1NC
CP
Shell
The United States federal government should
■ Expressly prohibit all forms of online-gambling including gambling utilizing
e-money allowing no state-based exceptions
■ Strengthen the authority of the Department of Justice and State Attorney
Generals to enforce criminal sanctions on both online gambling operators and
players
Criminalization of individual gamblers solves laundering – a clear, unambiguous
statement empowers law enforcement and removes uncertainty
Conon 9 (Jonathan Conon, “Aces and Eights: Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Resides in
Dead Man's Land in Attempting to Further Curb Online Gambling and Why Expanded Criminalization if Preferable
to Legalization”, 99 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, Summer 2009,
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7340&context=jclc)
First, Congress needs to amend the UIGEA with a comprehensive definition of "unlawful internet
gambling" and explicitly limit the exemptions granted under the law. In this way, the legislature
can make most forms of Intemet gambling illegal on an operator level.334 A strengthening
amendment would provide law enforcement officials the unambiguous tool they need to combat
Internet gambling,335 while also avoiding many of the pitfalls associated with prosecuting operators
under the Wire Act.336 Lastly, a clear federal ban on Internet gambling would remove much of the
uncertainty currently existing in state law on the subject.337 Second, Congress should take the broader
step of amending § 5363 of the UIGEA to excise language that requires a person to be "engaged in
the business of betting or wagering" for criminal liability to attach. Making Internet gambling
illegal on an individual basis should not be viewed as an unprecedented step when one looks to the
prevailing interpretation of the Canadian Criminal Code, 338 assuming that no state-based exceptions were
also included. Adding another criminal sanction will undoubtedly trigger discussion of the over-criminalization
that purportedly exists in the United States.339 However, when the criminal law cannot otherwise reach an
activity deserving of punishment, a broader extension of liability may be warranted.34 ° Internet
gambling is the paradigmatic example of this type of activity. Efforts targeting the operators of online sites will only
go so far as long as the potential to earn millions of dollars from recreational and problem gamblers exists to
counteract the threat of prosecution.341 Additionally, the ability to enforce criminal penalties on
international operators and intermediaries is severely constrained when few of them ever set foot
on U.S. soil.342 In evaluating this type of situation, the benefits of an overly broad law, in this case
one that reaches individual gamblers, should be weighed against its attendant costs.
Only the counter plan mobilizes global efforts – the plan leaves gambling laundering in
place globally
Kindt 5, Prof @Illinois Champaign, AND Brynn JD, 05
(John a professor of business and legal policy at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. After receiving a
B.A. in business from the College of William and Mary in 1972, Professor Kindt earned several graduate degrees in
law and business, specifically, J.D., 1976, and MBA, 1977, from the University of Georgia; LL.M., 1978, and
S.J.D., 1981, from the University of Virginia. , Anne E.C. an associate with Seyfarth Shaw LLP’s Business Services
Group, where she concentrates her practice in the areas of trusts, estates, and wills. Ms. Brynn received her J.D.,
cum laude, in 2002 from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and her B.A., cum laude, in 1993 from the
University of Vermont. , Destructive Economic Policies in the Age of Terrorism: Government-Sanctioned
Gambling as Encouraging Transboundary Economic Raiding and Destabilizing National and International
Economies ACDIS Occasional Paper)
Legalized gambling, when analyzed at a strategic macro-economic level, was a no-win proposition for
individual countries, as well as the international economy. The massive amount of capital that accrues to the
gambling industry at the expense of the public, destabilizes economies by effectively foreclosing opportunities
for new and pre-existing, non-gambling industries, and by imposing social and rehabilitative costs on society
which tax revenues are insufficient to cover. The vast expenditure of money by pro-casino interests suggested
“unbalanced decision-making processes by elected officials, regulatory agencies, and even the court system.”216
The United States needed to take a proactive approach to minimize the destructive, destabilizing impact of the
transnational economic raiding inherent in legalized gambling activities. First, the United States, as leader of
the international economy, was prodded to spearhead international discussions concerning the viability of
gambling as a tool for economic growth. These discussions were to be conducted with the ultimate goal of
instituting international multilateral treaties designed to combat the transnational economic raiding between
countries caused by government-sanctioned gambling activities. Unfortunately, efforts in this area were difficult
due to U.S. domestic gambling policy—or, more accurately, the lack of a U.S. gambling policy. Forcing the issue
in the international arena without setting a workable U.S. standard as a model was deemed essentially
inconsistent. Until the United States committed to different policy decisions on the domestic level, economic
isolationists would argue that the United States needed to assure that its citizens were incubated from the dangers
implicit in the spread of international legalized gambling. To this end, the United States would need, for example,
to effectively legislate against the specialized dangers of Internet gambling, relying not on outdated laws
such as the Wire Act,217 which were designed to apply to other technology and passed in view of different
concerns. Since most transfers to Internet gambling operations are accomplished through banks or credit
cards, holding these service providers responsible for illegal gambling transactions would deter much
unwanted behavior. Absent effective measures in these types of issue areas, the U.S. economy would be
transferring a substantial portion of its citizens’ assets, but not the accompanying social costs, to other
jurisdictions . For the United States to achieve its goal of domestic and international economic stability, it
needed to address the domestic state-sanctioned gambling issue. The first step required for effective change was to undermine the unbalanced
influence pro-casino interests had on the legislative processes. Several measures needed to be taken to accomplish this goal. First, the federal government needed to undercut interstate
cannibalism by assuming jurisdiction over gambling-related industries by invoking the Commerce Clause. The federal government then would have an option. The U.S. Congress could and
should, with the exception of Las Vegas and Atlantic City (because the industry is too deeply embedded in the social fabric of the cities) ban legalized gambling in its entirety. Preexisting
gambling casinos and accompanying hotels and restaurants could be transformed into educational institutions, trade schools, and colleges using the gambling industry’s own revenues. Although
industry interests would claim substantial repercussions from such decisions, they have already made many times their returns on investment and would lose nothing, while the states would gain
an educated public, as well as new consumer dollars pump-priming the economy. A decision to this end would also mitigate the problems surrounding ill-adapted and deficient treatment
programs for pathological and problem gamblers. Short of this measure, the federal government should impose a tax structure upon legalized gambling operations that reflects the cost they
impose on society, such as the Canadian model where taxes are 100 percent with only management fees going to the casino companies. The U.S. government should appropriate the revenue
collected and allocate it to treatment and rehabilitation programs for pathological and problem gamblers, as well as for educational buy-outs of the gambling establishments. (29)
Case
Regulations
Legalized online gambling causes proliferation of terrorist money laundering,
causing catastrophic terrorism – only prohibition solves
Thackston 14, James Thackston, is a Florida-based independent software engineer with a background in the
aerospace, manufacturing and energy industries. Earl L. Grinols is distinguished professor of economics at Baylor
University, former senior economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and author of "Gambling In
America: Costs and Benefits.", http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategicnational-threat/2151317
Remote gambling is fundamentally different from brick-and-mortar casino gambling because the
website operator never has complete control. Using technology undetectable to website operators and their
regulators, it is possible for gamblers to play games from physical locations that are not what they seem. We
know, because we have done it. Recently, House Energy and Commerce Committee staff and others in the
Capitol Hill office of U.S. Rep. Gregg Harper, R-Miss., witnessed a demonstration in which a single remote
computer took control of two computers and used them as alias machines to play poker online. The
Harper demonstration showed the technology and techniques that terror and crime organizations could
use to operate untraceable money laundering built on a highly liquid legalized online poker industry —
just the environment that will result from the spread of poker online . One of us set up a website —
undetectablelaundering.com — to help communicate the problem to a broader audience. No one should doubt the
ability of criminals to exploit the inherent weakness in online gambling. A drug cartel could arrange for
buyers' machines to be remotely linked and lose to the aliased cartel machines. Drug buyers would
not even need to play from their own machines. Illegal drug money would appear to be legal online
winnings. A single poker game takes just a few hours to transfer $5 million as was recently
demonstrated — legally — by American player Brian Hastings with his Swedish competitor half a world away. An
established al-Qaida poker network could extract from the United States enough untraceable money
in six days to fund an operation like the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. The threat is real. Last
month a Texas lawyer was found guilty of trying to launder $600 million in drug money for a Mexican cartel.
Caesar's Entertainment is currently under investigation by the Justice Department and IRS, accused of money
laundering and Bank Secrecy Act violations. In December 2012, the FBI's Tampa field office asked us to take down
the website explaining the threat. We complied. This May, special agents at FBI headquarters in Washington
responsible for enforcing the Wire Act and all other federal gambling laws were briefed on the vulnerability. In July,
a Senate Commerce Committee hearing seemed to reinforce concerns. Rep. C.W. Bill Young wrote a letter of
concern to FBI director Robert Mueller on Aug. 7. But since then action seems to have stalled. And the threat moves
on. With the passing of Young, we have put the website back up and joined together in hopes of spurring action.
Since it remains true that gambling regulations in Nevada, Delaware and New Jersey are no match for
determined terrorists and criminals, we feel duty-bound as responsible citizens to ensure knowledge of the
threat reaches as many policymakers as possible. We have proved it is possible to make money laundering
undetectable. Gambling should be firmly restricted to stay offline.
Plan doesn’t solve, e-money is irrelevant
No cyberterror – discount evidence from the new Pentagon report**
Rid, Reader War Studies at King’s College, 3-13-’13 (Thomas, “The Great Cyberscare” Foreign Policy,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/13/the_great_cyberscare)
The Pentagon, no doubt, is the master of razzmatazz. Leon Panetta set the tone by warning again and again of an impending "cyber
Pearl Harbor." Just before he left the Pentagon, the Defense Science Board delivered a remarkable report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat. The paper
seemed obsessed with making yet more drastic historical comparisons: "The cyber threat is serious," the task force wrote, "with potential consequences similar to the nuclear threat of the Cold
War." The manifestations of an all-out nuclear war would be different from cyberattack, the Pentagon scientists helpfully acknowledged. But then they added, gravely, that "in the end, the
The world has yet to witness a single casualty, let alone fatality, as
a result of a computer attack. Such statements are a plain insult to survivors of Hiroshima. Some sections of
the Pentagon document offer such eye-wateringly shoddy analysis that they would not have passed as an MA
existential impact on the United States is the same." A reminder is in order:
dissertation in a self-respecting political science department. But in the current debate it seemed to make sense. After all a bit of fear helps to claim - or keep -- scarce resources when austerity and cutting seems out-of-control. The report recommended allocating the stout sum of $2.5 billion for its top two priorities alone, protecting nuclear
weapons against cyberattacks and determining the mix of weapons necessary to punish all-out cyber-aggressors. Then there are private computer security companies. Such firms, naturally, are
keen to pocket some of the government's money earmarked for cybersecurity. And hype is the means to that end. Mandiant's much-noted report linking a coordinated and coherent campaign of
espionage attacks dubbed Advanced Persistent Threat 1, or "APT1," to a unit of the Chinese military is a case in point: The firm offered far more details on attributing attacks to the Chinese than
the intelligence community has ever done, and the company should be commended for making the report public. But instead of using cocky and over-confident language, Mandiant's analysts
should have used Words of Estimative Probability, as professional intelligence analysts would have done. An example is the report's conclusion, which describes APT1's work: "Although they
control systems in dozens of countries, their attacks originate from four large networks in Shanghai -- two of which are allocated directly to the Pudong New Area," the report found. Unit 61398
of the People's Liberation Army is also in Pudong. Therefore, Mandiant's computer security specialists concluded, the two were identical: "Given the mission, resourcing, and location of PLA
Unit 61398, we conclude that PLA Unit 61398 is APT1." But the report conspicuously does not mention that Pudong is not a small neighborhood ("right outside of Unit 61398's gates") but in
the company should have been
more careful in its overall assessment of the available evidence , as the computer security expert Jeffrey Carr and others have pointed out. The firm
fact a vast city landscape twice the size of Chicago. Mandiant's report was useful and many attacks indeed originate in China. But
made it too easy for Beijing to dismiss the report. My class in cybersecurity at King's College London started poking holes into the report after 15 minutes of red-teaming it -- the New York
The media want to sell copy through threat inflation
Times didn't. Which leads to the next point:
. "In Cyberspace, New Cold War," the headline writers at
the Times intoned in late February. "The U.S. is not ready for a cyberwar," shrieked the Washington Post earlier this week. Instead of calling out the above-mentioned Pentagon report, the paper
actually published two supportive articles on it and pointed out that a major offensive cyber capability now seemed essential "in a world awash in cyber-espionage, theft and disruption." The Post
the only military-style cyberattack that has actually created physical damage -- Stuxnet -- was
executed by the United States government. The Times, likewise, should have asked tough questions and pointed to some of the evidential problems in the Mandiant report;
instead, it published what appeared like an elegant press release for the firm. On issues of cybersecurity, the nation's fiercest watchdogs too often
look like hand-tame puppies eager to lap up stories from private firms as well as anonymous sources in the
security establishment. Finally, the intelligence community tags along with the hype because the NSA and CIA
are still traumatized by missing 9/11. Missing a "cyber 9/11" would be truly catastrophic for America's spies, so erring on the side of caution seems the rational
should have reminded its readers that
actually
choice. Yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper's recent testimony was more nuanced than reported and toned down the threat of a very serious cyberattack. But at the same time
the intelligence community, especially in the United States, has
far better information, better sources, better expertise, and better analysts than private companies like Symantec, McAfee, and Kaspersky Lab. But for a
number of reasons they keep their findings and their analysis classified . This means that the quality of the public debate
suffers, as experts as well as journalists have no choice but to rely on industry reports of sometimes
questionable quality or anonymous informants whose veracity is hard to assess.
