PRISM Neg - LWY (4)

On Case
US/EU Frontline
The U.S. government has acted decisively to mitigate EU concerns about PRISM and
NSA surveillance.
Archick, 2014 [Kristin, Specialist in European Affairs, Congressional Research Service, U.S.-EU
Cooperation Against Terrorism, December 1, 2014,]
U.S. officials have sought to reassure EU leaders and MEPs that U.S. surveillance activities operate within
U.S. law and are subject to oversight by all three branches of the U.S. government. Some observers note that
the United States has been striving to demonstrate that it takes EU concerns seriously and is open to
improving transparency, in part to maintain European support for the SWIFT and the PNR accords. At the EU’s request, a
high-level U.S.-EU working group was established to discuss the reported NSA surveillance operations,
especially the so-called PRISM program (in which the NSA allegedly collected data from leading U.S. Internet companies), and to
assess the “proportionality” of such programs and their implications for the privacy rights of EU citizens.35 In
November 2013, the European Commission (the EU’s executive) issued a report on the findings of this working group, along with
recommendations for addressing European concerns about U.S.-EU data flows and restoring transatlantic trust.36 U.S. and EU policy makers
have been seeking possible ways to implement some of the Commission’s proposals. In June 2014, U.S.
Attorney General Holder
announced that as part of efforts to conclude the DPPA, the Obama Administration would seek to work with Congress to
enact legislation to provide EU citizens with the right to pursue redress in U.S. courts for certain data
privacy violations—a key EU demand.
Shared interests between U.S. and Europe trump fallout from U.S. surveillance.
Relations are resilient.
Raisher, ‘14 [Josh is a program coordinator for the Transatlantic Trends survey at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States, ”Ties that Bind?” U.S. News & World Report, 9-11-2014,]
Fortunately, this is happening at a time when shared
interests continue to push the two countries towards closer
cooperation, irrespective of how much their leaders – and publics – trust each other. Whatever
difficulties exist in the transatlantic relationship, Obama and Merkel have presented a united front when
addressing Russian actions in Ukraine. And there is evidence of this confluence of policy preferences in the
general public as well: In the same Transatlantic Trends survey, American and German publics often agreed when asked what tools they
would prefer to use to address foreign policy concerns. Sixty percent of Germans said that U.S. leadership in world affairs was
desirable, and 70 percent of Americans said the same of the EU. The relationship between the two
countries is still fundamentally strong, and Germany still sees a prominent place for the U.S. in world
affairs. But more and more, Germans may want that place to be farther outside of their own borders.
TTIP kills the multilateral trading system
Defraigne, ’14 (Pierre, Executive Director, Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, former Deputy Director-General in DG Trade,
former Head of Cabinet for Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade (1999-2002), and former Director for North-South Relations and
Head of Cabinet for Etienne Davignon, Vice-President of the European Commission (1977-1983), “THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL
Bretton-Woods multilateralism has provided the world with 30 years of economic growth following
World War II. Its initial purpose was mainly political: building up an international system geared towards
support, across the IMF membership, of New Deal models through trade liberalisation and monetary
stability guaranteed by capital controls. Because of the Cold War and the persisting colonial and postcolonial system, it was the West and the North that primarily reaped Bretton-Woods benefits. America
gradually abandoned its role of guardian of the Bretton-Woods mainly by decoupling dollar from gold
and pushing to replace solidarity between countries through the IMF by entrusting financial markets,
through deregulation and floating exchange rates, with the responsibility of preventing and correcting
structural deficits and surplus, which actually did not work. However, market-driven globalisation has
taken over and has succeeded in eventually bringing about a certain North-South convergence through
the rise of Asia, driven by China’s Renaissance. This change in the power balance between emerging and
advanced economies must translate into a new type of governance. This governance model must build
up on Bretton-Woods foundations, and must definitely retain its multilateral character, but with the
rebalancing of voting rights and enough flexibility to allow for the diversity of development models in
economies that are catching up. TTIP goes in a different direction by substituting pressure with
negotiation and by imposing a ‘one-size fits all’ reference model. An EU-US deal would further weaken
a multilateral trading system already undermined by a chaotic flurry of FTA deals and by the
competitive liberalisation race triggered by the US. • The coalition of the two largest trading powers
would entail a trade diversion effect for the rest of the WTO membership. • A regulatory coalition of
the declining hegemons amounts to an attempt to twist the arm of emerging nations with regard to
norms and standards. • However, emerging nations have the right to develop their own norms and
standards for their domestic markets which are expanding faster than in advanced countries. This is
where the real trade-off between the West and China comes though: regulatory harmonisation for
access to rising markets. • TTIP will either create the risk of a regulatory divide or will constitute a
regulatory domination of the West over emerging countries, two scenarios which are incompatible with
the spirit of multilateralism.
TTIP kills the NATO alliance – weakens U.S.-Europe relations.
Defraigne, ’14 (Pierre, Executive Director, Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, former Deputy Director-General in DG Trade,
former Head of Cabinet for Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade (1999-2002), and former Director for North-South Relations and
Head of Cabinet for Etienne Davignon, Vice-President of the European Commission (1977-1983), “THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL
TTIP would put Europe and America on a path which undermines the multilateral trading system at a
time when the overall multilateral governance needs to be mended, rebalanced and reinforced so as to
adjust it to the new multipolar structure of the world economy. By leaving China outside the scope of
TPP and of TTIP, the US and Europe are running the risk of isolating this great emerging nation, with the
subsequent prospect of pushing it towards an alternative strategy, i.e. forming a regional normative
coalition with its neighbours so as to pursue its expansion by retaining the dynamism of its domestic and
its regional markets for its companies. The EU and the US should be more careful about uniting against
China. Their alliance will be perceived as two declining hegemonic powers attempting to dictate their rule to emerging powers. Instead of
engaging in the construction of a new international economic order, TTIP is trying to prolong the ancient
one. There is still time to stop the hazardous process of TTIP or rather to let it sink into the moving sands of popular contestation. An early
harvest would serve as a face-saving device. A “plurilateralisation” of TTIP including China would however be the best possible outcome. It
would represent a first step towards more balanced multilateral governance. The
European Commission must reassess TTIP
and propose to change tack before the whole process derails into frustration and acrimony with an
unexpected paradox, a weakening of the strategic Atlantic Alliance.
TTIP’s economic benefits are vastly exaggerated. It may even reduce economic output .
Bromund, Hederman, Riley and Coffey, ’13 [Ted, PhD, is Senior Research Fellow in Anglo–
American Relations in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom; Rea, the Director of the Center for
Data Analysis and the Lazof Family Fellow; Bryan, Jay Van Andel Senior Policy Analyst in Trade Policy in
the Center for International Trade and Economics; Luke, the Margaret Thatcher Fellow in the Thatcher
Center at The Heritage Foundation; “Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): Pitfalls and
Promises,” Issue Brief #4100, The Heritage Foundation, December 5, 2013,]
Existing models do not fully capture the dynamic and beneficial effects of freer trade. But precisely because
the U.S. and EU
economies are both large and already relatively open, the beneficial effects of freer trade, though real,
would not be dramatic. One reason for caution about TTIP is the exaggerated hopes that many
proponents place on it. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Victoria Nuland asserts that “TTIP can be for our economic
health what NATO has been to our shared security.”[3] The Atlantic Council similarly asserts that TTIP “should increase military spending in
Europe” and “would be a significant boost to the NATO alliance.”[4] Both of these
claims are doubtful at best. The reality is that,
due in part to the policies of the EU itself, the EU’s share of world output has declined and will continue
to decline. According to the October 2013 edition of the International Monetary Fund’s World Outlook Database, the EU share was 30.9
percent in 1980; by 2018, it will be 16.7 percent.[5] That is the fundamental fact that is driving world events and U.S. policy to turn away from
Europe, and no
conceivable TTIP would alter this reality. Indeed, a bad agreement could actually make both the
U.S. and the EU even less well off.
The overestimated benefits of TTIP are outweighed by its negative effects; low tariffs
now, long time frame, miniscule benefits and uncertain job creation.
European Green Party Green Electoral Convention, ’14 [“Position Paper "TTIP – Too many
untrustworthy promises and real risks,” February 22, 2014,]
A standard argument for “free trade” agreements is that they reduce tariffs, thereby expanding trade,
allowing access to cheaper imports and that broad benefits to the economy clearly outweigh the downsides. But tariffs
between the US and the EU are quite low already – 3 percent on average. Officials promoting TTIP are therefore
focusing their positive economic predictions on the 'elimination, reduction, or prevention of unnecessary
”behind the border” policies', so called non-tariff trade barriers. Optimistic studies have assumed that TTIP might
result in a 0.5-1 percent increase in gross domestic product (GDP). Besides the fact that this way of thinking is the one
that has lead Europe to the actual crisis, such estimates are unrealistically high, and fail to mention that
the full range of benefits is only projected to be achieved by 2027. This means that the short-term benefits are
unlikely to outweigh the negative effects – in terms of health, social protection, environment and
privacy – of the agreement According to an analysis by Public Citizen´s Global Trade Watch (a consumer advocate group), benefits from
TTIP would amount to about less than €40 per family, per year. And that does not take into account any
additional costs from weakened safeguards regarding health, financial, environmental and other public interest
regulations. Tom Jenkins from the European Trade Union Council (ETUC) has voiced his doubts regarding job
increases promised through TTIP: „It is unclear, where these jobs should come from and which EU countries
would in the end benefit.”
TTIP undermines democratic freedoms through secret negotiations and special
international tribunals.
European Green Party Green Electoral Convention, ’14 [“Position Paper "TTIP – Too many
untrustworthy promises and real risks,” February 22, 2014,]
The lack of transparency that has characterised the TTIP negotiations is not only an ominous signal but an
infringement on every citizen´s right to know what is being negotiated in their name. The negotiating mandate which
the EU Council gave to the Commission is still classified as a secret document. Even members of the European Parliament, which plays an
important role in Europe´s trade relations, because it can veto trade deals, as it did for Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), are only
allowed limited access to negotiating texts. The EU Commission does claim that it is being more transparent about TTIP than it was in earlier
trade negotiations, but the members of an advisory body, which includes civil society representatives, do not have access to negotiating texts.
Citizens, instead of transparency, get propaganda about an alleged benefit of €500 per family. We suspect that the organisation of a public
consultation on investor protection provision for corporations are meant as a smokescreen designed to keep the issue off the agenda until after
the European elections in late May. This secrecy undercuts democratic values. When neither citizens nor their representatives
are allowed to be in the know about sensitive negotiations concerning regulatory issues that affect their daily lives in so many ways, this is not
right. It is a collusion of bureaucratic power with special interest groups who get privileged access through some 600
lobbyists. Greens insist on full transparency, nothing less. The negotiation mandate and the negotiating texts of each round should be made
public, so that a transparent and public debate can be held at regular intervals. After all, norms
and rules that have been
democratically decided are at stake. Greens also strictly oppose the inclusion of investor-to-state dispute settlement
(ISDS) mechanisms in TTIP. ISDS allows foreign investors to bypass domestic courts and to file their
complaints directly with international arbitration tribunals, often composed of corporate lawyers. Why have such legal
privileges for international investors when they could rely on well-developed judicial systems? This is about corporate power. If an arbitration
tribunal concludes that democratically determined policies might narrow an investor's projected profits, it could oblige a government to pay
billions in damages. This
would disastrously limit the democratic freedom to legislate on environmental, health,
financial and other matters.
Democracy prevents nuclear warfare, ecosystem collapse, and extinction.
Diamond 95. [Larry a professor, lecturer, adviser, and author on foreign policy, foreign aid, and
democracy, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and instruments, issues and imperatives : a
report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict”, December 1995,]
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former
Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies
through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly
corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate.
The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these
new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of
democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
TTIP is a secret trade agreement hurting our health, food safety, public services, the
environment and democracy
The Gaia Foundation 14 {The Gaia Foundation is a charity group dedicated to helping people
around the world and preserving the world; “What is the TTIP? Why is it bad news? What can you do
about it in the UK?”; 6-27-14;; ME}
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a bilateral 'free trade' agreement currently
under secret negotiation by the EU, USA and powerful industry lobbies. According to its supporters the
TTIP will boost economic growth and create jobs, but in reality it represents a corporate assault on our
health, food safety, public services and the ecosystems we rely upon as EU citizens. This is because the
TTIP is designed to 'harmonise' regulations and standards (regarded as 'trade irritants' by industry)
between the EU and US. Since the EU has much stronger trade regulations protecting public health, food
safety, and the environment, this 'harmonisation' really means deregulation in the EU; reducing
protections for the environment and public health, in favour of exploiting them for corporate profits. If it
is successful the TTIP will also place transnational corporations above the law, giving them new powers
that undermine democracy and the ability of governments to control them. The EU and US want to
finalise TTIP by the end of 2014, so it is vital that we understand and resist this threat to our health,
ecosystems and common heritage. Here are some insights at a glance, and a few suggestions for how
you can take action to stop the TTIP. The TTIP's regulatory harmonisations will ignite a 'race to the
bottom' of environmental regulations in the EU, so that they come to resemble the USA's far weaker
regulatory system. This watering down of protective regulation, and the likely abandonment of the
precautionary principle, (the cornerstone of EU environmental legislation) will open up our ecosystems
to unchecked exploitation from fracking, GM monocultures, mining and other threats. It will also open
EU markets to ecologically damaging and toxic products, such as tar sands, fuelling further ecological
devastation around the globe. To top it all the TTIP could lock the EU and the USA into intensified use of
fossil fuels.
