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Port Security Neg
AT: INHERENCY
2
AT: ECON
9
A2 TERRORISM
25
ALT CAUSE LABOR SHORTAGE
51
AT: INVASIVE SPECIES
55
AT: ORGANIZED CRIME
58
AT: SOLVENCY
64
A2 ECON IMPACT
87
CAPITALISM LINK
88
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AT: Inherency
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Squo Solves (Generic)
Squo solves—port security and grant distribution improving now
Terreri 09—World Trade [April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Security improved significantly since 9/11 through relationship building and resource sharing
among federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency response agencies, notes Beth
Rooney, manager of port security at the Port Authority of NY & NJ. "These improvements are due in large part to
physical security improvements, personnel enhancements through training and drills, and
through a tremendous amount of work done in collaboration and partnership with other
agencies," she says. The Port of NY & NJ is the third largest in the country and it is the highest atrisk port as well. "While folks view us to be the end-all of the port, the reality is we touch only 13 of over 190 commercial
maritime facilities in the port," continues Rooney. But the port continues to take an active role in security and
has, for the last six years, chaired the Area Maritime Security Committee, a bottom-up approach to security that is
working well. Historically, port and terminal operators and law enforcement entities competed for
grant dollars. So the port decided to work collaboratively to assure the money went where these
various entities felt the greatest risks were, explains Rooney. "We wrote our own document called 'Port-wide
Strategic Risk Management Plan' in which we identified initiatives for the next five years that would benefit everyone. This is a
huge success story for us because the only reason we could accomplish this was by collaborating
with our two states, five boroughs, the City of New York, 17 New York counties, and seven New Jersey counties." This type of
plan is now a national requirement for the nation's top 45 ports. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach account for about 45
percent of containerized cargo entering the U.S. Port security is approaching the optimal state in terms of
capabilities and initiatives performed to achieve its security mission, adds Cosmo Perrone, director of
security for the Port of Long Beach. "We are approaching the point of execution on critical large-capital projects as we continue to
look for continuous improvements." He adds that because larger ports are reaching maturity, they will focus
on resiliency and the trade community's ability to operate under adverse situations. Like the Port of
NY & NJ, the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles are landlord ports-as opposed to operator ports-and are not regulated under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act. Operator ports adhere to the U.S. Coast Guard's rules for port facilities. "But we have a
duty to our customer base as well as to the public at large and to the national economy to assure
goods move through our port in an effective and secure manner," says George Cummings, director of port
security, Port of Los Angeles. The port developed a layered security model allowing terminal operators,
transportation companies, and other stakeholders to operate under a unified security system
within one command-and-control center. "We can deploy information in real time to our
customers or response agencies, including military organizations." He adds that California's 11 ports are
discussing the feasibility of developing a Pacific Coast model of regional integration to facilitate security monitoring and response.
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AT: Inherency Funding High Now
Port security funding high now
Customs and Border Protection, 2006 [ No author given, "An Overall Picture of Port Security", CBP.gov,
07/12/2006, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/port_security/securing_us_ports.xml, 18/06/2012]
Port security has been dramatically strengthened since 9/11. Funding has increased by more
than
700 percent since September 11, 2001. Funding for port security was approximately $259 million in FY 2001. DHS spent
approximately $1.6 billion on port security in FY 2005. Following 9/11, the federal government has implemented a
multi-layered defense strategy to keep our ports safe and secure. New technologies have been
deployed with additional technologies being developed and $630 million has been provided in grants to our
largest ports including $16.2 million to Baltimore; $32.7 million to Miami; $27.4 million to New Orleans, $43.7 million to New
York/New Jersey; and $15.8 million to Philadelphia.
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Squo Solves – Tech exists and is being implemented now
Tech Exists and has already been implemented in other areas
Grant 10- US port security council (Jay Grant is the Director US Port Security Council and the Chief of InterPort
Police; Written June 19, 2012; Accessed June 20, 2012; “A leap in technology: fusion authentication”
http://www.porttechnology.org/-images/uploads/technical_papers/PTI-26.pdf)
The system has been successfully installed by the government in several housing projects
throughout the US, along with some other commercial buildings and a police station. We have just begun pilot testing in the
port authority environment. Yet as stated, the greatest challenge for any system is adoption and cost. Those
factors will be crucial for this or any other system. As new as all this sounds, we are seeing similar programs being
tested. The UK has in place facial recognition entries at Gatwick Airport and an employee
program at Heathrow. They plan to implement full facial screening for EU passport holders later this year. Again, this moves
the bar from verification to identification.
Tracking tech exists and is being utilized on a small scale now
Walker 12 (Shaun Walker is a writer for PRWeb; Written May 24, 2012; Accessed June 20, 2012;
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/5/prweb9540171.html; National Security Boosted As A Critical Louisiana Port Installs NextGeneration Technology)
The Greater Lafourche Port Commission, in partnership with national security firm Crescent Guardian, Inc., has
completed implementation of an advanced video analytics application to accompany its nextgeneration video surveillance system. This milestone ensures that first responders in Port Fourchon
are receiving “as they happen” alerts identified automatically by the surveillance system and can
coordinate their response in real time. This level of data sharing and interoperability is
unprecedented and will aid in lowering response times and overall situational awareness during
real-time events, placing the port’s security among the most advanced in the nation. The Greater Lafourche Port Commission's is
committed to continually improving the security and emergency response preparedness of Port Fourchon by building a Maritime
Domain Awareness System that allows local, state and federal agencies such as Harbor Police, Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Office,
LOOP, Lafourche Parish EOC, Fire Central Dispatchers, GOHSEP, Department of Defense, Customs, and Coast Guard to collaborate
effectively and become more proactive. To do this, the port's director of information technology, April Danos, wanted to find a way
to take all technologies and disparate data and bring them into one common operating picture that would allow these several
agencies to work collaboratively within the same situational awareness platform over multiple networks. Crescent Guardian, Inc., a
partner security firm of the port, developed an effective solution by providing advanced software that could run the new surveillance
system for Fourchon’s Maritime Domain Awareness System, or GLPC-C4. The cutting-edge software allows the system to send alerts
and alarms if anomalous behavior is detected, meaning there are "No Rules" to be written prior to their use—Making it one of the
easiest and most effective systems in the industry to install and use. “The Port Commission was pleased to work with CGI to
integrate BRS Labs’ video analytics into Port Fourchon’s Video Management System and the GLPC-C4 System,” said Director Danos.
The US Department of Defense supported Port Fourchon's efforts by sharing the DoD-developed capabilities of the
Knowledge Display and Aggregation System (KDAS) to serve as the basis for the Port's incident
command and control system. The use of KDAS provides Port Fourchon with the unique ability to network its system
with the DoD in the event of an incident requiring information sharing.
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Current technology more than adequate—we already have the newest technology
Harrald 05 [John R, “Sea Trade and Security: an Assessment of the Post-9/11 Reaction,” Web, Fall 05,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/220702986/1376BF5C74E6A8F9B1B/5?accountid=14667, 6/19/12]
Innovative technology has been applied to the problem of maritime security in two
general areas: (1) container security and (2) vessel identification and surveillance. The
advancements in container security include the CBP automated commercial
environment, which provides the information necessary to target inspections; improved
non-intrusive scanning technology; and the creation of sensorequipped containers. Prior to
9/11, and despite two decades of advances in electronic data interchange, the flow of information within the supply chain's
transaction layer and between the transaction layer and the oversight layer was slow and paper-driven. The
most
revolutionary technological change caused by U.S. government security initiatives, and
the least visible, is the automation of this information flow, which allows the effective
screening of containers prior to shipment. The second area of improvement is the
development of technologies to track containers and to ensure their physical integrity.
These include the smart-container initiatives, such as radio frequency identification that
can track sensors; sensors that can detect chemicals and radiation; sensors that detect
and record intrusions and other anomalies; and antitamper seals. An industry consortium, the
Strategic Council on security Technology, has initiated a series of pilot tests of sensor technology called Smart and secure Tradelines
(SST).47 For example, the Department of Defense (DOD) and SAVI Technology have developed an SST pilot that uses these
technologies to ensure the security of the DOD supply chain.48
Nonintrusive inspections of containers have
been improved with radiation monitors, portal sensors and remote monitoring
technologies. The SAIC-developed VACIS system uses a gamma-ray imaging system to produce
radiographie images that may be transmitted or stored. A mobile VACIS unit may be set up in 10 minutes
and can scan a 40-foot container in six seconds.49 VACIS technology is also being applied to the problem of
maritime domain awareness-identifying vessels and monitoring those with suspicious
cargoes, behavior or ownership. International requirements for AIS and SSAS are coming into
force. The U.S. Coast Guard and the Navy are utilizing satellite technology and airborne
sensors to locate and track vessels in the maritime domain, and both organizations plan to add
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to the mix. The Coast Guard is purchasing Bell Eagle Eye UAVs as
part of its fleet modernization program.50 Enhancing communication and information technologies will be
required to make the National Maritime Intelligence Integration Center an effective reality.
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Squo Solves – Piracy and Oil
Current security measures solve maritime oil threats
Houreld 11—Associated Press Writer [Katharine, “Oil Tanker Terror Hijacks Easy, Attacks Complex,” Web,
5/21/11, LexisNexis, 6/19/12]
To counter attacks, tanker owners have begun putting barbed wire around ship guardrails and
installing firehoses that can launch high pressure jets of water at attackers. They are also
installing bulletproof glass around ship bridges and accommodation quarters, a vessel's two
most vulnerable areas, said Chris Austen, the head of Maritime and Underwater Security Consultants. Some shipping
companies also insist their tankers travel through pirate-infested waters only in convoys, added
Crispian Cuss, program director at Olive Group, one of the biggest security companies working in the Middle East. If hijackers
decide they can't get onboard and steer a ship toward a target without detection, they might try
to seize a vessel in port but that would be much risker given the global port security measures in
effect in the last decade. The al-Qaida plot found in bin Laden's hideout also mentioned attacking oil facilities, but
most oil terminals are considered strategic installations meaning they are protected by roving
coast guard boats, radar, divers who conduct inspections and heavy security. Brazil, for example, is
justifying the cost of developing a nuclear submarine to protect its vast offshore oil fields. Security levels vary, but the ports that
terrorists value the most generally have the heaviest protection, Cuss said.
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Squo Solves – Biometric Screening
Current programs are sufficient—employee screening, inspections, increased
intelligence, partnerships, container inspection, X-ray/gamma ray machines, and
radiation detection devices
PR Newswire 2011 (American Association of Port Authorities, “10 Years After 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S.
Ports” 6/19/12 Lexis 6/19/12)
The industry also maintains
ongoing liaison with the federal government's lead port and maritime
security agencies. These dialogues address timely security issues such as the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC), which the TSA and Coast Guard implemented 2007 to ensure
those seeking access to secure port areas can be positively identified, have authorization to enter the facility and do
not pose a terrorist risk. In concert with public port authorities and terminal operators, the Coast Guard is charged
with routinely inspecting and assessing the security of U.S. port facilities and the vessels that call those
facilities, in accordance with the MTSA and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Since 9/11, the Coast
Guard has instituted innovative programs such as Maritime Safety and Security Teams, enforced
security zones, increased its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, expanded its
partnerships with the maritime industry, international organizations, federal, state and local
agencies, and has joined with other agencies within DHS to strengthen U.S. borders and protect
America's ports and waterways. The Coast Guard also cross-checks crew lists against terror watch lists
in advance of arriving ships. Additionally since 9/11, CBP has initiated: the Container Security Initiative to
examine high-risk, U.S.-bound containerized cargoes at foreign ports; the 24-Hour Rule, which
requires cargo manifests be submitted a least a day ahead of ship arrivals; C-TPAT which
provides expedited inspections for U.S. importers that voluntarily work with CPB to improve baseline security
standards for supply chain and container security; and large-scale X-ray, gamma ray and radiation detection
devices at U.S. ports to scan the contents of inbound cargo containers.
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AT: Econ
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1NC Econ
Turn :An attack would increase demand for higher security measures both by
workers and the government
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding principal of
Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12
One result might be that work crews understandably would refuse to work until the government could
assure some degree of safety. In another scenario, the ports could be closed not by labor but by the
government. If the attack on the World Trade Center was an indication of what might happen in the wake of a serious
attack, then the government itself might shut down U.S. ports while deciding how to handle the new
crisis. This would imply that the government would have to put some sort of screening process into place
rapidly by which safe containers could be separated from potentially dangerous ones, with a second
physical screening to detect potential explosives in this latter category.
Economists’ predictions of the effect of a supply chain disruption on the economy
are highly exaggerated
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding principal of
Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Previous Port Closures Hold Lessons for the Present When economists trying to make predictions are faced with a
long list of unknowns, they can either develop complex models to help answer the questions before
them or look to historical events that might provide lessons for the future. The complex questions stemming
from a terrorist attack on the port complex cannot be answered easily within a typical static input-output
(IO) model, because the economy is flexible and will work to mitigate the potential damage caused by a
supply chain disruption. Input-output models assume a mechanical structure in which a resource unused in one place
remains unused. For example, there is an assumption that a laid-off worker will not try to find new
employment, or that a factory, denied a critical component, will simply shut down instead of finding an
alternative supplier. Of course, these assumptions are not true. Input-output models tend to highly
exaggerate the true cost (and also the true benefits under other circumstances) of economic
events.
Improving the scanning program would impede trade and hurt the economy
Terreri 09—World Trade [April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Donnelly at NAM believes the 100 percent scanning directive is heading in the wrong direction. "It
treats all cargo the same, spreading our limited enforcement resources across all shipments,
rather than targeting shipments from riskier shippers from dubious places. Major transnational companies
with overseas plants shipping to their own companies here in the U.S. every two weeks should
not be subjected to the same intensive security review as an unknown shipper. Established shippers
and importers have invested in government programs like C-TPAT and are sharing information to assure their supply chains are
secure. Security
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checks need to focus where the risks are the greatest."
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Turn: Increased trade introduces invasive species, which can`t be fixed—
international problem
Keller 2011-worked at the Program on the Global Environment at the University of Chicago, Illinois (Reuben P., Charles
Perrings- worked at the ecoSERVICES Group in the School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe “International Policy
Options for Reducing the Environmental Impacts of Invasive Species” Bioscience 12/11 ProQuest 6/20/12)
Preventing the spread of nonnative invasive species is an international public good. Some categories of invasive species-such as
diseases of humans and livestock-are addressed by international agreements that coordinate efforts to reduce their spread. In
contrast, invasive species that primarily cause environmental impacts are managed almost exclusively at
the national level. Control of environmental invaders is internationally undersupplied because
the efforts of nations that do invest to prevent their spread are undercut by nations that do not .
Addressing this problem will require international cooperation. We identify the international approach to
controlling human diseases as a model that could provide institutions and mechanisms to map the spread of environmental invaders
and assess the risks they impose. This would allow individual nations to manage potential vectors of invasion. Because such a system
is unlikely to be implemented in the near future, we make recommendations for intermediate steps, including the widespread
adoption of existing risk assessments and importation standards. Keywords: Convention on Biological Diversity, sanitary and
phytosanitary agreement, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, invasive species International trade
increases human welfare but also leads
to the introduction and establishment of nonnative invasive
species, such as human and livestock diseases, pests and diseases of crops, and species that cause environmental harm. The
increasingly global nature of trade means that efforts to prevent the spread of invasive species
should be internationally coordinated. To this end, there are already relatively advanced international programs in
place for identifying and managing the spread of human diseases, and the 178 member nations of the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) have agreed to report outbreaks of animal diseases, mostly diseases of livestock, to a central database. These programs
allow nations to track invasive species threats and to use the shared information to impose import restrictions. Species known to be
diseases and pests of crops are often the focus of quarantine inspections at national borders, but this varies by country and there is
little international coordination. In contrast, nonnative invasive species that do not directly affect human health or agriculture are
generally perceived to primarily pose risks of environmental harm. Few international agreements exist to control
the spread of these species, and at an international scale, they are traded with much less
inspection and fewer efforts to prevent their spread. This essay addresses the potential for wiser management of
these species, which we refer to as environmental invaders. Despite the lack of international efforts to prevent their spread,
environmental invaders have enormous environmental, economic, cultural, and human-health
impacts (Pejchar and Mooney 2008, Sala et al. 2000). These include reductions in the populations of desirable
native species as a result of predation, competition, parasitism, and disease. An example of this is the
invasion of European waterways by North American crayfish, which both compete directly with native crayfish for resources and
carry the crayfish plague disease (Aphanomyces astaci) that has devastated European crayfish populations (Gherardi and Holdich
1999). Economic impacts can arise in a variety of ways, including the costs of herbicides and
pesticides to control nonnative invaders in national parks and the costs of cleaning industrial
facilities that become infested with invaders (e.g., zebra mussel [Dreissena polymorpha] infestations of
power plants in the Laurentian Great Lakes require the facilities to close down while workers
clean pipes; Leung et al. 2002). Cultural and human-health impacts can also arise in many ways, but a
good example comes from cases in which invasive species become so prolific that farmers
abandon agricultural land, leading to the loss of traditional farmland and agricultural practices
and potentially to human-health impacts from reduced food supplies. This has occurred in
Mexico, where it is no longer feasible in some areas to control the invasive bracken fern (Pteridium aquilinum; Schneider and
Geoghegan 2006). The introduction of environmental invaders is an externality of trade (Perrings et al.
2002, 2005). That is, the impacts of these species are not incorporated into the costs of doing trade, and
those who trade the species have no economic incentive to reduce the invasion risks inherent in their
business. For example, the global horticultural trade is responsible for many thousands of invasions of harmful plants and plant
diseases around the world (Reichard and White 2001, Dehnen-Schmutz et al. 2007). However, the environmental costs
are not borne by either exporters or importers. Instead, these costs are spread
widely among society as government agencies spend taxpayer dollars on inspection,
interception, eradication, containment, and compensation. Two factors have hampered efforts to slow the
international spread of environmental invaders. First, although nations generally act defensively to control
invasive species, the benefits arising from that control are almost always shared broadly among
those at risk of being invaded, not just among those who pay for the control (Perrings et al. 2002). For
example, if a country spends resources to ensure a disease-free horticultural industry, all nations to which it
imposed by this trade
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exports benefit from a reduced likelihood that they will be invaded. In the absence of cooperation, however,
individual countries will protect their own borders but are less likely to commit resources to preventing
the export of invaders. Because the invasion risk to which a country is exposed depends on the
actions of its neighbors and trading partners, this means that countries face higher risks than they
would if there were greater cooperation. Second, controlling the spread of an invasive species is a
"weakest-link" public good (Perrings et al. 2002). Although the risks posed by any nation will depend on a complex set of
climatic, biogeophysical, and social factors, including the type of trade they engage in and its volume, the overall global risk
will be strongly determined by the nations or trades that operate the least effective programs to
control species transport. Because removal of an invasive pest from trade requires all those involved to
contribute, and because little is gained by providing more than the country making the smallest
contribution, there is an incentive to adopt a matching strategy-to converge on the weakest link. This is
because unilateral action cannot prevent the pest from continuously spreading through trade (Touza
and Perrings 2011). Nevertheless, even though enhancing cooperative efforts should be the ultimate goal of a collective strategy to
manage the problem of environmental invasions, there is much that can be done independently. In this article, we identify
alternative strategies at the national and international levels for reducing the spread of environmental invaders with or without
cooperation. We begin by reviewing existing unilateral defensive efforts to reduce exposure and by identifying programs that have
been successful and could be implemented more widely without the need for additional international policy. We then consider the
options for effective coordinated international management, building on existing commitments by countries under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and on the international success achieved in managing human diseases. Finally, we discuss the options
for achieving at least some of the gains that could be had from coordinated action without the need for renegotiation of any
multilateral agreement. Figure 1 summarizes our recommendations. National efforts to manage the spread of environmental
invaders Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its constituent agreements, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), individual countries have
the right to take actions in restraint of trade if those actions are needed in order to protect food safety and animal or plant health. In
contrast to those that deal with human diseases, these agreements authorize only national defensive measures. That is, individual
nations have direct responsibility for managing risks to themselves posed by the many vectors of nonnative species introduction
(table 1) but are not permitted under the GATT and the SPS agreement to cooperate in the collective control of pest or pathogen
transmission through trade restrictions. The standard-setting bodies for the SPS agreement-the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC), the OIE, and Codex Alimentarius-do cooperate in setting sanitary and phytosanitary standards and reporting
requirements for member countries. This has led to the harmonization of rules on classes of traded commodities involving known
risks. The OIE has also coordinated veterinary campaigns against particular pathogens within member countries and has achieved
success in the eradication of rinderpest, one of the most damaging of all animal pathogens (Normile 2008). But only in the case of
novel human diseases does there exist an agreement to take collective action in restraint of trade as a precautionary measure.
Environmental invaders can be transported to a country through intentional or unintentional vectors. Regardless of the vector, it is
widely accepted that the most cost-effective way to reduce total impacts from nonnative invasive species is to prevent their arrival
and establishment (see figure 1a, 1b; IUCN 2000, Leung et al. 2002, Lodge et al. 2006, Keller et al. 2007, 2009). That is, preventing
the arrival of an invasive species will generally lead to less harm than addressing the species after it enters a country. Nations can
choose from a range of options to prevent a species' arrival, including restrictions on trade in species of concern, requirements on
exporters to ensure that invaders do not leave their shores or do not survive transit, and the operations of quarantine and inspection
facilities at the point of entry (Lodge et al. 2006). Importantly, policies focused on prevention have more opportunities to shift the
burden of responsibility to the industries that profit from risky trade in live organisms (Perrings et al. 2005). As an example of a
prevention program, most plant shipments to the United States must be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate to show that
they were produced at a facility following high standards for the control of plant diseases and parasites. This system puts the costs of
obtaining certificates and those of producing relatively safe plants onto exporters. In contrast, established plant pest species can
generally be controlled only through expensive techniques such as manually pulling plants or the use of herbicides and pesticides.
