REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA CITY
EN BANC
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
G.R. No. 207264
For: Certiorari in Relation to Rule 64
of the Rules of Court
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN,
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------------------- x
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies? (But who is to guard the
guardians themselves?)
Under our constitutional scheme, the Supreme Court is the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution, particularly of the allocation of
powers, the guarantee of individual liberties and the assurance of the
people’s sovereignty. The Court has the distinguished but delicate duty
of determining and defining constitutional meaning, divining
constitutional intent and deciding constitutional disputes. Nonetheless,
its judicial supremacy is never judicial superiority (for it is co-equal
with the other branches) or judicial tyranny (for it is supposed to be
the least dangerous branch). Instead, judicial supremacy is the
conscious and cautious awareness and acceptance of its proper place in
the overall scheme of government with the objective of asserting and
promoting the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, whenever the
Court exercises its function of checking the excesses of any
branch of government, it is also duty-bound to check itself.
Otherwise, who will guard the guardian?1 (Emphasis supplied)
The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives
should be exercised with great caution and after the proper
proceedings for the ouster has been validly completed. For
to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the highest number
of votes in the elections, and during the pendency of the proceedings
determining one’s qualification or disqualification, would amount
1
Dueňas vs HRET (G.R. No. 185401; 21 July 2009).
1
to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides.2 (Emphasis supplied)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
with
MOTION FOR INHIBITION OF JUSTICE JOSE P. PEREZ
Petitioner, by counsel, respectfully moves for a reconsideration of the
extended and signed Resolution of the Honorable Court dated 25 June 2013 (a
copy of which was received by the Petitioner on 28 June 20133) based on the
following discussion.
PREFATORY STATEMENT
1. The rule on inhibition of justices of the Court is rendered nugatory if there
are colleagues who disregard the Internal Rules of the Court, long established
jurisprudence and even the Constitution itself just to come up with a “hasty and
imprudent action” that “favors the son of a Member of the Court.”4
Hasty and Imprudent Action Even Faster
Than the Davide Impeachment Case
2. One of the fastest cases decided by the Honorable Court in recent memory
was the case of Francisco vs. House of Representatives5 where the Honorable Court came
out with its Decision on 10 November 2003 on the Petitions filed on or before 28
October 2003 for a period of 13 days. Despite the expedited resolution of the
Francisco vs. House of Representatives landmark case, the Honorable Court in that case
still found it indispensably obligatory to give the Respondents therein both the
opportunity to Comment on the Petitions and to hear the parties on oral argument.
The Supreme Court then did not take it upon itself to resolve the issue based
exclusively on the Petitions filed therein no matter how urgent or important the issue
was in that case.
3. In the present case, the Honorable Court came out with its Resolution on
25 June 2013 after the Petition was filed on 10 June 2013. Not counting
Independence Day as well as the anniversary celebration of the Honorable Court on
12 and 11 June 2013, respectively, the present case was resolved within the same
period as the Davide Case if not even faster. Unlike in the case of Francisco vs. House of
Representatives, however, the Respondents herein were neither given the opportunity
to Comment on the Petition nor were the parties heard on oral argument.
Limkaichong vs. COMELEC, infra.
The fifteen day period for filing a Motion for Reconsideration will expire on 13 July 2013, a
Saturday. The last day for the filing of the motion is therefore on the next working day following
such Saturday which is on Monday, 15 July 2013.
4
Dissent of Justice Brion.
5
G.R. No. 160261; 10 November 2003.
2
3
2
4. It was understandable for the Honorable Court to have expeditiously acted
the way it did in the Davide Case since the impeachment case involved then was
widely viewed as an institutional attack on the Supreme Court itself and not just
against the then Chief Justice. The Davide Case was not simply a case against Davide,
it was a case against the whole Court.
5. In the case at bar, there is nothing that lent urgency to the case to justify the
Court acting the way it did, the Court’s explanation notwithstanding. This is
especially true considering the following pronouncements of the Honorable Court:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with the said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.6
6. If indeed the HRET’s jurisdiction does not come into effect unless invoked
by a party in a case filed before it, then why did the Honorable Court feel the need to
hastily resolve the Petition without the benefit of a Comment from the Respondents
prior to and in consideration of the beginning of the term of office of the Petitioner
on 30 June 2013 as was the explanation offered by the Honorable Court?
7. What reason or consideration more important than the need to defend the
Court from an attack against it as an institution impelled the Honorable Court to
decide this case in a “hasty and imprudent” manner that without any shred of doubt
the members of the majority of the Court knew would benefit Lord Allan Velasco,
son of Justice Presbitero Velasco?
8. Given the insubstantiality of the explanation offered to justify the “hasty”
decision, the Supreme Court Justices who signed the majority decision will not be
able to fault law professors, law students, law practitioners, and trial judges --who will read the jurisprudence that is now incipiently coming out of this case and as
will be memorialized in the SCRA and Philippine Reports --- to suspect or even
conclude that there was no other factor that may have impelled the Honorable Court
to take such “hasty and imprudent action” except to make the “son of a Member of
the Court” benefit from the Resolution. The Resolution in this case, with all due
respect, if allowed to become jurisprudence, has the potential makings of becoming
a perpetually-cited example --- in the local and international legal arena --- of a
Supreme Court terribly gone astray.
9. It is under such backdrop that Petitioner is filing this Motion for
Reconsideration.
6
Resolution, at p. 6.
3
Manifestations
10. Before anything else, Petitioner respectfully manifests to and furnishes the
Honorable Court with a certified true copy of her Identification Certificate No. 0505424 (attached hereto as Annex “A”) issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated
13 October 2005 recognizing her as a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the
provisions and implementing regulations of Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner begs
the indulgence of the Honorable Court for this belated submission of her
Identification Certificate as her records with the Bureau of Immigration has been
missing. Fortunately, her Index Card on file at the Fingerprint Section was found and
it became the basis, together with Petitioner’s copy of the certificate which she just
unearthed lately, for the issuance of a certified true copy of her Identification
Certificate No. 05-05424. Unfortunately, since her records are missing, Petitioner
was unable to secure a copy of her Oath of Allegiance taken before her Identification
Certificate was issued.
11. Petitioner likewise manifests that she retook her oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines when she took her oath as a Notary Public on 15 October
2009 and after she was appointed as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque. A copy
of these oaths is attached hereto as Annexes “B” and “C.”
12. Petitioner likewise submits a Certification, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Annex “D,” from the Bureau of Immigration that she used only her
Philippine passport in her travels abroad after she renounced her American
citizenship.
Compliance with the Requirements Laid Down
in the 25 June 2013 Resolution
13. The Honorable Court’s extended and signed Resolution essentially
declared that “the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal) does not
have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representative”7 and that “to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office”8. Then the Honorable
Court concluded that “the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office”9 considering that
the petitioner can only assume office “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
14. As a short response, Petitioner respectfully manifests to the Honorable
Court that she has, at this time, satisfied all the requirements stated in the extended
and signed Resolution of the Honorable Court as borne by the following discussion.
Resolution dated 25 June 2013, at p. 6.
Ibid., at p. 7.
9
Ibid., at p. 8.
7
8
4
This does not mean though that Petitioner agrees, under any measure, with the
Resolution of the Honorable Court.
Mandatory Judicial Notice of Passage of NOON of 30 JUNE 2013
15. Petitioner respectfully invites the Honorable Court to take judicial notice
of the fact that the “thirtieth day of June” 2013 has come and gone. As stated in the
Manifestation dated 2 July 2013, and in obedience to the constitutional mandate
under pain of a criminal sanction, Petitioner legally assumed the duties of her office
“at noon on the thirtieth day of June” 2013 and in fact filed her bill and resolution, a
copy of which was furnished the Honorable Court, on 1 July 2013.
16. Thus, going by the very pronouncement of the Honorable Court in its
Resolution which was rendered without giving the other party as well as the Public
Respondent the opportunity to file a comment, the COMELEC has lost its
jurisdiction over the Petitioner.
Petitioner Validly Took Her Oath of Office
17. Petitioner has also duly taken her oath of office. As stated in the Petition,
Petitioner took her oath of office on 5 June 2013 “before Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.”10
18. Further, Petitioner respectfully manifests that she also took her oath
before the President of the Philippines on 27 June 2013 as evidenced by the attached
photographs (Annexes “E” and “E-1” hereof) of Petitioner with the President,
among others. We invite the Honorable Court to take judicial notice of such official
act of the executive department of the Republic of the Philippines, done by no less
than the President of the country. A copy of the news article/release issued by the
Presidential Communications Operations Office is attached hereto as Annex “F.”11
19. The Honorable Court raises doubts over the validity of such oath taking
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives saying that “it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with” in accordance with
Sec. 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives which
states:
Sec. 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall
take their oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before
the Speaker in open session.
20. Petitioner respectfully requests the Honorable Members of the Supreme
Court to read the foregoing provision again in the context in which it was cited in the
extended and signed Resolution of 25 June 2013 and under the prevailing legislation
on the matter.
10
11
Ibid., at p. 4
See also http://www.pcoo.gov.ph/archives2013/jun27.htm.
5
21. The Honorable Court foists upon the Filipino people and the whole world
an interpretation of the foregoing provision that is completely illogical.
22. First, there is no dispute that the Speaker of the House of Representatives
is an Official Authorized to Administer Oath pursuant to the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, as follows:
"Sec. 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oath. - The following officers
have general authority to administer oaths: President; Vice-President;
Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
Members of the Judiciary; Secretaries of Departments; provincial
governors and lieutenant-governors; city mayors; municipal mayors;
bureau directors; regional directors; clerks of courts; registrars of
deeds; other civilian officers in the public service of the government of
the Philippines whose appointments are vested in the President and are
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; all other
constitutional officers; and notaries public."
23. The above-quoted provision of the Administrative Code of 1987 does not
prescribe the procedure or formalities for the taking of the oath, or as the Honorable
Court seems to suggest, that it be in open session of Congress in order for the same
to be “valid or official taking of the oath.”12
24. The Honorable Court’s interpretation that for the oath before the Speaker
of the House of Representatives to be valid it must be done only “in open session”
essentially makes a distinction between oaths before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives on one hand, and oaths taken before the ordinary Members thereof
who may administer an oath at any time, at any place and under any condition, on the
other hand. The Speaker of the House is a “Member of . . . Congress” who is
empowered to administer oaths without being bound to do so exclusively “in open
session” under the provisions of the Administrative Code.