Eco collapse causes extinction.
Jayawardena 9 (Asitha, London South Bank University, “We Are a Threat to All Life on Earth”,
Indicator, 7-17,
Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) explain in detail why the natural environment is so important for life on Earth. It is from the environment
that the living organisms of all species import the energy and raw material required for growth, development and reproduction. In almost all
ecosystems plants, the most important primary producers, carry out photosynethesis, capturing sunlight and storing it as chemical energy. They
absorb nutrients from their environment. When herbivores (i.e. plant-eating animals or organisms) eat these plants possessing chemical
energy, matter and energy are transferred ‘one-level up.’ The same happens when predators (i.e. animals of a higher level) eat these herbivores
or when predators of even higher levels eat these predators. Therefore, in ecosystems, food webs transfer energy and matter and various
organisms play different roles in sustaining these transfers. Such transfers are possible due to the remarkable similarity in all organisms’
composition and major metabolic pathways. In fact all organisms except plants can potentially use each other as energy and nutrient sources;
plants, however, depend on sunlight for energy. Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995) further reveal two key principles governing the biosphere
with respect to the transfer of energy and matter in ecosystems. Firstly, the energy flow in ecosystems from photosynthetic plants (generally
speaking, autotrophs) to non-photosynthetic organisms (generally speaking, heterotrophs) is essentially linear. In each step part of energy is
lost to the ecosystem as non-usable heat, limiting the number of transformation steps and thereby the number of levels in a food web.
Secondly, unlike the energy flow, the matter flow in ecosystems is cyclic. For photosynthesis plants need carbon dioxide as well as minerals and
sunlight. For the regeneration of carbon dioxide plants, the primary producers, depend on heterotrophs, who exhale carbon dioxide when
breathing. Like carbon, many other elements such as nitrogen and sulphur flow in cyclic manner in ecosystems. However, it is photosynthesis,
and in the final analysis, solar energy that powers the mineral cycles. Ecosystems are under threat and so are we Although it seems that a
continued energy supply from the sun together with the cyclical flow of matter can maintain the biosphere machinery running forever, we
should not take things for granted, warn Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995). And they explain why. Since the beginning of life on Earth some 3.5
billion years ago, organisms have evolved and continue to do so today in response to environmental changes. However, the overall picture of
materials (re)cycling and linear energy transfer has always remained unchanged. We could therefore safely assume that this slowly evolving
system will continue to exist for aeons to come if large scale infringements are not forced upon it, conclude Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995).
However, according to them, the present day infringements are large enough to upset the world’s ecosystems and, worse still, human activity is
mainly responsible for these infringements. The rapidity of the human-induced changes is particularly undesirable. For
example, the development of modern technology has taken place in a very short period of time when compared with evolutionary time scales –
within decades or centuries rather than thousands or millions of years. Their observations and concerns are shared by a number of other
scholars. Roling (2009) warns that human
activity is capable of making the collapse of web of life on which both
humans and non-human life forms depend for their existence. For Laszlo (1989: 34), in Maiteny and Parker (2002),
modern human is ‘a serious threat to the future of humankind’. As Raven (2002) observes, many life-support
systems are deteriorating rapidly and visibly. Elaborating on human-induced large scale infringements, Sloep and Van DamMieras (1995) warn that they can significantly alter the current patterns of energy transfer and materials
recycling, posing grave problems to the entire biosphere. And climate change is just one of them! Turning to a
key source of this crisis, Sloep and Van Dam-Mieras (1995: 37) emphasise that, although we humans can mentally afford to step outside the
biosphere, we are ‘animals among animals, organisms among organisms.’ Their perception on the place of humans in nature is resonated by
several other scholars. For example, Maiteny (1999) stresses that we humans are part and parcel of the ecosphere. Hartmann (2001) observes
that the modern stories (myths, beliefs and paradigms) that humans are not an integral part of nature but are separate from it are speeding our
own demise. Funtowicz and Ravetz (2002), in Weaver and Jansen (2004: 7), criticise modern science’s model of human-nature relationship
based on conquest and control of nature, and highlight a more desirable alternative of ‘respecting ecological limits, …. expecting surprises and
adapting to these
Extension – Surveillance No Impact on Relations
NSA surveillance has not harmed trust and relations with Europe.
A. France proves no adverse impact.
Landauro and Schechner, 6-24-15 [Inti, writes about French industrial companies and general
news from The Wall Street Journal’s Paris bureau; Sam, covers technology across Europe, based out of
the Wall Street Journal's Paris bureau. He has previously served as a French business correspondent,
“France Seeks to Play Down Tensions With U.S. Following Spying Allegations,” Wall Street Journal, 6-242015,]
During the call, Mr. Obama
“reiterated that we have abided by the commitment we made to our French
counterparts in late 2013 that we are not targeting and will not target the communications of the French
president,” the White House said. French government spokesman Stephane Le Foll said France didn’t expect the
WikiLeaks allegations to hurt relations between the allies. France’s intelligence coordinator, Didier Le Bret, he said,
plans to meet with NSA officials to ensure that the agency is honoring pledges that the Obama administration
made in the wake of leaks from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. “We need to keep a measured response given
what is at stake,” Mr. Le Foll said. WikiLeaks and two French publications published late Tuesday six documents describing purported
U.S. surveillance of internal deliberations and conversations of Mr. Hollande, as well as former French presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and Jacques
Chirac. “These are unacceptable facts that have already led to clarifications between the United States and France,” Mr. Hollande’s office said.
“France will not tolerate any acts that compromise its security and the safeguarding of its interests.” After his meeting with Ms. Hartley, Mr.
Fabius said he had asked the U.S. ambassador to come back with assurances that similar surveillance of the French government will not occur
again. “We understand that there may be interceptions where terrorists are concerned,” he said. “But that has absolutely nothing to do with
listening to allied and friendly leaders.” After the documents were published, the
White House said it wasn’t currently spying on
Mr. Hollande and wouldn’t conduct such surveillance of him in the future. The statement didn’t deny that spying had
taken place in the past. “We do not conduct any foreign intelligence surveillance activities unless there is a
specific and validated national-security purpose,” said Ned Price, a spokesman for the White House National
Security Council. “This applies to ordinary citizens and world leaders alike.” Still, the latest leak detailing alleged U.S.
spying on European allies is a reminder of the simmering trans-Atlantic tensions over surveillance. The disclosure of widespread spying has also
put European governments on the defensive over their gathering of intelligence. France ranks among the most sophisticated countries when it
comes to electronic surveillance. U.S. intelligence and law-enforcement officials have cited France as one of the countries with the capabilities
to spy on the U.S., though Mr. Le Foll reiterated on Wednesday that France doesn’t spy on allies.
France also shares electronic
intelligence with the NSA, taking advantage of the its access to submarine cables and communications
networks in swaths of Africa where it was once a colonial power, one former French official said. In return, the U.S. shares
information on other parts of the world, the official added.
B. Germany has dropped investigations into alleged U.S. surveillance of Angela Merkl.
No actual evidence was unearthed.
Landauro and Schechner, 6-24-15 [Inti, writes about French industrial companies and general
news from The Wall Street Journal’s Paris bureau; Sam, covers technology across Europe, based out of
the Wall Street Journal's Paris bureau. He has previously served as a French business correspondent,
“France Seeks to Play Down Tensions With U.S. Following Spying Allegations,” Wall Street Journal, 6-242015,]
Since 2013, leaks from Mr. Snowden have detailed widespread surveillance efforts by the NSA, as well as
specific allegations of U.S. spying on allies—including the tapping of the cellphone of German Chancellor
Angela Merkel. The German general prosecutor’s office said earlier this month it was dropping its
investigation into the alleged eavesdropping on Ms. Merkel’s cellphone because of a lack of evidence.
Tuesday’s publication comes just weeks after documents unearthed by a German parliamentary probe
alleged that Germany’s intelligence service helped the NSA spy on European governments, including
France’s. The allegations caused a political firestorm in Germany and were embarrassing for the German
government, which has loudly protested U.S. surveillance practices.
Empirically, U.S.-German relations have thrived despite U.S. surveillance. Germany
has dropped its investigation for lack of evidence.
BBC, 6-12-15 [“Snowden NSA: Germany drops Merkel phone-tapping probe,” BBC News-Europe, 6-1215,]
Germany has dropped an investigation into alleged tapping of Chancellor Angela Merkel's phone by the US
National Security Agency (NSA). The office of federal prosecutor Harald Range said the NSA had failed to provide
enough evidence to justify legal action. The allegations of NSA phone-tapping came out in the secrets leaked by US whistleblower
Edward Snowden about large-scale US surveillance in 2013. German-US ties were severely strained. When the allegations were made the White
House gave no outright denial, but said Mrs Merkel's phone was not being bugged currently and would not be in future. Mrs Merkel told the US
government angrily that "spying between friends just isn't on". And the alleged spying shocked public opinion in Germany. On 4 June last year
Mr Range said "sufficient factual evidence exists that unknown members of the US intelligence services spied on the mobile phone of
Chancellor Angela Merkel". But in December he revealed that the
investigation was not going well and he had not
obtained enough evidence to succeed in court. A statement from Mr Range's office on Friday said "the accusation
cannot be proven in a legally sound way under criminal law". It said "the vague statements by US officials about possible
surveillance of the chancellor's mobile telecommunication by a US intelligence service - 'not any more' - are not enough to describe what
happened''. The prosecutor did not manage to obtain an original NSA document proving the alleged spying, and a transcript which purportedly
re-created it from memory was deemed insufficient as evidence. The BBC's Jenny Hill in Berlin says Germans are very concerned about privacy
because of their own history. Mass surveillance was a characteristic of the Nazi era and the communist East German state. But now President
Obama and Chancellor Merkel have a fairly pragmatic, pleasant relationship, our correspondent says. A German
parliamentary committee is also investigating NSA surveillance, but it has not managed to get much help from US officials either, Germany's
Spiegel news website reports.
Extension – TTIP Kills Economy
TTIP trades off with domestic reforms that are key to the economy. Domestic growth
must precede trade induced economic progress.
Defraigne, ’14 (Pierre, Executive Director, Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, former Deputy Director-General in DG Trade,
former Head of Cabinet for Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade (1999-2002), and former Director for North-South Relations and
Head of Cabinet for Etienne Davignon, Vice-President of the European Commission (1977-1983), “THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL
The most serious problem posed by TTIP will be the social cost for Europe of the large restructurings
that would arise from the mergers, acquisitions, closures and privatisations brought about by the
completion of a single transatlantic market. The economic law of a single price for goods and services in
a unified market tends to make factor prices i.e. wages and profits converge. The communicating vessels process is
very effective for the labour market. In the context of unemployment, labour prices will be pulled downwards and
the unequal income structure prevailing in the US will weigh on the European wage structure. In such a
context, productivity gains brought about by economies of scale will not translate into higher wages, but
into lower ones. The transformative effect asserted by TTIP proponents might in the end just be an overall
degradation of working conditions and of the Welfare State. Ignoring this high risk scenario against the
current populist backcloth in Europe would be politically hazardous. In conclusion, the main rationale for
TTIP might not withstand the decisive test of growth. The truth about growth and jobs in Europe – a
large economy where the macroeconomic impact of external trade is limited – is that the solution does
not lie under the lamppost of trade policy. The Eurozone has entered into a ‘lost decade’ for growth. The
EU can be caught in the ‘secular stagnation’ recently highlighted by Lawrence Summers, whilst deflation becomes a short-term possibility for
the Eurozone. Growth
has come to a halt in Euthat rope for both supply-side and demand-side reasons. On
the supply side, which is decisive for the long-term potential output, Europe is lagging behind on
innovation, both technological and institutional. The relative cost of labour to capital is too high. Energy
costs are relatively more expensive than in the US. On the demand side, which is at present the most
critical element for attaining the potential output level, the debt overhang, both public and private,
severely inhibits consumption demand. Moreover, as highlighted by the IMF, growing inequalities – the poor
spend, the rich save – also exert a deflationary impact. Fiscal austerity, when procyclical as it currently is,
aggravates the poor growth performance and further deteriorates the debt/GDP ratio. The way to
resume growth is not through trade, which for Europe is a necessary but auxiliary growth engine. Today,
only domestic policies can spark growth in the Eurozone: first, mutualisation and restructuring of debt through a transfer
union with fiscal discipline would prove very effective; second, massive innovation investments hanging from R-D and education to
transeuropean networks would boost both long-term competitiveness and short-term job creation; third, fighting inequalities through national
social policies would be eased by EU tax harmonisation. The
expansionary impact of domestic policy-driven Eurozone
growth on transatlantic trade would by far exceed the growth impact of bilateral trade liberalisation. In
the trade and growth nexus, causality undeniably goes both ways. Growth feeds trade as trade feeds
growth, depending on the economic context and on the type of trade deal. TTIP is definitely not the
right answer for resuming growth, either in Europe, or in the US. However, a growth policy would boost
Atlantic trade.
TTIP doesn’t generate real economic growth.