Because it is almost never possible to determine the party responsible for an invasion, these costs have never (to the best of our
knowledge) been passed on to importers or consumers who benefited from imports. Intentionally introduced species, including pets,
crops, and garden plants (table 1), provide many economic and social benefits. They also often become environmental invaders or
act as vectors for environmental invaders (Jeschke and Strayer 2005). Efforts to reduce imports of environmental invaders generally
consist of individual-species risk assessments so that resources can be focused on those species posing the highest risk. Because the
proportion of traded species that become invasive is generally low (Smith et al. 1999), this approach leaves most species-those with
low risk of invasion-unaffected. The approach has been shown to yield financial benefits for importing countries (Keller et al. 2007),
whereas fewer invasions confers environmental, social, and agricultural benefits. The most prominent riskassessment procedure
currently available is the Australian Weed Risk Assessment (WRA; Pheloung 1995). Australian government scientists developed this
tool in the early 1990s, and in 1997, it was introduced as a mandatory screening tool for all new plant species proposed for
introduction to Australia. Species assessed as posing a high risk are not allowed to be imported. The WRA has been demonstrated to
have good accuracy in Australia, New Zealand, Florida, Hawaii, and the Czech Republic (Gordon et al. 2008). It has been adopted in
a modified form by New Zealand. In contrast to intentional introductions, species transported unintentionally have some probability
of becoming invasive but are not expected to provide benefits. This means that efforts to prevent their arrival can aim to simply
remove all organisms from transport. Although this is conceptually simple, the number and magnitude of
unintentional vectors makes preventing introductions an enormous challenge. For example, the global
maritime fleet includes more than 99,000 large vessels and moves most international trade (IMO 2009). Each arriving ship
presents risks of introducing new nonnative species entrained in its ballast water, attached to its
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hull, and in the cargo it offloads (table 1; Keller et al. 2011). It is unlikely that any nation could commit
sufficient resources to ensure that all arriving ships are free of invasive species. Each vector of
unintentional species transport requires a different management approach. This approach needs to be based on the trade moving
the species, the mode of transport, and the available technology. For example, the approaches necessary to limit the movement of
fouling organisms of recreational boats are very different from those required to prevent the spread of invasive mollusks on watergarden plants or of forest pests in wooden packaging material. One relatively successful approach to limiting the spread of
unintentional invaders is the US phytosanitary certificate system mentioned previously. This program aims to prevent the arrival of
diseases, parasites, and plants that unintentionally accompany a traded species. It does this by requiring certain standards of plant
and soil hygiene at facilities that grow plants for export to the United States. It is consistent with the United States' obligations as a
signatory to the WTO's SPS agreement (Hedley 2004). Although the number of risk-assessment tools and
vector management strategies continues to increase, they still provide protection against only a
small proportion of the vectors that introduce invasive species. We offer two suggestions for improving this situation
within the current international policy framework. First, some existing risk-assessment tools have been shown to perform well in a
range of countries (e.g., Gordon et al. 2008), and other nations could adopt those tools. This was done by New Zealand when it
adopted a modified version of the Australian WRA. In many cases, it may be possible for nations to relatively cheaply adopt tools
developed elsewhere. Second, established national standards for treating vectors of unintentional introduction could be adopted by
other countries. For example, the US Phytosanitary Certificate program could probably be adopted by other importing countries
because many export facilities are already set up to achieve its standards. Further developing and applying these tools and standards
would serve a double purpose by directly protecting those countries that adopt the procedures and by providing indirect protection
to other nations that would subsequently be less likely to receive invaders from their trading partners. Although there are
potential advances to be made in national defensive policies, these can never provide the level of
protection that would arise from increased international cooperation (see figure 1c). Most vectors could
be more efficiently rendered free of invasive species in their country of origin. This would, for
example, reduce the demand on quarantine facilities at ports of entry. Such coordination is currently
unlikely for at least three reasons. First and foremost, there are no international agreements or bodies that are
mandated to implement such a coordinated approach. Second, the "free-rider" issue means that
the financially rational approach for many countries is to take the benefits from trading with
countries that implement higher standards but not to pay the costs to implement those
standards in their own operations. Finally, many countries lack the resources, institutions, or political will
to implement such policies. Without programs to transfer resources and expertise to these
countries, they will remain weak links and will continue to pose a risk to all other nations.
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Evidence shows that significant closure of ports would only have a mild effect on
the economy
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding principal of
Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
“Surely you must be joking!” might be the immediate response to the conclusion that a significant closure of the ports
would have at most a mild effect on the economy. It would seem more likely that a substantial disruption to the
supply chain because of a port shutdown would have a very dramatic effect on the production process. Yet all the evidence points to
the opposite conclusion. The major labor actions of the sixties had measurable effects on the timing of imports but hardly any on
total imports, and there is little or no evidence to support the idea that they had any substantial effect
on the overall economy as measured by rising prices, falling employment, or a reduction in
production activity.
Port shut downs do not adversely affect the broader economy
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief Economist
of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a founding principal of
Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S.
Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E. Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W.
Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing
Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Indeed, with these results in mind, it is hardly surprising then that we could find little evidence of the port
shutdowns within the context of the broader economy. The statistical results reconfirm our eyeball results for
the other four variables studied—manufacturing production; consumer spending on durable and non-durable goods; and
employment in manufacturing, wholesale trade, and transportation. Very few of the strike indicator variables
have
any statistical significance, implying that there is little reason to believe that the strikes had any
significant effect on the wider economy.
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2NC Ext. Econ
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AT: Econ – port security impossible hurts the economy
Extensive increases in port security undercut the economy—it’s impossible to
eliminate every threat
Wolf 06—Political Editor and Director for ABC [Z Byron, Political Editor and Deputy Political Director
for ABC News, “How Much Is Too Much for Port Security,” Web, 9/13/06, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Politics/
story?id=2425748&page=1, 6/19/12]
Despite billions of dollars already spent, he argued, the government can't ensure 100 percent safety. Chertoff
the analogy between car accidents and port security, but that's
matter how careful drivers were, people were
going to die in car crashes. Then he implied the same was true of port security, suggesting there
was no way to entirely safeguard America's ports. The federal government has spent $10 billion on port security
probably didn't expect to find himself drawing
what he did in one awkward exchange. He said to the panel that no
since 2004, according to Chertoff. The new bill would allocate nearly $9 billion more over the next five years to beef up security at
the nation's ports. While Chertoff encouraged its passage, he tried to convince Sen. Frank Lautenberg, D-N.J., that scanning
100 percent of the cargo coming into the country was logistically impossible. "You know, it's like I
get in my car or I put my daughter in my car. I understand it's not 100 percent safe. If I wanted
my daughter to be 100 percent safe, I'd put a 5-mile-an-hour speed limit cap on the car, and it
wouldn't go more than 5 miles an hour." Noting that the costs would be immense, he also argued against an
amendment offered by Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., that would require screening of all shipping
containers coming into the United States. "No matter how hard we may try, we cannot eliminate
every possible threat to every individual in every place at every moment. And if we could, it
would be at an untenable cost to our liberty and our prosperity," Chertoff said to the committee. "We
don't want to undercut our economy while trying to protect it. We also don't want to undercut
our civil liberties while trying to protect them."
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AT: Econ – hurts small businesses
Small businesses and suppliers are currently suffering due to increased security
regulations
Laite 10—Georgetown University [Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]
Regulations often serve as a ‘‘fear factor’’ for small companies with limited resources and the
Internet-based paperwork can mean problems for those in rural or remote communities. Add to this the
uncertainty of continuously revised regulations under an implement and amend approach, and it is not hard to
reach the conclusion that security can drive away the faint-hearted supplier. Micro-businesses and
artisans, the path to economic development in many developing countries, will see security as a barrier to growth.32
Non-compliance by developing-world companies can mean more than just increased scrutiny by
customs officials and can seriously disadvantage these countries’ trade programs. The American Association
of Exporters and Importers (AAEI), for example, has expressed concerns that though importers often lack the
“expertise or wherewithal to guarantee container security…[U.S. companies] could be held
responsible for security in places where they may have no control, such as the premises of small
suppliers in Third World Countries.”34 Since non-compliance with C-TPAT results in disenrollment from the program and a loss
of competitive advantage, importers drop small suppliers in the developing world in favor of more
established suppliers having better security, often in more developed countries. In fact, a 2007 survey
conducted by the University of Virginia, found that 12.2 percent of the C-TPAT member-companies surveyed had rejected foreign
suppliers, manufacturers, or vendors due to security concerns in the previous year.35
Small businesses and suppliers are key to the economy
The Seattle Times 09 [“Obama Says Small Businesses Key to Economy,” Web, 5/19/09,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2009238084_apusobamasmallbusiness.html, 6/20/12]
WASHINGTON —President Barack Obama says the nation's small businesses are responsible
for half of the
nation's private sector jobs and deserve support from Washington. Obama on Tuesday welcomed winners of a
Small Business Administration award to the White House's East Room. He said some of the nation's best businesses
began as small ventures, such as Google and McDonald's. Such businesses' impact goes beyond the
economy, Obama said, adding that small business owners help strengthen local neighborhoods. Given
everything a small business does for its community, the government should do its part to help leaders, he said. That's why Obama
says his economic policies would help pay off private loans and increase government backing for SBA loans.
The key to an improved economy is small business and suppliers—government and
private sector needs to back down
Redmond 12—member of Job Creators Alliance [Billie, “Small Businesses Are Key to the Economy, Not
Big Government,” Web, 6/18/12, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/06/18/small-businesses-arekey-to-the-economy-not-big-government, 6/20/12]
The solution to the jobs problem is small business, not more government. Job Creators Alliance has laid
out a roadmap to sustainable economic recovery—and that path is paved with commonsense regulatory reform, certainty about
future taxes, and the return of spending sanity to our federal government. In recent years, the federal government has
unleashed a regulatory onslaught on small businesses in the private sector and has made it
much harder for the engine of our economy to function as it should. Until policymakers and
elected officials start to listen to the voice of the entrepreneur and small business owner, it's
hard to see how job creation will come back. A March Small Business Outlook Survey conducted by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce shows that concerns about over-regulation are the highest we've seen in the past year.
Small business owners are hesitant to hire because of uncertainty created by the plethora of
threatening regulations coming from and pending in Washington. There is something to be said about the correlation
between the unemployment rate and the increasing concern about regulations coming out of
Washington. America needs the government to step down and let true job creators lead the way to
recovery.
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AT: Econ – Hurts Consumers
Increase in Security will lead to an increase in prices for the consumer
Thibault et al, 2006—Marc Thibault is a researcher, Homeland Security Institute
[Mary R Brooks is William A. Black Chair of Commerce, Dalhousie University, Mary Brooks was on a Fulbright Fellowship at George
Mason University, Kenneth J Button is professor of public policy and director, Center for Transportation Policy and Logistics,
George Mason University; George Mason Center for Infrastructure Protections and Homeland Security, The Response of the U.S.
Maritime Industry to the New Container Security Initiatives, Transportation Journal, pgs. 5-15, Winter 2006, Proquest 6/19/12]
The competitive nature of the shipping industry poses an additional challenge to increase the
security of the maritime container supply chain. Vessel operators, ports, and marine terminals compete on the
basis of price as well as security, safety, and on-time delivery. Each of these actors provides its customer with a
desired level of service by utilizing different combinations of production factors. Each has a
strong incentive to minimize its costs because a failure to do so may undermine its profits,
excluding it from a shipping network and making it less competitive. Firms that provide higher levels of security
than their competitors may have to raise their prices or cut back other types of service they
provide their customers, facing the distinct possibility of losing customers to their competitors.
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AT: Econ—Developing Countries
Current programs impede exports from developing countries, which also harms
US economy
Laite 10—Georgetown University [Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]
Though C-TPAT is likely to improve overall security to the global supply chain, components of the program act
as
non-tariff barriers to companies in the developing world. According to the program’s security criteria,
importers must conduct a comprehensive assessment of their international supply chains
including outsourced and contracted elements (e.g. foreign facilities, conveyance, and domestic warehousing) to
receive a certification. They are required to work with these business partners to ensure that
necessary security measures are in place and adhered to, and are responsible for establishing
processes by which business partners are chosen.29 An Importer must also provide information
indicating which of their business partners, eligible for C-TPAT, have and have not received a
certification. Similarly, those business partners not eligible for the program (e.g. many companies in the
developing world) must demonstrate that they have met C-TPAT security criteria.30 To cope with these
regulations, many C-TPAT companies contractually require businesses to improve security, extending
C-TPAT’s reach well beyond the borders of the United States.31 Lloyd’s Practical Shipping Guide, entitled Risk Management in Port
Operations, Logistics and Supply-Chain Security, highlights some of the problems that arise from increased trade security
regulations on developing countries: Regulations often serve as a ‘‘fear factor’’ for small companies with limited resources and the
Internet-based paperwork can mean problems for those in rural or remote communities. Add to this the uncertainty of continuously
revised regulations under an implement and amend approach, and it is not hard to reach the conclusion that security can drive away
the faint-hearted supplier. Micro-businesses and artisans, the path to economic development in many developing countries, will see
security as a barrier to growth.32 Similar concerns have been voiced at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Members at a recent meeting on the Development of Multimodal Transport and Logistics Services. which “felt that the
developing countries had difficulty in meeting the requirements of the C-TPAT, which would
significantly affect their exports.”33 Since all C-TPAT importers must prove that the companies they work with at every
point in the supply chain meet C-TPAT requirements, companies that cannot afford to meet these
requirements – or are ineligible to participate in the program – are flagged for increased
security checks by customs officials, resulting in a major non-tariff barrier into the U.S. market.
Developing countries have motives for flooding the market—US creates non-tariff
barriers that increase the cost of trade
Laite 10—Georgetown University [Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]
Many laud the benefits of these security initiatives, however, some are concerned that they create non-
tariff barriers for trading partners and will “penalize developing countries who may not be able
to afford the installation of the required facilities at their ports, and thus be unable to join the
[initiatives].”7 In 2003, the OECD estimated the initial burden of implementing supply chain security measures on ship
operators to be at least $1.3 billion, and $730 million per year thereafter, with most costs coming from management staff and
security-related equipment expenditures. Similarly, the OECD analyzed the cost of system-wide procedural changes, like the United
States’ 24-hour advance notice rule, which is estimated to cost approximately $281.7 million8. U.S. programs have also
been perceived as non-tariff barriers by some of America’s closest allies. According to the European
Commission, the reluctance of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to allow foreign participation
in C-TPAT is discriminatory and increases costs for European exporters. Similarly, CSI causes additional
costs and delays in E.U.-U.S. shipments9. When combined with the fact that exporters in developing
countries often pay two to three times as much in import customs and duties in destination
countries as do exporters in developed countries, it is clear that significant trade barriers to
developing countries pervade the new maritime trade security environment10.
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Developing countries could flood the market—developed countries dependent on
international maritime trade
Laite 10—Georgetown University [Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]
In today’s globalized world, almost no nation can rely solely on what it produces domestically. Most
countries are involved in international trade at some level. Everything from raw materials like oil, copper, and
lumber, to consumer goods like food and clothing are transported overseas. Without shipping, intercontinental trade would not
exist, nor would the bulk transport of raw materials and the import and export of affordable food and manufactured goods 1. As the
most cost-efficient method of bulk transport, over 90% of world trade is carried on the water. Worldwide
maritime commerce supports 8.4 million jobs, and over $300 billion in personal income2. There
are around 50,000 merchant ships trading internationally, which represent over 150 countries3. In the United
States, maritime trade makes up 78% of all international trade4. Annually, U.S. maritime trade
amounts to nearly 1.6 billion tons of cargo, valued at over $2 trillion and generating over $21 billion
in U.S. customs revenue. This reliance on international maritime trade, however, has not benefited
all countries equally. A recent study analyzed the role of maritime freight costs in determination of ocean-shipped imports.
By disaggregating imports (including detailed freight charges) from trading partners of 43 countries, the study found that in 2007
maritime transport costs made up about 6 percent of a product’s total cost. On average, this totaled a cost-per-weight shipping rate
of about $59 per ton of merchandise. The study concluded that the cost of exporting from developing countries
was significantly higher than the cost of exporting from countries within the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and that it was cheaper to import into developing
countries than into OECD countries5. This disparity in shipping costs has significant
implications for those in the developing word. The higher cost of shipping for developing
countries makes it more difficult for these countries to export their goods to the global market.
Conversely, the lower import costs into developing countries makes it easier for OECD-origin products to
“flood” the developing world with their products. The Graph 4.1 reveals a significant uptick in shipping costs
starting in the 2001-2002 timeframe. This is likely due in part to the trade barriers that resulted because of trade security measures
implemented around the world after 9/11.
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Programs are non-tariff barriers to developing countries—small suppliers no
longer exporting
Laite 10—Georgetown University [Parker Stone, “Maritime Trade Security: Promoter of Terrorism?,” Thesis,
5/10, http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553351/laiteParker.pdf?sequence=1, 6/20/12]
Although CSI arguably improves U.S. maritime supply-chain security, it also serves as a non-tariff barrier to
developing countries whose smaller ports are often unable to afford CSI participation costs.43 The
program incentivizes the use of CSI ports. Because goods are scanned prior to their arrival at U.S.
ports, resulting in shorter wait times and fewer security checks, a significant number of shipping
companies have moved away from smaller non-CSI ports to keep their competitive advantage. The
expense of meeting CSI requirements (especially to small port facilities that need to upgrade
their systems to handle electronic shipping manifest data, hire new security personnel, and purchase Gamma and X-ray
machines, bio sensors, and advanced container locks) limits membership to only the larger and more modern
port facilities. According to Luciano Pugliatti of Crown Agents, an NGO working to help developing nations modernize their
customs infrastructure, “customs in less-developed countries face problems of corruption, under-capacity,
outmoded inspection methods, and loss of national revenue to fraud and smuggling. Such nations don't have the money
to buy high-tech inspection equipment, nor do they have the trained personnel to run them."44
India fears that CSI has “imposed additional costs on exports to the United States...[and] may
penalize developing countries who may not be able to afford the installation of the required
facilities at their ports, and thus are unable to join the US initiative."45 Similarly, Malaysia, is concerned
about “who would bear the cost if unloading was delayed or if consignments were detained for further inspection.” 46 Based on
documentation fees levied by carriers, the OECD estimates the overall implementation costs of the 24- hour rule to be approximately
$281.7 million. This number, however, does not cover the costs associated with delays, liabilities, or fines.47 According to the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), "non-CSI ports may find it difficult to stay
competitive, and as far as U.S. trade is concerned may sooner or later be used only for pre-carriage purposes goods being loaded at one of these ports on feeder vessels to join the nearest CSI port."48 This would disproportionately
increase shipping distances and costs for developing countries. Shipping experts like Pugliatti fear that, as a
result, increased supply-chain security measures could negate the trade facilitation and
modernization that has taken place in the developing world over the past decade by the widening gulf between
developed and underdeveloped nations.”49 CSI disadvantages Exporters in the EU as well. According to the EU’s 2009
annual report on US trade and investment barriers, CSI is causing “significant additional costs and delays to
shipment of European machinery and electrical equipment to the United States.”50 As a result, a
number of small European engineering companies have stopped exporting to the United States.51
The majority of CSI ports are in developed countries; only 12 of 58 (21 percent) CSI ports are located in the developing world.52
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AT: Econ – Can’t solve Internationally
Any shipments across water to reach the US often go through many countries
and people
Lukas, 2004—Analyst with Cato's Center for Trade Policy Studies and U.S. Trade
Representative [Title: Protection without protectionism: Reconciling Trade and Homeland Security, April 8 2004, Lukas is
also an analyst at the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies. CATO foundation site, http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpa/tpa027.pdf, accessed Jun 19 2012]
The manufacturer, the freight forwarder, the railroad, the port authority in Hong Kong, the shipping company, the Port of Manila,
the Port of Los Angeles, and an American trucking company all have some control over it at different stages. This scenario is not
unusual; indeed, many shipments follow paths far more convoluted than the one described above. According to the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the typical door-todoor journey
using a shipping container will involve the interaction of about 25 different actors, generate 30–
40 documents, use 2–3 different transportation modes, and be handled at 12 to 15 physical
locations. There are many points during this imaginary journey where the shipment could be
susceptible to terrorist infiltration or tampering: at the manufacturer; during or before packing;
during movement by rail, especially when the train is stationary at a switching station or side track; at the port in Hong Kong; during
the voyage by sea; and finally, at the port in Los Angeles before clearing customs. In addition, if the container had landed in Canada
or Mexico and then traveled to the United States by ground—as many cargos do—that would create more points of vulnerability. The
fact that thieves regularly violate the integrity of the cargo chain—with worldwide thefts estimated at $30–50 billion per year by the
OECD—illustrates the leakiness of today’s international trade environment.19 The ideal security system would offer what experts call
“Total Asset Visibility and Authentication”— integrated procedures and technologies that safeguard cargos at all stages of transport.
Total Asset Visibility and Authentication would require (1) loading of shipments in a secure facility, by authenticated personnel; (2)
verification of the contents of a shipment; (3) security in transit; (4) transmitting the content and manifest information to Customs
and stakeholders upon loading; (5) the ability to identify container tampering; and (6) a way for Customs to provide verification of a
container’s contents and integrity in a nonintrusive manner at the point of entry.
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AT: Econ – No impact 9/11 proves
Previous terrorist attacks were not the fault for a slow US economy
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Similarly, the U.S. economy did not slow down after the September 11 attacks; indeed, the economy was
accelerating its way out of the 2001 business-led downturn that had begun in the middle of
although consumer confidence fell sharply after the attacks, consumer spending in the
fourth quarter grew at an unprecedented 7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR), one of the
sharpest increases seen in the past decade (Figure 2.2). Unemployment did rise sharply after the
event, but this seemed to be primarily an acceleration of the employment loss that would have been expected
given the weak economic climate. This was especially true because labor markets were still overheated from the techin the midst of
2000. And
fueled economic boom of the late nineties. Retail sales did drop sharply in September 2001 but also rebounded sharply in October
and returned to trend in November—business delayed, not business cancelled. Indeed, it is hard to find any evidence of
an effect of the September 11 attacks on the aggregate economy, with the exception of that on the air travel
industry. Even in that case, the industry was in deep trouble beforehand, with profit margins dipping into the red in the beginning of
2000—long before the attacks. Even then, it must be remembered that total consumer spending went up, so the dollars that were not
spent on air travel went to some other part of the economy.
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AT: Econ – No impact natural disasters prove
Natural Disasters Do Not Cause Recessions
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
More local effects of disasters are easier to see in the data. The three state charts in Figure 2.3 show indexes of the quarterly path of
real personal income (adjusted for changes in the consumer price index) for substantial catastrophes in Florida, California, and New
York. Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, and the September 11 attacks each caused
approximately $25 billion to $30 billion worth of destruction in each state’s economy, in constant (2004)
dollars. The charts give a rough approximation of the disturbance to the local flow of the economy—business disturbances should
result in loss of economic output, and thus income. (Government transfers have been removed to exclude federal disaster relief
payments.) In all three cases we also show personal income for the balance of the United States as
frame of comparison. The quarter in which the disaster event occurred is highlighted.
a
Recessions are not caused by natural disasters
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
All this indicates that disasters, although tragic, are not recession- causing events. Recessions are
caused by a sharp, substantial, and sustained reduction in spending by one or more segments of the
economy. Typically, this segment is consumer spending on homes and durables, but not always. In the case of the 1953 recession,
and in the case of the 2001 recession, Department of Defense spending on the Korean War, and business spending on equipment
and software, were the respective segments that experienced reductions. Natural disasters might cause a sharp and
substantial decline in consumer spending, but that decline is very short-lived. Within a month or two,
there is more consumer spending, not less, because of repair and rebuilding activities. The hype of the effect of a disaster is typically
much greater than the reality. Business is only delayed, not cancelled, and the economy can quickly get
back on track.2
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A2 Terrorism
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1NC
Current methods are effective for employee screening—tamper proof and
biometric
Rockwell 2012- Washington Correspondent for Security News for Government Security News. (Mark, “TSA and U.S. Coast
Guard Extend TWIC Renewal” Government Security News, 6/18/2012
<http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/26569c=maritime_port_security> 6/19/12)
The Transportation Security Administration and the U.S. Coast Guard have implemented a new
option for ship crews and port workers to renew their security documentation. The two agencies
announced a new policy for Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) cards on June 15 that allows a temporary
extension. TWIC cards are the tamper-resistant biometric credential given to maritime workers
for
unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities, outer continental shelf facilities and ships. Those that
need unescorted access to secure areas aboard ships and all Coast Guard credentialed merchant
mariners have to possess a TWIC. To get the card, workers have to provide biographic and biometric
information, such as fingerprints, sit for a digital photograph and successfully pass a security threat
assessment conducted by TSA.