America's top spies are not as forthcoming with more detailed information as they could be. We know that
Plan doesn’t solve for law enforcement—not regs
Trade
GATT/WTO decline key to development of regionalism which is a better check on
protectionism and war. They’ll use their Cho evidence to say that creates a dangerous
spaghetti bowl but that assumes old forms of regionalism not new regionalism which is a
never ending supply of delicious Olive Garden hospitaliano
Brkic 13, Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo (Snježana, 3/25, Regional Trading Arrangements – Stumbling Blocks
or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?,
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275)
Besides those advocating the optimistic or pessimistic view on regionalism effect on global trade liberalization, some economists, such as Frankel
and Wei, hold a neutral position, in a way. Frankel and Wei believe that forms and achievements of international economic integrations can vary
and that, for this reason, regionalism can be – depending on circumstances – linked to greater or smaller global
trade liberalization. In the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the
integration processes were becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was
taking place during the capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the
world market. Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness
of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two
waves of regionalism occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually
spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by
discriminatory international economic integrations, primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with
expressedly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that resulted in considerable trade deviations. This particularly refers to
the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The
current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world to a far greater extent than
any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier
regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of
flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and
most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new
regionalism". The most specific characteristics of new regionalism include: geographic spread of RTAs in terms of
encompassing entire continents; greater speed; integration forms success; deepening of integration processes; and, the
most important for this theoretical discussion, generally non-negative impact on outsiders, world economy as a whole, and the
multilateral liberalization process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish between the "benign" and "malign" regionalism. On the one hand,
regionalism can advance the international economic stability, multilateral liberalization and world peace. On the other, it can have mercantilist
features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts .
Analyses of trends within the
contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have features of "benign" regionalism . Reasons
for this are numerous. Forces driving the contemporary regionalism development differ from those that used
to drive earlier regionalism periods in the 20th century. The present regionalism emerged in the period characterized
by the increasing economic inter-dependence between different world economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve
trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional
initiatives represent attempts to make the members' participation in the world economy easier, rather than
make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new initiatives are less frequently motivated
exclusively by political interests, and are less frequently being used for mercantilist purposes. After the
Second World War, more powerful countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen
their political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders. The examples include CMEA and European Community
arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new regionalism, mostly driven by
common economic interests, yielded less trade diversion than previous one, and has also contributed to the
prevention of military conflicts of greater proportions . Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in
earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and between socialist
countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional integrations primarily seem to lead to trade
creation . Contrary to the “beggar thy- neighbor” model of former international economic integrations, the
integrations now offer certain advantages to outsiders as well, by stimulating growth and spurring the role of
market forces. The analyses of contemporary trends in world economy also speak in favor of the "optimistic"
proposition. The structural analysis shows that the world trade is growing and that this growth results both from the increase in
intra-regional and from the increase in extra-regional trade value (Anderson i Snape 1994.)28. Actually, the intraregional
trade has been growing faster, both by total value and by its share in world GDP . The extra-regional trade share in
GDP was increasing in some regions – in North America, Asia-Pacific and Asian developing countries. However, the question arises as to
whether the extra-regional trade would be greater without regional integrations or not? The answer would primarily depend both on the estimate
of degree of some countries' trade policy restrictedness in such circumstances, and on factors such as geographic distance, transport
communications, political relations among states. One should also take into account certain contemporary integration features
– the primarily economic, rather than strategic motivation, and continuous expansion, which mostly includes
countries that are significant economic partners. With respect to NAFTA, many believe that the negative effects
on outsiders will be negligible, since the USA and Canada have actually been highly integrated economies for
a long time already, while the Mexican economy is relatively small. The same view was pointed out by the EU, with
respect to its expansion. It particularly refers to the inclusion of the remaining EFTA countries, because this
will actually only complete, in institutional terms, the EU strong economic ties with these countries. Most
EFTA countries have been part of the European economic area (EEA), i.e. the original EC-EFTA agreement, for a few
years already, and conduct some 70% of their total international exchange with the Union countries. EU countries are also the most
significant foreign-trade partners of Central and East Europe countries, and the recent joining the Union of
several of them is not expected to cause a significant trade diversion . Besides, according to some earlier studies, during the
previous wave of regionalism, in the 1967-70 period, the creation of trade in EEC was far greater than trade diversion:
trade creation ranged from 13 to 23% of total imports, while trade diversion ranged from 1 to 6%. In Latin
America, the new regionalism resulted in the faster growth of intra-regional trade, while the extra-regional
exports and imports also continued to grow. Since early 1990s, the value of intra-regional imports registered the average annual
growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the
total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to 12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional
imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great
unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the imports from countries outside the region grew much faster the exports.30 Since
the described trends point to the continued growth of extra-regional imports and exports, they also show that
regional integration in Latin America has had the open regionalism character . Besides, the pending
establishment of FTAA – Free Trade Area of Americas will gather, in the same group, the so-called "natural" trade
partners – countries that have had an extremely extensive mutual exchange for years already, and the outsiders are therefore
unlikely to be affected by strengthening of regionalism in this part of the world. Contemporary research shows
that intra-regional trade is growing , however, same as interdependence between North America and East Asia
and between the EU and East Asia. It can also be seen that the biggest and the most powerful countries, i.e. blocs,
are extremely dependent on the rest of the world in terms of trade. For the EU, besides the intra-European
trade, which is ranked first, foreign trade has the vital importance since it accounts for 10% of European GD P. In
early 1990s, EU exchanged 40% of its foreign trade with non-members, 16% out of which with North America and East Asia together. EU
therefore must keep in mind the rest of the world as well . The growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing
"The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides,
the past few years witnessed a series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain
groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the ratio between
intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55.
Any attempt to move towards significantly closed
blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the significant inter-dependence between major trading
blocs . Besides the analysis of contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade, other research was conducted that
was supposed to point
to the reasons why the new regionalism has mainly a non-negative impact on outsiders and
global liberalization . The distinctive features of new regionalism were also affected to characteristics of
international economic and political environment it sprouted in. In the 1980s, economic nationalisms were not
so expressed as in the interventionism years following the Second World War; however, the neo-liberalism represented
by GATT activities did not find the "fertile ground” in all parts of the world. Regionalism growth in the circumstances of
multilateral system existence is, among other things, the consequence of distrust in multilateralism . „The revival of
the forces of regionalism stemmed from frustration with the slow pace of multilateral trade liberalization... If the
world trade regime could not be moved ahead, then perhaps it was time for deeper liberalization within more
limited groups of like-minded nations... Such efforts would at least liberalize some trade... and might even prod the other nations to
go along with multilateral liberalization.“33 Kennedy's round and Tokyo round of trade negotiations under GATT auspices brought a certain
progress in the global trade liberalization. However, the 1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the
GATT trade system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still
exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system of conflict
resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision. In this vacuum that was created in
promoting trade and investment multilateralism from the
point when GATT inadequacy became obvious until the start of the
Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave of regionalism started spreading across the world
again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative
solution – establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic integrations . Even the USA,
the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started working on designing a North American
integration.
That outweighs—multilateral trade causes wars with a larger impact
Thoma- Economics Prof, U of Oregon- ‘7 Mark, Trade Liberalization and War, July,
http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2007/07/trade-liberaliz.html
Globalisation is by construction an increase in both bilateral and multilateral trade flows. What then was the
net effect of increased trade since 1970? We find that it generated an increase in the probability of a bilateral
conflict by around 20% for those countries separated by less than 1000kms, the group of countries for which
the risk of disputes that can escalate militarily is the highest. The effects are much smaller for countries which are more distant.
Contrary to what these results (aggravated by our nationality) may suggest, we are not anti-globalisation activists even though we are aware that some implications of
The result that bilateral trade is pacifying brings several more optimistic
implications on globalisation. First, if we think of a world war as a war between two large groups or coalitions of countries, then globalisation makes
our work could be (mis)used in such a way.
such a war less likely because it increases the opportunity cost of such a conflict. Obviously, this conclusion cannot be tested but is a logical implication of our results.
our
results do confirm that increased trade flows created by regional trade agreements (such as the EU) are indeed
pacifying as intended. Given that most military conflicts are local, because they find their origins in border or
ethnic disputes, this is not a small achievement. These beneficial political aspects of regional trade agreements
are not usually considered by economists who often focus on the economic distortions brought by their
discriminatory nature. Given the huge human and economic costs of wars, this political effect of regional
trade agreements should not be discounted. This opens interesting questions on how far these regional trade agreements should extend – a
topical issue in the case of the EU. The entry of Turkey in the EU would indeed pacify its relations with EU countries
From this point of view, our work suggests that globalisation may be at the origin of a change in the nature of conflicts, less global and more local. Second,
(especially Greece and Cyprus), but also increase the probability of a conflict between Turkey and its non-EU neighbours. However, our simulations suggest that in
this case, the
first effect dominates the second by a large margin. More generally, our results should be interpreted as
a word of caution on some political aspects of globalisation. As it proceeds and weakens the economic ties of
proximate countries, those with the highest risk of disputes that can escalate into military conflicts, local
conflicts may become more prevalent. Even if they may not appear optimal on purely economic grounds, regional and bilateral trade
agreements, by strengthening local economic ties, may therefore be a necessary political counterbalance to
economic globalisation.
WTO credibility waters down Multilateral Environmental Agreements eliminating their
effectiveness – particularly CITES
Millimet 14, Professor of Economics at SMU (Daniel, May 12, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the
WTO, www.freit.org/WorkingPapers/Papers/TradePolicyMultilateral/FREIT745.pdf)
In light of the positive time trends in WTO membership and the number of MEAs in force, the time series evidence does not suggest a `chilling'
effect of WTO membership on the creation of new MEAs. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be concerned. First, theoretical models of
MEAs emphasize the need for full participation to achieve success, and full participation requires
punishments (or rewards) which typically are enacted through trade policies such as trade sanctions, import tariffs, or
export subsidies. Absent such punishments (or rewards), full participation is difficult to sustain in theory. Moreover, trade leakage due to
nonparticipants may undermine the effectiveness of MEAs (Barrett 2005). In practice, Eckersley (2004, p. 26) states that “increasing international
awareness of vulnerability
to a WTO challenge has given rise to a conservative or ‘cool’ implementation of trade
restrictive obligations under existing MEAs to avoid the threat of legal challenge ." Second, some MEAs must
impede free trade by definition to achieve their objectives . For example, the Convention on International Trade in
aims “to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild
animals and plants does not threaten their survival." Thus, the underlying premise of the MEA is to impede
trade in certain goods for the sake of environmental preservation. Given that many MEAs are incompatible
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
with the objectives of the WTO to further the “principles of liberalization" through “commitments to lower custom tariffs and other
agreements to “require governments to make their trade policies transparent by notifying the
WTO about laws in force and measures adopted," countries may be wary of joining MEAs that distort free trade due to
trade barriers" and
fear of violating WTO rules (Rauscher 2005). Thus, even though an increasing number of MEAs have entered into
force, less than full participation may, in part, be attributable to the WTO and may undermine the effectiveness
of these agreements. Alternatively, attempts by relatively recent MEAs to ensure compatibility with multilateral
trade rules through the avoidance of trade issues do so at the expense of effectiveness , making them less appealing to potential
participants. For example, Eckersley (2004, p. 26) concludes that “ the
expanding reach of the WTO's trade agreements does
serve to cramp the scope and operation of MEAs ..."
CITES is key to ocean biodiversity and global food security
Vincent 13, Canada Research Chair in Marine Conservation at the Fisheries Centre at the University of British
Columbia (Amanda, June, The role of CITES in the conservation of marine fishes subject to international trade,
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faf.12035/full)
Ensuring sustainable extraction of marine fishes is crucial to the conservation of biodiversity in the oceans ,
well-being of local communities and
food security globally . The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
indicates that 57% of all fisheries it tracks are fully exploited and require effective management to avoid decline and
that a further 30% are overexploited, depleted or recovering from depletion; the latter is a notable increase from 10% in 1974 to 26% in 1989
(FAO 2012a). Over 80% of global catches, however, are derived from fisheries lacking formal assessment, and small unassessed fisheries are in
substantially worse condition than assessed fisheries (Costello et al. 2012). There is, today, no doubt that populations of marine fishes
can indeed be extirpated or become globally threatened, notwithstanding their typically high fecundity and capacity for wide
dispersal (Hutchings 2001; Sadovy 2001; Reynolds et al. 2005). It is also evident that a tremendous number of people depend on fishing for
livelihoods (up to 820 million people) and food security (some 3 billion people) (FAO 2012a). The economic value of many species draws
greatly from their international trade. Approximately 38% of all fish products (from both wild and cultured sources) were exported in 2010 (FAO
2012a). Increased trade is facilitated by improvements in storage and transport capabilities and stimulated by the increasing use of fish in
expanding cash economies and for foreign exchange earnings (e.g. Béné et al. 2007; Asche and Smith 2009). It is also enabled by the spiralling
prices attained by some species, such as bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) (Collette et al. 2011). Seafood has become one of the most widely traded
of all commodities, with a total export value of the seven principal fishery commodity groups (94.66% of world total) reaching 109 billion US
dollars in 2010 (FAO 2012a). A study by TRAFFIC, the wildlife trade monitoring network, in the early 1990s found that fisheries constituted
about 25% of international trade in wild species, which has a total worth of about $160 billion (TRAFFIC as cited in Dickson 2002). In addition,
many millions of tonnes of low trophic level fishes are used as fishmeal for agriculture and aquaculture or for other non-food purposes.
