure
ISIS never gets hold of them. This bears considerable weight on the United States because America
is a pioneer of the nuclear technology, and a close ally of Pakistan. Moreover, the US is a prime
target of terrorism from Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
ISIS has desire to steal nukes and strike US—public statements prove
Saul 5/23- online correspondent for the Independent specializing in Middle Eastern issues,
internally cites Dabiq, ISIS’ propaganda magazine (Heather, “Isis claims it could buy its first nuclear
weapon from Pakistan within a year”, The Independent, 5/23/15,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-claims-it-could-buy-its-first-nuclearweapon-from-pakistan-within-12-months-10270525.html)//WK
Isis has used the latest issue of its propaganda magazine Dabiq to suggest the group is
expanding so rapidly it could buy its first nuclear weapon within a year. The hyperbolic
article, which the group attributes to the British hostage John Cantlie, claims Isis has transcended
its roots as “the most explosive Islamic ‘group’ in the modern world” to evolve into “the
most explosive Islamic movement the modern world has ever seen” in less than twelve months.
Photojournalist Cantlie is regularly used in the terror group’s propaganda and has appeared in a
number of videos, including a YouTube series called "Lend Me Your Ears". He has been held a
hostage by Isis for more than two years. John Cantlie has now been held captive for more two years
by Isis militants John Cantlie has now been held captive for more two years by Isis militants The
piece, entitled "The Perfect Storm", describes militant Islamist groups such as Boko Haram,
which recently pledged allegiance to Isis, uniting across the Middle East, Africa and Asia to
create one global movement. The article claims this alignment of groups has happened at the same
time as Isis militants have seized “tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, anti-aircraft
systems,” from the US and Iran before turning to the subject of more extreme weapons the group
is not in possession of - such as nuclear weapons. “Let me throw a hypothetical operation onto the
table,” the article continues. “The Islamic State has billions of dollars in the bank, so they call
on their wilāyah in Pakistan to purchase a nuclear device through weapons dealers with links
to corrupt officials in the region." It admits that such a scenario is “far-fetched” but warns: “It’s
the sum of all fears for Western intelligence agencies and it’s infinitely more possible today
than it was just one year ago. "And if not a nuke, what about a few thousand tons of
ammonium nitrate explosive? That’s easy enough to make." An attack launched by Isis against
America would ridicule "the attacks of the past". "They’ll [Isis] be looking to do something big,
something that would make any past operation look like a squirrel shoot, and the more
groups that pledge allegiance the more possible it becomes to pull off something truly epic.
“Remember, all of this has happened in less than a year. How more dangerous will be the
lines of communication and supply a year on from today?” The capacity of Isis to acquire such a
device is certainly beyond the group at the moment. But Isis is indeed a well funded group
having secured a number of oilfields in Syria and Iraq. The group also sells artefacts looted from
historic areas seized during its insurgency, sometimes for six figure sums, as well as imposing taxes
on civilians trapped in its self-declared caliphate and other methods of extortion. The finances of
the group have been estimated by some to be in the $2billion area, though it is impossible to
verify how much money it actually has access to. The threats come against a mixed backdrop of
successes and losses in both countries; the group has been driven out of Tikrit in Iraq but has
overrun Ramaldi and the Syrian ancient city of Palmyra. A recent call to arms from its leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi also appeared to suggest it may be overstretched in some areas, with his speech
urging supporters from across the world to travel to its territories in the Middle East. In September
last year, the Home Secretary, Theresa May, warned that the militant group could become the
world's first "truly terrorist state". “We will see the risk, often prophesied but thank God not yet
fulfilled, that with the capability of a state behind them, the terrorists will acquire chemical, biological
or even nuclear weapons to attack us," she said.
Jabhat Al Nusra (Syria)
Goal/Ideology
FYI – JN’s influence and goals
Cafarella 14
/December 2014, Jennifer Cafarella is the Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of
War, where she focuses on Syria, the Syrian civil war and opposition groups, as well as the activities
of ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria, pg. 12, pdf, spark/
Note: JN = Jabhat al-Nusra
As an official AQ affiliate, JN activity in Syria is closely linked to global AQ objectives. JN views
its war in Syria as the direct extension of a broader jihad against the West as envisioned
by Osama bin Laden and represented by the global AQ movement. JN leader Abu
Mohammed al-Joulani refers to this lineage in public statements, and JN social media propaganda
occasionally reinforces this imagery.5 As it crafts its engagement in Syria, JN draws inspiration from al-Qaeda’s
intellectual foundation, especially from influential Jihadi theorist Abu Musab al-Suri. Al-Suri laid the
groundwork for a nuanced campaign that prioritizes popular support above all other
objectives .6 JN has implemented this methodology with care in Syria, and its success
represents a dangerous advance for AQ as a whole. Like the rest of the global Salafi-Jihadist movement, JN
envisions as its end-state an Islamic Caliphate that encompasses, at the very least, the broader Muslim world. “ We don’t have a
Caliphate, even though we are working toward this goal ,” stated Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir, a senior
member of JN’s Shari‘a Committee, in an interview on April 12, 2014.7 This Caliphate will reverse what Salafi-Jihadists view as the
decline of the Muslim community, challenging an “anti-Islamic alliance” of “‘Crusaders,’ ‘Zionists,’ and ‘apostates.’”8 Jihadi
scholars consider this goal so important that fighting to establish this Caliphate becomes
a duty incumbent upon every Muslim. This Caliphate, however, is a long-term goal for
the AQ organization as a whole.9 In the intermediate term, JN is pursuing a regional Islamic Emirate in Syria – a
localized state that will later be part of a larger Caliphate – as a component effort of the global AQ campaign that complements similar
JN is influenced by a trend within the global jihadist movement that
pursues a gradualist methodology during the intermediate stages of jihad. Ayman al-Zawahiri,
efforts by other affiliates.10
bin Laden’s successor, long favored this paradigm for the conduct of a paced, global insurgency. This paradigm prioritizes the support
of local populations over opportunities for direct control, in order to set the conditions for the Muslim community to embrace an
Islamic State in the long-term.
Threat
al-Nusra = a threat – attraction to foreign fighters
Cafarella 14
/December 2014, Jennifer Cafarella is the Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of
War, where she focuses on Syria, the Syrian civil war and opposition groups, as well as the activities
of ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria, pg. 11, pdf, spark/
Note: JN = Jabhat al-Nusra
JN is more subtle and insidious than ISIS, and is therefore more difficult to contain or
defeat . While ISIS pursues direct, overt, and top-down control, JN leverages an elite
military force to win allies among the Syrian armed opposition and to sponsor locally
tailored governance in ungoverned areas of Syria. JN has benefitted from the lack of effective Western
intervention in Syria. It has further benefitted from the radicalization of the Syrian opposition after September 2013, when the
JN has a flow of foreign
fighters and contributes asymmetric “special forces” capabilities to opposition forces,
securing prominent victories for rebel campaigns through its contributions to wider
military efforts . The significance of this contribution increased in late 2013 and throughout 2014, as a lack of international
engagement in Syria increased the relative importance of JN’s contribution to the fighting. As such, JN’s military
campaign has earned it significant leverage with other rebel groups . At the end of 2014, the rise
of ISIS changed the Syrian wartime environment and forced meaningful shifts in JN’s
disposition in Syria. These shifts, over time, may begin to impact its network of rebel allies. However, JN’s success in
establishing influence within rebel ranks has kept JN from losing popular support in the
shortterm, despite an increasingly aggressive stance. It is therefore unlikely that JN’s
embedded position within rebel ranks will unravel without additional outside pressure.
decision by the U.S. not to intervene in Syria demoralized large segments of the opposition.
al-Nusra is bound to be more dangerous than Al-Qaeda and ISIS – victories,
gaining control, nuanced military strategies/capacities, competition
Cafarella 14
/December 2014, Jennifer Cafarella is the Evans Hanson Fellow at the Institute for the Study of
War, where she focuses on Syria, the Syrian civil war and opposition groups, as well as the activities
of ISIS, Jabhat Al-Nusra in Syria, pg. 8-9, pdf, spark/
Note: JN = Jabhat al-Nusra
ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) is not the only Salafi-Jihadist threat emanating from Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), alQaeda’s (AQ) affiliate in Syria, has also developed into a serious and expanding threat both to the
West and to the future of Syria. JN is not less dangerous than ISIS . Rather, JN shares alQaeda’s aims and is working to achieve them. JN is gaining control of terrain in Syria
even as U.S. forces target ISIS with airstrikes . JN is a threat to American national security in three ways.
First, JN is a successful al-Qaeda affiliate whose victories support the overall mission of
the global terror organization including the establishment of a caliphate. Second, JN actively
facilitates the Khorasan group, which is developing imminent plots on behalf of al-Qaeda
to attack the West from safe havens in Syria. Lastly, JN’s success in embedding itself within
the Syrian opposition threatens the U.S. mission to field a counter-ISIS force in Syria that
is not influenced by AQ or vulnerable to its aggression. JN is pursuing an Islamic emirate in Syria as a
component of a future al-Qaeda caliphate. The differences between JN and ISIS are not in objective, but rather in methodology. JN
follows a more gradualist approach to state-building than that of ISIS.
JN adheres to AQ leader Ayman alZawahiri’s methodology, which prioritizes social outreach and proselytization over direct
conquest of terrain and the immediate declaration of a state. JN does so as a part of its
long-term strategy to gain popular acceptance. This strategy seeks to avoid popular
backlash , characteristic of the Awakening movements that undermined the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006-2007. JN’s approach is
increasing its traction with the Syrian population. JN is engaged in a nuanced and carefully formulated
state-building effort in Syria that is targeted to secure the long-term establishment of
Shari‘a law in a post-Assad state . If allowed to continue, JN is likely to succeed in developing a proto-state in Syria’s
rebel-held spaces that is responsive to al-Qaeda. JN brings important military capabilities to the fight
against Bashar al-Assad. JN’s unequivocal commitment to fighting the Assad regime
attracts rebel groups that do not necessarily share its vision for the future of Syria as an
al-Qaeda emirate. JN’s strategy of working through networks of partnered or affiliated rebel groups obscures the true extent
of its activities in Syria and its aggregate level of influence throughout rebel ranks. JN serves as a force multiplier for other rebel
groups. JN leverages small units of highly skilled fighters to contribute an essential special forces-like capability to rebel military
offensives. JN
provides highly effective capabilities such as the deployment of suicide
bombers to produce asymmetric effects against the regime. JN’s military operations are
targeted to produce influence within rebel ranks. JN complements this influence with a
nonlethal campaign for local support within rebel-held Syria. JN leverages both lethal and
non-lethal approaches to influence Syria’s armed opposition in ways that may translate into long-term
power within rebel-led governance structures. These structures are at risk of becoming responsive to JN, and therefore AQ Not all
rebels are radicalized, nor are they all pro-JN in practice. There
are tiers of pro-JN rebel relationships, and
some of these relationships are transactional. Therefore, there is a moderate opposition in
Syria that can be split from JN if conditions are properly set. While a moderate opposition exists within
Syria, its continued reliance on JN as a partner against Assad will degrade the possible mechanisms whereby those rebels can reject
JN’s influence in the long-term. The United States has months, not years, to begin counterbalancing JN’s leverage. In order to deny alQaeda safe-haven in Syria, the
United States must neutralize JN’s campaign to influence the
population. This requires engagement with opposition forces, not simply airstrikes against JN. A strategy limited to targeted
airstrikes to disrupt ISIS and the Khorasan Group will not achieve this goal. The U.S. must actually adopt an anti-Assad strategy in
order to prevent JN from subsuming the moderate opposition. Opposition to Assad drives the recruitment and radicalization of
jihadists. JN is ostensibly committed to fighting the regime, making them more attractive than both ISIS and the U.S. Furthermore,
JN is capitalizing on a feeling of betrayal and resentment from the Syrian population
toward the international military coalition against ISIS to penetrate more deeply into
rebel ranks and the fabric of Syrian society. It is still possible for the United States and the
West to contest control of institutions and split JN from the population and moderate
opposition. If the U.S. makes it easier for the opposition to defeat the Syrian regime by bringing more asymmetric capabilities to
the battlefield, most rebel groups are likely to follow along with the U.S. rather than preferring JN or fighting on its behalf. JN is an
insurgency competing for popular support and winning it. JN must be separated from the population. It will be necessary for to
compete for the trust and allegiance of the Syrian population and its moderate rebels in order to secure U.S. interests in the region,
JN can become more dangerous
over time. Al-Qaeda and ISIS are in a competition for leadership of the global, violent
jihad. Its foreign fighter networks into Syria are robust. JN can further support the development of plots
against the West and the U.S. homeland in order to prove al-Qaeda’s capacities and
relevance. In the longer term, JN would also become more dangerous if it reconciled with
ISIS, even at the unit level rather than the leadership level. JN leaders are pursuing such
negotiations under the guidance of AQ leader Zawahiri . The combined military power of
JN and ISIS would constitute a large and lethal force.
defeat ISIS, and mitigate the threat to the U.S homeland posed by AQ in Syria.
al-Nusra = a threat – strong push into multiple regions and strong military
organizations – the media’s overly obsessive focus on ISIS put al-Nusra under
the radar
Habeck 14
/10 September 2014, Mary Habeck is a Senior Fellow with the Foreign Policy Research Institute
(FPRI) and a Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), The Spread of al-Nusra Front
and the Continuing Threat from Al-Qaeda, http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/entry/248the-spread-of-jabhat-al-nusra-and-the-continuing-threat-from-al-qaeda, spark/
While most American attention has been on the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS),
previously known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), another danger has been building over the
past few months. Since early July, al-Qaeda’s (AQ) affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) or al-Nusra
Front, has been quietly on the move . Al-Nusra Front once had a close relationship with
IS, but al-Nusra Front engaged in a very public dispute with IS—then ISIS —just over a year
ago, leading to a split between the two groups and eventually to AQ and IS disavowing
each other earlier this year. Since then, the IS has made rapid advances in both Iraq and Syria, apparently overshadowing
al-Nusra Front as a jihadist group. In addition, there have been reports that al-Nusra Front is suffering
from internal difficulties, suggesting that the group was in disarray or even near collapse. A closer look at
events in the region suggests something quite different. Over the past few weeks, al-Nusra Front
has seized strategic territory in Syria, including parts of Homs and Hama governorates;
expanded its range of attacks into Lebanon; seized a border crossing in the Golan Heights and taken prisoners from the UN forces
stationed there; and there are hints that the group has bigger targets in mind, perhaps in Europe or even beyond. All
these
events paint a picture of an AQ affiliate on the march, one that has been laying the
groundwork for a conquest that might prove just as widespread and durable as the
“Caliphate” declared by IS. The recent territorial gains by al-Nusra Front in Syria have
been impressive and show that it is premature to write off AQ as a continuing threat to
the region . The recent territorial gains by al-Nusra Front in Syria have been impressive and show that it is premature to write off
AQ as a continuing threat to the region. At the very same time that IS has been making great gains in northern Syria, the rural Homs
headquarters of IS was handed over to al-Nusra Front, according to one report, on the orders of the head of IS, Abu Bakr alBaghdadi, himself. Al-Nusra
Front then proceeded to carry out a large offensive around the city
of Hama, leading to the capture of several villages and the siege of the important town of
Maharda. Within the last week, the group has succeeded in seizing a series of government
military checkpoints near Hama, with the objective of taking the airport in Hama. From the
direction and nature of this offensive, it seems likely that al-Nusra Front is attempting to cut off Damascus from the traditional
Alawite strongholds on the Syrian coast. The strategic nature of al-Nusra Front’s military advances is also evident in the group’s
seizure, in cooperation with other extremists, of a key city in the Golan Heights, putting the AQ affiliate in control of nearly the entire
disputed border between Israel and Syria. In addition to aiding in the encirclement of Damascus, the
seizure of Qunaytra,
a vital border-crossing, will allow al-Nusra Front to carry out attacks into Israeli territory.