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The aff makes the terrorist smarter than they are- this helps them recruit and
leads us to over defend ports they aren’t capable of attacking
Bynum 10 – Ph.D in political science (Daniel Bynum; Staff Member of the 9/11 Commission , Policy Analyst
and Director for Research, Center for Middle East Public Policy, The RAND Corporation, Director of the Center for Peace and
Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, and
holds a Ph.D in Political Science; Written June 14, 2010; Accessed June 19, 2012; Brookings; http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/06/14-terrorism-byman, “Most Terrorists Lack Training, Expertise”)
In the years after 9/11, the images we were shown of terrorists were largely the same: shadowy jihadists who,
even when they were foiled, seemed always to have come terrifyingly close to pulling off a horrific attack. We’ve all
become familiar by now with the stock footage of Talibs in black shalwar kameezes zipping across monkey bars or, more recently,
perfecting kung fu kicks in some secret training camp. Even in the aftermath of the botched Times Square bombing earlier this
spring, the perception persists that our enemies are savvy and sophisticated killers. They’re
fanatical and highly organized—twin ideas that at once keep us fearful and help them attract
new members. But this view of the jihadist community is wildly off the mark. To be sure, some terrorists
are steely and skilled—people like Mohamed Atta, the careful and well-trained head of the 9/11 hijackers. Their leaders and
recruiters can be lethally subtle and manipulative, but the quiet truth is that many of the deluded foot soldiers are
foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable. Acknowledging this fact could help us tailor
our counterterrorism priorities—and publicizing it could help us erode the powerful images of
strength and piety that terrorists rely on for recruiting and funding. Nowhere is the gap between sinister
stereotype and ridiculous reality more apparent than in Afghanistan, where it’s fair to say that the Taliban employ
the world’s worst suicide bombers: one in two manages to kill only himself. And this success rate
hasn’t improved at all in the five years they’ve been using suicide bombers, despite the experience of hundreds of attacks—or
attempted attacks. In Afghanistan, as in many cultures, a manly embrace is a time-honored tradition for warriors before they go off
to face death. Thus, many suicide bombers never even make it out of their training camp or safe
house, as the pressure from these group hugs triggers the explosives in suicide vests. According to several sources at the United
Nations, as many as six would-be suicide bombers died last July after one such embrace in Paktika. Many Taliban operatives are just
as clumsy when suicide is not part of the plan. In November 2009, several Talibs transporting an improvised explosive device were
killed when it went off unexpectedly. The blast also took out the insurgents’ shadow governor in the province of Balkh. When
terrorists do execute an attack, or come close, they often have security failures to thank, rather than their own expertise. Consider
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—the Nigerian “Jockstrap Jihadist” who boarded a Detroit-bound jet in Amsterdam with a suicidal plan
in his head and some explosives in his underwear. Although the media colored the incident as a sophisticated al-Qaeda plot,
Abdulmutallab showed no great skill or cunning, and simple safeguards should have kept him off the plane in the first place. He was,
after all, traveling without luggage, on a one-way ticket that he purchased with cash. All of this while being on a U.S. government
watch list. Fortunately, Abdulmutallab, a college-educated engineer, failed to detonate his underpants. A few months later another
college grad, Faisal Shahzad, is alleged to have crudely rigged an SUV to blow up in Times Square. That plan fizzled and he was
quickly captured, despite the fact that he was reportedly trained in a terrorist boot camp in Pakistan. Indeed, though many of the
terrorists who strike in the West are well educated, their plots fail because they lack operational know-how. On
June 30, 2007, two men—one a medical doctor, the other studying for his Ph.D.—attempted a brazen attack on Glasgow Airport.
Their education did them little good. Planning to crash their propane-and-petrol-laden Jeep Cherokee into an airport terminal, the
men instead steered the SUV, with flames spurting out its windows, into a security barrier. The fiery crash destroyed only the Jeep,
and both men were easily apprehended; the driver later died from his injuries. (The day before, the same men had rigged two cars to
blow up near a London nightclub. That plan was thwarted when one car was spotted by paramedics and the other, parked illegally,
was removed by a tow truck. As a bonus for investigators, the would-be bombers’ cell phones, loaded with the phone numbers of
possible accomplices, were salvaged from the cars.) A similar streak of ineptitude has been on display in the
United States, where many of those arrested on terrorism-related charges possess long criminal
records and little sense of how to put a nefarious idea into action. A group of Miami men schemed (often
while smoking marijuana) to attack targets in South Florida as well as the Sears Tower in Chicago, but they couldn’t get their hands
on explosives and were uncovered when the FBI easily penetrated their ranks. If our terrorist enemies have been
successful at cultivating a false notion of expertise, they’ve done an equally convincing job of casting themselves
as pious warriors of God. The Taliban and al-Qaeda rely on sympathizers who consider them devoted Muslims
fighting immoral Western occupiers. But intelligence picked up by Predator drones and other battlefield cameras challenges that
idea—sometimes rather graphically. One video, captured recently by the thermal-imagery technology housed in a sniper rifle, shows
two Talibs in southern Afghanistan engaged in intimate relations with a donkey. Similar videos abound, including groundsurveillance footage that records a Talib fighter gratifying himself with a cow. Pentagon officials and intelligence analysts concede
privately that our foes also have a voracious appetite for pornography—hardly shocking behavior for young men, but hard to square
with an image of piety. Many laptops seized from the Taliban and al-Qaeda are loaded with smut. U.S. intelligence analysts have
devoted considerable time to poring over the terrorists’ favored Web sites, searching for hidden militant messages. “We have
terabytes of this stuff,” said one Department of Defense al-Qaeda analyst, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “It isn’t possible
that they are encrypting messages in all of this stuff. Some of these guys are just perverts.” Tawdry though this predilection for porn
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may be, it is not necessarily trivial. There is, after all, potential propaganda value in this kind of jihadist behavior.
Current U.S.
public diplomacy centers on selling America to the Muslim world, but we should also work to
undermine some of the myths built up around our enemies by highlighting their incompetence,
their moral failings, and their embarrassing antics. Beyond changing how the Muslim world perceives terrorists,
we can help ourselves make smarter counterterrorism choices by being more realistic about the
profile and aptitude of would-be attackers. More and more, as we work to disrupt training efforts, the jihadists
we face are likely to be poorly prepared, and while that won’t always ensure a bungled attack, it
suggests that terrorists are likely to select targets that are undefended and easy to hit. The United States has spent
billions on port security since 9/11, even though terrorists have shown little interest in ports as
targets and even less ability to actually strike them. In contrast, even small investments in
training for police and airport-security personnel can make a big difference, as these are the
people most likely to encounter—and have a chance to disrupt—an unskilled attacker. The difference
between a sophisticated killer like Mohamed Atta and so many of his hapless successors lies in training and inherent aptitude. Atta
spent months learning his trade in Afghanistan and had the help of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership—a fact that underscores the
importance of rooting out al-Qaeda havens in Pakistan. After all, fighting terrorism is a chore made simpler when
we can keep the terrorists as inept as most of them naturally are.
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No more funding is needed—high risk of overlap in existing grant programs
GAO 2012 (“HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination among Four Overlapping
Grant Programs” Government Accountability Office 2/12 <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-303> 6/22/12)
Multiple factors contribute to the risk of duplication among four FEMA grant programs that GAO
studied—the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), Federal Emergency Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI), Port Security Grant Program, and Transit Security Grant Program. Specifically,
these programs share similar goals, fund similar projects, and provide funds in the same
geographic regions. Further, DHS’s ability to track grant funding, specific funding recipients, and
funding purposes varies among the programs, giving FEMA less visibility over some grant
programs. Finally, DHS’s award process for some programs bases decisions on high-level, rather
than specific, project information. Although GAO’s analysis identified no cases of duplication among a sample of grant
projects, the above factors collectively put FEMA at risk of funding duplicative projects . FEMA officials stated
that there is a trade-off between enhancing management visibility and reducing administrative burden, but also recognized that
FEMA should use more specific project-level information for award decisions and have taken initial steps towards this goal. For
example, FEMA is considering how to better use existing grant information and has also begun to phase in a
However, FEMA has not
determined all of its specific data requirements. As FEMA determines these requirements, it will be
important to collect the level of information needed to compare projects across grant programs .
Given the limitations in currently collected information, FEMA would benefit from collecting information with
greater detail as this could help FEMA better position itself to assess applications and ensure that
it is using its resources effectively. FEMA, as well as state and local stakeholders, have taken steps to improve
coordination in administering the four programs, but FEMA could take further action. For example, FEMA does not
internally coordinate application reviews across the four programs. Specifically, the programs are
managed by two separate FEMA divisions which review grant applications for each program
separately and there is no process in place to ensure that application information is shared among
the programs during this process. Thus, it is difficult for FEMA to identify whether grant monies are being
used for the same or similar purposes. FEMA could benefit from further examining its internal grant coordination
grants management system that includes an explicit goal of collecting project-level information.
process, while considering the large volume of grant applications it must process. FEMA introduced some performance measures for
the UASI and SHSP programs in 2011 that add value, but these measures do not assess program effectiveness. FEMA has efforts
under way to develop outcome measures—that will focus on program effectiveness—for each of the four grant programs in this
review, but has not completed these efforts. Further, the FEMA project plan that guides these efforts does not provide information
on what measures will be implemented for each grant program and when this will occur. A revised project plan that includes more
specific schedule information and accurate implementation timelines could help guide these efforts. DHS also has several
efforts under way to measure the collective effectiveness of its grant programs in achieving shared
program goals, but these efforts are recent and ongoing. Thus, it is too soon to evaluate the extent to
which these initiatives will provide FEMA with the information it needs to determine whether
these grant programs are effectively improving the nation’s security.
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Economists’ predictions of the effect of a terrorist attack on the economy are
highly exaggerated
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Previous Port Closures Hold Lessons for the Present When economists trying to make predictions are faced with a
long list of unknowns, they can either develop complex models to help answer the questions before
them or look to historical events that might provide lessons for the future. The complex questions stemming
from a terrorist attack on the port complex cannot be answered easily within a typical static input-output
(IO) model, because the economy is flexible and will work to mitigate the potential damage caused by a
supply chain disruption. Input-output models assume a mechanical structure in which a resource unused in one place remains
unused. For example, there is an assumption that a laid-off worker will not try to find new employment,
or that a factory, denied a critical component, will simply shut down instead of finding an alternative
supplier. Of course, these assumptions are not true. Input-output models tend to highly exaggerate
the true cost (and also the true benefits under other circumstances) of economic events.
Terrorism won’t impact the economy – past labor strikes were worse for ports
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Of course, a labor action is not the same as a terrorist attack; labor actions can be anticipated to some extent,
whereas lack of anticipation is intrinsic to terrorist attacks. However,
similarities remain. The labor actions of the
sixties and seventies were often marked by wildcat strikes and work slowdowns, deliberately created
to reduce or prevent mitigating actions on the part of the companies involved. Furthermore, there cannot
now be an unexpected, surprise terrorist strike at U.S. ports. Because of the terrorist threat, many
businesses have put in place redundancies and contingencies that will help mitigate the disruption
caused by a port attack, just as they undoubtedly did in anticipation of the port strikes that loomed in the
1960s. Furthermore, it is our understanding from interviews with experts, that it is highly unlikely that the physical
damage from an attack would be enough to close the combined ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach completely. The size of the port complex and the large amount of excess physical capacity would
make it nearly impossible for a conventional attack to stop or even reduce substantially the amount of cargo
that currently moves through the ports—as long as authorities intervened to allow displaced shippers to use other parts
of the complex. The port might nonetheless be shut down if the dockworkers refused to work or were
prevented from working by the government. Such a directive might affect all the ports on one or both coasts.
Although the United States is considerably more trade-dependent today than in earlier periods, this potential vulnerability is offset
by a number of factors. One is the shift from ship to aircraft for delivery of many high-value, time-sensitive goods, particularly on the
export side. Second, countermeasures to a terrorist strike, such as increased inspections of containers, may be
more onerous for imports coming from uncertain ports than for exports packaged in the United
States. And although a widespread labor action would stop most maritime trade completely, a
terrorist strike would only slow trade rather than stop it. When added together, these factors mean that the
disruption to the flow of goods as a result of a current terrorist attack could be roughly similar in size to the effect of a major port
strike in the 1960s. percent—this during a period when the United States regularly exported more goods than it imported.
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Terrorist attacks would disrupt supply chains for only 60 days government is
prepared
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
We believe that the same would be likely after a terrorist attack on a port: Its effects are not
likely to show up other than in imports and exports. Of course, our study presumes a short- to
medium-term disruption to the supply chain, limited to approximately 60 days, as were the labor
actions we study. It is our belief that lengthier disruptions are highly unlikely as long as the
government is prepared to intervene.
Nuclear Terrorism is unlikely – bomb materials rare and well defended
Allison 4- Assistant Secretary of Defense under Clinton (Graham Allison; dean of Harvard's School of
Government, Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Special Advisor to the Secretary of Defense under
Reagan; Assistant Secretary of Defense under Clinton; recipient of the Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service; Written
November 16, 2004; “Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe”;
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5049.html/_res/id=sa_File1/Nuclear_-Terrorism.pdf; Accessed June 25,
2012)
Part II is the more controversial part of the book. The book's conceptual advance has largely gone unrecognized, certainly by the U.S.
government, which is that this ultimate terrorist attack, this attack that could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans in one
fell swoop, is preventable. However, there is no way, no level of activity, no degree of security, that we could
organize that would prevent some future terrorist attacks on America. That will happen 100 percent in my
view, and I think most of the national security community is unanimous about that . But the good news with
respect to the worst form of terrorist attack, the ultimate terrorist attack, is that that kind of attack is preventable. So how
can that be? The answer is because with respect to this ultimate terrorist catastrophe, there exists a strategic
narrow to the problem, a chokepoint in effect, which we could choke, and which if we did choke would lead to the reduction of
the likelihood of such an event to nearly zero. Now, how does that work? Fortunately, in order to make a nuclear explosion
you have to have one of two very rare items or materials, either highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
Neither of these materials exists in nature. Neither can be made in your bathtub or in your back yard or in
your basement. Each requires a multibillion-dollar investment and a decade-long substantial facility in
order to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Iran, for example, has been working on this project for about
eighteen years and is just now coming to conclusion. So it's not impossible for a state to do, but it requires a big and
substantial—and, indeed, visible—effort. Now, unfortunately, if a terrorist short-circuits this process by
starting with highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the rest of the process is rather straightforward. So with
respect to the highly enriched uranium that exists today, which is a finite amount of stuff—a lot, but a finite
amount—do human beings know how to lock up things successfully that we don't want people to steal? I ask: Does the
United States lose any gold from Fort Knox? —Answer: not an ounce. Does Russia lose any treasures from the Kremlin
Armory? —No, none. So could you imagine locking up nuclear weapons and material as good as gold
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Improving the scanning program would impede trade and hurt the economy
Terreri 09—World Trade [April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Donnelly at NAM believes the 100 percent scanning directive is heading in the wrong direction. "It
treats all cargo the same, spreading our limited enforcement resources across all shipments,
rather than targeting shipments from riskier shippers from dubious places. Major transnational companies
with overseas plants shipping to their own companies here in the U.S. every two weeks should
not be subjected to the same intensive security review as an unknown shipper. Established shippers
and importers have invested in government programs like C-TPAT and are sharing information to assure their supply chains are
secure. Security
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checks need to focus where the risks are the greatest."
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Emphasis on Port Defense is flawed- terrorists will attack easier non-port targets
or find new ways around port security
Shie 4- from the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Tamar Renee Shie; Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University and a visiting author for CSIS; Written October 15, 2004, Accessed June 19, 2012,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/-pac0445a.pdf; “Ships and Terrorists – Thinking Beyond Port Security”; CSIS)
First, the emphasis on upgrading the security of major ports neglects the fact that these represent
only a single link in the transportation chain. A shipping container may pass through some 15
physical locations and some two dozen individuals and/or companies while traveling from
departure point to destination. Because containers are only searched at the major port, there is
no guarantee they cannot be waylaid in route after that point. Second, the CSI conducts security
checks only on U.S. bound containers. Therefore even if a tampered container arrives at a major
port, if it is destined for a port other than the U.S., it is more likely to escape notice. Containers
between the major ports of Singapore and Shenzhen or Pusan and Hong Kong are not subject to CSI requirements. Yet terrorist
assaults on U.S. ships or interests can occur outside the U.S. Third, as major ports increase
security, terrorists will look for other maritime targets or other means to target those ports.
Terrorists are increasingly aiming at soft targets. Attacking maritime targets has never been
particularly easy, often requiring a greater sophistication in planning, training, and coordination
than those aimed at many land-based facilities. This is why maritime terrorism is rather rare, and why
terrorists are less likely to attack a more secure major port. Yet in considering maritime terrorist
threat scenarios – using a ship to smuggle goods or weapons, sinking a vessel in a major
shipping thoroughfare, using a ship as a weapon, or even targeting maritime vessels – none
require access to a major port or a shipping container to carry out a strike. There remain
numerous small ports and small vessels not covered under the new security initiatives. The ISPS
Code for instance only covers ships of 500 tons or more and port facilities that serve large international-bound vessels. The Code
would not have protected the USS Cole. How else might terrorists strike? Piracy in Southeast Asia may provide a clue as to how
terrorists will respond to these new measures. In 2002, there were 161 actual and attempted pirate attacks in Southeast Asian
waters. Of those, 73 percent occurred within ports. The following year, of the 187 attacks, only 37 percent occurred within ports.
Between the two years, the total number of attacks increased by 26. In the first quarter of 2004, of the 41 reported attacks, only onethird were committed in ports. Also between 2002 and 2003 pirate attacks in traditionally targeted ports fell while they rose in ports
where few if any attacks were previously reported. Though it may be too soon to definitively tell, it would appear that
pirates are adapting to the more stringent security measures in larger ports. If pirates can do it,
so can terrorists. Finally, an attack on a major port does not require terrorists to gain direct access
to that port. As pirates are capable of attempting more attacks on vessels at sea, it is not
unimaginable that terrorists will commandeer a ship at sea and steer it toward a target. The bomb,
biological, chemical or radiological agents, or even nuclear materials, can be loaded onto the ship once seized. Then they head for a
port or another ship. The May 2004 collision between two cargo ships off Singapore’s Sentosa Island illustrates how easily terrorists
could conduct a similar but more disastrous operation.
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Increased trade introduces invasive species, which can`t be fixed—international
problem
Keller 2011-worked at the Program on the Global Environment at the University of Chicago, Illinois (Reuben P., Charles
Perrings- worked at the ecoSERVICES Group in the School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe “International Policy
Options for Reducing the Environmental Impacts of Invasive Species” Bioscience 12/11 ProQuest 6/20/12)
Preventing the spread of nonnative invasive species is an international public good. Some categories of invasive species-such as
diseases of humans and livestock-are addressed by international agreements that coordinate efforts to reduce their spread. In
contrast, invasive species that primarily cause environmental impacts are managed almost exclusively at
the national level. Control of environmental invaders is internationally undersupplied because
the efforts of nations that do invest to prevent their spread are undercut by nations that do not.
Addressing this problem will require international cooperation. We identify the international approach to
controlling human diseases as a model that could provide institutions and mechanisms to map the spread of environmental invaders
and assess the risks they impose. This would allow individual nations to manage potential vectors of invasion. Because such a system
is unlikely to be implemented in the near future, we make recommendations for intermediate steps, including the widespread
adoption of existing risk assessments and importation standards. Keywords: Convention on Biological Diversity, sanitary and
phytosanitary agreement, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, invasive species International trade
increases human welfare but also leads
to the introduction and establishment of nonnative invasive
species, such as human and livestock diseases, pests and diseases of crops, and species that cause environmental harm. The
increasingly global nature of trade means that efforts to prevent the spread of invasive species
should be internationally coordinated. To this end, there are already relatively advanced international programs in
place for identifying and managing the spread of human diseases, and the 178 member nations of the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) have agreed to report outbreaks of animal diseases, mostly diseases of livestock, to a central database. These programs
allow nations to track invasive species threats and to use the shared information to impose import restrictions. Species known to be
diseases and pests of crops are often the focus of quarantine inspections at national borders, but this varies by country and there is
little international coordination. In contrast, nonnative invasive species that do not directly affect human health or agriculture are
generally perceived to primarily pose risks of environmental harm. Few international agreements exist to control
the spread of these species, and at an international scale, they are traded with much less
inspection and fewer efforts to prevent their spread. This essay addresses the potential for wiser management of
these species, which we refer to as environmental invaders. Despite the lack of international efforts to prevent their spread,
environmental invaders have enormous environmental, economic, cultural, and human-health
impacts (Pejchar and Mooney 2008, Sala et al. 2000). These include reductions in the populations of desirable
native species as a result of predation, competition, parasitism, and disease. An example of this is the
invasion of European waterways by North American crayfish, which both compete directly with native crayfish for resources and
carry the crayfish plague disease (Aphanomyces astaci) that has devastated European crayfish populations (Gherardi and Holdich
1999). Economic impacts can arise in a variety of ways, including the costs of herbicides and
pesticides to control nonnative invaders in national parks and the costs of cleaning industrial
facilities that become infested with invaders (e.g., zebra mussel [Dreissena polymorpha] infestations of
power plants in the Laurentian Great Lakes require the facilities to close down while workers
clean pipes; Leung et al. 2002). Cultural and human-health impacts can also arise in many ways, but a
good example comes from cases in which invasive species become so prolific that farmers
abandon agricultural land, leading to the loss of traditional farmland and agricultural practices
and potentially to human-health impacts from reduced food supplies. This has occurred in
Mexico, where it is no longer feasible in some areas to control the invasive bracken fern (Pteridium aquilinum; Schneider and
Geoghegan 2006). The introduction of environmental invaders is an externality of trade (Perrings et al.