Defraigne, ’14 (Pierre, Executive Director, Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, former Deputy Director-General in DG Trade,
former Head of Cabinet for Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade (1999-2002), and former Director for North-South Relations and
Head of Cabinet for Etienne Davignon, Vice-President of the European Commission (1977-1983), “THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL
Growth is the main rationale put forward for justifying TTIP. A CEPR study financed by the Commission estimates that by
the end of a 12 year transition, TTIP will have secured an EU GDP additional growth of 0.5% provided
that the negotiation liberalisation objectives are fully met with regard to tariffs, NTBs and public
procurement. 0.5% is a very low figure and ex-post analysis usually proves that such forecasts are very
tentative and are usually overrated. In the case of TTIP, which is the first FTA the EU is negotiating with a
somewhat larger and more advanced partner; three major risks cannot be ignored. (i) A modest growth
figure Why is the figure so modest though? This is essentially for three reasons. Firstly, no one challenges the idea that trade liberalisation is
conducive to long term growth if only through its transformative impact. Yet the more differences there are between
partners, the higher the trade-led growth. This is the case in multilateral deals with broad sectorial and
geographical coverage. It is less obvious when resource endowments and productivity levels are very
similar between partners like between the US and the EU. Transformation benefits are then minimal but
restructuring costs can be high. Secondly, the US and the EU have already completed a high level of
integration in the goods sector through massive crossed investments, aimed at turning the regulatory
obstacles around and providing 7 million jobs on each side of the pond. Harmonisation would mean partial job
repatriation. In the services sector, which is less integrated, the expected benefits will be limited by imperfect competition (monopolies,
oligopolies, market power) resting on economies of scale, network effects and branding. US firms often enjoy the advantages of being the
prime movers, such as in information technology and digital industries and services. Moreover, it is unlikely that efficiency gains in sensitive
sectors like health, education and public utilities, for which pressure for de facto privatisation schemes will grow, will be felt by the consumer.
They will be monopolised by the shareholders of large firms. Restructuring will take place through privatisation and through mergers and
acquisitions, and their eventual growth impact and distributional effects are not clear. In the case of “public goods by choice” (health,
education, water), the political dimension cannot be ignored. In this case, market liberalisation can conflict with democracy and therefore come
into severe conflict with public opinion. Thirdly,
TTIP promoters completely ignore an assumption which trade
theoreticians deem critical: trade allows for an increase in productivity as imports free up already employed resources so that they
can be redirected into more efficient uses. The current high level of unemployment in Europe severely limits this
crucial gain from trade liberalisation. In fact, trade liberalisation in the context of severe unemployment
can very well generate no additional growth at all. Unemployment must first be brought down by
domestic growth policy. (ii) A diverging growth The overall additional EU GDP growth of 0.5%
guaranteed by TTIP would translate into further divergence within the Eurozone and would aggravate
domestic inequalities within countries. Some countries such as Germany and its Nordic neighbours will benefit but other
countries will lose out. However, unlike the US, neither the EU nor even the Eurozone, have any effective political mechanisms for redistributing
gains and losses among Member States and among social groups2 . (iii)
A clash between two social models Contrary to the
proponents of the so-called trigger-down growth theory, trade does not amount to a win-win game and does not
necessarily alleviate poverty. If trade proves a win win game in the long term, there are winners and losers in the short and medium
term. Most trade economists dismiss or overlook these distributional issues and deem them irrelevant.
They insist that growth matters more than fair redistribution. This is challenged by the school of inclusive growth which highlights the social and
economic costs of excessive inequalities. Distributional effects of trade liberalisation are critical since nowadays they provide the main source of
citizen mistrust vis-à-vis markets, governments and the EU. Moreover, the IMF has recently acknowledged the deflationary bias of growing
Extension – TTIP Kills Democracy
TTIP will ruin democracy by enhancing corporate power.
The Gaia Foundation 14 {The Gaia Foundation is a charity group dedicated to helping people
around the world and preserving the world; “What is the TTIP? Why is it bad news? What can you do
about it in the UK?”; 6-27-14;; ME}
The TTIP represents
an unabashed corporate attack on democracy. This attack is implemented through
Dispute Settlement (ISDS), a mechanism that grants corporations the right to
sue governments if they pass laws or enact policies that could reduce a corporation's present or future
profits. ISDS will allow corporation's to sue such government's through secretive international trade courts. The money won by
corporations in these secretive and undemocratic 'justice' proceedings will be taken directly from the
taxpayers' pockets. ISDS and similar provisions have already been used to undermine authorities who chose to protect their people and
something known as the Investor-State
Earth around the world to chilling effect. Even before legislation is passed they have prevented states from introducing socially or
environmentally progressive measures for fear of being challenged through ISDS.
Extension – TTIP Is Net Worse
TTIP could cause job loss, lower income, risk public services, environment damage,
and violate safety regulations, worsening income inequality.
O’Grady 14 {Frances O’Grady is the British Trades Union Congress General Secretary; “TTIP - A Bad
Deal Could Be Worse Than No Deal at All”; 25/11/14;}
But I'm worried that a bad deal would be even worse. A
bad deal could cost jobs, lower wages, and worse still it could put the
NHS and other public services at risk. A bad deal might well be worse than no deal at all. Projections from some
economists suggest that, even if TTIP creates growth, the benefits won't necessarily be shared fairly, and the proportion of
growth going to wages could fall further - deepening a trend that has been going on for a generation. Using the more-realistic-than-most
UNCTAD economic model, Tufts University researchers suggest workers' wages could fall by over £3,000 a year. Some of the tariff reductions
proposed in TTIP could indeed be good news for British exporters, such as the chemicals and automotive industries - and even textiles, Scotch
Whisky and farming. And there are some non-tariff barriers, such as regulatory requirements that achieve the same standards by different
routes, which could also usefully be negotiated away. But I think the cart has been put before the horse. Instead of seeking an agreement with
those limited but uncontentious objectives, politicians
and business on both sides of the Atlantic have over-reached, seeking
to sweep away all sorts of health and safety, environmental and consumer protections.
AT: TTIP Solves EU Soft Power
TTIP kills EU soft power.
Defraigne, ’14 (Pierre, Executive Director, Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, former Deputy Director-General in DG Trade,
former Head of Cabinet for Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade (1999-2002), and former Director for North-South Relations and
Head of Cabinet for Etienne Davignon, Vice-President of the European Commission (1977-1983), “THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL
TTIP will aggravate Europe’s already ingrained difficulty to build up its own identity. From the very
beginning, Europe has been a hybrid construction mixing federal and intergovernmental features.
However, more importantly, it has developed a schizophrenic personality. It still cannot decide whether
it wants to build up a true European political community with its own model, its own currency, and its
own defence; or constitute a subset of a broader Atlantic Alliance, in which its economic affiliation to
the US supplements the strategic NATO partnership. TTIP exacerbates these feelings of ambivalence and
Atlanticist tropism which would interfere with Europe’s drive towards political unity. This last objection
to TTIP is the most decisive, but it is also extremely difficult to express in clear and convincing terms. For
those who see Europe mainly through business lenses, the very idea that a Transatlantic Common
Market would put the attempt to build up a sense of a common destiny among European citizens at risk
is irrelevant or even ludicrous. Yet this is the crux of the argument against TTIP: one must choose
between Europe and TTIP.
TTIP trades off with an effective EU foreign policy
Defraigne, ’14 (Pierre, Executive Director, Madariaga-College of Europe Foundation, former Deputy Director-General in DG Trade,
former Head of Cabinet for Pascal Lamy, European Commissioner for Trade (1999-2002), and former Director for North-South Relations and
Head of Cabinet for Etienne Davignon, Vice-President of the European Commission (1977-1983), “THE FUTURE OF EU-US RELATIONS: POLITICAL
TTIP is first and foremost a formidable distraction from EU priorities which, from a growth and jobs
perspective, should focus on completing the unity of the Single Market, consolidating Eurozone
governance and remedying its dangerous drift towards deflation. From a more political standpoint, the
EU should tackle the construction of its own strategic capacity which conditions the possibility of an
effective EU foreign policy aimed at promoting EU interests and values which differ from US ones. Europe
must reassess the Atlantic relationship in the light of its own long term future which does not yet appear very clear to most Europeans, and
does not even achieve consensus among governments. However, whatever the institutional forms the EU takes or the exact geographical
territory it covers, Europe will have to come to terms with two challenges: the first is the choice of a common social and environmental model
as the benchmark for all national ones so as to reconcile the unity of the EU’s Single Market with the free circulation of people, production
factors, goods and services and to share the governance consistency of the Eurozone. The second is a sufficient degree of strategic autonomy
so as to take responsibility for defending the model, which reflects not only a way of life but deep and important values which make up the
European civilisation. This
construction calls for a sense of commonality of destiny, which would provide the
EU with a shared transnational identity beyond national identities.
Cloud Computing Adv
Cloud Computing Frontline
Alternative causality: Declining U.S. educational standards devastate its
Grossman, Rivkin, Sharer and Porter, 2014 [Allen, Senior Fellow and Professor of Management
Practice, Harvard Business School; Jan, Rauner Professor at Harvard Business School; Kevin, Senior
Lecturer of Business Administration, Harvard Business School; Michael Porter, Bishop William Lawrence
Professor at Harvard Business School; “K–12 EDUCATION AND THE ROLE OF BUSINESS,” AN ECONOMY
DOING HALF ITS JOB, September 2014,]
The challenge that America’s education system poses to U.S. competitiveness has been obscured by a
lack of long-run information on student performance that is comparable across countries. Last fall, however, the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released new data that make it possible to see the
issue in a fresh light. For the first time, the OECD evaluated the workplace competencies of adults—in literacy, numeracy, and problemsolving skills—by age and country.4 The data allow us to examine adult competencies in successive age cohorts within a country and thereby
get a sense of how well a country’s education and training systems have performed over long periods. Figure 10 shows the OECD results for
literacy, with a measure of proficiency on the vertical axis. The blue columns show that younger U.S. workers have better literacy skills than
older workers. This reflects, presumably, an education system that is making progress in absolute terms. The
challenge to America,
however, is that the green columns, representing the international average, have progressed much faster than the blue
columns. America has among the most literate 55- to 65-year-olds in the world, but the same is not true of
younger cohorts. Figure 11 shows that America faces similar challenges in problem-solving and numeracy
skills. What were once American advantages in human capital have turned into disadvantages. Relative
performance matters in global competition, where American workers must out-produce and outinnovate the world’s best. Some would argue (and we would agree) that Figures 10 and 11 reveal an ethical issue: our society is not
fulfilling its promise to children to educate and prepare them. Others would argue (and again we would agree) that the figures point to a
political problem: our democracy cannot work well when many citizens are denied the opportunities that strong educations afford. We would
add that the figures highlight a fundamental business problem: companies
operating in the U.S. cannot succeed without
well-educated, highly skilled employees. Moreover, the living standards of most Americans will not rise if their workplace skills
lag much of the world’s. The situation captured in the OECD data—and reflected also in the mediocre performance on international tests—does
not allow business leaders to sit on the sidelines.
Alternative Causality: Inadequate post educational job skills kill U.S. competitiveness.
Fuller, 2014 [Joseph, Senior Lecturer of Business Administration, Harvard Business School;
data discussed on page 14—showing a growing U.S. disadvantage in adult competencies—point to
weaknesses not only in America’s K–12 education system but also in the way we develop skills after high school and on
the job. Troubles in workforce skills have been evident in the United States for years. In annual surveys conducted by
ManpowerGroup since 2006, the portion of U.S. employers reporting difficulty in filling positions reached as high
as 52%, with “lack of technical skills” in applicants among the top causes.5 In the 2011 HBS survey on U.S.
competitiveness, alumni involved in firm location choices reported that access to skilled labor was more often a reason to
move a business activity out of the United States than it was a reason to keep an activity in America.6 In 2013–14 as
in past years, alumni assessed workforce skills as a U.S. strength that is in decline. (See Figure 5 on page 10.) Skills shortages make it
hard for firms operating in the United States to increase their productivity consistently, the major driver in sustaining
their ability to compete and raising their capacity to pay workers. Thus, skills issues are at the heart of the aspect of U.S.
competitiveness that worries us the most: the stagnation of living standards among most Americans. Historically, the prosperity of
America’s middle class rested on a foundation of world-class workplace skills. That has proven especially true for workers in so-called middleskills jobs—roles that require more education and training than a high school diploma but less than a four-year college degree. Middle-skills
jobs are estimated to account for as much as 48% of all work in America.7 They have provided high and rising living standards for generations of
American welders, machinists, health care workers, computer technicians, and others. Any
path to greater U.S. competitiveness,
and especially to higher living standards in America, will require reinvigorating the skill base of America’s workforce,
particularly for middle-skills occupations.
Alternative Causality: Crumbling transportation and logistics infrastructure crush U.S.
Kanter, 2014 [Rosabeth Moss, Ernest L. Arbuckle Professor of Business Administration, Harvard
It is widely understood that America’s
companies depend heavily on the nation’s transportation
infrastructure— to bring inputs into their operations, to deliver goods to customers, and to move personnel where they
are needed. Infrastructure affects the costs, quality, speed, service, and safety of business in America.