During the initial assault, the group captured a group of UN peacekeepers and has made a series
of bold demands for their freedom, including the release of top AQ-linked leader Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the removal
of al-Nusra Front from the UN list of terrorist organizations. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) workers
detained by al-Nusra Front In early August, al-Nusra
Front spread its attacks beyond Syria’s borders for
the first time, hinting at the possibility of a more regional agenda rather than a purely
local battle with Assad. The attack, which was originally thought to be a raid to free a captured rebel commander, led to
several days of widespread fighting with the Lebanese army and the kidnapping of a number of Lebanese soldiers. Some observers
believe that the raid was actually an attempt to seize the border town of Arsal, while al-Nusra Front has put forward demands for the
release of their hostages that seem to be attempts to affect the participation of Lebanese Shi’a (including Hezbollah) in the Syrian civil
war. If this were not worrisome enough, there have been indications that the group might have global ambitions as well. In early July,
there were reports that the top bomb maker for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), a man named Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, was working with al-Nusra Front
to train foreign fighters to target their home countries. The operational cooperation
between two different AQ affiliates is troubling , but the focus of the threat—i.e. U.S-bound planes—is even
more so. If most countries have been focusing primarily on the threat posed by the IS, it seems from these reports that
we must also take very seriously indeed the possibility of a terrorist attack emanating
from al-Nusra Front as well. Each of these developments are concerning on their own, but taken together, they present a
picture of an AQ affiliate that is advancing militarily and beginning to reach across borders as Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghrib (AQIM), and other AQ affiliates have done in the past. They also suggest that the competition between al-Qeada and IS is
not a zero sum game, nor has it been aimed primarily at each other. Rather, both organizations might be radicalizing fresh recruits
rather than stealing from each other, taking territory primarily at the expense of local regimes (i.e. in Syria and Iraq), while
While the threat from the Nusra Front has
been overshadowed by the atrocities committed by the IS, the IS declaration of the
Caliphate, and the rapid gains made by that organization in both Syria and Iraq, we
ignore the growing strength of the lower-key al-Nusra Front to our own peril .
independently planning on carrying out terrorist attacks abroad.
Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia)
High Risk of Maritime Terror
High risk of attacks on Strait of Malacca—lack of effective security protocols
Raj 14- Southeast Asia Regional Director for the International Association for Counterterrorism
and Security Professional-Centre for Security Studies (Andrin, “Jemaah Islamiyah Still a Real Threat”,
fz.com, 2/15/14, http://www.fz.com/content/jemaah-islamiyah-still-realthreat#ixzz3eUGYiWqR)//WK
JEMAAH Islamiyah (JI) still poses a real threat to Indonesia and the region. The religious
militant group, although has been crippled significantly after the 911 attacks, remains Indonesia’s
major security threat today. JI also remains a regional threat to the Southeast Asia region as
it commands a force structure within the four Mantiqis it helped to set up in Southeast Asia.
JI has close and direct links with Al Qaeda since its inception by Abu Bakar Bashir, JI’s head and
religious cleric. The relationship between JI and Al Qaeda remains a close knit relationship till
today, as Abu Bakar Bashir was a close ally of Osama Bin Laden. His support came from Osama Bin
Laden who assisted JI in training and funding for its operational capabilities and its force structure.
My recent visit to Indonesia was significant to this article as it has supported my theory of this threat.
The Indonesian government has also been complacent in its operations to counter terrorism
and religious militancy due to the fact that a major attack has not taken place after the Bali bombings.
The Indonesian authorities also are divided with issues pertaining to religion and what
constitutes religious extremism and militancy. Political agendas in Indonesia also play a key role
in addressing these sentiments. Power struggle and corruption within the government add to
the political discourse of Indonesia. These issues also propagate religious extremism and create a
platform for religious militancy to evolve providing the given scenarios. My trip en route to Bali
indicates that the security forces on the island are not able to address a foreseen “terrorist”
attack judging from the local authorities’ capabilities on the ground. The fact that a major attack
has not taken place provides the belief that Bali is safe and that an “attack” is not comprehensible at
this time! Is it so? Although Indonesia has significantly been able to monitor and curtail the threat (to
a major extent), it is the support that the Australian authorities have provided that has enabled the
Indonesian authorities to establish a secured parameter around the island of Bali. Besides the
Australians, there is also the support of the Americans involved in training the counter terrorism task
forces of Indonesia, Detachment 88. Detachment 88 of the special task force in countering terrorism
has over the years been groomed as one of Indonesia’s best Special Forces in addressing terrorism,
and by my views, considered a reliable and capable unit in addressing the threats of terrorism. The
trainings provided by the two governments have significantly propelled Detachment 88 to a more
efficient and capable unit. The Australian authorities have played a key role in assisting the
Indonesian authorities after the Bali attacks which saw a large number of Australian tourists killed in
the attack. Australia has provided technology to monitor the threats of terrorism and maritime
threats with satellite monitoring capabilities as well as coastal monitoring equipments to assist in
securing the threats of terrorism. Within the island of Bali, the population of Balinese is now being
overtaken slowly by migrants from the Java Island who are predominantly Muslims. The migrant
influx is due to the thriving tourist economy that has created more jobs within the islands of
Indonesia. This has also provided a platform for terrorist, religious and extremist groups infiltrating
the economy. From sources provided, the locals are aware of the steady migrants of the Javanese
immigrants who are basically moving in owing to the economic opportunities being provided.
Concerns are also growing that a steady flow of JI and extremist groups are also infiltrating
the system. Sources claim that there are a number of JI “sleeping cells” within the Bali
Island and this to me is alarming. Local sources also indicate that financing of “religious
extremism” is still evident in Indonesia coming from the Middle East. Tourist spots such as
Ubud and Kuta township districts are thriving with tourists from all over the world. How safe are
they today in comparison to the Bali attacks? My visits to these places saw tourists of all walks of life
enjoying the beautiful settings of these small townships and the atmosphere was very calm and
peaceful. But as I was saying earlier, the local authorities are not prepared for an immediate disaster.
This is not only of a terrorist attack but in all senses of “security”. The laid back attitude of
the local authorities is seen to some extent, but nevertheless, it just could be their way of doing
things. How well trained are the local police and authorities in curtailing some of these security
threats? With the possible threat looming within the island of Bali, how are the maritime security
parameters being protected? The threat of maritime terrorist attack in the Straits of Malacca
uncovered by US troops in Afghanistan in an Al Qaeda video and JI’s manuscripts by Singapore
intelligence in the region clearly indicate the plans of JI in the maritime domain. Is JI able to
mount a maritime attack on the island’s port areas? From my views, yes! Two vessels at a
nearby berthing pier near the Candidasa township district on the eastern part of Bali saw a Liquid
Petrol Gas (LPG) tanker and a cargo tanker stay afloat either awaiting for new shipment or simply
berthing there under Indonesia’s flag. The security parameter did not seem too convincing. The
parameter was open to small boats which could easily move into close proximity of the
vessels. Even though the tankers could be empty, simply the security protocols were not evident.
Terrorist groups could easily plant explosive devices under and around the tanker without
being noticed or simply by hijacking the vessel. The threat of a maritime terrorist attack may not
be imminent for now but this sort of security protocols give leeways for easy targeting. A
maritime attack could be devastating to Bali’s coastal waters. JI is still relevant and its links
to Al Qaeda and the terrorist groups in the region is evermore a concern. The threats of
maritime terrorism using piracy as a means to achieve its goals are tightly linked together.
Maritime terrorism as a transnational threat is also evident and the reality seems to be very
prospective for all groups in terms of the monetary gains it offers. The Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG) and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) are some groups with these capabilities. The current
threat scenario should be assessed with stringent risk management associated with the maritime
domain. The influx of migrants into Bali should also be a serious security risk factor to be assessed
by the local authorities to weed out JI operatives and religious militancy within the island. If JI
operatives and religious extremists are seen to be moving into the island, a possible threat scenario is
imminent. Proactive measures should be in place immediately before the island is influenced
by extremism and terrorism. This eventually will be harder to curtail within the island if left
untreated.
Strait of Malacca Good – Global Trade
Malacca attack shuts down global trade
Banlaoi 5- Professor PolSci National Defense College of the Philippines (Rommel, Autumn,
“Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia The Abu Sayyaf Threat” Naval War College Review, Vol 58
No 4)
The growth of commercial shipping in Southeast Asia makes the challenge of piracy and
maritime terrorism in the region alarming. Since 1999 the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordinating Center has forecast that world
commercial shipping will increase enormously by 2020 and that this will trigger the
proliferation of transnational crime and terrorism at sea. 8 It has also forecast that growth in the cruise-line industry and the
emergence of high-speed ferries will be key developments in the maritime passenger transport business through 2020. 9 Shipping has long been the
major form of transport connecting Southeast Asia to the rest of the world. 10 Four of the world’s busiest
shipping routes are in Southeast Asia: the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar straits. 11 Every year more than 50 percent of the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage transits these
The
Malacca Strait alone carries more than a quarter of the world’s maritime trade each year—more
straits, and more than 15 percent of the value of world trade passes through Southeast Asia. 12 These figures are projected to grow unless major disasters occur in the region.
than fifty thousand large ships pass, including forty to fifty tankers. 13 Because the strait is the maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, it will remain a world
were
terrorists to hijack one and turn it to a floating bomb to destroy ports or oil refineries, the
effect would be catastrophic. Such an attack incident would not only cripple world trade and
slow down international shipping but spread fear—more broadly than on 9/11. The prospect
of such a maritime incident is not remote. Container shipping is highly vulnerable, and the possibility of its use as a weapon of mass destruction
has been documented. 15 Thus, maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia must prudently be considered no
longer a question of if, but rather of when and where. 16 One maritime security analyst goes farther—that maritime terrorism in
center of maritime activity. It has been argued that it would be difficult for terrorists to disrupt shipping in the strait by sinking a ship in a precise spot. 14 However,
Southeast Asia is not even a question of when but of how often and what we are going to do about it. 17 Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia is all the more serious a regional security
Al-Qa‘ida knows the
impact of maritime terrorist attacks on shipping and has therefore planned to carry out acts
of maritime terrorism. 19
concern because al-Qa‘ida and its operatives have a keen awareness of maritime trade and understand its significance to the global economy. 18
Psychological impact of Southeast Asia maritime terrorism kills trade
Raymond 5- Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (Catherine, March, “Maritime Terrorism
in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment”)
Potential Consequences of a Maritime Terrorist Attack Terrorist attacks are by definition very difficult to predict and the scale of any such attack will vary considerably from case to case.
the economic impact is likely to be much
greater. However, it is almost impossible to calculate accurately the exact impact of an attack. This is due in part to the fact that like most economic
activity, trade is very susceptible to unquantifiable psychological factors. Trade and
commerce cannot flourish where there is no confidence in the security environment within
which it must operate. A good example of this is the attack on the Limburg, which although
was only an attack on a single vessel, had a profound economic impact on the Yemeni
maritime industry. Immediately following the attack, underwriters tripled insurance premiums for vessels calling on Yemeni ports. These premiums
led some lines to cut Yemen from their schedules and or switch to ports in neighbouring
counties. Yemeni terminals saw throughput plummet. Local sources claim as many as 3000 people lost their employment and government estimated losses stemming from the
attack are USD 15 million per month.7" The Southeast Asian shipping industries are already suffering from the
sharp rise in piracy in the late 1990s. Thus, a terrorist attack in the Strait of Malacca would
considerably add to the already existing perception that the region is insecure. If a maritime terrorist attack
caused the closure of the Sunda and Lonibok Straits, ships would be forced to reroute around the Indonesian
archipelago. This would raise freight rates, putting severe pressure on the economies of
regional and extra-regional countries. So too would an attack on one of the region's major ports. Manufacturers could face increased warehousing
While the human costs are likely to be low unless the attack is carried out against a ferry or cruise ship,
costs due to the backlog of exports if a port was closed for several days.
Strait of Malacca Good – Global Economy
JI attack on Malacca literally halt global commerce
Richardson 4- Senior Fellow Institute of South East Asian Studies (Michael, “A Time Bomb for
Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
http://www.southchinasea.org/docs/Richardson,%20Time%20Bomb%20for%20Global%20TradeISEAS.pdf)
Impact on Global Trade The use of either a nuclear or radiological bomb in a major port-city would cut
the arteries of commercial container cargo shipping if it was known or suspected that the
device had been shipped in. It would bring much of the world’s trade to a halt and severely
damage the global economy, as governments in the affected country and economies that did
extensive seaborne trade with it scrambled to put in place security measures to better protect
their people, cities and economies. Such measures would be drastic and include: … lengthy cargo inspections in receiving as well as originating ports,
…or even the complete closure of ports for an indefinite period, while extra checks and safeguards were put in place to allay public anxiety. One of the first things
the US government did after the terrorist attacks in September, 2001, was to shut US airspace
and ground all civilian flights for four days – a security measure to protect the American public that had severe repercussions on aviation,
travel, tourism and business around the world, including in Asia, as hundreds of scheduled flights had to be cancelled or diverted. It also closed US ports for two days. (Speech 1
December 2003 by Frits Bolkestein, European Commission official in charge of the Internal Market, Taxation and Customs of the European Union, to Freight Forwarders; Reuters
report in Business Times of Singapore shipping section 12 December, 2003, “Terror attack is worst nightmare for US ports; Speech by Jack Short, Secretary General of the European
Conference of Ministers of Transport, to the Irish Exporters Association in Dublin, Ireland, on 21 March, 2003.) Are sea container shipping and its land links in the global supply chain
vulnerable to a major terrorist attack? Many officials in the US, Asia and Europe believe so. Here are some samples: The US Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert
Bonner: “The system is vulnerable to exploitation by international terrorist organisations. A cargo container loaded up with any kind of nuclear or radiological weapon would have a
potentially catastrophic effect, not only in loss of life but to the US economy and the economies of every trading nation in the world. While the threat is hopefully small, the effects could
be so great that anybody in my position would have to be concerned.” (International Herald Tribune 23 September 2003, Q&A interview with US Customs Commissioner Robert
One major challenge to the marine
industry is global global terrorism. The 9/11 attacks, and subsequently the discovery of the
Jemaah Islamiyah group in Singapore, showed that terrorism is a problem of global scale.