2002, 2005). That is, the impacts of these species are not incorporated into the costs of doing trade, and
those who trade the species have no economic incentive to reduce the invasion risks inherent in their
business. For example, the global horticultural trade is responsible for many thousands of invasions of harmful plants and plant
diseases around the world (Reichard and White 2001, Dehnen-Schmutz et al. 2007). However, the environmental costs
are not borne by either exporters or importers. Instead, these costs are spread
widely among society as government agencies spend taxpayer dollars on inspection,
interception, eradication, containment, and compensation. Two factors have hampered efforts to slow the
international spread of environmental invaders. First, although nations generally act defensively to control
invasive species, the benefits arising from that control are almost always shared broadly among
those at risk of being invaded, not just among those who pay for the control (Perrings et al. 2002). For
example, if a country spends resources to ensure a disease-free horticultural industry, all nations to which it
imposed by this trade
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exports benefit from a reduced likelihood that they will be invaded. In the absence of cooperation, however,
individual countries will protect their own borders but are less likely to commit resources to preventing
the export of invaders. Because the invasion risk to which a country is exposed depends on the
actions of its neighbors and trading partners, this means that countries face higher risks than they
would if there were greater cooperation. Second, controlling the spread of an invasive species is a
"weakest-link" public good (Perrings et al. 2002). Although the risks posed by any nation will depend on a complex set of
climatic, biogeophysical, and social factors, including the type of trade they engage in and its volume, the overall global risk
will be strongly determined by the nations or trades that operate the least effective programs to
control species transport. Because removal of an invasive pest from trade requires all those involved to
contribute, and because little is gained by providing more than the country making the smallest
contribution, there is an incentive to adopt a matching strategy-to converge on the weakest link. This is
because unilateral action cannot prevent the pest from continuously spreading through trade (Touza
and Perrings 2011). Nevertheless, even though enhancing cooperative efforts should be the ultimate goal of a collective strategy to
manage the problem of environmental invasions, there is much that can be done independently. In this article, we identify
alternative strategies at the national and international levels for reducing the spread of environmental invaders with or without
cooperation. We begin by reviewing existing unilateral defensive efforts to reduce exposure and by identifying programs that have
been successful and could be implemented more widely without the need for additional international policy. We then consider the
options for effective coordinated international management, building on existing commitments by countries under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and on the international success achieved in managing human diseases. Finally, we discuss the options
for achieving at least some of the gains that could be had from coordinated action without the need for renegotiation of any
multilateral agreement. Figure 1 summarizes our recommendations. National efforts to manage the spread of environmental
invaders Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its constituent agreements, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), individual countries have
the right to take actions in restraint of trade if those actions are needed in order to protect food safety and animal or plant health. In
contrast to those that deal with human diseases, these agreements authorize only national defensive measures. That is, individual
nations have direct responsibility for managing risks to themselves posed by the many vectors of nonnative species introduction
(table 1) but are not permitted under the GATT and the SPS agreement to cooperate in the collective control of pest or pathogen
transmission through trade restrictions. The standard-setting bodies for the SPS agreement-the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC), the OIE, and Codex Alimentarius-do cooperate in setting sanitary and phytosanitary standards and reporting
requirements for member countries. This has led to the harmonization of rules on classes of traded commodities involving known
risks. The OIE has also coordinated veterinary campaigns against particular pathogens within member countries and has achieved
success in the eradication of rinderpest, one of the most damaging of all animal pathogens (Normile 2008). But only in the case of
novel human diseases does there exist an agreement to take collective action in restraint of trade as a precautionary measure.
Environmental invaders can be transported to a country through intentional or unintentional vectors. Regardless of the vector, it is
widely accepted that the most cost-effective way to reduce total impacts from nonnative invasive species is to prevent their arrival
and establishment (see figure 1a, 1b; IUCN 2000, Leung et al. 2002, Lodge et al. 2006, Keller et al. 2007, 2009). That is, preventing
the arrival of an invasive species will generally lead to less harm than addressing the species after it enters a country. Nations can
choose from a range of options to prevent a species' arrival, including restrictions on trade in species of concern, requirements on
exporters to ensure that invaders do not leave their shores or do not survive transit, and the operations of quarantine and inspection
facilities at the point of entry (Lodge et al. 2006). Importantly, policies focused on prevention have more opportunities to shift the
burden of responsibility to the industries that profit from risky trade in live organisms (Perrings et al. 2005). As an example of a
prevention program, most plant shipments to the United States must be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate to show that
they were produced at a facility following high standards for the control of plant diseases and parasites. This system puts the costs of
obtaining certificates and those of producing relatively safe plants onto exporters. In contrast, established plant pest species can
generally be controlled only through expensive techniques such as manually pulling plants or the use of herbicides and pesticides.
Because it is almost never possible to determine the party responsible for an invasion, these costs have never (to the best of our
knowledge) been passed on to importers or consumers who benefited from imports. Intentionally introduced species, including pets,
crops, and garden plants (table 1), provide many economic and social benefits. They also often become environmental invaders or
act as vectors for environmental invaders (Jeschke and Strayer 2005). Efforts to reduce imports of environmental invaders generally
consist of individual-species risk assessments so that resources can be focused on those species posing the highest risk. Because the
proportion of traded species that become invasive is generally low (Smith et al. 1999), this approach leaves most species-those with
low risk of invasion-unaffected. The approach has been shown to yield financial benefits for importing countries (Keller et al. 2007),
whereas fewer invasions confers environmental, social, and agricultural benefits. The most prominent riskassessment procedure
currently available is the Australian Weed Risk Assessment (WRA; Pheloung 1995). Australian government scientists developed this
tool in the early 1990s, and in 1997, it was introduced as a mandatory screening tool for all new plant species proposed for
introduction to Australia. Species assessed as posing a high risk are not allowed to be imported. The WRA has been demonstrated to
have good accuracy in Australia, New Zealand, Florida, Hawaii, and the Czech Republic (Gordon et al. 2008). It has been adopted in
a modified form by New Zealand. In contrast to intentional introductions, species transported unintentionally have some probability
of becoming invasive but are not expected to provide benefits. This means that efforts to prevent their arrival can aim to simply
remove all organisms from transport. Although this is conceptually simple, the number and magnitude of
unintentional vectors makes preventing introductions an enormous challenge. For example, the global
maritime fleet includes more than 99,000 large vessels and moves most international trade (IMO 2009). Each arriving ship
presents risks of introducing new nonnative species entrained in its ballast water, attached to its
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hull, and in the cargo it offloads (table 1; Keller et al. 2011). It is unlikely that any nation could commit
sufficient resources to ensure that all arriving ships are free of invasive species. Each vector of
unintentional species transport requires a different management approach. This approach needs to be based on the trade moving
the species, the mode of transport, and the available technology. For example, the approaches necessary to limit the movement of
fouling organisms of recreational boats are very different from those required to prevent the spread of invasive mollusks on watergarden plants or of forest pests in wooden packaging material. One relatively successful approach to limiting the spread of
unintentional invaders is the US phytosanitary certificate system mentioned previously. This program aims to prevent the arrival of
diseases, parasites, and plants that unintentionally accompany a traded species. It does this by requiring certain standards of plant
and soil hygiene at facilities that grow plants for export to the United States. It is consistent with the United States' obligations as a
signatory to the WTO's SPS agreement (Hedley 2004). Although the number of risk-assessment tools and
vector management strategies continues to increase, they still provide protection against only a
small proportion of the vectors that introduce invasive species. We offer two suggestions for improving this situation
within the current international policy framework. First, some existing risk-assessment tools have been shown to perform well in a
range of countries (e.g., Gordon et al. 2008), and other nations could adopt those tools. This was done by New Zealand when it
adopted a modified version of the Australian WRA. In many cases, it may be possible for nations to relatively cheaply adopt tools
developed elsewhere. Second, established national standards for treating vectors of unintentional introduction could be adopted by
other countries. For example, the US Phytosanitary Certificate program could probably be adopted by other importing countries
because many export facilities are already set up to achieve its standards. Further developing and applying these tools and standards
would serve a double purpose by directly protecting those countries that adopt the procedures and by providing indirect protection
to other nations that would subsequently be less likely to receive invaders from their trading partners. Although there are
potential advances to be made in national defensive policies, these can never provide the level of
protection that would arise from increased international cooperation (see figure 1c). Most vectors could
be more efficiently rendered free of invasive species in their country of origin. This would, for
example, reduce the demand on quarantine facilities at ports of entry. Such coordination is currently
unlikely for at least three reasons. First and foremost, there are no international agreements or bodies that are
mandated to implement such a coordinated approach. Second, the "free-rider" issue means that
the financially rational approach for many countries is to take the benefits from trading with
countries that implement higher standards but not to pay the costs to implement those
standards in their own operations. Finally, many countries lack the resources, institutions, or political will
to implement such policies. Without programs to transfer resources and expertise to these
countries, they will remain weak links and will continue to pose a risk to all other nations.
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Terrorist are rational and US response- incites more terrorist action
Weihao 12 Ph.D Candidate (Weihao Yin is at Virginia TechReserach Assistant at Virginia Tech A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
MARITIME SECURITY INSPECTION UNDER U.S. SECURITY PROTOCOLS 12 PDF
http://www.trforum.org/forum/downloads/2012_22_Maritime_Security_Inspection.pdf)
Kanev (2005) defined terrorism as the behavior of rational individuals, not as a pathological
deviation from an economic point of view. Moreover, Addison, T. and S. Murshed (2002) further
pointed out terrorists’ actions of taking the lives of innocent victims serve just as instruments for
achieving their political goals as well as economic benefits. At most occasion, terrorists are more
concerned whether governments’ reactions such as social policy transformation are consistent
with their desired goals or not. The way in which an administration reacts to a terrorist attack is
usually to set up new and more aggressive security measures. However, not only do the organized terrorist
actions but the ways in which terrorists react to counteraction to terrorism demonstrate their
rationality. (Kanev, 2005) To illustrate, increasingly strict security regulations and deployment
of advanced security equipment and facilities in airport are possibly reacted by terrorists with
attacks on railway and maritime transportation. Therefore, appropriate measures taken will
significantly counter the extreme actions of terrorists
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2NC Terrorism: costs of port security too high
Deterring terrorist by making cost higher than the reward
Weihao 12 Ph.D Candidate (Weihao Yin is at Virginia TechReserach Assistant at Virginia Tech A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
MARITIME SECURITY INSPECTION UNDER U.S. SECURITY PROTOCOLS 12 PDF
http://www.trforum.org/forum/downloads/2012_22_Maritime_Security_Inspection.pdf)
If the target countries are considered as the providers of these two resources
as benefits, then9 the
terrorists are those who try to take possession of these two resources, and the cost they spend on
their “purchasing behavior” is the money and time they spend on terrorist activities such as training
participants or accomplices. Thus, terrorists are at the demand side, and the target countries are at the
supply side. The behavioral assumption of rationality allows for the explanation of terrorists’ decisions on the number and size
of terrorist acts as dependent on marginal benefits and costs of terrorism. Furthermore, the revenue of the supply side
could be calculated as the attack intentions discarded by the terrorists due to effective measures
taken for protection purposes. This means that by taking proper measures, it is possible to reduce the
potential risk of terrorist activities. Furthermore, the target country is regarded as the only “manufacturer”
who provides the desired resources in the marketplace such that this country has monopoly of
the so-called supply. It has to be pointed out that terrorist groups’ ability to conduct an attack and their determination varies
from group to group. If the cost to achieve their goals is prohibitively high, some terrorist groups may
give up or at least reconsider their decision. Therefore, the elasticity of the demand may vary for
different terrorist organizations, and based on this reason, price discrimination should be used
to get the maximum revenue. It means differentiated security measures should be established to ensure that the
protection work becomes more effective. More specifically, the segment of high elasticity should receive lower
cost, while the resource for preventing terrorists’ action should be exerted in the market segment
of low elasticity.
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2NC Terrorism: Invasive Species
Turn—increased terrorism initiatives make the country more vulnerable to
invasive species—post-9/11 empirics prove
Associated Press 2011 (“9-11 protections allowed invasive species a way in” The Daily Breeze 10/10/11 ProQuest
6/20/12)
AGRICULTURE: A new focus on anti-terrorism took away attention from parasites. FRESNO - Dozens
of foreign insects
and plant diseases slipped undetected into the United States in the years after 9-11, when
authorities were so focused on preventing another attack that they overlooked a pest explosion
that threatened the quality of the nation's food supply. At the time, hundreds of agricultural scientists
responsible for stopping invasive species at the border were reassigned to anti-terrorism duties
in the newly formed Homeland Security Department - a move that scientists say cost billions of dollars in crop
damage and eradication efforts from California vineyards to Florida citrus groves. The consequences come
home to consumers in the form of higher grocery prices, substandard produce and the risk of
environmental damage from chemicals needed to combat the pests. An Associated Press analysis of
inspection records found that border-protection officials were so engrossed in stopping
terrorists that they all but ignored the country's exposure to destructive new insects and
infections - a quietly growing menace that has been attacking fruits and vegetables and even prized forests ever since. "Whether
they know it or not, every person in the country is affected by this, whether by the quality or cost of
their food, the pesticide residue on food or not being able to enjoy the outdoors because beetles are killing off the
trees," said Mark Hoddle, an entomologist specializing in invasive species at the University of California,
Riverside. Homeland Security officials acknowledge making mistakes and say they are now working to step up
agricultural inspections at border checkpoints, airports and seaports. While not as dire as terrorism, the threat is
considerable and hard to contain. Many invasive species are carried into the U.S. by people who
are either unaware of the laws or are purposely trying to skirt quarantine regulations. The
hardest to stop are fruits, vegetables and spices carried by international travelers or shipped by
mail. If tainted with insects or infections, they could carry contagions capable of devastating
crops. Plants and cut flowers can harbor larvae, as can bags of bulk commodities such as rice. Beetles have been found hitchhiking
on the bottom of tiles from Italy, and boring insects have burrowed into the wooden pallets commonly used in cargo shipments.
Invasive species have been sneaking into North America since Europeans arrived on the continent, and many got established long
before 9-11. But the abrupt shift in focus that followed the attacks caused a steep decline in
agricultural inspections that allowed more pests to invade U.S. farms and forests. Using the Freedom
of Information Act, the AP obtained data on border inspections covering the period from 2001 to 2010. The analysis showed that
the number of inspections, along with the number of foreign species that were stopped, fell
dramatically in the years after the Homeland Security Department was formed. Over much of the same
period, the number of crop-threatening pests that got into the U.S spiked, from eight in 1999 to at
least 30 last year. The bugs targeted some of the nation's most productive agricultural regions,
particularly California and Florida, with their warm year-round climates that make it easy for foreign species
to survive the journey and reproduce in their new home. A look at the damage: No fewer than 19 Mediterranean fruit
fly infestations took hold in California, and the European grapevine moth triggered spraying and quarantines across wine country.
The Asian citrus psyllid, which can carry a disease that has decimated Florida orange groves, crossed the border
from Mexico, threatening California's $1.8 billion citrus industry. New Zealand's light brown
apple moth also emerged in California, prompting the government in 2008 to bombard the
Monterey Bay area with 1,600 pounds of pesticides. The spraying drew complaints that it caused
respiratory problems and killed birds. Officials spent $110 million to eradicate the moth, but it
didn't work. The sweet orange scab, a fungal disease that infects citrus, appeared in Florida, Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi,
which all imposed quarantines. Chili thrips, rice cutworms and the plant disease gladiolus rust also got into Florida, which saw a 27
percent increase in new pests and pathogens between 2003 and 2007. The erythrina gall wasp decimated Hawaii's wiliwili trees,
which bear seeds used to make leis. Forests from Minnesota to the Northeast were also affected by beetles such as the emerald ash
borer, many of which arrived in Chinese shipping pallets because regulations weren't enforced. In all, the number of pest
cases intercepted at U.S. ports of entry fell from more than 81,200 in 2002 to fewer than 58,500
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in 2006, before creeping back up in 2007, when the farm industry and members of Congress began complaining. Once the
pests get established, costs can quickly spiral out of control. The most widely quoted economic
analysis, conducted in 2004 by Cornell University, puts the total annual cost of all invasive species in the
U.S. at $120 billion. Much of that burden is borne by consumers in the form of higher food costs
and by taxpayers who pay for government eradication programs. For instance, if the destructive
infection known as citrus canker were to become established in California, which produces most of the
nation's fresh oranges, consumers would pay up to $130 million more a year for the fruit , according to an
ongoing study by scientists at University of California, Davis.
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2NC Terrorism Improves terrorist tactics
The aff makes the terrorist smarter than they are- this helps them recruit and
leads us to over defend ports they aren’t capable of attacking
Bynum 10 – Ph.D in political science (Daniel Bynum; Staff Member of the 9/11 Commission , Policy Analyst
and Director for Research, Center for Middle East Public Policy, The RAND Corporation, Director of the Center for Peace and
Security Studies and the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, and
holds a Ph.D in Political Science; Written June 14, 2010; Accessed June 19, 2012; Brookings; http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/06/14-terrorism-byman, “Most Terrorists Lack Training, Expertise”)
In the years after 9/11, the images we were shown of terrorists were largely the same: shadowy jihadists who,
even when they were foiled, seemed always to have come terrifyingly close to pulling off a horrific attack. We’ve all
become familiar by now with the stock footage of Talibs in black shalwar kameezes zipping across monkey bars or, more recently,
perfecting kung fu kicks in some secret training camp. Even in the aftermath of the botched Times Square bombing earlier this
spring, the perception persists that our enemies are savvy and sophisticated killers. They’re
fanatical and highly organized—twin ideas that at once keep us fearful and help them attract
new members. But this view of the jihadist community is wildly off the mark. To be sure, some terrorists
are steely and skilled—people like Mohamed Atta, the careful and well-trained head of the 9/11 hijackers. Their leaders and
recruiters can be lethally subtle and manipulative, but the quiet truth is that many of the deluded foot soldiers are
foolish and untrained, perhaps even untrainable. Acknowledging this fact could help us tailor
our counterterrorism priorities—and publicizing it could help us erode the powerful images of
strength and piety that terrorists rely on for recruiting and funding. Nowhere is the gap between sinister
stereotype and ridiculous reality more apparent than in Afghanistan, where it’s fair to say that the Taliban employ
the world’s worst suicide bombers: one in two manages to kill only himself. And this success rate
hasn’t improved at all in the five years they’ve been using suicide bombers, despite the experience of hundreds of attacks—or
attempted attacks. In Afghanistan, as in many cultures, a manly embrace is a time-honored tradition for warriors before they go off
to face death. Thus, many suicide bombers never even make it out of their training camp or safe
house, as the pressure from these group hugs triggers the explosives in suicide vests. According to several sources at the United
Nations, as many as six would-be suicide bombers died last July after one such embrace in Paktika. Many Taliban operatives are just
as clumsy when suicide is not part of the plan. In November 2009, several Talibs transporting an improvised explosive device were
killed when it went off unexpectedly. The blast also took out the insurgents’ shadow governor in the province of Balkh. When
terrorists do execute an attack, or come close, they often have security failures to thank, rather than their own expertise. Consider
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—the Nigerian “Jockstrap Jihadist” who boarded a Detroit-bound jet in Amsterdam with a suicidal plan
in his head and some explosives in his underwear. Although the media colored the incident as a sophisticated al-Qaeda plot,
Abdulmutallab showed no great skill or cunning, and simple safeguards should have kept him off the plane in the first place. He was,
after all, traveling without luggage, on a one-way ticket that he purchased with cash. All of this while being on a U.S. government
watch list. Fortunately, Abdulmutallab, a college-educated engineer, failed to detonate his underpants. A few months later another
college grad, Faisal Shahzad, is alleged to have crudely rigged an SUV to blow up in Times Square. That plan fizzled and he was
quickly captured, despite the fact that he was reportedly trained in a terrorist boot camp in Pakistan. Indeed, though many of the
terrorists who strike in the West are well educated, their plots fail because they lack operational know-how. On
June 30, 2007, two men—one a medical doctor, the other studying for his Ph.D.—attempted a brazen attack on Glasgow Airport.
Their education did them little good. Planning to crash their propane-and-petrol-laden Jeep Cherokee into an airport terminal, the
men instead steered the SUV, with flames spurting out its windows, into a security barrier. The fiery crash destroyed only the Jeep,
and both men were easily apprehended; the driver later died from his injuries. (The day before, the same men had rigged two cars to
blow up near a London nightclub. That plan was thwarted when one car was spotted by paramedics and the other, parked illegally,
was removed by a tow truck. As a bonus for investigators, the would-be bombers’ cell phones, loaded with the phone numbers of
possible accomplices, were salvaged from the cars.) A similar streak of ineptitude has been on display in the
United States, where many of those arrested on terrorism-related charges possess long criminal
records and little sense of how to put a nefarious idea into action. A group of Miami men schemed (often
while smoking marijuana) to attack targets in South Florida as well as the Sears Tower in Chicago, but they couldn’t get their hands
on explosives and were uncovered when the FBI easily penetrated their ranks. If our terrorist enemies have been
successful at cultivating a false notion of expertise, they’ve done an equally convincing job of casting themselves
as pious warriors of God. The Taliban and al-Qaeda rely on sympathizers who consider them devoted Muslims
fighting immoral Western occupiers. But intelligence picked up by Predator drones and other battlefield cameras challenges that
idea—sometimes rather graphically. One video, captured recently by the thermal-imagery technology housed in a sniper rifle, shows
two Talibs in southern Afghanistan engaged in intimate relations with a donkey. Similar videos abound, including groundsurveillance footage that records a Talib fighter gratifying himself with a cow. Pentagon officials and intelligence analysts concede
privately that our foes also have a voracious appetite for pornography—hardly shocking behavior for young men, but hard to square
with an image of piety. Many laptops seized from the Taliban and al-Qaeda are loaded with smut. U.S. intelligence analysts have
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devoted considerable time to poring over the terrorists’ favored Web sites, searching for hidden militant messages. “We have
terabytes of this stuff,” said one Department of Defense al-Qaeda analyst, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “It isn’t possible
that they are encrypting messages in all of this stuff. Some of these guys are just perverts.” Tawdry though this predilection for porn
may be, it is not necessarily trivial. There is, after all, potential propaganda value in this kind of jihadist behavior. Current U.S.
public diplomacy centers on selling America to the Muslim world, but we should also work to
undermine some of the myths built up around our enemies by highlighting their incompetence,
their moral failings, and their embarrassing antics. Beyond changing how the Muslim world perceives terrorists,
we can help ourselves make smarter counterterrorism choices by being more realistic about the
profile and aptitude of would-be attackers. More and more, as we work to disrupt training efforts, the jihadists
we face are likely to be poorly prepared, and while that won’t always ensure a bungled attack, it
suggests that terrorists are likely to select targets that are undefended and easy to hit. The United States has spent
billions on port security since 9/11, even though terrorists have shown little interest in ports as
targets and even less ability to actually strike them. In contrast, even small investments in
training for police and airport-security personnel can make a big difference, as these are the
people most likely to encounter—and have a chance to disrupt—an unskilled attacker. The difference
between a sophisticated killer like Mohamed Atta and so many of his hapless successors lies in training and inherent aptitude. Atta
spent months learning his trade in Afghanistan and had the help of al-Qaeda’s senior leadership—a fact that underscores the
importance of rooting out al-Qaeda havens in Pakistan. After all, fighting terrorism is a chore made simpler when
we can keep the terrorists as inept as most of them naturally are.
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2NC Terrorism—No Impact – strikes prove
No impact-terrorists attack similar to past labor actions
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Therefore, we feel that these historic labor actions correspond closely enough to the kind of port disruption
that a terrorist attack might bring to tell us a lot about the probable effect on the national economy of
a terrorist attack on the ports. We will show how these labor actions are visible in the import data and export data of the
period. In all cases, there was a small increase in import volume before these actions, a drop in volume
during the action, and a large surge in import volume after the dispute was settled. Because of the size of
that postdisruption volume surge, the overall loss of trade during a labor action was very small and in some
cases nonexistent. Trade was postponed but not lost.
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2NC Terrorism—No Econ Impact
No Impact- A terrorist attack would not affect the economy
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
This is testimony partly to the great resilience of a modern economy. Short interruptions to supply chains can be
mitigated fully by drawing down inventories, especially if they were built up in anticipation of the event. When
inventories are depleted and delivery essential, cargo can be shifted to air or land through a neighboring
economy. Somewhat longer interruptions can be compensated for through a temporary shift to domestic suppliers—an especially
easy alternative if supply chains have built-in redundancies that allow the needed flexibility. Some consumers at the end of
the supply chain may have to wait a while or pay higher prices. The sale—and profits—may be
postponed, but they are not prevented. Our results do not say that no business was hurt by port labor actions or that
profits were not adversely affected by the increase in transaction costs. Some industries, some firms, and some regions were surely
adversely affected. Nor do we claim that a terrorist attack on the ports and the resultant disruption to the supply chain would not
harm any region or company—certainly some firms and regions would be affected. However, as is often the case in a modern
complex economy, when one industry or area suffers as a result of some economic disturbance, another
prospers as a result of an offsetting shift in demand: There are winners and losers. Our main point here is that these past
disruptions were insufficient to cause any noticeable change in the aggregate flow of the economy:
Either the losses were small compared with the overall economy or they were largely offset by
gains elsewhere.
