71493
IS CLASS I TOP TIER?
Can the Civil Service Be a Key to Progress in
Bangladesh?
CONTENTS
SUMMARY .........................................................................................................................................i
1. THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A KEY TO PROGRESS ............................................................................. 1
2. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM’S POOR TRACK RECORD ....................................................................3
The government did not implement the recommendations of reform commissions ............................... 3
Elected and appointed executive were averse to risks and faced no penalties for inaction .................... 4
Earlier reform initiatives focused on process rather than outcomes ....................................................... 6
The driver of change was neither highly placed nor close to the center ................................................. 7
3. EMPHASIZING MERIT IN CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT ......................................................... 10
Merit must be restored to its central position ........................................................................................ 11
Merit must be incorporated into affirmative action .............................................................................. 12
Merit must be championed by the Public Service Commission ........................................................... 15
Merit must guide Class I officers’ promotion and career management ................................................ 16
Merit can be built through training ....................................................................................................... 17
Compromising merit and competition can lead to unintended consequences ...................................... 18
4. BUILDING A STRONGER LEGAL FRAMEWORK, MORE INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT, AND
BETTER TOOLS FOR MANAGING PERFORMANCE ..................................................................... 20
A sound legal framework must be established to manage the civil service .......................................... 20
The Public Service Commission must be free from political micromanagement ................................. 21
The civil service examination is outdated and needs revamping .......................................................... 23
The annual confidential report is not useful for managing performance and career progression ......... 24
Promotions are not use effectively to reward good performance ......................................................... 26
5. NEXT STEPS ..............................................................................................................................28
Forewarned is forearmed ...................................................................................................................... 28
A program of action will show the way forward .................................................................................. 29
ANNEXES
1. Recommendations of various administrative reform commissions and committees ................ 35
2. The Bangladesh Public Service Commission ................................................................................ 36
3. The public administration training policy .................................................................................... 38
4. The annual confidential report ...................................................................................................... 40
5. Promotion rules ............................................................................................................................... 42
6. Proposed ministry clusters ............................................................................................................. 46
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 48
SUMMARY
1.
A country’s civil service is a tool the government can use to convert its manifesto into
results. Bangladesh needs a more effective and efficient civil service to move the country toward
its goals for social and economic development. Improving the performance of the civil service
and more effectively using the latent talents of its officers are the keys to progress.
2.
The strengths and weaknesses of Bangladesh’s civil service are well known because the
government has set up at least ten different committees and commissions in the past 25 years to
study the problems. Although their recommendations have been very similar, few decisive
actions have resulted. The objective of this study is to convince government officials and their
development partners that doing more of the same will not create a modern civil service, capable
of making policies and delivering services relevant in the twenty-first century. This report is
intended to shape how the government builds the political will and administrative capacity to
support ongoing and future reforms, such as the proposed clustering of ministries and
establishment of a senior civil service.
3.
The report begins by examining the scope of previous civil service reform initiatives in
Bangladesh and the reasons why their track record has been so poor. Despite many diagnoses
and recommendations from government-appointed commissions and development partners’
reports, progress has faltered for four main reasons.




First, successive governments have not acted upon the recommendations and development
partners have not followed up on the recommendations’ implementation.
Second, reforms have not been propelled forward because there were strong vested interests
in the status quo and little demand for the changes that remained unimplemented.
Third, when initiatives were in fact started, they were considered to be an end in themselves
rather than a step toward achieving the higher objective of an efficient and effective civil
service. The government’s follow through with its public administration training policy for
Class I officers illustrates this characteristic. Although the government announced the policy
in 2003, it was not followed by an implementation plan containing details of costs and staff
resources.
Finally, even when the government decided to act upon recommendations and initiate reform,
there was no driver of change—individual or unit—placed highly enough to carry the reform
through. Currently, all civil service reform initiatives are the responsibility of the Ministry of
Establishment, which has important governmentwide human resource functions but is neither
strategically placed nor perceived as politically powerful. The discharge of routine functions
takes up so much of its resources that change management is not among the ministry’s
priority tasks. A high-placed reform unit, unencumbered with day-to-day personnel
management, and working with other central management agencies, would help drive the
reform process forward.
4.
This investigation focuses on civil service management practices, such as recruitment,
training, performance evaluation, promotion, and career management. The rules and practices
guiding these elements of personnel management most directly affect civil servants’ behavior
and their approach to their tasks. For Bangladesh, with its career-based civil service, examining
civil service management is particularly important because the behavior patterns induced by
these rules and practices will be more permanent than in position-based systems, where officers
come and go and where the entire civil service could theoretically be replaced by a new set of
officials with desired skills and behavior.
5.
Other aspects of the civil service, such as its architecture, size, budgetary impact, and
service delivery mechanisms—to name a few—are beyond the scope of this study, although they
are ultimately important for civil service reform. Especially, compensation is central to civil
servants’ incentives, but because the topic was covered in a governance note delivered to the
government in 2005 it is not addressed directly here. Although Bangladesh’s civil service
comprises nearly a million officials, this study is deliberately restricted to a small group—the
Class I officers, who make up only 10 percent of the civil service. This group is at the tip of the
civil service pyramid; it has the potential to function as the spearhead of reform.
6.


The study makes two major recommendations:
Give additional emphasis to merit in managing the civil service.
Focus on the fundamentals of civil service reform, where tinkering at the edges has been
unproductive, by building a stronger legal framework, more independent oversight, and
better tools for managing performance.
Emphasizing merit in civil service management
7.
The merit principle, which entails the appointment of the best person for any given job
based on explicit rules that are publicly understood and consistently applied, is central to civil
service management, especially in a career-based service such as Bangladesh’s. Meritocratic
civil service systems tend to promote commitment and integrity among public servants and are
associated with lower corruption and better performance. But merit and competition have been
sidelined in some aspects of Class I officers’ management. Currently, less than half (45 percent)
of the total Class I recruitment is based on merit; the rest is distributed among districts according
to their populations—besides a quota of 10 percent for women. The recruitment quotas have
changed a few times since they were first laid down in 1972.
8.
Recruitment quotas are not unique to Bangladesh. Many governments use them to
implement affirmative action in public service. Since Bangladesh has a definite goal of altering
the civil service’s profile through the use of quotas, those polices can be implemented more
successfully if the government clearly lays down the goals of affirmative action along with the
implementation plan.
9.
Beyond the recruitment process, excellence is sidelined when the government waives the
requirement of training for promotion and career progression, and quotas among different cadres
restrict merit-based promotions to the highest levels of the civil service. Seventy-five percent of
positions at deputy secretary level are reserved for a particular cadre (BCS Administration), and
70 percent of positions at the joint secretary level positions are reserved for the same group.
There are exemptions for officers who fail the promotion examinations. The stated purpose of
the president quota is to induct very competent persons from outside the civil service to top
ii
levels of government, but it is used to promote some officers who fail to get the minimum 85
marks necessary for promotion to the rank of joint secretary.
10.
Nonetheless, the sidelining of merit in Bangladesh’s civil service is a relatively recent
phenomenon that could be reversed. Bangladesh’s Public Service Commission is the custodian
of the merit principle, but its ability to uphold merit has varied. The commission can more
effectively fulfill its role as a champion of merit in civil service management through various
measures described in the report, including freeing the commission of political
micromanagement.
11.
Building competence—and ultimately meritorious performance—through training needs
to become part of career management. A recent survey of Class I officers reveals that they do not
perceive training as a method for building competence and excellence. Rather, undergoing
training is associated with an officer’s having a deficiency needing to be met.
12.
Because merit is fundamental to civil service management, it must be restored across all
personnel management functions: recruitment, training, and promotions. This is especially urgent
if the Class I officers, or a small part of this group, are going to lead reform in the rest of the civil
service. Without merit, they cannot demonstrate their competence and leadership. Nor will they
be perceived by the political leadership as useful tools to achieve results—genuine keys to
progress in Bangladesh.
Building a stronger legal framework, more independent oversight, and better tools for
managing performance
13.
So far, the attempted reforms of Bangladesh’s civil service have not yielded substantive
changes because they have essentially made small “Band-Aid” fixes at the extremities, while
ignoring anomalies at the heart of the matter. For example, donors including the World Bank
have funded technical assistance to improve the performance of the Public Service Commission
(PSC). But Bangladesh’s PSC, unlike those in many other countries, is not independent, which
increases its vulnerability to political micromanagement and damages its impartiality in the eyes
of the general public.
14.
Now, to restore the health of the system, fundamentals need attention. This chapter
argues that two main institutional changes are needed: (a) enactment of laws defining the roles
and responsibilities of the civil service and the Public Service Commission, as a legal framework
for civil service management and (b) establishment of the Public Service Commission as an
independent guardian of merit. At the same time, there is an urgent need to revamp the tools to
manage the Class I civil service: the recruitment examination, the annual performance
assessment, and rules governing promotions.
15.
Establishing the right legal framework. In both career- and position-based systems, civil
service laws are important for restraining the executive’s arbitrary actions. Although the
Constitution provides for it, no act or law relating to civil service management exists in
Bangladesh since Independence. Not having such a legal framework blurs the responsibilities of
the various organizations involved in civil service management: the Public Service Commission,
iii
the Ministry of Establishment, and the ministries and departments managing the cadres. Scope
exists for the development of an act, which would define the roles and responsibilities of the
Public Service Commission and also of the line ministries and Ministry of Establishment. It
would also define the civil service and seek to entrench the basic values of public service that a
well-functioning civil service should reflect.
16.
Insulating the Public Service Commission from political interference and making it a
guardian of merit. The Public Service Commission’s impartiality is all the more important in
Bangladesh because it has a career-based civil service: the elected government comes and goes,
but the appointed civil service remains the same. Unfortunately, the commission does not enjoy
such independence. Although a constitutionally mandated body, it functions as an attached
department of the Ministry of Establishment. Various commissions have made
recommendations, and donors have funded diagnoses for making the Public Service Commission
more capable of discharging its duties. But there is no discussion within government of how the
commission might more effectively champion and implement the merit principle. The mandate
and powers of the commission need be spelled out more explicitly, making clear its central role
as a watchdog of the merit principle in public life. The time and resources it spends on the annual
recruitment process can be reduced by streamlining the recruitment process.
17.
Revamping the civil service examination. Because it is the method of selecting Class I
officers, the civil service examination is a critical component of civil service management.
Subsequently in their careers, the competence level and skills of Class I officers often comes in
the way of their being able to adequately perform government functions. Many of the officers are
not able to pass the promotion examinations. This shortfall in middle or late stages of the
officers’ careers can be traced back to the indifferent quality of the recruits that enter the Class I
civil service. The examination is considered to be inadequate to identify the talent required to
perform government’s present-day functions. The 27th civil service examination was supposed
to have incorporated many changes, but the changes were only cosmetic. The syllabus and
questions of the civil service examination do not appear to be testing analytical or managerial
skills.
18.
Revamping performance assessments. The annual confidential report is not an
appropriate management tool for judging the performance of Class I officers. It prompts
judgments about a disproportionate number of personal traits. The scale points (1 through 4)
measuring each of the attributes are not defined, making the assessment dependent on how the
supervisor interprets the scale’s points. The report is confidential and is not shared with the
officer being appraised. If an officer is entirely average and receives no adverse remarks, that
officer could complete his entire career without ever receiving any feedback on his performance.
Furthermore, senior officers who appraise their subordinates do not receive guidelines on how to
do so.. Changes to the report’s format and contents are not widely communicated or explained.
Neither the appraisers nor those being appraised understand the changes or the rationale behind
them. There is no evidence of fundamental rethinking about the value and use of the annual
confidential report.
19.
Revamping rules for promotion. Promotions are not used effectively to reward good
performance. The practices of giving preference to seniority and considering entire batches of
iv
candidates together for promotion leads to perceptions of stagnation and able officers’
frustration. It results in officers continuing to perform the same tasks but increasing their ranks.
Next steps
20.
The report warns that civil service reform is universally difficult because it involves
changing officials’ behavior. Technical solutions alone will not show results: political
engagement is essential. Soundly designed technical fixes are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for reform to succeed. Without political commitment, the best technical advice remains
ineffective. Furthermore, the elements of civil service management are so closely connected that
it is difficult to mend one weak element of civil service management without changing all the
related pieces. The many interconnected problems sometimes make the reform’s scope too big
and overwhelming to governments.
21.
Some dos and don’ts in approach follow from the importance of political support for
reforms’ success. Do follow policies with implementation plans. Don’t constitute more
commissions to determine what should be done. Many notable commissions have already
examined the issues.
22.