Terrorists are operating through international networks. There is growing concern that their next attack may be via ships
and shipping containers. This would not only inflict heavy casualties and damage to
property, but also disrupt the wheels of international commerce. This can potentially cripple
international trade…” (Speech by Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 10 August 2002, at the Jurong Shipyard Pte Ltd National Day Observance
Ceremony.) Frits Bolkestein, European Commission member in charge of the EU’s Internal Market, Taxation and Customs: “ The massive flow of
containers around the world makes global maritime transport an essential part of the world
economy and makes it almost impossible to picture the disastrous consequences which a
terrorist attack would have on global freight supply systems. Borders would be closed; ships
might not be allowed to enter ports. There would be a complete disruption of the global
supply chain with enormous consequences for the global economy.” (Speech 1 December 2003 by Frits Bolkestein,
Bonner on “Screening cargo for terror shipments.”) Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong: “
European Commission official in charge of the Internal Market, Taxation and Customs of the European Union, to Freight Forwarders.)
Strait of Malacca Good – China Economy
Malacca terrorist attacks collapses Chinese economy – they backlash to any
foreign attempt to secure the Strait
Storey 6- Fellow Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Ian, April 12, “China’s “Malacca Dilemma””
Jamestown Foundation China Brief, Vol 6 Issue 8)
Energy security, and particularly oil supply security, has become a major concern for the
Chinese government over the past several years. The focus of this anxiety is the vulnerability of
seaborne energy imports. At present, China lacks the naval power necessary to protect its sea
lanes of communication (SLOCs). Beijing fears that during a national security crisis ships
carrying energy resources could be interdicted by hostile naval forces. Any disruption to the
free flow of energy resources into China could derail the economic growth on which the
Chinese government depends to shore-up its legitimacy and pursue its great power
ambitions.
China’s heavy use of the Malacca and Lombok/Makassar straits in Southeast Asia is
emblematic of this concern. The Malacca Strait is a narrow and congested waterway
separating Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern tip. As the shortest
route between the Indian and Pacific oceans, the strait is one of the world’s most important
waterways. More than 60,000 vessels transit the strait each year, carrying 25 percent of global
trade. The Lombok/Makassar Strait passes through the Indonesian archipelago and is used mainly
by Very Large Crude Carriers. In terms of volume of oil shipped, this route is of near equivalent
importance to the better known Malacca Strait.
For China, the strategic significance of these straits increases every year. At present,
approximately 60 percent of China’s crude oil imports originate in the Middle East, and this
figure is expected to rise to 75 percent by 2015. Oil from the Persian Gulf and Africa is shipped to
the PRC via the Malacca or Lombok/Makkasar straits. Over the past few years Chinese leaders
have come to view the straits, especially the Malacca Strait, as a strategic vulnerability. In
November 2003 President Hu Jintao declared that “certain major powers” were bent on controlling
the strait, and called for the adoption of new strategies to mitigate the perceived vulnerability.
Thereafter, the Chinese press devoted considerable attention to the country’s “Malacca dilemma,”
leading one newspaper to declare: “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of
Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China” (China Youth Daily, June
15, 2004).
Over the past 18 months the Malacca Strait has attracted the attention of security analysts for reasons
other than China’s oil supply security. During 2003-2004 the straits witnessed an upsurge in
pirate attacks. Perceived lax security in the strait engendered concerns that transnational
terrorist groups might link up with pirates to disrupt maritime traffic and hence global
commerce. International criticism led the littoral states (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) to stepup strait security through the establishment of coordinated air and naval patrols. As a result of these
and other initiatives, the number of pirate attacks in the area declined in 2005. Yet piracy and other
transnational threats in the strait remain major concerns. Due to sensitivities over sovereignty,
Indonesia and Malaysia have firmly rejected the idea of external powers such as the U.S.,
Japan or India permanently stationing military forces in the strait. They have welcomed help
from external powers, however, in the form of capacity building, intelligence exchanges, and training.
As a heavy user of the Malacca Strait, the PRC has a vested interest in the elimination of
transnational threats in the waterway. Yet Beijing remains uneasy at the prospect of a greater
role for external powers in securing the strait. Chinese security analysts have accused the
U.S. and Japan of using the threat of terrorism as a pretext to expand their naval presence in
and around the strait. The PRC has also watched with concern India’s enhanced presence in
the area, especially the modernization of military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
located near the northern entrance to the Malacca Strait. Some Chinese newspaper commentaries
have bordered on the paranoid. For instance, when the United States restored the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program to Indonesia last year, one Chinese newspaper
accused U.S.-Indonesia military cooperation as “targeting China” and aimed “at controlling China’s
avenue of approach to the Pacific” (Takungpao, March 7, 2005). Nevertheless, China does not want
to be left out and has offered the littoral states its assistance to improve security in the strait. At a
meeting held in Jakarta in September 2005 to discuss strait security, Ju Chengzi, director general of
China’s Ministry of Transportation, said the PRC government was willing to assist the littoral states
with capacity building, technical support, training programs, hydrographic surveys, and navigation
aids (Xinhua, September 7, 2005). More specific details have yet to be released.
China’s economic rise prevents CCP instability and lashout --- decline tubes
the global economy, US primacy, and Sino relations
Mead 9- Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign
Relations (Walter Russell, “Only Makes You Stronger,” The New Republic, 2/4/9,
http://www.tnr.com/story_print.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8)//WK
The greatest danger both to U.S.-China relations and to American power itself is probably not
that China will rise too far, too fast; it is that the current crisis might end China's growth
miracle. In the worst-case scenario, the turmoil in the international economy will plunge China into a major
economic downturn. The Chinese financial system will implode as loans to both state and private
enterprises go bad. Millions or even tens of millions of Chinese will be unemployed in a country
without an effective social safety net . The collapse of asset bubbles in the stock and property markets
will wipe out the savings of a generation of the Chinese middle class. The political
consequences could include dangerous unrest--and a bitter climate of anti-foreign feeling that
blames others for China's woes. ( Think of Weimar Germany , when both Nazi and communist politicians
blamed the West for Germany's economic travails.) Worse, instability could lead to a vicious cycle , as nervous
investors moved their money out of the country, further slowing growth and, in turn, fomenting evergreater bitterness. Thanks to a generation of rapid economic growth, China has so far been able to
manage the stresses and conflicts of modernization and change; nobody knows what will
happen if the growth stops.
Extinction
Yee and Storey 2- *Professor of Politics and IR @ Hong Kong Baptist University, **Lecturer in
Defence Studies @ Deakin University. (Herbert and Ian, “The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and
Reality,” p. 5)//WK
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the
PRC, resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into
neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative
impact on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of
its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialization and
pollution. These problems
are putting a strain on the central government’s ability to govern
effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of
Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC
would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China’s neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in
another nightmare scenario- nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial
leaders or warlords . From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its
neighbours and the world.
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Kashmir)
Generic
Lashkar-e-Taibi explanation
Stephen Tankel ’11, assistant professor in the School of International Service at American
University (“Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba,” Google Books, lpc)
Lashkar-e-Taiba means Army of the Pure. By the time of the Mumbai attacks, it was one of the most
powerful militant groups in South Asia and boasted transnational networks stretching across several
continents. The group was generally agreed to be Pakistan’s most powerful proxy against India, while
experts debated whether it was also an al-Qaeda affiliate. Lashkar would surely reject the appellation,
but after 9/11 it had become involved in the global jihad against America and its allies. Although it
always had a maximalist agenda for jihad, Lashkar’s priorities and approach were and are heavily
influenced by Pakistan’s rivalry with India. Thus, where al-Qaeda spoke of the ‘Zionist-Crusader
alliance,’ Lashkar’s forces were arrayed against a ‘Hind-Zionist-Crusader alliance.’ The deliberate
targeting of Westerners and Jews during the Mumbai attacks raised questions about the direction of
the organization. Was this evidence that Lashkar was moving deeper into al-Qaeda’s orbit, and
perhaps on a trajectory to displace Osama bin Laden’s network as the next major global jihadi threat?
Or were the attacks simply the group’s latest attempt to harm Pakistan’s rival, India? To understand
the calculus that informed Mumbai and why Lashkar suffered little fallout in Pakistan as a result of
the attacks, it is necessary to situate them and the group within a wider context over the last twenty
years.
Threat
LeT is now targeting countries globally
Mohammad Waqas Sajjad and Jawad Ahmad ’11, *PhD candidate, Theological Union at UC
Berkeley ** Department of Electrical Engineering, HITEC University, Pakistan (9/30, “Lashkar-eTayyiba and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa: the case for a Pakistani narrative,” Strategic Studies, vol. 33,
ProQuest, lpc)
In an age when a plethora of militant groups with misguided justifications for terrorism, different
levels of political involvement and parochial, regional and global presence are competing for space,
sustained spotlight has been hard to attain. In these circumstances, the LeT has done remarkably
well to keep up appearances. It has been unique in having a narrower geographic outlook
and political goals in the garb of Islam limited to South Asia and yet, it is now firmly established
in Western perceptions as a global phenomenon that needs a global solution.9 Needless to say,
the LeT is a prominent and dangerous organization and a subject of much interest when
dealing with terrorism. However, by making it a global player with goals bigger than they are,
Pakistan – and by implication India and the United States – cannot come up with a viable
strategy to deal with yet another Frankenstein‟s monster. Moreover, that gives it legitimacy
among extremists in the West and, ironically, provides it the opportunity and reason to
expand its reach and make global alliances that did not previously exist.
PKK (Turkey)
Threat
Ceasefire between the PKK and Turkish police forces has ended
Aziz Istegaoen ’14, Turkish political reporter (5/28, “Turkish commentary sees Kurdish rebels'
actions threatening peace process,” BBC Monitoring Europe, Lexis Nexis, lpc)
Responding to ongoing work for the construction of a military outpost in the
region, PKK operatives blocked a road leading to Lice district on April 27 and then kidnapped
two senior sergeants. Then, PKK terrorists wounded three civilians while trying to abduct
Mikail Ayik, a member of the Free Cause Party (Huda-Par), in the town of Darakol near
Diyarbakir. They later blocked the Diyarbakir-Bingol road and dug a trench using construction
machinery to prevent vehicles from driving on the road. The road has remained blocked for
almost a week. Earlier this week, PKK terrorists also blocked the Hani-Lice highway and
kidnapped one senior sergeant. People in the region used to be pleased to see that there had
been a ceasefire between the Turkish security forces and PKK terrorists, but are currently
worried about the prospect of a revival of clashes. There are tangible and intangible reasons that
have led the terrorist PKK to increase its unlawful activities. Among the tangible reasons
the PKK's response to the government's increased efforts to construct military outposts in the
Kurdish-dominated east and southeast. The PKK is also disturbed by the recruitment of new
village guards by the Turkish state recently. The terrorist group claims that the state has been
giving arms to civilians - in reference to the village guards - even though a settlement process is
under way. In addition, the PKK is uneasy about ongoing works for the construction of dams in
eastern and southeastern regions. According to the group, the state is building these dams not
because the regions need them but because it wishes to prevent PKK operatives from easily crossing
Turkey's border with northern Iraq, where the terrorist group has military bases. Among the
intangible reasons is the PKK's desire to show its strength. According to some anti-terrorism
experts, the PKK wants to make people see that it is still strong and active even though it is
holding negotiations with the state for the settlement of the Kurdish problem. This tactic is also
a source of motivation for PKK members.
Quds Force (Syria)
Chemical Weapons
Assad regime pursuing chemical weapons – risk and threat high
Wiser 15
/29 June 2015, Daniel Wiser is a staff writer for the Washington Free Beacon. He graduated from
UNC-Chapel Hill in May 2013, where he studied Journalism and Political Science and was the State
& National Editor for The Daily Tar Heel. U.S. Intel Officials Suspect Assad Retained Chemical Weapons,
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-intel-officials-suspect-assad-retained-chemicalweapons, spark/
U.S. intelligence agencies are concerned that the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad might still harbor
some chemical weapons and could use them in an attempt to prevent his ouster, the Wall
Street Journal reports. While Assad was supposed to relinquish all of his chemical weapons as
part of a 2013 deal brokered by the United States and Russia, intelligence officials say
he might have retained small amounts of deadly nerve agents. His regime has also
launched dozens of attacks with chlorine, an industrial chemical that can be lethal
when weaponized . The Journal reports: Last year, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad let international inspectors oversee
the removal of what President Barack Obama called the regime’s most deadly chemical weapons. The deal averted U.S.
airstrikes that would have come in retaliation for an Aug. 21, 2013, sarin-gas attack
that killed more than 1,400 people . Since then, the U.S. officials said, the Assad regime has
developed and deployed a new type of chemical bomb filled with chlorine , which Mr. Assad
could now decide to use on a larger scale in key areas. U.S. officials also suspect the regime may have
squirreled away at least a small reserve of the chemical precursors needed to make
nerve agents sarin or VX. Use of those chemicals would raise greater international
concerns because they are more deadly than chlorine and were supposed to have been
eliminated . The intelligence is “being taken very seriously because he’s getting desperate” and because of doubts within the
U.S. intelligence community that Mr. Assad gave up all of his deadliest chemical weapons, a senior U.S. official said. […] Hamish
de Bretton-Gordon, a former commanding officer of the British army’s chemical-weapons unit, said: “ Even
if the
regime had only one ton of VX left, that would be enough to kill thousands of people .”
The Assad regime now reportedly controls only about one-fourth of Syria amid
victories for the Islamic State, other terrorist groups, and U.S.-backed rebels.
Threat
Quds force is a major part of radical Islamic military strategies
AIPAC 15
/22 April 2015, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, The Iranian Threat, Chapter 4, pg. 5-6, pdf,
spark/
Iran employs its terrorist proxies Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as its Quds Force, in
a bid to spread its radical Islamist ideology. Iran praised Hamas for instigating the 2014 summer conflict
with Israel and has commanded Hezbollah to join the war in Syria, injecting a dangerous sectarian element into a war that has
The Quds Force is heavily involved in bolstering Assad’s
forces in Syria. U.S. officials believe the Quds Force is also helping Hezbollah
smuggle advanced anti-ship missiles from Syria into Lebanon to threaten Israel . Iran
already claimed well over 220,000 lives.
foments unrest throughout the region through the funding and training of Shiite militias. Iran has backed insurgencies in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, aimed at dominating its neighbors, attaining regional primacy and
exporting its Islamic Revolution. Achieving
a nuclear weapons capability would embolden Iran to
escalate its campaign of terrorism, bringing even more conflict to a chaotic region.
Iran, and its terrorist proxies, would use the protection of a nuclear umbrella to shield
themselves from consequences for provocations against the U.S. and its Israeli and
Sunni Arab allies.
Quds force cooperating with hezbollah now – sharing of expertise
Waterman 14
/20 September 2014, Shaun Waterman, Washington Times, Iranian militias ‘pose threat to U.S.’,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/20/iranian-militias-pose-threat-to-us, spark/
Iran’s extremist militias and their proxies were behind a recent string of terrorist
attacks against Israeli diplomatic targets around the globe and might seek to strike the United States,
U.S. counterterrorism officials said Wednesday. “Quds Force, Hezbollah and others have shown they both have the capability and
the willingness to extend beyond that [Middle East] region of the world and likely here into the homeland itself,” Kevin L.
Perkins, associate deputy director of the FBI, told a hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee. “We
look at it as a serious threat,” he added, saying the bureau is “focusing intelligence
analysts and other resources on that on a daily basis to monitor that threat.” Matthew G.