25. The law does not distinguish, and Petitioner requests the Honorable
Court not to read a distinction when the law does not do so.
26. And as the following discussion will show, the oath before the Speaker in
open session is merely a formality for those who have already taken their oath as the
very same provision itself presupposes that the “Member” has already taken his or her
oath.
27. The provision refers to “Members” and by the operational definition of
Members of the House of Representatives as discussed in the Resolution, three
requisites must concur, namely: 1) a valid proclamation; 2) a proper oath; and 3)
assumption of office which cannot happen until 30th of June 2013. Since by
definition, a “Member” of the House of Representatives is supposed to have taken his
12
Resolution, at p. 9.
6
or her oath and assumed office, what then is the purpose of the oath before the
Speaker in open session, as mentioned in the Rules of the House of Representatives?
28. Also, by the Honorable Court’s definition of a “Member” of the House of
Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives cannot validly
administer an oath to any congressman-elect before 30 June 2013 because: 1)
Congress is not in session by that time; and 2) the person taking an oath cannot be
considered a “Member of the House of Representatives” as he or she has yet to
assume office at noon of 30 June 2013.
29. If the Honorable Court’s above-stated definition is followed, even if the
noon of 30 June 2013 passes by, since at that time there is technically no Speaker of
the House until he or she is elected as such when Congress convenes in session, then,
the earliest time that the Speaker of the House can administer an oath is on the
opening of the congressional session.
30. Thus, is it the Honorable Court’s ruling that the only valid and earliest
oath that may be taken before the Speaker of the House of Representatives is on the
opening day of the congressional session after the Speaker has been elected to such
position?
31. Is the Honorable Court saying that the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the current Congress when the elections were held cannot, while
Congress is not in session, administer an oath to anyone who desires to take his or
her oath before the Speaker of the House before his term expires at noon of the 30 th
of June following the elections?
32. If the Speaker of the House can only administer the oath on the opening
day of the congressional session, will the duly elected and proclaimed winners for
congressional seats be liable for the crime of refusal to discharge elective office
considering that they could not assume the duties of their office before taking such an
oath with the Speaker of the House of Representatives?
33. In theory therefore, if all congressmen-elect opt to take their oath before
the Speaker of the House, by the Honorable Court’s interpretation of the provision,
it would be actually and legally impossible for Congress to convene considering that
the congressmen-elect cannot be considered Members of the House of
Representatives without that oath and the Speaker cannot be elected as Speaker
without any Member of the House of Representatives to elect such Speaker.
34. Taking the argument a little further, if all congressmen-elect take their
oath before the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress when the
elections was conducted, and only exclusively before him but not in open session,
then going by the Honorable Court’s ruling, anything the House of Representatives
does when it convenes is void for not having been done by persons who have satisfied
the Honorable Court’s requirements to be considered as Members of the House of
Representatives.
7
35. On a more personal level is the consequence of the Resolution with
respect to duly elected and proclaimed candidates for the position of Members of the
House of Representatives who took their oath of office before Speaker Belmonte
before the past congress expired and who discharged their duties starting noon of 30
June 2013. Are they now liable for violation of Article 236 of the Revised Penal
Code for anticipation of duties of a public office for not having been properly and
validly sworn in?
36. Although it is unclear to the Petitioner, she certainly hopes that the
Honorable Court does not intend such an otherwise pointless and incredible
interpretation of the said House Rules. But it has to be qualified and frankly spoken
that professors, students, or practitioners of law cannot be faulted if they entertain
suspicions that such an interpretation is not pointless at all viewed from the
perspective of who stands to benefit from the Resolution of the Court.
37. Lest it be forgotten, the Honorable Court could have simply given the
oath before the Speaker of the House of Representatives the respect it deserves and
relied on the presumption that “official duty has been regularly performed”13
especially since neither of the Respondents have submitted any comment on the
Petition and thus, theoretically, the Honorable Court is bound by the allegations of
fact of the Petitioner in her Petition as well as her other pleadings in this case.
38. In any case, if there is any doubt at all on Petitioner’s oath taking before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the previous Congress, all that is
water under the bridge with Petitioner’s oath taking before the President of the
Philippines.
Petitioner was Duly and Validly Proclaimed Winner for the Position
of Member of the House of Representatives
39. There is likewise no dispute from the records of this case that Petitioner
was and remains to be the duly proclaimed winner for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional
district of the province of Marinduque. There is nothing in the record of
this case that indicates that Petitioner’s proclamation on 18 May 2013 has
been annulled, voided or set aside by the Commission on Elections
before Petitioner assumed her office at noon of 30 June 2013.
40. Thus, proceeding from the pronouncement of the Honorable Court in its
Resolution that “until such time (that is, noon of 30 June 2013 -- ours) the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction,” since the noon of 30 June 2013 has come and gone,
COMELEC is devoid of jurisdiction to annul Petitioner’s proclamation of
18 May 2013.
41. Thus, by this time or to be more accurate, from noon of 30 June 2013
onwards, the Resolution of the Honorable Court as far as Petitioner’s case is
13
Section 3 (m) Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
8
concerned and insofar as it has not become final and executory, is no longer
supported by the existing facts. Unless the Honorable Court plans to hold
hostage the passage of time, there is no escaping the effects thereof on this case and,
as is only proper, on the Honorable Court.
42. Petitioner once again brings to the Honorable Court’s kind attention the
legal presumption that, in so far as the proclamation of the Petitioner is
concerned, such official duty has been regularly performed.14
43. But that notwithstanding, it does not mean that the Honorable Court’s
disquisition in relation to Petitioner’s proclamation is not without fault and
Petitioner respectfully takes issue with the pronouncements of the Honorable Court
on this matter.
Petitioner’s Proclamation NOT and
NEVER Been an Issue in this Petition
44. First is the fact that the validity or invalidity of Petitioner’s proclamation
on 18 May 2013 has never been an issue in this case and the Honorable Court, for all
its collective wisdom, cannot pass upon this issue when such was not even the issue
before Respondent COMELEC. But that was in fact what the Honorable Court did
without directly saying so.15 Specifically, the Court said:
… We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the
argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the
COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which
proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render
nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a
decision of the COMELEC First Division.
45. Why the Honorable Court would even raise such issue with respect to the
proclamation when it has not even been raised as an issue in the Petition is not
beyond comprehension. It only makes sense, given that it could only have become an
issue if the Respondents took issue with it, when viewed from the point of view of
one Lord Allan Velasco, son of Justice Presbitero Velasco.
46. With the present ruling of the Honorable Court, Lord Allan Velasco may
not only possibly judicially oust Petitioner from office, he may even be a beneficiary
of the Honorable Court’s ruling which may be interpreted to mean as authorizing the
COMELEC to not only disqualify Petitioner and annul her proclamation, but more
importantly to proclaim the second placer – Lord Allan Velasco, son of Justice
Presbitero Velasco who is a sitting Member of this Court, WHO WAS
CLEARLY AND SOUNDLY REJECTED BY THE ELECTORATE OF
14
15
Ibid.
See Resolution, pp. 9-10.
9
MARINDUQUE and beaten by Petitioner by about four thousand (4,000)
votes – as the winning congressman-elect.
Court Resolution Contrary to Prevailing Jurisprudence
on Validity of Proclamation
47. The case at bar is on all fours with the case of Planas vs. COMELEC16 as far
as the validity of Petitioner’s proclamation is concerned. In both cases, the
resolutions of the COMELEC disqualifying Defensor and the Petitioner have not yet
become final and executory at the time of their respective proclamations. Thus, the
Supreme Court ruled:
In the case at bar, at the time of the proclamation of Defensor
who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution
invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final, hence, he had
at that point in time remained qualified. Therefore, his proclamation
was valid or legal.
48. The same ruling was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong where the
Court said:
Whether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC
Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007.
On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the COMELEC En
Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the
incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of
the motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there
was no impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the
winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order and ruling.
xxx
Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s
constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of
16
G.R. No. 167594; 10 March 2006.
10
procedure relative to the conduct of the elections. In adopting such
policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections,
the COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the sovereign
will of the people and in the interest of justice and fair play.
Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still
pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain the highest
number of votes from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the
hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Whereas, in this case,
the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on the
disqualification cases against Limkaichong until after the conduct of the
elections, with her obtaining the highest number of votes from the
electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the PBOC
pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.
The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC,
that at the time of the proclamation of Defensor, the
respondent therein who garnered the highest number of
votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of
candidacy was not yet final. As such, his proclamation was
valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained
qualified. Limkaichong’s situation is no different from that of
Defensor, the former having been disqualified by a Division Resolution
on the basis of her not being a natural-born Filipino citizen. When she
was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the elections
for obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the
Division Resolution disqualifying her has not yet became final as a
result of the motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
49. The same doctrine was enunciated in the case of Gonzalez vs. COMELEC.17
The Supreme Court said:
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the May 8, 2010 resolution
of the Second Division having been timely filed, the said resolution had
not become final and executory. Considering that at the time of
the proclamation of Gonzalez who garnered the highest
number of votes for the position of Representative in the
3rd district of Albay, the said Division Resolution declaring
Gonzalez disqualified as a candidate for the said position
was not yet final, he had at that point in time remained
qualified. Therefore, his proclamation on May 12, 2010 by
the PBOC was valid or legal. Moreover, the May 8, 2010
resolution cannot as yet be implemented for not having attained
finality. (Emphasis supplied)
17
G.R. No. 192856; 8 March 2011.
11
50. The rationale for upholding the proclamation of a winning candidate
whose disqualification has not yet attained finality at the time of the elections has
been proclaimed by the Court in the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Limkaichong case dated 30 July 2009. The pronouncement of the Court is
squarely applicable to the present case, to wit:
Accordingly, it is not enough that one's qualification, or lack of
it, to hold an office requiring one to be a natural-born citizen, be
attacked and questioned before any tribunal or government institution.
Proper proceedings must be strictly followed by the proper officers
under the law. Hence, in seeking Limkaichong's disqualification on
account of her citizenship, the rudiments of fair play and due process
must be observed, for in doing so, she is not only deprived of the right
to hold office as a Member of the House of Representative but her
constituents would also be deprived of a leader in whom they have put
their trust on through their votes. The obvious rationale behind
the foregoing ruling is that in voting for a candidate who
has not been disqualified by final judgment during the
election day, the people voted for her bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person
to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government. (Emphasis supplied)
51. Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that there is doubt as
regards the validity of the proclamation of the Petitioner, such questions are better
addressed to the sound discretion of the HRET considering the proclamation, oath
and assumption of office of the Petitioner. This was the categorical ruling of the
Court in Lazatin vs. COMELEC18 when it declined jurisdiction over the case filed
before it and ruled as follows:
The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has
been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first
district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed
his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the
electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the
House Electoral Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the
COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the
rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the sound judgment of the
Electoral Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)
18
G.R. No. 80007; 25 January 1988.