This analysis leads to the following set of specific action points:
Reorient organizations’ and individuals’ focus away from process towards results.
Use a medium-term expenditure framework to encourage officers’ awareness of outputs.
Restore merit across the whole range of human resource functions.
Strengthen the Public Service Commission and demarcate the respective roles of the
commission, the Ministry of Establishment, and the line ministries.
Strengthen the tools for managing performance: training, appraisal, and promotions.
Build support for modernization within the civil service, among politicians, and in the
wider civil society.
v
1. THE CIVIL SERVICE AS A KEY TO PROGRESS
1.1
A country’s civil service is a tool the government can use to convert its manifesto into
results. Bangladesh needs a more effective and efficient civil service to move the country toward
its goals for social and economic development. Improving the performance of the civil service
and more effectively using the latent talents of its officers are the keys to Bangladesh’s progress.
1.2
The strengths and weaknesses of Bangladesh’s public administration are well known
because the government has set up at least ten different committees and commissions in the past
25 years to study the problems. Their recommendations have been very similar: uphold merit
principle in the civil service, increase the independence of the Public Service Commission,
reorganize the legal structure and administrative systems for public service, reform salary and
compensation policies, and improve employee motivation. The same set of recommendations
also followed from the World Bank’s recent analytical and advisory services: Government that
Works (1996), Taming Leviathan (2002), Experience and Perceptions of Public Officials (2001),
and Improving Governance to Reduce Poverty (2002) have all identified the executive’s lack of
accountability, poor personnel management, and weak capacity for policy formulation and
implementation as obstacles to the delivery of public services and the implementation of
economic and financial reform. But few decisive actions have resulted from these consistent
messages—both from within the country and from development partners.
1.3
The objective of this study is to convince government officials and their development
partners that doing more of the same will not create a modern civil service, capable of making
policies and delivering services relevant in the twenty-first century. This report is intended to
shape how the government builds the political will and administrative capacity to support
ongoing and future reforms, such as the proposed clustering of ministries and establishment of a
senior civil service.
1.4
This investigation focuses on civil service management practices, such as recruitment,
training, performance evaluation, promotion, and career management. The rules and practices
guiding these elements of personnel management most directly affect civil servants’ behavior
and their approach to their tasks. For Bangladesh, with its career-based civil service, examining
civil service management is particularly important because the behavior patterns induced by
these rules and practices will be more permanent than in position-based systems, where officers
come and go and where the entire civil service could theoretically be replaced by a new set of
officials with desired skills and behavior.
1.5
Other aspects of the civil service, such as its architecture, size, budgetary impact, and
service delivery mechanisms—to name a few—are beyond the scope of this study, although they
are ultimately important for civil service reform. Especially, compensation is central to civil
servants’ incentives, but because the topic was covered in a governance note delivered to the
government in 2005 it is not addressed directly here.
1.6
Although Bangladesh’s civil service comprises nearly a million officials, this study is
deliberately restricted to a small group—the Class I officers, who make up only 10 percent of the
civil service. This group is at the tip of the civil service pyramid; it has the potential to function
as the spearhead of reform. Comprising top positions of cadres and the secretariat, this group,
although small, is very influential and could potentially lead by example to create a critical mass
of change agents to sustain reform. Good practices initiated in this group can percolate
downward through the entire civil service. Other development partners assisting the government
to reform the civil service have also found this group a potential point of entry. The United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development has recently followed up its earlier
program, Managing at the Top (MATT 1), with a seven-year MATT 2 program designed to train
a critical mass of senior managers and develop reformed human resources systems within the
Bangladesh civil service.
1.7
To suggest improvements in Class I officers’ management, this report draws upon the
themes that recurred in three background summaries written by in-country experts familiar with
the context and the issues of public administration. The first report [Khan 2006] focused on Class
I officers’ recruitment and training. Performance appraisal and management of Class I officers’
career progression were the topic of a second paper [Aminuzzaman 2006]. Possibilities of a
senior civil service and the proposed grouping of ministries into clusters (for the purpose of civil
service management) were analyzed in the third report [Ali 2005]. These analyses all found the
same underlying reasons for failed reforms, whether in recruitment, training, performance
appraisal, or promotion: successive governments have not implemented the advice of reform
commissions, no high-level individual or body has been responsible for implementing reform,
and there has been no punishment for inaction. And, in a larger sense, there are vested interests
in the status quo, which work to block change. The lessons for the future are to place merit front
and center in civil service management and to go to the heart of the matter when tinkering at the
edges has had little impact. In each of these areas, this report provides examples of how other
countries, having similar administrative traditions, have approached and succeeded in reform.
The examples are mostly from countries with career-based civil services like Bangladesh’s.
1.8
We hope this report, along with the policy notes delivered previously to the government,
will initiate and sustain a dialogue on which reform initiatives are likely to succeed and why and
how they may be sequenced. A forthcoming dialogue could be helpful to the government as it
considers options for ministry clusters and for initiating a senior civil service, both of which have
recently featured in the government’s agenda of reform options.
1.9
The rest of the report is organized as follows. The following chapter (2) analyzes why
civil service reform has a poor track record in Bangladesh. Knowing why efforts did not succeed
will help avoid same mistakes. The next two chapters (3 and 4) suggest two major principles that
may guide the design and implementation of reform. Finally, Chapter 5 outlines how these
principles and lessons from the past may shape the debate on future reform initiatives, such as a
senior civil service and ministry clusters. Because the analysis often refers to previous reform
commissions’ recommendations, annexes 1–5 give brief descriptions of the Bangladesh civil
service examinations conducted by the Bangladesh Public Service Commission; the
government’s public administration training policy; the Class I officers’ annual confidential
report; and the application of promotion rules of 2002. A brief summary of the proposal to
cluster ministries is contained in annex 6, but the proposal has not been analyzed in depth in the
text, as no final decision has been made on that initiative.
2
2. CIVIL SERVICE REFORM’S POOR TRACK RECORD
2.1
This chapter examines why civil service reform has faltered despite many diagnoses and
recommendations from government-appointed commissions and development partners’ reports.
Four main reasons account for the lack of progress. First, successive governments have not acted
upon the recommendations and development partners have not followed up on the
recommendations’ implementation. Second, reforms have not been propelled forward because
there were strong vested interests in the status quo and little demand for the changes that
remained unimplemented. Third, when initiatives were in fact started, they were considered to be
an end in themselves rather than a step toward achieving the higher objective of an efficient and
effective civil service. Finally, even when the government decided to act upon recommendations
and initiate reform, there was no driver of change—individual or unit—placed highly enough to
carry the reform through.
The government did not implement the recommendations of reform commissions
2.2
Between 1973 and 1997, the government set up no fewer than ten commissions to
examine and recommend on civil service management issues. In fact, so many commissions
already had been appointed that in 1993 the Administrative Reform Committee was established
to examine the contents of previous studies. The Administrative and Services Reorganizing
Committee, 1972, the National Pay and Services Commission, 1977, the first and third Martial
Law Committees, 1982 and 1983, and the Public Administration Reform Commission, 2000,
have all recommended reforms to emphasize merit and affirmative action in recruitment. Yet,
there is no policy on these subjects and therefore implementation is uneven. Both the National
Pay and Services Commission, 1977, and the Public Administration Reform Commission, 2000,
recommended the constitution of a senior civil service and management pool. Such a pool was
also recommended by the public administration efficiency study funded by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (1989); the public administration sector study funded by the UN
Development Programme; the Towards Better Government study led by four permanent
secretaries to the government and funded the by U.K. Department for International
Development; and the study Government that Works funded by the World Bank (1996). There is
no evidence of the government having accepted or acted upon the recommendations of any of
these reports.
2.3
One explanation for why these generally sensible reform suggestions were not carried out
could be that political circumstances may have changed in the time between the launching of the
reform initiatives and the final submission of detailed analyses and recommendations. This is a
risk all public management reforms face, since political will waxes and wanes with electoral
cycles. Although this might explain the failure to implement any particular set of reform
recommendations, what is so striking about Bangladesh’s case is the large number of reform
commissions that have been ignored and the similarity of their analyses and recommendations,
not all of which would have come at the politically wrong time. Nor were the reform
recommendations themselves to blame: for the most part they comprised thoughtful and practical
diagnoses of current problems and how they might be rectified. Bangladesh’s experience differs
3
markedly from Tanzania’s and New Zealand’s, where political will and bureaucratic support
combined to advance recommended reforms (Box 2.1).
Box 2.1: Political commitment and bureaucratic support for effective implementation of
recommendations in New Zealand and Tanzania
At different ends of the Commonwealth public administration spectrum, both New Zealand and
Tanzania provide clear examples of how reform can move forward when the central management
agencies work together, when the political leadership backs the reforms, and when the reforms
respond to a broader societal view that change is necessary.
New Zealand launched its pathbreaking public management reforms in the mid-1980s. The
principal driver of reforms was the Treasury under its dynamic finance minister, Roger Douglas,
who obtained high-level backing from the prime minister. But there was also co-leadership of the
reforms from New Zealand’s public service agency, the State Services Commission. Initially
successful, reforms stalled in the later 1980s when the prime minister became concerned,
unnecessarily in the view of the reformers, about the political fallout from such far-reaching
reforms. The momentum picked up again when the leadership changed.
Tanzania’s public service reforms in the past decade are seen as one of the most successful in SubSaharan Africa. They have been led by the technically capable Ministry of the Public Service,
which developed a clear vision of the reform process and the actions needed to move it forward.
But the ministry was continuously supported by parallel public financial management reforms
pursued by the finance ministry, and by a president unwavering in his belief that if the government
was to respond to popular demand for better living conditions, the performance of the civil
services had to be improved. In Tanzania’s case, donors played an effective supporting role.
These two examples suggest that reform moves forward when the relevant central management
agency has a clear vision and the capacity to translate it into new structures and processes, when it
is supported by the political leadership responding to popular demand and backed up by
complementary reforms by other central management agencies. Furthermore, the reform program
in these two countries was not generated by an external commission, but came from the ideas of
reforming ministers and senior officials in the central management agencies. In this sense,
contracting out the design of the reform program to an external body—however knowledgeable—
could itself be part of the problem in Bangladesh.
Elected and appointed executive were averse to risks and faced no penalties for inaction
2.4
Unsurprisingly, short-run political calculations have affected successive governments’
approach to civil service reform. Frequent electoral cycles dominate the concerns of politicians
in many countries, yet governments do undertake reform. In Bangladesh, the cost of reform and
especially the absence of support from those civil servants who would have lost privileges must
have outweighed the perceived gains from better service to the larger civil society.
2.5
Furthermore, the tendencies to avoid risk and stay within the comfort zone of established
ways are something all civil services have to contend with (Box 2.2). In one sense, it is the
consequence, and still desirable attribute, of “rule- bound” public administration, which, when
introduced, was seen as a distinct improvement on the patronage and corruption that
4
characterized earlier regimes. But it is also a product of the incentive system civil servants face.
Staff conduct rules in civil services such as Bangladesh’s cover many dimensions of an officer’s
public life, but when they address behavior, they are as much about what an officer should not do
(such as divulge information, get into debt, and other traits that might embarrass the service), as
they are guidance on what an officer should do (such as dress neatly, be courteous to the general
public, and obey a superior’s orders). Traditional civil services that perform well rise above these
staff conduct rules because they inculcate in officers strong public service values. Somewhere in
the evolution of Bangladesh’s civil service, such public service values got eroded, leaving only
the formal rules of staff conduct, allied with a lot of informal behavior and practices. Promotion
rules are biased toward avoiding adverse comments, which in a seniority-based system means
not taking risks and alienating the supervisor. The annual performance evaluation system is
based on a superior’s subjective assessment of behavior, not measurement of performance
against agreed tasks.
Box 2.2: Innovating and taking risks to promote change in Malaysia
In Malaysia, the Public Service Department (PSD) is part of the Prime Minister’s Office. Its
responsibility is not only the management of public personnel at federal and state levels, but also
its further development. (Similar to the Bangladesh Ministry of Establishment’s being the cadrecontrolling authority of the BCS Administration cadre, the Malaysia Public Service Department is
also the cadre-controlling authority for the elite Malaysian Administrative and Diplomatic
Service.) As in Bangladesh’s case, the PSD also takes initiative to suggest new reforms. In this, it
is assisted by the Malaysian Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit
(MAMPU), also located in the Prime Minister’s Office. MAMPU is a well-resourced government
agency that advises the government on administrative reform. The main difference is the fact that
for many years there has been a strong modernizing drive on the part of Malaysia’s political and
bureaucratic leadership. Thus, the issue of public management reform is a “given” in the political
dialog. Not only do these units discuss how government is reorganized, they also keep the public
and government employees informed of the nature and rationale for changes via Development
Administration Circulars and an interactive website link.
2.6
A growing number of countries with similar civil service traditions have sought to
counter the tendency for civil services to become inward looking and excessively focused on
rules, instead of acting responsively in the public interest. They have done this in various ways.
An important change has been to balance the traditional preoccupation with inputs in budget
preparation and execution with a greater focus on what budget resources are supposed to
achieve, often expressed as expected outputs or desired outcomes. Budgets increasingly include
performance information, and departments engage in strategic planning to identify policy and
program goals and the way to achieve them. In like manner, departments are required to report
annually on their achievements in relation to strategic goals. In this way, departmental managers,
from the accounting office (vote holder) downward are held accountable not just for the proper
use of inputs, but also for achieving results. In doing so, a lot of work has gone into how best to
define and measure outputs and outcomes. Departmental performance goals are then cascaded
downward to the level of individual officers, who in turn are held accountable in much more
specific ways than is the case with Bangladesh’s present performance evaluation system.
Increasingly, governments have used independently conducted surveys of officers’ attitudes to
5
understand better the existing incentive system and gain insights into what could be improved at
the workplace to achieve higher performance.
2.7
Such governments have also worked on the values side of the civil service, not by
discarding the traditional values of economy, efficiency, equity, and a concern for truth, but by
adding to them. Civil servants, under their ethical codes, are expected to display not only the
traditional civil service values, but also new ones such as responsiveness to the client,
innovation, knowledge, and cost effectiveness.
2.8
The absence of penalty for not taking action is a disincentive for good performers and
entrenches poor services, red tape, and delays in project outcomes—in turn consolidating the
poor public image of government. For example, in 1989 the government announced that it would
allot land to the Public Service Commission to construct its own building. Land was finally
allotted in 2000 and construction began in 2005. It took six years to get a formal order from the
prime minister to the minister of public works and another five years for the ministry to locate a
piece of suitable land in Dhaka. The ministry’s inaction has affected the provision of facilities
necessary for the effective functioning of the Public Service Commission. Delay is so deeply
entrenched that Class I officers themselves suffer for their colleagues’ inaction. The procedure
for holding department examinations requires the Public Service Commission to seek the list of
eligible candidates from the government. In some cases, however, the relevant ministries have
failed to send the list in the prescribed form, so the officers were unable to take the examination.
Earlier reform focused on process rather than outcomes
2.9
Reforms have a higher chance of success when they are focused on outcomes and
followed through with implementation plans (Box 2.3). The government’s follow through with
its public administration training policy for Class I officers illustrates this characteristic.
Responding to the importance of training highlighted in many government-constituted
commissions and development partners’ reports, in 2003 the government announced its public
administration training policy. The policy is summarized in annex 3. A high priority was
apparently accorded to civil servants’ training because the prime minister herself heads the
National Training Council, which oversees training policy priorities, coordinates and monitors
training programs, and is supposed to provide guidelines on monitoring and evaluation of
training outcomes. However, in the three years since the announcement of the policy, it was not
followed by an implementation plan containing details of costs and staff resources. There was no
prioritization among activities for funding, no sequencing identified among the various elements
of the policy, nor any indicators against which progress can be measured. Furthermore, given the
competing demands on the prime minister’s time, the National Training Council has been unable
to meet frequently. In the absence of a budget and plan for implementation, the declaration of the
training policy became an end in itself, instead of providing the results it was meant to achieve.
6
Box 2.3: Focusing India’s National Training Policy on outcomes and implementation
India’s government has been implementing the National Training Policy since its adoption by the
cabinet in 1996. During the past ten years, several steps have been introduced to make the
implementation effective. For example, the Department of Personnel is allocated an adequate budget
to implement training goals, and at least 1 percent of line ministries’ revenue budgets are earmarked
for training. Training is not entirely supply-driven. Officers who apply on their own and get selected
in mid-career for professional development courses abroad are liberally allowed study leave so that
they can take these courses. The government also created other enabling conditions for officers’
training. Reputed management institutes were added to the network of national and state-level
training institutes to widen the menu of training options.
As training policies go, the one in India is also traditional and supply-driven. The differences from
Bangladesh’s policies, however, are that organizations’ budgets contain funds earmarked for
training, that these funds are adequate and used each year, that staff go to well-designed training
programs within the country and abroad, and that they can put their new skills to work on return.
2.10 Experience with the promotion rules for Class I officers, adopted in 2002 and described
in annex 5, also illustrates how these rules are applied as an end in themselves. The promotion
rules lay down how officers’ performance, as assessed in the annual confidential report, will
regulate promotion. The rules go into a great deal of detail, allocating 30 percent of the total
points for the officers’ annual confidential reports during the preceding five years; 25 percent of
the points to the officer’s annual confidential reports from the beginning of the officer’s career
until the start of the preceding five years; 25 percent of the points for educational attainments
starting from high school; and 20 percent bonus points divided in equal halves for the absence of
adverse remarks in previous annual confidential reports and the absence of formal punishments.
While detailing the distribution of points, the annual confidential report’s main objective, which
is to manage the officers’ performance, is not achieved. There is no provision for providing
feedback to poor performers, or even for pointing out to good performers where they may
improve their performance. The points system is not used to calculate how many persons should
be promoted to the next higher level according to vacancies. Instead of being a means of
planning succession, determining rewards, and managing civil service size and composition, the
rules are applied for deciding which officers are eligible for promotion.
The driver of change was neither highly placed nor close to the center
2.11 A critical element in successful reform is strong leadership of the transformation effort.
This needs to be anchored in a strong civil service ministry, but also requires both high-level
political commitment and complementary actions by the other central management agencies, as
demonstrated by the recent experience in the United Kingdom and South Africa (Box 2.4). In
Bangladesh, even when there was an urgent need for change, the transformation was not
entrusted to any highly placed individual, group, or body that was undisputedly in charge of
managing the change. All current civil service reform initiatives are the responsibility of the
Ministry of Establishment, as part of its regular business, but the ministry is neither strategically
placed nor perceived as politically powerful.
7
Box 2.4: Units managing change in civil service management in the United Kingdom and South
Africa: High up and centrally located
Since the early 1980s, the United Kingdom’s government has progressively introduced far-reaching
changes in the management of the senior civil service. Initially, the changes were focused on
improving the efficiency of departmental functions and then broadened to encompass organizational
change, through the creation of agencies with performance contracts, and the improvement of service
across the public sector. These reforms were ushered in by the scrutiny of administrative efficiency,
the decentralization of management, and the replacement of detailed bureaucratic rules with bestpractice guidance, performance agreements with executives, accelerated recruitment and progression
for talented graduates, and performance-based pay.
The changes were facilitated by change agents in the Cabinet Office, such as the Efficiency Unit and
the Next Steps Unit. At the same time, budgeting incentives were changed through the introduction of
a medium-term expenditure framework, and, in due course, accrual accounting. Implementation was
overseen by the Cabinet Office and was reviewed by the prime minister every quarter, with close
oversight continuing even after change of government. Presently, the United Kingdom’s civil service
reform is driven by the Corporate Development Group, which is part of the Cabinet Office Delivery
and Reform Team and supports the head of the Home Civil Service.
The U.K. reforms moved ahead partly because the prime minister was frustrated by what she saw as
bureaucratic attitudes and inefficiency in the civil service, and she was prepared to press for deepseated change. In addition, many in the civil service itself recognized that the challenges it faced
required new approaches.
A key civil service reform initiative in South Africa is the 1997 Batho Pele policy to modernize
government. The policy’s implementation is the responsibility of the high-profile Department of
Public Service and Administration, which has consistently enjoyed political support. The department
provides guidelines within which national departments and provincial administrations can develop
their own programs, structures, mechanisms, administrative bases, and quality control measures.
Government has set up the Centre for Public Service Innovation to encourage service delivery
innovation in the public service. The center focuses on using innovative means to achieve outcomes in
sustainable service delivery partnerships, influence the work culture within government, and develop
an environment supportive of innovation. These reforms are part of a broader transformation of the
public sector in South Africa, which includes parallel public financial management reforms led by the
National Treasury, which gives departments greater flexibility to manage their budgets within a hard
budget constraint, while at the same time holding management accountable for performance. In this
way, civil service reforms are complemented by the reforms led by other powerful central
management agencies.
2.12 Historically, however, Bangladesh’s civil service management unit was not always far
from the center of government. In undivided Bengal, the Organization and Methods Branch was
part of chief secretary’s office and was headed by an officer with the rank and status of secretary
to the government. East Pakistan’s Services and General Administration Department (SGAD)
was the nerve center of administration in the central government. However, the SGAD became
burdened with personnel management tasks of a general nature, which reduced its ability to
manage the critical tasks. By the mid 1960s, the SGAD was in charge of recruitment, discipline,
service conditions, status, transfer, and welfare of central civil servants. It also started
supervising the Public Service Commission. After Bangladesh’s independence, the SGAD was
8
renamed the Establishment Division and then later changed to the Ministry of Establishment.
According to the current allocation of business among different government organizations, the
Ministry of Establishment performs 55 functions. The discharge of routine functions takes up so
much of its resources that change management is not among the ministry’s priority tasks.
2.13 A high-placed reform unit, not too encumbered with day-to-day management, is all the
more important for Bangladesh’s Class I civil service because of the divisive effects of 28
functional cadres within Class I and the quotas determined by district of origin, both of which
tend to inculcate loyalty to the cadre or colleagues from the same district rather than to the
government. The ministry is supposed to be in overall charge of personnel management, but its
credibility with cadres other than the Civil Service (Administrative) cadre is diluted because the
ministry itself also controls that cadre. This introduces the divisive effects of cadre and batch
loyalties, regional identities, and political divides. Besides, if the reform unit is going to be
forward thinking, it needs some space from running the day-to-day business of government.
2.14 Reform has not moved ahead because the government has not perceived the civil service
as its own tool for achieving economic development and delivering services, nor has the Class I
civil service embraced change in a risk-averse work culture that imposes no penalties for
inaction. Thus, when successive commissions recommended change, the government ignored the
recommendations, even though it had itself called for them. When a few reforms were initiated,
they achieved little because they were viewed as ends in themselves rather than the means of
achieving strategic goals; they focused on process rather than their outcome; and they were not
lead by a highly placed driver of change. Thus, reform efforts ended up being piecemeal. They
neither added up nor fused together as a part of an overall strategy for civil service reform.
9
3. EMPHASIZING MERIT IN CIVIL SERVICE MANAGEMENT
3.1
The merit principle is central to civil service management, especially in a career-based
service such as Bangladesh’s. The merit principle in the civil service entails appointment of the
best person for any given job, whether through recruitment or promotion, based on explicit rules
that are publicly understood and consistently applied. The essence of a merit-based system is that
the criteria are specified, widely communicated, and contestable: failure to appoint a candidate
can be appealed and reviewed against explicit specifications for the position and the appointment
procedure. An individual who is aggrieved by an organization or government’s application of the
merit principle can ask for review and redress from a higher authority, an administrative tribunal,
or the judiciary. A merit-based system is in direct contrast to one based on patronage and
discretionary changes in rules or interpretation of procedures. Meritocratic civil service systems
tend to promote commitment and integrity among public servants and are associated with lower
corruption and better performance (Box 3.1).
Box 3.1: Merit is important for civil service management
Using data from 35 developing countries, Rauch and Evans (2000) showed that meritocratic civil
service systems are associated with lower corruption and better bureaucratic performance.
Meritocratic recruitment is the element of bureaucratic structure that is most important for
improving bureaucratic performance. Institutionalization of meritocratic recruitment in particular is
crucial to ensure that any benefits for bureaucratic performance will outlast the pressures of the
moment.
The United Nation’s World Public Sector Report 2005 reported that strengthening appointment on
merit is one of the most powerful, yet simplest, ways in which governments can improve their
effectiveness. A merit-oriented and career-based civil service is decisive in explaining cross-country
differences in the performance of governments in terms of the quality of services and the absence of
corruption. The presence of these factors helps to foster organizational standards, behavioral norms,
and high morale, which all help to promote commitment and integrity among public servants.
The authors of Understanding Public Sector Performance in Transition Countries – An Empirical
Contribution (World Bank 2003) found from interviewing 1,050 public officials in Kyrgyz
Republic, Romania, and the Slovak Republic that a meritocratic system for personnel administration
is the single most important determinant of public sector performance in all types of enabling
environments. The primary effect of well-functioning personnel management systems is to reinforce
meritocratic practices. In weaker enabling environments, it may also strengthen performance
directly. Simplicity and monitoring of administrative procedures are especially important when the
enabling environment is weak.
3.2
In a merit-based system, contestability needs to be an essential aspect of all major human
resources decision-making processes, such as recruitment and selection, promotion, and major
disciplinary actions. For instance, recruitment and selection procedures should not be reduced to
testing alone, followed by assignment of candidates to posts based solely on the test results. Nor
should decisions be made by any single actor, be it a manager, the Ministry of Establishment, or
the Public Service Commission. Rather, such decisions should be made through a process that
includes multiple screenings by differing sets of actors, so that no single actor (or process, such
10
as a testing procedure) can completely determine who will be selected. Judgments have to be
made in all major personnel actions. These actions can never be completely reduced to simple,
objective criteria capable of being applied unerringly by a machine or mathematical algorithm.
Given that judgments must be exercised and that no two people will always come to exactly the
same decision when making such judgments, it is important to have multiple screens by varying
sets of actors.
Merit must be restored to its central position
3.3
Merit and competition are supposed to be the basis for recruitment and promotion in
almost every civil service system (Box 3.2). Nonetheless, merit and competition have been
sidelined in some aspects of Class I officers’ management in Bangladesh. Less than half (45
percent) of the total recruitment is based solely on merit; the rest is distributed among districts
according to their populations—besides a quota of 10 percent for women. Recruitment quotas are
not unique to Bangladesh. Many governments confront the challenge of whether and how to
reflect diversity goals, whether of gender, race, caste, or region of origin, in civil service
appointments and promotions. In many countries what starts as a justifiable goal of making the
civil service more representative of the society it serves, ends up undermining the merit
principle. Bangladesh’s Class I management is unique in undermining merit in personnel
management rules and practice beyond the recruitment process. For example, excellence is
sidelined when the government waives the requirement of training for promotion and career
progression. Competition is eliminated when promotion examinations are waived for some
groups of officers.
Box 3.2: Merit determines civil servants’ recruitment and career progression
Merit is the basis of selection in both career-based and position-based systems. In the mandarin
system, such as is operative in Bangladesh, competition is intense, and only very few of those who
take the entrance examination are actually recruited in the senior civil service. In Japan, only about 2.5
percent of those who take the examination are offered jobs, and in Korea only 1 percent of those
taking the senior civil service examination are admitted to grade 7. In India, only 0.1 percent of
examinees are selected to the generalist cadre of the Indian Administrative Service.
On the face of it, Bangladesh has a merit-based recruitment system for its Class 1 officers. But it is a
laborious and time consuming process, ripe for modernization, which would screen candidates much
more rigorously for the quality of their degrees, conduct interviews more intensively on a smaller
number of those who passed exams, and give weight to their potential to become effective officers, as
well as their academic credentials.
In Sri Lanka, the Public Service Commission prescribes the criteria for promotion to higher levels of
civil service. The weight of seniority is less than half. Other criteria are grades secured in previous
performance assessments, commendations received by the officer during the year, acquisition of
professional qualifications beyond what is stipulated for recruitment, knowledge of departmental
working and laws, and performance in an interview.
The merit filter ensures that only the most capable are promoted to the highest levels. In Japan, only
two or three officers achieve the position of administrative vice minister among those who have
worked 28 to 30 years.
11
3.4
Sidelining merit is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1979, the Public Service
Commission was strong enough to resist the pressure to waive merit guidelines and recruited
only 131 candidates against the 196 available vacancies in the Class I civil service examination
because the remaining candidates did not satisfy the required standards.
3.5
Successive committees and commissions such as the Administrative and Services
Reorganization Committee, the National Pay and Services Commission, Towards Better
Government in Bangladesh (the Four Secretaries’ report), and the Public Administration
Reorganization Commission have all recommended that recruitment be based solely on merit and
that quotas be eliminated or reduced. But pressure for special treatment for certain groups is
recurring. In 1972, the Administrative and Service Reorganization Commission had suggested
holding a separate examination for first class graduates of Bangladesh’s universities to fill up a
limited number of positions. Because Bangladesh has a career-based civil service, the need to