Conservation and sustainable use of fish stocks, populations and species has largely been vested in fisheries management agencies and
organizations at national, regional and global levels. At the national level, fisheries and/or marine affairs agencies tend to be production oriented
and distant from the forestry and environment agencies that are typically charged with conservation policy and activity. The approximately 17
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs: FAO 2012b) have a mandate for managing high seas, straddling and highly migratory
fish stocks, either by taxon or by geographical region. Increasingly, however, there have been calls for RFMOs to improve their conservation and
management of fishery resources (see refs in Gilman et al. 2013). Most RFMOs, for example, have large governance deficits in areas such as bycatch, with binding measures addressing about one-third of by-catch problems (Gilman et al. 2013), and many fisheries are not covered by any
RFMO. FAO, often argued to be the arbiter of fisheries issues and concerns, has no fisheries management mandate or capacity per se, nor can it
insist on agreed action (FAO 1995). Rather, FAO works primarily through its voluntary Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF)
across a wide range of fisheries issues, provides important capacity building assistance to many countries and collates and analyses fisheries data.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ( CITES)
is ideally placed to complement
national and regional management of fish species subject to international trade . First, CITES was crafted
specifically to prevent international trade from contributing to the extinction of commercially exploited
species. To that end, it has a precautionary mandate to regulate international trade of species that are or may
become threatened by such commerce. Second, it has a long history of engagement with difficult issues and has
achieved notable successes by catalysing improvements in the conservation status of taxa ranging from crocodiles to
orchids (Kievit 2000; Dickson 2002). Third, CITES is the only multilateral environmental agreement that has legal
mechanisms in place to promote compliance with agreed restrictions on exports. Fourth, CITES has a global
reach with 177 member States (Parties), representing over 90% of the world's countries. CITES can be seen as both a trade Convention
serving to address conservation concerns, and a conservation Convention that addresses threats by regulating trade.
Ocean biodiversity key to all life
Craig 03, Law Prof at Indiana (Robin, Taking Steps Toward Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral
Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 155)
Biodiversity and ecosystem function arguments for conserving marine ecosystems also exist, just as they do for terrestrial ecosystems, but these arguments have thus far rarely been raised in
political debates. For example, besides significant tourism values - the most economically valuable ecosystem service coral reefs provide, worldwide - coral reefs protect against storms and
dampen other environmental fluctuations, services worth more than ten times the reefs' value for food production. n856 Waste treatment is another significant, non-extractive ecosystem function
ocean ecosystems play a major role in the global geochemical cycling of
all the elements that represent the basic building blocks of living organisms, carbon, nitrogen, oxygen,
phosphorus, and sulfur, as well as other less abundant but necessary elements." n858 In a very real and direct sense, therefore, human
that intact coral reef ecosystems provide. n857 More generally, "
degradation of marine ecosystems impairs the planet's ability to support life. Maintaining biodiversity is
often critical to maintaining the functions of marine ecosystems. Current evidence shows that, in general, an
ecosystem's ability to keep functioning in the face of disturbance is strongly dependent on its biodiversity,
"indicating that more diverse ecosystems are more stable ." n859 Coral reef ecosystems are particularly dependent on their biodiversity. Most
ecologists agree that the complexity of interactions and degree of interrelatedness among component species is higher on coral reefs than in any other marine environment. This implies that the
ecosystem functioning that produces the most highly valued components is also complex and that many otherwise insignificant species have strong effects on sustaining the rest of the reef
maintaining and restoring the biodiversity of marine ecosystems is critical to maintaining and
restoring the ecosystem services that they provide. Non-use biodiversity values for marine ecosystems have been calculated in the wake of marine disasters,
system. n860 Thus,
like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. n861 Similar calculations could derive preservation values for marine wilderness. However, economic value, or economic value equivalents, should not
be "the sole or even primary justification for conservation of ocean ecosystems. Ethical arguments also have considerable force and merit." n862 At the forefront of such arguments should be a
recognition of how little we know about the sea - and about the actual effect of human activities on marine ecosystems. The United States has traditionally failed to protect marine ecosystems
because it was difficult to detect anthropogenic harm to the oceans, but we now know that such harm is occurring - even though we are not completely sure about causation or about how to fix
every problem. Ecosystems like the NWHI coral reef ecosystem should inspire lawmakers and policymakers to admit that most of the time we really do not know what we are doing to the sea
and hence should be preserving marine wilderness whenever we can - especially when the United States has within its territory relatively pristine marine ecosystems that may be unique in the
: if we kill the ocean we kill ourselves, and we will take most of the
biosphere with us. The Black Sea is almost dead, n863 its once-complex and productive ecosystem almost entirely replaced by a monoculture of comb jellies, "starving out fish and
world. We may not know much about the sea, but we do know this much
dolphins, emptying fishermen's nets, and converting the web of life into brainless, wraith-like blobs of jelly." n864 More importantly, the Black Sea is not necessarily unique.
Food security collapse causes failed states - extinction
Brown 09, Founder of both the WorldWatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute (May, Lester R., Scientific
American, “Could Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Ebsco)
The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government
collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate
sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But
sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis. For most of us, the idea that
civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure
from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We
are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our
civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global
agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of
those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet
I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global
civilization. I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world
food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible.
The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome
support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental
decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen
short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in
the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and
summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever. As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the
resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge
of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb
in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the
growth of their populations. But if
the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an
ever increasing rate . We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international
security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at
risk. States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social
services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on
power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their
programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy. Failing states are of
international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening
political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is
a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in
Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of
the Congo (number six). Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-
states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control
international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious
diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble . Once states fail, no one
assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten
the stability of global civilization itself .
Regulating the wildlife trade is key to prevent global pandemics
Karesh 05, Wildlife Conservation Society (William, Emerging Infectious Diseases: vol 11, no. 7, July, p. 1001-2)
Rather than attempting to eradicate pathogens or the wild species that may harbor them, a practical approach
to decrease the risk for the spread of infectious diseases would include decreasing contact among species.
Closing down retail poultry markets in Hong Kong for 1 day per month reduced the rate of H9N2 avian influenza
virus in market birds. Little equivalent research has been conducted in market systems that sell wildlife, but an
analogous approach to the precautionary principle would be an appropriate action to take before the next outbreak or
pandemic. Since wildlife markets are a system of networks with major hubs, these trading points provide
practical control opportunities to maximize the effects of regulatory efforts. Focusing efforts at markets to
regulate, reduce, or in some cases, eliminate the trade in wildlife could provide a cost-effective approach to
decrease the risks for humans, domestic animals, wildlife, and ecosystems.
Global pandemics are coming and outweigh nuke war
Zakaria 05, Editor of Time Magazine (Fareed, “A Threat Worse than Terror,” 10-31, Newsweek,
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/newsweek/103105.html)
A flu pandemic is the most dangerous threat the U nited S tates faces today," says Richard Falkenrath, who until
recently served in the Bush administration as deputy Homeland Security adviser. "It's a bigger threat than
terrorism. In fact it's bigger than anything I dealt with when I was in government." One makes a threat
assessment on the basis of two factors: the probability of the event, and the loss of life if it happened. On
both counts, a pandemic ranks higher than a major terror attack, even one involving weapons of mass destruction. A
crude nuclear device would probably kill hundreds of thousands. A flu pandemic could easily kill millions. Whether this
particular virus makes the final, fatal mutation that allows it to move from human to human, one day some
virus will . The basic factor that is fueling this surge of viruses is China's growth. (China is the natural habitat of the
influenza virus.) As China develops, it urbanizes, and its forests and wetlands shrink. That forces migratory birds to
gather closer together-and closer to human habitation--which increases the chances of a virus spreading from one
species to the next. Also, growth means a huge rise in chicken consumption. Across thousands of homes in China
every day, chickens are slaughtered in highly unhygienic ways. "Every day the chances that this virus or another
such virus will move from one species to another grow," says Laurie Garrett, author of "The Coming
Plague," who has been writing brilliantly on this topic for years. Nobody really disputes that we are badly
unprepared for this threat . "If something like this pandemic were to happen today," says Falkenrath, "the
government would be mostly an observer, not a manager." The government can't even give intelligent advice to
its citizens because it doesn't actually know what to say. We don't know whether people should stay put, leave cities,
stay home or go to the nearest hospital. During the cold war, hundreds of people in government participated in
dozens of crisis simulations of nuclear wars, accidents and incidents. These "tabletop exercises" were
conducted so that if and when a real crisis hit, policymakers would not be confronting critical decisions for
the first time. No such expertise exists for today's deadliest threat.
HFC amendments to the Montreal Protocol are moving forward – it’s a critical greenhouse
gas
Doniger 14, Director of the Climate and Clean Air Program at NRDC (David, 7/20, At Some Point of Time We
Will Go With This Proposal, switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/at_some_point_of_time_we_will.html)
Countries jousted again over proposals to place the super-potent heat-trapping chemicals called hydrofluorcarbons
(HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol, the world’s most successful environmental treaty. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait emerged as the
most vociferous opponents. But the large majority of countries, both developed and developing, voiced support for moving
ahead, and even some of the opponents are viewing an HFC agreement as inevitable. Here’s a rundown on where key countries
stand in the talks on HFCs that took place last week in Paris. Workshop on HFC Management The Paris session began with an HFC management
workshop on July 11-12, well-attended by more than 400 country delegates, scientific, technical, and legal experts, and industry and
environmental observers. Top takeaways: Scientists showed that HFC production, use, and emissions are growing much
faster than emissions of CO2 or other heat-trapping pollutants, with a staggering 10-fold increase expected in developing
countries by 2030, and 30 to 50-fold growth expected by 2050. HFCs will transform from a bit player into a monster,
accounting for about 20 percent of total heat-trapping pollution.
Fear of WTO conflict ensures new Montreal agreements will be too weak to be effective
Wirth 04, Law Prof at Boston College (David, May, The Relationship between MEAs and WTO Rules,
www.ecologic-events.de/eu-trade-policy/en/documents/01_Wirth.pdf
A number of multilateral agreements, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and the Basel Convention
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, regulate trade in environmentally sensitive sectors or
hazardous products. Others, such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, utilize trade measures
as ancillary tools to achieve the larger policy goals of the agreement. Without trade measures, the Montreal
Protocol would create considerable incentives for non-parties to serve as pollution havens , to serve as an
external source of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to countries that have taken on obligations under the agreement,
and to continue to invest in outmoded, environmentally harmful technologies. The trade provisions of the Protocol
reverse those incentives by allowing trade among parties, but authorizing restrictions on trade in bulk CFCs, products containing CFCs, and
products manufactured with CFCs with non-parties. With those trade restrictions, the Protocol creates incentives for non-parties to accept the
obligations in the agreement and removes the rewards for states remaining outside the agreement. As between parties to a multilateral
environmental agreement (MEA), both of which are WTO members, the MEA operates as lex specialis or an agreed derogation from
GATT/WTO rules, which consequently do not apply in this situation. However, trade provisions, such as those in the Montreal
Protocol, potentially run afoul of GATT/WTO rules because those measures discriminate between parties
and non-parties to the multilateral environmental agreement, all of which may be WTO members . There has
been no concrete dispute in the WTO challenging such measure, but the likelihood that article XX would apply is greater than in the case of a
purely unilateral measure. The WTO Appellate Body’s report in the turtle-shrimp case, as well as the arbitrators’ reports, are also encouraging in
suggesting that discriminatory trade measures in MEAs would withstand scrutiny. Attempts to deal with the “MEA problem”
have not been entirely successful. The WTO’s Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) has failed to endorse a “legislative” solution.
Article XXV of GATT, the waiver provision, and article 104 of NAFTA are less than entirely satisfactory solutions as a matter
of principle. Since this issue began to penetrate the consciousness of policymakers and the public, a number of new agreements that raise the
“MEA problem” have been negotiated, most notably the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous
Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The persistence of the “MEA problem”
has a potential for a chilling effect on necessary and effective trade measures in newly-negotiated agreements.
Controlling HFC emissions is the only way to avoid climate tipping points – it’s more
important than CO2
AP 09 (Obama Administration to Push For Major Initiative to Fight Global Warming,
www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/04/30/obama-administration-push-major-initiative-fight-globalwarming/#ixzz2eoLvyx00)
Proponents say eliminating HFCs would have an impact within our lifetimes. HFCs do most of their damage in their first 30
years in the atmosphere, unlike carbon dioxide which spreads its impact over a longer period of time.
" Retiring HFCs is our best hope of avoiding a near-term tipping point for irreversible climate change . It's an
opportunity the world simply cannot afford to miss, and every year we delay action on HFCs reduces the benefit," said Alexander von
Bismarck, executive director of the Environmental Investigation Agency, a nonprofit watchdog group in Washington that
first pitched the idea two years ago. Globally, a huge market has sprung up around the use of HFCs, a man-made chemical, as a
result of their promotion under the Montreal Protocol. Several billion dollars have been spent through an affiliated fund to prod countries to stop
making and using CFCs and other ozone-damaging chemicals and to instead use cheap and effective chemicals like HFCs. Scientists say
eliminating use of HFCs would spare the world an amount of greenhouse gases up to about a third of all CO2
emissions about two to four decades from now. Manufacturers in both Europe and the U.S. have begun to replace HFCs with so-called
natural refrigerants such as hydrocarbons, ammonia or carbon dioxide. HFCs
can be up to 10,000 times more powerful than
carbon dioxide as climate-warming chemicals, according to U.S. government data.