12
Legality of Proclamation Beyond Court’s Jurisdiction;
Non-Availment of Administrative Remedies
52. Even if Petitioner gives the aforesaid questioned passage from the Court’s
ruling the significance it does not clearly deserve, is it the Honorable Court’s ruling
that, when it proclaimed Petitioner as the winner of the congressional race, the
Board of Canvassers was acting illegally or was conducting an illegal proceeding? If
so, the Honorable Court is acting illegally and beyond jurisdiction in doing
so for the following reasons:
53. First, as mentioned earlier, it was not an issue in this Petition. This
Petition was under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifically
questioning the Respondent COMELEC’s disqualification of the Petitioner in SPA
No. 13-053. The issue in this Petition is the lack of jurisdiction and/or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of
the COMELEC in issuing its assailed Resolution.
54. Second, the Honorable Court does not have original jurisdiction
over annulment of proclamations. Even assuming without conceding that the
HRET did not yet, at the time of the filing of the Petition, have jurisdiction over
Petitioner, still, going by the reasoning of the Honorable Court, it is the
COMELEC that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over preproclamation controversies19 such as the question of the legality or illegality of
the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers and thus, the annulment of the
proclamation of the Petitioner.
55. Third, even if such issue may be validly raised before and passed
upon by the Honorable Court, it is dismissible for the simple reason of
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under the Comelec Rules of
Procedure the issue of the illegality of the proceedings of the board of canvassers
must be raised before the board itself or directly with the Comelec.20 It must be
“filed immediately when the board begins to act as such,” “or immediately at the
point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal.”21
56. Fourth, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Disputes In An
Automated Election System in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Elections
(Resolution No. 8804), as amended by Resolution No. 9164, the question of the
illegality of the proceedings of the board of canvassers must be brought
immediately before the board or the COMELEC, to wit:
Section 2. Jurisdiction of the Commission in Pre-Proclamation
Controversies. - COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction in preproclamation controversies arising from national, regional or local
elections.
Section 1 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Ibid., Sections 2 and 5.
21
Ibid., Section 5(b).
19
20
13
A pre-proclamation controversy may be raised by any candidate
or by any registered political party, organization, or coalition of
political parties before the BOC, or directly with the Commission.
Issues affecting the composition or proceedings of the Boards
may be initiated by filing a verified petition before the Board or
directly with the Commission.
If the petition is filed directly with the Board, its decision may
be appealed to the Commission within three (3) days from
issuance thereof. However, if commenced directly with the
Commission, the verified petition shall be filed immediately
when the board begins to act illegally, or at the time of the
appointment of the member of the board whose capacity to sit as such
is objected to. (Emphasis supplied)
57. There is no showing that the above-cited procedure has been complied
with in this case. Neither was there a petition filed with the Board of Canvassers duly
appealed with the COMELEC nor was a verified petition commenced directly with
the COMELEC “immediately when the board begins to act illegally.”
An Illogical Advisory Opinion
to Restrain the Passage of Time
58. The Honorable Court faults Petitioner for not availing of “Section 1, Rule
37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by filing a
petition before this Court within the 5-day period” in order to “prevent the assailed
Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory.”
59. For such a statement to be made by the Honorable Court is baffling to say
the least. Given the context of this case, such faulting of Petitioner is understandable
but is nevertheless not supported by any legal and jurisprudential bases.
60. Petitioner would like to point out that the Honorable Court is partly
correct in its observation that “petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made only in
an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory
judgment in SPA No. 13-053.”22 This is for the simple reason that it is the only
recourse available to the Petitioner or to anyone aggrieved by a decision or resolution
of the COMELEC en banc – that is, to apply with the Honorable Court on certiorari
and for a restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from implementing its
questioned decision or resolution. Not even the HRET can review COMELEC’s
resolutions much less issue a restraining order against its implementation.
61. This is the first time for the Petitioner, who is a lawyer herself, as well as
her counsels, to read about a decision being restrained by the Supreme Court from
becoming final and executory in a certiorari and injunction action. And make no
mistake about it – this is precisely the import of the pronouncement of the
Honorable Court when it said the following:
22
Resolution, at p. 5.
14
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from
becoming final and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of
Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5day period, but she failed to do so. She would file the present last hour
petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent
COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
62. It would be interesting to see how the dispositive portion of the
restraining order would read. Perhaps, it will go along the following lines:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the prayer for a restraining
order or preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED. The Resolution
of the COMELEC dated 14 May 2013 is hereby restrained from
becoming final and executory, the five (5) day period after which such
Resolution may become final and executory is hereby suspended. This
Resolution shall take effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
63. Such an incredible and incredulous pronouncement if not for the grave
consequences that it may entail goes against the basic rule of procedure that a
judgment, final order or resolution is stayed only by a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal,23 not by certiorari. Certiorari is by its very
purpose designed to nullify the assailed judgment, order or resolution or the
proceedings had in arriving at such judgment, final order or resolution, regardless of
the fact that it may have become final and executory. The writ of certiorari and its
resultant order of nullity operate as if the judgment, final order, resolution or
proceedings had not been conducted at all and is thereby set aside.
64. Moreover, a certiorari petition under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court requires that the petition is filed within thirty (30) days [or in case of
Rule 65, within sixty days] from the questioned judgment, order or resolution when
“there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.” The period allowed for the filing of a petition for certiorari itself
presupposes that the judgment, order or resolution has become final and executory
as normally, decisions or final orders or resolutions become final and executory
within fifteen (15) days.
65. Such interpretation is in consonance with the constitutional provision on
the one and only remedy allowed from decisions of the COMELEC, to wit:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
23
See Rules 37 and 39 of the Rules of Court.
15
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing
of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of
each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof.24 (Emphasis supplied)
66. The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines specifically
mandates certiorari as the one and only available remedy from “any decision,
order or ruling” of the COMELEC by the aggrieved party. In mandating certiorari
with the Supreme Court as the only remedy, the 1987 Constitution thereby
considers “any decision, order, or ruling” of the COMELEC as final and
unappealable. Thus, not even the Supreme Court, despite its supremacy in
the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws, can restrain the
finality and unappealability of any such decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC.
67. Furthermore, Petitioner invites the Honorable Court to again read
Section 3 of Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure to discern the intent of
the provision and the meaning of the phrase “unless restrained by the Supreme
Court.” If the Honorable Court was not quite hasty – to use the term of the Dissent
— with its Resolution, perhaps the Honorable Justices of the majority would have
realized that given the context of the provision, that is, the cases enumerated therein,
the phrase “unless restrained by the Supreme Court” refers to the
authority of the Court to restrain the consequences or effects of the
Resolution becoming final and executory after the period of five days
and not its becoming final and executory.
68. The phrase “unless restrained by the Supreme Court” is rendered
necessary by the fact that the cases enumerated under Section 3 of Rule 37 refer
generally to pre-election or pre-proclamation cases and as such, has a material effect
on the conduct and results of the elections and may uphold or thwart the sovereign
will of the electorate. Thus, the need for such “decision, order or ruling” to be
implemented immediately upon becoming final and executory within a period of five
(5) days unless otherwise restrained by the Supreme Court.
69. Contrary to the interpretation of the Honorable Court, Petitioner, with
all due respect, understands the five (5) day period as referring to the inevitable
finality of the “decision, order or ruling” and not a period for the aggrieved party and
the Honorable Court within which it can restrain the decision, order or ruling from
becoming final and executory.
70. Petitioner further invites the Honorable Court to revisit the provisions of
the Rules of Court on Preliminary Injunction. Section 1 of Rule 58 defines what a
preliminary injunction is, to wit:
24
Section 7, Article IX C, 1987 Constitution.
16
SECTION 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. – A
preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party
or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular
act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. (Emphasis supplied)
71. Clear from the provision is the fact that an injunctive writ or a
restraining order has for its object the restraint of particular act or acts.
Applied to the case of the Petitioner as the Honorable Court would have it by its
Resolution, what particular act or acts would be its object? The passage of time? Can
the Honorable Court now, even if only legally, restrain the passage of time? That
would be one for the books.
72. The provision likewise enumerates the entities against whom the
injunctive writ is issued, namely, “a party, court, agency or a person.”
But if the object of the writ is to restrain the passage of time so as to prevent the
assailed resolution of the COMELEC from becoming final and executory as advised
by the Honorable Court to the Petitioner in its Resolution, then the entities against
whom the writ is issued are powerless to effect the restraining order or injunctive
writ that may be issued by the Honorable Court. One might as well issue an
injunctive writ against God himself.
73. With the foregoing, one is reminded of what has oft been widely said
about the Supreme Court: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final”25. One believes and prefers the Supreme Court to
be the repository of supreme intelligence – but then again, it cannot play God’s
better by bidding time to stop.
74. The foregoing more than complies with the Honorable Court’s
requirements for the jurisdiction of the HRET to kick in and thereby oust the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over the qualifications of the Petitioner.
The Errors in the Resolution of the Honorable Court
75. But this Petition is not merely designed to show compliance with what the
Honorable Court has set as the requirements for the HRET jurisdiction to be
effective. This Petition for Certiorari questions COMELEC’s lack or excess of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
coming out with its assailed Resolutions. Petitioner is thus constrained to take issue
with the arguments or pronouncements in the extended and signed Resolution of the
Honorable Court.
25
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson.
17
Honorable Court is Confused About the Available Remedies;
Court Failed to Understand Nature of the Petition Filed Before it
76. The Resolution faults the Petitioner for “taking an inconsistent, if not
confusing, stance while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it is
the HRET which has jurisdiction over her.”26
77. Petitioner once again reiterates that this case is the one and only remedy
available to the Petitioner under the Constitution against the assailed resolutions of
the COMELEC. That remedy is a case for Certiorari.