renew it via competition from outside has also been raised. The Public Administration
Reorganization Commission recommended that 5 percent of posts at the level of secretary, and
10 percent at the level of deputy secretary and above should be filled by persons from outside the
civil service.
3.6
The government maintains a variety of recruitment quotas, as summarized in Table 3.1.
The Public Service Commission has announced its difficulty in filling the “freedom fighter”
quota, so the quota is now extended to cover the children of freedom fighters.
Table 3.1: Distribution of recruitment quotas, by civil service class
(in percent)
Class I and
II posts
Type of quota
Merit
Total district quota distributed according to district’s population
Physically handicapped/mentally retarded
Distribution of district quota
Freedom fighters; or if not available then martyrs’ children
Women
Persons belonging to tribes
Ansars (Village Defense Members)
General candidates of the district
Total
Class III and
IV posts
45
55
10
30
10
5
10
100
30
15
5
10
30
100
Source: Establishment Division Memo No. Coordination (R-I)-S-8/95 (Part-2)-56(500), March 17, 1997.
Merit must be incorporated into affirmative action
3.7
The civil service recruitment quotas are part of the government’s social goals and its
affirmative action policies. Many other governments implement affirmative action policies in the
composition of their civil service to boost the participation of groups that have been
discriminated against in the past, as was done, for example, in South Africa (Box 3.3). The
general experience is that having such quotas builds pressure to fill them, even while a
government attempts to control the overall size of its workforce and its wage bill. The same lack
12
of opportunity that caused underrepresentation of the disadvantaged group(s) also makes desired
skills scarce in those preferred groups. So, quotas tend to be underfilled at technical and
managerial levels, or filled with officials who soon turn out to be underperforming (see, for
example, Deshpande 2005). This tendency may run counter to a government’s attempts to create
a more skilled civil service. Where countries already have well-entrenched merit- based
appointment and promotion systems, the introduction of diversity goals may have a beneficial
effect on the civil service. But where the merit-based systems are weak, quotas can potentially
undermine the merit principle, encourage patronage, and breed cynicism.
Box 3.3: Affirmative action policies and implementation plans in South Africa
In 1995, the new government’s first public sector policy reform document was the influential white
paper on the transformation of the public service. The white paper laid down the minimum affirmative
action targets that the public service had to achieve. The government would review and reset national
minimum targets in 1999 and every three years thereafter
 Within four years, all departments should have 50 percent blacks at management level.
 In addition, within four years, at least 30 percent of new recruits at senior and management level
should be women.
 Within ten years, persons with disabilities should constitute 2 percent of the public service
personnel.
Each department was required to draw up detailed affirmative action plans within its human resources
development and capacity building. To provide the legal framework to enforce government
organizations to implement these policies, the government enacted the 1998 Employment Equity Act
and Public Service Regulations.
The results of affirmative action policies are monitored. Significant progress has been recorded in the
proportion of women in management level positions. Their proportion increased from 8 percent in
1995 to 25 percent in 2004.
Although the implementation of affirmative action has not been without controversy, there is a
political and social consensus that it is necessary. What has made it effective is that a strong emphasis
on merit has been retained.
3.8
Some governments implement their social and political goals through affirmative action
in civil service recruitment. But among them, successful implementers are those that widely
announce their goals, enforce implementation, and regularly monitor progress. As Bangladesh
has a definite goal of altering the civil service’s profile, it can implement those polices more
successfully if the government clearly lays down the goals of affirmative action along with the
implementation plan. The benefits for the favored groups should be widely communicated so that
all members of the favored group—and not just a privileged few within the group—know about
the benefits available to them. If Bangladesh’s policy is to attract a greater proportion of recruits
from some districts, then that policy should be laid down, its implementation plan and timetable
should be worked out, and progress against targets should be monitored. Currently, 10 percent of
the Class I posts are reserved for women. For improved implementation, there could be a specific
program to target female students in high schools and colleges, and they could receive subsidized
training to better prepare them for the recruitment examination.
13
3.9
Among developing countries that implement affirmative action policies in civil service
composition, Nigeria’s affirmative action, being based on geographical representation and
district quotas, is somewhat similar to Bangladesh’s. Some observers in that country have
remarked that, contrary to the stated intention, district-based quotas actually heighten a sense of
separateness within the population because of the quotas’ emphasis on differences in origins.
Such an emphasis may be excessive in a country where nation building is a goal.
3.10 In Bangladesh, recruitment quotas do not appear to be managed consistently and
according to any documented plan to implement the government’s affirmative action policies.
The district quota was introduced apparently to remove the disparity in civil service
representation among different regions of the country. The disparity was rooted before
Independence in the emphasis on merit and the greater success of economically advanced
regions with better educational opportunities. The quotas have changed a few times since they
were first laid down in 1972, as described in Box 3.4. An office memorandum (called the interim
recruitment policy) specified that 20 percent of the entry positions were to be filled according to
merit alone. That interim recruitment policy was amended in 1976, raising the merit quota from
20 percent to 40. The policy was modified again in 1985, raising the merit component for Class I
posts from 40 percent to 45 percent.
Box 3.4: A history of quotas in Bangladesh
The practice of quotas in Bangladesh began in 1949 and was included in the 1956 and 1962
Constitutions of Pakistan. Twenty percent of the vacancies in the Pakistan civil service were filled
on the basis of merit. The remaining 80 percent were distributed among candidates from the
provinces on the ground that it would give fair representation to the two parts of the country.
In 1950, the government of Pakistan created the Economic Pool (along the lines of the Finance and
Commerce Pool in British Indian government) for staffing specialized positions in the Ministries of
Finance, Commerce, and Industries. Even in those early years, 60 percent of the positions in the
pool were reserved for civil service officers, and 40 percent for officers of the Finance and Accounts
services. This reservation for civil service officers was intensely criticized on the ground that it
defeated the purpose for which the pool was created, i.e., specialization.
After independence, quotas were reaffirmed in the interim recruitment policy of 1972. Twenty
percent of all Class I vacant posts would be filled on the basis of merit, and the remaining 80 percent
would be distributed among districts and divisions, with 30 percent reserved for freedom fighters
and 10 percent for women. The policy was amended in 1976 to raise the merit quota from 20 percent
to 40 percent and to reserve 10 percent for women in Class I posts. During 1979 to 1989, when the
Senior Services Pool (SSP) existed, posts were filled under the quota reservation system.
While quota systems have a legitimate role to play in ensuring that officers in the civil service
reflect the diversity in the population as a whole, it is important that whatever arrangements are put
in place to support diversity do not end up undermining the merit principle.
14
Merit must be championed by the Public Service Commission
3.11 The Public Service Commission is typically a body mandated by the constitution and
granted specific powers by statute. This can be a specific law setting up the commission, or,
more usually, a broader civil service law that establishes the principles by which the civil service
will be operated and the roles and responsibilities of the main civil service management and
oversight bodies. In either case, the law often has a section setting out the mandate of the
commission, the appointment (and dismissal) of commissioners, the power to issue regulations
and guidelines, and to recommend (or require) remedial actions and sanctions. While such
commissions are required to publish an annual report, commissions normally report to the head
of state. They are thus part of the executive government (unlike the supreme audit institution,
which normally reports directly to the legislature), but are independent of the executive in the
performance of their statutory functions. Commissioners are appointed by the head of state and
are protected from arbitrary dismissal, much like a high court judge. They are not themselves
civil servants, though they may have civil servants in the commission secretariat. Typically,
commissioners of a well-functioning Public Service Commission are chosen for their integrity
and deep knowledge of human resource management, both in the public and private sectors. The
commission acts as a watchdog agency reporting on the executive’s performance in managing
the civil service (Box 3.5).
Box 3.5: Perceived fairness in civil servants’ recruitment
Because Public Service Commissions are the guardians of the merit principle, it is not only important
for them to act fairly, but also to be perceived as fair and impartial.
At http://www.civilservicecommissioners.gov.uk/frequently_asked_questions/merit.asp on its
website, the United Kingdom’s Office of Civil Service Commissioners explains in “Interpretation of
selection on merit and fair and open competition,” exactly how it acts openly and fairly.
Recently, Canada’s Public Service Commission performed a review of competency and fairness in
public service recruitment and promotion. The result of the review, including the negative findings,
are published at http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/lhhr-lcrh/2002/02_40a_e.htm.
On its website at http://www.csb.gov.hk/english/admin/appoint/33.html, Hong Kong’s government
explains how it ensures impartiality and fairness through the Public Service Commission, an
independent statutory body with the chairman and members appointed by the chief executive. Its
mission is “to safeguard the impartiality and integrity of appointment and promotion systems in the
civil service and to ensure that recommendations for appointment and promotion are based on merit
and are free from political patronage or pressure.” Although the commission’s role is purely
advisory, and it has no executive powers, its functions are ensuring uniformity and consistency in the
application of policies and procedures on appointments, promotions, and discipline. It does this by
“maintaining a watching brief to ensure the selection process is carried out fairly, meticulously, and
thoroughly.”
In none of the three cases does the Public Service Commission carry out the recruitment process
itself. Rather it monitors departmental adherence to recruitment processes binding on departments,
which are set by the Establishments Ministry.
15
3.12 In Bangladesh, the Public Service Commission is the custodian of merit-based
recruitment, but it is perceived to be a weak organization and has not always managed the
recruitment process very well. The media has reported allegations of examination irregularities,
such as the “leakage of question papers” in civil service examinations and other Class I
examinations. As a result, the position of merit in the management of Bangladesh’s Class I civil
service has been further weakened. The Public Service Commission is described in annex 2.
Merit must guide Class I officers’ promotion and career management
3.13 In Bangladesh, quotas exist in promotion procedures, in addition to the quotas and
preferences arising from affirmative action at recruitment. Seventy percent of positions at the
deputy secretary level are reserved for the BCS Administration cadre, and 75 percent of joint
secretary positions are reserved for the same group. Such reservation severely reduces the
probability of competent officers for cadres other than BCS Administration to fill positions of
deputy or joint secretary. These reservations are not part of any affirmative action policy of the
government; they are part of day-to-day civil service management. They arise out of, and
perpetuate, divisions and factional tendencies within the civil service. This reservation imposes a
rigidity based on the result of one examination conducted 25 years earlier (Box 3.6).
Box 3.6. Access to top positions from all functional groups in the civil service
In India, members of the All India Services and 58 organized services have equal access to highlevel positions in national government. The selection is administered by the Department of
Personnel and Training and supervised by the Civil Services Board, headed by the Cabinet
Secretary. Based on their performance evaluations, all officers—regardless of the functional group
to which they belong, with eligible service and clean integrity record—are assessed very rigorously
for empanelment in the position of joint secretary. The Cabinet Secretariat directly prepares the
panels for appointment as secretaries and additional secretaries based on the recommendation of a
committee of senior secretaries headed by the cabinet secretary.
In Pakistan, lateral entry to high-levels of the government is encouraged. Within the All Pakistan
Unified Group, by 2003, the percentage of lateral recruitment increased steadily and was 7.2 percent
in BS 18 to 15 percent in BS 19, 25 percent in BS 20, 26 percent in BS 21, and 45 percent in BS 22,
the highest level. Recognizing that civil service pay scales may be insufficient to attract talented
professionals from the private sector, the Management scale and the Management Pay scale were
introduced to attract professionals from the private sector into government service.
In Bangladesh a similar selection process to the higher echelons of the civil service applies.
However, a quota system operates, which has the effect of ensuring that the bulk of appointments to
assistant secretary and above go disproportionately to the BCS Administration cadre. There is a very
strong case for examining afresh the existing selection process and trying to make it more open and
competitive.
3.14 Merit is being diluted by exemptions from promotion requirements. Recruitment rules of
1981 require that an officer must pass an examination to move from the junior time scale to the
senior scale. An officer was given sufficient chances to take and pass the examination. If he
failed to pass in all three subjects within the ninth year of his service, he could appear in three
more examinations in the successive three years—after a gap of two years from the date
commencing after this ninth year of service. If the officer failed three examinations, he was not
16
allowed any further chance to appear in any examination. This competence requirement was
waived in the 1986 civil service rule on “examination for promotion.” Those who failed the three
examinations were allowed to appear instead before a Special Promotion Committee. The merit
criterion was further diluted in 1992 by exempting officers, over age 50, who failed the
examination if they had completed fifteen years of service. The operation of the promotion rules
was suspended for a period of three years effective from October 1989, by an order issued in
1994!
3.15 The merit principle in career management was further diluted when the government
introduced the “president’s quota” to promote some officers who fail to get the minimum 85
marks necessary for promotion to the rank of joint secretary. The stated purpose of this quota is
to induct very competent persons from outside the civil service to top levels of the government.
However, this quota is often used instead to accommodate preferred, influential, or politically
important officers.
Merit can be built through training
3.16 Successful completion of training courses is a precondition for officers’ confirmation in
the service and for promotion to joint secretary. These courses (a foundation training course for
the entering officers and an advanced course on administration and development and a senior
staff course for the rising officers) are conducted by the Bangladesh Public Administration
Training Centre. However, the importance of training—and therefore competence building—for
performance is reduced by exempting some officers from training. Officers who are 50 or older
do not undergo the foundation training course. Officers 54 and older are not required to attend
the required advanced course on administration and development or the senior staff course. The
Personnel Manual outlines that performance in the compulsory training programs by senior
officers is to be given due weight in consideration for promotion and placement decisions. The
Promotion Rules 2002 also state that the performance of officers in training programs will be
evaluated and that the training evaluation report will be used in promotion decisions. However,
these are not counted in promotion decisions. Although the annual confidential report has a
section where the supervisor is supposed to recommend training areas for the subordinate, the
rest of the report does not have any reference to participation in training courses.
3.17 Training is not perceived as a method for building competence and excellence. Rather,
undergoing training is associated with an officer’s having a deficiency needing to be met. As part
of this report’s analysis, a consultant administered a survey to 34 randomly chosen deputy and
joint secretaries. Respondents were asked: “Do you think that formal training like the advanced
course on administration and development for deputy secretary or the senior staff course for joint
secretary is directly linked with career development in the Bangladesh civil service?” Seventy
eight percent of officers reported that there is no link or implications of such training on career
progression.
17
Compromising merit and competition can lead to unintended consequences
3.18 Determining promotion by the points and rules of the annual confidential report has
introduced some anomalies. An officer who performed well in high school and college should
not get multiple benefits: first at recruitment and again at successive stages of promotion.
Furthermore, taking the averages of all previous years’ annual confidential reports translates into
a disincentive for current performance. If reports in the beginning of the officer’s career are bad,
then he or she has little chance of making it up in future as the weight of the “bad” report will
always count as a negative, even if the officer performs excellently thereafter. An officer having
no adverse remark for the entire length of his or her career is entitled to a bonus mark of ten.
Conversely, as stipulated in rule 5 of schedule 2, there are provisions for deduction of marks in
case of officers having adverse remarks. Thus, there are two dissimilar levels of evaluation (plus
and minus marks) consisting of adverse remarks during the previous five years and those of the
entire career. In addition, the practice of communicating adverse remarks to the officer is fraught
with delay. For natural justice, those who have suffered major or minor penalties in the past
should not be subjected to penalties yet again by deducting marks during promotion. Especially
if the officer is later exonerated of charges, he or she still loses the chance of promotion. Given
the poor state of personnel management system in each ministry, such a dispensation needs to be
amended until the management of annual confidential reports is improved. Singapore’s
promotion criteria offer a model for study (Box 3.7).
Box 3.7: Managing promotions to ensure high-caliber management in Singapore
Singapore’s government amended its promotion criteria in 1994 to encourage competent officers to
remain in public service by allowing them to rapidly advance in their careers through promotions.
The required time interval between promotions was shortened. Recommended ages were assigned to
senior positions. An officer is expected to be at least 32 years old to become deputy secretary, and
40 years old to become permanent secretary.
But these rapid promotions have not created stagnation at higher levels and a mushroom shaped
civil service. The “flow through” arrangement was introduced in 2000, which provides for fixedterm appointments for deputy and permanent secretaries. An officer can be employed as deputy
secretary for a maximum of ten years. If he or she is promoted as permanent secretary, employment
is extended for a further period of ten years. In both cases, at the end of the ten year term, he or she
is assigned to a position outside the upper ranks of the Administrative Service. Alternatively, the
officer can take a job in the private sector or take early retirement. Officers who do not reach the
level of deputy secretary by the age of 32 and lack the qualities for senior positions are redeployed
to a position outside the service.
In many respects the Singapore system is unique. What especially stands out, and should be studied
for replication, is the effort that is made to identify high-potential officers and accelerate their
promotion.
3.19 By laying down the annual confidential report marks required for promotion, the rules
only appear to focus on merit. But this focus is lost because promotion decisions are taken batch
by batch. Even if an officer performs excellently and gets the full 100 marks, he or she will be
considered for promotion when the batch is taken up. According to a clarification issued by the
Ministry of Establishment in 1990, even if a junior officer passes the test earlier than his senior,
18
the latter after successfully completing the test at a later date will get precedence over the junior
officer if they are considered at the same time. This provision effectively negates the incentive
for junior officers to pass the examination and is contrary to the recommendation made by the
Public Service Commission.
3.20 Because merit is fundamental to civil service management, it must be restored across all
personnel management functions: recruitment, training, and promotions. This is especially urgent
if the Class I officers, or a small part of this group, are going to lead reform in the rest of the civil
service. Without merit, they cannot demonstrate their competence and leadership. Nor will they
be perceived by the political leadership as useful tools to achieve results—genuine keys to
progress in Bangladesh.
19
4. BUILDING A STRONGER LEGAL FRAMEWORK, MORE
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT, AND BETTER TOOLS FOR MANAGING
PERFORMANCE
4.1
So far, the attempted reforms of Bangladesh’s civil service have not yielded substantive
changes because they have essentially made small “Band-Aid” fixes at the extremities, while
ignoring anomalies at the heart of the matter. For example, donors including the World Bank
have funded technical assistance to improve the performance of the Public Service Commission.
But Bangladesh’s commission, unlike those in many other countries, is not independent, which
increases its vulnerability to political micromanagement and damages its impartiality in the eyes
of the general public.
4.2
Now, to restore the health of the system, fundamentals need attention. This chapter
argues that two main institutional changes are needed: (a) enactment of laws defining the roles
and responsibilities of the civil service and the Public Service Commission, as a legal framework
for civil service management and (b) establishment of the Public Service Commission as an
independent guardian of merit. At the same time, there is an urgent need to revamp the tools to
manage the Class I civil service: the recruitment examination, the annual performance
assessment, and rules governing promotions.
A sound legal framework must be established to manage the civil service
4.3
In most countries, civil service management rules follow from a law, whose guidance is
provided in turn by the Constitution. In both career- and position-based systems, such a law is
important for restraining the executive’s arbitrary actions (Box 4.1).
4.4
Although the Bangladeshi Constitution provides for it, no act or law relating to civil
service management has existed in Bangladesh since Independence. Article 133 of the
Constitution outlines how Parliament should lay down civil service law: “Subject to the
provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may by law regulate the appointment and conditions
of services of persons in the service of the Republic.” In the same article, authority is given to the
president to make rules as only a temporary measure. “Provided that it shall be competent for the
President to make rules regulating the appointment and the conditions of services of such persons
until provision in this behalf is made by or under any law, and rules so made shall have effect
subject to the provisions of any such law.” Thus, civil service management rules were clearly
meant to be a temporary measure until an act or law, approved by Parliament, was put in place.
As there is still no law, successive governments have changed rules frequently to meet shortterm objectives.
20
Box 4.1: Civil service law is fundamental to civil service management
SIGMA (Support for Improvement in Governance and Management), supported by OECD and the
European Union, assisted in central and eastern European countries’ public management reform
during the 1990s. In most of those countries, previous civil service management was according to
the general labor code. A civil service law was considered essential for defining the civil service and
the qualification, rights, and duties of the civil servants, as well as their working conditions. Such a
law was also considered necessary to lay down the relation between itself and other laws, whether
superior, complementary, or subordinate, such as the labor code, laws on pension rights, etc.
SIGMA developed a set of guidelines and a checklist for the 11 countries on which their civil
service laws were based.
One of the first steps in reconstructing Afghanistan’s civil service has been the drafting of the basic
civil service law. The law defines the civil service and lays out the role of civil servants, including
their rights and privileges, and the role and function of the Independent Administrative Reform and
Civil Service Commission. The law received the president’s approval in 2005 and is now awaiting
the newly constituted parliament’s approval.
Until 1973, Pakistan had no civil service law. The 1973 Civil Service Act established the legal
framework for civil service management. It abolished the reservation of posts in the federal
government. The Establishment Division issues rules following from the law.
Like Bangladesh, India has no act or law for managing civil services, except for legislation on the
All India Services. The Constitution (Articles 308 to 323) provides the legal framework for civil
service management, and rules follow directly from the Constitution’s articles. However, the High
Courts, Supreme Court, and administrative tribunals have, from time to time, interpreted the
constitutional provisions and these, in effect, substitute for the law.
While Bangladesh could continue without a specific civil service law, developing such a law is a
useful exercise in defining what the new civil service should be. It presents an opportunity for
dialogue both within and outside the civil service on roles and responsibilities and on the principles
of ethical behavior, freedom from corruption, fairness, equity, a concern for truth, and
responsiveness.
4.5
Not having such a legal framework blurs the responsibilities of the various organizations
involved in civil service management: the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of
Establishment, and the ministries and departments managing the cadres. Putting in place a civil
service law will require time and effort, consistency with the Constitution, debate within the
country, and perhaps review of compatible provisions of other countries’ laws. But in the
absence of such a law, the executive of the day will continue to make and amend rules to benefit
some favored groups.
The Public Service Commission must be free from political micromanagement
4.6
The Public Service Commission’s impartiality is all the more important in Bangladesh
because it has a career-based civil service: the elected government comes and goes, but the
appointed civil service remains the same. This administrative tradition is different from that of
many countries, such as the United States and the Philippines where many top officials change
21
with every change of government (Box 4.2). Therefore, it is very important for the civil service
to be apolitical and to be managed on the basis of merit, according to widely understood law and
rules. For this reason, many career-based civil services assign civil servants’ recruitment and
discipline to be managed or overseen by an organization that is widely perceived to be
independent and fair.
Box 4.2: The independence of Public Service Commissions
The Philippines’ Civil Service Commission is independently constituted. It carries out recruitment and
acts as final arbiter on disputes about civil service personnel actions. It describes its responsibilities as:
“recruitment, building, maintaining and retention of a competent, professional and highly motivated
government workforce, truly responsive to the needs of the government, its client, the people.” First
among its mandated functions is, “Administer the merit system.”
The Australian Public Service Commission is a “central agency within the Australian Public Service
with a critical leadership role in contributing to the future capability and sustaining of the Service.”
Less a regulator than promoter of the values of a modern service oriented civil service, the
commission does not engage itself directly in recruitment or promotion processes, like a traditional
Civil Service Commission. These are the responsibility of line ministries and departments, which must
follow governmentwide personnel rules and guidelines established by the Department of Finance and
the Prime Minister’s Office. But the commission has a watchdog function, and its annual reports are
taken seriously by the legislature.
Such civil service commissions are operationally independent within the framework of the law that
brought them into being. Passing a law allows the composition, funding, and responsibilities of the
Public Service Commission to be clearly specified.
4.7
Unfortunately, the Public Service Commission does not enjoy much independence or
have a reputation for exemplary fairness and high standards. Although a constitutionally
mandated body, it is required to liaise with Ministry of Establishment for administrative purposes
and is treated as an attached department of that ministry. The Public Service Commission is
discussed in Articles 137 to 140 of Bangladesh’s Constitution. Provisions include the possibility
of establishing more commissions, appointment and removal of the Commission’s chairperson
and members, and the role and functions of the Public Service Commission. The commission is
supposed to submit an annual report to the president by 1 March of the following year, and it
generally does so. This is a ritualistic process and no discussion takes place in Parliament on the
Public Service Commission’s performance. Thus, there could be need for an act or law to lay
down the commission’s reporting requirements according to constitutional provisions.
4.8
The third Martial Law Committee recommended that the government invariably accepted
the recruitment recommendations of the Public Service Commission. Other steps were
recommended by different commissions, and donors also funded diagnoses for making the
Public Service Commission more capable of discharging its duties. These include enhancing
status of chairman and members of Public Service Commission in the warrant of precedence and
staffing the Commission’s secretariat with its own staff, rather than civil service officers. But
these changes, even if implemented, can be marginal at best. There is no discussion within
government of how the Public Service Commission might more effectively champion and
implement the merit principle.
22
The civil service examination is outdated and needs revamping
4.9
Because it is the method of selecting Class I officers, the civil service examination is a
critical component of civil service management. Subsequently in their careers, the competence
level and skills of Class I officers often comes in the way of their being able to adequately
perform government functions. Many of the officers are not able to pass the promotion
examinations. This shortfall in middle or late stages of the officers’ career can be traced back to
the indifferent quality of the recruits that enter the Class I civil service. Because Bangladesh has
a career-based system, the same set of officers continue to move up the civil service to occupy
the government’s top positions, so it is important to get the best possible talent to start with. This
can happen only if the civil service examination is a useful tool to identify that talent. For several
years now, the examination has been considered inadequate for identifying the talent required to
perform government functions.
4.10 The 27th civil service examination was supposed to have incorporated many changes, but
the changes were only cosmetic. For the general and nontechnical cadres, the optional papers
were eliminated, and the marks for Bengali and Bangladesh affairs were raised from 100 to 200.
Thus, these changes only tinkered with the weight of subjects and the interview within the total,
while keeping the test overall not very different from the Indian civil service examination of 150
years ago. India has moved ahead with updating its examination (Box 4.3), but Bangladesh has
not. There has been no concerted effort by government or any high-level committee or
commission to examine whether the examination’s content and format are indeed good
predictors of future civil service performance and whether its management by the Public Service
Commission is efficient.
Box 4.3: The reform of India’s recruitment examination
In the early 1970s, the Indian examination for selecting candidates for the All India Services and Class
I functional services was perceived to be outdated The Kothari Commission was asked to examine the
matter and propose recommendations to make the selection examination(s) more conducive to
modern-day functions of the government. The commission proposed radical reforms.
Within a year, the government acted on the report. In a major departure from the previous
examination, the government introduced the present two-tier structure for preliminary examination in
general knowledge and ability to write a general essay, followed by subject-based examinations for
the candidates who scored above a certain level, to be followed by interviews for the short-listed
candidates.
The effectiveness of the recruitment examination is reviewed regularly. The most recent review was
conducted in 2002 by an expert committee headed by Professor Y.K. Alagh. The government
implemented the recommendations from that review.
The relevance of this country example to Bangladesh is that it represents an effort to keep the
operations of a Public Service Commission up to date. By contrast, Bangladesh’s Public Service
Commission has evolved very little in the past decades. There is a need to overhaul the recruitment
process, transforming the Public Service Commission from an examination mill to an agency that
either oversees the recruitment of other ministries or undertakes it on behalf of ministries, using the
most up–to-date methods.
23
4.11 The syllabus and questions of the civil service examination do not appear to be testing
analytical or managerial skills. For example, in the Bengali paper I, 30 marks are allocated to
grammar (correction of errors in sentences, filling in the blanks with appropriate words,
changing simple sentences to compound and complex, and use of idioms and phrases), 20 each
to amplification of ideas and writing précis, and 30 marks for short answers to questions about
Bengali literature—from medieval to modern. In Bengali Paper II, 40 marks each are assigned to
writing an essay with hints and another essay without hints, and 20 marks for letter writing. Such
content suggests that the examination is geared to identifying talent for administrative and
support functions and not for leaders and change managers. Furthermore, the mathematics paper
tests algebra elements, such as the Remainder Theorem, and geometry elements, such theorems
on parallelograms and circles. It is unlikely for Class I officers to solve such mathematical
problems in the course of their work in government. The questions call for answers that are all
descriptive rather than analytical in nature. For example, in the Bangladesh Affairs paper,
candidates are asked to describe how Bangladesh came into being as an independent nation or
what development policies were pursued during the first decade of independence. Similarly, as
part of the International Affairs paper, candidates are asked to describe the various organs of the
United Nations. Thus, the syllabus and questions don’t seem to test whether the candidate has
good analytical skills, whether the candidate can draw lessons from experience or international
examples and apply them to current work, or whether the candidate has leadership qualities and
can manage changes.
The annual confidential report is not a useful tool for managing performance and career
progression
4.12 Class I officers’ performance is reviewed annually through an annual confidential report.
As it is the formal method of performance appraisal, the report needs to efficiently separate the
good performers from the average and provide the feedback necessary for all officers to improve
their individual performance.
4.13 The report is in a fixed format, in which the supervising officer reports upon the
subordinate. After the first evaluation, the report then goes to a countersigning officer, who is
one level above the supervisor that completed the first report. Details of the actual form and its
grading are given in annex 4. The form does not contain any information on the officer’s job
content. For uniformity, the same form is used for all officers—from entry level officers to the
most senior, thus reducing the appraisal’s relevance to the actual work performed by the officer.
4.14 The annual confidential report is not an appropriate management tool for judging
performance of Class I officers.