Olsen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said “Iran remains the foremost state-sponsor of
terrorism in the world. We have seen an uptick in operational activity by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Quds Force over the last year or so.” The Quds
Force is the elite division of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
responsible for operations abroad , and Mr. Olsen cited the federal prosecution last year of a foiled Iranian plot
to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. by bombing a Washington restaurant. A senior official of the Quds Force, Gholam
Shakuri, was indicted in October for his involvement in the plot, which actually was an elaborate sting by a Drug Enforcement
Administration informant. He remains at large in Iran. The Treasury Department later sanctioned both the Quds Force and its
commander, Brig. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, for their roles in the plot. Iran has denied the charges. The
Quds Force and
the Lebanese Shiite extremist militia Hezbollah, which the Iranians have used as a
proxy for terrorist attacks in the past, have been “reaching outside of their normal
areas of operation in the Middle East and conducting attacks elsewhere,” said Sen. Joe
Lieberman, Connecticut independent and committee chairman. Quds Force operatives had been involved in anti-Israeli attacks
and plots as far afield as India and Georgia, Mr. Olsen said. Adding to concern about Hezbollah is an article in the Times of
London on Wednesday based on an interview with a major general in the Syrian army who recently defected. Gen. Adnan Sillu
told the paper that the Syrian regime had plans to provide chemical weapons to Hezbollah for use in rocket attacks against Israel.
The regime now has “nothing to lose” in sharing the weapons, he added. “If
and Israel, it will be only good for Syria.”
a war start\s between Hezbollah
Quds destabilizing influence
Scarborough 15
/24 June 2015, Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Iran bullies region, broadens influence outside
Persian Gulf, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/24/iran-bullies-region-broadensinfluence-outside-per/?page=all, spark/
Iran holds a special place in the realm of terrorism. It is one of only three countries — the others are Sudan and Syria — the U.S.
has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. This means the regime and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei actively
approve and support terrorist attacks abroad. The State Department report said that Iran:
Deploys the Quds Force
to “provide cover for intelligence operations and create instability in the Middle
East.” The Quds Force “is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and
supporting terrorists abroad.” Provides financing and training “to support the Assad
regime’s brutal crackdown that has resulted in the deaths of at least 191,000 people in
Syria.” Supports radical Iraqi Shia groups, such as Kataib Hezbollah, that have “exacerbated sectarian tensions in Iraq and
have committed serious human rights abuses against primarily Sunni civilians.” Repeatedly violates United Nations resolutions by
arming Lebanon’s Hezbollah militants. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, who heads the Revolutionary Guard Corps aerospace force,
Deploys the Quds Force to Africa,
Asia and Latin America in a bid to influence political events. Operates a human
pipeline to allow al Qaeda fighters to move west to Syria and east to South Asia.
said, “The IRGC and Hezbollah are a single apparatus jointed together.”
Scarborough 14
/20 September 2014, Rowan Scarborough, Washington Times, Iran’s Quds force aiding Iraqi Shiites with
Obama administration’s blessing, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/20/irans-qudsforce-aiding-iraqi-shiites-with-obamaa/?page=allhttp://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/20/irans-quds-force-aiding-iraqishiites-with-obama-a/?page=all, spark/
Iran’s secretive Quds force is becoming more active in Iraq along side Iraqi soldiers
and militias battling the Islamic State terrorist group, as the Obama administration sends signals
welcoming Tehran to the fight. A source close to the U.S. special operations community said some elite Quds forces
were on the ground last month when Iraqis recaptured the strategic Mosul Dam from
Islamic State fighters. The Iraqis were aided overhead by U.S. strike aircraft providing close-air support. The report
comes as the Obama administration is talking more openly about relying on Iran, a Shiite-dominated nation, to take on the
Islamic State group, which also is known by the acronyms ISIS and ISIL. “There is a role for nearly every country in the world to
play, including Iran,” Secretary of State John F. Kerry said Friday at the U.N. while drumming up support for destroying the
Islamic State. The Pentagon says it
had no troops on the ground and thus does not know the
affiliations of all the anti-Islamic State fighters during the battle for Mosul Dam, the most
famous and successful to date after U.S. planes began striking the terrorists in early August. But a senior defense official told The
Washington Times that Quds force troops are active in Iraq advising Shiite militias and other Iraqi forces. “We
know that
the Quds forces have been operating in Iraq,” the official said. “That we know for a fact. And
we know that they have been doing some partnering and assisting with Iraqi forces. A
lot of what the Quds forces are doing is more focused on the militias, the Shiite
militias.” The battle for Mosul Dam in northern Iraq would be the first known clash in which Americans fought on the same
side with Iran, albeit not in an official or a coordinated manner. The Iran-U.S. relationship has grown more convoluted with the
rise of the Islamic State, which controls towns and territory in Syria and Iraq, and has proclaimed itself an Islamic caliphate.
During the U.S. occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 2011, the Quds force trained Iraqi Shiite extremists who attacked and killed U.S.
troops. Quds
force troops are now in Syria fighting on the side of President Bashar
Assad, who has directed the slaughter of thousands civilians and whom the U.S. wants
ousted. Iran also backs Hamas and Hezbollah, two U.S.-designated terrorist groups. But in Iraq, America and Iran now have a
common enemy whose brutality and threat to the region trump the two countries’ long sour relationship. It is an undeclared
alliance. The State Department says it will not coordinate with Iran, and Tehran rejects the thought of a war partnership with the
U.S. The source close to the special operations community told The Times that the Quds force “was the principal force for taking
over the dam” on and around Aug. 18. Navy Cmdr. Elissa Smith, a Pentagon spokeswoman, told The Times: “ We
are
aware Iran has sent personnel to Iraq who are training and advising some Iraqi
security forces and illegal militia. We also know that Iran has provided some supplies,
arms, ammunition, and aircraft for Iraq’s armed forces. “We have been clear that ISIL
represents a threat not only to the United States, but also — and most immediately —
to the entire region. We believe all countries, regardless of their differences, should work toward the goal of degrading
and ultimately defeating ISIL.” The Quds force is the prime adviser to Shiite militia groups viewed as critical to protecting
Baghdad and reinforcing the shaky Iraqi army. While
Iraqi Shiites are more than willing to combat the
Islamic State, which brands them as heretics and designates them for murder, many
Sunni Iraqis are not. One of the new diplomatic tasks of retired Marine Gen. John
Allen, who commanded troops in Iraq, is to reach out to Sunni tribal and military leaders to persuade them to join a coalition
against the terrorists. Quds force is the foreign operations arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s overriding
military institution embedded in policymaking and society. The Wall Street Journal reported in June that then-Quds leader Qasem
Soleimani visited Iraq to consult with Baghdad’s Shiite-led government. Before U.S. airstrikes began last month, Army Gen.
Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Chiefs chairman, was asked by National Public Radio if the military would coordinate with Iranian
advisers in Iraq. “That’s to be determined,” he said. “We
will look at Iran with a cold eye on where and
when we may need to operate in the same space and toward what is potentially the
same goal of countering” the Islamic State. “I’m not predicting that it’s entirely impossible that we would at
any point act collaboratively with Iran,” the top U.S. military official said. “But there’s a long way to go between here and there, in
my judgment.” Gen. Dempsey recently described the Mosul Dam battle in some detail before the Senate Committee on Armed
Services. He said American
advice came at a distance from a joint command center in the
Kurdish city of Irbil in northern Iraq. Planners used video feeds from unmanned aircraft to provide intelligence
to Kurdish fighters and Iraqi counterterrorism units. He made no mention of any Quds forces on the ground. Gen. Dempsey told
NPR he is aware of Quds force’s history: “I can tell you there’s a lot of leaders of the IRGC Quds force and some of the advisers
to the Shia militia that have a lot of American blood on their hands.”
Response Now
Threats high – state department mobilizing troops now
Claffey 15
/11 February 2015, Lauren Claffey, Homeland Security, Chairman McCaul Opening Statement at Hearing
on Preventing Terror Travel and Homegrown Terrorism, ProQuest, spark/
The victims are the reason why we are here today. We must keep those barbaric terrorists out of the
homeland to protect the American people. This hearing will also assess the urgent and growing threat of
terrorists recruiting and inspiring Americans. We need to accurately define the threat - violent Islamist extremism - and recognize
it is spreading like wildfire around the globe. These fanatics want nothing less than destruction of our way of life, and now their
ability to match words with deeds is growing at an astonishing rate. In recent years, their
safe havens have
proliferated and their ranks have swelled. In many ways, we are no longer talking about
terrorist groups. We are talking about terrorist armies. ISIS now controls a territory the
size of Belgium, governs millions of people, draws on billions of dollars in revenue,
and commands tens of thousands of foot soldiers. And they are brutal - their latest act of barbarism was
on full display with the horrific murder of the Jordanian pilot. This evolving Islamist terror landscape has given rise to the "dual
threats" of foreign fighter returnees and homegrown terrorism. The recent terror attack in Paris, and other attacks and plots in
Belgium, Germany, the U.K., Australia, Canada, and here in the U.S. are proof that the threat has surged and that the enemy is
dead set on attacking the West. As Mr. Rasmussen notes in his testimony, more
than 20,000 fighters from over
90 countries have made their way to the battlefield to join al Qaeda, ISIS, and other
extremist groups - making this the largest convergence of Islamist terrorists in world
history. That number continues to grow despite months of airstrikes. Up to 5,000 of these fighters are Westerners, many of
whom are able to travel into the United States without obtaining a visa. More than 150 American citizens have attempted to or
succeeded in getting to the battlefield--and we know some have already returned to our shores. But extremists do not need to
travel overseas in order to become a threat to our homeland. Through Hollywood-like propaganda videos and social media,
Islamist terror groups are inciting their followers and potential recruits to wage war at
home. Both ISIS and Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have called for
Westerners - including Americans - to "wage individual jihad" in their home countries
- and it's working. ISIS social media also gives step-by-step instructions on how to get
to the fight and how to return. Following the attacks in Paris last month, our European partners have been busy
uncovering new terrorist cells and disrupting imminent plots. Also, just recently here at home, the FBI arrested an Ohio-based
ISIS sympathizer who was intending to attack the U.S. Capitol with pipe bombs.
I am worried about our ability
to combat this threat abroad, but also here at home. I wrote to the president recently and raised
concerns that we still have no lead agency in charge of countering domestic radicalization and no line item for it in the budgets of
key departments and agencies. I am also concerned that the few programs we do have in place are far too small to confront a
threat that has grown so quickly. Today, I hope to hear how the administration assesses the danger posed by foreign fighters,
particularly Westerners, and the threat of homegrown terrorism here in the United States. More importantly, I hope we will hear
about how the administration is responding--and plans to ramp up its response--to these challenges. This morning I would like to
welcome all of our witnesses but especially Mr. Rasmussen. It
is his first appearance before Congress after
being confirmed as the Director of the NCTC, and we look forward to his testimony.
As part of our Committee's focus on this critical national security issue, the Ranking
Member and myself are establishing a Task Force on Combatting Terrorist and
Foreign Fighter Travel. The six-month task force will review U.S. government efforts - focusing on DHS - to disrupt
terrorist travel into our country and to combat the foreign fighter threat. It will ultimately provide recommendations to the
Committee on how we can improve U.S. security against these dangers. I am very disappointed that the State Department chose
not to send a witness here today. The
threats we are discussing are serious, and the State
Department plays a key role in combating them. I recently sent a letter to the White House expressing my
concerns over the Department's desire to resettle tens of thousands of Syrian refugees in the United States. I am worried ISIS
could exploit this effort in order to deploy operatives to America via a federally funded jihadi pipeline.
Taliban (Afghanistan)
Threat
Taliban is making a comeback post US withdrawal
Bilal Sarwary ’15, Al Jazeera political reporter (2/4, “The Taliban comeback,” Aljazeera,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/01/taliban-comeback-150128092123970.html,
lpc)
Ganjgal Valley, Afghanistan - The Taliban has made a comeback in Afghanistan's strategic
Kunar province since the drawdown and departure late last year of US-led coalition troops.
"When the Americans were here, we had fighter jets bomb Taliban hideouts, we had drones
patrol Kunar's night skies," said Haji Pacha, an Afghan local police commander. "This kept the
Taliban on their toes. They were not as bold as they are today." The tranquillity of northeastern
Kunar's lush, green mountains and crystal-clear rivers belies a more violent reality. The province
borders Pakistan's lawless tribal areas, was one of the first places in Afghanistan to have an
al-Qaeda presence, and saw some of the fiercest clashes between US forces and the Taliban. Over
the past decade, the US invested heavily in Kunar, building schools and constructing bridges that
connected isolated communities cut off by rugged, mountainous terrain. But already, the province's
limited infrastructure has begun to crumble because of a lack of maintenance and fresh
investment. Its schools have few students, and clinics lack medicine and doctors.
Taliban comeback threatens Pakistani stability
Zahid Hussain ’14, judge of Supreme Court of Pakistan and a former Chief Justice of Lahore High
Court (10/19, “The Taliban Question,” The Cairo Review of Global Reviews,
http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/pages/articledetails.aspx?aid=668, lpc)
A more likely scenario is a protracted conflict, in which the insurgent militia could gain
control over a large swath of the predominantly Pashtun region after the cessation of active
combat operations by the coalition forces. This would not only seriously test the mettle of the
Afghan national security forces, but also threaten the stability of Pakistan across the border
facing its own problem of Taliban insurgency in the semi-autonomous tribal regions. Having failed
to disrupt the Afghan presidential election in 2014, the Taliban stepped up attacks on
coalition forces during its summer offensive. In August, for the first time since the Vietnam War,
a U.S. army general was killed in a foreign war when an Afghan soldier, apparently a Taliban
infiltrator, shot him at a training facility. The killing of General Harold Greene—the
highest ranking member of the U.S.-led coalition killed in the Afghanistan war—
underscored the challenge facing coalition forces as they try to wind down their involvement in
the thirteen-year-old conflict. Far from vanquished, the Taliban have widened its operations,
particularly in the eastern and southern region of Afghanistan where the security transition has
completely taxed Afghan forces. Indeed, for the Taliban, the withdrawal of U.S.-led combat
troops is a victory for their resistance. The traditional Eid message of Taliban supreme leader
Mullah Omar this year blended tones of triumph with an offer of reconciliation. While claiming
victories on the battlefield, he called for the establishment of an inclusive government
protecting the interests of all ethnic factions after the withdrawal of Western forces from
Afghanistan.
Tamil Tigers (Sri Lanka)
Threat
Terror network still intact despite military defeat
DNA India 6/20- Indian News Agency, internally cites US State Dept. Report on Terror
(“LTTE network intact despite military defeat in 2009, says US terror report”, DNA India, 6/20/15,
http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-ltte-network-intact-despite-military-defeat-in-2009-says-usterror-report-2097259)//WK
The LTTE's international network and financial support are still intact despite its military
defeat at the hands of Sri Lankan government troops in 2009, a US government report has said.