78. The Petition for Certiorari specifically questions the lack of
jurisdiction of Respondent COMELEC over the “election, returns and
qualifications” of the Petitioner who was, at the time of the filing of this Petition,
a proclaimed congresswoman-elect who has duly taken her oath of office and was
merely waiting to assume the duties of her office at noon of 30 June 2013. The
Petition likewise raises the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC when it issued the
assailed resolutions on the ground of denial of the rights to due process of
the Petitioner and for imposing additional qualifications, aside from those
enumerated in the Constitution, for those running for national office or
involving constitutional officers.
79. In contrast, a remedy with the HRET is either a protest case with respect
to the results of the election, voting or canvass or a quo warranto proceeding
involving the qualifications of Petitioner or other Members of the House of
Representatives.
80. From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the present Petition has
for its issue the lack of jurisdiction or the grave abuse of discretion of
the COMELEC which is different from the issue involved in a quo warranto
case before the HRET which is whether the respondent has the
qualifications required by the Constitution for the office of Member of the
House of Representatives.
81. Stated differently, the Petitioner, in filing this Petition, is not asking
the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her
qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the
jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such
qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC resolutions for having
denied Petitioner her rights to due process and for unconstitutionally
adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution.
82. Of course, as mentioned before, Petitioner agrees with the Court’s
observation that her “recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing its final and excutory judgment in SPA No. 1326
Resolution, at p. 5.
18
053”. But that is merely incidental to and as a consequence of the main case of
certiorari.
Hasty and Imprudent Resolution Designed
to Prevent Petitioner from Assuming Office
83. The Honorable Court justifies its “hasty and imprudent action” by taking
cognizance of the beginning of the term of office of Members of the House of
Representatives on 30 June 2013. The Court said:
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider
each of the issues raised by the petitioner. The need to do so, and at
once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013
where and when it was emphasized that the term of office of the
Members of the House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. 27
84. The foregoing is no explanation of the Honorable Court’s “hasty and
imprudent action” nor does it justify its rush to judgment. Given the context of this
case, the only reasonable inference for the Honorable Court’s coming out with its
Resolution in the manner it did is that it was designed to prevent Petitioner from
assuming the duties of her office at noon of 30 June 2013.
85. Given the circumstances of this case, Petitioner – as a natural-born
Filipino, a Member of the House of Representatives and a lawyer herself concerned
with the honor and integrity of the Court – cannot help but raise such doubts if only
for the Honorable Court to clear itself of any such misconception from the public so
as to “regain the trust of the people” as so often been the battle cry of the Honorable
Chief Justice.
86. Such reasonable inference is further bolstered by the annexes to
Petitioner’s Manifestation of 28 June 2013 where a bizarre thing happened before the
COMELEC. If the Honorable Court would kindly take notice, a “majority” of one (1)
Commissioner came out with a Resolution annulling the proclamation of the
Petitioner while a “minority” of two (2) Commissioners came up with their
“Dissenting Opinions.”
Hasty and Imprudent Action in
Violation of the Court’s Internal Rules
87. The majority of the Court hastily and hurriedly rendered judgment in this
case in total disregard of the Court’s Internal Rules.
88. The Internal Rules provides for the procedure on how actions or decisions
on pending case are reached by the Court, to wit:
27
Ibid., at p. 5.
19
SEC. 3. Actions and decisions, how reached. – The actions and
decision of the Court whether en banc or through a Division, shall be
arrived at as follows:
(a) Initial action on the petition or complaint. – After a petition
or complaint has been placed on the agenda for the first
time, the Member-in-Charge shall, except in urgent cases, submit to
the other Members at least three days before the initial
deliberation in such case, a summary of facts, the issue or
issues involved, and the arguments that the petitioner
presents in support of his or her case. The Court shall, in
consultation with its Members, decide on what action it will take.
(b) Action on incidents. – The Member-in-Charge shall
recommend to the Court the action to be taken on any incident during
the pendency of the case.
(c) Decision or Resolution. – When a case is submitted for
decision or resolution, the Member-in-Charge shall have the same
placed in the agenda of the Court for deliberation. He or she shall
submit to the other Members of the Court, at least seven
days in advance, a report that shall contain the facts, the
issue or issues involved, the arguments of the contending
parties, and the laws and jurisprudence that can aid the
Court in deciding or resolving the case. In consultation, the
Members of the Court shall agree on the conclusion or conclusions in
the case, unless the said Member requests a continuance and the Court
grants it.28
89. As per the Resolution of the Honorable Court, it appears that it
was made part of the agenda for the first time on 25 June 2013. Thus, if
considered urgent, it should have been preceded, at least three (3) days
before, by a summary of facts, etc. from the Member in Charge.
90. Even if that has been complied with, the Court coming out with
the Resolution on the very first day it deliberated on the case violates the
requirement of the Internal Rules that a case be decided upon its submission
for resolution “upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum,” to
wit:
SECTION 1. Period for deciding or resolving cases. – The Court
shall decide or resolve all cases within twenty-four months from the
date of submission for resolution. A case shall be deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum that the Court or its
Rules require.
The Member-in-Charge, assigned to oversee the progress and
disposition of a case, who is unable to decide or resolve the oldest cases
28
Rule 13.
20
within that period shall request the Court en banc for an extension of
the period, stating the ground for the request. The Court shall act on
the request as it sees fit, according to the circumstances of the case.
Should a Member object to the request, the Court shall grant a
final extension of thirty days within which the Member-in-Charge shall
report the case for deliberation, failing which, the case shall be reraffled to another Member who shall submit the report within thirty
days from assignment.
SEC. 2. List of cases submitted for decision or resolution. – The Clerk
of Court and the Division Clerks of Court shall maintain a system for
apprising the Court periodically, at least six months before the last day
of the twenty-four-month period for deciding or resolving a case, of
the approach of such cut off date.29
91. The submission for resolution of the case is crucial since under the above
quoted Section 4 (c) of Rule 13 of the Internal Rules, the Member-in-Charge
should have submitted at least seven days before 25 June 2013 “a report
that shall contain the facts, issue or issues involved, the arguments of the contending
parties, and the laws and jurisprudence that can aid the Court in deciding or resolving
the case.”
92. And then again, because of undue haste, the Honorable Court came out
with a Resolution not sanctioned under Section 6 of the Internal Rules on the Manner
of Adjudication where the Court adjudicates cases only by: 1) Decision; 2) signed
resolution; 3) unsigned resolution; and 4) minute resolution.30 In this case, the
Ibid.
Section 6 of Rule 13 states:
SEC. 6. Manner of adjudication. – The Court shall adjudicate cases as follows:
(a) By decision, when the Court disposes of the case on its merits and its rulings have significant
doctrinal values; resolve novel issues; or impact on the social, political, and economic life of the
nation. The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. It
shall bear the signatures of the Members who took part in the deliberation.
(b) By signed resolution, when the Court comprehensively resolves the motion for reconsideration
filed in the case or when a dissenting opinion is registered against such resolution. The signed
resolution shall no longer discuss issues resolved in the decision and need not repeat the facts and
the law stated in it. It shall also bear the signatures of the Members who took part in the
deliberation.
(c) By unsigned resolution when the Court disposes of the case on the merits, but its ruling is
essentially meaningful only to the parties; has no significant doctrinal value; or is of minimal
interest to the law profession, the academe, or the public. The resolution shall state clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
(d) By minute resolution when the Court (1) dismisses a petition filed under Rule 64 or 65 of the
Rules of Court, citing as legal basis the failure of the petition to show that the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (2) denies a petition
filed under Rule 45 of the said Rules, citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed
in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below; (3) dismisses an administrative
complaint, citing as legal basis failure to show a prima facie case against the respondent; (4) denies a
motion for reconsideration, citing as legal basis the absence of a compelling or cogent reason to
grant the motion, or the failure to raise any substantial argument to support such motion; and (5)
dismisses or denies a petition on technical grounds or deficiencies.
29
30
21
Honorable Court came out with an extended and signed resolution, which, to
use the term of the Dissent, is “unusual.”
93. A signed resolution is supposedly issued only involving a motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s Decision while a minute resolution is issued “when the
Court (1) dismisses a petition filed under Rule 64 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
citing as legal basis the failure of the petition to show that the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.”
94. The Resolution of 25 June 2013 is a different animal from a signed
resolution and a minute resolution but more of a hybrid of the two. It is a signed
resolution in the sense that the Members of the Court signed an extended resolution;
and it is also a minute resolution insofar as it dismissed the Petition for “finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections” even if the
dismissal was done via an extended resolution. It seems that the Honorable Court has
again suspended its rules in this case. But then, what good are rules for when it
can easily be brushed aside when “making a ruling that would favor the
son of a Member of the Court”31?
Petition Sufficient in Form and Substance
95. There is also the matter of the sufficiency in form and substance of the
Petition. Nothing has been said by the Honorable Court to the effect that the Petition
is not sufficient in form or in substance or for that matter, that it was “filed manifestly
for delay, or the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further
proceedings.” As pointed out by the Dissent, given that the Petition was not found
insufficient in form and substance, nor prosecuted for delay or found to have raised
too unsubstantial questions, Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
mandates the Court to “order the respondents to file their comments on
the petition within ten (10) days from notice thereof.”
96. Again, the Honorable Court violated the same. Petitioner again begs the
question: what good are rules for when it can easily be brushed aside
when “making a ruling that would favor the son of a Member of the
Court”?
HRET Jurisdiction over the Qualifications of the Petitioner
97. In its Resolution, the Honorable Court pronounced that the “COMELEC
retains jurisdiction” since Petitioner has not filed a petition with the HRET and that
“the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member
of the House of Representatives.”32
31
32
Dissenting Opinion, at p. 3.
Ibid.
22
98. Why should the Honorable Court expect Petitioner to file a quo warranto
Petition before the HRET when she was the duly proclaimed winner for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque? Is the Honorable Court suggesting that Petitioner file a quo warranto
against herself? This, of course, does not make any sense.
99. Moreover, it has come to the knowledge of the Petitioner that a quo
warranto case has been filed against her as well as a protest case filed by Lord Allan
Velasco, the son of Justice Presbitero Velasco, although Petitioner has not yet been
serve summons in the said cases. The protest case is entitled Lord Allan Velasco vs.
Regina Ongsiako Reyes and docketed as Case No. 13-028. The quo warranto case is
entitled Christopher P. Matienzo vs. Regina Ongsiako Reyes and docketed as Case No.13027. Thus, even the illogical advice for the Petitioner to lodge a case with the HRET
has been complied with in this case considering that Petitioner has been made a
respondent in two (2) cases before the HRET. Attached hereto as Annexes “G” and
“G-1” are the Certifications from the HRET on the pendency of the aforesaid cases
before it.
100. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HRET is a matter defined in the
Constitution and remains as such regardless of whether somebody files a Petition
before it or not. This is what has been called jurisdiction over the subject
matter which is different from the concept of jurisdiction over the person
which is what the Court meant, but misapplied, when it asked whether Petitioner has
already filed a case with the HRET. As the Dissent pointed out:
In any case, to stick to election law basics, the matter of
jurisdiction between the COMELEC and the HRET has always
constituted a dichotomy; the relationship between the COMELEC and
the HRET in terms of jurisdiction is not an appellate one but is
mutually exclusive.
This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a rule,
sequential. This means that the COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends when
the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. Thus, there is no point in time, when a
vacuum in jurisdiction would exist involving congressional candidates.
This jurisdiction, of course, refers to jurisdiction over the subject
matter, which no less than the Philippine Constitution governs.
Under Section 17, Article VI, the subject matter of HRET’s
jurisdiction is the “election, returns, and qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives.”
101. The HRET’s jurisdiction has clearly been set out in the 1987
Constitution. Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
23
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties
or organizations registered under the party‐ list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
102. Incidentally, there is a similarly worded provision regarding the Supreme
Court being the “sole judge” of contests involving the presidency and vicepresidency, to wit:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the President or Vice‐President, and may promulgate its rules
for the purpose.33 (Emphasis supplied)
103. And to leave no room for interpretation as to where jurisdiction over
nationally elected constitutional officers lie, the Constitution specifically limited the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to election contests involving “elective regional,
provincial and city officials” and elective lower officials. Section 2 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution states:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.
104. From the foregoing, the jurisdictional allocation of power over election
contests under the Constitution is exclusively as follows:
SC
SET
HRET
COMELEC
33
-----
For President and Vice-President;
For Members of the Senate;
For Member of the House of Representatives;
For elective regional, provincial and city officials;
Last par., Section 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
24
RTC
MTCs
---
For elective municipal officials; and
For elective barangay officials.
Historical Evolution and Jurisprudence on the
Electoral Tribunals as Sole Judge of Election Contests
105. The case of Lazatin vs. HRET34 provides a short disquisition on the
constitutional history of electoral commissions or tribunals in the country. The Court
said in that case that:
The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives, to
promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within
its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election
protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power
necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the
Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of
Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], where the Court,
speaking through Justice Laurel, declared in no uncertain terms:
... [The creation of the Electoral Commission carried
with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit
the time within which protests entrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a
general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance
of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of
any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be
followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore,
the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper
exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged
also in the Electoral Commission. [At p. 177; emphasis supplied.]
A short review of our constitutional history reveals that, except
under the 1973 Constitution, the power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the legislative branch has been exclusively
granted either to the legislative body itself [i.e., the Philippine
Assembly under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Senate and the
House of Representatives under the Philippine Autonomy Act (Jones
Law)] or to an independent, impartial and non-partisan body attached
to the legislature [i.e., the Electoral Commission under the 1935
34
G.R. No. 84297; 8 December 1988.
25
Constitution and the Electoral Tribunals under the amended
1935 and the 1987 Constitutions].
Except under the 1973 Constitution, the power granted is
that of being the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
legislative body. Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states it in this
wise:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra, at 1621. The exercise of the power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier, this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full,
clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under the amended 1935 Constitution,
the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal
[Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted
the legislature and the Electoral Commission [Lachica v. Yap, G.R. No.
L25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 1401]. The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
The 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, which separate and distinctly
apportion the powers of the three branches of government, lodge the
power to judge contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the legislature in an independent,
impartial and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose (i.e., the Electoral
Commission and the Electoral Tribunals) [see Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, supra]. It was only under the 1973
Constitution where the delineation between the powers of the
26
Executive and the Legislature was blurred by constitutional
experimentation that the jurisdiction over election contests involving
members of the Legislature was vested in the COMELEC, an agency
with general jurisdiction over the conduct of elections for all elective
national and local officials.
That the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to
restore fully to the Electoral Tribunals exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its Members, consonant with the return to
the separation of powers of the three branches of
government under the presidential system, is too evident to
escape attention. The new Constitution has substantially retained
the COMELEC's purely administrative powers, namely, the exclusive
authority to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall; to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections; to deputize law enforcement agencies and
government instrumentalities for election purposes; to register
political parties and accredit citizens' arms; to file in court petitions for
inclusion and exclusion of voters and prosecute, where appropriate,
violations of election laws [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(1), (3)-(6)], as well as its
rule-making power. In this sense, and with regard to these areas of
election law, the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code are fully
applicable, except where specific legislation provides otherwise. But
the same cannot be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to hear and decide election contests. This has been
trimmed down under the 1987 Constitution. Whereas the 1973
Constitution vested the COMELEC with jurisdiction to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications
of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and
city officials [Art. XII(C), Sec. 2(2)], the 1987 Constitution, while
lodging in the COMELEC exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction
over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay
officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral
Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec.
17].
The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well
within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which
protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical
precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear
language of the Constitution itself. (Emphasis supplied)
27
106. The doctrine in the aforesaid case was reiterated in subsequent cases. In
the case of Robles vs. HRET,35 the Court said:
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, its
orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are orders within its
jurisdiction, and however erroneous they may be, they cannot be
corrected by certiorari (Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56614,
July 28,1987,152 SCRA 378; Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Luna,
G.R. No. 61404, March 16,1987,148 SCRA 564). This rule more
appropriately applies to respondent HRET whose independence as a
constitutional body has time and again been upheld by Us in many
cases. As explained in the case of Lazatin v. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and Timbol, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988,
thus:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra ,at 162]. The exercise of the Power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been
described as "intended to be complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature" [Id. at 175]. Earlier,
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by
Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete" [Veloso v. Board
of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 (1919)]. Under
the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly
reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal [Suanes v. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818 (1948)] and it remained
as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
legislature and the Electoral Commission [ Lachica v. Yap, G.R.
No. L-25379, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 140]. The same
may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunals under the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, "judicial review of decisions or final resolutions of the
House Electoral Tribunal is (thus) possible only in the exercise of this
Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination
that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or,
paraphrasing Morrera, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such a GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse.
35
G.R. No. 86647; 5 February 1990.
28
In the absence of any clear showing of abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent tribunal in promulgating the assailed resolutions, a
writ of certiorari will not issue.
107. Again, in Vilando vs HRET,36 the Supreme Court stated:
Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility
of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy
of the certificate of naturalization.
True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions,
specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on the ground of lack of
citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the
authority to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power is
likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof
restates this duty, thus:
Rule 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Time and again, this Court has acknowledged this sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET. The power granted to HRET
by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and
unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. Such power is regarded as full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the
part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail
it or even affect the same. (Emphasis supplied)
108. In Javier vs. COMELEC,37 the Supreme Court defined exactly what is
meant by the words “sole judge,” “contest,” and “election, returns and
qualifications” as all-encompassing concepts, to wit:
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections
the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended
to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including
those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
36
37
G. R. Nos. 192147 & 192149; 23 August 2011.
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81; 22 September 1986.
29
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the
settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is
a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only
in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978
Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The
Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be
final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written
petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension
of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any
proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds
mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns
and qualifications of public officers came under the complete
jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end
and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have
been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth
Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution
was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation
stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate
jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative and the
second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time
Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution
did not follow the strict definition of a contention between
the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971,
which presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973
Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo
warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of
disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was
himself not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive
meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest
possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used
in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As
employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as
referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to
an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the
winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in
dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be given a consistent
meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and
Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
30
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications"
should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it
is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the
conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of
the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
"returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and
"qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as
his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
xxx
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide
the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did
not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the
power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the
lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division
to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the
provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election
contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to the
jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole
judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and
even the division of the Commission. A decision made on the
contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the
exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution
109. As early as 1993, in the case of Pangilinan vs. COMELEC,38 the Supreme
Court already declared COMELEC to be devoid of jurisdiction even over preproclamation cases and that the same is part and parcel of the jurisdiction of the
HRET pursuant to its being the “sole judge” of election contests, to wit:
We do not accept petitioner's contention, Sec. 3, Article IX-C
of the 1987 Constitution should be read in relation to Sec. 2, Article
IX-C of the same Constitution which provides, among others, as
follows:
Sec. 2 The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
38
G. R. No. 105278; 18 November 1993.
31
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
It will be noted that the aforequoted provision of the
Constitution vests in the COMELEC "exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contest relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial and city officials." It has no
jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, under Sec. 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives is the "sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications" of its members.
Consequently, the phrase "including pre-proclamation
controversies" used in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution should be construed as referring only to "preproclamation controversies" in election cases that fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC,
i.e., election cases pertaining to the election of regional,
provincial and city officials.
The petitioner's reliance on the case of Olfato, et al. vs.
COMELEC, et al., wherein this Court held that the word "all" in Section
242 of the Omnibus Election Code covers all pre-proclamation
controversies involving elections of Batasan, provincial, city and
municipal officials, is misplaced. The Olfato case was decided under the
regime of the 1973 Constitution. Under the said Constitution, the
Commission on Elections was "the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials." Since the
COMELEC had jurisdiction over election contest pertaining to the
election of Members of the Batasang Pambansa, it had, likewise, as
held in the Olfato case, the power and authority to hear and decide preproclamation controversies involving the election of Members of the
Batasang Pambansa.
Since the 1973 Constitution has been replaced by the 1987
Constitution, the Batasang Pambansa stands abolished and the
legislative power is now vested in the Congress of the Philippines
consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The
Senate and the House of Representatives now have their
respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members," thereby divesting
the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
32
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the
COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide
pre-proclamation controversies against members of the
House of Representatives as well as of the Senate.
Sec. 15 of R.A. 7166 is not, therefore, unconstitutional.
On the contrary, it is in harmony with the 1987 Constitution.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Comment —
The petitioner's arguments are totally misplaced. In fact,
Section 15, R.A. 7166 is consistent with Section 17, Article VI
which makes the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the House
of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
Petitioner's objection relating to the preparation, transmission
and appreciation of the election returns or certificates of canvass falls
within the sole jurisdiction of the (House) Electoral
Tribunal.
Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. has
already been proclaimed as the winner in the fourth district of Quezon
City. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his duties as
representative; hence, the remedy open to the petitioner was to have
filed an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives.