Extinction from environmental collapse and elimination of global security and trade
systems
Roberts 13, Citing World Bank review of climate science - staff writer at Grist (David, 1/10, If you aren’t
alarmed about climate, you aren’t paying attention, grist.org/climate-energy/climate-alarmism-the-idea-is-surreal/)
We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists
predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push
temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent World Bank review of the
science reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature
extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South
America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and
duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the
end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months
are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region
could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest
fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they
could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of
many societies and natural systems . [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in
combination
of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral
reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C
is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on
them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by
acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The
2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries —
regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing
water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in
Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events:
Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use
and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above
preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a
4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts , surpassing habitat
destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely
to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a
state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem
services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research
also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All
this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human
security and economic and trade systems .” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “ there is no certainty that
adaptation to a 4°C world is possible .” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now
ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6 degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely
know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing
feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That
would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is
inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.
Peaceful management of China’s rise is inevitable – assuming the WTO is key relies on an
infantilized notion of Chinese foreign policy
Herscovitch 14, Beijing-based Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Studies (Benjamin, Preserving
Peace as China Rises I, March, cis.org.au/images/stories/foreign-policy-analysis/fpa9.pdf)
Beijing and Washington are certainly locked in a subtle and high-stakes strategic dance. Nevertheless, there are
good reasons to expect each party to successfully pull off the necessary steps. Beijing and Washington have
each committed to ‘a new model of major country relations’ in a bid to emphasise mutually beneficial
cooperation and manage inevitable tensions. Of course, good intentions alone do not guarantee that Beijing and Washington will
be able to overcome strategic distrust and mitigate irritants straining the relationship. However, both capitals stand to benefit if they
can muster what Yang Jiechi, Chinese state councillor and former foreign minister, calls the necessary ‘wisdom to manage their
differences and frictions.’ Two-way trade between China and the United States in goods alone has grown from
US$33 billion in 1992 to more than US$536 billion in 2012.102 China exported US$426 billion worth of goods to the United States in 2012
(22% of total Chinese goods exports), and imported US$110 billion worth of US goods.103 In 2013, Chinese investment in the United States
totalled US$64 billion, while Beijing holds approximately US$1.3 trillion in Treasury securities. The evolving balance of power in the IndoPacific and fraught regional relations will periodically strain Sino-US ties, but
extensive and mutually beneficial economic
interests will help minimise the fallout from these difficulties. Economic interdependence is certainly not a
foolproof safeguard against conflict and war, but it offers a strong incentive for relatively stable and peaceful Sino-US
relations. The notion that China and the United States lack the requisite wisdom to carefully manoeuvre
around each other also inadvertently infantilises Beijing. Underlying the logic of a ‘China choice’ is the
assumption that China must get what it wants because otherwise it will bloody-mindedly risk war with the
United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners. Notwithstanding China’s gunboat diplomacy and sabre-rattling, Beijing
understands that wise foreign policy often means accepting an imperfect but mutually profitable compromise,
and forgoing the perfect realisation of strategic and territorial aims. With a leadership avowedly opposed to
the ‘Cold War mentality’ of ‘zero-sum games,’ and committed to peaceful development and co-existence,
Beijing can reliably be expected to choose economic growth and trade over achieving all of its strategic goals
and gaining control of every tract of territory it claims . In cases of unresolvable disagreement, Beijing does not expect
acquiescence to its demands; it instead wants other capitals to sidestep problems and focus on mutually beneficial arenas. As former Premier Li
Peng argued: Disputes defying immediate solutions can be temporarily shelved in the spirit of seeking common ground while putting aside
differences. They should never be allowed to stand in the way of the development of normal state-to-state relations.
Even if China’s rise isn’t peaceful regional deterrence checks – also what kind of shmuck
tags a card “no defense?” How can that possibly work?
Waldron 14, IR Prof at Penn (Arthur, 2/17, China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ Enters Turbulence, ac.elscdn.com/S0030438714000118/1-s2.0-S0030438714000118-main.pdf?_tid=30c7d5ca-47e9-11e4-8cc800000aab0f01&acdnat=1412002939_352a02e441d6e2070e3535ce1a936f5e)
What causes China to hesitate, I suspect, is the failure of Japan, Korea, or the United States to act in the way Beijing
had expected, as what strategists call “cooperative adversaries,” who will play their roles in the script on which the Chinese have pinned
their hopes of victory. As seen above, according to the script, China’s actions should intimidate both Washington and Tokyo. Then the United
States ought to pressure Japan to make some “symbolic” concession to calm the situation—and this, it must be admitted, is quite conceivable.
The concession most often discussed is an acknowledgement by Tokyo that a genuine dispute exists over the sovereignty of the Senakakus, which
the Japanese maintain belong to them, period. Such a statement by Japan would be welcomed by many, but would open the way for potentially
interminable negotiations that could (although this seems unlikely) end with the islands somehow winkled away from Japan, or Japan’s claims
diluted and her military edge dulled. Instead, Japan has responded, unexpectedly for the Chinese, by strengthening her
military preparations, raising the long steady defense budget by $12 billion to $246 billion.46 According to Stars and Stripes, “[T]he
Japanese Self Defense Forces are looking at buying 17 Ospreys, according to reports in major Japanese newspapers, which detail a five-year
defense build-up. The program, valued at 24.67 trillion yen ($238 million), includes new tanks, unmanned aircraft, aerial refuelers, submarines,
destroyers and amphibious vehicles that could ferry ground troops ashore on remote islands, according to media reports. It will also include three
Global Hawk surveillance drones, whose ability to hover at high altitudes for more than 30 hours will serve to strengthen Japan’s surveillance
capabilities in the region.”47 Japan and Korea are also both buying advanced American F-35 fighters: Tokyo reportedly 43, Seoul reportedly 40
with a possible 20 more. Because the F-35 can be given STOVL capabilities, it is quite conceivable that they might be carried by the latest
Japanese “helicopter destroyers” of the Izumo class, of which the first has just entered service.48 Japan has also spoken of the need for missiles to
counter strikes against her. These actions are, in this author’s opinion, long overdue if peace in the Pacific is not to be undermined
by what can only be called Chinese strategic irrationality. Why would she set a military course that undermines her necessary
economic development? To answer is extremely difficult. But she has undeniably done so. Furthermore, in typical Japanese style, this
very wisely conceived improvement of military capabilities is coming “just in time.” Japan will soon have the
ability to enforce “Anti Access and Area Denial” tactics against China should she threaten her territories. This
translates also into the ability, if necessary, to contribute, in case of conflict, to bottling the Chinese fleet into
the South China Sea by closing choke points. It is important to understand the larger implications of this
defensive capacity, not difficult to acquire, in the hands of other claimants as well as Japan, with whom China has
territorial disputes. The ability to frustrate any small step China may take —to block the acquisition of an island, for example,
or to prevail in a small scale naval or air conflict—means that the path of psychological suasion powered by small bites at the larger
strategic pie, is untenable for Beijing. Politically, China simply cannot risk the internal outrage and humiliation —
not to mention the disastrous loss of prestige abroad—that would follow if, for example, some of her planes were downed, or her
ships sunk, in engagements with Japan, China, Vietnam, or even the Philippines. Nor could she tolerate the ignominy of having a landing
force repelled from an island, or forced to give it up. In other words, the tactics that come naturally to the Chinese and are extolled in their
writings, ancient and modern, of rapid victories at low cost, are simply not available for the pursuit of her current policy—territorial recovery or
aggrandizement, call it what you will. Achieving those goals will demand a lot more fighting. The only option that remains for China is to
escalate: to abandon her traditions of limited and high-pay-off operations in favor of large engagements, protraction, attrition, and all the other
horrors of full-fledged war. Were China to attempt such a conflict, the pivotal question would be American extended nuclear deterrence. Would
Washington, in fact, launch nuclear strikes against China to defend Japan, South Korea, or any other ally? Attempts have been made to reassure
the Japanese on this count, with official visits to secret American nuclear facilities.49 This author believes that faced with an actual nuclear
exchange, the United States would carry out an “agonizing reappraisal” and back down. The British and French, who know us well, after all,
believe this too. This is why they maintain, at all times, one nuclear missile submarine carrying a terrifying thermonuclear force as a deterrent
against which no defense is possible. The Japanese, Koreans, and other American friends know this as well. So do the Chinese. If China
attempted nuclear blackmail in connection with any of her claims, the almost certain result, in addition to a vast international political and
economic crisis, would be a rapid appearance of similar submarine forces, under the flags of the threatened countries. Mutual Assured
Destruction would then freeze the map of Asia and forestall any Chinese acquisitions. Indirectly the Chinese
admit this. As we have seen, former Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Sha Zukang spoke of the Senkakus as tiny islands over
which it was not worth fighting. From that, however, he moved to threatening World War III.50 But whether intended or not, the first part of his
statement suggests that if they are not worth Japan or the United States fighting for, they are not worth a Chinese fight either. In the
future, perhaps, tensions in Asia will rise to the point where only the possession of independent nuclear deterrents by our allies can keep the
peace. For now, though,
the strengthening of conventional forces by our allies and other states, looks set to counter
sufficiently the Chinese threat . Let us hope that with the path of gradual steps and “victory without fighting” closed off, China will
have the sense not to choose the road of escalation.
2NC
China
2NC
Their evidence cherry picks examples
Johnston, Professor Government at Harvard, ’13 (Alastair Iain, Spring, “How New and Assertive is China’s New
Assertiveness?” International Security, Vol 37 No 4, p 7-48, ProjectMuse)
Analytical Problems with the New Assertiveness Meme¶ The argument that China’s diplomacy in 2010 was newly assertive
contains at¶ least three analytical flaws that have characterized much of the commentary ¶ on Chinese foreign
policy in the United States and elsewhere—selection on the¶ dependent variable; ahistoricism; and poor
causal specification. The first two¶ are general methodological problems that often plague media and pundit¶ analysis on a range of public
policy questions; though serious, I do not go¶ into them in detail here. The last deals with problematic empirical claims ¶
associated with causal arguments, the evaluation of which requires critical¶ examination of the available
evidence.¶ selecting on the dependent variable¶ A common problem in the new assertiveness analyses is that they
consider¶ only confirming evidence while ignoring disconfirming examples. The risk¶ here is exaggerating
change and discounting continuity. The pundit and media¶ world thus tended to miss a great deal of ongoing
cooperative interaction between¶ the United States and China throughout 2010. Examples include the¶
continued growth of U.S. exports to China during the year; the continued high¶ congruence in U.S. and Chinese voting
in the UN Security Council;70 Chinese¶ support for UN Security Council Resolution 1929, which imposed tougher¶ sanctions on the
Iranian regime—a move appreciated by the Obama administration;¶ 71 Beijing’s abiding by its 2009 agreement with the United States
to¶ hold talks with representatives of the Dalai Lama;72 a Chinese decision to con-¶ tinue the appreciation of the
renminbi prior to the Group of Twenty meeting in¶ Toronto in June 2010; Hu Jintao’s decision to attend the U.S.hosted nuclear¶ summit in April 2010 (in the wake of the January 2010 Taiwan arms sales decision, ¶ the Chinese had hinted that Hu would
not attend the summit); a Chinese¶ decision to pressure the Sudan government to exercise restraint should South ¶
Sudan declare independence; and China’s more constructive cross-strait policies,¶ in the wake of Ma Yingjeou’s 2008 election as president of the Republic of¶ China, which have contributed to a decline in tensions between
China and¶ Taiwan, thus reducing the probability, for the moment, of a U.S. military¶ conflict with the PRC.¶ In addition
to these U.S.-specific cooperative actions, throughout 2010 China¶ continued to participate in all of the major multilateral
global and regional institutions¶ in which it had been involved for the past couple of decades, including¶ the World Trade
Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the¶ United Nations Security Council, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations¶
(ASEAN) Plus 3, the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, UN peacekeeping¶ operations, and antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden.
There is no evidence¶ that, beginning in 2010, it began to withdraw from global institutional life or to¶ dramatically
challenge the purposes, ideology, or main organizational features¶ of these institutions to a degree that it had not in the
past. Diplomacy in these¶ institutions continued to show the expected mix of focused pursuit of status¶ and material
interest, defense of sovereignty, and functional cooperation that¶ has characterized China’s approach to these
institutions over the past couple¶ of decades.¶ This list of examples is not exhaustive, of course. I present these only as examples ¶ of a
more general point: that determining whether, on balance, Chinese diplomacy ¶ became much more assertive in 2010
requires considering the full¶ range of Chinese conflictual and cooperative behavior, not just China’s
noncooperative¶ actions. Methodologically, therefore, selecting on the dependent variable¶ makes it difªcult to arrive at any conclusion
about a new assertiveness.
China wouldn’t be a threat for decades
Etzioni, Professor International Affairs George Washington, 8-21-’12 (Amitai, “The United States’ Premature
Pivot to “Asia”” Soc Vol 49, p 395-399,
http://icps.gwu.edu/files/2012/09/A446_the_United_states_premature_pivot_to_asia.pdf)
Few, if any, question the observation that U.S. power is declining and that of China is rising. However, one should not overlook the fact that the U.S. decline starts from a
very high level and China’s rise from a very low one. Hence, even if China’s economy continues to grow at a rapid pace,
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace projects that, in 2050, the U.S. GDP per capita will still be nearly three times
larger than that of China, despite the fact that China’s total GDP will be 20 % larger. Moreover, given that China has a population four times larger than that of
the U.S., a population that is demanding and gaining a share of the affluence so far limited to a small fraction , and that the
legitimacy of the regime is based on such economic wellbeing, the income per capita is the more relevant figure. According to the World Bank, in 2010, China’s income per capita was a mere
$4,260 to America’s $47,240, placing it behind Ecuador and Algeria. While exact estimates and calculations vary, the wide per capita gap is expected to persist in the coming decades. And this
assumes no political and environmental upheavals and disregards the demographic deterioration of China and the relative youthfulness of the U.S.