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2NC Terrorism—No impact – only minor infrastructure damage
Terrorist Attacks cause only small setbacks infrastructure
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Econmist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Another form of secondary losses comes from all the costs that individuals bear to prevent or to insure against future damage. It is
easy, however, to overestimate these secondary effects. We have to be careful about distinguishing
between events that cause business to be delayed and those that cause business to be cancelled.
Very short-run disruptions to trade—whether by severe weather, traffic problems at the port, or a small terrorist
attack—have almost no net effect on the economy, since the disruptions caused are little more than
what happens during the normal, random, day-to-day life of commerce. Small delays have no measurable
effect, and firms very often have excess capacity in order to deal with unexpected fluctuations in demand. And although
consumers might stop flying as a result of an incident, they may instead begin to buy more
cars
sustained shocks
to the economy will have any permanent effect on the economy, and here we must be careful to recognize
that the economy is composed of conscious agents who will adjust plans and use resources in
different ways to mitigate damages. We must not underestimate the resilience of a free-enterprise
economy.
with the money they did not spend on air travel. Losses in one place may be offset by gains elsewhere. Only
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2NC Terrorism—No Tanker Impact
Low risk of oil tanker attack – can’t destroy the vessel
Houreld 11—Associated Press Writer [Katharine, “Oil Tanker Terror Hijacks Easy, Attacks Complex,” Web,
5/21/11, LexisNexis, 6/19/12]
Supertankers the hulking, slow-moving ships that transport half the world's oil have few
defenses against terrorist hijackers like those envisioned by Osama bin Laden, security experts said Saturday. AlQaida operatives with enough training could easily manage to capture ships carrying millions of
gallons of oil or liquefied natural gas. All they would have to do is imitate the tactics of Somali
pirates who already use small boats to overpower tanker crews in mostly remote locations, the
experts said. Few supertankers have armed guards, due to gun import laws and the risk of
accidental gunfire igniting explosive cargos. But once terrorists captured a supertanker, it
wouldn't be so easy to sow the economic chaos and costly environmental destruction bin Laden
desired and outlined in secret files captured from his Pakistan hideout. It's actually extremely complex to blow up a
supertanker or even sink it near heavily guarded oil shipping lanes like the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal
or the Strait of Hormuz at the end of the Persian Gulf. "It would only be a risk if they could sail it undetected
and had worked out how to blow it up, which is pretty complicated," said Graeme Gibbon-Brooks, the head
of Dryad Maritime Intelligence.
Terrorists won’t succeed against tankers—modern ships make attacks difficult
Houreld 11—Associated Press Writer [Katharine, “Oil Tanker Terror Hijacks Easy, Attacks Complex,” Web,
5/21/11, LexisNexis, 6/19/12]
Intelligence gathered from bin Laden's hideout revealed that al-Qaida
realized the tankers would have to be
boarded so explosives could be planted inside them. Security experts say, however, blowing them up
would be difficult because the tankers have double hulls and compartmentalized holds that
prevent oil spills in groundings and can withstand direct hits from rocket propelled grenades.
Plus, getting enough explosives aboard the tankers would mean using more speedboats than Somali
hijackers normally do to take over the ships and hold crews hostage, Gibbon-Brooks said. Somali pirates have already captured five
supertankers, proving that men with little training and basic weapons can easily seize the giant ships. Supertankers move slowly
when fully loaded, can be longer than three football fields and generally only have around 20 unarmed crew onboard. Although
the size of the ships makes them vulnerable, their slow speed also makes it harder for terrorists
to sneak one into a port or a narrow shipping passage. Ships are closely tracked via satellite and
any unexplained deviations from their travel plans would immediately raise alarms.
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2NC Terrorism—No Piracy Coop
Pirates won’t cooperate with terrorists
Houreld 11—Associated Press Writer [Katharine, “Oil Tanker Terror Hijacks Easy, Attacks Complex,” Web,
5/21/11, LexisNexis, 6/19/12]
While authorities fear that
al-Qaida may link up with the Somali pirates who have become so
adept at hijacking cargo ships, experts say the chance of any such alliance is remote because the
pirates are in the hijacking business for the multimillion-dollar ransoms they get from holding
ship crews hostage. If the pirates started working with terrorists, that could seriously hurt their
business, said Roger Middleton, a piracy expert with London's Chatham House think tank. "They're multimillionaires
running a very important business and don't want to see that jeopardized by too much politics,"
he said.
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AT: Terrorism – No nuke attack on ports
Conventional attacks won’t shut down ports and nuke attack unlikely
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Although the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach certainly represent a primary infrastructure
target in the United States, a complete shutdown of the ports is highly unlikely as a direct result of some
physical attack. There are two reasons for this: the sheer physical scale of the facilities and the large
amount of excess physical capacity (as opposed to human capital capacity) currently in place. As
shown in the port map on p. xxiii, the two facilities take up approximately 12 square miles of space in a six-by-four-mile area. The
complex is broken into a number of separate yards, each completely controlled by a number of
independent, competing major shipping lines, each of which have substantial investment in the physical
cranes and equipment on their property. Some of these yards are on Terminal Island, connected to the mainland by three
road bridges and a railroad; others are on the mainland itself. There are multiple access points into the area as the map shows,
including two highways. Even if these roads were shut down, it would be relatively simple to construct a temporary bridge to the
island, and although it might have some implications for the movement of ships, no yard would be effectively isolated.3
Conventional weapons would be able to damage, at best, only a small portion of the complex, and
would be unable to isolate a substantial portion of the port given the multiple access routes into
and out of the area. Even a so-called “dirty bomb” could cover only one or two square miles of area with
radioactivity. Given the location on the water, winds would quickly blow most of the radioactive materials away, leaving even most of
the initially affected area quickly reusable. The only known weapon that could take out an area of this size
for an extended period of time would be a nuclear weapon. It seems more likely that the target of
such a horrific device would be a densely populated area, not a port.
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AT: Terrorism – only partial shutdown – won’t effect econ
If an attack only hit a portion of a port, the port could still function
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
Given that it is unlikely for the entire port complex to be closed for an extended period as a result of an attack, the next question is
what would happen if an attack instead destroyed only a portion of the port facilities. Under this
scenario, the effect on trade and any secondary effects would depend on the ability of the functioning portions of the port to pick up
the slack. Although the stories of congestion at the port and ongoing plans for expansion seem to imply that the ports are
running close to or at capacity, they are not actually near capacity—at least not from a physical perspective.
Most of the year, the various facilities run only one shift per day. During periods of increased trade activity, they may run two or, in
the most desperate of circumstances, three. Multiple shifts, however, are very unusual because of the increased labor costs and work
restrictions of labor agreements. But if the manpower were available, each yard in the facility could likely move
at least twice as much merchandise through if it ran 24 hours a day. Indeed, this point has been made clearer than ever
in recent months as local officials have moved decisively to reduce midday congestion around the ports by charging a fee to
companies that want to move goods and products into and out of the ports during normal business hours. It is understood that the
port infrastructure is largely underused during most of the day, and that economic incentives are needed to use it more efficiently. If
a portion of the complex were closed as a result of damage to its transportation infrastructure, it would be
relatively simple to transfer the shipping into other facilities. We assume that in the event of a national
emergency, competing shipping companies would share facilities. The Problem Is With Labor
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2NC Terrorism—Terrorists will switch targets
Emphasis on Port Defense is flawed- terrorists will attack easier non-port targets
or find new ways around port security
Shie 4- from the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Tamar Renee Shie; Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University and a visiting author for CSIS; Written October 15, 2004, Accessed June 19, 2012,
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/-pac0445a.pdf; “Ships and Terrorists – Thinking Beyond Port Security”; CSIS)
First, the emphasis on upgrading the security of major ports neglects the fact that these represent
only a single link in the transportation chain. A shipping container may pass through some 15
physical locations and some two dozen individuals and/or companies while traveling from
departure point to destination. Because containers are only searched at the major port, there is
no guarantee they cannot be waylaid in route after that point. Second, the CSI conducts security
checks only on U.S. bound containers. Therefore even if a tampered container arrives at a major
port, if it is destined for a port other than the U.S., it is more likely to escape notice. Containers
between the major ports of Singapore and Shenzhen or Pusan and Hong Kong are not subject to CSI requirements. Yet terrorist
assaults on U.S. ships or interests can occur outside the U.S. Third, as major ports increase
security, terrorists will look for other maritime targets or other means to target those ports.
Terrorists are increasingly aiming at soft targets. Attacking maritime targets has never been
particularly easy, often requiring a greater sophistication in planning, training, and coordination
than those aimed at many land-based facilities. This is why maritime terrorism is rather rare, and why
terrorists are less likely to attack a more secure major port. Yet in considering maritime terrorist
threat scenarios – using a ship to smuggle goods or weapons, sinking a vessel in a major
shipping thoroughfare, using a ship as a weapon, or even targeting maritime vessels – none
require access to a major port or a shipping container to carry out a strike. There remain
numerous small ports and small vessels not covered under the new security initiatives. The ISPS
Code for instance only covers ships of 500 tons or more and port facilities that serve large international-bound vessels. The Code
would not have protected the USS Cole. How else might terrorists strike? Piracy in Southeast Asia may provide a clue as to how
terrorists will respond to these new measures. In 2002, there were 161 actual and attempted pirate attacks in Southeast Asian
waters. Of those, 73 percent occurred within ports. The following year, of the 187 attacks, only 37 percent occurred within ports.
Between the two years, the total number of attacks increased by 26. In the first quarter of 2004, of the 41 reported attacks, only onethird were committed in ports. Also between 2002 and 2003 pirate attacks in traditionally targeted ports fell while they rose in ports
where few if any attacks were previously reported. Though it may be too soon to definitively tell, it would appear that
pirates are adapting to the more stringent security measures in larger ports. If pirates can do it,
so can terrorists. Finally, an attack on a major port does not require terrorists to gain direct access
to that port. As pirates are capable of attempting more attacks on vessels at sea, it is not
unimaginable that terrorists will commandeer a ship at sea and steer it toward a target. The bomb,
biological, chemical or radiological agents, or even nuclear materials, can be loaded onto the ship once seized. Then they head for a
port or another ship. The May 2004 collision between two cargo ships off Singapore’s Sentosa Island illustrates how easily terrorists
could conduct a similar but more disastrous operation.
Can’t solve terror – will shift targets from ports
Haveman & Schatz 2006 Ph.D in Economics and expert on the economics of seaports,
goods movement, and international trade policy and Ph.D in public policy and Senior Economist
at RAND.(Jon D. and Howard J. “Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost”
Report for the Public Policy Institute of California.
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_606JHR.pdf Accessed: 6/20/2012)
Second, there has been recognition throughout the process that strengthening one target necessarily
means making other potential targets more vulnerable. Increasing the difficulty of slipping a bomb into a
container increases the likelihood that someone might try to bring it into the United States in a yacht, or
ship it to Mexico and bring it into the country by truck. Or, with strong enough port security measures,
terrorists might change their target focus from ports to the rail system or to shopping malls.
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Alt Cause Labor shortage
The largest problem a port can have is lack of labor which can be easily solved
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
The true limiting factor at the ports is not physical capacity but human capacity—labor to run the cranes
and to move goods and containers in and out of the yards. If a portion of the facilities were closed,
labor shortages in other yards handling the extra traffic could be made up of crews brought in from the closed
facilities or even from other port facilities on the West Coast, from emergency aid from the Coast Guard or other military
organizations, and eventually by new crews trained over the course of the succeeding weeks. At the same time, a certain amount of
shipping could easily be funneled through other West Coast ports with excess physical capacity. In the longer term,
shipping could be rerouted to East Coast ports and to refitted West Coast facilities not currently able to handle modern
containerized shipping. In short, although the cost of importing products would surely rise as a result of the logistical difficulties
created, there is no reason to believe that trade would be substantially interrupted. For those industries that rely
on imports to run their business, there would be extra costs in the short run.
The longer the disruption the less these
costs will be, as better solutions are found. In our view, the true threat to the ports is not the physical damage to
facilities, given the excess capacity in the system that could be used in the event of a true emergency. Rather, the true limitation is
the unwillingness of labor to work under potentially hazardous conditions. The most dangerous scenario might occur as follows: A
single conventional bomb goes off in a containerized shipment, killing or injuring a number of port personnel. The attack is followed
by a threat that a number of other similarly rigged containers are on their way into U.S. ports or perhaps have already been offloaded
and are awaiting transfer.
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Case Turns (Generic)
Increased trade introduces invasive species, which can`t be fixed—international
problem
Keller 2011-worked at the Program on the Global Environment at the University of Chicago, Illinois (Reuben P., Charles
Perrings- worked at the ecoSERVICES Group in the School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe “International Policy
Options for Reducing the Environmental Impacts of Invasive Species” Bioscience 12/11 ProQuest 6/20/12)
Preventing the spread of nonnative invasive species is an international public good. Some categories of invasive species-such as
diseases of humans and livestock-are addressed by international agreements that coordinate efforts to reduce their spread. In
contrast, invasive species that primarily cause environmental impacts are managed almost exclusively at
the national level. Control of environmental invaders is internationally undersupplied because
the efforts of nations that do invest to prevent their spread are undercut by nations that do not .
Addressing this problem will require international cooperation. We identify the international approach to
controlling human diseases as a model that could provide institutions and mechanisms to map the spread of environmental invaders
and assess the risks they impose. This would allow individual nations to manage potential vectors of invasion. Because such a system
is unlikely to be implemented in the near future, we make recommendations for intermediate steps, including the widespread
adoption of existing risk assessments and importation standards. Keywords: Convention on Biological Diversity, sanitary and
phytosanitary agreement, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, invasive species International trade
increases human welfare but also leads
to the introduction and establishment of nonnative invasive
species, such as human and livestock diseases, pests and diseases of crops, and species that cause environmental harm. The
increasingly global nature of trade means that efforts to prevent the spread of invasive species
should be internationally coordinated. To this end, there are already relatively advanced international programs in
place for identifying and managing the spread of human diseases, and the 178 member nations of the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) have agreed to report outbreaks of animal diseases, mostly diseases of livestock, to a central database. These programs
allow nations to track invasive species threats and to use the shared information to impose import restrictions. Species known to be
diseases and pests of crops are often the focus of quarantine inspections at national borders, but this varies by country and there is
little international coordination. In contrast, nonnative invasive species that do not directly affect human health or agriculture are
generally perceived to primarily pose risks of environmental harm. Few international agreements exist to control
the spread of these species, and at an international scale, they are traded with much less
inspection and fewer efforts to prevent their spread. This essay addresses the potential for wiser management of
these species, which we refer to as environmental invaders. Despite the lack of international efforts to prevent their spread,
environmental invaders have enormous environmental, economic, cultural, and human-health
impacts (Pejchar and Mooney 2008, Sala et al. 2000). These include reductions in the populations of desirable
native species as a result of predation, competition, parasitism, and disease. An example of this is the
invasion of European waterways by North American crayfish, which both compete directly with native crayfish for resources and
carry the crayfish plague disease (Aphanomyces astaci) that has devastated European crayfish populations (Gherardi and Holdich
1999). Economic impacts can arise in a variety of ways, including the costs of herbicides and
pesticides to control nonnative invaders in national parks and the costs of cleaning industrial
facilities that become infested with invaders (e.g., zebra mussel [Dreissena polymorpha] infestations of
power plants in the Laurentian Great Lakes require the facilities to close down while workers
clean pipes; Leung et al. 2002). Cultural and human-health impacts can also arise in many ways, but a
good example comes from cases in which invasive species become so prolific that farmers
abandon agricultural land, leading to the loss of traditional farmland and agricultural practices
and potentially to human-health impacts from reduced food supplies. This has occurred in
Mexico, where it is no longer feasible in some areas to control the invasive bracken fern (Pteridium aquilinum; Schneider and
Geoghegan 2006). The introduction of environmental invaders is an externality of trade (Perrings et al.
2002, 2005). That is, the impacts of these species are not incorporated into the costs of doing trade, and
those who trade the species have no economic incentive to reduce the invasion risks inherent in their
business. For example, the global horticultural trade is responsible for many thousands of invasions of harmful plants and plant
diseases around the world (Reichard and White 2001, Dehnen-Schmutz et al. 2007). However, the environmental costs
are not borne by either exporters or importers. Instead, these costs are spread
widely among society as government agencies spend taxpayer dollars on inspection,
interception, eradication, containment, and compensation. Two factors have hampered efforts to slow the
international spread of environmental invaders. First, although nations generally act defensively to control
imposed by this trade
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invasive species, the benefits arising from that control are almost always shared broadly among
those at risk of being invaded, not just among those who pay for the control (Perrings et al. 2002). For
example, if a country spends resources to ensure a disease-free horticultural industry, all nations to which it
exports benefit from a reduced likelihood that they will be invaded. In the absence of cooperation, however,
individual countries will protect their own borders but are less likely to commit resources to preventing
the export of invaders. Because the invasion risk to which a country is exposed depends on the
actions of its neighbors and trading partners, this means that countries face higher risks than they
would if there were greater cooperation. Second, controlling the spread of an invasive species is a
"weakest-link" public good (Perrings et al. 2002). Although the risks posed by any nation will depend on a complex set of
climatic, biogeophysical, and social factors, including the type of trade they engage in and its volume, the overall global risk
will be strongly determined by the nations or trades that operate the least effective programs to
control species transport. Because removal of an invasive pest from trade requires all those involved to
contribute, and because little is gained by providing more than the country making the smallest
contribution, there is an incentive to adopt a matching strategy-to converge on the weakest link. This is
because unilateral action cannot prevent the pest from continuously spreading through trade (Touza
and Perrings 2011). Nevertheless, even though enhancing cooperative efforts should be the ultimate goal of a collective strategy to
manage the problem of environmental invasions, there is much that can be done independently. In this article, we identify
alternative strategies at the national and international levels for reducing the spread of environmental invaders with or without
cooperation. We begin by reviewing existing unilateral defensive efforts to reduce exposure and by identifying programs that have
been successful and could be implemented more widely without the need for additional international policy. We then consider the
options for effective coordinated international management, building on existing commitments by countries under the Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD) and on the international success achieved in managing human diseases. Finally, we discuss the options
for achieving at least some of the gains that could be had from coordinated action without the need for renegotiation of any
multilateral agreement. Figure 1 summarizes our recommendations. National efforts to manage the spread of environmental
invaders Under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its constituent agreements, particularly the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), individual countries have
the right to take actions in restraint of trade if those actions are needed in order to protect food safety and animal or plant health. In
contrast to those that deal with human diseases, these agreements authorize only national defensive measures. That is, individual
nations have direct responsibility for managing risks to themselves posed by the many vectors of nonnative species introduction
(table 1) but are not permitted under the GATT and the SPS agreement to cooperate in the collective control of pest or pathogen
transmission through trade restrictions. The standard-setting bodies for the SPS agreement-the International Plant Protection
Convention (IPPC), the OIE, and Codex Alimentarius-do cooperate in setting sanitary and phytosanitary standards and reporting
requirements for member countries. This has led to the harmonization of rules on classes of traded commodities involving known
risks. The OIE has also coordinated veterinary campaigns against particular pathogens within member countries and has achieved
success in the eradication of rinderpest, one of the most damaging of all animal pathogens (Normile 2008). But only in the case of
novel human diseases does there exist an agreement to take collective action in restraint of trade as a precautionary measure.
Environmental invaders can be transported to a country through intentional or unintentional vectors. Regardless of the vector, it is
widely accepted that the most cost-effective way to reduce total impacts from nonnative invasive species is to prevent their arrival
and establishment (see figure 1a, 1b; IUCN 2000, Leung et al. 2002, Lodge et al. 2006, Keller et al. 2007, 2009). That is, preventing
the arrival of an invasive species will generally lead to less harm than addressing the species after it enters a country. Nations can
choose from a range of options to prevent a species' arrival, including restrictions on trade in species of concern, requirements on
exporters to ensure that invaders do not leave their shores or do not survive transit, and the operations of quarantine and inspection
facilities at the point of entry (Lodge et al. 2006). Importantly, policies focused on prevention have more opportunities to shift the
burden of responsibility to the industries that profit from risky trade in live organisms (Perrings et al. 2005). As an example of a
prevention program, most plant shipments to the United States must be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate to show that
they were produced at a facility following high standards for the control of plant diseases and parasites. This system puts the costs of
obtaining certificates and those of producing relatively safe plants onto exporters. In contrast, established plant pest species can
generally be controlled only through expensive techniques such as manually pulling plants or the use of herbicides and pesticides.
Because it is almost never possible to determine the party responsible for an invasion, these costs have never (to the best of our
knowledge) been passed on to importers or consumers who benefited from imports. Intentionally introduced species, including pets,
crops, and garden plants (table 1), provide many economic and social benefits. They also often become environmental invaders or
act as vectors for environmental invaders (Jeschke and Strayer 2005). Efforts to reduce imports of environmental invaders generally
consist of individual-species risk assessments so that resources can be focused on those species posing the highest risk. Because the
proportion of traded species that become invasive is generally low (Smith et al. 1999), this approach leaves most species-those with
low risk of invasion-unaffected. The approach has been shown to yield financial benefits for importing countries (Keller et al. 2007),
whereas fewer invasions confers environmental, social, and agricultural benefits. The most prominent riskassessment procedure
currently available is the Australian Weed Risk Assessment (WRA; Pheloung 1995). Australian government scientists developed this
tool in the early 1990s, and in 1997, it was introduced as a mandatory screening tool for all new plant species proposed for
introduction to Australia. Species assessed as posing a high risk are not allowed to be imported. The WRA has been demonstrated to
have good accuracy in Australia, New Zealand, Florida, Hawaii, and the Czech Republic (Gordon et al. 2008). It has been adopted in
a modified form by New Zealand. In contrast to intentional introductions, species transported unintentionally have some probability
of becoming invasive but are not expected to provide benefits. This means that efforts to prevent their arrival can aim to simply
remove all organisms from transport. Although this is conceptually simple, the number and magnitude of
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unintentional vectors makes preventing introductions an enormous challenge. For example, the global
maritime fleet includes more than 99,000 large vessels and moves most international trade (IMO 2009). Each arriving ship
presents risks of introducing new nonnative species entrained in its ballast water, attached to its
hull, and in the cargo it offloads (table 1; Keller et al. 2011). It is unlikely that any nation could commit
sufficient resources to ensure that all arriving ships are free of invasive species. Each vector of
unintentional species transport requires a different management approach. This approach needs to be based on the trade moving
the species, the mode of transport, and the available technology. For example, the approaches necessary to limit the movement of
fouling organisms of recreational boats are very different from those required to prevent the spread of invasive mollusks on watergarden plants or of forest pests in wooden packaging material. One relatively successful approach to limiting the spread of
unintentional invaders is the US phytosanitary certificate system mentioned previously. This program aims to prevent the arrival of
diseases, parasites, and plants that unintentionally accompany a traded species. It does this by requiring certain standards of plant
and soil hygiene at facilities that grow plants for export to the United States. It is consistent with the United States' obligations as a
signatory to the WTO's SPS agreement (Hedley 2004). Although the number of risk-assessment tools and
vector management strategies continues to increase, they still provide protection against only a
small proportion of the vectors that introduce invasive species. We offer two suggestions for improving this situation
within the current international policy framework. First, some existing risk-assessment tools have been shown to perform well in a
range of countries (e.g., Gordon et al. 2008), and other nations could adopt those tools. This was done by New Zealand when it
adopted a modified version of the Australian WRA. In many cases, it may be possible for nations to relatively cheaply adopt tools
developed elsewhere. Second, established national standards for treating vectors of unintentional introduction could be adopted by
other countries. For example, the US Phytosanitary Certificate program could probably be adopted by other importing countries
because many export facilities are already set up to achieve its standards. Further developing and applying these tools and standards
would serve a double purpose by directly protecting those countries that adopt the procedures and by providing indirect protection
to other nations that would subsequently be less likely to receive invaders from their trading partners. Although there are
potential advances to be made in national defensive policies, these can never provide the level of
protection that would arise from increased international cooperation (see figure 1c). Most vectors could
be more efficiently rendered free of invasive species in their country of origin. This would, for
example, reduce the demand on quarantine facilities at ports of entry. Such coordination is currently
unlikely for at least three reasons. First and foremost, there are no international agreements or bodies that are
mandated to implement such a coordinated approach. Second, the "free-rider" issue means that
the financially rational approach for many countries is to take the benefits from trading with
countries that implement higher standards but not to pay the costs to implement those
standards in their own operations. Finally, many countries lack the resources, institutions, or political will
to implement such policies. Without programs to transfer resources and expertise to these
countries, they will remain weak links and will continue to pose a risk to all other nations.