It requires judgments about a disproportionate number of personal traits: of the 25
dimensions along which the reporting officer assesses performance, 13 are under the heading
Personal Traits and 12 are under heading Work Performed. Thus, the assessment is tailored
to report on what a person is, but relatively little about what he or she actually does. The
current annual confidential report form ignores some critical parts of senior officers’ work—
such as how the officer negotiates or builds consensus or how well the officer manages
resources. Integrity is not a dimension measured in the present annual confidential report
and, therefore, not commented upon during the appraisal.
24


The scale points (1 through 4) measuring each of the personal attributes is not defined,
making the assessment liable to the supervisor’s subjectivity. For example, one supervisor
may consider a score of 3 out of 4 to mean very good, while another might consider this to
mean above average. Similarly, 2 could mean quite good or below average.
The annual confidential report is not shared with the officer being appraised. If an officer is
entirely average and receives no adverse remarks, that officer could complete his entire
career without ever receiving any feedback on his performance. Yet, as part of this analysis, a
consultant randomly surveyed 34 Class I officers and found that more than half of them
admitted they knew what scores they had received. This limited disclosure negates the very
purpose of the annual confidential report as a tool for development purposes. The officer
being appraised needs to receive feedback on his performance from the supervisor.
4.15 The medical exam that is part of the annual confidential report has no clear purpose. It
records height, weight, blood group (which do not change very much year to year), and any
“weakness.” The requirement of a medical examination contributes to the delay in submission of
the annual confidential report.
4.16 Senior officers who appraise their subordinates do not receive guidelines on how to
appraise performance, besides what is contained in Chapter VIII of the Establishment Manual.
They do receive some information during their induction course, but because many years elapse
before they become supervisors and start assessing other officers. Changes to the format and
content of the annual confidential report are not widely communicated or explained. Neither the
appraisers nor those being appraised understand the changes or the rationale behind them. Unless
there are documented incidents of outstanding or very unsatisfactory performance, the
subordinate’s appraisal is on the basis of the supervisor’s memory and general impression.
4.17 A different format for performance appraisal had been introduced during 1982 to 1984,
based on the recommendations of the third Martial Law Committee and borrowing from the
military system. More performance than personal traits were introduced, scales were laid down,
and the assessment was shared with the officer being appraised. This was withdrawn after a few
years on the grounds that sharing the performance report caused bad relations between the
subordinate and supervisor.
4.18 Apart from this brief period, there is no evidence of fundamental rethinking about the
annual confidential report. For example, is the confidential nature of the report appropriate? The
officer reported upon is given only the extracts of adverse remarks. This may have made sense in
the British colonial era, when the annual confidential report’s purpose was to assess the
“trustworthiness of the native officials and staff” to ensure allegiance to the colonial government.
In the past 20 years, changes to the annual confidential report have been marginal, although other
countries have extensively revised their processes for performance appraisal (Box 4.4). To
emphasize responsibility, “personal competence” has been added to personal qualities. Other
changes have been equally trivial. For example, in 1993, the Establishment Division had also
introduced a special provision for the performance appraisal of deputy commissioners: the
records of law and order in the district were reflected in the officers’ annual confidential report.
The supervising divisional commissioners were accordingly instructed to consider the law and
order status of the concerned district and reflect it in the annual confidential report of the
concerned commissioners. This is not practiced anymore.
25
Box 4.4: Officers’ performance assessment in Sri Lanka and India
Since 1998, Sri Lanka’s Class I officers are being appraised through an open system. At the
beginning of the year, the subordinate and supervisor agree and record a workplan and
performance measures. The workplan also includes the resources required for its achievement. A
midterm appraisal takes note of unexpected constraints and allows changes to the workplan. At the
end of the year, the assessment of performance is discussed between the subordinate and
supervisor, and the grading is recorded on a form that they both sign. The grading is subject to
review by a moderator.
Indian Administrative Service officers’ performance appraisal has also undergone changes. The
appraisal’s result is no longer confidential: the annual confidential report has been replaced with
the performance appraisal report. The officer receives a numerical grade based on 15–20
indicators of work output, personal skills, and functional competency. These are summed to make
a score on a 1 to 10 scale for overall assessment. The review points out major strengths and areas
of lesser strengths that require attention. The performance appraisal is used for career
management. After the review, the officer is informed about his overall score and has the
opportunity to appeal and for the score to be changed. The process of managing the appraisal
process has been strengthened. The timetable for review and score finalization is enforced, and a
personal dossier of every officer is now posted on the website of the authority controlling the
cadre.
The above are examples of modern performance management, with annual review processes built
on prior agreement between the officer and his supervisor on a workplan, which is then reviewed
and discussed openly with the officer, and remedial training, if necessary, is agreed upon. Rather
than being judged against character traits that are notoriously susceptible to bias, the officer’s
performance is assessed in terms of results
Promotions are not used effectively to reward good performance
4.19 Promotions are meant to reward good performers by moving them ahead of the average
performers in the civil service. But each Class I officer in Bangladesh has an attached rank and
can move to the next higher rank only when there is a vacancy in that higher rank. This creates
officers’ sense that they are entitled to promotions when vacancies arise. Officers believe that
after they have spent a certain number of years in a rank, they should be promoted when a
vacancy arises, regardless of whether or not they have performed well in the lower rank.
Additionally, seniority determines the right to promotion. The whole group of officers, who were
recruited in the same year, is considered together for promotion. Among them, those who do not
satisfy the criteria do not get promoted. But no officer recruited in a later year is considered for
promotion ahead of another officer recruited earlier. Thus, by the time an officer reaches the
position of head of department or secretary, he is close to retirement and does not have tenure
long enough to plan and bring about any meaningful improvements.
4.20 These practices of giving preference to seniority and considering entire batches together
for promotion leads to perceptions of stagnation and officers’ frustration. It results in officers
continuing to perform the same tasks but raising their ranks. By 2000, career stagnation was
perceived as a major demoralizing force in the Class I civil service and was addressed by major
batch promotions. In October 2001, the government promoted more than 1,000 officials at
26
various levels of Class I. Next, in June 2002, 170 deputy secretaries, from the recruitments of
1973, 1974, 1977, and 1979 were promoted to the post of joint secretary. In February 2003, 493
senior assistant secretaries from the 1982 and 1984 recruitment batches were promoted as deputy
secretaries. In 2004, 61 deputy secretaries were made joint secretaries. In 2005, 39 additional
secretaries and 327 senior assistant secretaries were promoted to the posts of secretary and
deputy secretary. Besides, 48 joint secretaries were recently promoted as additional secretaries.
These promotions, however, have not occurred against established positions. So many of the
officers have been designated as officers on special duty. They got the rank but not the work
associated with the promotion. Even when promoted, their morale did not improve.
4.21 To encourage talent, the government could alter the promotion process by diluting the
seniority principle. This could be done by allowing several batches to compete for promotion to
senior management levels and by having promotion recommendations made by an independent
panel, including representatives from the private sector and civil society. The panel would place
little emphasis on academic record and instead judge candidates on the basis of their
achievements and their potential for performance at a senior level. Such staff would be cleared
for promotion to senior positions, the latter taking place only when positions became vacant.
4.22 When doing more of the same is clearly not yielding results, it is time to stop making
marginal and peripheral changes and go to the heart of the matter. Civil service law provides the
fundamental legal framework on which the whole civil service management structure is built, so
having such a law may be a priority action. The merit principle is also a fundamental component
of civil service management, so strengthening the Public Service Commission to be its guardian,
by giving the commission more independence and protecting it from political micromanagement,
is also a high priority. Some tools of civil service management—the recruitment examination,
the annual confidential report form used to evaluate officers, the application of promotion
rules—need to be revamped to make them more relevant for improving the performance of the
civil service, especially at the highest levels.
27
5. NEXT STEPS
5.1
This chapter draws on the findings of the preceding chapters to prepare an action plan for
reforming the management of Class I officers in Bangladesh’s civil service. It first explains why
such reforms are generally hard to undertake and suggests an approach that draws on past
experience. Then, it lists an agenda for action.
5.2
Bangladesh’s overall economic performance has improved in recent years, and rates of
economic growth above the historic trend are raising standards of living and reducing numbers in
poverty. In this regard Bangladesh’s existing civil service deserves its share of praise for helping
bring this about. However, continued growth is not inevitable, and Bangladesh faces many
challenges ahead. Here, clear-sighted policymaking and sound implementation is of the essence.
Thus, as the challenges of the global economy multiply, Bangladesh needs to raise its capacities
in both policymaking and service delivery. Improving the performance of the civil service and
more effectively using the latent talents of its officers are the keys to progress.
Forewarned is forearmed
5.3
Civil service reform is universally difficult because it involves changing officials’
behaviors. New behaviors can be encouraged in both direct and indirect ways, partly by
imparting new approaches, skills, and values through training and partly by changing the formal
rules and processes that civil servants experience in their daily working life. Those who lose
from the changes resist them, creating hurdles to reform even when there is widespread
recognition that the officers as a group are performing below their potential and major reforms
are needed. Changes occur at different speeds in different settings. Politicians working on a short
time horizon do not always see the benefits of changes they initiate and may be unwilling to risk
their erosion of political capital with the losers. Public administration is a cross-cutting sector
that underpins other sectors’ ability to deliver services. Deficiencies in service delivery are
quickly linked to civil service failings. But when improvements do take place they are not
immediately traced back to the civil service’s better performance.
5.4
Technical solutions alone will not show results: political engagement is essential. This
emerges quite clearly from the diagnoses of the preceding pages. Soundly designed technical
fixes are a necessary but not sufficient condition for reform to succeed. Without political
commitment, the best technical advice remains ineffective. For example, several years ago, the
form for officers’ annual confidential report was altered to make it more output-oriented, the
appraisal was made open, and officers’ performance appraisals were shared with them. However,
this technical changes was not supported by a political will for performance orientation in
general and so the changes were reversed within a couple of years. After the Public Service
Commission itself pointed out the inadequacy of the civil service examination, some small
changes were made recently. But these are marginal, such as increasing the marks allocated to
some subjects. Unless there is a political acknowledgment that the examination is not designed
or administered to attract the best available talent, it will not identify the candidates that the
government would like to have join as Class I officers.
28
5.5
Some dos and don’ts in approach follow from the importance of political support for the
success of any civil service reforms. Do follow policies with implementation plans. Without an
action plan, the best policies remain grand-sounding announcements that amount to nothing. Do
undertake a costing exercise to determine what resources will be required to implement the
policy during its projected timetable. This will force the government to choose policies that are
implementable before announcing them. Broken down into a series of tasks, the action plan can
be monitored against the policy’s stated objectives and the government will know how it is
faring with respect to its own goals.
5.6
Don’t constitute more commissions to determine what should be done. Many notable
commissions have already examined the issues. Worldwide experience with commissions
suggests that they tend to be appointed when there is a lack of consensus within the civil service
about what needs to be done. But there is no difference in opinion over what needs to be done for
Bangladesh’s civil service reform. Appointing more commissions will push back the start date of
reform by two years or more.
A program of action will show the way forward
5.7
Within the approach outlined above, this analysis leads to the following set of specific
action points:
Reorient organizations’ and individuals’ focus away from process towards results.