Regionalism
Link
Lack of US trade leadership collapsing the WTO, causes shift to RTAs
Huang, Professor Law Wuhan University, ’11 (Zhixiong- Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Harvard Law School,
“Rise and Fall of Trade Multilateralism: A Proposal for “WTO à la Carte” as an Alternative Approach for Trade
Negotiations” Front Law China, Vol 6 No 1, p 35-43, SpringerLink)
It has to be admitted that the crisis that the WTO currently faces is of a systematic nature, arising out of a number of factors. For
example, the waning public support for multilateral trade liberalization and hence the lack of leadership on the part of major developed countries ,
the imbalance between the political and judicial branches of the WTO, the energies devoted to and challenges of regionalism, to varying degrees, are all responsible for the status quo. However,
one of the root problems for the WTO is that its governance structure failed to address the diverse needs and
preferences of its members in the new international trade environment of 21st century. Contrary to the purpose of fully involving
developing countries into the negotiation package of the Uruguay Round, the US and the EU has led the MTS to the direction that can be characterized by “one size for all.” Unfortunately, it has
in the light of the stricter consensus
decision-making rule, the single undertaking principle has increasingly become a “trouble-maker” for the
WTO. In view of the frequent stalemate in the multilateral trading system, countries now tend to negotiate
with “like-minded” groups and enter into Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) at regional or bilateral level. To a large extent, it
accounts for the relative “rise and fall” between regionalism and multilateralism.
not strengthened the multilateral trading system, but rather has weakened it. To be sure, it should not be underestimated that
Loss of faith in multilateral trade causes shift to regional agreements
Benini, Professor Economics University of Bologna, and Plummer, Professor International Economics Johns
Hopkins University, ‘8 (Roberta and Michael, December, “Regionalism and multilateralism: crucial issues in the
debate on RTAs” Econ Change Restruct, Vol 41, p 267-287)
Disillusionment with progress at Doha may be one additional reason for the proliferation of regional
agreements in Asia and the rest of the world, particularly accords between developed and developing countries.
The ambitious agenda of Doha, from both developed- and developing-country viewpoints, could be more easily
managed bilaterally or between a small group of countries—e.g., regional areas—than in an organization of 151
highly-divergent economies: what is needed to integrate global markets further, from non-tariff barriers to nonborder issues, might go beyond the WTO’ scopes and capacity. In some ways, the supposed ‘‘North-South’’
conflict at the WTO is a sign of maturity.
2NC Regionalism Good
WTO collapse causes the formation of regional trade that is more effective in sustaining
international trade and preventing global warfare
Several benefits to a regionalized system
a. stronger base for interdependence and recognizes environmental treaties
Bullard 04, Researcher with Focus on the Global South (Nicola, Why we must keep the WTO “train” off the
tracks, http://www.boell.de/alt/downloads/global/taz_WTO_nicola%20Bullard.pdf)
The world will not collapse into trade wars if the WTO is dismantled. Quite the reverse: without the heavy
burden of unfair trade agreements, developing countries would, at last, be free to develop economic and trade
policies that are in their interests, rather than in the interests of the rich countries and the corporations. Countries
will, of course, continue to trade and there must be some rules, most importantly to regulate transnational
corporations, to stabilise commodity prices and to ban the dumping of subsidised agricultural products.
Beyond that, we already have a vast body of international human rights and environmental treaties which
provide all the tools necessary to ensure that trade takes place in a way that promotes workers rights, creates
employment and prosperity and does not damage the environment. In short, to do exactly what the WTO is
meant to do but fails so miserably to achieve.
b. gradually builds to a stronger global trade system
Brkic 13, Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo (Snježana, 3/25, Regional Trading Arrangements – Stumbling Blocks
or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?,
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275)
There are over 180 independent states in the modern world, most of which differ enormously in economic
development and power. World economy is therefore a battlefield of varied interests expressed in the action of different national
economic policies. In such conditions, attempts to integrate world economy by global liberalization of
international trade cannot yield significant results overnight. Global free trade is considered the first best solution, but is
not feasible immediately and at once, since too many people believe that they would lose with global
liberalization. According to the view believed to be optimistic, creation of international economic integrations could be a
distinctive inter-step in the process of free world market creation. Lester Thurow points out: "In the long run, regionalism
development could be favorable for the world. Free trade within regions and regulated trade between regions could be the proper
road to free world trade in a long term. The shift from national to world economy at once would be too big a
jump. One should first make a few smaller inter-steps, and pseudo-trading blocs coupled with regulated trade could be
such a necessary inter-step." The essential rationale of this view is actually the speed of reforms - the gradual
versus “big bang” approach. Many contemporary economists, in their analyses of world economy trends, conclude that
political forces behind regional integration show signs of consistency with those acting towards global world
trade. According to the optimistic view, the multilateralization process is slowed down by different standpoints on the
free trade usefulness, by economic nationalisms, even by varying political interests, and therefore another way
had to be found in order to achieve the world market integration – a slower one, but more effective in the existing
constellation of international economic relations. This view denies the opposition between regionalism and multilateralism, and
explains it as follows: Since integration improves economic relations between members through removing trading and other barriers, and since all
these integrated regions are part of the world territory, the advancement of economic relations within regions can be
understood as the advancement of global economic relations. Regional trading, i.e. economic blocs would in this case be only
a bypass towards the creation of unified world market. "... What could not be achieved in global relations was achieved
within regions, through multilateralization of the European economic area. These achievements were later followed by many countries in
other world regions, in their mutual relations practice. Practically, we thus got regional multilateralisms." Regionalism advocates also point out
that the formation of economic integrations could facilitate the pending WTO negotiation rounds. Actually, the Uruguay round was partly
protracted due to a great number of participants and the "free riders" issue. Viewed in broader context, one could say that regionalism
contributes to overall globalization as well, since these are processes motivated from the same source. Both regionalism and
globalization are driven by big capital interests, and that these two phenomena are actually ways to make the
centuries-long capitalism aspiration – unified world market - come true. According to this view, the globalization process
as a process of world economy functional integration under the circumstances of imperfect market and hegemony weakening early in the 20th
century has to be supported by the institutional component, either on a multilateral basis through international organizations and institutions such
as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, or on regional scale through regional trading arrangements.
c. faster and more tailored to local conditions
CTIP 2
COMMISSION ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY 02 [International Chamber of Commerce, November,
online]
It is to be expected that trading partners and neighbours will try to advance liberalization through regional and
bilateral trade agreements. There is an array of such initiatives in progress or contemplated at the present time. A
total of 162 regional trade agreements notified under the GATT and the WTO are in force today. Between 100 and
200 new regional trade formations are anticipated by 2005. Regional or bilateral agreements may bring faster results
than the multilateral process, may enable parties to conclude levels of liberalization beyond the multilateral
consensus, and may be able to address specific issues that do not register on the multilateral menu.
d. multilat reduces bilateral dependence which increases likelihood of war
Martin et al, Professor Econ rue des Saints Peres, Mayer, Professor Econ rue des Saints Peres, and Thoenig,
Professor University of Lausanne, ’12 (Philippe, Thierry, and Mathias, June 16, “The geography of conflicts and
regional trade agreements” Politics, Economics and Global Governance: The European Dimensions,
http://econ.sciences-po.fr/sites/default/files/file/tmayer/fta-war-final.pdf)
Consider now the effect of multilateral openness. One theoretical and empirical result in Martin et al. (2008a) is that multilateral trade openness reduces the
opportunity cost of a bilateral war and therefore increases the probability that a dispute escalates into a war.
The rationale is that multilateral trade openness provides alternative trade partners and reduces bilateral trade
dependence with the countries with which a dispute could escalate. Hence, in the context of our framework, an increase in
multilateral openness has two opposite effects. It corresponds to a decrease in the cost of war W and an increase in the probability of escalation
e. Assuming that a change in multilateral openness has these effects, we can write the cost of war as W = (1!)W0 and the probability of escalation as e = (1 + "cost!)e0 with ! as a measure of
multilateral openness, W0 is the cost of war and e0 the escalation likelihood when ! = 0. Substituting into equation (4) we obtain: T + "pol e0W0 + ("cost 1)( e0 T) + ("cost 1)("polW0 + "costT)(
when the elasticity of escalation e to the cost of war is large
enough, multilateral trade openness and the probability of war are expected to have a positive and
complementary impact on the probability of RTA formation. Political motives therefore imply that multilateral trade openness gives an incentive to
sign RTAs to country pairs prone to conflict. The intuition is that an RTA is a way to compensate the potentially destabilizing consequence
of multilateral trade openness. The incentive to do so increases with the probability of war. This result supports the view that the development of multilateralism during the
e0 !) c (5) The coefficient of the interaction term ( e0 !) is positive when "cost > 1. Hence,
80s and early 90s could have triggered the wave of regionalism in the late 90s. This echoes a recent empirical finding by Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud (2009) that in the US case multilateralism
has pushed towards regionalism. They indeed find that the extent of post Uruguay Round RTAs (in term of included tariff lines) is positively affected by the extent of MFN tariff cuts negotiated
by the US during the Urugay Round. While Fugazza and Robert-Nicoud provide no theory for their intriguing finding, our results suggest that this emulator effect of multilateralism on
regionalism could also be driven by security purposes.
RTAs specifically solve this i/l – statistical analysis proves
Vicard, Senior Research Economist Banque de France, ’12 (Vincent, January, “Trade, conflict, and political
integration: Explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements” European Economic Review, Vol 56, p 5471, ScienceDirect)
The results are presented in Table 3. All specifications include the basic determinants of war put forward by the literature in
political science: contiguity, distance and the number of peaceful years between the two countries (Beck et al., 1998). I first present the results from a simple probit estimator. Column
1 shows that RTA membership has no significant effect on war probabilities on the full sample of dyad-years. When only countries separated by less than 1000 km are considered,
belonging to a deep RTA, but not a shallow one, does significantly reduce war probabilities (specification (2)). These crude results emphasize
the need to account for heterogeneity in dispute occurrence. Specification (3) reports estimates using the bivariate probit accounting for selection. The first and second columns present the results
The coefficient on the
exclusion variable is significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The results confirm that membership of a
deep RTA does significantly reduce the probability that a dispute escalates into war . In this specification, membership of a
of the escalation into war and dispute initiation equations respectively. As expected, landlocked countries face a lower probability of dispute.
shallow RTA is found to have a lower, albeit significant, effect on escalation into war probabilities. It is however not significant when additional controls are included. Specification (4) in Table 3
includes several potential co-determinants of regionalism and war (see Appendix A for data source). First, I include year dummies to control for any global shock affecting war probabilities and
Regarding trade, we control for both bilateral (the log of the
and multilateral (the log of the mean of multilateral (excluding bilateral) imports as a percentage of GDP) trade
openness. 16 Martin et al. (2008) indeed argue that trade has an ambiguous effect on peace. Bilateral trade does reduce war probabilities but
regionalism over time. Other controls can be divided into two sets: trade and political variables.
mean of bilateral imports as a percentage of GDP)
multilateral trade openness, by reducing the dependence on a particular partner, increases war probabilities .
The results confirm that multilateral trade openness increases the probability that a dispute escalates into war , but show no
significant effect of bilateral trade. 17 A dummy variable for zero trade flows is included as well as dummies indicating countries sharing a common language, countries that have had a colonial
relationship or a common colonizer. Countries sharing a colonial history are indeed more likely to have unresolved disputes. They also share historical, cultural and institutional traits that make
them more likely to create a RTA. The set of political variables control for political regime, the size of countries, alliances and diplomatic relations. The level of democracy is included as a
control since democracies have been found to be less likely to wage wars (see Levy and Razin (2004) and Jackson and Massimo (2007) for a theoretical treatment, and Oneal and Russett (1997)
among others for empirical evidence). Democratic status has also been argued to affect the choice to create an RTA (Mansfield et al., 2002). The (sum of the log of the) area of the two countries
is included since a bigger territory is exposed to more opponents. Larger countries also depend less on foreign trade, which could affect their incentives to create RTAs. Finally, I control for
diplomatic affinity between countries using a dummy variable for common membership of a defense alliance and the correlation of voting in the UN General Assembly (lagged four years).
Controlling for all these potential co-determinants of war and regionalism, specification (4) confirms that deep
RTAs promote the peaceful settlement of disputes between members. Membership of shallow RTAs has no effect on war probabilities.
Moreover, the insignificant impact of bilateral trade on the likelihood of a dispute escalating into war confirms that the institutional channel dominates in regional integration. It is worth noting
that when all these controls are added, the Wald test of independent equations is no longer significant, meaning that the two equations estimated simultaneously are independent.