Transportation infrastructure also shapes the living standards of all U.S. citizens, by influencing commuting times and
the cost of living, for instance. Transportation infrastructure has an especially profound impact on less affluent citizens, who are more likely to
rely on public transportation and to live in neighborhoods with few transport options. For them in particular, mobility is opportunity.
Because it is so vital to America's businesses and citizens, transportation infrastructure has been a focal
topic for the HBS project on U.S. competitiveness. In 2013–14, Professor Rosabeth Moss Kanter, the head of HBS’s transportation
infrastructure efforts and an expert on change leadership, added a set of infrastructure questions to the alumni survey. She also convened a
national summit of 200 top leaders across sectors and industries to define an agenda for action, “America on the Move: Transportation and
Infrastructure for the 21st Century.” (For more information on the summit and agenda, see
research/transportation-infrastructure/america-on-themove.html.) This section draws lessons from both the survey and the summit. A
Strength, but in Decline The challenges
to American transportation and logistics infrastructure are well
publicized. The American Society of Civil Engineers recently gave the United States a D+ grade for the quality
of its infrastructure. The federal Highway Trust Fund nearly became insolvent in 2014. Congresss recently
extended funding until May 2015, but there is no plan for a longer-term funding solution. Such challenges have contributed
to increasing concerns about what has historically been a U.S. strength. Respondents to the 2012 HBS survey on U.S.
competitiveness rated logistics infrastructure as a competitive strength but were overwhelmingly pessimistic about its
trajectory—significantly more so than a sample of the general population.17 On the 2013– 14 survey, a majority of respondents, 75%, reported
that logistics infrastructure—railroads, highways, ports, and airports—was at least average compared to other advanced economies, with 52%
rating it better or much better than average. However, the majority, 51%, also reported that this infrastructure
is falling
behind that of other advanced economies, with only 8% indicating optimism about its trajectory. Compared to past
years, there is a slight upswing in optimism: in 2013–14, 10% fewer business leaders reported a belief that logistics infrastructure was declining
than in 2012.
More Alt Causes
Alternative Causality: the U.S. tax code places domestic companies at a severe
competitive disadvantage. This discourages critical investment.
Fricke, 2014 [Peter, contributor to the Daily Caller, former associate at the Charles G. Koch Institute,
“US Tax Code Causes Businesses to Flee Overseas,” Daily Caller, 7-28-14,]
While agreeing on the need for comprehensive business tax reform, many conservatives and other free-market advocates dispute Lew’s
assessment that inversion is just a cynical ploy to avoid paying U.S. taxes. Curtis
Dubay, a research fellow at the Heritage
Foundation, points out in a recent column for the Daily Signal that “any business, no matter where headquartered,
pays the 35 percent U.S. corporate tax rate on income earned within our borders.” The real motivation behind
inversion, he says, is the “worldwide tax system”, whereby U.S. businesses are taxed on their foreign earnings. The U.S.
is the only industrialized country in the world with such a system, putting domestic companies at a
disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who are “free to make investments that the U.S. worldwide
tax system makes unprofitable for U.S. businesses.” Jason Fichtner of the nonpartisan Mercatus Institute, a free-market think
tank, believes anti-inversion legislation serves mainly to deflect attention from the real issue of U.S. competitiveness. “Legislative proposals that
attempt to treat the symptoms of the corporate tax code’s problems—rather than issues causing them—are doomed to fail,” he told The Daily
Caller News Foundation.
Alternative Causality: US fiscal policy poses the largest threat to competitiveness
Walker and Kaplan, ’13 [David Walker served as United States Comptroller General from 1998 to
2008, and is Founder and CEO of the Comeback America Initiative. Robert Kaplan is a Professor Emeritus
at Harvard Business School and co-developer of both activity-based costing and the Balanced Scorecard,
Current Fiscal policy harms US competitiveness, 4/112013, , MC]
We’re focusing too much on the present, and too little on the future. Political dysfunction in D.C. has led to the American public being barraged
by continuous media reports about the fiscal cliff, the debt ceiling, and the sequester. But the political skirmishes and impasses around these
short-term events are distracting us from the real danger ahead: Our
reckless fiscal trajectory that threatens America’s
competitiveness. For the nation to prosper, we must remain an attractive location for companies to pay
competitive wages consistent with high and rising living standards. This requires targeted investments by
the government, especially in physical and informational infrastructure, education and training, and
scientific research. But the bad measurements used by the government are keeping the public in the dark about how needed
investments for the future are being crowded out by the government’s enormous debt and other
obligations. The nation’s reported debt has almost tripled — to over $16.6 trillion — just since 2000, and the interest
on this debt must be paid every year into the future. This obligation, however, is not the real problem. The U.S.
actually is in a much deeper financial hole, and one that is not evident on the federal balance sheet. The nation’s offbalance sheet obligations include our country’s promises for future Medicare and Social Security
payments which, as of fiscal 2012, totaled nearly $50 trillion. These off-balance sheet obligations also include other promises, such as the
unfunded pension and retiree health benefits for civilian and military personnel, and for various contingent commitments like guarantees for
student loans, home mortgages and corporate pension benefits.
Excessive regulation and high taxes stifle innovation, job creation, killing
SST ’12 [The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology has jurisdiction over all energy research,
development, and demonstration, and projects, “Excessive regulation and high taxes stifle innovation,
job creation”, 3/27/2012,, MC]
In the first three years of the Obama Administration, the Federal Government imposed 106 new major
regulations with annual costs of more than $46 billion. As of April 1, 2012, the United States will have the
highest marginal corporate income tax in the industrialized world. Chairman Quayle warned that “This tax rate
harms competitiveness by taking money away from companies that could be better used to conduct
research, develop new innovations and create jobs, and it encourages companies to look for more
favorable business environments abroad.” While the U.S. continues to have the largest economy in the
world, recent trends suggest that other countries are catching up in terms of economic growth and
competitiveness. A study by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a non-partisan research and educational institute,
ranks the U.S. sixth out of 40 countries in overall innovation-based competitiveness.
Solvency Frontline
Empirically, the President will engage in illegal NSA surveillance, ignoring legal
ACLU, 2015 [American Civil Liberties Union, “NSA SPYING ON AMERICANS IS ILLEGAL,” Copyright 2015,]
What if it emerged that the President of the United States was flagrantly violating the Constitution and a
law passed by the Congress to protect Americans against abuses by a super-secret spy agency? What if,
instead of apologizing, he said, in essence, "I have the power to do that, because I say I can." That
frightening scenario is exactly what we are now witnessing in the case of the warrantless NSA spying
ordered by President Bush that was reported December 16, 2005 by the New York Times. According to
the Times, Bush signed a presidential order in 2002 allowing the National Security Agency to monitor
without a warrant the international (and sometimes domestic) telephone calls and e-mail messages of
hundreds or thousands of citizens and legal residents inside the United States. The program eventually
came to include some purely internal controls - but no requirement that warrants be obtained from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court as the 4th Amendment to the Constitution and the foreign
intelligence surveillance laws require.
Absent international agreements, curtailing surveillance is impossible. So-called
totalitarian nightmares and beyond will be inevitable.
Rothkopf, 5-12-15 [David, CEO and Editor of the Foreign Policy Group, “What Would Thomas
Jefferson Do…With the CIA?” Foreign Policy, 5-12-15,]
By 2020, it is estimated, 50 billion devices will be connected to the Internet—most of them embedded
microprocessors that will offer real-time insights into every aspect of life on the planet. Furthermore,
effectively every human being, every organization, and every government on Earth will be connected in a
man-made system for the first time in history. Each of those billions of microprocessors and each connection on the
web will be a potential entry point for surveillance and spying. What’s more, thanks to drones and nanodevices that can be
hidden and embedded on targets by the millions, humans stand at the dawn of an era of potentially ubiquitous
sensing. (This is not to speak of the gradual impact artificial intelligence will have on how people direct, conduct, and analyze what is
gathered.) If the world does not set limits, preferably by international treaty, as to what is fair game in this
system—in terms of both surveillance and cyberconflict—humanity runs the risk of entering a period that will
make Big Brother dystopian fantasies pale by comparison. Central to this process of setting limits will be having a public
debate about the philosophical building blocks of the system: what is privacy, who owns the data each sensor produces, how should people
divvy up the rights of individuals, corporations, and states. Furthermore, intelligence
agencies will have to be reorganized to
deal with these new realities, and so too will entire national security systems. Increasingly, the Internet will be the
terrain on which most future battles will be fought, won, or lost; information warriors, many of them from the IC, will be the principal
Global efforts regulate information gathering will be necessary to render surveillance
more transparent.
Rothkopf, 5-12-15 [David, CEO and Editor of the Foreign Policy Group, “What Would Thomas
Jefferson Do…With the CIA?” Foreign Policy, 5-12-15,]
It will be essential that the world reconsider views on the classification of information. Vastly more
information is publicly available than could likely ever be gathered covertly. Such open-source information is
easier to verify, easier to share, of greater use to policymakers, and essential to the kind of public-private
collaboration that will be required in the new security environment. Conversely, estimates from career intelligence
consumers suggest the vast majority of what is available via classified channels is also available or
discoverable via open sources. Not classifying it would save billions of dollars.
Ext – Circumvention
Legislative reform of illegal surveillance will always be circumvented. Only revolution
which destroys the entire surveillance infrastructure can solve.
Whitehead, 5-16-15 [John, constitutional and human rights attorney, and founder of the Rutherford
Institute,” The NSA’s Technotyranny: One Nation Under Surveillance,” WashingtonsBlog, 5-16-15,]
In other words, it
doesn’t matter who occupies the White House: the secret government with its secret
agencies, secret budgets and secret programs won’t change. It will simply continue to operate in secret until
some whistleblower comes along to momentarily pull back the curtain and we dutifully—and fleetingly—
play the part of the outraged public, demanding accountability and rattling our cages, all the while bringing about
little real reform. Thus, the lesson of the NSA and its vast network of domestic spy partners is simply this:
once you allow the government to start breaking the law, no matter how seemingly justifiable the reason, you
relinquish the contract between you and the government which establishes that the government works for and obeys you,
the citizen—the employer—the master. Once the government starts operating outside the law, answerable to no one but
itself, there’s no way to rein it back in, short of revolution. And by revolution, I mean doing away with the entire
structure, because the corruption and lawlessness have become that pervasive.
NSA surveillance reform is useless: The government simply ignores restrictive
legislation and surveillance is too pervasive.
Whitehead, 5-16-15 [John, constitutional and human rights attorney, and founder of the Rutherford
Institute,” The NSA’s Technotyranny: One Nation Under Surveillance,” WashingtonsBlog, 5-16-15,]
The National Security Agency (NSA) has been a perfect red herring, distracting us from the government’s
broader, technology-driven campaign to render us helpless in the face of its prying eyes. In fact, long before the
NSA became the agency we loved to hate, the Justice Department, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration were
carrying out their own secret mass surveillance on an unsuspecting populace. Just about every branch of the
government—from the Postal Service to the Treasury Department and every agency in between—now has
its own surveillance sector, authorized to spy on the American people. Then there are the fusion and counterterrorism centers
that gather all of the data from the smaller government spies—the police, public health officials, transportation, etc.—and make it accessible
for all those in power. And of course that doesn’t even begin to touch on the complicity of the corporate sector, which buys and sells us from
cradle to grave, until we have no more data left to mine.
The raging debate over the fate of the NSA’s blatantly
unconstitutional, illegal and ongoing domestic surveillance programs is just so much noise, what Shakespeare
referred to as “sound and fury, signifying nothing.” It means nothing: the legislation, the revelations, the task forces, and the
filibusters. The government is not giving up, nor is it giving in. It has stopped listening to us. It has long since
ceased to take orders from “we the people.”
Illegal surveillance is inevitable. The rule of law cannot curtail it.
Whitehead, 5-16-15 [John, constitutional and human rights attorney, and founder of the Rutherford
Institute,” The NSA’s Technotyranny: One Nation Under Surveillance,” WashingtonsBlog, 5-16-15,]
What this brief history of the NSA makes clear is that you
cannot reform the NSA. As long as the government is allowed
to make a mockery of the law—be it the Constitution, the FISA Act or any other law intended to limit its reach
and curtail its activities—and is permitted to operate behind closed doors, relaying on secret courts, secret budgets and secret
interpretations of the laws of the land, there will be no reform. Presidents, politicians, and court rulings have come
and gone over the course of the NSA’s 60-year history, but none of them have done much to put an end to the NSA’s
“technotyranny.” The beast has outgrown its chains. It will not be restrained.
Surveillance State Adv
Surveillance State Frontline
The surveillance state is too pervasive. All branches and agencies, plus corporations,
exercise biopower over the people; NSA only reform will fail.