110. Otherwise stated, in the Pangilinan Case, the Court ruled that the
COMELEC is devoid of jurisdiction over the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives including pre-proclamation cases involving
said officials and that the remedy against winning candidates is to file an electoral
protest case with the HRET considering that the winning candidate in said case was
already proclaimed, taken oath and assumed the duties of his office.
111. In the case of Perez vs. COMELEC,39 the Honorable Court declined to
assume jurisdiction over the case on the ground that it is the HRET that has “sole”
jurisdiction after the proclamation winner in the congressional elections. The Court
said:
The threshold issue, therefore, is whether the Court has
jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition for certiorari and eventually
pass upon private respondent’s eligibility for the office of
Representative of the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner, in
sustaining the affirmative side of the question, invokes the following
provision of R.A. No. 6646:
39
G.R. No. 133944. October 28, 1999.
33
Sec. 6 Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
As already stated, the petition for disqualification against private
respondent was decided by the First Division of the COMELEC on
May 10, 1998. The following day, May 11, 1998, the elections were
held. Notwithstanding the fact that private respondent had already
been proclaimed on May 16, 1998 and had taken his oath of office on
May 17, 1998, petitioner still filed a motion for reconsideration on
May 22, 1998, which the COMELEC en banc denied on June 11,
1998. Clearly, this could not be done. Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6646
authorizes the continuation of proceedings for disqualification even
after the elections if the respondent has not been proclaimed. The
COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to entertain the
motion because the proclamation of private respondent
barred further consideration of petitioner’s action. In the
same vein, considering that at the time of the filing of this
petition on June 16, 1998, private respondent was already a
member of the House of Representatives, this Court has no
jurisdiction over the same. Pursuant to Art. VI, §17 of the
Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the
exclusive original jurisdiction over the petition for the declaration of
private respondent’s ineligibility. As this Court held in Lazatin v. House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:
The use of the word “sole” emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred. The exercise of the
power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as “intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature.” Earlier, this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm “as full, clear and complete.”
Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was
unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted
the legislature and the Electoral Commission. The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
under the 1987 Constitution.
34
Petitioner’s remedies should have been (1) to reiterate her
prayer in the petition for disqualification, and move for the issuance of
an order by the COMELEC suspending the proclamation of private
respondent pending the hearing of the said petition and, in the event
the motion was denied before the proclamation of private respondent,
file a petition for certiorari in this Court with a prayer for a restraining
order to enjoin the proclamation of private respondent; or (2) to file a
petition for quo warranto in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal within ten (10) days after the proclamation of private
respondent as Representative-elect on May 16, 1998. Obviously,
neither of these remedies can be availed of now.
In any event, even assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to
resolve the instant petition for certiorari, we find no merit in
petitioner’s allegation that private respondent is ineligible for the office
of Representative of the Third District of Cagayan.
112. In Rasul vs. COMELEC40 involving the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal formed under the same provision of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the Court ruled that inasmuch as the COMELEC had already
proclaimed the 12th winning candidate and the Petitioner therein was contesting the
validity of the proclamation, it is the SET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
The Court said:
Without necessarily going into the veracity of the proofs
submitted by private respondent to substantiate the foregoing
allegations, we find the instant petition devoid of merit.
In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections, this Court has ruled that
“where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner
in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to
file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives.” In like manner, where as in the case at
bar, petitioner assails the Commission’s resolution proclaiming the
twelfth (12th) winning senatorial candidate, petitioner’s proper
recourse was to file a regular election protest which under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code exclusively pertains to
the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as Section 250
of the Omnibus Election Code provide that “(t)he Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. x x x.” In Javier vs. Comelec, this
Court interpreted the phrase “election, returns and qualifications” as
follows:
40
G.R. No. 134142. August 24, 1999.
35
“The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should
be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of thevotes; “returns” to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners,
including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and
“qualifications” to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto
proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty
or ineligiblity or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.”
The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code
underscore the exclusivity of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members. Inasmuch as petitioner contests
the proclamation of herein respondent Teresa Aquino-Oreta
as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the Senate
Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on
the complaint of petitioner. Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal provides that an election protest must be
filed by any candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has
been voted upon for the same office. It reads in full:
“RULE 14. Election Protest. – A verified petition contesting the
election of any Member of the Senate shall be filed by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and been
voted for the Office of Senator within fifteen (15) days after the
proclamation of the protestee. No joint election protest shall
be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and sufficient reasons,
may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them
jointly. (Emphasis supplied)
113. Barbers vs. COMELEC41 reiterated the foregoing rulings of the Supreme
Court in the following manner:
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
41
G.R. No. 165691; 22 June 2005.
36
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organization
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
provides:
RULE 12. Jurisdiction. – The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their
respective Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members,” thereby divesting the Commission
on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution over
election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa (Congress).
In Javier v. COMELEC, we interpreted the phrase “election,
returns and qualifications” as follows:
The phrase “election, returns and qualifications” should
be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to
specify, we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; “returns”
to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of
the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications”
to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
(Emphasis supplied)
The word “sole” in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (“SET”) underscores the exclusivity of the SET’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to members of the Senate. The
authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and complete. It is
37
therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
instant petition. Since Barbers contests Biazon’s proclamation as the
12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has exclusive
jurisdiction to act on Barbers’ complaint.
In Pangilinan,21 we ruled that “where the candidate has
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the
remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives.” In like manner, where as in
the present case, Barbers assails Biazon’s proclamation as the 12th duly
elected Senator, Barbers’ proper recourse is to file a regular election
protest with the SET.
114. To the same effect was the ruling in Chato vs. COMELEC42 thus,
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 17.
The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Construing this provision in Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections,
the Court held that:
x x x The Senate and the House of Representatives now
have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the “sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members,” thereby divesting
the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress). x x x
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members. The use of the word “sole” in Section 17,
42
G.R. No. 172131; 2 April 2007.
38
Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus
Election Code underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Further, the phrase “election, returns, and qualifications” has
been interpreted in this wise:
The phrase “election, returns, and qualifications” should be
interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the
validity of the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify,
we can say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of votes; “returns” to
the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the
winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications”
to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
(Emphasis supplied).
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of
the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Stated in another
manner, where the candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of the
petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the HRET.
(Emphasis supplied)
115. The Limkaichong Case’s Decision on the merits had the following to say
on the issue, to wit:
We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time
of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should
now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's
election, returns and qualifications.
The use of the word “sole” in
39
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction
over election contests relating to its members. (Underscoring supplied)
116. Finally, in Jalosjos vs. COMELEC43 where Justice Abad pointedly framed
the issue as involving the “demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET),” the Supreme Court held:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without
limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives
and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests
solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the
HRET begins.
The proclamation of a congressional
candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor
of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June
3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as
winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and
declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department
insisted, that the proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the
above-stated rule. Since the COMELEC declared him ineligible to
run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation was void following the
ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has
jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on Section 6 of
Republic Act 6646. Section 6 provides:
Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate
who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election,
43
G.R. No. 192474; 26 June 2012.
40
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the
COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the
Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos.
Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name
from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The
last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling
of the COMELEC’s Second Division that allowed his name to stay on
that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order
suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case.
With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue
regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the
required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the
COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos
ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased
to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions
(G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s failure to annul
his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested
by the Constitution solely on the HRET. (Emphasis supplied)
117. Any contrary interpretation, as the Honorable Court did in its
Resolution of 25 June 2013 which is not even a Decision on the merits will certainly
emasculate and usurp the jurisdiction of the HRET.
Violation of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis
118. The Supreme Court now stands to invalidate and reverse the solid
jurisprudence on the long-established jurisdiction of the HRET as consistently
enunciated in the long line of cases cited above. The Supreme Court will erase the
said solid jurisprudence under an undisputed factual backdrop where the beneficiary
of such an abandonment of long-established jurisprudence is the “son of a Member of
the Court.”
119. Such abandonment of the prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter via a Resolution -- not a Decision on the merits – arrived at without the
benefit of the submissions from all the parties to the case and without offering a
distinction as regards the circumstances of the present case that justified
the departure from established jurisprudence violates the doctrine of
stare decisis.
41
120. In the case of Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. COMELEC,44 the
Honorable Court explained the legal basis for stare decisis under our jurisdiction and
the importance of adhering to the doctrine. The Court said:
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires
courts in a country to follow the rule established in a
decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land.
The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. The doctrine is grounded on
the necessity for securing certainty and stability of judicial decisions,
thus:
Time and again, the court has held that it is a very
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a
court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all
future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare
decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb
not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the sake
of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be applied to those that follow if the facts are
substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that,
absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put
forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue. (Underscoring supplied)
121. More importantly, it specifically stated that no less than a showing
of changed circumstances would justify departure from judicial
44
G.R. No. 190529: 29 April 2010.
42
precedents as follows:
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing
that circumstances attendant in a particular case override
the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it
aside.
As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to
abandon Minero exists; it was clearly an erroneous application of the
law – an application that the principle of stability or predictability of
decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law
in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the
continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon
Minero and strike it out from our ruling case law. (Emphasis supplied)
122. In the present case, the circumstances have not changed enough to
override the benefits from adherence to the doctrine of judicial precedents. If there is
any overriding circumstance at all in this case, it can only be what the Dissent
referred to:
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be
without basis and out of our sense of delicadeza (which we should
have), the Court should at least hear and consider both sides before
making a ruling that would favor the son of a Member of the
Court.45
123. Without any justifying changed circumstances, it would be hard for any
reasonable person to make a conclusion other than that arrived at by the Dissent
which makes the words of the Chief Justice apropos in this case thus,
“What is black can be called “white” but it cannot turn white by
the mere calling.”46
124. Applied to this case, no amount of calling it by any other name can erase
the impression generated which has aptly been referred to by the Dissent as a “ruling
that would favor the son of a Member of the Court.”
Resolution Contrary to HRET Rules
125. The Honorable Court’s pronouncement that the HRET’s jurisdiction
“begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of
At p. 3.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC – IN THE MATTER OF THE
CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO; 15 October 2010.
45
46
43
Representative” is not only contrary to the relevant provision of the Constitution47
and the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, it is likewise contrary to the Rules of
Procedure of the HRET as follows:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the Members of the House of Representatives.
