Developing a National Framework for
Monitoring the Iraqi NDP
MEASURING GOVERNANCE
Marie Laberge
Global Programme on Country-Led Governance Assessments
UNDP Oslo Governance Centre
Types of indicators & data sources
Examine the limitations of global composite indicators
Discuss the rationale for using complementary indicators (input
vs. Process vs. outcome – de jure vs. de facto)
Identify indicators that are ‘actionable’
Identify 4 ways in which indicators can be made pro-poor and
gender sensitive
Identify common sources of governance data
Part One
International sources of governance
indicators
Global composite indicators of governance
Global
Accountability
Index of ReportDemocracy
Democracy
Index
World
World
Human Governance
Democracy
Rights Assessment
Audit
Indicators
Governance
Gender
and
State
Weberian Empowerment
Democracy
Failure
Comparative Measure
Processes
Dataset
State Project
Institutional
Women in
Press
Profiles
Parliament
Freedom
Database
Index
Index of
Economic
BEEPS Countries at the
Freedom
Crossroads
CIRI
Commitment to Human Rights
Failed
Databse
Development
States Index
Bertelsmann
Open
Journalists Governance
Transformation Budget
killed
Matters
Opacity Index
Index
Index
World
Integrity Index
Corruption
Bribe
Values
Global
Perceptions
Payers
Survey
GAPS
in
Index
Index Workers’ RightsPeace Index
Political
Terror
Scale
Global
Competitiveness
Polity
Index
International
CPIA
Country
Risk
Press
Freedom in
Guide
Freedom
the World
Survey
1974 76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
00
02
04
06
08
Transparency
International
Freedom House
World Bank
Governance
Indicators
Bertelsmann
Foundation
Global
Integrity
(Syria, Saudi
Arabia not
included)
Top Jordan
Saudi
Arabia
Kuwait
Morocco
“Partially
free”:
Jordan,
Morocco,
Lebanon,
Yemen,
Kuwait
Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan,
Jordan, Kuwait,
Kuwait,
Saudi
Algeria
Egypt,
Arabia,
Palestine
Morocco
Bot- Lebanon
tom Yemen
“Not free”: Syria
Syria
Algeria,
Yemen
Saudi
Egypt, Saudi Palestine Arabia
Arabia, Syria
Palestine
Morocco
Algeria
Yemen
Lebanon
How to explain these discrepancies in rankings?
1) What is each index measuring?



TI CPI  Public sector only
WB ‘Control of Corruption’ indicator  public & private
sectors
Global Integrity Index  anti-corruption mechanisms
2) What types of indicators make up each index?


High-level corruption vs. petty corruption
Frequency of bribes vs. size of bribes
3) What data sources are used?
Selected
sources
(out of 13 in
2009)
Subject asked
(based on
perceptions)
Respondents
Coverage
World Economic
Forum (WEF)
Undocumented extra
payments or bribes
connected with various
government functions
Senior business
leaders; domestic and
international
companies
131 countries
Bertelsmann
Transformation
Index (BTI)
The government’s
capacity to punish and
contain corruption
Network of local
experts / local
business people
125 countries
Economist
Intelligence Unit
(EIU)
The misuse of public
office for private (or
political party) gain
International experts
170 countries
And…
4) Are data sources the same
every year?
2009
2008
2007
TI Corruption Perception index (CPI)
126th
Syria
5 surveys
176th
Iraq
3 surveys
179th
Afghanistan
4 surveys
147th
Syria
5 surveys
176th
Afghanistan
4 surveys
178th
Iraq
4 surveys
138th
Syria
4 surveys
172th
Afghanistan
4 surveys
178th
Iraq
4 surveys
Part two
National governance indicators
Monitoring the input, process and
outcome sides of governance
reforms
Three levels of indicators
Outcome indicators will tell us:
What do we want to achieve?
Have we achieved it?
Process indicators will tell us:
How are inputs used to generate outcomes?
What are the ‘best’ processes?
When & how do processes need adjustment?
Input indicators will tell us:
What is needed to create these processes?
Whether it is available?
Complementarity in the use of indicators
• De jure (input) indicator: In law, is there an agency with
a legal mandate to address corruption? Does it receive
regular funding, a professional & full-time staff?
Measuring a change in law, in procedures, in resources
• De facto (process / outcome) indicator: In practice, is
the anti-corruption agency effective?
Measuring improved governance in practice (how are
citizens benefiting from this new institution?)