Whitehead, 5-16-15 [John, constitutional and human rights attorney, and founder of the Rutherford
Institute,” The NSA’s Technotyranny: One Nation Under Surveillance,” WashingtonsBlog, 5-16-15,]
The National Security Agency (NSA) has been a perfect red herring, distracting us from the government’s
broader, technology-driven campaign to render us helpless in the face of its prying eyes. In fact, long
before the NSA became the agency we loved to hate, the Justice Department, the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement
Administration were carrying out their own secret mass surveillance on an unsuspecting populace. Just about
every branch of the government—from the Postal Service to the Treasury Department and every agency
in between—now has its own surveillance sector, authorized to spy on the American people. Then there are the
fusion and counterterrorism centers that gather all of the data from the smaller government spies—the police,
public health officials, transportation, etc.—and make it accessible for all those in power. And of course that doesn’t even
begin to touch on the complicity of the corporate sector, which buys and sells us from cradle to grave, until we
have no more data left to mine. The raging debate over the fate of the NSA’s blatantly unconstitutional, illegal and ongoing domestic
surveillance programs is just so much noise, what Shakespeare referred to as “sound and fury, signifying nothing.” It means nothing: the
legislation, the revelations, the task forces, and the filibusters. The
to us. It has long since ceased
government is not giving up, nor is it giving in. It has stopped listening
to take orders from “we the people.
NSA surveillance isn’t analogous to Foucault’s Panopticon. At best, reactions to rather
than applications of surveillance are comparable.
McGraw, ’13 [Bryan, Associate Professor of Politics at Wheaton College, “How NSA Surveillance is
NOT Like Foucault (but our reactions are),” Civitas Peregrina, June 11, 2013,]
It’s easy to see why we might then jump from the NSA’s Prism program to Foucault. But here’s what makes
Foucault’s argument interesting and not just some obtuse forerunner of the “X Files” (or any other conspiracy minded move/tv show). One of
the panopticon’s key features was that the tower where the guards resided was mirrored so that the prisoners could not tell if they were
actually under observation at any particular moment. In fact, they need not be under observation at all for the tower to do its job. Foucault’s
view was that our liberal society was indeed one of deep disciplining, but it was not the case that there was a “them” that was doing the
disciplining. Rather, we all are caught up and participate in our mutual disciplining. We are, to Foucault’s mind, our own oppressors in that we
impose a kind of “normalization” on one another. What
the NSA=Foucault folks suppose is that Foucault had in mind a
social order in which some small elite, armed with technologies and power, would herd the rest of us
into docile compliance. Foucault’s argument was actually much more worrisome: that all of us, armed with
the ordinary technologies of communication and observation, would herd ourselves into docile
submission. So the NSA program (whatever its merits and demerits) isn’t Foucaldian. Rather, I would argue, it is our
reactions – where commentators assume their expected positions, offer ritualized expressions of support
or outrage, and punish (via dialogue) those who range outside the bounds of “proper” discourse – that
reminds me of Foucault.
Alternative Causality: the modern Imperial Presidency is the root cause of Foucaldian
Smith, ’13 [Reid, Freedom Works’ staff writer and editor, “The Surveillance State in Your Head,” The
American Conservative, July 19, 2013,]
With the fall of the Soviet Union, there was hope that the imperial presidency would be scaled back by
Congress, but such optimism proved hollow. In The Cult of the Presidency, Gene Healy notes that while partisan rhetoric today is as acerbic as it
has been in decades, Republicans and Democrats alike accept the bottomless depth of executive responsibility
and the president’s unique grasp on power. We’ve normalized dependence on his guidance and our
subordination. The modern president has greatly exceeded, in size and scope, the few enumerated powers initially bestowed upon him and in the process
has become a great deal more powerful—and potentially more dangerous. His powers of surveillance and social compulsion are
virtually unmatched in human history. From a Foucauldian perspective, one might argue our president (Bush or
Obama, it hardly matters) has staked his claim as our watchman. We become increasingly aware that all we do takes
place under surveillance, and our dull surprise at this revelation suggests our submission to the system—the
inevitable outcome of our assent to political power.
Foucaldian critique of NSA surveillance is impossible under modern capitalism.
Current power structures are self -reinforcing.
Bruno, ’14 [Zachary, BA, Critical Theory, Occidental College, “The PRISM Program Panopticon:
Foucault’s Insights in the Era of Snowden,” March 24, 2014,]
With this, Foucault
would propose that critiquing the NSA’s illicit surveillance program would first require
deconstructing the structures of power and discursive claims making which surround it. In this regard, Reeves
(2003) argues that a self-reinforcing dynamics exists, as it pertains to the discourses and power structures sustaining such
governmental tools. In this regard, the difficulty of critiquing them, in the sense which Foucault (1995) intends, is related to the
manner in which this power is self-reinforcing. Indeed, to garner a better understanding of the difficulties of critique in such a
context, one need only examine Foucault’s work on sexuality, repression, and biopolitics-based social control to understand the operation of
these mechanisms. With the above in mind, what becomes most apparent, from considering Foucault’s portrayal of the diffusion of normalizing
power in contemporary society, is that it is impossible to resist the potency of this power from within modern society itself. Given that the
latter is permeated with multiple structures of repression, often invisible to the human eye, or already internalized to such a degree that we are
no longer capable of even recognizing their existence; it becomes clear that we live in a social context in which resistance
critique, within society, is at least temporarily impossible. If a social revolution were to ever undo the structures of normalizing
power which currently permeate our social interactions, it might become possible to rebuild a society without the concentrations of capital,
and thus power, which prevail today. In the interim, however, resisting and informally critiquing
within the confines of
capitalist society is a futile endeavor because of the all-too-deep entrenchment of those
entities which regulate us, and force us to adopt certain behaviors in spite of our desires. Thus, because the entirety of our
society has been permeated by these powerful exogenous forces, there is no true potential for resistance
within society. Instead, because we cannot necessarily understand or confront all of the elements of our oppression, it
organized modern
is clear that resistance to the forces identified by Foucault must take place outside of mainstream society. On this basis, critique of the everyday
colloquial variety is impossible simply because it necessitates that we accept and take for granted the imposed structures of meaning which
emerge from society’s most significant power bases.
The American populace cannot engage in Foucaldian critique of NSA surveillance
because of disciplinary structures like the War on Terror.
Bruno, ’14 [Zachary, BA, Critical Theory, Occidental College, “The PRISM Program Panopticon:
Foucault’s Insights in the Era of Snowden,” March 24, 2014,]
Applied to the context of the NSA’s surveillance Panopticon, the ultimate reality of the impossibility of
critique is one wherein it is impossible for the American mass to understand the multiple structures of
oppression inherent to the PRISM Program. Indeed, the apathy discussed by Zurchner (2014) is likely an
embodiment of a context wherein the American population is blinded by the other disciplinary structures,
like the purported threats of the War on Terror, which serve to maintain high levels of fear in American society. In this
regard, the work of Lokaneeta (2010) suggests that these, associated with the notion of American governmentality, have preponderated in the
post-9/11 context because of the visceral power of the discourse of threat which the Bush and Obama Administrations have spread.
Extension – Alt Causes to Panopticism
The Foucaldian Panopticon is inherent to a myriad of government agencies. Restricting
NSA based surveillance is too narrowly based to succeed.
Buttar, ’13 [Shahid, former executive director of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, is a
constitutional lawyer and grassroots organizer. Shahid directed a national program to combat
racial and religious profiling, after serving for three years as associate director of the American
Constitution Society for Law & Policy, “Beyond the Panopticon: The NSA Isn’t Alone,” Defending
Dissent Foundation, 12-26-13,]
The Panopticon is real. It siphons billions of dollars each year from a federal budget in crisis. And it is watching you and your
children. Lost in the debate about NSA spying, however — and even most public resistance to it — have been the various
other federal agencies also complicit in Fourth Amendment abuses. Even critics of domestic surveillance
have largely failed to recognize how many government agencies spy on Americans. A presidential review panel
recently recommended substantial changes to FBI powers, including ending the authority to issue National Security Letters. NSLs are secret
data requests used to circumvent both First and Fourth Amendment protections, demanding information about third parties and gagging the
recipients. The
FBI’s pattern of abusing undercover infiltration to disrupt First Amendment protected organizations,
however, stretches back decades, threatens democracy even more deeply than NSLs, and continues unabated. Beyond the NSA
and FBI, many other agencies are also involved in domestic surveillance. And all of them continue to evade public
and congressional scrutiny.
Federal agencies other than NSA are complicit in maintaining the Panopticon.
A. Department of Homeland Security:
Buttar, ’13 [Shahid, former executive director of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, is a
constitutional lawyer and grassroots organizer. Shahid directed a national program to combat racial and
religious profiling, after serving for three years as associate director of the American Constitution
Society for Law & Policy, “Beyond the Panopticon: The NSA Isn’t Alone,” Defending Dissent Foundation,
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
is a sprawling behemoth, with nearly a quarter million employees scattered across
purporting to protect the “homeland” (a term with loaded connotations worth
noting, but setting aside for now) from various threats, DHS spies on Americans in several disturbing ways. Some of the most
dystopian piggyback on programs presented to the public as supporting immigration enforcement. Border security agencies, like
Customs & Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), have facilitated a record number of
deportations under the Obama administration, creating a domestic humanitarian crisis. Critics of the administration’s immigration
crackdown have vocally challenged its failures. According to the New York Times, “the department’s continually shifting strategies
against illegal immigration had two things in common. They were ineffective and cruel.”
nearly two dozen component agencies. While
B. Postal Service:
Buttar, ’13 [Shahid, former executive director of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, is a
constitutional lawyer and grassroots organizer. Shahid directed a national program to combat racial and
religious profiling, after serving for three years as associate director of the American Constitution
Society for Law & Policy, “Beyond the Panopticon: The NSA Isn’t Alone,” Defending Dissent Foundation,
Nor are law enforcement agencies the only ones joining the intelligence agencies to spy on Americans. Even
the US Postal Service is
getting in on the surveillance racket. In July, the New York Times reported on the Mail Isolation Control and Tracking program, “in
which Postal Service computers photograph the exterior of every piece of paper mail that is processed in
the United States — about 160 billion pieces last year….” It concluded that “postal mail is subject to the same kind of scrutiny
that the National Security Agency has given to telephone calls and e-mail.” Like the NSA’s ubiquitous electronic wiretapping,
postal surveillance carries disturbing implications, particularly in terms of enabling the suppression of political
dissent. Most astounding in the context of the controversy over NSA spying, however, is the sheer ignorance about the postal service’s
monitoring practices.
C. State and local law enforcement:
Buttar, ’13 [Shahid, former executive director of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, is a
constitutional lawyer and grassroots organizer. Shahid directed a national program to combat racial and
religious profiling, after serving for three years as associate director of the American Constitution
Society for Law & Policy, “Beyond the Panopticon: The NSA Isn’t Alone,” Defending Dissent Foundation,
DHS also erodes constitutional rights through its collaborations with local police. State and local law
enforcement agencies around the country collaborate with a series of over 70 regional DHS-funded fusion
centers pursuing ambiguous missions at unknown costs. DHS leaders have praised fusion centers, but critics — extending from the
libertarian CATO Institute and immigrant rights groups to FBI veterans — have described them as wasteful, duplicative, constitutionally
offensive, and ineffective from a public safety standpoint. Targeted surveillance, of the sort abused by the FBI,
is also a problem
across state & local departments. For years, peace activists, Ron Paul supporters, environmentalists, and Muslims have been
targeted for government spying in dozens of states--not only by the FBI, but also by state and local police. Until being shut down by the
Governor in 2010, Pennsylvania state officials not only spied on environmental activists, but also shared its intelligence reports with their
corporate targets, including mining companies. DHS also facilitates the paramilitarization
of local and state police
agencies, which around the country have sought DHS grants to buy everything from sophisticated listening devices to surveillance cameras,
automated drivers license plate scanners developed originally for military uses, aerial surveillance drones, and even armored tanks.
AT: Add-ons
AT: Internet Fragmentation Add-on
Internet fragmentation is irreversible. Countries have gone too far in establishing their
own networks. In any case, no impact on Internet users.
Kaspersky, ’13 [Eugene, chairman and CEO of Kaspersky Lab, “What will happen if countries carve up
the internet?” the Guardian, 12-17-2013,]
Ordinary users will hardly perceive any change while these state-run parallel networks are being built, but
there is another aspect of this global trend that will affect everyone directly. Some countries are already seriously considering
making sure as much of their internet traffic as possible stays within their national borders. In some countries,
for example Brazil, there's talk about forcing global giants such as Google and Facebook to locate their data centres locally to process local
communications. If this trend gains worldwide momentum, it will be a disaster for global IT giants and pose a threat of full-blown Balkanisation
of the internet. The
process would probably foster the creation of local search engines, email systems, social
networks and so on – an intimidating prospect for publicly listed companies. As a result, the whole notion of netizens, or global online
citizens, and of the internet being a global village could lose all practical meaning. What could emerge is a patchwork of online nation states
with different rules and regulations and hindered communications. Sadly,
I don't think the trend can be reversed. It feels as
inevitable as the change of the seasons. But while one can't help complaining about bad weather in December, it's worth
remembering that a bit of snow is not the end of the world.
Alternative causality: Multiple factors generate internet fragmentation, not just
surveillance: dominance of international bodies, cyber- crime and cyber war.