As a start, the government could formalize the civil service’s mission statement in a
formal Government’s Plan document.
This may be followed by requiring all organizations to formulate their missions and
goals. Having a specific set of goals would provide each organization with targets to
work toward, which in turn would guide individual officers’ workplans against which
their performance would eventually be measured. (In turn, the organization’s managers
need to take the missions and goals seriously and lead their staff accordingly.)
With each organization knowing its goals and targets, it could be asked to prepare an
annual performance report based on what it set out to achieve, the resources that it was
given, and the results achieved at the end of the year. This is not an entirely new
concept—simply an old practice that needs reviving. In the old Bengal Presidency days,
each department produced its annual performance report at the end of each fiscal year.
The aim now would be to resuscitate the practice and bring it up to date with more
explicit information on performance. Further sharpening could be achieved if
departments and agencies carried out individual strategic planning exercises. Done in a
participatory way, strategic plans provide a possibility for fundamental reflection on the
role of an organization and how it should use its resources to achieve its goals.
Individual officers’ reorientation toward results can be accelerated by the effective use of
the performance appraisal process. There is a strong case for discontinuing the secret
assessment. It implies that the supervisor and subordinate are somehow adversaries,
which prevents them from seeing themselves as part of a team trying to reach the
organization’s goals. Moving away from the old to the new open system will present
challenges, particularly for supervisors, who themselves will need performance
29