Combining indicators to show discrepancies
 De jure indicator:
In law, is there an agency with a legal mandate to address
corruption? (input)
 De facto indicators:
In practice, is the anti-corruption agency effective? (outcome)
• When necessary, is the ACA able to independently initiate
investigations? (process)
• Does the ACA make regular public reports (e.g. to the
parliament)? (process)
• Can citizens complain to the ACA without fear of recrimination?
(e.g. whistle-blower mechanisms) (process)
• Does the ACA act on citizen complaints within a reasonable time
period? (process)
Input / process indicators are more ‘actionable’
• Outcome indicators are useful to assess progress
towards the desired objectives of governance
programmes (new laws / increased expenditures
mean nothing in and of themselves)
• But they lack ‘actionability’ (they don’t tell us what
needs to be fixed / points of interventions)
• Example: A government cannot ‘choose’ to lower a
crime rate (an outcome indicator)
• It can, however, choose to put more police on the
streets (input) or toughen penalties for offenders
(prosecution process)
Actionable indicators:
Experience from Morocco
Outcome indicators
(non-actionable)
Input / process indicators
(actionable)
% citizens who believe there is a lack
of transparency in the operations of
local governments
Number of provinces which have a
public forum for citizens to discuss
with locally elected officials
Number of provinces which formally
publish contracts, tenders, local
budget and local development plan
% citizens who do not believe that
legal protection is ensured equally to
all citizens regardless of their material
status, ethnic, religious affiliations,
political/party affiliations
Number of provinces where an
awareness-raising programme on
citizens’ rights to seek legal protection
has been conducted
% citizens who say they know where
to / how to seek legal protection
A word of caution:
“Not everything
that counts can
be counted, and
not everything
that can be
counted counts.”
– Albert Einstein
A word of caution:
“Not everything that
counts can be counted,
and not everything that
can be counted counts.”
– Albert Einstein
Measuring is not an end in itself, but
rather a means to an end (actual
governance reforms).
So what we measure should help us
implement reforms – if not, why
measure it?
A word of caution
• Risk of measuring things because they are easily
measurable, leading to ‘reform illusion’
• Example: Measuring the number of corruption cases brought
to trial (as an indicator of the efficiency of the judicial system
in combating corruption):
• Does an increase in this indicator mean an increased
level of confidence in the reporting mechanism, and in the
courts?
• Or rather, does it indicate a higher incidence of
corruption?
• Or both...?
 In other words, are you really measuring what you intended
to measure?
Balanced baskets of indicators
Do you have a balanced
basket of indicators that
measures progress towards a
single aim?
Is the ambiguity inherent in
each indicator reduced by the
presence of the others?
Balanced baskets of indicators
– What is the aim you want to achieve?
– What are the many reasons why your aim
might NOT be achieved?
– For each “reason”  develop one
indicator
Unbalanced baskets of indicators
Aim: “Equal access to justice”
Indicator 1:
Number of new courts opened in rural and urban
areas
Indicator 2:
Number of courts per 100,000 residents
Indicator 3:
% citizens who say that they have access to court
systems to resolve disputes
Indicator 4:
% accused not represented at trial
Indicator 1:
Number of new courts opened
in rural and urban areas
Measures the activity of a
court-building programme, but
does not tell us the result of the
programme: do people have
their fair share of courts?
Indicator 2:
Number of courts per 100,000
residents
Tells us nothing about the
equality of the distribution of
courts (serving mainly one
group / one region?)
Indicator 3:
% citizens who say that they
have access to court systems to
resolve disputes
Tells us nothing about equality
Indicator 4:
% accused not represented at
trial
The basket as a whole is
unbalanced: 3 indicators relate
to the courts, and one to legal
aid
Balanced baskets of indicators
Checklist for building a well-balanced
basket of indicators
 Avoid narrow activity indicators
 What is the strategic aim you want to achieve?
 Draw one indicator from each institution/service
that contributes to the overall aim
Or...
What are the many reasons why your aim
might NOT be achieved?
For each “reason”  develop one indicator
Balanced baskets of indicators
4 key services/institutions for achieving
“equal access to justice”
4 indicators:
1. Court system
2. Legal aid service
3. Police service
4. Prosecution service
Indicator 1 – Court system
% citizens who say that they have
access to court systems,
disaggregated by gender, ethnicity,
region, etc.
Adapted from version 1:
Disaggregated to reveal issues of
inequality
Indicator 2 – Legal aid service
% accused persons legally
represented at one or more court
appearances, disaggregated by
gender, ethnicity, region, etc.
Adapted from version 1:
Disaggregated to reveal issues of
inequality
Indicator 3 – Police service
% citizens who say that the police will
respond to them without requiring a
bribe if called to resolve a dispute,
disaggregated by gender, ethnicity,
region, etc.