The State Department's annual Country Report on Terrorism for 2014 released yesterday noted
that there have been no known attacks in Sri Lanka that could verifiably be attributed to the
LTTE since the end of the war, but a total of 13 LTTE supporters, several of which had
allegedly planned attacks against US and Israeli diplomatic facilities in India, were arrested
in Malaysia in 2014. The report noted that before their defeat the LTTE was responsible for an
integrated battlefield insurgent strategy that targeted key installations and senior Sri Lankan
political and military leaders. It conducted a sustained campaign targeting rival Tamil groups, and
assassinated former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe
Premadasa in 1993. Although most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, called the Black
Tigers, LTTE also had an amphibious force - the Sea Tigers, and a nascent air wing - the Air Tigers.
Fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan military escalated in 2006 and continued through
2008. In early 2009, Sri Lankan forces recaptured the LTTE's key strongholds, including their capital
of Kilinochchi. In May 2009, government forces defeated the last LTTE fighters, killed LTTE leader
Prabhakaran and other members of the leadership and military command, and declared victory.
US-Based Terrorism
Threat
White supremacist threat increasing
Nevins 15
/16 January 2015, Sean Nevins is a Washington DC based staff writer for MintPress focusing on
foreign affairs, and the intersection of politics and policy, White Supremacy And Homegrown Terrorism
Pose A Growing Threat In The US, http://www.mintpressnews.com/white-supremacy-homegrownterrorism-pose-growing-threat-us/201258, spark/
In response to the rising number of hate groups in the country, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) commissioned an intelligence assessment of the situation in 2009. It was
dispersed to federal, local, and tribal counterterrorism and law enforcement agencies
across the country. That assessment did not find “specific information” about right-wing groups planning acts of
violence, but it noted that right-wing extremists “may be gaining new recruits by playing on their fears about several emergent
issues. The economic downturn and the election of the first African American president present unique drivers for rightwing
radicalization and recruitment.” The
government defined right-wing extremism as “groups,
movements, and adherents that are primarily hate-oriented (based on hatred of particular religious,
racial or ethnic groups), and those that are mainly antigovernment, rejecting federal authority
in favor of state or local authority, or rejecting government authority entirely. It may include
groups and individuals that are dedicated to a single issue, such as opposition to abortion or immigration.” The assessment also
the rise of extremism may be the result of the economic and political
atmosphere, which included the recession, outsourcing of jobs and a “perceived
threat” to U.S. power . It said that “possible passage” of firearms restrictions and
challenges faced by returning military veterans integrating back into society “could
lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of
carrying out violent attacks.” “We’re currently in one of the hottest periods of extremist activity in the United
determined that
States that I’ve seen in my 20-year career. This blows what we saw pre-Oklahoma City out of the water and makes it look like a
kindergarten picnic,” Daryl Johnson, a domestic terrorism expert and founder of DT Analytics, a private consulting firm for law
enforcement and Homeland Security professionals, says during an interview for the recent Vice News documentary. Johnson was
also the main author of the intelligence assessment issued by DHS in 2009. Yet, rather than acting on the information gathered in
the assessment, the government cancelled all of its domestic terrorism reporting and law enforcement training after the report was
leaked and politicized by conservative media outlets and politicians. One such publication described “the piece of crap report” as
“a sweeping indictment of conservatives.” It continues, “In Obama land, there are no coincidences.
It is no coincidence
that this report echoes Tea Party-bashing left-wing blogs … and demonizes the very
Americans who will be protesting in the thousands on Wednesday for the nationwide
Tax Day Tea Party.” Conservative news organizations interpreted the publication of the report as a political power play
by Obama to demonize the right, rather than an impartial analysis of domestic terrorism that could help law enforcement. In
2011, two years after the report was released, Johnson said he was deeply disheartened by how the report was characterized.
Johnson told Joe Hamilton at the Muskegon Chronicle that he was “a former intelligence analyst and counterterrorism expert for
the U.S. Army, an Eagle Scout, Mormon, one-time church missionary, an anti-abortion gun owner, and third-generation lifetime
registered Republican.” In short, he said he is a conservative. Johnson
added that the report could not have
been a political move on the part of Obama, since he was hired in 2004 by the George W. Bush
administration. Following Hamilton’s opinion piece, Johnson penned his own article for Salon, “Daryl Johnson: I tried to warn
them.” In it, he makes a damning indictment of the DHS decision not to follow through on recommendations made in his report.
Right-wing extremists are something serious
Shane 15
/24 June 2015, Scott Shane is an American journalist, currently employed by The New York Times,
reporting principally about the United States intelligence community, Homegrown Extremists Tied to
Deadlier Toll Than Jihadists in U.S. Since 9/11, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/tally-ofattacks-in-us-challenges-perceptions-of-top-terrorthreat.html?emc=edit_th_20150625&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=54689414&_r=0, spark/
In the 14 years since Al Qaeda carried out attacks on New York and the Pentagon,
extremists have regularly executed smaller lethal assaults in the United States, explaining
their motives in online manifestoes or social media rants. But the breakdown of extremist ideologies behind those attacks may
come as a surprise. Since Sept. 11, 2001, nearly twice as many people have been killed by white supremacists, antigovernment
fanatics and other non-Muslim extremists than by radical Muslims: 48 have been killed by extremists who are not Muslim,
including the recent mass killing in Charleston, S.C., compared with 26 by self-proclaimed jihadists, according to a count by New
America, a Washington research center. The slaying of nine African-Americans in a Charleston church last week, with an avowed
white supremacist charged with their murders, was a particularly savage case. But it is only the latest in a string of lethal attacks by
people espousing racial hatred, hostility
to government and theories such as those of the
“sovereign citizen” movement, which denies the legitimacy of most statutory law. The
assaults have taken the lives of police officers, members of racial or religious minorities and random civilians. Non-Muslim
extremists have carried out 19 such attacks since Sept. 11, according to the latest count, compiled by
David Sterman, a New America program associate, and overseen by Peter Bergen, a terrorism expert. By comparison, seven
lethal attacks by Islamic militants have taken place in the same period. If such
numbers are new to the public, they are familiar to police officers. A survey to be
published this week asked 382 police and sheriff’s departments nationwide to rank the
three biggest threats from violent extremism in their jurisdiction. About 74 percent listed
antigovernment violence, while 39 percent listed “Al Qaeda-inspired” violence, according to the researchers, Charles Kurzman of
the University of North Carolina and David Schanzer of Duke University. “ Law
enforcement agencies around
the country have told us the threat from Muslim extremists is not as great as the threat
from right-wing extremists ,” said Dr. Kurzman, whose study is to be published by the Triangle Center on
Terrorism and Homeland Security and the Police Executive Research Forum. John G. Horgan, who studies terrorism at the
University of Massachusetts, Lowell, said the mismatch between public perceptions and actual cases had become steadily more
obvious to scholars. “There’s
an acceptance now of the idea that the threat from jihadi
terrorism in the United States has been overblown,” Dr. Horgan said. “And there’s a belief that the threat
of right-wing, antigovernment violence has been underestimated.” Counting terrorism cases is a subjective enterprise, relying on
shifting definitions and judgment calls. If terrorism is defined as ideological violence, for instance, should an attacker who has
merely ranted about religion, politics or race be considered a terrorist? A man in Chapel Hill, N.C., who was charged with fatally
shooting three young Muslim neighbors had posted angry critiques of religion, but he also had a history of outbursts over parking
issues. (New America does not include this attack in its count.) Likewise, what about mass killings in which no ideological motive
is evident, such as those at a Colorado movie theater and a Connecticut elementary school in 2012? The criteria used by New
America and most other research groups exclude such attacks, which have cost more lives than those clearly tied to ideology.
Some killings by non-Muslims that most experts would categorize as terrorism have
drawn only fleeting news media coverage, never jelling in the public memory. But to revisit
some of the episodes is to wonder why In 2012, a neo-Nazi named Wade Michael Page entered a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and
opened fire, killing six people and seriously wounding three others. Mr. Page, who died at the scene, was a member of a white
supremacist group called the Northern Hammerskins. In another case, in June 2014, Jerad and Amanda Miller, a married couple
with radical antigovernment views, entered a Las Vegas pizza restaurant and fatally shot two police officers who were eating
lunch. On the bodies, they left a swastika, a flag inscribed with the slogan “Don’t tread on me” and a note saying, “This is the
start of the revolution.” Then they killed a third person in a nearby Walmart. And, as in the case of jihadist plots, there have been
sobering close calls. In November 2014 in Austin, Tex., a man named Larry McQuilliams fired more than 100 rounds at
government buildings that included the Police Headquarters and the Mexican Consulate. Remarkably, his shooting spree hit no
one, and he was killed by an officer before he could try to detonate propane cylinders he drove to the scene. Some Muslim
advocates complain that when the perpetrator of an attack is not Muslim, news media commentators quickly focus on the
question of mental illness. “With
non-Muslims, the media bends over backward to identify
some psychological traits that may have pushed them over the edge,” said Abdul Cader Asmal,
a retired physician and a longtime spokesman for Muslims in Boston. “Whereas if it’s a Muslim, the
assumption is that they must have done it because of their religion.” On several occasions since
President Obama took office, efforts by government agencies to conduct research on right-wing
extremism have run into resistance from Republicans, who suspected an attempt to
smear conservatives.
Whites killed more people than Muslims – just face the facts
RT 15
/27 June 2015, RT News USA, White Americans bigger terror threat than Islamic extremists – study,
http://rt.com/usa/270142-white-americans-terror-threat, spark/
White Americans are the biggest terror threat in the United States, having killed more
people in attacks than Muslims or any other group in the last 14 years , according to a new
study. The research, conducted by the New America Foundation, examined the 26 attacks on US soil
defined as acts of terror since 9/11, and found that 19 of those attacks were committed
by non-Muslims. Since the September 11 atrocity, 48 people have been killed by
extremists who are not Muslim, compared to 26 killed by people who claimed to be
jihadists. The non-Muslim groups included right-wing, racist, and anti-government
organizations. However, the study found that radical Islamists were indicted more frequently than non-Muslim extremists
and served longer sentences. “From a legal point of view, when people go into court, the Justice Department has certain
guidelines about sentencing. So, for instance, if a crime is deemed to have a terrorist underpinning, the sentences that are handed
down are longer than it would be just for a conventional crime,” Peter Bergen, vice president and director of studies for the New
America Foundation, told NPR. For the purpose of the research, terrorism
was defined as an “act of
political violence against a civilian target by someone other than the state,” Bergen said. Last
week's Charleston shooting, which left nine people dead at a historically black church, was
included in the study. The shooter, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, supported white supremacist ideology. Also included in the count
was a
2012 Sikh temple shooting in Wisconsin, which left six people dead. The shooting was carried
out by Michael Page, who was involved in neo-Nazi and white supremacist circles,
and had founded a white supremacist band. A 2011 multi-state killing spree was also listed, during which
David Pedersen and Holly Grigsby killed four people. The indictment alleged the two were members of a criminal enterprise
whose purposes included “promoting and advancing a white supremacist movement to 'purify' and 'preserve' the white race...”
The findings align with a survey published this week, which asked 382 police and
sheriff's departments in the US to rank the three biggest threats from violent
extremism in their jurisdiction. About 74 percent listed anti-government violence, while 39 percent listed Al-Qaeda-inspired
violence. The study was conducted by Charles Kurzman of the University of North Carolina and David Schanzer of Duke
University, and will be published by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security and the Police Executive Research
Forum, the New York Times reported.
White supremacists groups are a bigger threat than any militant Islamic group
– violence is real
PTV 15
/26 June 2015, PressTV, White Americans biggest terror threat in US: Study,
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/06/26/417611/US-terror-study-New-America-Foundation,
spark/
White, right-wing Americans present a far greater terror threat to the United States than
individuals linked to the al-Qaeda or ISIL extremist groups, according to a new study. Most of the
“terror” attacks carried out on US soil since the September 11, 2001 attacks have been committed by white
supremacist and radical anti-government groups, according to the New America Foundation, a
Washington-based think tank. Nearly twice as many people have been killed by white supremacists and antigovernment fanatics
since 9/11 than by al-Qaeda-inspired individuals, according to the latest count by the New America Foundation. The study found
48 people have been killed by extremists who are not Muslim, including the recent
mass killing in Charleston, South Carolina, compared with 26 by self-proclaimed
Muslims. The massacre of nine African-Americans in a Charleston church last week
by an avowed white supremacist was the latest in a string of white terrorist attacks in
the US. Lethal attacks by people espousing racial hatred and hostility to government has taken the lives of police officers,
that
members of racial or religious minorities and random civilians. John Horgan, who studies terrorism at the University of
Massachusetts, said the mismatch between public perceptions and actual cases had become steadily more obvious to scholars.
“There’s
an acceptance now of the idea that the threat from jihadi [takfiri] terrorism in
the United States has been overblown,” Dr. Horgan said. “And there’s a belief that the threat
of right-wing, antigovernment violence has been underestimated .” However, the criteria
used by New America Foundation and most other research groups exclude attacks by
white Americans with no apparent ideological motive, which have cost more lives than those clearly
tied to ideology. Most mass shootings, like Sandy Hook school massacre or the Colorado movie theater shooting that took place
in 2012 weren't included in the study. Attacks by non-Muslim white individuals, whether ideological or not, generally receive little
coverage in the news media. Muslim advocates complain that when the perpetrator of an attack is not Muslim, news media
commentators quickly focus on the question of mental illness. “With non-Muslims, the
media bends over
backward to identify some psychological traits that may have pushed them over the
edge,” said Abdul Cader Asmal, a retired physician and a longtime spokesman for Muslims in Boston. “Whereas if it’s a
Muslim, the assumption is that they must have done it because of their religion.” A
white supremacist by the name of Wade Michael Page entered a Sikh temple in
Wisconsin in 2012 and opened fire, killing six people and seriously wounding three
others. Page, who died at the scene, was a member of a neo-Nazi group called the Northern Hammerskins.
Types
Bioterror
Ebola
Ebola is easily transmittable and severe – functions as an effective biological
weapon
Naveen Gunaratne ’15, grad student at the Lee Kuan Yes school of public policy at National
University of Singapore (“The Ebola Virus and the Threat of Bioterrorism,” Lexis Nexis, pp. 67, lpc)
The first dimension of the structured, focused comparison is the biological agent’s
pathogenesis and etiology. Pathogenesis of the agent is an indispensable variable in an act of
bioterrorism. The pathological analysis of Ebola is contrasted here to anthrax and smallpox
(variola major) and shows that if successfully weaponized, Ebola is a more suitable
bioterrorism agent due to its potency and acute effects. Compared with anthrax and smallpox,
the pathogenesis and etiology of the Ebola virus have distinct characteristics. Anthrax and smallpox
infections are primarily spread by inhalation of aerosol droplets, while the Ebola virus infects
by “direct contact with blood, secretions, or tissue of humans.”24 Although it may seem like Ebola
is less potent as a bioterrorist agent, in reality it has the capacity to infect with minor contact,
through multiple entry routes. In addition, research indicates that contact with infected skin of
Ebola patients can transmit the disease.25 Cutaneous contraction is highly possible when
disposing of the dead bodies, whether it may be during funeral traditions or burial processes. The
mutating factor of the Ebola virus increases the risk of spread because it is difficult to predict the
incubation time and the time for infection symptoms to appear in victims. And though anthrax,
smallpox, and Ebola can all cause fatalities, Ebola causes far more severe necrosis than the other
two bio-agents. Ebola therefore has a higher “terror factor” than anthrax or smallpox.