Patrick,’14 [Stewart, Senior Fellow and Director, Program on International Institutions and Global
Governance, Council on Foreign Relations, “The Obama Administration Must Act Fast to Prevent the
Internet’s Fragmentation,” The Internationalist, 2-26-2014,]
Since the dawn of the digital age, the United States had consistently supported an open, decentralized, and
secure cyber domain that remains largely in private hands. Even before the Snowden disclosures, that vision was
under threat, thanks to disagreements among governments on three fundamental issues. First, some world
leaders are questioning whether the ITU( International Telecommunications Union) ought to play a more
active role in regulating cyberspace. To the degree that the Internet is “governed,” the primary regulatory body
remains ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), an independent, nonprofit corporation
based in Los Angeles. The outsized role of ICANN—and the widespread perception of U.S. (and broader Western) control over the
Internet—has long been a sore point for authoritarian states, as well as many developing countries, which would prefer to
move cyber governance to the intergovernmental ITU. A second threat to the open Internet has been a surge in cyber
crime—and disagreement over how to hold sovereign jurisdictions accountable for criminality emanating
from their territories. Estimates of the magnitude of cyber crime range from large to astronomical. In 2012, NSA director general Keith
Alexander put the annual global cost at $1 trillion. Most cyber crime is undertaken by nonstate actors against private sector targets for motives
of financial gain. But national authorities have also been involved in economic espionage, both directly and through proxies. The most infamous
case involves a unit of China’s People’s Liberation Army, which allegedly has been at the forefront of Chinese hacking efforts to steal industrial
secrets and technology from leading U.S. companies. Third,
nations threatens
the growing specter of cyberconflict—even cyber war—among
a secure and open Internet. Worldwide, dozens of governments are developing doctrines and capabilities to
conduct “information operations.” This includes, of course, the United States, which has established a robust Cyber Command within the
Department of Defense. Meanwhile, there is no international consensus on what constitutes a “cyberattack,” what responses to these
incursions are permissible, and whether and how existing laws of war might be applied to cyberconflict.
U.S. surveillance isn’t the real reason for fragmentation. It’s an excuse for the real,
localized motivations for national and regional networks.
Lillington, ’14 [Karlin, journalist and columnist with the Irish Times focusing on technology, with a
special interest in the political, social, business and cultural aspects of information and communication
technologies, PhD from Trinity College; “Halting internet fragmentation tops agendas,” Irish Times, 5-82014,]
Most sessions at the two-day event had acknowledged that the revelations by Edward Snowden of mass covert
surveillance by the NSA in the US, and GCHQ in England, had accelerated proposals to localise data – often referred to as a “Balkanisation”
of data – in some countries. But human rights activists had warned that such proposals were not always what
they seemed. For example, Joana Varon Ferraz, of Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade da Fundação Getulio Vargas, Brazil, noted several
times during the event that Brazil’s motivations in agreeing to build new undersea broadband cables, and calling
for data to be held only within its borders, were more about increasing its own access to its citizen’s
data, and opportunities for internal covert surveillance.
An non-fragmented Internet enhances cyberstalking, violence against women and
actually restricts freedom.
Lillington, ’14 [Karlin, journalist and columnist with the Irish Times focusing on technology, with a
special interest in the political, social, business and cultural aspects of information and communication
technologies, PhD from Trinity College; “Halting internet fragmentation tops agendas,” Irish Times, 5-82014,]
She (Jody Liddicoat, human rights specialist with the Association for Progressive Communications) also questioned whether
completely free and unfettered internet was desirable. The arrival of new technologies, such as Google Glass,
highlighted this complication, she said, as its use could contribute to cyberstalking and the ongoing problem of
violence against women. “One internet isn’t one where all freedoms are unbounded. It’s one where we
begin to negotiate those freedoms,” she said. “Unbounded freedom has the potential to inhibit the freedom
of another.”
AT: Cybersecurity Add on
There is no clear evidence of existential cyber security threat. Alarmist rhetoric
constitutes an example of threat construction similar to the run-up to the Iraq War.
Brito & Watkins, ’11 [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University;
Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, ”Loving the Cyber Bomb? The
Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Harvard National Security Journal, April 26, 2011,]
Over the past two years, there
has been a steady drumbeat of alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington about
potential catastrophic cyber threats. For example, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing last year, Chairman Carl Levin
said, “cyberweapons and cyberattacks potentially can be devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects.”2 Proposed
responses include increased federal spending on cybersecurity and the regulation of private network security practices. Security risks to private
and government networks from criminals and malicious state actors are no doubt real and pressing. However, the
rhetoric of “cyber
doom”3 employed by proponents of increased federal intervention in cybersecurity implies an almost
existential threat that requires instant and immense action. Yet these proponents lack clear evidence of
such doomsday threats that can be verified by the public. As a result, the United States may be witnessing a bout
of threat inflation similar to that seen in the run-up to the Iraq War. Additionally, a cyber-industrial complex is
emerging, much like the military-industrial complex of the Cold War. This complex may serve not only to supply cybersecurity solutions to the
federal government, but to drum up demand for those solutions as well.
Using apocalyptic rhetoric to address cybersecurity ensures counterproductive
policymaking. Further study is necessary before acting.
Brito & Watkins, ’11 [Jerry, Senior Research Fellow, Mercatus Center at George Mason University;
Tate, Research Associate, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, ”Loving the Cyber Bomb? The
Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy,” Harvard National Security Journal, April 26, 2011,]
Cybersecurity is an important policy issue, but the alarmist rhetoric coming out of Washington that focuses on
worst-case scenarios is unhelpful and dangerous. Aspects of current cyber policy discourse parallel the runup to the Iraq War and pose the same dangers. Pre-war threat inflation and conflation of threats led us
into war on shaky evidence. By focusing on doomsday scenarios and conflating cyber threats,
government officials threaten to legislate, regulate, or spend in the name of cybersecurity based largely on
fear, misplaced rhetoric, conflated threats, and credulous reporting. The public should have access to
classified evidence of cyber threats, and further examination of the risks posed by those threats, before sound
policies can be proposed, let alone enacted.
Empirical, historical evidence proves cyber-doom scenarios are highly unlikely.
Threatened systems are resilient.
Lawson, ’11 [Sean, writes about science, technology, security, and military affairs. Topics of interest
include cybersecurity policy, surveillance, drones, network-centric warfare, military use of social media,
and the rhetoric of threat inflation. He is assistant professor in the Department of Communication at the
University of Utah, “Cyberwar Hype Comes Under Increasing Scrutiny,” Forbes, April 28, 2011,
My own report for the Mercatus Center, also released in January, largely echoed the findings of the OECD report. In it, I argued that current
debates about cyberwar rely too much on hypothetical scenarios that imagine the worst, what I called
“cyber-doom scenarios.” I demonstrated that when subjected to evaluation based on empirical evidence from
history and sociology, we can conclude that cyber-doom scenarios are unlikely. Fears of vulnerabilities based
in new technologies are not new. The telegraph, telephone, radio, railroads, and other new technologies have led to similar fears in
the past and those fears have yet to be realized. Instead, what history and sociology show us is that both technological systems and
social systems are more resilient than we often assume. Cases such as strategic bombing, blackouts, natural
disasters, and terrorist attacks have not typically led to total or long-term collapse of social, economic, or
technological systems. If these events have not led to the kinds of results that the prophets of cyber-doom
predict, why would we expect that cyber-attacks would?
Cybersecurity hype increases the risk of a NATO-Russia war. It constitutes a selffulfilling prophecy.
Lee & Rid, ’14 [Robert, an active-duty USAF Cyber Warfare Operations Officer who has led multiple
cyberspace operations programmes in the Air Force and US Intelligence Community; Thomas, professor
in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, OMG CYBER! THIRTEEN REASONS WHY HYPE
MAKES FOR BAD POLICY,” RUSI Journal, October/November 2014,]
Eleven: Hype
Escalates Conflict. Government, military and industry leaders are consequently able to make wild
claims without providing evidence. This has an escalatory effect. ‘We’re in a pre-9/11 moment, in some
respects, with cyber,’ said John Carlin, assistant attorney general for national security in the Justice Department in
Aspen, Colorado in July. 25 He did not provide concrete details to back up his claim. Just weeks after Russia
annexed Crimea in March 2014, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), USAF General Philip Breedlove,
made comments about Russia’s use of cyber in doing so. He told the New York Times that cyber-warfare had been used to
isolate the Ukrainian military on the Crimean peninsula.26 A month later he revisited these claims, stating that cyber was a critical part of
Russia’s actions. To quote Breedlove:27 When they [Russia] took Crimea, cyber was part of a well-planned, total decapitation of Crimea from
the command and control structure of Ukraine. Ukraine was absolutely disconnected from being able to do anything with their forces in that
area. Cyber was one of three tools used, and used quite exquisitely. Consequently, the Atlantic Alliance is updating its cyber-defence policy – a
point confirmed at the recent NATO summit in Wales. A
very serious cyberattack, some in the Atlantic Alliance seem to
suggest, should be treated like an invasion. ‘For the first time we state explicitly that the cyber-realm is covered by Article5of
the Washington Treaty, the collective defence clause’, said Jamie Shea, NATO’s deputy assistant secretary general for emerging security
challenges, in June. 28 At first glance, this statement appears to be meant as a deterrent. However, deterrence does not seem to apply: to
deter, a statement needs to be clear and backed by credible threat of punishment. So far, NATO is doing the reverse: ‘We do not say in exactly
which circumstances or what the threshold of the attack has to be to trigger a collective NATO response,’ Shea said, ‘and we do not say what
that collective NATO response should be’.29 A
vague but high bar for cyber-attacks also implicitly legitimises ongoing
espionage attacks as acceptable and minor. Moreover, the vast majority of cyber-attacks also do not fall into NATO’s remit in the
first place: espionage and cyber-crime are problems for intelligence agencies and law enforcement, not for a military alliance. For militants and
the Kremlin, the subtext is clear: cyber matters; better up your game. NATO – among others–is
escalating a problem that
someone else will have to solve.
Current efforts will provide effective safeguards against cyber- attacks. Security
improvements are ongoing.
Keller, 3-3-15 [John, editor-in-chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics magazine, which provides
extensive coverage and analysis of enabling electronic and optoelectronic technologies in military,
space, and commercial aviation applications. A member of the Military & Aerospace Electronics staff
since the magazine's founding in 1989, Mr. Keller took over as chief editor in 1995., “DARPA eyes cyber
security program to safeguard private and proprietary computer information,” Military & Aerospace
Magazine, March 3, 2015,]
U.S. military researchers will brief industry on 12 March 2015 on an upcoming new cyber security research
program to develop ways of protecting the private and proprietary information of individuals and
enterprises. Officials of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington, Va., will detail the upcoming program
from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. on 12 Brandeis March 2015 at the Holiday Inn, 4610 North Fairfax Drive, in Arlington, Va. The Brandeis proposers day is
to familiarize participants with DARPA’s interest in privacy science; identify potential proposers; and provide an opportunity for potential
proposers to ask questions about the upcoming Brandeis program. Privacy is critical to a free society, DARPA researchers say. As Louis Brandeis
said in 1890, the right to privacy is a consequence of understanding that harm comes in more ways than just the physical. He was reacting to
the ability of the new “instantaneous camera” to record personal information in new ways. Since then, the ability of technology to collect and
share information has grown beyond all expectation. DARPA
researchers are reaching out to industry for ways to
continue the benefits of information sharing, while safeguarding the private information of individuals and
businesses. Related: DARPA picks six companies to define enabling technologies for U.S. cyber warfare strategy The White House
has made cyber security a priority and has launched initiatives to enable the safe and effective sharing
of information to increase the nation’s ability to protect itself and to thwart any adversary’s ability to
shut down our networks, steal trade secrets, or invade the privacy of Americans, researchers say.
Off Case
Executive Self Restraint CP
1NC CP Shell
TEXT: The President should issue and implement an executive order repealing all
domestic online surveillance authority under Executive Order 12333, preventing
enforcement of domestic online surveillance authority under the Patriot Act and the
FISA Act Amendments of 2008 and prohibiting any requirement for manufacturers of
electronic devices or software to provide bypasses for encryption.
Counterplan is net beneficial because using the executive avoids the link to politics.
Executive Self Restraint functions to substantially curtail national security and
specifically surveillance operations. Empirics prove.
Sales, ’12 [Nathan, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, “SELF RESTRAINT AND
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, August 8, 2012,]
If the only thing we knew about national security was what we learned from Hollywood, we’d come
away with the impression that the Pentagon and CIA were populated entirely by rogue agents who
routinely, if not gleefully, flout the legal restrictions that govern them. Think of Jack Bauer goading a captured terrorist into
talking by staging a mock execution of his young son, or General Jack Ripper enthusiastically ordering a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union.
That crude caricature is almost the exact opposite of reality. Military and intelligence officials tend to be
scrupulously careful when deciding how to deploy the immense powers at their fingertips. The
government frequently adopts constraints on its ability to carry out certain national security operations,
restrictions that go much farther than what is required by the governing principles of domestic or international
law. Recent history offers plenty of examples. Counterterrorism interrogators aren’t getting as close as
possible to the legal line drawn by the Convention Against Torture, the federal torture statute, and the Detainee
Treatment Act; they’ve been restricted to the relatively benign techniques authorized in the Army Field Manual. In the
1980s and 1990s, officials were reluctant to order targeted killings that they believed were perfectly
consistent with domestic and international prohibitions on assassination; they either rejected them outright (in
the case of Osama bin Laden) or modified them to camouflage their true purpose (in the case of Mohammar Qadaffi). Military officers
aren’t itching to order attacks that are even arguably permissible under the laws of war; they’re foregoing lawful strikes that members of the
JAG corps regard as problematic for moral, economic, and other non-legal reasons. Justice
Department lawyers didn’t
aggressively promote information sharing under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; they built a
wall that segregated cops from spies and set themselves up as the department’s information sharing
New Executive Orders curtailing surveillance are easy to pass and implement as well
as legally binding. Time frame is immediate.