orientation and training on how to convey negative feedback in such a way that it can
improve performance. In turn, this would improve confidence in the system and improve
the confidence of those with ability who seek recognition.
Simultaneously, generic job descriptions could be prepared for the different levels of
responsibility. These would require updating the existing job descriptions, which reflect
the functions of many years ago and a regulatory rather than developmental role for the
government. Comparing the subordinate’s performance, even with the generic job
description, will allow the review discussion to assess whether the officer is performing
at the required level or below par.
5.8
The annual confidential report itself should also be altered to make it more focused on
results. Currently, one quarter of the officer’s performance grade is determined by the results of
examinations that the officer took as a student, long before starting work in the civil service. The
educational qualification criteria can be used as threshold for entry in Class I positions: thereafter
it does not have much relevance for what the officer did to achieve each year’s targets. There
could also be a change in the 25 attributes on which the officer is graded. At present, very few of
them have anything to with how the officer has performed on tasks. In order to start thinking in
this direction, the government could review a sample of appraisal forms and methods in similarly
placed countries and then adapt some of these to make a form and system uniquely responsive to
Bangladesh’s situation.
Use a medium-term expenditure framework to encourage officers’ awareness of outputs
5.9
More detailed action points will emerge from the World Bank’s planned public
expenditure and institutional review. Meanwhile,



Synergies between public financial management and human resource management can be
exploited to the benefit of civil service reform. The medium-term expenditure framework
can be a vehicle for changing the culture of public administration, balancing a concern
over inputs with greater awareness of the outputs and results of government spending
programs.
Successfully introducing a medium-term expenditure framework can improve
policymaking by making clearer the medium-term costs of a new policy, by introducing
greater contestability, and by improving prioritization. Conversely, if resources and needs
are not matched well through the budget process, funds will not be released to spending
ministries and departments in a predictable way, and the productivity of civil servants
will be adversely affected.
A budget prepared within a medium-term expenditure framework is more likely to be
implementable because policies will be better aligned with resource availabilities,
facilitating the conversion of inputs into outputs, thereby supporting better performance.
Restore merit across the whole range of human resource functions.
5.10 Merit and competence drive civil servants’ performance, and they are identified through
competition.
30




The government should declare that excellence is the civil service’s goal and make this
evident in all its policies and rules. At the same time, it should avoid special recruitment
to administration, police, and general education cadres by waiving the written
examination or omitting the training for police officers—all of which signal that the
government is not committed to the merit principle. The role of the Public Service
Commission should explicitly include monitoring merit in human resource management,
and the commission should be supported to play this role effectively.
Recruitment quotas should be carefully examined to check their alignment with the
government’s stated policies, and every effort should be made to improve its
implementation by laying down targets, formulating rules to guide practice, improving
communications to inform all eligible candidates about available opportunities, and
monitoring implementation progress against targets. The approach will be not to lower
standards for the preferred groups, but to enhance their examination performance with
access to scholarships and special coaching. Special assistance after recruitment may also
be provided, as was done in the United Kingdom’s Pathways System.1 Diversity goals to
make the civil service more fully reflect the way society as a whole is composed are
appropriate, but should be implemented in ways that make clear that the overriding
principle of the civil service is merit.
As a first step to dispel the rigidity imposed by seniority, five batches should be taken up
simultaneously for promotion to deputy and joint secretary positions, and within that
cohort, merit alone should determine who gets promoted.
There is need to identify high performers from among Class I officers who can staff a
senior civil service corps. All positions of deputy secretary and above should not
automatically be designated as senior positions. A few critical positions should be so
identified, amounting perhaps of 10 percent of all secretariat posts, and entry to these
positions should be through competition and not according to quotas. In 2005, the World
Bank presented the government with some options for a senior civil service, and those
may be revisited.
Strengthen the Public Service Commission and demarcate the respective roles of the
commission, the Ministry of Establishment, and line ministries.
5.11 A critical institution in supporting Bangladesh’s effort to bring about a better performing
civil service is the Public Service Commission. Currently, its main function is processing new
entrants into Class I of the civil service in annual batches.