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AT: Invasive Species
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AT: Invasive Species—Impacts
Invasive species won’t cause extinction—long term effects are increases in
biodiversity
Craig 10—Department of Marine Sciences, University of Puerto Rico [Matthew T, “Patter
Versus Process: Broadening the View of Marine Invasive Species,” Web, 10/10, Marine Biology, Proquest, 6/21/12]
The patterns observed as results of invasive species often evoke strong emotional responses as
in the short
term seemingly catastrophic changes occur. However, in taking a broader look at the processes underlying species
invasions and their long-term ecological interactions, we see that they may be a fundamental contributor
to the generation of new diversity through Briggs' IAS mechanism. Take for example, the Great Trans Arctic
Biotic Interchange (Briggs 1995). The opening of the Berring Straight during the Cenozoic allowed for the
exchange of hundreds of species between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific Oceans . Among
the Atlantic species of molluscs with Pacific ancestors, nearly 47% evolved into distinct species (Vermeij 2005).
Invasive species won’t lead to extinction—marine ecosystems resilient
Craig 10—Department of Marine Sciences, University of Puerto Rico [Matthew T, “Patter
Versus Process: Broadening the View of Marine Invasive Species,” Web, 10/10, Marine Biology, Proquest, 6/21/12]
While invasive species undoubtedly have the tendency to alter ecosystems, the resiliency of marine
ecosystems allows the invader to be accommodated through small to large shifts in niche occupancy of
native species. Rather than cause extinctions, per se, this accommodation increases ecological
interactions among species, which over evolutionary time scales may result in ecological speciation.
Briggs thus argues that a three-step process, invasion, accommodation, and speciation (the IAS mechanism), provides a plausible
mechanism for invasive species to actually cause an increase in biodiversity.
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AT: Invasive Species—Turns
Marine invasive species don’t cause extinction of other species but rather it
increases biodiversity
Craig 10—Department of Marine Sciences, University of Puerto Rico [Matthew T, “Patter
Versus Process: Broadening the View of Marine Invasive Species,” Web, 10/10, Marine Biology, Proquest, 6/21/12]
In terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, invasive species have been shown to have severe effects
on
ecosystems, some of which are so detrimental as to have caused extinctions of native species (e.g.,
the brown treesnake, Boiga irregularis, on the Pacific island of Guam; Fritts and Rodda 1998). However, in the marine realm,
there are no known examples of extinctions directly linked to an invasive species (Briggs 2007;
Gurevitch and Padilla 2004). Rather, in this environment, invasive species alter ecosystems to a large degree,
but as a general rule the native community accommodates the invasive species without catastrophic
consequences. This capacity for accommodation of invasive species by native ecosystems is the focus of a paper by Briggs
(2010) that provided a provocative examination of the long-term consequences of invasive species in the marine environment.
Briggs presented a potential mechanism to support the hypothesis that invasive species may lead to an overall
increase in biodiversity (measured by species richness). While contrary to general opinion, the ideas presented in this
paper are logical, well thought out, and force readers to consider aspects of marine invasions in the
light of evolutionary biology, something that Dobzhansky would certainly appreciate. With the growing awareness of the
alarming rates of biodiversity loss around the planet, there is a ubiquitous tendency to assert that invasions cause a loss of
biodiversity (usually measured by species richness). However, as Briggs astutely points out, upon invasion to a new geographic area,
species richness (biodiversity) increases if the species becomes established. Thus, an established
invasive species would have to cause the extinction of two native species before any negative
effects on species richness (biodiversity) would be observed. The quantification of biodiversity loss caused
by invasive species hinges in large part upon the scale of observation, both geographic and temporal. If one
examines the effects of invaders over small scales of either category, the result is nearly always the
observation of fewer species. However, over larger scales, the raw number of species is increased on
a geographic scale (unless extirpation of more than one species occurs), and the selective forces that are
enhanced through ecological competition may further increase the number of species over long
temporal scales.
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AT: Organized Crime
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AT: Organized Crime – Impact
Previous terrorist attacks were not the fault for a slow US economy
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698,
6/20/12]
Similarly, the U.S. economy did not slow down after the September 11 attacks; indeed, the economy was
accelerating its way out of the 2001 business-led downturn that had begun in the middle of
although consumer confidence fell sharply after the attacks, consumer spending in the
fourth quarter grew at an unprecedented 7 percent seasonally adjusted annual rate (SAAR), one of the
sharpest increases seen in the past decade (Figure 2.2). Unemployment did rise sharply after the
event, but this seemed to be primarily an acceleration of the employment loss that would have been expected
given the weak economic climate. This was especially true because labor markets were still overheated from the techin the midst of
2000. And
fueled economic boom of the late nineties. Retail sales did drop sharply in September 2001 but also rebounded sharply in October
and returned to trend in November—business delayed, not business cancelled. Indeed, it is hard to find any evidence of
an effect of the September 11 attacks on the aggregate economy, with the exception of that on the air travel
industry. Even in that case, the industry was in deep trouble beforehand, with profit margins dipping into the red in the beginning of
2000—long before the attacks. Even then, it must be remembered that total consumer spending went up, so the dollars that were not
spent on air travel went to some other part of the economy.
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AT: Organized Crime—Solvency
Conspiracies, corruption, and counter-surveillance by Mexican smuggling
organizations make it difficult to detect operations
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement '12 ("Border Security Threats to the Homeland: DHS'
Response to Innovative Tactics and Techniques" Homeland Security Department Documents and Publications 6/19/2012, Lexis
6/19/2012)
Internal conspiracies and corruption are another significant vulnerability seen by HSI in its
investigations of smuggling organizations at commercial airports and other U.S. ports of entry.
In many of its investigations, HSI sees how these internal conspiracies utilize various employees from multiple companies and
positions, including managers and supervisors. Employees utilize innumerable diversionary tactics to
smuggle contraband around CBP examination. Finally, Mexican smuggling organizations routinely
utilize counter-surveillance methods in an attempt to adjust their methods of operation based
on U.S. law enforcement efforts. "Spotters," as they are known, operate almost exclusively in Mexico, rarely entering the
United States where they can be detained for questioning or arrest. In addition, modern cellular telephone and
radio communication technology make detection even more difficult, as organizations can use
them to adjust their modes of operation in order to be more successful.
Spending too much money can be bad- criminals will find different ways
Willis, Ortiz, 2006 - Willis is the Associate Director at the RAND Homeland Security and Defence
Center, Ortiz is a Professor at RAND graduate school [ Henry H. Willis, David S. Ortiz, Securing America's Ports,
March 26/2006, http://www.rand.org/commentary/2006/03/26/SDUT.html, 18/06/2012]
At some point, spending more money on port security won't make San Diego or the rest of
the country any
safer. As ports become more difficult to attack, terrorists may choose to attack through other means. This is
especially relevant for San Diego, which is close to the U.S. Mexican-border and several international airports. Also, excessive
emphasis on port security can actually reduce security as a whole. Impediments to the
movement of legitimate cargo may cause that cargo to be moved by other, less secure, means.
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AT: Econ–Collapse doesn’t cause war
Econ collapse doesn’t cause war
Bazzi (Department of Economics at University of California San Diego) and Christopher Blattman (assistant
professor of political science and economics at Yale University) November 2011 “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence
Samuel
of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d
7bd4
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord
politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political
transitions in economics and political science.
Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest
cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed,
we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower
the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price
shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid
increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17
Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be
taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so,
commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is
difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility.
Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with
conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes
(Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues
drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or
downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a
revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or
extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current
revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example,
conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect
household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see
a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and
state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse
relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted
above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover,
we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost
mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and
sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed
to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity price
shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that
political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed.
One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination
challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type
or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other
shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking
the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of
publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in
conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks
and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model
assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard
the
sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005)
demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and
lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions,
outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical
significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly,
almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness
checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on
timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file
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drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition
pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy,
and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In
the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant
results than ambiguous ones.20
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AT: US China Coop—No coop now
Japan is uncertain about entering into trilateralism—its seeming compliance is
just a response to pressure
Christoffersen 09 [Gaye, “Japan and the East Asian Maritime Security Order: Prospects for Trilateral and Multilateral
Cooperation,” Web, 2009, Asian Perspective, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Kenneth Pyle has portrayed Japan's expanding security
role in the region as reactive. He claims that
Japan is responding to a rising China and pressure from the United States to take on a greater
role. He argues that the U.S.-Japan military alliance is the central element in a Japan-China-U.S. trilateral relationship.13 Glen
Hook has portrayed Japan as the "sandwiched state," caught between U.S. pressure to assume more of a
global military role on one side and, on the other side, opposition to overseas deployment by the
political opposition in the Japanese parliament (the Diet), peace organizations, and public
opinion.14
Yoshihara and Holmes have argued that Japan, confined to the security alliance with the United States, has
lost the capacity for strategic thought that might impede Tokyo's ability to respond to China's
rising naval power.15 Takashi Inoguchi maintains that Japanese international relations theory has a bumi putra or narrowly
indigenous character which makes it hard for Japanese scholars to communicate their visions of
international relations, not only with the United States, but also with theorists from China, Taiwan, and South Korea who
have understandings of international relations more influenced by U.S. ideas.16 Moreover, Inoguchi argues that grand
strategies and international relations theory are produced by great powers, a status that Japan
continues to harbor ambivalence about.17
Japan could not want to enter into trilateralism—public is currently clueless and
could oppose
Christoffersen 09 [Gaye, “Japan and the East Asian Maritime Security Order: Prospects for Trilateral and Multilateral
Cooperation,” Web, 2009, Asian Perspective, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Tsuneo Watanabe finds the source of the problem in Japanese
security policies, which emerge from
opaque, backroom circumstances rather than from open public discussion. Because of a
"hollowing out" of any real discussion of Japan's defense policy, the public remains clueless. 18
Watanabe argues that there exists a large gap between Japanese civilian and military cultures that
makes domestic debate on security policy difficult. The emphasis on nontraditional security issues such as piracy
somewhat resolves the problem, since these are considered to contribute to international order rather than preparations for war.19
All of these scholars portray Japan as muddling through, reacting and responding to other
countries' initiatives.
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AT: Solvency
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AT: Solvency—Generic
Fixing the all the problems is too difficult—too much dependence on other
countries and no clear understanding of risk
Harrald 05 [John R, “Sea Trade and Security: an Assessment of the Post-9/11 Reaction,” Web, Fall 05,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/220702986/1376BF5C74E6A8F9B1B/5?accountid=14667, 6/19/12]
Reliability. The primary goals of programs to date have been improving the security of U.S. ports and of the flow of containerized
cargo. The thrust of all the initiatives has come in the form of government-imposed rules and programs.
The business case
for security has not been made to or accepted by many participants in the global supply
chain. This leads to four unresolved issues. (1) The primary supply-chain vulnerabilities are at the ends of the
chain-in the warehouses where containers are stuffed and opened, in truck transport (i.e., road
stops) and in rail yards. The physical security of these private sector assets throughout the world
is critical and extremely difficult to ensure. (2) Security of ships and cargo in foreign ports
is beyond the effective control of the U.S. government. It is the responsibility of foreign
governments and private companies, and maiding the diplomatic and business case to
achieve cooperation is difficult. (3) The focus on container vessels has led to an
underestimation of the vulnerabilities of other subsystems. There is no tanker or bulk-cargo analogy to
CSI or C-TPAT, nor are tankers and bulk cargoes subject to the 24hour rule. The certainty that the threat is
external to the United States has led to an underinvestment in reducing the vulnerability
to shore-side security threats, in particular the threat to passenger ferries and cruise
ships, so potential mass casualty targets remain vulnerable to conventional attack. (4) The
piecemeal implementation of global security programs has created a system without
measurable risk-management objectives. International regulators of transportation
systems have long wrestled with the "how safe is safe" question. Now they must attempt to define acceptable
security. What, for example, is an acceptable probability that a container with terrorist contraband will enter the United States
undetected in any given year? The answer to this drives the direct and indirect costs of security
interventions, affecting the efficiency of the supply chain and the need for effective faulttolerance and resilience strategies.
The US will keep pushing back improvements
Calvan 12—Boston Globe Writer [Bobby Caina, “US to Miss Target for Tighter Port Security: Cargo Screening Put
Off to 2014,” Web, 6/12/12, Boston Globe, Proquest, 6/20/12]
WASHINGTON - The Department of Homeland Security
will miss an initial deadline of July 12 to
comply with a sweeping federal law meant to thwart terrorist attacks arriving by sea, frustrating
border security advocates who worry that the agency has not done enough to prevent dangerous
cargo from coming through the country's ocean gateways, including the Port of Boston. Only a small fraction of
all metal cargo containers have been scanned before arriving at US ports, and advocates for tighter port security say all maritime
cargo needs to be scanned or manually inspected to prevent terrorists from using ships bound for the United States to deliver a
nuclear bomb. The scenario might be straight out of a Hollywood script, but the threat of terrorism is not limited to airplanes,
according to Homeland Security critics, including Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts. Markey accuses the agency of
not making a good-faith effort to comply with a 2007 law he coauthored requiring all US-bound maritime shipments to be scanned
before departing overseas docks. "We're not just missing the boat, we could be missing the bomb," the Malden Democrat said. "The
reality is that detonating a nuclear bomb in the United States is at the very top of Al Qaeda's terrorist targets." Only about 5 percent
of all cargo containers headed to the United States are screened, according to the government's own estimate, with some shipments
getting only a cursory paperwork review. Homeland Security officials argue that wider screening would be cost-
prohibitive, logistically and technologically difficult, and diplomatically challenging. While
acknowledging the threat as real, they are exercising their right under the 2007 law to postpone for two
years the full implementation of the congressionally mandated scanning program. That would set the
new deadline for July 2014.
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More technology is being used in ports – past years prove
CBP.gov 2006 - CBP.gov is the United States Customs and Border Protection website. [No
author given, "An Overall Picture of Port Security", CBP.gov, 07/12/2006,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/port_security/securing_us_ports.xml, 18/06/2012]
Use of Cutting-Edge Technology: CBP is currently utilizing large-scale X-ray and gamma
ray machines
and radiation detection devices to screen cargo. Presently, CBP operates over 825 radiation portal monitors at our
nation’s ports (including 181 radiation portal monitors at seaports), utilizes nearly 200 large scale non-intrusive inspection devices
to examine cargo, and has issued over 14,000 hand-held radiation detection devices. The President’s FY 2007 budget requests
$157 million to secure next-generation detection equipment at our ports of entry. Also, over 1200 canine
detection teams, who are capable of identifying narcotics, bulk currency, human beings,
explosives, agricultural pests, and chemical weapons are deployed at our ports of entry.
We are prepared for attacks on ports - new plans have been established
Government Security News, 2012 [Mark Rockwell, Washington Correspondent for GSN, serves a BPA-audited
circulation of 35,000 qualified recipients in the fields of physical, IT and homeland security. This audience includes federal, state
and local officials, as well as integrators, contractors and suppliers who are similarly involved in homeland security.
http://www.gsnmagazine.com/node/26319, 18/06/2012]
For instance, the legislation would establish a special assistant to the president for biodefense to
coordinate federal biodefense policy; develop a national biodefense plan and a coordinated
budget that assess capability gaps and spending inefficiencies. It would also require DHS to establish a
national biosurveillance strategy, make first responder vaccinations voluntary and provide
response guidance for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. FEMA, for instance,
would be tasked with development of a communications plan to provide public information about preventing,
preparing for, and responding to a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attack. FEMA
would also develop and disseminate integrated public alerts and warnings system pre-scripted
messages and message templates to be provided to state, local, and tribal authorities to rapidly disseminate critical
information to the public in the event of such an attack. The measure would also authorize the Securing the Cities program to allow
for interdiction of a radiological device in high-risk cities.
There are many new layers of defense put in place- due to increased experience
CBP.gov 2006 - CBP.gov is the United States Customs and Border Protection website. [No
author given, "An Overall Picture of Port Security", CBP.gov, 07/12/2006,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/port_security/securing_us_ports.xml, 18/06/2012]
Screening and Inspection: CBP screens 100 percent of all cargo before it arrives in the U.S using intelligence and
cutting edge technologies. CBP inspects
all high-risk cargo. CSI (Container Security Initiative): Enables CBP, in working
high-risk maritime containerized cargo at foreign
seaports, before they are loaded on board vessels destined for the United States. In addition to the current 43 foreign
ports participating in CSI, many more ports are in the planning stages. By the end of 2006, the number is expected
with host government Customs Services, to examine
to grow to 50 ports covering 82 percent of transpacific maritime containerized cargo shipped to the U.S. 24-Hour Rule: Under this
requirement, manifest information must be provided 24 hours prior to the sea container being
loaded onto the vessel in the foreign port. CBP may deny the loading of high-risk cargo while the vessel is still overseas.
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AT: Solvency—Wrong Focus
Aff plan is focused on the wrong thing—instead of focusing on vulnerability instead
of recovery
Harrald 05 [John R, “Sea Trade and Security: an Assessment of the Post-9/11 Reaction,” Web, Fall 05,
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqrl/docview/220702986/1376BF5C74E6A8F9B1B/5?accountid=14667, 6/19/12]
Fault Tolerance and Resilience: These two system elements are closely related and must be part of a
comprehensive risk-management strategy. Risk cannot be reduced to zero; we cannot eliminate all
threats or vulnerabilities. We must therefore be prepared for post-event risk management interventions
for all subsystems. Thus far, the global strategy has been vulnerability-focused, with little attention
given to resilience and recovery strategies. The Transportation Research Board found
organizational and readiness deficiencies in U.S. marine firefighting and marine salvage capabilities that could
seriously affect the ability to contain the impacts of a terrorist attack on a U.S. port .52 The global
supply chain remains vulnerable to critical nodes, as the United States discovered with the Hurricane Katrinacaused disruption of a significant portion of its energy supply and distribution system, and with the labor conflict that closed West
Coast ports in 2004. While the U.S. government is preparing to respond to another terrorist attack,
little effort is being made to reduce our dependence on critical physical nodes, to prevent
cascading failures or to assist in economic recovery should an attack on the supply chain occur.
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AT: Solvency—Turns
Private infrastructure is necessary to port security – 85% privately owned
Dept. of Homeland Security ’05 [“Review of the Port Security Grant Program” January 2005
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-10_Jan05.pdf - Access Date 6/24/2012]
The government’s responsibility to protect the homeland, weighed against the realization that it
cannot assume the burden of the costs to protect the nation’s entire critical infrastructure, of
which 85% is estimated to be privately owned or controlled, presents a major policy issue for the
department. Further complicating the matter is the question of the extent to which the government should pay for the costs to
comply with MTSA, a federal mandate to improve port security that Congress has thus far not funded directly. National
strategic policies suggest that the government and industry share this burden. According to the
National Strategy for Homeland Security, “The private sector should conduct risk assessments
on their holdings and invest in systems to protect key assets. The internalization of these costs is
not only a matter of sound corporate governance and good corporate citizenship but also an
essential safeguard of economic assets for shareholders, employees, and the Nation.” The Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets identifies planning and resource allocation as one of its five objectives and
stresses the importance of incentives for private organizations, and market solutions where appropriate. According to the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, private owners and operators are expected to bear the
preponderance of protection and mitigation costs for surface and maritime modes of
transportation.
Private companies cannot work with the government on port security making the
aff unsolvable – afraid of losing competitive advantage
Dept. of Homeland Security ’05 [“Review of the Port Security Grant Program” January 2005
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-10_Jan05.pdf - Access Date 6/24/2012]
DHS is learning that many private companies are unwilling to share security information and
collaborate on security projects with port authorities. Port officials discussed the reluctance of
private sector entities to share information about their vulnerabilities for fear of reducing their
competitive advantage. Port authorities, while cognizant of this concern, want to establish
integrated and portwide security plans and security systems. This requires greater cooperation
and increased information sharing on the part of private entities. While there were occasional references to
the program’s goal of giving preference to port-wide projects, neither guidance nor reviewer comments indicated this was occurring.
The program does not adequately reinforce the cooperative efforts between public and private
entities that are required to develop an integrated approach to security.
Port security goes unnoticed and as the economy grows, problems will start again
Terreri 09—World Trade [April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Global supply chain security wasn't even a term a mere decade ago, but for today's trade community it is a neverending discussion
aimed at producing greater levels of security, notes Kelby Woodard, president of Eden Prairie, Minnesota-based Trade Innovations,
specializing in customs compliance and global supply chain security. "What I worry about is complacency, so we
need the trade to be fully engaged in supply chain security," he cautions. "Some ask why we continue
to require compliance to these initiatives, failing to recognize that the reason nothing has
happened is because we are doing all of these things." At the same time, Shaun Donnelly reports that while
problems persist in global supply chain security, the downturn in activity due to the recession
worldwide is masking some of those problems. "As the economy improves and trade starts to
grow again, we believe the problems will manifest themselves again," says Donnelly, senior director of
international business policy for the National Association of Manufacturers in Washington, D.C.