Adds balance: Will alert you to
problems in police services that may
block access to justice more for some
groups than for other.
Indicator 4 – Prosecution service
Ratio of prosecution caseloads in courts
serving wealthier communities to those
in courts serving marginalized
communities
Adds balance: Will alert you to
problems in prosecution services that
may block access to justice more for
some groups than for other.
How to make governance
indicators ‘pro-poor’ and
gender sensitive
What makes a governance
indicator ‘pro-poor’ or
gender sensitive?
4 ways to make indicators sensitive
to vulnerable groups:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Disaggregating by poverty/gender
Specific to the poor/women
Implicitly poverty/gender sensitive
Chosen by the poor/women
1. Disaggregating by poverty/gender (Parliament)
 Information is collected for the general population, then
disaggregated by sex or income
•
% seats held by women in parliament
•
Level of confidence among female citizens that the
Parliament represents their interests
•
% of Parliamentarians from poorer districts
that have functioning and accessible local
offices to meet with constituents
2. Specific to the poor/women
Measuring governance issues that are specific to
the poor or to women
• Size of funds allocated to legal aid in provincial
budgets (per capita)
• Number of attorneys as % of citizens in need of one
• % of local governments practicing gender-sensitive
budgeting
3. Implicitly poverty/gender sensitive
• Backlog of small cases of little financial value
 Makes no explicit reference to poverty status or
gender, but by its nature, clear that the indicator is of
particular relevance to low-income groups / women
• The number of hours that polling booths are open
during on election day
• Frequency of engagement of CSOs in consultations
on the legislation-making process
4. Chosen by the poor/women
 Identified & measured by using participatory
techniques (surveys, focus groups, etc.)
• Acceptance of documentation other than birth
certificates in the process of voter registration
• Women’s trust in the police and its ability to provide
women with redress if they file a complaint
Sources of governance data
Complementarity of data sources
• Important to monitor both the ‘supply’ and
‘demand’ for good governance
• Parallel with private sector:
– Assessment of the company’s charter, balance
sheet, internal processes and assembly line
OR / AND ?
– Assessment of whether consumers are actually
buying their product, whether they were satisfied
with it, and likely to keep on buying it
Implications for data sources?
1) Objective data – Qualitative:
Administrative sources: Policy and legal documents, codes of
conduct, organizational set-up and management systems,
processes for decision-making
Other narrative reports: Newspaper reports, reports by CSOs
2) Objective data – Quantitative:
Government statistics, data gathered by domestic NGOs,
international organizations and academics, expenditure tracking
and budgetary information, audit reports, court records
3) Opinion and experience-based data from citizens, specific
groups (MPs), specific institutions, or private sector through
surveys, focus groups, etc.
Assessing the ‘supply
side’ of governance
Assessing the ‘demand side’
of governance
IHEC has a permanent voter
registry with safeguards to
prevent fraud and
mechanisms for inclusion of
all Iraqis in elections
-% of people prevented from
registering (experience-based)
-% of people prevented from voting
because name not on voter list
(experience-based)
-% of people prevented from voting
due to intimidation (experiencebased)
-% of people who say results
accurate reflection of vote
-% of people who feel elections
produce legislature representative of
people
-% of people who feel elections
enable them to get rid of bad leaders
Assessing the ‘supply side’ of
governance
Number of criminal codes and
criminal procedure codes
harmonized with international
Human Rights Law
Assessing the ‘demand side’
of governance
% who say ordinary people can
commit crimes without
punishment
% who say high level officials can
commit crimes without
punishment
% who say people fear wrongful
arrest
Opportunity to draw from
‘fresh’ survey data
New ‘Arab Democracy Barometer’
Joint initiative by Arab Reform Initiative & Arab
Barometer
Nationally representative public survey
In 10 countries – including Iraq
Data to be collected by country teams
(starting autumn 2010)
75 questions
The Arab Democracy Index
• First governance index produced by an Arab institution (“The Arab Reform
Initiative”)
• Data collected by consortium of Arab research centres & universities
• Covers 10 countries
• 40 indicators
 Some measure the ‘means’ of democratic transition (legislation) – ‘de
jure’ indicators
 Some measure the ‘results’ of democratic transition – ‘de facto’
indicators
• Sources of data:
 Government & non-government
 Citizen’s impressions (public survey) used for 25% indicators
• 4 themes:
1) Strong & accountable public institutions
2) Rule of law
3) Respect for rights & freedoms
4) Equality & social justice