Better studies: The most extensive studies that estimate PTAs of all continents together
show benefits of regionalism
Rojid 06, In-country researcher for the yearly SADC Trade Review project (Are Existing Trading Blocks Building
or Stumbling Blocks?, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=1936)
As discussed above, a PTA can be categorized as a building block or a stumbling block depending on the net trade
effects of the particular PTA. Based on our estimates of the coefficients of the dummy variables for each PTA, table 3 shows whether a
particular PTA is a building bloc or stumbling bloc. Building blocks are blocks that liberalized trade more internally than
have diverted trade from the rest of the world. From the results obtained, we see that out of the eleven blocks studied, two of them
are stumbling blocks and the remaining nine are building blocks . We compare our estimates with some of the past estimates in table 3
below. An important point to note here is that we did not find any study in existing literature which took into account
African trading blocks. Thus, we believe that our study is the first of its sort to estimate PTAs of all continents
together . The two African trading blocks taken into consideration for analysis are the SADC and COMESA and both of these blocks seems to
be building blocks. Our estimates comes to reinforce previous studies stating that NAFTA and CER are indeed stumbling blocks and ANDEAN,
EU and SPARTECA are building blocks. As far as MERCOSUR and EFTA is concerned, some past studies show that they are building blocks
while some other past studies show that they are stumbling blocks. Our estimates show that they are both building blocks. 6. CONCLUSION In
this study we estimated whether existing PTAs are building blocks or stumbling blocks. Our study is different from past studies on 2
aspects: first, it takes into account more countries and more years and most recent data ; second, it includes two African
PTAs. So far we have not come across any such studies which include African PTAs. Our estimates show that both these African PTAs- SADC
and COMESA- are building blocks. Our estimates also reinforce some past studies in their conclusions on whether some PTAs are building or
stumbling blocks. We also report the coefficients on the observable effects determining bilateral trade. Except real effective exchange rate, all the
other variables are as expected and highly significant.
Their Cho evidence claims that regionalism will cause a clash of regulatory regimes but
regulatory diversity and competition is essential to free trade – WTO centralization
enshrines trade distorting rules
Wolf 01, Associate Editor Financial Times (Martin, Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance,
ed. Gary P. Sampson, p. 194-5)
For all its great merits, the WTO has limits as a tool for liberalizing trade . The first such limit is that the WTO is not the
only way to liberalize. On the contrary, both high-income and developing countries have liberalized extensively,
both unilaterally and in the context of preferential trading arrangements. The second limit is that international
rule-making is not always and necessarily liberalizing. Anti-dumping is an egregious example of bad trade
policy that is enshrined in the WTO . The balance of payments exemption for import restrictions is another .
The third limit is that the WTO’s clout has become attractive to those who have no interest in liberalization. The
extension of the trading system beyond the explicit goal of trade liberalization began, in the Uruguay Round, with TRIPs. Nowadays, however,
commercial interests are no longer alone in recognizing what they can gain by employing WTO-authorized sanctions against imports. A rich
assortment of activists have realized the potential value of the WTO’s enforcement mechanisms for their own varied purposes. Yet
a WTO
that raises regulatory barriers worldwide and eliminates both valid diversity among regulatory regimes and
competition among them could even be worse than no WTO at all .
Their Cho card claims regionalism will cause World War III but thirty years of rapid
expansion of regionalism empirically denies their impact
Brkic 13, Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo (Snježana, 3/25, Regional Trading Arrangements – Stumbling Blocks
or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?,
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239275)
In the years-long period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were
becoming particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the
capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market. Economic
integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness of international trading
system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism". The next two waves of regionalism
occurred in the years following the world wars. Since the disintegration processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms
and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war regionalisms were marked by discriminatory international economic integrations,
primarily at the level of so-called negative integration, with expressedly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies that resulted in considerable trade
deviations. This particularly refers to the regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the
consequences of Big Economic Crisis. The
current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the
world to a far greater extent than any previous one did : it has covered almost all the continents and almost all
the countries , even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China. Integration
processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200 RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more
than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years
Cho says that the WTO is needed to manage regionalism but WTO regulation of
regionalism fails and undermines the legitimacy of both
Legal Frontiers 10 (Regional trade agreements, neither building blocks nor stumbling blocks: dismantling a
tired dichotomy, http://www.legalfrontiers.ca/2010/04/regional-trade-agreements-neither-building-blocks-norstumbling-blocks-dismantling-a-tired-dichotomy/)
Since the establishment of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) in 1996, the WTO has scrambled to find ways to
effectively control the impact of RTAs. This futile mission to tighten RTA regulation has been driven by a
persistent fear of trade diversion, as well as by the assumption that regionalism—and the agreements springing from
it—is subordinate to the multilateral regime. WTO regulation of RTAs has evolved since 1947, notably with the introduction of the
1994 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the creation of the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs in
These regulations remain however, narrow and ambiguous . Article XXIV thus continues its long history
of being systematically flouted by member states with the WTO as little more than “an innocent bystander”
to the overwhelming spread of regionalism. Under the GATT 1947, regionalism was permitted as an exception. RTAs were
accepted, but only to the extent that they complied with the terms of GATT Art. XXIV. It is this exception ethos that reinforces the
“conceptual primacy of multilateralism,” which undermines the legitimacy of RTAs . In many respects, this
attitude has contributed to the disregard of GATT Art. XXIV.
2006.
MEAs
AT: No Conflict Between MEA’s and WTO
Actual WTO disputes aren’t necessary to cause our impact – the threat of a WTO
challenge is enough to chill and weaken MEAs
Chaytor 03, International Trade Lawyer (Beatrice, January, Interactions with the World Trade Organisation: The
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas,
www.ecologic.eu/download/projekte/850-899/890/in-depth/world_trade_organization.pdf)
The international trading regime governed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) interacts with many international
environmental regimes. The WTO is often a source of the interaction, invoking reactions from international environmental regimes
in the design and implementation of rules which is responsive to WTO prescriptions. The vast number of WTO
Members, the institution’s economic significance and its unparalleled ability to enforce its rules through its rigorous dispute settlement
mechanism, contribute to the WTO’s tendency to be more effective as a source of interaction rather than as a target. Nevertheless, the WTO is
also a target of interaction by international environmental regimes which are typically more proactive in seeking to inform and co-operate with
the WTO. The
effect of the interaction with the WTO as a source is largely disruptive , in the sense that the WTO’s
primary objective of facilitating free trade generates conflicts with the principal objectives of environment
regimes aimed at promoting environmental protection and sustainable development. The mere possibility of a WTO challenge
can inhibit negotiations and the implementation of measures under the international environmental regimes. Moreover,
ambiguities in the meaning and application of the WTO rules with respect to environmental measures make it difficult
to design and implement the international environmental regimes in a manner that complements the WTO system. Despite
these challenges, compromises are generally reached that ensure the complementary co-existence of the international trade and environment
regimes This chapter examines the nature and effects of interaction between the WTO and two international environmental regimes in particular: the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). It commences with a description of the WTO in Part 1 and follows in Part 2 with a summary of the experience of
interaction between the WTO and each of the environmental regimes considered in the GATT/WTO “inventory” which was prepared in the research for this chapter. In Part 3, the interaction
between the WTO and the Biosafety Protocol and ICCAT is studied in-depth, and general observations about the interaction between the WTO and the two environment regimes are set out in
Part 4. 1. Introduction to World Trade Organisation 1.1 General The WTO is an intergovernmental organisation established in 1995 and has a Membership of over 140 countries and customs
territories.1 The WTO is responsible for administering the multilateral trade agreements regulating the international trade in goods and services and the protection of intellectual property rights,
for providing a forum for the negotiation of new trade rules, and for operating procedures for the settlement of disputes among its Members (the WTO Agreements). The WTO aims to liberalise
markets, recognising the need to make “use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development” and to “protect and preserve the environment… in a manner
consistent with [the Members’] respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development”.2 The WTO’s institutional framework comprises its governing body, the General
Council, and several other councils and committees that are supported by the Secretariat in Geneva. The principal organ responsible for trade and environment issues at the WTO is the
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). Other WTO bodies that consider issues of environmental relevance include the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) and
the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Committee). The General Council and specialist councils and committees administer the WTO Agreements on a day-to-day basis
and Members convene a Ministerial Conference approximately every two years.3 1.2 The WTO Agreements The WTO Agreements will interact with any environmental regulation that has an
impact on the international trade in goods and services among its Members, including those regulations enacted pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The WTO pursues its
objective of market liberalisation by requiring its Members to maintain both relative and absolute standards of treatment of goods and services in the international and domestic market place. The
WTO’s relative standards prohibit WTO Members from the discriminatory treatment of “like” goods, services and service suppliers on the basis of country of origin. The WTO’s absolute
standards prohibit or discourage Members from putting in place certain types of measures that directly or indirectly interfere with the trade in products and services. The three main WTO
Agreements that have been of particular relevance to international environmental regimes are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement), and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement).4 At the most basic level, all three agreements share the common purpose of ensuring that
measures that affect the trade in products do not discriminate on the basis of a product’s country of origin (National and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment), and that these measures are no more
trade restrictive than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which they were designed. Each agreement has detailed rules, and a growing body of practice that develops these disciplines further.
The so-called environmental exceptions in Article XX of the GATT and similar provisions in the TBT and SPS Agreements deserve special mention. 5 Under Article XX, a measure which is
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or which relates to “the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” is permitted under the GATT provided it is not being applied in
an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or as a disguised restriction on international trade.6 The WTO Agreements are backed by a compulsory dispute settlement system with the ability to authorise
bilateral trade sanctions (known as suspensions of concessions). Any Member that feels benefits it expected to derive from the WTO Agreements have been undermined by a trade measure put in
place by another Member can initiate dispute settlement procedures. If the Members are unable to settle their differences between themselves, an ad hoc arbitral Panel of trade experts will be
established, and will seek to resolve the dispute. The report of the Panel can be appealed to a permanent Appellate Body of seven independent trade jurists, appointed by the WTO Membership.
The outcome is formally reviewed by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, a committee of all Members, which can only reverse the conclusion of a Panel or the Appellate Body by consensus. The
main objective of the dispute settlement system is to ensure that any trade measure that is found to be inconsistent with WTO rules be removed or made consistent. If a Member fails to correct
the offending measure, it can agree to compensate the affected Member, or find itself subject to trade sanctions imposed by the affected Member at a level equivalent to the continuing harm done
by the offending measure.7 The WTO Agreements, both on paper and in practice, also anticipate the need to take into account other existing international agreements, such as MEAs, and other
relevant state practice. Both the SPS and the TBT Agreements make reference to international standards developed by competent international organisations operating outside the WTO system.
Under the SPS Agreement, a WTO Member is required (unless it can justify the need for a higher standard) to base its SPS measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations
adopted by those international agencies specifically identified in the SPS Agreement or that may be later agreed by the SPS Committee (Article 3.1). SPS measures that are in conformity with
these international standards are rebuttably presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement (Article 3.2). No MEA has thus far been recognised as a standard setting instrument under the SPS
Agreement. Under the TBT Agreement, a WTO Member is also required to use international standards as the basis of its technical regulation (Article 2.4). A technical regulation that is put in
place for an identified “legitimate objective” (which includes the protection of human heath or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment) and is in accordance with “relevant
international standards” is rebuttably presumed to be TBT compatible (Article 2.5). Unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT does not identify which international standards would qualify for this
presumption. Many MEAs would, however, appear to meet the TBT’s general requirement that standards derive from a recognised “body or system whose membership is open to the relevant
bodies of at least all of the Members.”8 1.3 Institutional Development of Trade and Environment Agenda Since the WTO’s establishment, its Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) has
had the mandate to explore the relationship between the WTO and MEAs.9 In the CTE, and other WTO organs dealing with environmental matters, Members have discussed a range of trade and
environment issues. These include: the application of the WTO rules to trade measures taken pursuant to a MEA; the application of the WTO rules to measures based on process and production
methods (PPMs); environmental (or eco) labelling (especially with respect to genetically modified organisms); the relevance of the precautionary principle to risk assessments based on scientific
evidence (particularly in the context of the SPS Agreement); and the environmental impacts of certain subsidies, especially fisheries subsidies.10 Most observers acknowledge the usefulness of
the CTE’s work in promoting a better understanding of the WTO-MEA relationship and acknowledging the legitimate role of MEAs in promoting environmental objectives. However, the CTE’s
work has thus far been general and inconclusive, other than recognising that international trade rules and international environmental rules should be designed and implemented in a manner that
is “mutually supportive”.11 The CTE has been widely criticised for failing to produce any conclusions or recommendations of a substantive nature that would, for example, instruct the WTO’s
dispute settlement system on how to deal with a conflict should one arise.12 At the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, November 2001, the WTO Membership agreed to include as part
of a new round, substantive negotiations: without prejudging their outcome, on [. . .] the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations set out in multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules. as among parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall
not prejudice the WTO rights of any Member that is not a party to the MEA in question.13 The mandate is both vague and restrictive. It does, however, suggest that for the first time the WTO
may produce substantive rules aimed directly and intentionally at trade-related measures contained in MEAs to which its Members are also parties. In fulfillment of the WTO’s obligation to
make arrangements for cooperation with intergovernmental organisations,14 the CTE has granted observer status to intergovernmental organisations, including the Secretariats of the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and ICCAT, and hosts meetings with MEA Secretariats to discuss issues relevant to the WTO and MEAs.15 The fourth WTO Ministerial Conference encouraged
“efforts to promote cooperation between the WTO and relevant international environmental organisations”16 and launched negotiations between the Members on “procedures for regular
information exchange between MEA Secretariats and the relevant WTO committees, and the criteria for the granting of observer status.”1 There is a wary co-existence between the WTO and the
institutions overseeing the design and implementation of MEAs (environment regimes). The WTO Agreements anticipate the need to take into account MEAs, and the Appellate Body has been
inclined to consider existing MEAs when clarifying relevant provisions of the GATT/WTO. Some recent MEAs, such as the Biosafety Protocol, have included language that acknowledges WTO
the interaction between the WTO and environment regimes is generated by differences
in regime objectives and by differences in the institutional features designed to achieve those objectives. The
WTO is designed to promote free trade; the environment regimes in varying degrees require or authorise
trade restrictions in order to discourage the production and consumption of specific products with negative
environmental consequences The WTO Agreements are backed by a compulsory dispute settlement system with the ability to authorise
bilateral trade sanctions, while the arrangements for dispute settlement within most MEAs are looser and less binding. Membership of the
WTO and environment regimes substantially overlaps since each regime aims for universal membership . The
rights and obligations. At the outset,
WTO and the five environment regimes examined in the inventory prepared in researching this chapter – Montreal Protocol, Biosafety Protocol,
Basel Convention, ICCAT and CCAMLR18 – have each played roles as a source and a target of interaction for the other. The GATT/WTO
consistency of trade restrictions has been a concern that has constrained the respective rules and regulations
of the environment regimes (Biosafety, Montreal, ICCAT). Yet, some environment regimes have been cited in the WTO as
examples of properly functioning, multilaterally negotiated, and narrowly drawn exceptions to free trade rules (CCAMLR, Montreal).19 A
summary of the nature of the interactions between the WTO and the five environment regimes is contained in Table 1. The effect of the
WTO on the design of primary rules within the environment regimes has been viewed as “chilling”, disrupting
or slowing negotiation processes (Montreal, Biosafety), and limiting the composition and reach of trade measures
(Biosafety, Basel), and their further development and application (Montreal). The WTO and the Conferences of the Parties
of the various environment regimes each has the mandate to act in areas that lie in the other’s jurisdiction. Thus the nature of their “influence”
over each other, though implicit, is as powerful as if it were expressly stated.