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Port security initiatives fail- Ships can be attacked at sea or before the reach the US
Council on Foreign Relations 12 (an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank on foreign
relations; Written January 9, 2012; Accessed June 20, 2012; http://www.cfr.org/africa/global-oceans-regime/p21035#p3; “The
Global Oceans Regime”)
However, these conventions do not provide comprehensive security solutions for maritime
containers, and illegal cargo could be slipped into shipping containers during transit. Since 1992, the
IMO has tried to prevent attacks on commercial shipping through the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, which provides a legal framework for interdicting, detaining, and prosecuting terrorists, pirates, and
other criminals on the high seas. In reality, most enforcement action since the 9/11 attacks has focused on
securing ports to prevent the use of a ship to attack, rather than to prevent attacks on the ships
themselves. Reflecting this imperative, the IMO, with U.S. leadership, implemented the ISPS code in 2004. This
code helped create international standards for ship security, requiring ships to have security plans and officers. However, as with
port security, the code is not obligatory and no clear process to audit or certify ISPS compliance has
been established. Overall, a comprehensive regime for overseeing the safety of international
shipping has not been created.
Resilience solves better than protection- overprotecting port assets causes
economic disruption
Hardwood 12 (Matthew Harwood is a staff writer for Secure Management; http://securityma-nagement.com/-news/new-
report-examines-resiliency-us-transportation-systems009959?p-age=0%2C0; Written June 8, 2012; Accessed June 20, 2012)
Accessed June 20, 2012; “New Report Examines Resiliency of U.S. Transportation Systems”)
A new report from a prominent bipartisan think tank questions the resiliency of the U.S. transportation system and the global supply
chain if a major terrorist attack occurred. “[T]he U.S. government and the other major trade nations still
have no plan to respond and recover from a major security incident involving the global
intermodal transportation system," Dr. Stephen Flynn and Sean P. Burke, warn in their report, a More Resilient
America: The Case of Transportation, published by the Center for National Policy. "As a result, there could be a weekslong period where the international system of trade and logistics grind to a halt with devastating
consequences for the global economy." Resiliency, or the ability to recover quickly after serious
disruption, matters more than ever, they argue, as terrorists shift from sophisticated and timeintensive spectacular attacks to crude and quick smaller attacks. This realization, however, means U.S.
policymakers’ security mindset must evolve from primarily being focused on prevention and
protection to resilience. Otherwise, a perverse incentive is created for terrorists to dream up new ways of
attacking these targets, especially those critical to the flow of goods and services within the global supply
chain. "If every terrorist act or near-miss leads to new government measures that make
transportation systems more inefficient, then an adversary gets a much bigger dividend than the
actual attack could deliver," Flynn and Burke, both executives at the George J. Kostas Research Institute for Homeland
Security at Northeastern University, write in their report. There’s evidence that terrorists understand this very well. In the
November 2010 edition of Inspire, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) gloated that it had spent $4,200 dollars on
constructing two printer cartridge bombs that were eventually found on cargo planes destined for the United States. "In such an
environment of security phobia that is sweeping America, it is more feasible to stage smaller attacks that involve less players and less
time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America worked so hard to erect," the letter from the editor
explained. "This strategy of attacking the enemy with smaller, but more frequent operations is what some may refer to as a strategy
of a thousand cuts. The aim is to bleed the enemy to death." In response, the U.S. and other Western nations issued
cargo alerts and restrictions, particularly with Yemen, where the bombs entered the air cargo system. AQAP determined the plot,
dubbed Operation Hemorrhage and which failed to bring down a plane, was a success. "During the initial discussions of the team it
was determined that the success of the operation was to be based on two factors: The first is that the packages pass through the latest
security equipment. The second, the spread of fear that would cause the West to invest billions of dollars in new security
procedures," AQAP boasted. "We have succeeded in the former and we are now witnessing the inception of the latter." Knowing how
terrorist methodology has shifted means “it makes no sense” to jeopardize “the purpose of transportation so
as to better protect it," argue Flynn and Burke. Rather they recommend that U.S. policymakers and security
professionals commit themselves to reasonable prevention and protection measures that are
“not unduly disruptive” and can survive “the-morning-after test” when they fail, therefore maintaining public confidence,
while ensuring adequate plans are in place to get the transportation system up and running again quickly after an attack. If they do
so, then transportation targets become a waste of terrorists’ time and resources. "When the United States demonstrates that it has
the ability to withstand attacks without inflicting damage on the essential systems that underpin our economy and way of life,
terrorism becomes a less attractive weapon for America's adversaries,” Flynn and Burke write.
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AT: Solvency—Agents
Solvency Deficit—Agents provide inaccurate data to ports and hamper their ability
to solve
Heskerth 10- is a Senior Manager with HM Revenue and Customs (David Hesketh has a
Masters in International Customs Law and Administration, a Project Manager for the Department for International Development,
and a Senior Manager with HM Revenue and Customs; “Weaknesses in the supply chain: who packed the box?”;
http://documentsearch.org/read?=http://-www.worldcustomsjournal.org/media/wcj/-2010/2/Hesketh.pdf; Written September
2010; Accessed June 21, 2012)
The complexity of the contracts of carriage and the systems and procedures required to
transport goods internationally almost encourage the consignor to employ a Freight Forwarder,
or ‘agent’, to manage the door-to-door or container consolidation to de-consolidation process. The Freight Forwarder in
one country consigning goods to another Freight Forwarder in the country of destination traverses the
Logistics and the Transaction Layers to manage the documentary and transport complexities. So, in addition to the limited
data contained in transport documents, the manifest will show consignor to consignee as ‘agent
to agent’ rather than the true buyer and seller. In everyday practice, despite the legal requirement to
provide accurate data about the goods being carried, about 60 per cent of vessel manifest
information is described as ‘agent to agent’ making the data unfit for regulatory pre-arrival risk
assessment purposes. Well established commercial practices within the Logistics Layer are masking the accuracy of data
thereby increasing the risks posed by a lack of visibility. Annual losses in international trade
caused by maritime fraud are estimated to be as high as USD31 billion. Documentary maritime frauds
involving the letter of credit and traditional ocean bills of lading account for nearly two-thirds of these losses.
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AT: Solvency—PSGP
Certain areas can receive funding from 4 grant programs, resulting in wasted,
ineffective funding
GAO 2012 (“HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination among Four Overlapping
Grant Programs” Government Accountability Office 2/12 <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-303> 6/22/12)
The four grant programs in our review—SHSP, UASI, PSGP, and TSGP—have overlapping goals, project
types,
and funding jurisdictions, which increases the risk of duplication among the programs. Although the
specifics of the four programs vary, they share the overarching goal of enhancing the capacity of state and
local emergency responders to prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorism incident
involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or other explosive devices, or cyber attacks. More specifically, each
program funds similar projects such as training, planning, equipment, and exercises. For example,
the four programs have overlapping lists of allowable costs, so certain types of equipment, such as
communication radios, may be purchased through each grant program. Further, although the programs
target different constituencies, such as states and counties, urban areas, and port or transit
stakeholders, there is overlap across recipients. For example, each state and eligible territory receives a legislatively
mandated minimum amount of SHSP funding to help ensure that all areas develop a basic level of preparedness, while UASI
explicitly targets urban areas most at risk of terrorist attack.20 However, many jurisdictions within designated UASI areas also apply
for and receive SHSP funding. Similarly, a port stakeholder in an urban area could receive funding for patrol boats through both
PSGP and UASI funding streams, and a transit agency could purchase surveillance equipment with TSGP or UASI dollars. More
broadly, any designated high-risk urban area located near major waterways can receive funding
through SHSP, UASI, PSGP, and TSGP sources. In March 2011, we reported that overlap among
government programs or activities can be harbingers of unnecessary duplication. Further, we
commented on FEMA’s full suite of 17 fiscal year 2010 preparedness programs, including the four programs in this review, and
noted that FEMA needed to improve oversight and coordination of its grant awards .21 Identifying and
mitigating the risk of duplication could help ensure that these four grant programs, which distributed over $20 billion dollars in
funding to grant recipients from fiscal years 2002 through 2011, are allocating resources effectively. Table 2 below describes the
basic purposes, the types of projects funded, and the eligible applicants of the SHSP, UASI, PSGP, and TSGP programs. FEMA’s
ability to track which projects receive funding among the four grant programs is varied because
the project-level information FEMA has available to make award decisions—including grant funding
amounts, grant recipients, and grant funding purposes—also varies by program. This is due to differences in the grant
programs’ administrative processes. For example, in some cases, FEMA relies on stakeholders to review and recommend projects for
grant funding—adding layers to the review process. Delegating administrative duties to stakeholders reduces FEMA’s administrative
burden, but also contributes to FEMA having less visibility over some grant applications, specifically those funded via SHSP and
UASI. A combination of federal statutes and DHS policy determine specific grant allocation mechanisms and the federal partners
involved in grants administration. Figure 2 below describes the federal agencies involved, the path of the grant funds to the final
recipient, and the application and award process for each grant, as of fiscal year 2011.
Lack of information on overlap makes it impossible to know if programs are
effective
GAO 2012 (“HOMELAND SECURITY: DHS Needs Better Project Information and Coordination among Four Overlapping
Grant Programs” Government Accountability Office 2/12 <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-303> 6/22/12)
From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, DHS has distributed about $20.3 billion through four homeland security preparedness grants
that specifically target state, urban, port, and transit security. We recognize that even when programs overlap, they
may have meaningful differences in their eligibility criteria or objectives, or they may provide similar
types of services in different ways. However, because the four DHS programs in our review have similar goals,
fund similar types of projects, and are awarded in many of the same urban areas, it will be important
for FEMA to take additional measures to help ensure that the risk of duplication is mitigated. FEMA has delegated significant
administrative duties to the SAA for the larger SHSP and UASI programs, and FEMA officials recognize the trade-off between
decreased visibility over these grants and the reduced administrative burden on FEMA. However, the limited project-level
information on how funds are being used and the lack of coordinated reviews of grant
applications across programs, increases the risk that FEMA could fund duplicative projects.
Additional action could help mitigate this risk. For example, as FEMA develops the ND Grants system, it will be important for the
agency to ensure that information collected for all grant programs provides enough detail to allow for project comparisons in order
to identify any unnecessary duplication. In addition, while some steps have been taken at the federal, state, and local levels to
improve coordination in administering the four grant programs, additional actions could also help reduce the risk of duplication.
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For example, without
a process to coordinate reviews across the four grant programs, FEMA lacks
the information necessary to identify whether grant monies are being used for duplicative
purposes, especially since all four grant programs are being reviewed separately, yet have similar allowable costs. Thus, to reduce
the risk of duplication, FEMA could benefit from exploring opportunities to enhance its coordination of project reviews across grant
programs. Additionally, since DHS’s existing output-based performance measures for the SHSP and UASI programs do not provide
DHS with the information it needs to assess grant effectiveness and FEMA has not yet implemented outcome-based performance
measures for any of the four programs, it will be difficult for FEMA to fully assess the effectiveness of these
grant programs. Because the project plan FEMA has in place to guide its efforts to develop measures does not provide
adequate information to determine what measures will be implemented for each grant program and when this implementation will
occur, FEMA does not have reasonable assurance that these measures will be implemented in a
timely way to help assess the programs’ effectiveness.
PSGP cannot solve – multiple warrants
Dept. of Homeland Security ’05 [“Review of the Port Security Grant Program” January 2005
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-10_Jan05.pdf - Access Date 6/24/2012]
After the first three rounds of grants under the Port Security Grant Program, recipients have
spent only a small portion of the entire amount awarded. Of the $515 million awarded in the first three rounds
since June 21, 2003, including $75 million provided under ODP’s Urban Area Security Initiative, grant recipients have expended
$106.9 million or 21% of total program funding. As a result, the majority of projects have not been completed,
and the program has not yet achieved its intended results in the form of actual improvements to
port security. Most of the expended funds are from the first round. The time available to obligate funds varied, depending on
when DHS announced the availability of funds. In round one, the appropriation language stated that the funds should be expended
no later than September 30, 2003. DHS had slightly more than a year and a half to exhaust the funds. As
of April 19, 2004, recipients had not drawn down more than 40% of those funds. DHS allowed
12 months to complete projects. Grant recipients said that one year is inadequate because the
period begins on the award date, and precedes the date when the program office finally defines
the scope of, and approves, the project. The kind of project and the local entity’s acquisition processes also affect the
amount of time required to spend the grant funds.37 Program officials said that they granted extensions to the majority of grant
recipients in round one.38 They also confronted this issue in later rounds. We attributed the large amount of
unspent funds to incomplete applications, the award of hundreds of grants before the full scope
and details of the projects were known, and delays in performing work and executing contracts.
Projects were rarely ready to be initiated at the time of award. We counted numerous projects where the NRB
or ERB stipulated during its review that the applicant needed to clarify the project. This in turn led to a lengthy negotiation
process.40 During this process, the applicant and program office further negotiated the scope of the project and the applicant
subsequently submitted additional information. Another matter relating to the status of funds is the program
office’s ability to monitor these projects properly to ensure, among other things, their timely
completion. MARAD had oversight responsibility for round one. TSA, which had primary grant administration responsibilities
for rounds two and three, dedicated one full-time person to the operational oversight of port security grant projects. Rounds two and
three produced a total of 811 enhanced facility and operational security projects. One person cannot provide adequate oversight for a
program of this size. DHS needs to take steps to ensure that it has adequate resources to oversee program implementation effectively
and to accommodate the increasing workload of the program.
PSGP does not solve for port security – did not achieve previous goals
Dept. of Homeland Security ’05 [“Review of the Port Security Grant Program” January 2005
http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_05-10_Jan05.pdf - Access Date 6/24/2012]
After three rounds of the Port Security Grant Program, recipients spent only a small portion of
the entire amount awarded. Of the $515 million awarded between June 2002 and December
2003, including $75 million provided under the Office for Domestic Preparedness’s (ODP’s) Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI), grant recipients had expended only $106.9 million, or 21% of total program awards
as of September 30, 2004. As a result, the majority of projects have not been completed and the
program has not yet achieved its intended results in the form of actual improvements to port
security.
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AT: Solvency—PSGP Focus Bad/Too Small
The PSGP has narrow focus and hard to get grants-very competitive.
American Enterprise Institute, 2005 [Veronique de Rugy, Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer,
September 7, 2005,
http://directory.cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf, June
22, 2012]
The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) has a narrow focus. It concentrates on funding security
upgrades such as new patrol boats, surveillance equipment at roads and bridges, and new command and control facilities,
in the hope of mitigating direct attacks on ports. In 2002, Congress provided the first wave of funding to the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), then part of the Department of Transportation, to enhance the security of ports
and other facilities. TSA, along with the Maritime Administration (MARAD) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), developed the
PSGP, which it continued once it became part of the Department of Homeland Security. In May 2004, the PSGP was transferred
to the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The grants are awarded to state and local governments and
private companies. Eligible applicants in each port area may submit one application for
funding. Each applicant that meets the requirements of the PSGP Guidelines and Application Kit
is evaluated by a field review panel and a national review panel. Grant recipients are selected
through a competitive process.
The grants are very little-9 billion in 10 years for 361 ports.
American Enterprise Institute, 2005 [Veronique de Rugy, Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer,
September 7, 2005,
http://directory.cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf, June
22, 2012]
The stated objective of the Port Security Grant Program is to fund security upgrades to help protect
ports in case of a terrorist attack. According to an estimate by the Coast Guard, the cost for enhancing
security at America’s 361 maritime facilities would be $1.5 billion in the first year, plus an
additional $7.3 billion over the next decade. Thus, if the goal is to enhance security in our
ports, $140.9 million is likely to be inadequate. That remains true even if we include the
$706 million in direct grants already allocated to ports to improve their physical and
operational security and spending. In addition, critics have argued that the U.S. port
infrastructure is so vast that spreading $140.9 million across the entire nation will not
achieve meaningful security either. On the other hand, considering the narrow and specific focus of the grant
program, one can argue that there is a limit to how many video surveillance cameras are needed to secure the country and thus
four years after the program started, very little money needs to be allocated now to fill that objective. More substantive criticism
came from within the Department of Homeland Security. A review of four separate rounds of the Port Security Grant Program
conducted by the DHS Inspector General (IG) between December 2003 and May 2004 questioned the merits of hundreds of
projects funded with these grants, ultimately raising doubts about the ability of the program to achieve any meaningful security.
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Grant allocation is very poor- bad choices prove
American Enterprise Institute, 2005 [Veronique de Rugy, Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer,
September 7, 2005,
http://directory.cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf, June
22, 2012]
The grant system is meant to be a competitive grant allocation program. In theory, grants are given
out based the merits and the expected security returns of applications submitted by individual ports.
However, the IG reports that “[t]he program funded projects despite dubious scores by its
evaluators against key criteria, raising questions about the merits of several hundred
projects.” For instance, more than $130,000 was awarded to a port for a closed-circuit television
system even after the field reviewers ranked the project 27th of 29 applications and stated in its
internal review documents that “these initiatives would be redundant to what the port authority has in place.” A $25,000
grant was awarded to install video surveillance equipment and alarms at a port next to a
luxury entertainment complex that included restaurants, a hotel, and a spa, even though this
project was ranked last among the applications. Given the limited budget available, the funding of such lowpriority projects necessarily means that the reverse situation also occurred: many projects were not funded despite
strong support from the field review. For instance, in round three, no grants were awarded to 54 projects that were
ranked highly, i.e., in the top five of their groups. Private entities also applied for, and received, substantial funding. There, the
IG also reported that funds went to projects that were rated below average or worse during the evaluation process, calling into
question the merits of these projects. For instance, in rounds two and three, 155 private-sector projects that ranked below
average or worse were funded at a cost of $32.4 million.
Grant allocation is very poor- unfinished projects prove
American Enterprise Institute, 2005 [Veronique de Rugy, Is Port Security Spending Making Us Safer,
September 7, 2005,
http://directory.cip.management.dal.ca/publications/Is%20Port%20Security%20Spending%20Making%20Us%20Safer.pdf, June
22, 2012]
Furthermore, many port security grant recipients have not spent the funds awarded to them :
after the first three rounds of grants, including the Urban Area Security Initiative, recipients have spent
only 21 percent of the total amount awarded ($107 million out of $515 million). When the grant funds have
been spent, the IG reports some questionable uses of the money. For instance, many grants were given to port
security projects that “appeared to be for a purpose other than security against an act of
terrorism.” Here are some examples: • $351,000 awarded to a port to buy a mobile command
center that DHS’s field reviewers said “appears to be a luxury item.” • $10,000 given to one
port for encrypted radios that the DHS field staff concluded were not needed and perhaps not
compatible with the federal and state radios. • $935,000 awarded to a port where an
industrial park was being built, leading the Department staff members to question if the
money was in fact an economic grant instead of anti-terrorism financing.• $1,060,000
awarded to a port for fortified crash beams even though the Department field reviewers
believed that this project was primarily anti-theft, not anti-terrorism. In the end, the IG’s report on
the Port Security Grant Program concludes that the Department has “no assurance that the program is
protecting the nation’s most critical and vulnerable port infrastructure and assets.” Accordingly,
reform of the grant system is a worthy priority. The good news is that DHS’s Office of Domestic Preparedness, newly in charge
of the PSGP allocation, announced in May 2005 that the program was going to be completely revamped so that money would be
distributed using a risk-based formula based on the elements of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Previously, DHS had
tried to spread funds to as many applicants as possible, leading to 361 ports receiving security grants. In FY2005, The Nations;
129 largest ports were evaluated using risks elements. Based on ODP’s evaluation, only 66 port areas have been identified as
eligible. Successful applicants will be awarded through a competitive process. This is a tremendous improvement.
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AT: Solvency—Domestic Ports
It is not enough to just put measures in domestic ports, because most shipping
comes from outside the US
Keefer 7 (Wendy J. Keefer has a JD from Campbell university and specializes in compliance with Title III of the USA PATRIOT
ACT, insurance coverage issues, and business and commercial disputes;
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1462&context=clr; Container Port Security: A Layered Defense
Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain; Campbell law review; written Fall 2007; Accessed June 21,
2012)
Annually, more than nine million containers enter United States ports and most ships carrying
these containers are foreign owned, foreign registered and operated by foreign crews . Thus, any
threat of terrorist use of shipping containers or container carrying vessels does not merely arise
upon entry into a United States port. Rather, it is too late to combat the threat once the vessel on
which terrorists, their supplies or weapons are loaded sail into domestic waters. It is one goal of
port security to prevent terrorist entrance into United States waters altogether. The way in which
containers are used to pack and carry cargo complicates container security. A single container may contain cargo
from many different companies and shippers. These containers are typically loaded somewhere other than the port
(e.g., at company warehouses). Each cargo shipment may involve numerous persons and numerous stops
from the actual exporter and importer to the various transportation providers that carry the
cargo to and from the ports. Each time a container is transferred or opened a risk of tampering or the
loading of dangerous cargo exists. Moreover, given economic concerns, attacks targeting United States interests need
not occur at or near any of the over three hundred domestic ports; such attacks could occur among ports of foreign nation trading
partners. Containers discharged at ports outside the United States , such as Canadian ports, may ultimately be
transferred via truck or train into the United States. At
all stages of shipment, security measures are needed
and the cooperation of public and private parties in both the United States and abroad is vital. It
is in every trading country's interest to participate in efforts to secure these shipments.
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AT: Solvency—Container Scanning
Scanning mandates are ineffective—information sharing and local action is better
McNeill 2011-Senior Policy Analyst for Homeland Security at The Heritage Foundation (Jena, Matt Mayer- Visiting Fellow at
The Heritage Foundation and President of the Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions “Ten Years After 9/11: Thinking Smarter
About Homeland Security” 5/23/11 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/ten-years-after-9-11-thinking-smarterabout-homeland-security> 6/21/12)
Determining which reforms have made us more agile and better prepared for disaster—and which have been a
colossal waste of taxpayer dollars—will ensure that future investments are smart investments. To
perform such an assessment, one need not resort to hypothetical questions. The 39 terrorist plots foiled since 9/11 are real and
compelling stories of what works. The research demonstrates that investments made since 9/11 in tools like the
PATRIOT Act—which empowers law enforcement to track down leads in local communities—
and in strengthening information-sharing capabilities are the right investments for security. In
essence, if intelligence does not flow seamlessly between law enforcement, the U.S. will not be able to stop terrorist plots before the
public is in danger. Centralizing Disaster Preparedness Yet, for every dollar spent on the right investments, five
more have been spent on silly efforts to childproof the supply chain. Examples of efforts to scan
every cargo container or passenger, screen every box, or regulate the way to security are bountiful.
These labors have proved to be a black hole: Millions (if not billions) of taxpayer dollars go in with
little security to show for the investment. It is also clear that too often, the preference has been to drive homeland security
from Washington. Federal bureaucrats have made policy decisions without input from—or better yet, cooperation with—local
communities, despite the fact that the communities are the first responders when disaster strikes. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has acquired more power to drive efforts that belong at the state and local levels. One of the
most important lessons from 9/11 and subsequently Hurricane Katrina was that state and local
governments are the first on the scene when disaster strikes. Washington should not and cannot
be the center of the universe for homeland security. Yet each President over the past 50 years
has surpassed his predecessor in the number of federal disaster declarations issued—pushing
dependency on Washington and shortchanging state and local efforts. Take Steps to Use Resources Wisely Certainly,
there are countless positive examples of how post-9/11 reforms continue to make Americans safer against terrorism. The time has
come, however, to recalibrate policies that do not make America safer, empower communities to take a greater role in their
preparedness efforts, and return to the very principles of federalism that make the nation free, safe, and prosperous. Specifically,
Congress and the Administration should: Stop doing stupid security. Congress and the Administration should undertake
an honest assessment of which policies are making the nation safer and which are not. For
instance, the 100 percent
scanning mandate for maritime cargo has been found wholly unworkable in terms of cost and
logistics and would cause tremendous backlogs in the supply chain, yet it remains law. Meanwhile, the
sunset provisions of the PATRIOT Act—a vital investigative tool—must be reauthorized by May 27. Reform congressional oversight
of homeland security. Getting homeland security right in the future relies heavily on Congress’s ability to exercise oversight in an
effective manner. The current structure is too chaotic, with too many committees exercising jurisdiction over American security.