There is a need to thoroughly review the way in which the commission is undertaking its
principal function, which is recruitment. Because the cycle of recruitment has become
longer and longer, as inefficiencies have grown, there is need for streamlining the process
by investing in modern office technology, training staff, and bringing up to date the
1
Pathways was a two-year program designed to identify and develop senior managers from ethnic minorities with
potential to reach the Senior Civil Service (SCS). Between 20 and 30 senior managers from ethnic minorities, who
demonstrated the potential to advance to the SCS within the following five years, were selected annually.
Employees could also nominate themselves. Line and personnel managers were encouraged to nominate individuals,
and there was a responsibility on employers to meet the costs involved.
31




content of exams and the criteria used in selection interviews. For example, to reduce the
number of candidates, the government could lay down that only those with first- and
second-class bachelor’s degrees or master’s degrees will be allowed to sit for the
examination. This would cut the number of candidates. Interviews could then only be
granted to, say, the top 10 percent in the exam, depending on how many entrants to the
senior civil service the government wants each year. The ratio of interviewees to
successful candidates could be controlled to not exceed 3:1. Streamlining the recruitment
process in this way should make it much more manageable and thereby enable the Public
Service Commission to focus on quality candidates
There is scope for efficiency gains at each stage of the civil service examination and
selection process, including improving the way candidates’ documents are received and
scrutinized, shortening the time between the preliminary and main written examinations,
having a question bank, publishing exam results expeditiously, improving examination
venues and logistics; and offering higher fees for those who grade the scripts. A team of
local and external consultants could be engaged to review existing processes and bring
them up to date, bringing to bear knowledge of how selection and appointment processes
are carried out in other countries.
As the function of the Public Service Commission evolves, its legal framework may have
to be adjusted to give it greater operational independence within the law, as is already
laid down in the Constitution. The commission needs to operate separately from the
Ministry of Establishments, though at the same time act as an ally of reform in the pursuit
of civil service modernization. In whatever way its functions are delineated from the
personnel ministry and line ministries, it will need to be laid down in law and respected
by the government.
The Public Service Commission needs to develop its oversight role, as the guardian of the
merit principle in the public service, both in reviewing promotions and also in the design
and operation of human resource processes generally. As listed on the commission’s
website, one of its tasks is to regularize employees who were previously employed in
projects and paid from the capital budget. The commission cannot play its oversight role
efficiently if one of its own tasks is to regularize somewhat irregular employment
practices.
Resources will need to be invested in capacity building of managers and staff to enable
the Public Service Commission to fulfill its expanded role. Also critical will be the
appointment of commissioners who can bring human resource management skills from
the private sector and civil society, as well as the public sector.
Strengthen the tools for managing performance: training, appraisal, and promotions.
5.12 Even if the civil service examination identifies and recruits the best possible candidates,
that alone will not guarantee their high performance over the years following recruitment.
Officers’ performances must be actively managed throughout their careers. As the government’s
functions become more and more complex and change continuously, officers need more than
their undergraduate or graduate training to perform their new tasks. Furthermore, as they
progress in their careers, they may need training in managerial skills to get the best performance
from those that they manage.
32







The government now needs to begin implementing its existing training policy.
As Ministry of Establishment’s Career Planning and Training Wing has been mandated
as the managing organization for this function, that unit needs to be staffed and resourced
adequately. A database can keep track of which officer has been trained in what and
match the future training with courses available.
Donor-funded training abroad needs to be managed efficiently. Rather than sending
officers on year-long general master’s degree courses, the government may ask donors to
identify short-term courses that are specially focused on areas in need of strengthening. If
an officer attends a training abroad, on return that officer needs to be assigned to a
position where the new training can be put to use. These and other recommendations
have been made before; it requires political will to implement and enforce them.
Domestic training can be strengthened simultaneously, by attaching excellence and
prestige to the national training institutes. For example, only highly qualified persons
should be employed as trainers. Until the training organizations are fully staffed, if civil
service officers have to be assigned to those institutes, they should be those who have
demonstrated their high caliber in some area of work.
The annual confidential report’s input into merit determination in general, and the
promotion process in particular, can be improved by better management of the timetable
for assessment, reducing the weight of very early reports, and clarifying for all concerned
what amounts to adverse comments.
Good performers have to be rewarded with promotions, but everybody cannot be
rewarded equally—which is what the batch promotions amount to. If fewer officers from
each batch are going to be promoted, there is bound to be resistance from those who do
not get promoted. One option could be to allow those not promoted to draw higher pay
within their existing grade without receiving a higher rank and responsibility.
Because Bangladesh has a career-based civil service, recruitment and promotions must be
managed jointly to shape the size of the civil service. An annual review can indicate the
shape of the pyramid of civil service positions, before the pyramid of civil servants can
be mapped on to it. What changes can be expected from attrition? Are any departments to
be added or eliminated? This will determine how many officers can be promoted and how
many should be recruited.
Build support for modernization within the civil service, among politicians, and in the wider
civil society.
5.13 Previous reports by various commissions seem to have been launched into a vacuum or
not even launched at all. For example, only 1,000 copies of the Public Administration
Reorganization Commission’s report were printed, and they were not widely distributed.
5.14

To build the wider case, the government could:
Survey middle and senior civil servants to learn their attitudes about public
administration, their working conditions, and their remuneration. The survey would have
to be administered by an organization outside the government, and it would be useful
33


only if the respondents’ anonymity is guaranteed. It could throw up discontent with the
present system and a preference for monetization of benefits.
Ask political scientists to identify the real obstacles to modernization of the civil service.
Is the fault with the senior bureaucrats themselves or the politicians? This might make
politicians dissatisfied with the quality of support received from senior civil servants. It
might reveal the full extent of the complacency of current senior civil servants and the
nature of their vested interests, e.g., remunerative sinecures alongside their official jobs
and handsome retirement land grants, etc.
Analyze the relative attractiveness of the public service by comparing the quality of
recruits to the senior civil service with those recruited to the private sector and their
respective remuneration. Assess the implications of the dropout rate among top civil
servants.
34
Annex 1: Recommendations of the various administrative reform commissions and committees
Recommendation
Year set up
Year of recommendation
Recruitment to be based solely on merit /
increase of merit quota
Direct recruitment / Lateral appointment to
selected positions through open competition
Separate unit to manage civil servants'
training
Need-based training
Changing the structure of civil service
management
Superior Policy Pool / Senior Services Pool/
Senior Policy Management Posts
Centralized management of all cadres
Ensuring that recommendations of Public
Service Commission regarding appointment
and promotion implemented on time / remove
ad hoc recruitment
Rightsizing government
ASRC
P&S
C
MLC I
MLC
II
MLC
III
Committ
ee for
Examina
tion of
Irregular
ities
1973
1974
1976
1977
1982
1982
1982
1982
1983
1983
1982
1983
x
x
Administ
rative
Reforms
Committ
ee
Towards
Better
Governm
ent
CoPSC
PARC
1993
1993
1993
1993
1987
1988
1997
2000
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Note: ARCS – Administrative and Service Reorganization Commission; P&SC – Pay& Services Commission; MLC – Martial Law Committee; CoPSC –
Committee on Public Service; PARC - Public Administration Reorganization Commission.
35
Annex 2: The Bangladesh Public Service Commission
1.
The Bangladesh Public Service Commission (PSC) is a quasijudicial body established
under the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. It works under the provisions of
the Articles 137 to 140 of the Constitution and certain other rules and regulations made by the
Govt. from time to time under the Constitution. The annual report of the PSC is submitted to the
President. It summarizes what the Commission performed during the previous calendar year. The
reports are also placed before the parliament for evaluating the functions of the commission. The
PSC is an attached department of Ministry of Establishment (MoE).
2.
The PSC has the following responsibilities: to recruit the civil servants for the Republic;
To recommend for promotion at the level of Class-I and Class-II Gazetted positions; to give
opinion in the disciplinary cases drawn against the Govt. Servants in which major punishment is
proposed; to give opinion in the matters affecting the terms and conditions of the Govt. Servants
if referred to PSC; to regularize the service of the Govt. Servants which is required under certain
rules; to contribute in framing the recruitment rules for various Govt. Departments; to conduct
Senior Scale Promotion Exam for BCS cadre officials; to conduct Department Exam for both
cadre and noncadre officials.
The Public Service Commission and the civil service examination
3.
The Ministry of Establishment is overall responsibility of recruitment to Class I of all the
cadred services. The PSC’s role is to select the candidates upon the request of MoE. PSC is
responsible for conducting for selection examinations to the civil service and some noncadre
posts.
4.
There is no predetermined schedule for civil service recruitment. The recruitment process
starts when Ministry of Establishment sends the commission a requisition list, based on vacant
posts in different civil service cadres. Thus there often is a bunching in the commission’s
selection activities, and there is a shortage of Class I officers at the entry and senior assistant
secretary levels.
5.
The selection of candidates for the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) currently takes over
two and half years. There has been a significant increase in the number of BCS job applicants
over the years, rising to around 150,000 annually at present.
6.
The curriculum for the main written BCS examinations is intended to test core
competences required in Government. In March 2005, the PSC announced some changes in the
list of subjects of the BCS main written examination and their respective marks, for the general
and technical cadres. The changes for the general cadre were: doubling of the full marks
allocated for each of the languages [Bengali (200) and English (200)], reducing viva voce test
score by half (to 100) and doing away with a large number of optional subjects, which previously
accounted for 30 percent of total marks. Other subjects of the examination are Bangladesh
Affairs (200 marks), International Affairs (100 marks), Mathematical Reasoning and Mental
Ability (100 marks), and General Science and Technology (100 marks).
36
7.
Candidates’ ranking in the technical cadres includes weight (20 percent) for their
performance in previous examinations starting from high school. Scores from these academic
examinations are not considered in the ranking for general cadres.
Activities not connected with the examination
8.
A high proportion of the commission’s staff and managerial resources are spent on
recruitment to noncadre posts. A large number of candidates apply for noncadre posts in various
grades, reportedly as high as 5,000 applications per post, in some cases. The commission also
conducts promotion exams (for departmental, senior scale, and technical cadres), as well as
disciplinary reviews.
9.
The departmental promotion examination system is conducted twice a year. The senior
scale promotion exams are conducted twice a year. A very low percentage of candidates
reportedly pass the exam relating to laws and rules of government.
10.
When the government initiates disciplinary review of a civil servant for breach of
conduct as defined by the Government Servants Conduct Rules, the commission has the
responsibility to carry out this investigation. This activity has been taking up a substantial part of
the commission’s staff resources and time and attention of its senior management. It involves
much back-and-forth communication between the commission and concerned agencies. Because
information provided the agency is often incomplete, the commission seeks clarifications and
this takes up considerable effort and time.
11.
During FY88–90, and again during FY93–96, the Public Service Commission
implemented two technical assistance projects supported by the World Bank. Their purposes
were to improve civil servants’ recruitment, promotion and other activities through systemic
changes and capacity building. Outcome indicators, however, continue to be rather mixed.
37
Annex 3: The public administration training policy
1.
The public administration training policy (PATP) was approved by the government in
May 2003. The stated objectives are to promote a new administrative culture; and to create an
effective, efficient, innovative, responsive, transparent, accountable, honest, and committed
public service system capable of delivering quality and cost-effective services to the people and
to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Its purpose is to strengthen and reorient
training activities in order to enhance administrative and managerial capacity and overall
government productivity in support of the development efforts of the country. The policy
recognizes the importance of a congenial environment for attracting trainees as well as trainers
and for making training rewarding, and promoting efficiency and performance through training.
2.
The PATP outlines seven strategies to achieve objectives:







3.
Further strengthening of physical facilities, professional capabilities of faculties, and
research activities of all public sector training institutions.
Devising need-based, results-oriented and market-responsive training programs in the
public sector, aimed at building professionalism of public servants at different levels.
Providing appropriate training to public servants and retraining, both at home and abroad,
to update their knowledge and skills.
Developing Bangladesh Public Administration Training Centre (BPATC) as the apex
training institution and as a think-tank capable of providing advisory services to the
government on policy, administration and management matters, by forging linkage with
other training institutions, both public and private, at home and abroad.
Encouraging public sector training institutions to collaborate with private sector ones as
partners in training, research and development for mutual benefit.
Decentralizing training activities to ensure optimal utilization of the facilities and
resources of the existing training institutions.
Continuing and gearing up the National Training Council (NTC) for determining training
policy, priorities, providing guidelines, monitoring and evaluating training outcomes
against tangible and measurable standards.
The PATP contains modalities for organizing training:







Periodic needs assessment of training for their officers and employees  to be conducted
by all ministries, divisions, and other organizations with the assistance of concerned
training institution(s).
Formulation of Annual Training Plan by all ministries, divisions, and all other agencies
and maintaining an inventory of their employees’ training needs.
Preparation of Training Manual by all organizations/training institutions under them
Maintaining a set standard, uniformity and consistency in design, delivery, and
management of training programs.
Setting up of a Training Cell in every ministry, division, and organizations under them.
Modular approach in designing course contents and ensuring continuous.
Updates of course contents in need-based and an empirically established manner.
38
4.
The PATP has outlined various means of mobilizing resource persons for the training
institutions. These include: preparing and maintaining of an inventory of subject specialists
instructional resource persons with periodical update, fostering specialization of faculty, creation
of a pool of resource persons/trainers by the Ministry of Establishment from among the officers
(civil servants) having good academic background, aptitude, commitment, competence and
adaptability to training, development of instructional corps and management corps and
recruitment and professionalization of the faculty. It is envisaged under the PATP that
professionalization of faculty will be promoted through: continuous development of trainers
recruited by the training institutions; acquiring publications as professional responsibility based
on empirical study; undertaking research projects on the field of specialization; organizing
seminars on the areas of specialization; performance appraisal against set standard; field
orientation for exposure to realities; and quantitative and qualitative improvement of the in-house
faculty in terms of shared workload.
5.
The NTC plays an oversight role in public sector training. It is headed by the prime
minister, plays an oversight role in determining training policy priorities, coordination and
monitoring of training programs, and providing guidelines on monitoring and evaluation of
training outcomes. The Ministry of Establishment is responsible for formulation and
administration of training policy in the public sector.
6.
BPATC is the apex training institute in Government. It was created in 1984 by combining
three training institutions—Civil Officers’ Training Academy, National Institute of Public
Administration, and Bangladesh Administrative Staff College. BPATC is responsible for training
of senior public executives, imparting in-service training, providing foundational training to
officers of different cadres, and imparting foundational and refresher training to noncadre
officers. There is a strong presence of a large numbers of civil servants belonging to BCS
(Administration) cadre who are sent on deputation to BPATC.
7.
Other training institutions which cater to the needs of sectors and cadres: Bangladesh
Civil Service Administration Academy, Financial Management Academy, Academy for Planning
and Development, National Academy for Educational Management, National Institute for
Population Research and Training, Bangladesh Taxation Academy, Customs and VAT
Academy, Land Administration Training Centre, Foreign Service Academy, Central Extension
Resource Development Institute, and Livestock Officers Training Institute.
8.
To develop training institutions through financial autonomy and make them financially
self-reliant, the policy allows training institutions to undertake consultancy work. For long-term
foreign training, the stated policy is to give preference to candidates from training institutions.
The policy continues the existing special allowance (30 percent of basic pay) to encourage
officers to take up positions as trainers to training institutes.
39
Annex 4: The annual confidential report
1.
The annual confidential report (ACR) assesses the performance civil servants in
Bangladesh on an annual basis. The ACR provides information about promotion eligibility
disciplinary action, and skills and training requirements for officers.
2.
The objectives of the ACR are: ensuring accountability in the civil service; providing a
cumulative record of an officer’s performance; improving work performance; supplying vital
information for purposes of posting, transfer, training, career advancement, and other personnel
decisions; and facilitating career planning.
3.
The ACR consists of eight parts as listed below:
I.
Medical Examination Report, to be filled in by an authorized Medical Officer.
II. Bio-data, to be filled in by the Officer Reported Upon (ORU).
III. Personal Traits, to be filled in by Report Initiating Officer (RIO).
IV. Work Performed, to be filled in by the RIO.
V. Pen Picture, to be filled in by the RIO.
VI. Recommendation, to be filled in by the RIO.
VII. Comments by the Countersigning Officer (CSO).
VIII. To be filled in by the Ministry/Division.
4.
Parts III and IV are particularly important because they list the attributes along which the
officer is graded. Points scored in these two sections determine an officer’s total score and his
chance for promotion.
5.
In part III, there are 13 personal attributes. Each is graded on a scale of 1 to 4. Therefore,
this part contributes 52 out of the 100 marks of the ACR. The personal attributes are: Discipline,
Personality, Judgment and sense of proportion, Intelligence, Initiative and enthusiasm,
Relationship with peers, Cooperation, Punctuality, Dependability, Responsibility,
Communication (written), Communication (spoken), Promptness in carrying out instructions,
Security consciousness, and Public relations.
6.
In Part IV there are 12 attributes. Each is graded on a scale of 1 to 4. Therefore, this part
contributes 48 out of the 100 marks of the ACR. The work performed attributes are: Professional
knowledge, Quality of work, Quantity of work done, Capacity for supervision and direction,
Relationship with peers, Decision making skill, Decision implementation capability, Interest and
capability to train subordinates, Communication (written), Communication (spoken), Promptness
in completing and countersigning the ACR, and Dedication.
7.
A score of 95 to 100 is considered Exceptional, 85 to 94 as Very Good, 41 to 60 as
Average, and less than 40 as Below Average.
8.
Instructions about managing the ACR are contained in Chapter 27 of the Personnel
Manual. The ACR is intended to be managed according to a specific timetable. The ACR process
takes 10 months to complete, is initiated in mid-October, and lasts until end-August. The
40
timetable is summarized in the table below. The submission of ACR for each officer every
calendar year is mandatory. The performance of the Secretaries is not assessed. An ACR may be
initiated any time during the year provided the Officer Reported Upon (ORU) has served for a
minimum of three months under the Report Initiating Officer (RIO).
Table A4.1. Timetable for preparing ACRs
Action
Submission of letter of instruction by ministries to the concerned
heads of divisions and attached departments
Submission of ACR by Report Initiating Officers to the Countersigning Officer)
Submission of ACR by CSOs to the respective ministry
Notification of Officer Reported Upon by ministries about adverse
comments.
Response by Officer Reported Upon on adverse comments of the
Report Initiating Officer (RIO) to the ministry.
Finalization of ACR by concerned ministry or division and
submission to the Ministry of Establishment
Deadline
October 15
January 31
March 15
April 30
May 21
August 31
9.
On an average, each RIO has to appraise the performance of about 20–25 officers. A
Divisional Commissioner has to appraise performance of 10–15 District Commissioners (DC)
and three Additional Commissioners. In addition, the Commissioner has to countersign about
100 officers, such as Upazilla Nirbahi Officers (UNO), Additional Deputy Commissioners
(ADC), etc.
10.
The ACR is kept confidential, not shared with the ORU. The RIO is obligated to share
the comments with the ORU only if there are adverse comments. The ACR forms part of the
service records dossier of each officer.
41
Annex 5: Promotion rules
1.
The Promotion Rule 2002 was issued in June 2002. It is applicable only for promotion to
secretariat posts, and not to cadre posts in different services. So, it affects promotion of 1,500
officers.
History of the rules
2.
Senior level promotions used to be decided by the Council Committee on Promotion to
Superior Posts until it was challenged by a petition and subsequent court ruling on the process
and the scoring formula. Promotion from the junior to the senior scale was formalized in 1986 by
the “Bangladesh Civil Service Cadre Officers’ Senior Scale Promotion Examination” Rules,
which provide the eligibility criteria, including, among others, four years length of service with
confirmation. Officers in the junior time scale are confirmed after passing a departmental
examination conducted by the Public Service Commission (PSC). Officers completing 14 years
of service were prohibited from appearing at the departmental exams. The only exception in this
regard used to be the BCS (Economic) cadre, whose departmental examination was conducted by
the Ministry of Planning, but this responsibility has been recently vested with the PSC.
3.
The 1986 BCS (Examination for Promotion) Rules allowed some officers to be exempted
from passing the promotion examination. If an officer failed the promotion examination but had
completed 15 years of service, or an officer was 50 years or older, he or she was exempted from
passing the senior scale examination. These rules were not enforced for a three-year time period
starting October 1989, and the examinations were suspended for three years beginning April
1994. The PSC recommended that promotion examination be made compulsory for all officers
irrespective of the length of service, and that the officers who perform better in the examinations
should get preference over others in terms of promotion and seniority, but this was not
implemented.
Promotion types
4.
Promotion from junior to senior scale four years after entry: under the existing system,
the PSC is responsible for conducting examinations for promotion from Junior to Senior Scale
Senior scale for all cadre officers, four years after entry.
5.
Promotion from Grade VI-IV: The Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) is
responsible for promotion to various positions within the hierarchical structure of each cadre for
grade VI to IV.
6.
Promotion to III and above: The Superior Selection Board (SSB) is responsible for
recommending promotions at the most senior levels, grade III and above (joint secretary,
additional secretary, and secretary). The recommendations are initially screened by the Senior
Selection Board (SSB), headed by the cabinet secretary, and then submitted to the prime minister
through the SSB for final approval. Under the Rules of Business all secretariat appointments of
the ranks of deputy secretary to secretary require the approval of the prime minister.
42
Application of the promotion rules
7.
No officer is allowed to take part in more than one examination in a calendar year and in
more than three examinations in a period of nine years.
8.
Class I cadre officers are not required to participate in any promotion examination
beyond the senior scale promotion examination. The only post entry promotion exam for cadre
officers is the Senior Scale Promotion Examination conducted by the PSC.
9.
According to the new rules, promotion is determined by an officer’s score in the annual
confidential report (ACR). An officer’s overall score is determined as follows:






Average of ACR ratings during the five years preceding the evaluation = 30 percent.
Average ACR rating in the officers’ career except the immediately preceding five years =
25 percent.
Past academic performance in the four major examinations, from high school final to
highest university degree = 25 percent.
Bonus marks for absence of adverse remarks covering the entire length of service ( not
limited to last five years) = 10 percent.
Bonus marks for absence of any punishment during entire career = 10 percent.
There is a penalty for adverse remarks in ACR. This is not included in the above scoring
formula but mentioned at serial 5 of the second schedule of the rules is the deduction of
marks by way of. In case of minor penalty awarded through departmental proceedings a
deduction of two marks and it is five marks for major punishment.
10.
Officers scoring 83 percent or higher qualify for promotion to deputy secretary, while
officers have to score 85 percent or higher to be considered for joint secretary or higher.
11.
Academic results at the bachelor’s examination are weighted most heavily, followed by
results at the school and college final level, with the lowest weight given for the master’s degree
level. The incremental marks awarded for a higher division or class increases from 2 for the
secondary school and high school certificate to 3 for the graduation degree and then declines to 1
for the master’s degree.
Table A5.1. Marks allocated for academic performance in promotion score
Division
SSC
HSC
Graduation
Master’s
1st
6
6
9
4
2nd
4
4
6
3
3rd
2
2
3
2
Note: SSC = Secondary School Certificate, HSC = Higher Secondary Certificate.
12.
Regardless of aggregate score, to be considered for promotion, it is mandatory for an
officer to obtain a minimum of 15 points out of a total for 25 for academic performance.
Reportedly, over 500 officers from senior assistant secretary to joint secretary levels have failed
to obtain the required minimum educational performance score. The rules have provision for this
category of officers to appear at a promotion examination to be conducted by the Public Service
Commission. In the event such officers are able to qualify, they will be entitled to five bonus
43
marks but the total marks on educational qualification criteria will not exceed 20. Two hundred
marks have been allotted for the examination
Table A5.2. Changes introduced by the promotion rules of 2002
Previous
-- No separate promotion rule existed.
-- Only one rule relating to promotion was part of
Recruitment Rules 1981, with six conditions for
promotion (see section 5 of Recruitment Rules).
Present
-- More comprehensive than relevant
provisions of Recruitment Rules.
-- Provides in specific terms conditions of
eligibility for promotion and a clear
scoring formula.
-- Overrides all previous circulars and other rules
relating to promotion thus provide clarity and
transparency.
-- Requirement of obtaining clearance from now -- Clearly specify that any
defunct Bureau of Anti-Corruption was loosely candidate for promotion against whom
worded in the notification.
charge sheet has been framed in a corruption case
-- This requirement gave enough discretion to the shall not be considered for promotion.
relevant Promotion Committee to decide cases
of promotion.
-- Notification provided adequate discretion
-- Debar from consideration for promotion of any
to the relevant Promotion Committee in cases
officer against whom statement of charges has
involving breach of conduct leading to
been issued in a departmental proceeding.
disciplinary proceedings.
-- Notification did not specifically address the
-- Consolidated all notifications and
issue of cases of officers against whom a criminal memoranda.
case is pending in any court of law
-- Apart from requirements relating to corruption
-- Notification of 1991 gave enough latitude for
and departmental charges, the promotion rules
the Promotion Committee to relax the
clearly make an officer ineligible for
above requirements.
consideration of promotion if government has
issued sanction for his prosecution in a
criminal case.
-- Notifications and memoranda do not mention of -- Mandatory under to consider the case of such
cases in which an officer has been acquitted of the officers and also make the officers entitled to
charges levelled against him either in a
retain their original seniority under what is called
departmental case, criminal case or a case relating the Next Below Rule.
to corruption.
-- Officers of other cadres selected for various
Permanently prevent such to and fro movements
secretariat posts could go back to their own cadres and debar such officers to be considered for
and return at will to the Secretariat depending on promotion at a subsequent stage in the secretariat
their convenience.
system once he/she has opted for a cadre post.
_Length of service criteria of eligibility in
-- Consolidated such requirements including quota
different secretariat posts including reservation of system and gave it a regulatory shape.
quota for different cadres was earlier in the form
of notification from the MoE.
-- Notifications did not provide for consideration -- Mandatory to apply the Next Below Rule for all
of cases of senior officers having the required
cases of promotion even to the extent of relaxation
length of service of five years or more as the case of length of service required in each cases.
may be in the senior scale for appointment to
deputy secretary, joint secretary and additional
44
Previous
Present
secretary as applicable to officers who are entitled
to get the benefit of the Next Below Rule.
-- Successful completion of training was not given --Make completion of training mandatory when
weight in promotion.
considering promotion, although there are
provisions for relaxation of these requirements.
-- Neither the 1981 Recruitment Rules nor the
-- Provide the minimum marks for consideration
MoE notification of 1991 provided for any scoring for promotion at each stage.
format in clear and transparent term.
-- Gives clear details of a formula for scoring
-- Total marks for educational qualification is 25,
of which 60 percent is the qualifying marks.
45
Annex 6: Proposed ministry clusters
1.
The concept of cluster within the structure of the senior civil service was born as early as
in 1939. It was revived in 1950 when Pakistan reconstituted the Finance and Commerce Pool to
create the Economic Pool to serve the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Industries. The aim
was to open up opportunities for competent members of Finance and Accounts cadres to fill up
secretariat posts in these ministries. While this concept is not new in the region, the system has
not been implemented on a large scale or for an extended period of time.
Previous commissions’ reports on clusters
2.
Administrative commissions have supported the cluster proposal on the ground that this
will contribute to the specialization required in the management of ministries. The ASRC (1972)
was the first entity to recommend ministry-based clusters. It proposed the creation of eight
clusters of “area groups” for administrative convenience, training and deployment facilities.
ASRC suggested the need for defining the cadre posts as functional posts and area group posts as
positions within a cluster. The PASS Commission, also known as the Rashid Commission
(1977), recommended organizing the services into a four tier-hierarchical order. PARC (2000)
recommended clustering of ministries/divisions into three groups—general, economic, and
physical and social infrastructure. In respect of internal mobility, PARC further recommended a
closed-door approach. Once included in a particular cluster, the officer and staff will remain
confined there. However, it provided some flexibility to the effect that ten percent of the total
posts in a cluster could be filled up from other clusters. The Government That Works report
recommended creation of a Specialized Senior Staffing Pool (SSSP) to manage four functional
clusters : macroeconomic, social sector, agriculture and natural resource management, and
general administration groups. The suggestion was similar to the SSP, except for entry at joint
secretary level through examination and emphasis on needed skill and lifetime tenure in the
selected cluster, subject to satisfactory performance.
The current proposal
3.
The government is considering clustering the ministries and divisions into four broad
categories—general, economic, social and physical infrastructure and regulatory. There was
considerable divergence of views about the optimum number of cluster between the four major
reports (ASRC, PASS, Government That Works, and PARC), with each recommending a
different number of clusters. The proposed grouping of the ministries and their location in four
clusters is presented in Table A6.1. Entities outside the cluster are Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs, the Parliament Secretariat, and the Election
Commission Secretariat.
46
Table A6.1. Proposed grouping of the ministries and divisions
Cluster
General
Ministries and divisions
President’s Secretariat, Prime Minister’s Office, Defence, Food and Disaster
Management, Rural Development and Cooperative, Land, Information, Cultural
Affairs, Religion Affairs, Labour and Employment, Chittagong Hill Tracts and NonResident Welfare and Foreign Employment, and Liberation War
Economic
Finance, Economic Relations, Internal Resources, Planning, Statistics,
Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation, Commerce, Agriculture, Fisheries and
Livestock, Forests and Environment, Industry, Jute and Textiles and Garments
Social and
Works, Communication, Science and Technology, Power, Energy, Shipping, Social
Physical
Welfare, Women and Children Affairs, Youth and Sports, Telegraph and
Infrastructure Telecommunication, Water Resources, Education, Primary and Mass Education,
Health and Family Welfare and Civil Aviation and Tourism
Regulatory and Local Government, Establishment, Cabinet, Home Affairs
Monitoring
4.
The clustering proposal does not yet specify at which level of seniority the officers would
be formally assigned to join the clusters. The recruitment to SSP was also decided in favour of
the deputy secretary level. The PARC recommended entry into clusters at grade III or joint
secretary level.
5.
The cluster proposal is based on the argument that the business of ministries in various
sectors is quite different. Sectoral knowledge and experiences are important for effective
management, based on area group specialization. Formal ministry clusters would help to prevent
ad hoc appointments in senior positions.
47
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