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 7-9-15 [EFF-The Electronic Frontier Foundation is the leading
nonprofit organization defending civil liberties in the digital world. EFF champions user privacy, free
expression, and innovation through impact litigation, policy analysis, grassroots activism, and technology
development. “Tell Obama: Stop Mass Surveillance Under Executive Order 12333,” 7-9-15,]
Executive orders are legally binding orders given by the President of the United States which direct how
government agencies should operate. Executive Order 12333 covers "most of what the NSA does" and is "the
primary authority under which the country’s intelligence agencies conduct the majority of their operations."1 So
while the U.S. Congress is considering bills to curtail mass telephone surveillance, the NSA’s primary
surveillance authority will be left unchallenged. It’s time to change that. Last July, former State Department chief
John Napier Tye came forward with a damning account of Executive Order 12333, which he published in The Washington Post2. Thanks to his
account and the reports of others who have spoken out candidly against surveillance under E.O. 12333, we know: Executive Order 12333 is
used to collect the content of your communications– including Internet communications like emails and text messages. Executive Order 12333’s
has no protections for non-U.S. persons, a fact that has been used to justify some of the NSA's most extreme violations of privacy, including the
recording of an entire country's telephone conversations.3 Executive Order 12333 is used to collect information on U.S. persons who are not
suspected of a crime. As Tye wrote, "It does not require that the affected U.S. persons be suspected of wrongdoing and places no limits on the
volume of communications by U.S. persons that may be collected and retained." No
US court has seriously considered the
legality and constitutionality of surveillance conducted under Executive Order 12333. This executive order was
signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, many years before the Internet was widely adopted as a tool for mass communication. A stroke
of the U.S. President's pen over thirty years ago created the conditions that led to our global surveillance
system. The present President could fix it just as easily. Join us in calling on President Obama to fix Executive Order 12333
and end the mass surveillance of people worldwide.
1NC Net Benefit Shell: Presidential Power Good
The President acting alone preserves executive power – prevents Congress from
stepping in.
Wall Street Journal 2013
[Wall Street Journal, 9/5/2013. “Obama's Curbs on Executive Power Draw Fire,”]
A senior administration official said that while the new drone-strike policy does rein in executive authority, the NSA and Syria proposals weren't
a reduction of power but an effort to increase transparency and build public confidence. Still, the president, who was criticized for seizing too
much power through recess appointments and other steps that some said circumvented Congress, now is being criticized by veterans of past
Republican administrations for weakening the presidency. John Yoo, The
president's moves on national-security issues
reflect a mix of political pragmatism as well as personal principles, and exactly how much power Mr. Obama actually has
given up is the subject of debate. He has walked a fine line on Syria, for example, saying he wasn't required to seek sign-off from lawmakers for
a military strike but asking for their approval anyway. a Justice Department official in the George W. Bush administration, said Mr. Obama had
unnecessarily limited his own authority. He noted that it is rare to see a president restrict his powers. Mr. Obama "has been trying to reduce
the discretion of the president when it comes to national security and foreign affairs," said Mr. Yoo, now a law professor at the University of
California at Berkeley. "These proposals that President Obama is making really run counter to why we have a president and a constitution."
Others, though, said the president had given up a modicum of authority in an effort to protect presidential power and guard against
congressional action. The question of the extent of executive power has been long debated in Washington. President Lyndon Johnson was
accused of using a narrow congressional resolution to vastly and illegally expand the Vietnam War, for example, and President Richard Nixon
was accused of creating an "imperial presidency" before his resignation. More recently, Mr. Obama's predecessor, Mr. Bush, was accused by
Democrats of having inappropriately expanded executive powers in combating terrorism. Jack Quinn, who served as White House counsel for
President Bill Clinton, said Mr. Obama's
recent moves amount to threading a needle to reach agreements and
avoid larger setbacks for executive power. "Sometimes, it's important to show tolerance for others in order to preserve the
power that you have," he said. "I don't think anyone can say that he is a shrinking violet when it comes to his use of power as president." A.B.
Culvahouse, White House counsel under Ronald Reagan, agreed that the
president imposing constraints on executive
authority is the preferable course if it helps dissuade Congress from stepping in to impose the same or
more onerous limitations. Lawmakers retain the power of the purse, he noted, and also could codify restrictions in statute.
A strong unchecked executive is necessary to prevent and win inevitable conflicts,
including wars with China, North Korea, Iran and the War on Terrorism.
McCarthy, ‘06
[Andrew, Director Center for law and counterterrorism at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies,
March 2006, “The Powers of War and Peace by John Yoo,” Commentary,]
Yoo’s thesis in this book is strongest as an argument grounded in text—the text, that is, of our founding law. Precisely because
Constitution reposes such power in the executive, he argues, it is adaptable to the demands of crisis (though
one must add that broad presidential power is necessarily also open to great abuse and even disastrous miscalculation). It is also flexible
enough to allow for international cooperation in the name of the national interest without a wholesale
commitment to dreamy multilateral constructs (though this, too, can make for trouble in an age of globalization in which
dependable allies are essential). But is Yoo’s reading, especially concerning the power of war, truly consistent with the framers’ original
understanding? As the constitutional scholar Cass Sunstein has observed in reviewing Yoo’s book, George Washington himself construed
Congress’s power to declare war as meaning that “no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they [Congress] have
deliberated on the subject, and authorized such a measure.” Other giants of the founding—Adams, Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Chief Justice
John Marshall—voiced similar sentiments. Even granting that the framers expressly resisted congressional war-making, and promoted a vibrant
executive, one need not interpret “declare” as narrowly and legalistically as Yoo suggests. In short, the tension reflected in the debates at the
constitutional convention persists. But one must also be alert to reality. In
a world beset by the constant threat of sudden
destructive force, a robust and firmly grounded view of presidential power is imperative. Potential perils
come today not just from growing national powers like China but from rogue states in Iran and North
Korea as well as from increasingly diffuse terror cells that have demonstrated their capacity to continue striking
globally even when, as now, they are under siege. If public safety is to be something other than an illusion, securing
it will demand the power to attack quickly and, in appropriate circumstances, preemptively; the price of awaiting
consensus from 535 members of Congress may be too prohibitive. For showing how that power derives from the very system
the framers bequeathed us, John Yoo deserves our deep thanks.
2NC: Executive Self Restraint CP Extensions
Executive Self Restraint eliminates the need for external checks and oversight.
Empirically, the incentives for restraint are powerful.
Sales, ’12 [Nathan, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, “SELF RESTRAINT AND
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, August 8, 2012,]
Much of the case law and scholarship concerning national security rests on the assumption that the
executive branch is institutionally prone to overreach – that, left to its own devices, it will inch ever
closer to the line that separates illegal from legal, and sometimes enthusiastically leap across it. The
obvious conclusion is that external, principally judicial, checks are needed to keep the Executive in line.2
In many cases the Executive does indeed push the envelope. But not always.3 The government often has
powerful incentives to stay its own hand – to forbear from military and intelligence operations that it
believes are perfectly legal. Officials may conclude that a proposed mission – a decapitation strike on al
Qaeda’s leadership, say, or the use of mildly coercive interrogation techniques on a captured terrorist –
is entirely permissible under domestic and international law. Yet they nevertheless might rule it out. In
other words, the government sometimes adopts self-restraints that limit its ability to conduct
operations it regards as legally justified; it “fight[s] with one hand behind its back,” to borrow Aharon
Barak’s memorable phrase.4
There are powerful motives for executive self- restraint: cost/benefit analysis and
bureaucratic empire building.
Sales, ’12 [Nathan, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, “SELF RESTRAINT AND
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, August 8, 2012,]
The question then becomes why officials adopt these restraints even when they believe them to be legally
unnecessary. Public choice theory suggests two possible explanations. First, self-restraint might result from
systematic asymmetries in military and intelligence officials’ expected value calculations. The expected costs
of a given national security operation often dwarf the expected benefits; officials have more to lose from being
aggressive than they have to gain. In particular, operations –even concededly lawful ones – can inspire adversaries to
launch demoralizing propaganda campaigns accusing the United States of war crimes, can sap the willingness
of allies to assist this country, and can even result in criminal prosecutions or private lawsuits against the
responsible officials. In addition, the resulting costs can be internalized onto the responsible officials more easily than
the resulting benefits. While all national security players experience a degree of cost benefit asymmetry, some experience more than others.
In particular, the senior policymakers who approve operations, and the lawyers who review them, seem even more cautious
than the operators who actually carry them out. This may be because policymakers and lawyers discount some of the benefits that operators
expect to gain (e.g., certain forms of psychic income), and also account for certain costs that operators overlook (e.g., ramifications for the
country’s broader strategic priorities). Policymakers and lawyers therefore will veto proposed missions when they calculate – as they often will
– that their costs exceed their benefits. Second,
self-restraint might result from bureaucratic “empire building,”5 as
lawyers and other officials seek to magnify their clout by rejecting operations planned by their inter- and intra-
agency competitors. Military and intelligence
figures seek to maximize, among other values, the influence they hold
over senior policymakers as well as autonomy to pursue the priorities they deem important. One way for an official to do that is to
interfere with a rival’s plans. A bureaucratic player typically gains no power by serving as a competitor’s yes man. Often, it gains by
saying no, because its obstruction forces the rival to be responsive to its concerns. Reviewers in the government’s national security apparatus
therefore will veto operations planned by other entities when doing so will enhance their welfare.
Cost benefit differences and bureaucratic empire building enhance executive selfrestraint.
Sales, ’12 [Nathan, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, “SELF RESTRAINT AND
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, August 8, 2012,]
Public choice theory can help answer that question. As developed in this article, there
are at least two explanations that can
account for the government’s tendency to tie its own hands in national security operations: cost-benefit
asymmetry and empire building. Officials in military and intelligence agencies tend to be cautious for a
straightforward reason. It is in their interest to be cautious. The expected costs of national security operations are
often greater than the expected benefits. The best case scenario for a cop, spy, or soldier is that he gets a pat on the back; the worst
is that he goes to jail. That gap naturally predisposes officials to play it safe, and senior government policymakers
(and therefore their lawyers) are likely to be especially cautious. It shouldn’t come as much of a surprise, then, when attorneys in
the intelligence community or the Pentagon veto an operation – even a concededly lawful operation – that has the potential to inspire
demoralizing propaganda campaigns by adversaries, expose officials to criminal prosecutions, or worse. The lawyers are doing what all lawyers
do – trying to keep their clients out of trouble. You
may be convinced that it’s legal to bomb a particular convoy or share a
particular intelligence report with your buddy at the FBI. But there’s no guarantee that Belgian war crimes prosecutors or
the FISA Court will see things the same way. Why take the chance?
Persuasive examples of executive self- restraint in national security and specifically
surveillance abound.
Sales, ’12 [Nathan, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University, “SELF RESTRAINT AND
University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, August 8, 2012,]
One example of self-restraint is Executive Order 13,491, which limits counterterrorism interrogations,
including those conducted by the CIA, to the techniques listed in the Army Field Manual. The AFM
prohibits or severely restricts a number of fairly mild interrogation methods such as low-grade threats,
the “good cop, bad cop” routine, and other staples of garden-variety law enforcement investigations. A
second example, sketched above, is the White House’s onetime reluctance to use targeted killings
against Osama bin Laden, despite its belief that doing so would be consistent with domestic and
international laws against assassination. Third, lawyers in the Judge Advocate General corps sometimes
reject military strikes that would be permissible under the law of war, but that they regard as
problematic for moral, economic, social, or political reasons. A fourth example is the Justice
Department’s erection of a “wall” that restricted information sharing between intelligence officials and
criminal investigators, despite the fact that the applicable statute (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978) contained no such limits, and despite the fact that the governing DOJ guidelines established
mechanisms for swapping such data.
Politics Links
PRISM Politics Links
Bipartisan support for PRISM is overwhelming. Congress definitively supports the
status quo.
Green, ’13 [Lloyd, former attorney in the Justice Department, “Prism and the NSA: Something
Congress Can Agree On,” The Daily Beast, June 6, 2013,]
Finally, our
polarized political leaders have found their bipartisan spirit. Lloyd Green on why members of Congress from
both sides of the aisle like government data mining. The center lives. Bipartisanship is not dead, as Democratic and
Republican congressional leaders rally around the National Security Agency’s big data grab. With the exception of
op-ed writers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Pauls—Rand and Ron—Washington’s establishment is standing
together with the administration. In this scrum, party is secondary, at least on Capitol Hill. In a show of unity virtually
unseen since 9/11, the congressional leadership has come out unanimously in support of the status quo,
while deflecting allegations that The Guardian’s news story was actually news. According to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid,
senators who complain about being left in the dark have only themselves to blame, and all other
Americans should sit down and shut up.
Fear of being blamed for terrorist attacks ensures continued Congressional support for
PRISM surveillance.