Congressional leadership should fix this problem by consolidating oversight into the two standing homeland security committees
(separating Senate Governmental Affairs from Homeland Security), the appropriations committees, and the intelligence committees.
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Increases in inspection of cargo fail, because they burden trade too much
Keefer 7 (Wendy J. Keefer has a JD from Campbell university and specializes in compliance with Title III of the USA PATRIOT
ACT, insurance coverage issues, and business and commercial disputes;
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1462&context=clr; Container Port Security: A Layered Defense
Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain; Campbell law review; written Fall 2007; Accessed June 21,
2012)
Container shipments are indisputably used for illicit purposes. To date, and to our knowledge, potential
terrorists attempting to use the anonymity of container shipments to their advantage have all been detected - Farid - or are known to
and presumably monitored by the United States - al Qaeda owned vessels. The government has not yet publicly identified any
specific terrorist threats to container shipments or the ports through which such shipments pass, but serious gaps in
container security required attention. "Like many parts of our society, we thus confront an unknown threat, but a
known vulnerability." The only way wholly to ensure terrorists are unable to use containers to import
weapons, other supplies or even would-be terrorists themselves is greater, indeed complete,
physical inspection of incoming containers. Such inspections would need to be conducted prior
to the carrying vessel's entry into U.S. waters. Searches of all entering containers - or even inspection of any
statistically significant number of containers - is extremely impractical. The impracticality of
large scale inspections is clear when one considers that even now only about 5% of containers entering United States
ports are examined to identify their contents. Any large scale expansion of the number of containers examined whether using non-intrusive imaging technology or involving an actual physical search - would be overly burdensome on
global trade. Indeed, such security measures may themselves serve one of the potential terrorist
goals by slowing maritime trade to an economically unacceptable level.
International Coop key to container security- jurisdictional issues, bad
conventions, and inaccurate information
Heskerth 10- is a Senior Manager with HM Revenue and Customs (David Hesketh has a
Masters in International Customs Law and Administration, a Project Manager for the Department for International Development,
and a Senior Manager with HM Revenue and Customs; “Weaknesses in the supply chain: who packed the box?”;
http://documentsearch.org/read?=http://-www.worldcustomsjournal.org/media/wcj/-2010/2/Hesketh.pdf; Written September
2010; Accessed June 21, 2012)
The international trade supply chain has grown in complexity to a point where clear visibility is
masked from those who need to know what is going on. International conventions cover the transport of goods
between seller and buyer but concentrate more on limiting liabilities than they do on ensuring the accurate description of the goods.
The person who knows what is being sent into the supply chain is the person who packed the
box or consigned the goods. If the packing list is wrong, not used or hidden from view then the transport documents such
as way bills and the manifest are likely to be inaccurate. This poses safety, security, legal compliance
and commercial risks. Information required by border enforcement agencies is being asked for
further upstream in the supply chain, prior to the goods being loaded. But the consignor, who holds the
key to the majority of that information is outside the jurisdiction of the importing country’s
authorities so they turn to the carrier and the importer instead. Unfortunately, information held by the
carrier is not always accurate and Customs hold the importer accountable for goods they have
probably never seen. In these days of information management rather than the physical control of the goods, the role of
export data is increasingly important. A multilateral, international legal framework with enforceable
jurisdiction is needed with more emphasis placed on the point at which the international movement of the goods begins. The
consignor and the true packing list play a key role. A new key performance indicator and critical way-point must be created called
the Consignment Completion Point. A web-based, seamless, electronic data ‘pipeline’ needs to link the
seller/consignor and the buyer/consignee and the interested economic operators in between.
Real-time, accurate data must be assured from the beginning, updated as the goods move, and
shared in a risk based, layered approach.
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Scanning improvements are pointless—no uniform system
Wolf 06—Political Editor and Director for ABC [Z Byron, Political Editor and Deputy Political Director
for ABC News, “How Much Is Too Much for Port Security,” Web, 9/13/06, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Politics/
story?id=2425748&page=1, 6/19/12]
But many Democrats say that checking a manifest does nothing to verify what is actually inside
a cargo
container. They point to Hong Kong, where screeners send every container through machines that
check for radioactivity. The United States puts containers through similar machines at select
ports, and other containers are scanned by hand-held scanners. Chertoff said the widely varying
security measures at ports around the globe made screening for radioactivity challenging. "There's
nothing I'd like more than to be able to say, 'Wow, we have a way to make every port in the world scan
all the radiation overseas.' But I can't do that with a straight face because not every port is physically
constructed to be able to do that, and not every country is willing to do that," Chertoff said.
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AT: Solvency – Single solutions fail, need a comprehensive
approach
Single programs fail – comprehensive reforms key to solve
Goslin, 8 - Vice President of International Operations for Duos Technologies [Maritime
and Port Security by Charles Goslin, Inc. and Former Seinior Advisor to the Regional Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the U.S.
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&ved=0CHYQFjAG&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.eskema.eu%2FDownloadFile.
aspx%3FtableName%3DtblSubjectArticles%26field%3DPDF%2520Filename%26idField%3DsubjectArticleID%26id%3D514&ei=zq9wT4baBuiDsALHt
5X3BQ&usg=AFQjCNFszV4Yx95-79z5BZjgi4ckuDE0IQ&sig2=shSnWWRop3hNee8nzpZigw]
No single security countermeasure such as the container security initiative (CSI) or the terrorist
watch list, can adequately address port or maritime security and safety concerns. Technology
alone cannot secure ports and shipping, nor can adding additional security procedures, physical
barriers, or additional manpower fully mitigate the risk. What will work is an integrated,
carefully planned approach that incorporates the best elements of technical, physical,
procedural and information security disciplines into a comprehensive strategy.
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AT: Solvency—Projects
Solvency Deficit—port security projects fail, because they are classified from
people who could improve them
Flynn 11- was the maritime advisor to the Bush Administration (Written in 2011 Stephen Flynn
is the President of the Center for National Policy, was a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, has a Ph.D. in
international relations, and was the maritime and homeland security issues advisor to the Bush Administration; Recalibrating
Homeland Security; http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/Flynn_Forei-gnAffairs_May-Jun-2011.pdf; Accessed June 24,
2012)
On the surface, it seems sensible to avoid releasing information about vulnerabilities or security
measures that potential adversaries could exploit. But this insularity often undermines the
defense of critical infrastructure, such as seaports, dams, and waterworks. In determining the best way to protect
a suspension bridge, for example, the bridge’s chief engineer is likely to have ideas that would not
occur to a law enforcement or military professional working in the Department of Homeland
Security. But government officials frequently fail to consult that engineer. They will share
security information only with vetted company security officers, who in turn are barred from passing this
information on to senior executives and managers who do not hold active security clearances. As a result, investment and
operational decisions are often made with scant attention paid to the potential security stakes.
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2012-2013
AT: Solvency—Safety
U.S. can’t solve safety—we have little control over international regulations put
forth by the IMO Convention
Papp 2012-U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral (“The Law of the Sea Convention: Perspectives from the U.S. Military”
DefencePro 6/18/2012 <http://www.defpro.com/news/details/36522/?SID=6333d8234b2346da2f916706fb4d2e1b> 6/20/12)
Vibrant and safe U.S. ports are also vital to a healthy and thriving economy. The safety of U.S. ports, and the vessels that call on
them, is a function of U.S. port state control. The Coast Guard maintains a comprehensive port state control program, including
vessel inspections, assuring the proficiency of mariners, and monitoring port activity to ensure compliance with the highest
standards of maritime safety, security, and environmental protection. Uniform international standards, negotiated and
adopted through the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), are the foundations of this program. These
the linchpin of a transportation system that depends
on speed—inconsistent and misunderstood standards only lead to expensive delay and mishaps.
In international maritime shipping, where a ship may be flagged by one jurisdiction, owned by a party in
another jurisdiction, chartered by a party in yet another jurisdiction, sail through the coastal
zones of several jurisdictions, and call in the ports of many other jurisdictions, uniformity of
standards is key. The concept of port state control recognizes responsibility through the
hierarchy of a ship’s affiliations (including owner, ship classification society, and flag state) to comply with these
internationally agreed standards, which should result in compliance wherever a ship is located, including when it sails
standards, accepted by the international community, are
through waters of the United States but is not calling on a U.S. port (and thus not subject to our port state jurisdiction). The
shipping standards negotiated at the IMO are the fabric of the port state control regime that is
underpinned by the Convention. It is the
Convention that sets forth the responsibilities of flag states, port
states, and coastal states for shipping, and the Convention is the agreement that holds nations
accountable for adhering to those responsibilities. Because of the currently anomalous situation where the
United States is a party to the substantive IMO standards, but not the underlying legal
framework of the Convention, our ability to ensure comprehensive global accountability demanded
by the port state control framework is weakened. Acceding to the Convention would strengthen Coast Guard negotiation efforts
at the IMO, where we lead in the continued development of these important international standards. Although other countries look
to us for leadership, there is growing skepticism for certain U.S. negotiating positions because the
United States is not a party to the Convention. Becoming party to the Convention would increase the Coast Guard’s
credibility as a leader at IMO and result in greater effectiveness in ensuring that U.S. interests are reflected in the standards that are
ultimately adopted. The Coast Guard needs the Convention to better promote United States safety, security, and environmental
interests at the IMO.
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2012-2013
AT: Solvency – Radiation Scanners
Current radiation scanners can’t detect shielded material
Terreri 09—World Trade [April, “The Current State of Port Security,” Web, 10/09, World Trade, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Rooney is also concerned about the fact that overseas radiation portal monitors are unable to detect shielded
nuclear materials. Another concern relates to U.S. overseas inspectors. "The GAO and others indicate a number of
containers are not inspected overseas because of issues including sovereignty and limited
resources for equipment and manpower. So these containers are not inspected until they get
here." She adds that if the layered approach was working according to expectations, and overseas inspections were
taking place as required, there would be no need to re-inspect these containers once they hit U.S.
ports. She maintains the model is not working as it should.
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AT: Solvency—Federal Government
Can’t solve—government regulations are useless without industry agreement
Stowsky 06- executive director of the UC Berkeley Project on Information Technology and Homeland Security (“Protecting
the Nation`s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost” PPIC 7/1/06 <www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf> 6/21/12)
With some 25,000 containers arriving at U.S. docks each day, and tens of thousands traversing ports across the rest of the globe, the
opportunities for theft, fraud, smuggling, and terrorist infiltration are enormous. Current security solutions, such as
electronic antitamper seals; chemical, radiological, and biological sensors; tracking technologies of various types; and encrypted data
transmission, tend to secure the nodes of the supply network rather than providing true end-to-end
security along the entire supply chain. To achieve the latter, industry and government agencies
will have to agree on technical standards for interoperability and interconnection. Commercial suppliers, shippers,
and port operators cannot afford to maintain multiple technical platforms, infrastructure, or communications protocols from the
cargo suppliers’ facilities all the way to the final receiving location. So far the U.S. government has been relying
mainly on industry self-regulation to bring about standardization. The shipper and carrier
industries have been responsive, but only to a point. A regulated security system offers many benefits to
commercial shippers and carriers, as it is likely to speed the movement of cargo more rapidly through the world’s ports, freeing ships
up more quickly for the next load. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which incorporated parts of the Customs Service and
is part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has issued some new rules, most prominently a requirement that ocean
carriers must file a manifest, electronically, 24 hours before a cargo container bound for the United States is loaded at a foreign port.
But the U.S. government has wielded more carrots than sticks
Government is more concerned with cost than with security implications
Calvan 12—Boston Globe Writer [Bobby Caina, “US to Miss Target for Tighter Port Security: Cargo Screening Put
Off to 2014,” Web, 6/12/12, Boston Globe, Proquest, 6/20/12]
Homeland Security "has concluded that 100 percent scanning
of incoming maritime cargo is neither the
most efficient nor cost-effective approach to securing our global supply chain," said Matt Chandler, an
agency spokesman. Homeland Security "continues to work collaboratively with industry, federal partners, and the international
community to expand these programs and our capability to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials,"
Chandler said, adding that "we are more secure than ever before." The agency has used what it calls a "risk-based approach" to
shipments. As a result, Homeland Security has focused on cargo originating from 58 of the world's busiest seaports, from Hong
Kong to Dubai. Last year, US agents stationed at those ports inspected 45,500 shipments determined to be high risk, according to
joint testimony by Homeland Security, Coast Guard, and US Customs officials in February before the House Homeland Security
Committee. Republicans have been wary of forcing the agency to comply with the scanning
mandate because of the presumed cost, perhaps at least $16 billion - a figure disputed by Markey and others who cite
estimates that the program could cost a comparatively modest $200 million. Representative Candice Miller, a Michigan Republican
who chairs the House subcommittee on border and maritime security, was more inclined to accept the estimate from Homeland
Security officials. In light of the country's budget troubles, "we have to try and prioritize," she said. Scanning cargo
"100 percent would be optimal," she conceded, "but it's not workable." Still, she acknowledged the need to secure the
country's borders, whether by air, land, or sea. There is no dispute that a terrorist attack at a major port could be catastrophic to the
global economy. Much of the world's products - T-shirts sewn in China, designer shoes from Italy, and other foreign-made products arrives in the United States in large, metal cargo containers. While some countries have voluntarily improved
cargo screening, others have not. Large retailers have opposed measures that could increase
their costs. Without full scanning compliance, it is often difficult to determine if shipments have
been inspected because cargo is sometimes transferred from ship to ship offshore. "The existing
system has some real problems," said Stephen Flynn, the founding codirector of the Kostas Research Institute for
Homeland Security at Northeastern University. "We should be focusing on how to improve the system," he said,
"and that's really not happening." November will mark a decade since Congress approved the sweeping
maritime law that put in place standards and procedures for screening cargo. In 2007, Markey and
other Democrats won approval of the 100-percent scanning program, opposed by Homeland Security officials but ultimately signed
by President Bush. "They don't agree with the law. They think we should run the risk of nuclear
devastation," said Representative Jerrold Nadler, a New York Democrat.
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ST. LOUIS URBAN DEBATE LEAGUE
2012-2013
AT: Solvency—Megaport
Megaports fails- lack of cooperation and machine maintenance and handling
issues
Keefer 7 (Wendy J. Keefer has a JD from Campbell university and specializes in compliance with Title III of the USA PATRIOT
ACT, insurance coverage issues, and business and commercial disputes;
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1462&context=clr; Container Port Security: A Layered Defense
Strategy to Protect the Homeland and the International Supply Chain; Campbell law review; written Fall 2007; Accessed June 21,
2012)
Unfortunately, two years into the program many of the ports identified as presenting the greatest risk for
nuclear smuggling were not yet agreeable to participate in the program. Many hurdles blocked progress.
Political difficulties negotiating agreements with foreign countries and concerns about the
additional resources (e.g., employees) participating countries would need to perform the required
screening resulted in agreements with only two of the twenty countries in which the top priority ports
were located. Moreover, technical difficulties inherent in the actual screening equipment and
procedures were less than certain to detect the presence of nuclear or radiological materials .
Nonetheless, DOE continues to negotiate agreements for additional participants in the Megaports Initiative. Despite less than glow.
Factors such as the distance between the detection equipment and the container or other cargo
being screened, difficulties of devices in detecting highly enriched uranium which emits only
gamma radiation which can be shielded using substances such as lead, consistency in the
settings used on the detection devices, and maintenance of the detection equipment once
control is handed over to the foreign country and port officials may hinder detection of
smuggled materials.
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ST. LOUIS URBAN DEBATE LEAGUE
2012-2013
AT: Solvency – Lack of Consensus
No supply chain solvency – lack of consensus and standardization
Sadovaya, 2012—PhD Student (PhD Student at Nanyang Technological University” Maritime Security
Requirements for Shipping Companies and Ports:
Implementation, Importance and Effectiveness PDF May 27, 2012http://www.icms.polyu.edu.hk/ifspa2012/Papers/M05.pdf
6/19/12)
Thus, the question about the necessity of unification of the existing common standards and maritime
regulations, partly by mutual recognition concept, is widely discussed in the literature (Aigner, 2010;
Altemöller, 2011; Gould, et al., 2010; Ireland, 2011; Metaparti, 2010; Mikuriya, 2007; Pallis & Vaggelas,
2008; Stasinopoulos, 2003; Voort, et al., 2002). Widdowson and Holloway (2009) believe that “there is a strong
demand for standardization, harmonization and mutual (cross-border) recognition.” The problem of
overlapping of security regimes was also discussed in the paper of Grainger (2007), in that the author used the concept of
“security spaghetti” to describe the existing situation. However, just a few studies have been conducted on the comparison of
security requirements imposed by different regulations. For example, Gutierrez & Hintsa (2006) in their research combined
security measures found in different voluntary supply chain security programs. Similarly, our paper
provides a list of compulsory and voluntary security requirements for shipping companies and
ports, most often met in different regulations.
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AT: Solvency – Coast Guard Solves
Many partnerships have been made- Coast guard doing its job.
American Association of Port Authorities, 2011 [10 years after 9/11, Security Still a Top Priority of U.S.
Ports, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/10-years-after-911-security-still-a-top-priority-of-us-ports128888213.html#linktopagetop, 18/06/2012]
In concert with public port authorities and terminal operators, the Coast Guard is charged with routinely
inspecting
and assessing the security of U.S. port facilities and the vessels that call those facilities, in accordance with
the MTSA and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has instituted
innovative programs such as Maritime Safety and Security Teams, enforced security zones,
increased its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, expanded its partnerships with the
maritime industry, international organizations, federal, state and local agencies, and has joined with other
agencies within DHS to strengthen U.S. borders and protect America's ports and waterways. The
Coast Guard also cross-checks crew lists against terror watch lists in advance of arriving ships.
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A2 Econ Impact
Port Strikes are more damaging than a terrorist attack
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
It is distinctly possible that a port strike would cause less damage to the economy than a terrorist attack
would. Unlike a terrorist attack, a port strike is predictable because lengthy labor negotiations occur
ahead of time. Of course, a terrorist threat is predictable as well, even if the actual attack is not. The probability levels
of an actual attack, by comparison, might be substantially smaller, thus leading to less mitigating reaction by business. However, the
government typically does not intervene in the event of a labor action, whereas it would in the event of a terrorist strike. As a result,
a strike or other work stoppage might cause a greater slowdown in traffic than a terrorist attack
might. One objection to this line of inquiry is that we are looking at labor disputes that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when the
United States was less trade-dependent and in particular less dependent on the imports of parts and intermediate goods.
Past shut downs serve as a good estimate for potential future terrorist attacks
Learner and Thronburg 2006 - Director of the UCLA Anderson Forecast, Chief
Economist of the Ceridian-UCLA Pulsel of Commerce, Christopher Thornberg is a
founding principal of Beacon Economics [ Chirstopher Thornberg, Edward E Learner, Jon D. Haveman and
Howard J. Shatz (editors), Stephen S. Cohen, Peter Gordon, Jon D. Haveman, Matthew C. Hipp, Seth K. Jacobson, \ James E.
Moore, II, Qisheng Pan, Harry W. Richardson, Howard J. Shatz, Jay Stowsky, , Ernesto Vilchis, and Amy B. Zegart , Protecting the
Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Cost, 2006, http://www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=698, 6/20/12]
All these factors indicate that although past port shutdowns may not be the perfect example of the effect of a
terrorist attack on our ports today, they should be very informative. We might consider this a low estimate for the
potential for disturbance to the aggregate economy, but it is certainly a solid estimate.
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2012-2013
Capitalism Link
Ports increase competition reifies the capitalist system
International Transport Forum ‘08 [“Joint Transport Research Centre Discussion Paper
no. 2008-19 October 2008 – Port Competition and Hinterland Connections” Round Table, 10-11
April 2008 Paris
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/discussionpapers/DP200819.pdf - Access
Date 6/25/2012]
Containerization was a major technological innovation that revolutionized the nature of maritime-based freight transport of
manufactured goods. It caused a substantial degree of standardization of port services, implying that ports cannot rely on
specialization to maintain market share and generate revenues as much as they used to. With containerization, ports in the
same region become closer substitutes, and hence are more exposed to competition from other
ports and other routes. This tendency is reinforced by two other factors. First, the use of ever
larger container vessels1 implies that fewer port calls are required for the same freight volume.
This move to larger ships reduces shipping lines’ dependence on particular ports and intensifies
competition among ports for the remaining calls (assuming each port can handle the larger vessels2). Second,
the emergence of intermodal rail and barge corridors has extended gateway ports’ geographical
reach. The extension of hinterlands leads to more overlap among ports’ hinterlands and hence to
stronger competition. These technological factors imply that the exposure of ports to
competition has increased. At the same time, there has been widespread adoption by
governments of new public management principles and the ensuing devolution of port
management has resulted in a more commercial approach to the management of port operations
(Brooks and Cullinane, 2007); this has led to intensified port competition as well. This is not to say that all ports
behave like private firms as, in many cases, they pursue a mix of private and public objectives and there is considerable public sector
involvement in infrastructure supply. The change in port behavior has been facilitated by a rather passive policy context; in section
3, the question to be tackled is: is a more active public policy towards port and supply chain developments now required?
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Ports Parallel the capitalist form of market dominance by a handful of large
players
International Transport Forum ‘08 [“Joint Transport Research Centre Discussion Paper
no. 2008-19 October 2008 – Port Competition and Hinterland Connections” Round Table, 10-11
April 2008 Paris
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/discussionpapers/DP200819.pdf - Access
Date 6/25/2012]
The increase in levels of concentration, along several dimensions, is quite spectacular. In 1980 the top 20 of the world’s shipping
lines controlled 26% of TEU-slot capacity; by 2007 their share had increased to 81% (Notteboom, 2008).3 Many of these top 20
further concentrate effort by engaging in alliances. Shipping lines also vertically integrate, in some cases working towards “extended
gates” where shipping lines take control of inland transport and inland terminals and depots. At the level of port terminal
operations, the market share in terms of throughput of the top 10 players rose from 42% in 2001
to 55% in 2005. This raises concerns over increasing market concentration. Some terminal operators
have extended vertically in the direction of “terminal operator haulage”. With respect to vertical integration, the
current picture is one of widespread experimentation with ways of organizing the supply chain
(see Notteboom, 2008, for an overview), and while it is not clear exactly which models will persist, the
emerging picture is one of market dominance by a handful of large players at each segment of
the supply chain, combined with fringe firms specialising in profitable niche markets. Despite
the small number of players, competition in and for the market (within and between ports) is strong,
and may be strong enough to alleviate concerns about market power in the supply chain in many
circumstances. Concerns were expressed by participants that the market power of integrated, global transport and logistics
companies is a concern for ports themselves. Finally, geographical concentration of flows is increasing as well. For example, the
North-South imbalance among ports in Europe is growing larger, and this is largely because of more favourable hinterland transport
conditions in the North.
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