Moreover, the rapid development of the Ebola virus within the infected individual and person-toperson transmission, which helps to create mass public panic, serves the purpose as a
bioterrorism agent.
Terrorists could easily obtain and release Ebola – the threat is real
Naveen Gunaratne ’15, grad student at the Lee Kuan Yes school of public policy at National
University of Singapore (“The Ebola Virus and the Threat of Bioterrorism,” Lexis Nexis, pp. 72-73,
lpc)
The present Ebola outbreak provides any terrorist organization interested in bioterrorism an
Ebola virus reservoir of infected individuals or infected dead bodies, lessening the difficulty of
covertly acquiring the virus strain. Without proper public infection control mechanisms, this
outbreak could rapidly rise to an epidemic level. Weaponizing Ebola would primarily depend on
non-explosive methods that suit bioterrorism. A coordinated deliberate release of the virus using
infected humans as “weapons,” targeted infections by the use of injections, or exposure to
infected animals can cause a small outbreak within the target population and then
consequently propagate the virus throughout the country via person-to-person contact. Finally, the
lack of a vaccine or any antiviral or antimicrobial drug to treat Ebola patients makes it a highly
effective bio-agent that can cause mass fatalities, public panic, and public health system failure.
Moreover, infection control is extremely difficult in an Ebola outbreak because it is highly infectious
through person-to-person contact. The requirement of containment facilities, infection control
protocols, and extreme personal protection equipment to handle the virus and the infected
patients is more likely to cause nosocomial and public infections. Therefore, Ebola is well suited
as a bio-agent in modern bioterrorism.
Chemical Terror
Effective
Chemical weapons work – empirics
J. Meara et al ‘3, national radiological protection board (R.Thornton, B. Court, V. Murray, I. Palmer,
R. Scott, M. Wale and D. Wright, 11/9, “Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism: an
introduction for occupational physicians,” Occupational Medicine Journal,
http://occmed.oxfordjournals.org/content/54/2/101.full.pdf+html, lpc)
The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect has twice used sarin against the civilian population, once in
Matsumoto in 1994 in which seven people died and 600 were injured [6] and again in the
Tokyo Underground in 1995 [7]. Approximately 24 l of chemical agent were reported to have
been manufactured approximately 48 h before the second attack. It apparently consisted of a
mixture of sarin (GB) and a small amount of tabun (GA), which are two classic military nerve agents
and acetonitrile that had been added to ‘jump-start’ evaporation. The liquid was soaked onto
newspaper and contained in plastic bags transported inside umbrellas. Five different subway
trains on three separate lines were attacked on 20 March 1995 at 07:55 h by 10 terrorists who
punctured holes in the plastic bags. In total, 5510 people sought medical attention in 278
hospitals and clinics, with 12 dead, 54 critical and 984 moderately poisoned, while 688
victims were transported to hospital by ambulance with over 4000 casualties reaching
hospitals on foot or by private transport [8]. The reason why there were not far more casualties in
such a confined space as the underground was thought to be that the strong smell of acetonitrile
alerted passengers to the danger.
Threat High
Chemical weapons threat
Reuters 15
/6 June 2015, Reuters, Australian foreign minister says Isil is using chemical weapons,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11656403/Australian-foreign-ministersays-Isil-is-using-chemical-weapons.html, spark/
Islamic State militants have used chlorine as a weapon and are recruiting highly
trained technicians in a serious bid to develop chemical weapons, Australia's Foreign Minister
Julie Bishop has warned. ADVERTISING In a speech to an international forum of nations that works to fight the spread of such
the rise of militant groups such as Isil, also known as Daesh, posed
"one of the gravest security threats we face today ." "Apart from some crude and small scale endeavours,
the conventional wisdom has been that the terrorist intention to acquire and
weaponise chemical agents has been largely aspirational ," Ms Bishop told a meeting of the Australia
Group in Perth. The speech on Friday was posted online. " The use of chlorine by Daesh, and its
recruitment of highly technically trained professionals, including from the West, have
revealed far more serious efforts in chemical weapons development ," she said. " Daesh is
likely to have amongst its tens of thousands of recruits the technical expertise
necessary to further refine precursor materials and build chemical weapons," Ms Bishop
weapons, Ms Bishop said
said. The comments follow allegations by Iraqi Kurdish authorities that they have evidence that Isil used chlorine gas against their
peshmerga fighters in northern Iraq in January. The Kurdish allegations that soil and clothing samples taken after an Isil car
bombing attempt contained levels of chlorine couldn't be independently confirmed. Chlorine
is a choking agent
whose use as a chemical weapon dates back to World War One. It is banned under the 1997
Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits all use of toxic agents on the battlefield. The Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons has been investigating allegations of dozens of recent chlorine gas attacks in Syrian villages, but it is being
refused access to the sites by President Bashar al-Assad's government.
Many groups own the chemical materials – now is the key time to respond
Straub 15
/23 March 2015, Bill Straub is a Washington freelancer and a former White House correspondent for
Scripps Howard News Service, ‘Important Time’ to Prep Country for Chemical Weapons Attacks,
http://pjmedia.com/blog/important-time-to-prep-country-for-chemical-weapons-attacks, spark/
The head of the nation’s chemical defense program warned that the nation faces “an
important time” when it comes to addressing the potential for toxic attacks and the
federal government is working with local agencies to both defend against assaults and
go over how to respond should one occur. Appearing before the House Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response and Communications, Dr. Mark Kirk, director of the Chemical Defense Program in the Department of
Homeland Security, reminded lawmakers that chemical agents are used to kill or incapacitate large numbers of people, cause
permanent or long-lasting harm, contaminate critical infrastructure and create uncertainty, fear and panic. “Although
the
United States and many countries around the world have since banned chemical
weapons and committed to controlling their precursors, these materials continue to be
a threat today,” Kirk said. “Evidence shows sarin has been used in Syria and the toxic,
industrial chemical chlorine allegedly has been used in multiple attacks in Iraq and
Syria since 2007.” Chemical weapons’ recipes, dispersion methods and manuals on
how to use them are readily found on the Internet and are easily available to potential
terrorists who wish to do the U.S. and other nations harm . “Readily accessible
chemicals are used in the United States by those committing ‘chemical suicide’ and
recently chlorine was deliberately released in a Rosemont, Ill., hotel affecting a group
attending a convention,” Kirk told the panel. Even small-scale attacks, Kirk said, carry a large and lasting impact.
Twenty years ago on March 20, 1995, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult attacked the Tokyo subway by intentionally releasing
sarin. Twelve people died, about 1,200 people showed signs of poisoning and 5,500 sought medical care. Nearly 250 first
responders and hospital staff developed adverse effects from secondary exposure. Even that can be considered a relatively minor
assault given the chemical warfare agent used. Government officials can plan for chemical threats but time, Kirk said, is a
“dangerous element.” “ Chemical
incidents often occur abruptly, with many victims falling ill
at once ,” he said. “Protective movements and life-saving treatments — and the key
decisions that facilitate these actions — must occur very quickly to make a difference.
This rapid response requirement necessitates that communities stabilize incidents on
their own, often before specialized resources and federal assets can mobilize.” During the
early stages of many chemical events, medical personnel and first responders may find themselves operating “in the blind,” having
to react immediately to a threat before complete information is available, requiring them to sift through reports to determine the
difference between accurate and misleading accounts. That can prove difficult, Kirk said, and key information about the alleged
chemical may not yet be known. “Responders can suffer injury if they fail to use adequate personal protection for the threat they
face,” he said. “Fear
from the public and inaccurate information can overwhelm health
systems and make it difficult to determine the real scale of an incident.” The Department of
Homeland Security is working diligently to strengthen the nation’s chemical defense capabilities and is providing support for
community-level capacity-building. Several government-funded demonstration projects are enhancing the agency’s understanding
of the need for immediate response at the community level following a large-scale chemical incident. The information will help
the Chemical Defense Program facilitate the building of tools to intervene at critical points and optimize the emergency response
system. “The most important direction moving forward is translating our findings into implementation plans and actionable
“We intend to share our collection of guidance, best practices, and newly
developed decision-aids with all communities. We plan to partner with other agencies
and relevant organizations to share our findings so that we can assist in the creation of
training and education methods that will help decision-makers at all levels operate
within a structured environment even during the chaotic first moments of a chemical
incident, and optimize key information sharing in order to make sound, critical
decisions.” Other officials appearing before the subcommittee said that the effort to address potential chemical weapons
steps,” he said.
attacks needs more money. Essex County, N.J., Sheriff Armando Fontoura said it’s necessary for the federal government to “lead
the way.” Fontoura said his county, a large population base that includes the city of Newark, includes one of the nation’s busiest
ports. Enhanced Homeland Security funding has allowed inspectors to go from checking out 10 percent of the shipping
containers being handled to almost 90 percent. “ We need to do better — we need to inspect them all ,”
he told the subcommittee. Emergency agencies in Essex County have conducted drills, Fontoura told lawmakers, to prepare for
attacks. But federal funds are necessary to provide greater security for potential assault sites. Dr. Christina Catlett, associate
director of the Office of Critical Event Preparedness and Response, Department of Emergency Medicine at Johns Hopkins
Hospital, said budget restraints are limiting the ability of hospitals to prepare for chemical attacks. She added that training should
be improved, noting that too many medical workers are poorly prepared. Catlett recommended increased research funding to
determine what medical facilities need to be prepared for and determine those areas that require improvement. Rep. Martha
McSally (R-Ariz.), the subcommittee chairwoman, acknowledged that the nation finds itself “at a pivotal time in our fight against
terrorists around the world.” “ISIS is better resourced, more brutal, and more organized than any terrorist group to date,” she
terrorists will acquire and use military grade chemical
weapons or other chemical agents in their attacks . In fact, earlier this year, CENTCOM reported that a
coalition air strike killed ISIS’ chemical weapons expert. Reports have also indicated that ISIS used chlorine gas in
their attacks last year .” McSally called a terrorist attack using chemical agents “a low probability, high consequence
scenario.” A chemical attack, she said, could result in mass casualties and significant
economic losses . “In light of this, we must be vigilant and ensure our first responders and medical personnel are ready to
said. “We know that, given the opportunity,
respond,” she said.
Attacks probable – so many groups want the weapons
WT 15
/17 June 2015, Washington Times, The administration must deal with Syria’s rain of chemical weapons,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/17/editorial-obama-must-deal-with-syriaschemical-wea, spark/
President Obama warned in August 2012 that Syria must not cross his “red line” against using
chemical weapons against the rebels — or else. President Bashar Assad has continued to cross Mr. Obama’s
red line, and we’re still waiting to see the “else.” What is plain to see is a heavy rain of chemical weapons on rebel fighters in Syria,
the deal Mr. Obama made last
year with the government in Damascus “left chlorine on the table as a weapon.” Barrel
bombs filled with weaponized chlorine do deadly work. To add insult to incompetent negotiating, Mr. Obama and
Secretary of State John Kerry continue to embrace the lie that the United States has
succeeded in getting “all the chemical weapons out of Syria.” Mr. Obama clearly understands the
consequences of doing nothing. In 2012, he said that “ the point … made about chemical and biological
weapons is critical. That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern Syria . It concerns our
close allies in the region, including Israel. It concerns us. We cannot have a situation where chemical
or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. “We have been very clear to the Assad
regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is [when] we start
seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would
in 29 incidents this spring alone. The Washington Times reported Wednesday that
change my calculus. That would change my equation.” Or he can just change his story. Our reporter Guy Taylor reports that
“House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce plans on Wednesday to highlight how claims by the administration and
the United Nations to have successfully rid Syria of chemical weapons have fallen far short — leaving the regime with a deadly
arsenal of barrel bombs filled with weaponized chlorine.” Mr. Royce, California Republican, asserts that President
Assad’s forces have recently “stepped up” the use of such barrel bombs on civilians in
rebel-controlled areas, particularly in and around the northeastern Syrian city of Idlib,
near the border with Turkey. Mr. Obama never said what, if anything, he would do if his much-ballyhooed red line was crossed. A
year after he made his implied threat to punish the Damascus government, hundreds of women and children were slain on the
outskirts of Damascus with Sarin gas, and nothing happened, except for his declaration that there were no more chemical
weapons in Syria. In June last year U.N. officials made a similar declaration, asserting that “Syria’s
chemical arsenal,
including mustard gas and sarin, had been successfully removed.” Now it turns out that only
some chemicals were removed, leaving the Assad regime to stockpile chlorine. With the Foreign Affairs Committee about to take
testimony from rescue workers recently back from northeast Syria, Mr. Kerry grudgingly acknowledges the grim facts. “ We
are certain that the preponderance of those attacks have been carried out by the
regime, and we’re putting together a portfolio of that data that supports that even as
we speak now ,” Mr. Kerry says. Mr. Kerry is the very U.S. official caving now in his negotiations with Iran, negotiations
fraught with no less far-reaching and deadly consequences. A “portfolio” may be regarded as fearsome retaliation in the precincts
of Foggy Bottom, but a portfolio has never frightened or intimidated an evildoer anywhere. Someone in this administration must
summon the courage to act with fearless and decisive action.
Threat high – availability is soooo easy
Cantrell 15
/19 March 2015, Rebecca Cantrell, KFOR, News Channel 4, OKC Fire Chief to US House panel: ‘Active
and realistic threat’ of attacks, http://kfor.com/2015/03/19/okc-fire-chief-to-us-house-panel-activeand-realistic-threat-of-attacks, spark/
Oklahoma City’s Fire Chief says that violent extremists want to use chemical weapons
in terrorist attacks in the United States , and that local first responders will need the
federal government’s help to stay prepared for such attacks. Chief G. Keith Bryant, International
Association of Fire Chiefs president and chairman of the board, testified before a U.S. House of Representatives panel Thursday.
toxic industrial chemicals like chlorine and anhydrous ammonia are readily
available in the nation’s transportation system and chemical facilities, presenting an
“active and realistic threat.”