Although a dispute challenging a MEA provision
has never been brought before the WTO dispute settlement system, the threat of a WTO “challenge” under
the WTO’s dispute settlement system further influences the design of rules under the environment regimes,
and the membership of the environment regimes remains acutely conscious of this interaction . While some rules
and behaviour of the environment regimes have developed to accommodate WTO rules,
adjustments have tended to come at the
expense of the environment regimes’ objectives . In particular, there has been no satisfactory resolution of the distinctions, if any,
to be made between otherwise like products on the basis of their process and production methods.
CITES
Impact
Disease turns all impacts
Huang 03, IR Prof at Seton Hall (Yanzhong, CBACI Report, Mortal Peril: Public Health in China and its Security
Implications, http://www.cbaci.org/pubs/special_reports/number_7.pdf, p. 55-7)
Given China’s status as a major player in international relations, the resulting spillover can have serious implications for health, stability,
prosperity, and security at the regional and global levels. To begin with, the health challenges in China could influence the course of
epidemics elsewhere in the world, including the United States. The impact can be felt in various ways. For example, China has currently one-fifth
of the world’s population and one-seventh of the world’s disease burden, measured in years of healthy life lost.227 Against the background of a
globalized economy, diseases originating in China can be spread and transported globally through trade, travel, and population movements. Not
coincidentally, New York City, which has one of the largest Chinese immigrant groups in the United States, also has the highest rate of
tuberculosis in this nation. According to the Department of Health, the percentage of new tuberculosis cases among foreign-born New Yorkers
rose from 18 percent in 1992 to 64 percent in 2001.228 Since February 2003, a form of atypical pneumonia called SARS (Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome) has spread at the speed of a jet to Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America, prompting WHO to declare the ailment “a
worldwide health threat.” According to WHO, as of 29 March 29 2003, a cumulative total of 1550 cases and 54 deaths have been reported from
13 countries. Most scientists believe that the new disease first emerged in Guangdong of Southern China, where the cumulative SARS cases from
16 November 2002 to 31 March 2003 stand at 1153 cases and 40 deaths. As immigrants from China and other developing countries are perceived
as creating further demands on the public health system and other public services, the issue of minorities and immigration could become a
sensitive domestic political issue. The 2002 presidential election in France highlights the danger of such an issue being exploited by political
extremists to challenge a country’s political system. While the potential dangers in this scenario should not be exaggerated, the U.S. commitment
to antiterrorist wars could create an anti-immigrant public mood, which might be exploited by the politically
ambitious to fan xenophobia and racism and influence election outcomes. Moreover, the increased burden of disease
diminishes the government’s capacity to address broader political and social demands. Inability to meet these
demands can then produce massive population movements, which not only facilitate the spread of diseases, but also lead
to heightened regional-wide tensions and destabilization. Already, the collapse of the health system in North Korea has added
to its socioeconomic crisis, resulting in a flow of 100,000-200,000 people into China.229 As more and more North Koreans chose to seek asylum
in foreign diplomatic compounds, China’s relations with its East Asian neighbors, especially South Korea and Japan, became strained.230 The
North Korean case by no means represents the worst scenario. History is full of examples showing that the weakening of state bodies, if caught in
a crisis, can easily spark coups, revolts, and other political and ethnic struggles to secure control over resources.231 If this leads to the ultimate
collapse of state capacity in China, today’s recipient of refugees could be tomorrow’s exporter. At the stake are the lives and welfare of the
largest population on earth. In addition, the nation borders 14 other countries. This has tremendous implications for regional and
global stability and security . As the author of the apocalyptic novel Yellow Peril warned in 1992: Imagine someday chaos in China
leads to shrinking production, and the land can no longer support so many people, the desire to survive will undoubtedly drive Chinese to cross
the national border and head for other countries. … In the past, hundreds and thousands of Vietnamese traveled far away across the sea, shocking
the whole world. What kind of chain reaction will be produced if millions of, tens of millions of, or hundred of millions of Chinese move to other
countries? What is the end result? We cannot predict this by now, but this is surely going to be devastating.232 Equally important, an
unsustainable economy or state collapse spawned by poor health will deal a serious blow to the global economy .
Among the developing countries, China has been the largest recipient of foreign investment, averaging about $40 billion per year during the late
1990s. As foreign companies are shifting manufacturing to China, the country is becoming a workshop for the world. As demonstrated in the
1998 Asian financial crisis, China’s robust economy can be the anchor of global economic stability. China also has the potential to replace Japan
as the engine of economic growth in Asia. The rising market demand in China has been the main factor behind the recent increase of exports in
Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore. Only one quarter of the size of Japanese economy, China is now the market to $40 billion worth of Asian
export goods, which is half of the size of the Japanese market.233 A world economy that is so dependent on China as an industrial lifeline can
become increasingly vulnerable to a major supply disruption caused by “war, terrorism, social unrest, or a natural disaster.”234 Last but not least,
social and political instability caused by poor health can combine with the authoritarian characteristics of the Chinese regime to make it warprone.235 It is not farfetched to imagine that authoritarian leaders in China might undertake aggressive action abroad to
divert the public’s attention from domestic political turmoil. Alternatively, the single-party dictatorship can be strengthened
as the leaders embrace hyper-nationalism to rally the masses and restore political order. The end result will be a fascist state that by definition
praises military virtues and embarks upon military expansion. While this probability remains quite low, the “third way” of the corporate state, or
the “market economy with Chinese characteristics,” seems to make the latter outcome more likely.236 In the words of David Shambaugh, China
may “become more confrontational externally, even as it becomes more fragmented internally.”
Montreal
Impact
extinction
Mazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow
for Environmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010,
“Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,” pg. 122
The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels,
depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst
'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from
3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperature
would still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Without
early and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the second half of the twenty-first
century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries in the developing world - not to
mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could even undermine the strength and stability of
emerging and advanced economies, beyond the knock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and
collapse in developing countries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many
informed observers believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an
existential threat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience for such
rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to these extremes would mean
profound social, cultural and political changes.
Warming causes nuclear war in less than a decade
Harris, ‘4. Paul, The Observer, Feb 22, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2004/feb/22/usnews.theobserver.
Climate change over the next 20 years could result in a global catastrophe costing millions of lives in wars
and natural disasters.. A secret report, suppressed by US defence chiefs and obtained by The Observer,
warns that major European cities will be sunk beneath rising seas as Britain is plunged into a 'Siberian'
climate by 2020. Nuclear conflict, mega-droughts, famine and widespread rioting will erupt across the world.
The document predicts that abrupt climate change could bring the planet to the edge of anarchy as countries
develop a nuclear threat to defend and secure dwindling food, water and energy supplies. The threat to global
stability vastly eclipses that of terrorism, say the few experts privy to its contents. 'Disruption and conflict
will be endemic features of life,' concludes the Pentagon analysis. 'Once again, warfare would define human
life.'
Warming outweighs nuclear war –
a. Certainty
Hanson et al, ‘7 [J (Goddard Institute for Space Studies), “Dangerous human-made interference with climate,”
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2287/2007/acp-7-2287-2007.pdf]
These stark conclusions about the threat posed by global climate change and implications for fossil fuel use are not
yet appreciated by essential governing bodies, as evidenced by ongoing plans to build coal-fired power plants
without CO2 capture and sequestration. In our view, there is an acute need for science to inform society about the
costs of failure to address global warming, because of a fundamental difference between the threat posed by climate
change and most prior global threats. In the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and United States, a crisis
could be precipitated only by action of one of the parties. In contrast, the present threat to the planet and civilization,
with the United States and China now the principal players (though, as Fig. 10 shows, Europe also has a large
responsibility), requires only inaction in the face of clear scientific evidence of the danger.
b. Magnitude
Hunter, ‘3 [Bob, Foudner of Greenpeace, Thermageddon: Countdown to 2030, p. 58-9]
Even though, from the beginning, Rachel Carson had warned of worldwide chemical fallout patterns, the individuals
who were most sensitive to her message believed (some still do) it must be possible to find a haven or refuge outside
The System, somewhere beyond the reach of the thrashing tails of the dying urban dinosaurs. The back-to-the-land
movement, with its flurry of communes being set up as close to the end of the road as possible, in remote valleys or
on the shores of isolated bays, was a reenactment of the North American pioneer stage, embodying the same spirit of
independence and naive faith in Utopia. A fantasy existed that even a nuclear war was survivable if you lived far
enough away from any big cities and you had a supply of seeds, some solar panels, iodine pills, a gun, and a copy of
The Whole Earth Catalogue. And it was true, should the nuclear exchange be limited, that it was just possible there
would be survivors out in the bush and the countryside, somewhat unscathed. In the face of a truly drastic climate
flip of the ecosystem, unfortunately, there ultimately will be no safe, remote places left anywhere. The Pacific
Northwest's coniferous forests are expected to last longer than boreal forests, as rising temperatures turn the glacial
moraine into a frying pan, but with climate itself affected, everything - everywhere - is affected. The skies and air
and water of even Walden Pond are already degraded and slipping further. If the sudden global heating we have
triggered does indeed activate an ice age, there will be no place in the entire northern hemisphere to hide. In the
worst-case situation, a runaway greenhouse effect, there would be no place on Earth, period. The fantasy of escaping
to an organic farm is no longer a reasonable, let alone viable, option. A better, more realistic hope, by the time my
grandson is my age, will be to head out into space. Good luck making the final crew list, Dexter.
c. Reversibility
Dunpont, ‘8 [Alan, Professor of International Security at U-Sydney, Jun, “The Strategic Implications of Climate
Change,” Survival, Volume 50, Issue 3]
War has customarily been considered the main threat to international security because of the large number
of deaths it causes and the threat it poses to the functioning and survival of the state. Judged by these criteria,
it is clear that climate change is potentially as detrimental to human life and economic and political order as
traditional military threats.57 Environmental dangers, such as climate change, stem not from competition between
states or shifts in the balance of power; rather, they are human-induced disturbances to the fragile balance of nature. But the consequences of
these disturbances may be just as injurious to the integrity and functioning of the state and its people as those
resulting from military conflict. They may also be more difficult to reverse or repair.
1NR
CP
2NC O/V
Advocates for legalization conclude that the most determinant is law enforcement
effort
Ingo Fiedler 13, Visiting Scholar at University of Hamburg, diplomas both in business administration and
economics from the University of Hamburg. His Ph.D. thesis “Empirical Analyses on Online Poker” was awarded a
prize for the best dissertation at the faculty of Business and Economics at the University of Hamburg. Dr. Fiedler
was a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, and the Research Chair on Gambling Studies at
Concordia University, Montreal. His expertise was sought by the European Parliament, the Financial Committee of
the German Bundestag, Germany’s Ministry of Finance, Québec’s Ministry of Finance, and other institutions,
Online Gambling as a Game Changer to Money Laundering, http://www.wiso.unihamburg.de/fileadmin/bwl/rechtderwirtschaft/institut/Ingo_Fiedler/Online_Gambling_as_a_Game_Changer_to_Mo
ney_Laundering_01.pdf
5 Conclusion and Regulatory Advice
Hence, online
gambling can be used to launder money easily . Small and medium sums of criminal proceedings
can be laundered using current unregulated gambling operators to transfer the funds into the legal system. To
launder large sums an online casino in a regulatory haven can be founded and fake revenues
created which can be paid out to the owners as legal business profits. All forms involve very low
costs and a detection of virtually zero. Online gambling is thus a game changer to money laundering. It increases the profitability and thus
the prevalence of crime.
All forms of money laundering in online gambling involve unregulated or illegal operators as they
do not have to oblige to anti-money laundering directives but can hide in regulatory havens . Legal
operators, in contrast, are not prone to money laundering (Brooks 2012), especially because of the much lower payout ratios.