RULE 15. How Initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing
of a verified petition of protest or a verified petition for quo warranto
against a Member of the House of Representatives. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition
for quo warranto include an election protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest. – A verified petition contesting the
election or returns of any Member of the House of
Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office,
within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the
winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
xxx
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto
contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered voter
of the district concerned within fifteen (15) days from the
date of the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the
petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party
shall be known as the respondent.
xxx (Emphasis supplied)
126. It is clear therefrom that it is the proclamation of the winner that
is the operative fact the triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET. Under the
foregoing provisions of the HRET Rules, the winner in the congressional elections is
for all intents and purposes, considered a Member of the House of Representatives.
Violation of Doctrine of Respect for
Administrative Construction
127. Considering that the HRET is a separate and distinct quasi-judicial
agency of the Government, its determination of its jurisdiction and competence over
its domain of expertise should be given great weight by the courts. This is pursuant
to the doctrine of respect for administrative or practical construction. In the case of
47
Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
44
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs. Philippine Gaming Jurisdiction
Incorporated48 it was held that:
Both PAGCOR and the Ecozones being under the supervision
of the Office of the President, the latter’s interpretation of R.A. No.
7903 is persuasive and deserves respect under the doctrine of respect for
administrative or practical construction. In applying said doctrine, courts
often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases thereof –
factors leading the courts to give the principle controlling weight in
particular instances, or as independent rules in themselves. These
factors include the respect due the governmental agencies
charged with administration, their competence, expertness,
experience, and informed judgment and the fact that they
frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret; that the
agency is the one on which the legislature must rely to
advise it as to the practical working out of the statute, and
practical application of the statute presents the agency with unique
opportunity and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies,
or improvements in the statute.
128. If only for the fact that the Rules of Procedure of the HRET was crafted
with the participation and approval and has been implemented as such by no less than
the three (3) Members of the Honorable Court at any given time, should have given
the Honorable Court pause before it brushed aside the foregoing Rules.
129. The Honorable Court’s interpretation would furthermore invalidate
each and every protest and quo warranto cases filed before June 30 following an
election and decided by the HRET as well as those brought on certiorari before the
Honorable Court on the ground that the HRET did not have jurisdiction over them
when the cases were filed. Thus, should the HRET then dismiss the quo warranto
case filed against the Petitioner as well as the protest case filed by Lord Allan Velasco
against the Petitioner, both with the HRET, for having been filed when the HRET
had as yet no jurisdiction over the same?
130. Moreover, to rule that the HRET’s jurisdiction does not begin until and
unless the candidate becomes a Member of the House of Representatives is to rule,
by analogy, that the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal does not begin until
the candidate is considered a Member of the Senate. For that matter, the jurisdiction
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal does not begin until the candidate who won as
President or Vice-President has already been proclaimed, sworn in and assumed
office.
131. Petitioner invites the Honorable Court to take judicial notice of the
Rules of Procedure of the Senate Electoral Tribunal49 and the Rules of Procedure of
G.R. No. 177333; 24 April 2009.
The relevant provisions state:
RULE 12.Jurisdiction. — The Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the Senate.
48
49
45
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal50 which reckon its jurisdiction, consistent with the
Rules of the HRET, from the proclamation of the winner.
132. It must be observed that the Members of the Honorable Court sit, at all
times, as a Member of an Electoral Tribunal, be it the HRET, the SET or the PET.
As such, each Member of the Court cannot and should not take an inconsistent
position with the rules of such electoral tribunals, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
most especially. Especially not – in the words of the Dissent – “before making a
ruling that would favor the son of a Member of the Court.”
133. It would be the height of duplicity and double standards for the
Honorable Court – sitting as Justices of the Court – to maintain that HRET’s
jurisdiction starts on 30 June next following a congressional candidate’s election
while at the same time maintaining, as Members of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, that the jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is reckoned from
the proclamation of the winner.
134. At the very least and to avoid any appearance or impression of
impropriety or to avoid the impression that, in the words of the dissent, the Court
came out with a ruling “that would favor the son of a Member of the Court,” the
Honorable Court should have given due course to the Petition and required the
Respondent to Comment thereon.
COMELEC Denied Petitioner her Right to Due Process
RULE 13.How Initiated. — An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against a Member of the Senate. An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo warranto include an election protest.
RULE 14.Election Protest. — A verified petition contesting the election of any Member of the
Senate shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and been voted
for the office of Senator within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the protestee. No joint
election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and sufficient reasons, may
consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them jointly.
RULE 15.Quo Warranto. — A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a
Member of the Senate on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the respondent.
50
The relevant provision state:
Rule 13. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines. (R12)
Rule 14. How initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice- President. An election protest shall not
include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
(R13)
Rule 15. Election Protest. - The registered candidate for President or Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of
the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified election protest with the
Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.
(R14)
Rule 16. Quo warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the President
or Vice - President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
may filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten days after the
proclamation of the winner. (R16)
46
135. Petitioner will no longer belabor the points she raised in her Petition and
incorporates the same in this Motion by way of reference and will just highlight some
points that the Honorable Court failed to consider in its Resolution.
136. The Honorable Court pronounced Petitioner to have been given more
than sufficient opportunity or right to be heard. But pray, tell, what did the
COMELEC do when Petitioner specifically asked for a hearing51 to present her
evidence in support of her Motion for Reconsideration? This was never mentioned or
discussed at all. If COMELEC expected Petitioner to just submit her evidence
without any hearing, identification and authentication -- all the technical rules of
evidence – then it could have directed her so. Petitioner, in her desire to comply
with the rules of evidence, precisely asked for a hearing but was never heard thereon.
Thus, it is disappointing to say the least for the Honorable Court to fault her for her
dedication to abide by the Rules of Court on the matter of presentation of evidence.
One would expect the Honorable Supreme Court to take the lead in the observance
of the rules it crafted but that apparently is not the case here.
All the Evidence on Record Establish Petitioner as a Filipino Citizen
Notwithstanding that She is also an American Citizen
137. Even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed established by
the evidence of the Private Respondent that Petitioner was an American citizen, it
did not mean that she was not, at the same time, a Filipino. Thus, it was erroneous
for the Honorable Court to make the following conclusion:
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving
for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC, respondent submitted
records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a “balikbayan.” At
this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her
the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation
that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no
proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as
to the inapplicability of RA No. 9225 to her.
138. The issue of Petitioner’s retention of Filipino citizenship has been raised
by the Petitioner in her Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC.52 And this
has never been questioned by the Private Respondent before the COMELEC.
139. Moreover, with all due respect, the Honorable Court, like the
COMELEC, conveniently disregarded the Certificate of Live Birth of the Petitioner
which is Annex “A” of Annex “E” (Petitioner’s Answer before the COMELEC) of the
51
52
See paragraph 26 and Annex “I” of the Petition.
See par. 30-31 of Annex “H”of the Petition.
47
Petition showing her to have been born to Filipino parents. While the COMELEC
mentioned this in its Resolution of 27 March 2013,53 it did not draw therefrom the
appropriate legal conclusion that, having been born to Filipino parents,
Petitioner must perforce be a Filipino.
Petitioner is a FILIPINO
Judicial Admission by Private Respondent
of Petitioner’s FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP
140. Even from the submissions of the Private Respondent, there is no
question that Petitioner was, at the time of the filing of the disqualification case
before the COMELEC, a Filipino.
141. Such fact grows in significance in view of the judicial admissions of the
Private Respondents as elaborated on in the submissions that follow below.
142. Petitioner was the Provincial Attorney of Marinduque since January
2011. Annex “B” of Private Respondent’s Amended Petition before the COMELEC
shows Petitioner’s service record from the time she served as counsel at the Office of
the Solicitor General in 1983 to her tenure as Provincial Administrator in January
2011 is likewise evidence of her being a Filipino.
143. Petitioner’s Filipino Citizenship at the time of the filing of the Petition
before the COMELEC was admitted by the Private Respondent himself in his
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (Annex “C” of
the Petition) as follows:
2. Under item 8 of Respondent’s Certificate of Candidacy, she made
mention that she is a Filipino Citizen. Based on information, she is an
American Citizen. She acquired American Citizenship and became
both an American and a Filipino Citizen at the same time.
This is not a violation of the citizenship requirement per se. However,
she must, through positive acts, take an oath of allegiance in
accordance with RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention Act. She,
however, failed to abide by RA 9225. (Emphasis supplied)
144. The foregoing judicial admission was again restated in toto in
Private Respondent’s Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or To Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy (Annex “D” of the Petition). Private Respondent further
added:
Regina Ongsiako Reyes is not eligible to run for Congress due
to the fact that she has not properly renounced her foreign citizenship.
She is both an American and a Filipino Citizen. As such, before
running for congress, she must, through positive acts, renounce her
foreign citizenship….
53
See p. 4 of Annex “Ä”of the Petition.
48
145. Thus, from the records, there is no dispute that Petitioner was, and still
is, a Filipino. It was therefore a grave error for the COMELEC and the Honorable
Court to have concluded or assumed that just because Private Respondent has
allegedly proven Petitioner to be an American Citizen, that she has therefore lost her
Filipino citizenship.
146. Such a hasty conclusion of the Honorable Court is contrary to the nature
of a judicial admission. Under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court on WHAT NEED
NOT BE PROVED, specifically Section 4 thereof, it states:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
147. In this case, neither Private Respondent, Respondent COMELEC nor
the Honorable Court claimed that the admission by Private Respondent of
Petitioner’s Filipino Citizenship at the time of the filing of the Petitioner with the
COMELEC in October 2012 was “made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.” As such, it is conclusively binding on the Private Respondent.
148. The Honorable Court is respectfully reminded of its pronouncements in
Cahilig vs. Terencio54 made through Justice Leonardo-De Castro on the
binding effect of judicial admissions, as follows:
In a number of cases, we have held that the obligation of the
court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears
that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming
a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.
However, unlike in those cases, the third-party claim in the
instant case was not presented at the onset of litigation. In fact, it was
not the original theory propounded by petitioners when they filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 29, 2001 issued by
the trial court which first granted the writ of possession in private
respondent’s favor. More importantly, the judicial admissions made
by petitioners in their motion were wholly incompatible with their
belated claim that they are actually vendees of Soterania Siñel’s
property.
Judicial admissions are discussed in Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court which states that:
54
G.R. No. 164470; 28 November 2011.
49
Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions. - An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.