Green, ’13 [Lloyd, former attorney in the Justice Department, “Prism and the NSA: Something
Congress Can Agree On,” The Daily Beast, June 6, 2013,]
But can
you really blame Congress for its reluctance to challenge the president or the very legal rubric that
Congress itself enacted? As Peggy Noonan put it, “The thing political figures fear most is a terror event that will
ruin their careers. The biggest thing they fear is that a bomb goes off and it can be traced to something
they did or didn’t do, an action they did or didn’t support.”
The American public supports PRISM as critical to fight terrorism after 9-11.
Green, ’13 [Lloyd, former attorney in the Justice Department, “Prism and the NSA: Something
Congress Can Agree On,” The Daily Beast, June 6, 2013,]
Meanwhile, Americans
are not demanding that the administration stop doing whatever it is doing. Public
opinion is ambivalent, not adamant, with conflicting polls delivering contrary messages. According to a joint Washington Post–
Pew Research Center poll, 56 percent find the NSA’s telephone tracking program to be acceptable, while
two in five disagree. Still, a later Gallup poll showed a majority of the public opposed to telephone and Internet tracking, with less than two
fifths supportive. In other words, don’t expect much to change, insofar as 9/11
has changed everything where the
threat of terror is concerned. Sen. Al Franken, by way of Harvard and SNL, tells us that Prism and the NSA are “not
about spying on the American people.” Channeling his inner Stuart Smalley, Franken adds, “There are certain things that are
appropriate for me to know that is not appropriate for the bad guys to know.”
There is bipartisan House support for continuing the current PRISM program.
Harris, ’13 [Bryant, reporter with Inter Press Service News. He has worked in Muscat, Oman and was a
U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Morocco. He graduated from UW-Madison in 2011 with a BA in Middle
East Studies, “Amash Amendment: House PRISM Vote Shows GOP Hypocrisy in Action,” News.Mic, July
25, 2013,]
On Wednesday the
House voted on an amendment to an appropriations bill that would have defunded the NSA’s
PRISM program and ended its ability under the PATRIOT Act to collect phone records and metadata from
individuals not under investigation. “Small government” Republicans teamed up with “liberal”
Democrats to narrowly defeat Rep. Justin Amash’s (R-Mich.) amendment, 217-205. One hundred thirty-four
Republicans voted “no” on the Amash amendment, as opposed to 83 Democrats. Although many of the
Republican representatives who opposed the amendment constantly rail against the excesses of big
government and actively oppose the Affordable Care Act on the grounds that it gives the federal government too much power, they
have no problem giving President Barack Obama control and unlimited access to our phone records and
There is bipartisan Senate support for continuing the PRISM program.
Fischer-Zernin, ’13 [Maxime, Studying Political Science at Duke University (T. '15). His interests lie
primarily in American national security and foreign policy. He is currently an Editor-at-Large for the Duke
Political Review, and is a contributor for, “PRISM Scandal: Same Republicans Who
Blamed Obama For Benghazi, IRS, AP, Are Silent On PRISM — Why?” News.Mic, June 7, 2013,]
The NSA programs of acquiring broad amounts of telephone and Internet data have drawn support from
both Republicans and Democrats, including the leading members of both parties on the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss. While some in the GOP, such as Sen. Rand Paul
(R-Ky.) are standing by their principles, others such as Sen. Chambliss (R-Ga.) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) appear
to trust Obama only when it suits their agenda. In a statement, Chambliss says that these "lawful intelligence activities must
continue, with the careful oversight of the executive …" This is surprising coming from the same man who believes that President Obama was
misleading the American people: "What Susan Rice said was exactly what President Obama told her to say … They were about ready to throw
her under the bus." He later added, "I do think that there were some politics involved in the message that the White House wanted to send."
Talking about the IRS and Benghazi scandals, Sen. Lindsey Graham commented, "The Obama administration is not a victim of anything other
than their excess abuse of power," calling Obama's actions "every bit as damaging as Watergate." However, Graham does not seem to have an
issue with the same administration that was "spinning the American people" and "stonewalling the Congress" while acquiring masses of
telephone and Internet data on American and foreign citizens. Defending the NSA, Graham told Fox & Friends that "I'm glad the NSA is trying to
find out what the terrorists are up to overseas and in our country." While neither Chambliss's nor Graham's mistrust of Obama is necessarily
problematic, it is difficult to "square the circle" as to why the White House cannot be trusted to run the IRS or secure diplomatic compounds,
but can be trusted with voluminous quantities of personal data. On the libertarian right, congressmen have been far more consistent in their
views. Sen. Rand Paul condemned the NSA surveillance as "an astounding assault on the Constitution," adding, "After revelations that the
Internal Revenue Service targeted political dissidents and the Department of Justice seized reporters' phone records, it would appear that this
administration has now sunk to a new low." Sen. Graham has even gone as far as to attack Rand Paul for criticizing the White House: "I see the
threat to the average American, radical Islam coming to our backyard trying to destroy our way of life. He sees the threat (from) the
government that's trying to stop the attack. I'm more threatened by the radical Islamists than I am the government agencies who are trying to
protect us." While Republicans continue to push the Benghazi and IRS scandals, the
choice of many to defend Obama’s use of
the NSA suggests that Republicans may actually care about the policy enough not to exploit the issue
and use it as part of the giant scandal narrative, which would seem to be the smart political play.
Terrorism DA
Terror Links
PRISM is Essential to U.S. Security in War Against Terrorism –DA Links!
Carafano ‘13 (James, Vice President for the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
National Security and Foreign Policy, and the E. W. Richardson Fellow, “PRISM is Essential to
U.S. Security in War Against Terrorism”, August 6th, 2013,
Our intelligence
professionals must be able to find out who the terrorists are talking to, what they are
saying, and what they're planning," said the president. "The lives of countless Americans depend on our ability to
monitor these communications." He added that he would cancel his planned trip to Africa unless assured Congress would support
the counterterrorism surveillance program. The president was not Barack Obama. It was George W. Bush, in 2008, pressing Congress to extend
and update reforms to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). He was speaking directly to the American public, in an address broadcast
live from the Oval Office. How times have changed. Back then, the President of the United States willingly led the fight for the programs he
thought necessary to keep the nation safe. Now, our president sends underlings to make the case. In distancing himself from the debate over
PRISM (the foreign intelligence surveillance program made famous by the world-travelling leaker Edward Snowden), President Obama followed
the precedent he established in May at the National Defense University. There, he spoke disdainfully of drone strikes, the authorization to use
military force against terrorists, and the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay. All three are essential components of his counterterrorism
strategy. In distancing himself from his own strategy, Obama hoped to leave the impression that he is somehow above it all. He has dealt with
the Snowden case the same way. When asked while traveling in Africa if he would take a role in going after the leaker, the president replied "I
shouldn't have to." The White House's above-it-all attitude sends seriously mixed messages to the American people, who are trying to figure if
the government's surveillance programs are legal and appropriate. Congress has not been much better. The
authority for PRISM is in
FISA Section 702. Congress debated these authorities in 2007 and again when the program was reauthorized in 2008. Senate Majority
Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., surely remembers the controversy. He wrote President Bush: "There is no crisis that should lead you to cancel your
trip to Africa. But whether or not you cancel your trip, Democrats stand ready to negotiate a final bill, and we remain willing to extend existing
law for as short a time or as long a time as is needed to complete work on such a bill." Evidently, Reid must have felt the authorities granted
under Section 702 received a full and sufficient hearing. Most current members of Congress were seated under the dome during the 2008
debates. They had every opportunity not just to read the law, but to be briefed on the program by intelligence officials before voting on the bill.
For them to act shocked at the scope of the program today rings about as hollow as Obama's expressed disdain for the operations he oversees.
The reality is that Congress and the administration share responsibility for these programs. If they want to change or modify them, who's
stopping them? If changes are made, however, they should to be made for the right reason. Leaders must never compromise our security for
political expediency. At
least 60 Islamist-inspired terrorist plots have been aimed at the U.S. since the 9/11
attacks. The overwhelming majority have been thwarted thanks to timely, operational intelligence about
the threats. Congress should not go back to a pre-/11 set of rules just to appeal to populist sentiment. Congress and the White House have an
obligation to protect our liberties and to safeguard our security -- in equal measure. Meeting that mission is more important than winning
popularity polls.
PRISM helped stop terrorism in US and 20-plus countries.
Mattise ‘13 (Nathan, New Orleans-based Staff Editor at Ars Technica, “PRISM helped stop terrorism in
US and 20-plus countries”, June 16th 2013,
US intelligence officials sent Congress a new declassified document on Saturday, which the Senate Intelligence Committee
then made public. Outlets such as CNN and the Associated Press received the document and revealed a number of interesting
statistics related to the government's use of the NSA's controversial PRISM program. However, this document has not
yet been published on the Senate Intelligence Committee's website (and does not seem to be easily obtained through basic Internet search).
The new document is part of an intelligence official's effort to "show Americans the value of the program," according to the AP. The report's
primary supporting stat? Intelligence
officials said that information gleaned from these NSA initiatives helped
prevent terrorist plots in the US and more than 20 other countries. Additionally, the release stated that
phone metadata was searched for less than 300 times within the secretive database last year. The document also added
details to the public's growing picture of the PRISM program. CNN reported that the NSA must delete these records after five
years. The AP wrote that the NSA programs are reviewed every 90 days by a secret court authorized by the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), and that the metadata records (which includes a call's time and length) can only be
inspected for "suspected connections to terrorism." Despite all the public attention, the Obama Administration continues to
insist that no privacy violations took place. According to White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough (speaking Sunday on Face The Nation),
the president plans to further clarify this "in the days ahead." On Friday, TechDirt also published a set of two documents described as "talking
points about scooping up business records (i.e., all data on all phone calls) and on the Internet program known as PRISM." One of the talking
points' main arguments is that Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act authorizes actions similar to those described above. This
is despite the fact that no member of the public has ever been able to see the FISA court's ruling of the government's interpretation.
PRISM stopped 50 terrorist attacks, including assaults on the New York Stock
Exchange and New York City subways.
Gerstein ‘13
(Josh, White House reporter for POLITICO, specializing in legal and national security
issues, “PRISM stopped NYSE attack”, June 18th 2013,
Recently leaked communication surveillance programs have helped thwart more than 50 “potential
terrorist events” around the world since the Sept. 11 attacks, National Security Agency Director Keith Alexander said Tuesday. Alexander
said at least 10 of the attacks were set to take place in the United States, suggesting that most of the terrorism disrupted by the program had
been set to occur abroad. The NSA also disclosed that counterterrorism officials targeted
fewer than 300 phone
numbers or other “identifiers” last year in the massive call-tracking database secretly assembled by the U.S.
government. Alexander said the programs were subject to “extraordinary oversight.” ”This isn’t some rogue operation that a group of guys
up at NSA are running,” the spy agency’s chief added. The data on use of the call-tracking data came in a fact sheet released to reporters in
connection with a public House Intelligence Committee hearing exploring the recently leaked telephone data mining program and another
surveillance effort focused on Web traffic generated by foreigners. (POLITICO Junkies: NSA leaks cause flood of political problems) Alexander
said 90
percent of the potential terrorist incidents were disrupted by the Web traffic program known as PRISM. He
FBI Director Sean Joyce said the
Web traffic program had contributed to arrests averting a plot to bomb the New York Stock Exchange that
resulted in criminal charges in 2008. Joyce also indicated that the PRISM program was essential to disrupting a plot to
bomb the New York City subways in 2009. “Without the [Section] 702 tool, we would not have identified Najibullah Zazi,” Joyce
was less clear about how many incidents the call-tracking effort had helped to avert. Deputy
said. However, President Barack Obama acknowledged in an interview aired Monday that it is impossible to know whether the subway plot
might have been foiled by other methods. ”We might have caught him some other way. We might have disrupted it because a New York cop
saw he was suspicious. Maybe he turned out to be incompetent and the bomb didn’t go off. But at the margins we are increasing our chances
of preventing a catastrophe like that through these programs,” Obama told Charlie Rose on PBS. At the hearing, Alexander detailed the scope
and safeguards of the programs, while Deputy Attorney General James Cole laid out the legal basis for the surveillance. “This is not a program
that’s off the books, that’s been hidden away,” Cole said of the call-tracking program, which was classified “top secret” prior to recent leaks. He
noted that the Patriot Act provision found to authorize it has been twice reauthorized by Congress. “All of us in the national security
[community] are constantly trying to balance protecting public safety with protecting people’s civil liberties,” Cole said. NSA Deputy Director
Chris Inglis said a very limited number of individuals are authorized to access the call-tracking database.
Terror DA Turns the Case – EU Relations
Fallout from a terrorist attack would damage US-European relations far more than
U.S. surveillance. The disad turns the case.
Raisher, ‘14 [Josh is a program coordinator for the Transatlantic Trends survey at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States, ”Ties that Bind?” U.S. News & World Report, 9-11-2014,]
So even if
policymakers significantly rein in the NSA program itself, along with other espionage activities
targeting Germany, something new would inevitably replace them – and potentially something far less
appealing to America’s allies. The potential domestic fallout of a successful terror attack is sufficiently
monumental that it makes political sense for leaders to disregard the fraying of America’s relationship
with an ally if it reduces the risk of such an event; and if the president wants to curtail intelligence-gathering programs, his
room for error is dangerously narrow.