However, the online gambling market is still dominated by illegal operators; legal ones play only a
minor role . This leaves plenty of opportunities of money laundering.
The obvious way to tackle money laundering in unregulated/illegal online gambling is to introduce
legal markets. But this is far from sufficient. Legal operators are far less attractive to customers due to
lower payout ratios which result from taxes and fees the operators have to pay. Even in regulated
markets like France the illegal operators still play an important role. The reason is a lack of law
enforcement against unregulated/illegal operators. For example, Germany is the largest online poker market worldwide
although it is illegal (Fiedler and Wilcke 2012). Thus, the first and most important step in tackling money laundering
in online gaming and preventing it from increasing the prevalence of organized crime in our society is
operators.
to enforce the law against illegal/unregulated
AT Prediction Markets
Economics means that their data fails—the free market is overly focused on efficiency so
won’t bet on the right things
Rodrik ‘11
(Dan, Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard University, “Occupy the classroom?”, 16 Dec 2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/2011121494147161362.html)
Consider the global financial crisis. Macroeconomics and finance did not lack the tools needed to
understand how the crisis arose and unfolded. Indeed, the academic literature was chock-full of models of financial bubbles,
asymmetric information, incentive distortions, self-fulfilling crises, and systemic risk. But, in the years leading up to the crisis, many
economists downplayed these models' lessons in favour of models of efficient and self-correcting
markets, which, in policy terms, resulted in inadequate governmental oversight over financial markets. In my book
The Globalization Paradox, I contemplate the following thought experiment. Let a journalist call an economics professor
for his view on whether free trade with country X or Y is a good idea. We can be fairly certain that the economist,
like the vast majority of the profession, will be enthusiastic in his support of free trade. Now let the reporter go
undercover as a student in the professor's advanced graduate seminar on international trade theory. Let him pose the same
question: Is free trade good? I doubt that the answer will come as quickly and be as succinct this time around. In fact, the
professor is likely to be stymied by the question. "What do you mean by 'good'?" he will ask. "And good for whom?" The professor
would then launch into a long and tortured exegesis that will ultimately culminate in a heavily hedged statement: "So if the long list of
conditions I have just described are satisfied, and assuming we can tax the beneficiaries to compensate the losers, freer trade has the
potential to increase everyone's well-being". If he were in an expansive mood, the professor might add that the effect of free trade on an
economy's growth rate is not clear, either, and depends on an altogether different set of requirements. A direct, unqualified
assertion about the benefits of free trade has now been transformed into a statement adorned by all
kinds of ifs and buts. Oddly, the knowledge that the professor willingly imparts with great pride to his
advanced students is deemed to be inappropriate (or dangerous) for the general public. Economics instruction at
the undergraduate level suffers from the same problem. In our zeal to display the profession's crown jewels in untarnished form market efficiency, the invisible hand, comparative advantage - we skip over the real-world complications
and nuances, well recognised as they are in the discipline. It is as if introductory physics courses assumed a world without gravity,
because everything becomes so much simpler that way. Applied appropriately and with a healthy dose of common sense,
economics would have prepared us for the financial crisis and pointed us in the right direction to fix what caused it.
But the economics we need is of the "seminar room" variety, not the "rule-of-thumb" kind. It is an economics that recognises
its limitations and knows that the right message depends on the context. Downplaying the diversity of
intellectual frameworks within their own discipline does not make economists better analysts of the real world. Nor
does it make them more popular.
Regulations
2nc XT: Link
Legalized online gambling green-lights industry expansion and makes cracking down on
terrorist financing impossible – even if they’re 100% correct that terrorists get money now,
a legal market would exponentially magnify their economic base so they can earn enough
money in 6 days to fund another 9/11
Prefer our internal link – it represents a growing body of evidence and the FBI agrees
Wilson 14, Spokesperson at the Coalition to Stop Internet Gambling, How International Criminal Organizations
Could Move Money Through Internet Gambling Sites, http://stopinternetgambling.com/how-international-criminalorganizations-could-move-money-through-internet-gambling-sites/
***NOTE: This evidence internally cites a 2013 FBI letter to Congress
In the September 2013 letter, the agency warned that, “Transnational organized crime (TOC) groups might
exploit legal online gambling to generate revenue, steal personally identifiable information (PII), and engage in
public corruption.” It also explicitly warned that if Internet gambling spreads to more states, these groups “will
draw upon their experience with their illegal gambling operations to legitimize at least a portion of their
enterprise.” “The FBI has said definitively that sophisticated technologies can be employed by terrorist
groups and criminal organizations to move money undetected, conceal their physical locations, and entangle
unwitting online players,” said former New York Gov. George Pataki (R-NY), National Co-Chair of the Coalition
to Stop Internet Gambling. “The FBI’s warning is part of a growing body of evidence that demonstrates how
dangerous the expansion of Internet gambling will be. “Congress needs to do the responsible thing to protect
American families and the innocent bystanders caught up in criminal schemes online. It must restore the longstanding federal ban on all forms of Internet gambling.”
2NC AT Cyber Terror
Too hard to pull off
Birch, Foreign Correspondent Associated Press, 10-1-’12 (Douglas, “Forget Revolution: What would really
happen if the lights went out” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget_revolution)
But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of
long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the
world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph
Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected
the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at
which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they
feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the
discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper
published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in
order to
create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ---- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six
coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system .
Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the
network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is
configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers
are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used
computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems
linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to
attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of
armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he
said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure."
No incentive or technical capability – much more likely attackers steal info than destroy
infrastructure
Larry Clinton – president of the Internet Security Alliance – 10/18/12, Exaggeration Unfairly Shifts
Responsibility, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/10/17/should-industry-face-more-cybersecuritymandates
We need to start by clearly defining which problem we are trying to solve. Our government has not yet done that.
Theoretically, nation states, like China, have the ability to disable our nation’s critical infrastructure through
cyber attacks — just as they do through conventional weapons. However, why would the Chinese want to
destabilize the U.S. economy by taking down our electric grid? China owns about half our debt, and
destabilizing our economy would also destabilize China’s economy. Yes, terrorists or rogue states may have
this desire, but they do not have the technical ability to launch the ultra- sophisticated cyber attacks that
would have this effect, and probably won’t for some time. Moreover, it’s wrong to say that the recently failed
Senate bill, which would have established government standards for private-sector cyber security, is an answer to
catastrophic cvber threats. The ultra-sophisticated cyber attacks — known as Advanced Persistent Threat — could
disable critical infrastructure. However, these ultra-sophisticated attacks are not going to he stopped by the adoption
of best practices and standards. These are nonstandard attacks that overcome defenses like intrusion detection,
firewalls and passwords. This is a much more sophisticated problem than would be solved by the Senate bill. And
who should be responsible for protecting us from these nation-state attacks? Let’s say the damage Panetta refers to
was caused by conventional means, rather than digital. Would we expect the owners of power plants to erect their
own anti-aircraft weapons and radar? A recent Blooinberg study reports that if Lhis maximum defense were paid for
by the private sector, it would require a tenfold increase in spending by private companies. A mandate of this sort
would drive companies off-shore, crippling employment and innovation — and not solving the problem. While the
unrealistic threats of crumbling critical infrastructure may be useful rhetoric to scare senators into voting on
issues they have not studied adequately, the real cyber problem lies elsewhere. Nation states and criminals are
not trying to take down the Internet; they want to use it to steal intellectual property. This is an entirely
different sort of attack requiring a completely different solution that promotes collaboration between industry and
government. Cyber security is not simply a technical or standards issue. It has strategic and economic dimensions as
well, and none of the current proposals deal with it in a truly comprehensive way that goes beyond standards to deal
with economics and incentives at both a domestic and international level.
Terrorists aren’t even thinking about it
Smith and Wallman, 10-11-’11 (Austin and Laurenne, “Terrorists yet to turn to cyberattacks”
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2011/10/11/Terrorists-yet-to-turn-to-cyberattacks/UPI50111318362866/?spt=hs&or=tn)
Despite their prevalent, tech-savvy online presence, terrorist groups may not have demonstrated the ability -- or
even interest in attaining the ability -- to launch cyberattacks, experts said. National security experts aren't arguing against better
security -- they are just noting that while the United States faces many cyberthreats, terrorism may not yet be one of them.
Terrorist groups' use of the Web has proliferated in the past decade and, former CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden says, they are "cybersmart." But
Hayden said the organizations, perhaps surprisingly, haven't exhibited evidence that terrorists use cyberspace for
anything beyond support activities. "I don't know why. I really don't," he said last week in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives
Intelligence Committee. Cybersecurity expert James Lewis, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said in a telephone interview that
causing physical damage and devastation using the Web is far more complicated than the minor attacks terrorist
groups may be able to launch. "They are looking for a splashier event," Lewis said. "They want explosions and things that will play well on
the nightly news. Making the traffic lights blink on and off might not do that for them." A key example of physical destruction caused by a cyberattack is the June
2010 Stuxnet virus, which infected computers at a nuclear reactor in Iran, causing it to malfunction and ultimately break down. The undetected virus caused the
closure of the plant and setbacks in Iran's uranium enrichment program. Experts said that U.S. infrastructure is no better protected than the reactor in Iran was but that
terrorist groups aren't likely to have the resources to gain the internal knowledge they would need to
infiltrate U.S. systems. "It's actually a lot harder not because of the technical component, but because of the amount of intelligence required to do it
properly," said Allan Friedman of the Center for Technology Innovation at the Brookings Institution, a nonpartisan Washington think tank. Liam O Murchu, of
Symantec Corp., a California software security company, said, Stuxnet "has shown us that you can write a piece of software that will be able to change how a factory
works." To replicate a similar attack -- one focused on a particular target -- would require precise insider intelligence and millions of dollars. Terrorist
organizations could look at Stuxnet as a blueprint, Murchu said in a telephone interview, and they could also look at it to learn certain
techniques. However, "the sophistication of the threats would depend on how skilled the attackers were and how much insider information they had," he said.
Lewis, whose research at CSIS focuses on Internet policy and cybersecurity, said the only organizations with the capability to do this -- at
the moment -- are nation states.
Their evidence is “aspirational blather”
Healey, Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council of the US, 10-3-’11 (Jason, “Cyberterror
is Aspirational Blather” http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/cyberterror-aspirational-blather)
Terms such as “cyber 9/11” and “cyber terrorism” have been used frequently to describe the security threats posed by terrorists online. Cyber technologies, like any
other, enable terrorist groups to do their terrorizing more effectively and efficiently. In the past few years it is increasingly common for them to use the Internet for
propaganda, fundraising, general support, and convergence. Videos and anonymous discussion forums allow for the dissemination of training information and the call
groups have not yet used cyber attack
capabilities in any significant way to cause casualties or actually terrorize anyone. While Ibrahim Samudra or Irahabi 007
hacked to raise funds through credit-card fraud, this is a traditional support activity, not “cyber terror ”. The US
to arms for more individuals to participate and join groups. Importantly, the panelists agreed that these
government was a relatively early advocate of a strict definition of cyber terrorism, as nearly a decade ago they were calling it as “a criminal act perpetrated through
computers resulting in violence, death and/or destruction, and creating terror for the purpose of coercing a government to change its policies.” Not defacing a
webpage, not flooding a website (even of the South Korean president) and not stealing credit card information. Some
terrorists groups may talk
about waging an e-Jihad, but such talk remains, for now, aspirational blather . For decades, the rule of thumb for intelligence
analysts has been that adversaries with motives for damaging cyber attacks do not have the capabilities, while those
with the capabilities do not yet have the motives. A large-scale cyber attacks is more difficult than is generally
believed and few adversaries have both the motive and capability . Additionally, terrorist groups have many
disincentives for pursing cyber capabilities. For example, their leadership tends to be conservative and they tend
to stick with what they know will work – suicide bombers, road-side bombs, and kinetic assaults. These actually kill and terrorize
people which, as yet, no cyber attack has accomplished. The Congressional Research Service summed this up as “ lower risk, but
less drama.” One day, though, a terrorist group could overcome the barriers and their own reservations to innovate. It is unlikely to happen this week, or even
this year. Skepticism, however, has been an excellent analytical tool for two decades and will remain a healthy
response when anyone, whether your local newspaper or a religious extremist, blathers about cyber terrorism.
2NR
Predictions Markets Add-On
McGinnis
Their author from the 1AR concedes governmental transparency and new metrics are
necessary
McGinnis, 12
(Law Prof-Northwestern, “A Politics of Knowledge,” http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/a-politicsof-knowledge)
Second, in
order to enable prediction markets to function better, government at all levels should increase the
availability of detailed policy proposals in advance of votes. Before a congressional committee votes on
proposed legislation, for instance, or before a vote is taken in Congress or the president signs a bill, the exact
language at issue and all relevant amendments should be posted for all to see . Such a reform would of course
build on a growing public demand for greater government transparency. I ndeed, President Obama promised during his
2008 campaign to wait five days before signing any non-emergency bill, and the current House of Representatives has required that a bill be
posted online three calendar days before a vote — but these pledges have proved elastic. In order for prediction markets to be as beneficial as
possible, let alone to satisfy citizens' demand for more honest and open lawmaking, such requirements should be implemented — and, just as
important, honored — throughout American government.
Prediction markets also need metrics for the results of public
policy that are free from manipulation — so that outcomes can be clear, and so that winners and losers
among the bettors can be determined . Because these indicators will also often be compiled by the government,
the need for such data argues again for transparency and for making all government data public. Once more,
the needs and products of empiricism, of the new media of dispersed expertise, and of prediction markets can
build upon one another.