In Maagad v. Maagad, we explained:
It is well-settled that a judicial admission
conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot
thereafter take a position contradictory to, or
inconsistent with his pleadings. Acts or facts admitted do
not require proof and cannot be contradicted unless it is shown
that the admission was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. (Emphasis supplied)
149. In Del Rosario vs. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.55 the Honorable
Court, through Justice Del Castillo, had the following to say about judicial
admissions, to wit:
The allegations in petitioner's Complaint constitute judicial admissions.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC,
among others, that: (1) sometime in 1991, without their consent and
authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes;
and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of
the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus
conclude that respondent's possession of subject property is only by
tolerance.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. x x x
"A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the
progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence
otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary
to be observed and complied with." Correspondingly, "facts alleged
in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and
binding upon him." "The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against
the pleader."
55
G.R. No. 170575; 8 June 2011.
50
In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents
took control and possession of subject property without their consent
and authority and that respondent's use of the land was without any
contractual or legal basis. (Emphasis supplied)
150. Still in the case of Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Philippine First
Insurance Co., Inc.,56 the Honorable Court, speaking through Justice
Reyes, said:
The Court’s Ruling
On the first issue – Reputable is a
private carrier.
The Court agrees with the RTC and CA that Reputable is a
private carrier. The issue of whether a carrieris private or common on
the basis of the facts found by a trial court and/or the appellate court
can be a valid and reviewable question of law. In this case, the
conclusion derived by both the RTC and the CA that Reputable is a
private carrier finds sufficient basis, not only from the facts on record,
but also from prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Malayan relies on the alleged judicial admission of Philippines
First in its complaint that Reputable is a common carrier. Invoking
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence that “an admission verbal
or written, made by a party in the course of the proceeding in the same
case, does not require proof,” it is Malayan’s position that the RTC and
CA should have ruled that Reputable is a common carrier.
Consequently, pursuant to Article 1745(6) of the Civil Code, the
liability of Reputable for the loss of Wyeth’s goods should be dispensed
with, or at least diminished.
It is true that judicial admissions, such as matters
alleged in the pleadings do not require proof, and need not
be offered to be considered by the court. “The court, for the
proper decision of the case, may and should consider,
without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by
the parties.” The rule on judicial admission, however, also states that
such allegation, statement, or admission is conclusive as against the
pleader, and that the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed
admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him. In this case, the
pleader or the plaintiff who alleged that Reputable is a common carrier
was Philippines First. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be made
conclusive as against Reputable whose nature of business is in question.
(Emphasis supplied)
56
G.R. No. 184300; 11 July 2012.
51
151. Given the nature of judicial admissions as conclusive upon the person
making it as expounded by the Honorable Justices Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo
and Reyes, the burden of proof, as the Honorable Court put it, could not have shifted
to the Petitioner. Not even the Honorable Court can undo such judicial admissions
and it has no choice except to take judicial cognizance thereof.
152. This is precisely where the COMELEC and the Honorable Court gravely
erred, that is, on the issue of what legal conclusions to draw from the fact that
Petitioner, while maintaining her Filipino citizenship, also became at one time, an
American citizen. What the Honorable Court and the COMELEC did was to
repudiate entirely Petitioner’s Filipino citizenship in the light of proof of her
American citizenship. In a sense, the Honorable Court cannot reconcile the idea of
dual citizenship as regards Petitioner.
153. In fact, as far as the Petition in SPA No. 13-053 is concerned, Private
Respondent’s only issue is not Petitioner’s Filipino citizenship but that:
Regina Ongsiako Reyes is not eligible to run for Congress due
to the fact that she has not properly renounced her foreign citizenship.
She is both an American and a Filipino citizen. As such, before running
for congress, she must, through positive acts, renounce her
foreign citizenship.57 (Emphasis supplied)
154. Such issue was again asserted by Private Respondent in his Amended
Petition before the COMELEC, to wit:
Apparently, respondent failed to renounce her American
citizenship.58
155. Thus, Petitioner’s Filipino citizenship was never at issue.
156. And considering that Private Respondent was merely concerned with the
additional requirement of renunciation, such requirement being an additional
qualification for the position of Member of the House of Representatives as
enumerated in the Constitution must be struck down for the vice of
unconstitutionality as discussed in the Petition in this case.
157. In sum, what the foregoing discussion shows is that, with all due respect,
the Honorable Court misapplied the terms “dual” and “sole and exclusive.” It applied
the term dual or more appropriately concurrent, not on Petitioner’s citizenship, but
with respect to the jurisdictions of the HRET and COMELEC. It applied the terms
sole and exclusive, not on the jurisdiction of the HRET, but on the matter of
Petitioner’s American citizenship as excluding her Filipino citizenship.
57
58
See p. 4 of Annex “C” of the Petition.
See p. 5 of Annex “D” of the Petition.
52
158. To adapt/paraphrase a well written dissent59 in consideration of the facts
of this case:
Unless reconsidered, this Court would unfortunately
be remembered as the Court that in a “hasty and imprudent
action” made “a ruling that would favor the son of a
Member of the Court,” without clarifying whether its ruling
applies only to situations where “a son of a Member of the
Court” is involved or to others as well. It will also weaken this
Court’s disciplinary authority ─ the essence of which proceeds from its
moral authority ─ over the bench and bar. In a real sense, this Court
has rendered tenuous its ability to positively educate and influence the
future of intellectual and academic discourse.
159. Given the kind and “originality” of the Resolution arrived at by the
Honorable Court on 25 June 2013, Petitioner cannot help herself but recall some
wise words written by one who is now the primus inter pares when she was then just an
Honorable Justice, to wit:
It is not hypocrisy, contrary to what is implied in a statement in
the majority Decision, to make a finding of plagiarism when plagiarism
exists. To conclude thus is to condemn wholesale all the academic
thesis committees, student disciplinary tribunals and editorial boards
who have made it their business to ensure that no plagiarism is
tolerated in their institutions and industry. In accepting those review
and quality control responsibilities, they are not making
themselves out to be error-free, but rather, they are exerting
themselves to improve the level of honesty in the original
works generated in their institution so that the coinage and
currency of intellectual life – originality and the attribution
of originality – is maintained. The incentive system of
intellectual creation is made to work so that the whole
society benefits from the encouraged output.60 (Emphasis
supplied)
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC – IN THE MATTER OF THE
CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO; 15 October 2010. The exact words of the Dissent reads:
Unless reconsidered, this Court would unfortunately be remembered as
the Court that made “malicious intent” an indispensable element of plagiarism and
that made computer-keying errors an exculpatory fact in charges of plagiarism,
without clarifying whether its ruling applies only to situations of judicial decisionmaking or to other written intellectual activity. It will also weaken this Court’s
disciplinary authority ─ the essence of which proceeds from its moral authority ─
over the bench and bar. In a real sense, this Court has rendered tenuous its ability
to positively educate and influence the future of intellectual and academic
discourse.
60
Ibid.
59
53
160. Petitioner hopes that the opportunity given to the Honorable Court by
this her motion for reconsideration will “improve the level of honesty” and
“delicadeza” “so that the whole society – not just the “son of a Member of the Court”
-- benefits from the encouraged output.”
161. Given the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully moves for the Honorable
Court to reconsider its Resolution of 25 June 2013, give due course to the Petition
and require the Respondents to Comment thereon.
Grounds for Inhibition of Justice Jose P. Perez
162. Petitioner respectfully moves for the inhibition of Justice Jose P. Perez
based on the following grounds:
163. It is a matter of public and judicial record that Justice Perez was the
Deputy Court Administrator of then Court Administrator Presbitero Velasco, the
father of Lord Allan Velasco,the beneficiary of the “ruling that would favor the son of
a Member of the Court.” Such relationship between an immediate superior and a
subordinate, not as colleagues, lasted for five (5) years, more or less. It is a
relationship akin or similar to or it is as if Justice Perez “was counsel, partner or
member of a law firm” of Justice Velasco who, because of his son, is “pecuniarily
interested in the case.” By sitting in judgment in this case, Justice Perez, with all due
respect, is sitting in judgment on a matter involving his former boss. It is
inconceivable that his five years immediate subordinate relationship to Justice Velasco
will not come into play, whether positively or negatively, when he is sitting in
judgment in this case.
164. Overlapping such relationship is the fact that Justices Perez and Velasco
were classmates at the University of the Philippines College of Law Class of 1971.
While it is not specifically a ground for inhibition, if taken into consideration with his
being an immediate subordinate of Justice Velasco for about five years – a
relationship so fresh that it immediately preceded their respective appointments as
Members of the Supreme Court – their long acquaintance with each other grows in
significance.
165. By virtue thereof, Petitioner respectfully moves for the inhibition of
Justice Jose P. Perez in the resolution of this case.
54
PRAYER
Petitioner respectfully prays for the Honorable Court to reconsider and set
aside its Resolution of 25 June 2013 and to give due course to the Petition. Petitioner
also prays for the inhibition of Justice Jose P. Perez in this case.
Petitioner likewise reiterates her prayer for the temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction as prayed for in the Petition.
Other just and equitable reliefs under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Makati City for Manila, 15 July 2013.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ___ day of July 2013 by
affiant who is known to me personally.
Doc. No. ____;
Page No. ____;
Book No. ____;
Series of 2013.
ROQUE & BUTUYAN LAW OFFICES
Antel Corporate Center
Unit 1904, 19th Floor
121 Valero Street, Salcedo Village
Makati City 1227
Email: mail@roquebutuyan.com
Tel. Nos. 887-4445; 887-3894
Fax No. 887-3893
By:
H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR
Roll No. 36976
PTR No. 369262/18 Jan 2013/Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01749/PPLM
MCLE Exempt. No. IV-000513/15 Feb 2013
55
JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN
Roll No. 36911
PTR No. 3692463 /18 Jan 2013 – Makati
IBP Lifetime No. 01742/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-0011417/11 Jan 2013
ROGER R. RAYEL
Roll No. 44106
PTR No. 7651758/11 Jan 2013/Quezon City
IBP Lifetime No. 02159/Quezon City
MCLE Comp. No. IV-017519/19 Apr 2013
EXPLANATION
The foregoing pleading was served and filed by registered mail due to time,
distance and manpower constraints.
ROGER R. RAYEL
Copy furnished:
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Postigo Street, Intramuros
Manila City
ATTY. MARCELINO MICHAEL I. ATANANTE IV
ATTY. HERMINIO F. VALERIO
Counsels for Respondent Joseph Socorro B. Tan
Unit 201 Cityland Condominium 8
98 Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue, Makati City
Regina Reyes Motion for Reconsideration 071413/
56