Bryant said that
Extremists pursing biological and chemical weapons – comprehensive
strategy key
Phillips 15
/1 April 2015, Jim Philipps is an Assistant Director, Strategic Communications, IAFC President: There
Is a Real Chemical Weapons Threat, http://www.iafc.org/Media/articlePR.cfm?ItemNumber=8337,
spark/
Fire Chief G. Keith Bryant, IAFC president and chairman of the board, testified today before a panel of leaders in the field of
violent extremists would like to use biological and
chemical weapons in terrorist attacks within the United States and that local
emergency responders must be prepared with assistance from the federal government .
homeland security and bioterrorism that
“There is a real threat that violent extremists would like to use chemical or biological agents in domestic terrorist attacks,” said
Bryant, fire chief of the Oklahoma City Fire Department. “These
biological and chemical agents require
the use of industrial chemicals that play an important role in our daily life.” Bryant appeared
before the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, co-chaired by former Senator Joe Lieberman and former Governor Tom
Ridge. Other panel members include former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala, former Senator Tom
Daschle, former Representative Jim Greenwood and the Honorable Kenneth Wainstein. Bryant testified that, while the initial
the federal government has a large role to play in
any successful response to a terrorist attack using biological agents or chemicals . “One
major role for the federal government is providing important threat information to
local first responders,” Bryant said. “ Considering the myriad potential threats and the
budgetary constraints of local governments, local first responders need to know for
which threats they should prepare .” Bryant continued, “The federal government provides a
number of critical resources to help state and local agencies, including planning
resources, training opportunities, and material support through funding. As federal,
state and local governments address tightening budget capabilities, we must focus on
remaining prepared to protect our citizens from this pernicious threat.”
response would primarily involve local first responders,
Cyberterror
Grid Attacks
Attacks on the grid cause nuclear war
Andres and Breetz 11- *Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College
and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for
Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University,
**doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, (Richard and Hanna, “Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations: Capabilities,
Costs, and Technological Implications”, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)//WK
Grid Vulnerability. DOD is unable to provide its bases with electricity when the civilian electrical
grid is offline for an extended period of time. Currently, domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their
electricity from the civilian power grid. As explained in a recent study from the Defense Science Board: DOD’s key problem with
electricity is that critical missions, such as national strategic awareness and national command authorities, are almost entirely dependent on the national
transmission grid . . . [which] is fragile, vulnerable, near its capacity limit, and outside of DOD control. In most cases, neither the grid nor on-base backup
power provides www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 262 3 sufficient reliability to ensure continuity of critical national priority functions and oversight of strategic
missions in the face of a long term (several months) outage. 7 The grid’s fragility was demonstrated during the 2003 Northeast blackout in which 50 million
people in the United States and Canada lost power, some for up to a week, when one Ohio utility failed to properly trim trees. The blackout created cascading
disruptions in sewage systems, gas station pumping, cellular communications, border check systems, and so forth, and demonstrated the interdependence of
modern infrastructural systems. 8 More recently, awareness has been growing that the
A report sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security suggests that a
grid is also vulnerable to purposive attacks.
coordinated cyberattack on the grid could
result in a third of the country losing power for a period of weeks or months. 9 Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are not
well understood. It is not clear, for instance, whether existing terrorist groups might be able to develop the capability to conduct this type of attack. It is
likely, however, that some nation-states either have or are working on developing the ability to take down
the U.S. grid. In the event of a war with one of these states, it is possible, if not likely, that parts of the civilian grid would
cease to function, taking with them military bases located in affected regions. Government and private organizations
are currently working to secure the grid against attacks; however, it is not clear that they will be successful. Most military bases currently have backup power
that allows them to function for a period of hours or, at most, a few days on their own. If power were not restored after this amount of time, the results could
be disastrous. First, military assets taken offline by the crisis would not be available to help with disaster relief. Second, during
an extended
blackout, global military operations could be seriously compromised ; this disruption would be particularly
serious if the blackout was induced during major combat operations. During the Cold War, this type of event was far less likely because the making bases more
resilient to civilian power outages would reduce the incentive for an opponent to attack the grid United States and Soviet Union shared the common
understanding that blinding an opponent with a grid blackout
current opponents, however, may not share this fear or be deterred by this possibility.
could escalate to nuclear war. America’s
Turns Trust Internal Links
Cyberterror attacks turn trust—data is perceived as vulnerable
Jacobs et al. 15- *Boston University, Metropolitan Computer Science Dept. United States,
**Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs. PhD, Boston University MS,
Medical College of Virginia MS, BS,***Associate Professor of Computer Science and Dean ad
interim of Metropolitan College & Extended Education. PhD, MS, BS (Stuart, Lou Chitkushev, and
Tanya Zlateva, “Identities, Anonymity and Information Warfare”, Complex Systems Studies and
Terrorism, Springer)//WK
Modern information warfare embodies many different forms and types, using various
computer devices and applications as weapons. However, several common characteristics, based
on fundamental intentions of the contemporary cyber warrior have been identified: (1) neutralize an
adversary’s (target’s) ability to defend itself (2) reduce an adversary’s ability to launch a counter
attack, and (3) increase the adversary’s willingness to submit to the demands of the attacking
entity/organization. The primary focus of information warriors is usually on rendering the
target’s information and communications infrastructure unusable via interfering with
infrastructure service delivery capabilities. Many denial-of-service type attacks are based on fl
aws in the current networking protocols and mechanisms and represent one of the most
common tools in information warfare. Another intention of information warriors may be
causing the target to no longer “trust” the reliability or integrity of its infrastructure. These
types of attacks are detrimental for industries that rely on reliability of the communication
infrastructure, such as the financial industry. Causing the target to no longer “trust” the
information processed or communicated by the infrastructure may be another goal of
information warriors. It usually results in reluctance of target to use the networking
resources and overall decrease in communication activities. Finally, preventing the target from
use of assets or destruction of infrastructure components and assets is a form of information warfare
that can have devastating consequences in sensitive areas such as military applications.
Likely Now
Cyber threats are mounting – the US is vulnerable
Wagner 14 (Meg, producer, reporter and editor, currently working on New York Daily News‘s
digital news desk. 6/22/14, America is still vulnerable to terrorism as Al Qaeda-affiliated groups
grow and turn to cyber attacks: study, Daily News, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/study-us-vulnerable-terror-attacks-article-1.1876645, JHR)
America is still astoundingly vulnerable to terror attacks, a new study by the authors of 'The 9/11 Commission Report' warns. “The world has become more dangerous over the past few
. “The struggle against terrorism is far from
over.” The study warns against terrorism’s “new and dangerous phase,” pointing out the perils of cyber attacks. “Al Qaedaaffiliated groups are now active in more countries than before 9/11,” the report says, and those organizations are increasingly turning to
cyber terror. It quotes one former U.S. agency official who says: “We are at Sept. 10 levels in terms of cyber preparedness.” The report defends National Security Agency
data collection and calls on officials to “persuade a skeptical public that data collection is no broader than necessary to keep the country safe.” It says since Edward
Snowden’s revelations of NSA snooping, applications to work for the agency have dropped by onethird.
years,” says the report, released Tuesday, 10 years after the original 9/11 Commission report
Lone Wolf Attacks
Lone wolf cyberattacks likely—organizations not necessary for effective
attacks
Archer 14- Assistant Professor and Chair of the Politics & History department at Woodbury
University (Emerald, “Crossing the Rubicon: Understanding Cyber Terrorism in the European
Context”, The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, Volume 19, Issue 5, 7/29/14, Taylor and
Francis)//WK
The increase in lone wolf numbers may indicate that lightly structured terrorist networks
have become more common than highly structured ones. The cyber domain and its many
tools is invaluable to the individual who is only loosely connected to an organization. It
appeals to lone wolves because it is inexpensive to enter and to exit, and because it affords
anonymity. Lone wolves can act with the government’s approval and sometimes against it.
Joseph Nye Jr. cites the 2008 Russian attack on Georgia as an example where “any civilian, Russian
born or otherwise, aspiring to be a cyber warrior was able to visit pro-Russian websites to download
the software and instructions necessary to launch a denial of service attack on Georgia.” He points
out that individuals acting within the cyber domain benefit from asymmetric vulnerability,
whereas their state or corporation counterparts do not: They have very low investment and
little to lose from exit and re-entry. Their major vulnerability is to legal and illegal coercion by
governments and organizations if they are apprehended, but only a small per cent are actually caught.
In contrast, corporations have important vulnerabilities because of fixed legal investments in
complex operating system, intellectual property, and reputation. Similarly, large
governments depend on easily disrupted complex systems, political stability, and
reputational soft power. While hit and run cyber strikes by individuals are unlikely to bring
governments or corporations to their knees, they can impose serious costs of disruption to
operations and reputations with a miniscule investment. If one looks at terrorism from the
perspective of the lone wolf, cyber methods appear to be the ultimate weapon. Beyond the
ability to break the information infrastructure of advanced societies if an individual has the skill set, a
cyber terrorist could also bring media attention to their cause without causing death or human
suffering. To date, however, no lone wolf has yet used cyber tactics effectively in an attack.
Turns Econ
Cyber attacks turn the economy—shuts off key sectors
Stevens 14- Schreyer Honors College of Pennsylvania State University (Cameron, “Casualties Of
Cyber Warfare: U.S., Chinese Companies Getting Caught In Crossfire Of Brewing Cyber War”,
http://fortunascorner.com/2014/08/25/casualties-of-cyber-warfare-u-s-chinese-companies-gettingcaught-in-crossfire-of-brewing-cyber-war/)//WK
That the United States and China have engaged in skirmishes in the cyber domain is no secret.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, targeted cyber attacks, often with signs of Chinese origin, have attempted to penetrate
the computer networks of U.S. corporations and government agencies in search of
potentially valuable information. In response to this new strategic threat, the U.S. Military’s Strategic Command commissioned the
creation of a sub-unified Cyber Command in 2009, with one of its stated objectives being the “defense of specified Department of Defense information
networks.” U.S. President Barack Obama
very clearly defined the threat that cyber attacks pose to the
economy, in both the public and private sectors, when he said that the “ cyber threat is one of the most
serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation.” Indeed, conflict in the
cyber domain is still having some serious repercussions for the business world. The characteristic of
cyber warfare that makes it so uniquely dangerous to the corporate sector is that military power in the cyber domain must be extended through computer
networks provided and maintained by non-governmental bodies. The use of these networks for cyber attacks or defense requires the conscription or
cooperation of civilian resources. This creates extreme liabilities for the corporations that provide these networks, as they will quickly become the targets of
suspicion and possible retaliation from the enemy state. In recent years, both Chinese and American companies have been caught in just this situation. On
October 8, 2012, the U.S. House of Representatives’ intelligence committee released a report that warned of potential national security threats posed by
Chinese telecommunication giants Huawei and ZTE. After conducting a year-long investigation of the suspect companies, the intelligence committee found
serious vulnerabilities caused by hidden “backdoors” worked into the companies’ technologies that would allow access to U.S. government and business
networks. The report advised against the purchase of products manufactured by Huawei or ZTE, and suggested that policymakers block any mergers between
either of the two companies and U.S. telecommunication corporations. These accusations have seriously hurt consumer confidence in the two companies, to
the extent that in December of 2013, Huawei’s executive vice president dramatically declared “we are not interested in the U.S. market anymore.” While
Huawei has managed to hold on to a small market share in America, the company’s association with Chinese state-sponsored cyber attacks has devastated its
ability to operate in the United States. It became clear last year, though, that the United States was a perpetrator of cyber attacks as well as a victim. In June
2013, former U.S. National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden provided the world with a look into the intelligence apparatus of the NSA, releasing
thousands of classified documents to the media. The released documents revealed that the U.S., like China, was using domestic tech firms (in many cases
without their knowledge or consent) as conduits for intelligence gathering cyber attacks. In May 2014, the Chinese government announced that it would no
longer purchase or use two of Microsoft’s main products, the Windows 8 operating system and the Microsoft Office 365 Suite. Then, in late July and early
August, Chinese officials from the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) raided multiple offices owned by Microsoft and its contractors in
China. While vague statements about an anti-monopoly probe were made, the company’s decision to end support for the Windows XP operating system – a
move that would expose the many Chinese computers that use the operating system to security risks – was also cited as a factor in the raids. While it is likely
that the ban and subsequent raids were also intended to pave the way for new operating system technologies created in China, the Snowden revelations allowed
potential U.S. espionage activities to be cited as a justification. Just as Huawei and ZTE suffered for their association with espionage activities of the Chinese
government, Microsoft took a major hit because of the provocative actions of its government. An Undefined Battlefield On both sides of the Pacific, it
is
clear that both U.S. and Chinese tech firms are being caught in the crossfire of these cyber
skirmishes between the two countries. Any escalation in tensions in the cyber domain could
be disastrous to the private sector. Unfortunately, despite the risks that future cyber wars hold for
multinational corporation s, there is a marked absence of legislation, precedent, and international norms that could govern the relationships
between private companies and the governments looking to use them as avenues through which cyber war could be conducted. For as long as these
ambiguities exist, corporations that deal in the communication technology industry will exist in the gray area of an unregulated cyber battlefield devoid of any
policies meant to protect the assets and infrastructures of civilian actors. It is in the interests of both countries to more clearly define, through domestic
cooperation with corporate partners and with bilateral international discussion and agreement, the boundaries between civilians and the military in cyber
warfare. Failure to do so could severely hamper the
countries and further destabilize an already fragile Sino-American relationship.
economic interaction that has been so lucrative for both
Cyber attacks hit the stock market—collapses economy
Booton 13- Fox News Correspondent, internally cites Cedric Leighton, former NSA analyst
(Jennifer, “'White Hat' Hackers Expose Flaws of U.S. Stock Market”, Fox News, 10/23/13,
,http://www.foxbusiness.com/technology/2013/10/22/white-hat-hackers-expose-cyber-flaws-usstock-market/)//WK
Ethical "white hat" hackers, intentionally looking to expose the cyber vulnerabilities of U.S.
equity markets, were able to directly impact market performance in a test last month --forcing a
mock market close. Details of the exercise, dubbed Quantum Dawn 2, were unveiled in a new report earlier this week and highlight the
steps the financial industry has taken to tackle ongoing digital threats. More importantly, they underscore the work that still needs to be
done. “You don’t know what you don’t know until you do exercises like this ,” said Cedric Leighton, a
former U.S. intelligence officer with the National Security Agency (NSA). More than 50 entities and 500 people in the financial services
sector participated in the wide-scale mock cyber attack hosted by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) on
July 18. Ethical hackers were told to give everything they had to try and cripple the U.S. stock
market. The six-hour exercise, which simulated multiple trading days, was designed to be realistic
and intense, underscoring the growing sophistication of malicious hackers in an effort to
improve the industry's coordinated response in the event of a systemic attack. “Quantum Dawn 2
demonstrated the industry’s resiliency when faced with serious cyber attacks that aimed to steal money, crash systems and disrupt equity
market trading,” SIFMA CEO Judd Gregg said in a statement. While the industry has made strides on this front, the test showed how
much work still lies ahead in protecting critical U.S. assets, including the highly liquid equity markets. “ Complacency
is not an
option in the fight against cyber crime ,” said Gregg, a former senator. It Could Happen Using multiple
attack vectors, including those originating from external sources and malicious insiders, individuals from the private and public
sector participating in the SIFMA exercise gained experience reacting to realistic attempts by hackers to crash the technical
systems that serve as the lifeblood of U.S. equity markets. With motives varying from a desire
to steal billions of dollars, disrupt equities markets or degrade a firm’s post-trade processing
capability, participants fought off attempted phishing schemes, corruption in widely-used
source code, distributed denial of service attacks, fraud designed to falsely move the market as well as stolen administrator accounts
that triggered automatic selloffs in target stocks. To top it all off, malicious code and equipment was introduced that in a real-world
scenario, would serve to divert authorities in their investigation and slow down response time. “The more realistic the exercise, and the
more involved the traders and the hierarchy of the exchanges and the whole financial community are in these exercises, the better prepared
they’ll be if and when attacks from a cyber standpoint occur,” Leighton said. SIFMA said cooperation between the private and public
sector was crucial in dealing with the attacks and re-ignited the call to Congress to pass legislation that would make it easier for the
private/public sectors to share information in an effort to prevent an attack. At an unrelated cyber security industry event in Midtown
Manhattan on Monday, acting Department of Homeland Security Secretary Rand Beers also encouraged Congress to pass comprehensive
cyber legislation, calling security a "shared responsibility." Ed Powers, national managing partner of Deloitte’s Security & Privacy practice,
who helped audit the SIFMA exercise, says it's unrealistic to expect defenses to prevent all cyber incidents, though he says understanding
the need to not just be secure, but also "vigilant and resilient" is key to thwarting them. The SIFMA rehearsal also tackled the market’s
open and close decision process in the event of an attack, including understanding how the market would react and function once
reopened following the loss of critical infrastructure and assets. “It’s much easier to respond if you’ve practiced responding to it,” Leighton
notes. Bullseye on America's Markets Ongoing analysis of intelligence is crucial in the fight against cyber
crime, terrorism, hacking and espionage, especially as crime continues to evolve and the
hackers themselves consistently update methods designed to throw off authorities. Western
financial institutions have long been a target of cyber evildoers , particularly those operating out of anti-
capitalist groups and nations overseas. While no known cyber attacks have taken The New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq Stock Market
offline (though their systems have succumbed to tech glitches), the threat is unwavering and has seeped into other aspects of the financial
industry. For example, last September and earlier this year, major U.S. and European banks, including Bank of America (BAC), JPMorgan
(JPM) and HSBC (HBC) suffered from DDoS attacks that temporarily downed their consumer sites. In 2011, the Nasdaq OMX Group
(NDAQ) disclosed that its confidential document-sharing service was infiltrated. Spokespeople from the Nasdaq and NYSE exchanges
couldn’t immediately be reached to discuss the Quantum exercise specifically. However, at Monday's cyber security event in Manhattan,
Mark Graff, CISO at Nasdaq OMX, said the exchange remains “a big target” of those who want to “hurt the financial industry.” Beers
agreed, saying, "cyber networks and systems are increasingly being targeted."
AT: Empirically Denied
Empirics are a bad model—cyberthreats are constantly evolving
Archer 14- Assistant Professor and Chair of the Politics & History department at Woodbury
University (Emerald, “Crossing the Rubicon: Understanding Cyber Terrorism in the European
Context”, The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, Volume 19, Issue 5, 7/29/14, Taylor and
Francis)//WK
Despite the fact that cyber terrorists have so far not been able to launch a destructive
cybernetic attack, what the future holds is uncertain. The hactivist group Anonymous
illustrates the evolving nature of cyber threats. Considered “a loosely affiliated group of activist
computer hackers who got their start years ago as cyber-pranksters,” Anonymous seemed more like
an online community of tech-savvy kids interested in making mischief rather than political
statements. Today that group has significantly evolved, and its coordinated attacks on major
corporate and government websites have become common. The constitution of Anonymous
is borderless, giving the group a global appeal, but their attacks are highly targeted and
successful, and such attacks seem to be ideological in nature. Anonymous, then, serves as an
unsettling model that more familiar terrorist groups may strive to emulate. The group has
successfully attacked the U.S. Department of Justice websites and has broken into the Vatican
computer networks, accessing sensitive information that is easily exploitable. The evolving
capabilities of Anonymous thus indicate what can be done at higher, more threatening levels
of access. Indeed, cyber terrorism may become a more popular tactic as power shifts and
global structures are transformed. Information and technology revolutions are changing the
nature of power and increasing the diffusion of it globally. Joseph Nye Jr. argues that while
power is a contested topic, “cyber power” is broadly defined as “the ability to obtain preferred
outcomes through the use of electronically interconnected information resources of the cyber
domain.” This power can be used to produce outcomes within cyberspace and can employ
cyber instruments to affect outcomes outside of the cyber domain. Computing systems are
manmade, and as such, they are subject to the most rapid technological changes. These changes and
the demands to keep up technologically may make cyber less attractive to terrorists as a method, but
since the barriers to entering this domain are so low, both individuals and non-state actors
can play a significant role with little effort or cost. Thus Nye believes that our increasing
“dependence on complex cyber systems for support of military and economic activities
creates new vulnerabilities in large states that can be exploited by non-state actors.” Power,
then, will likely shift hands in the context of cyber attacks. Governments ultimately have the most
sophisticated resources when it comes to the Internet, but individual actors can still make waves that
impact the state’s ability to function. With this in mind, what kinds of cyber activity seem most likely
today?
Nuclear Terror
Deterrence Fails
Nuclear terror is the most dangerous nuclear threat because deterrence fails
Sid-Ahmed, ‘4 – Mohammed, political analyst, “Extinction!” al-ahram weekly,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm.
The most critical moment was the one when the Soviet Union collapsed and fragmented into a number of independent republics. The lack
of a central authority in a vast nation with massive arsenals of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction raised the nightmare
prospect of those weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible parties who would not hesitate to use them.¶ Despite the acute
contradiction on which it was based, the bipolar world order was an international system in which nations could be in a state of conflict but
where they were also members of the United Nations, related to each other via agreements, accords, treaties, etc.. that is, through a system
of mutual obligations, which restricted, to one extent or another, their freedom of action. The disappearance of the Soviet Union left the
field clear not only to the United States at the summit of the global community but to the forces of international terrorism
at its base. These forces are waging a war on the international system unbound by any constraints. It
is a war waged by "irresponsible" groups who do not expose themselves to the accountability of the world system, nor to transparency in
any form. That
is why terrorism is so difficult to cast light on and can represent a greater danger
than wars waged by regular armies.¶ During the Cold War, the overkill capabilities developed
by the superpowers allowed them to use deterrence as a device to prevent nuclear conflagration; there
was a tacit agreement between them that while they could, and did, engage in brinkmanship by threatening to use their weapons of mass
destruction, they would desist from actually doing so. In the absence of any kind of parity between the protagonists in today's
shadowy war on terror, mutual deterrence has been replaced by a process of pre-emption that
incites the enemy to take anticipatory measures.¶ The devastating attack of 11 September 2001, which claimed nearly 3,000 victims, is a case
in point. What provoked the attack? Why that particular type of anticipatory blow? Is there an explanation for the sequence of events that
began with raids against two US embassies in Africa, followed by the attack on an American destroyer close to Aden and climaxed with
9/11? It was a practice run for an even more devastating attack involving nuclear weapons. But if Osama Bin Laden was in possession of
nuclear weapons at the time, why did he choose to go for an intricate plan entailing the hijacking of four passenger planes, tight
synchronisation and split-second timing? Surely triggering a nuclear device would have been easier. Settling for the low-tech alternative of
turning planes into missiles indicates that Bin Laden was not then in possession of nuclear weapons. Actually, the idea of linking terrorism
to prohibited weapons of mass destruction came from Bush, not from the terrorists themselves, and was aimed at establishing some sort of
link between Iraq and terrorism to legitimise his war against Saddam Hussein.¶ We have reached a point in human history where the
phenomenon of terrorism has to be completely uprooted, not through persecution and oppression, but by removing the reasons that make
particular sections of the world population resort to terrorism. This means that fundamental changes must be brought to the world system
itself. The phenomenon of terrorism is even more dangerous than is generally believed. We are in for surprises no less serious than 9/11
and with far more devastating consequences.¶ A
nuclear attack by terrorists will be much more critical than
Hiroshima and Nagazaki, even if -- and this is far from certain -- the weapons used are less harmful than
those used then, Japan, at the time, with no knowledge of nuclear technology, had no choice but to capitulate. Today, the
technology is a secret for nobody.¶ So far, except for the two bombs dropped on Japan, nuclear weapons have been used only to threaten.
Now we are at a stage where they can be detonated. This completely changes the rules of the game. We have reached a point where
anticipatory measures can determine the course of events. Allegations of a terrorist connection can be used to justify anticipatory measures,
including the invasion of a sovereign state like Iraq. As it turned out, these allegations, as well as the allegation that Saddam was harbouring
WMD, proved to be unfounded.¶ What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it
would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies
would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and
religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the
awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.¶ But the
still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a
conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution
infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.
Generic Impact
Extinction
Ayson, 10 Professor of Strategic Studies [Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies, Director of
Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Senior Research Associate with Oxford’s Centre for International
Studies. “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, pages 571-593]
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not
necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism
should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global
catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these
weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance
alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as
long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the
possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear
worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just
possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of
events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In
this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state
possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by
third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called
n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation
where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the
event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China
could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state
sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist
behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how
might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come
from Russian stocks, and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that
nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the
debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable,
identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials
used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.” Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism
came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)
suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and
probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps
Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high
stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between
these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances
of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited
armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as
these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur
in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and
Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the U nited States as a possible perpetrator
or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also
raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in
the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be
expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense
environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might
mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that
situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption
would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism
(as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or
disarming attack against the leadership of the terror ist group and/or states seen to support that group.
Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as
being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and
even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that
some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what
Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ . . . long-standing interest in all things nuclear
Likely
Nuclear terrorism is increasingly likely
Plame 14 (Valerie, a former career covert CIA operations officer and a New York Times best-selling
author, 9/26/14, The Hill “Nuclear terrorism: Most immediate and extreme threat to global
security,” http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/218959-nuclear-terrorism-most-immediate-andextreme-threat-to-global-security, JHR)
Yet this mounting violence and instability pales in comparison to what could be wrought by nuclear-armed terrorists. We know that the Islamic State
group has the means and motive to attain weapons of mass destruction. They have an appetite
for shocking demonstrations and indiscriminate killing, and have already seized low-grade nuclear material from a facility in
Mosul. They are acquiring the ability to build radioactive dirty bombs that could cause major health and economic damage. With
reports of escalating funding and recruitment of citizens from every continent, and ties to radicals in
nuclear weapons-states such as Pakistan, it is increasingly conceivable that weapons-grade materials – or
even a ready-made nuclear device – could fall into their hands. If that happens, they would not hesitate to use them –
possibly at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. There are more than 16,000 nuclear weapons in the world and enough highlyenriched uranium and plutonium to make hundreds of thousands more. We can do our best to prevent isolated incidents in which terrorists buy, build or steal them – but those efforts
are stop-gap at best, and we won’t know if we missed something until it’s too late. Nuclear terrorism is all but inevitable unless we work quickly and urgently to secure all nuclear
materials and eradicate all nuclear weapons. To eliminate the risk we have to drain the swamp.
Impact—Indo-Pak War
A terrorist attack in India leads to a nuclear war – the US can’t do anything
about it because it would be so bayad
Iqbal 15
/28 Feburary 2015, Anwar Iqbal is a correspondent for Dawn, based in Washington, DC. Terrorist
attack in India may lead to nuclear war: US experts, http://www.dawn.com/news/1166399/terroristattack-in-india-may-lead-to-nuclear-war-us-experts, spark/
A major terrorist attack in India might lead to a large-scale military assault on
Pakistan, which then could lead to a nuclear war in one of the world’s most populous
regions , the US Congress was told. Two US experts on South Asian affairs — George Perkovich and Ashley Tellis —
presented the doom’s day scenario before a Senate panel earlier this week. The US Senate and the House of Representatives held
a series of hearings this week to consider the Obama administration’s budget proposals for 2016. While debating the US State
Department’s proposals for foreign aid, lawmakers invited senior US officials — including Secretary of State John Kerry — and
think-tank experts to explain the administration’s foreign policy. During one of these hearings, the two experts argued that
Pakistan might use nuclear weapons against India if the latter launched a large-scale
military assault in retaliation for a major terror attack from across the border . “South
Asia is the most likely place nuclear weapons could be detonated in the foreseeable
future. This risk derives from the unusual dynamic of the India-Pakistan competition,”
said Mr Perkovich, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr Tellis of the same institute urged the United States to
there is little that the United States can do
to preserve deterrence stability between two asymmetrically-sized states where the
gap in power promises to become even wider tomorrow than it is today ,” he said.
use its influence to preventing a terrorist attack. “Other than this,
Impact—Russia War
Terrorism culminates a US Russia war that causes extinction
Barrett et al 13 - *Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, AND **Global Catastrophic Risk Institute,
Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, and Department of
Geography, Pennsylvania State University, AND ***Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Center
for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University (Anthony, Seth D. Baum, Kelly R.
Hostetler, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States
and Russia,” 6/28/3013, http://sethbaum.com/ac/2013_NuclearWar.pdf )
War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far
the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing
food production for years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide
and even the extinction of humanity.2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia
could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first
attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to
maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking
nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches
nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from
otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence
capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and
Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter- attack. However,
concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s
forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities
to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first
attack.5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was
significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk.7 While the United
False
indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways . First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly
States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8
interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second,
terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia
that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a
stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis
between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible.12
Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the
United States .13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch
control safeguards or exploit holes in their security.14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is
significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly
There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions
between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to
misinterpret events as attacks.16
deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions.
Yes Attribution
Nuclear attribution is certain – advanced technology
Walt 13 (Stephen, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard
University 7/25/13, Foreign Policy, “Why We Don’t Need to Worry About a ‘Nuclear Handoff’,”
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/25/why-we-dont-need-to-worry-about-a-nuclear-handoff/, JHR
)
The fear that nuclear-armed states would hand weapons to terrorists has been a staple of U.S. threat-mongering ever since 9/11. It was a key part of the justification for invading Iraq in
, a nuclear-armed state has
little incentive to give up control over weapons it has labored long and hard to acquire, for what could the state
possibly gain from doing so? Second, a state giving nuclear weapons to terrorists could never be sure that those
weapons would not be traced back to it and thereby invite devastating retaliation. Lieber and Press examine the
2003, and it forms part of the constant drumbeat for military action against Iran. But it never made much sense for two reasons. First
historical record and show that it is almost impossible to conduct a major terrorist operation and not be blamed for it. Here’s the abstract for their article: Many experts consider nuclear
terrorism the single greatest threat to U.S. security. The fear that a state might transfer nuclear materials to terrorists was a core justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and, more
recently, for a strike against Iran’s nuclear program. The logical basis for this concern is sound: if a state could orchestrate an anonymous nuclear terror attack, it could destroy an enemy
. But how likely is it that the perpetrators of nuclear terrorism could remain anonymous?
attribution is very likely after high-casualty terror
attacks. Attribution rates are even higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a
major U.S. ally — 97 percent for incidents in which ten or more people were killed. Moreover, tracing a terrorist group that used a
nuclear weapon to its state sponsor would not be difficult, because few countries sponsor terror; few
terror groups have multiple sponsors; and only one country that sponsors terrorism, Pakistan, has nuclear
weapons or enough material to manufacture them. If leaders understand these facts, they will be as reluctant to give weapons to terrorists as they are to use them directly; both
yet avoid retaliation
Data culled from a decade of terrorist incidents reveal that
actions would invite devastating retaliation.
Yes Retaliation
The US would retaliate – existing tensions
Ayson, 10 (Robert, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in
New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging
Catalytic Effects”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, InformaWorld)
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist
group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling
out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in
Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program
continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in
this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a
backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had
already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst ? Of
course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they
were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist
attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise
Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack
the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia
and /or China . For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the
U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a
high er stage of alert . In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that
Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear
force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted
domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
on its own soil might also raise
that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as
discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack
against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might
interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps
not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in
connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly
raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of
how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack
on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But
what would happen if the
United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington
found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also
suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the
chances of a major exchange . If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia
there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example,
and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their
culpability?