Thurs. Oct. 18
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN STATE
COURT
quasi in rem
Shaffer v. Heitner
(US 1977)
I would explicitly reserve judgment . . . on whether the
ownership of some forms of property whose situs is
indisputably and permanently located within a State may,
without more, provide the contacts necessary to subject a
defendant to jurisdiction within the State to the extent of
the value of the property. In the case of real property, in
particular, preservation of the common law concept of
quasi in rem jurisdiction arguably would avoid the
uncertainty of the general International Shoe standard
without significant cost to “traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.
Shaffer v. Heitner pp. 591 (Powell, J. concurring)
Nevertheless, he contends that appellants' positions as
directors and officers of a corporation chartered in
Delaware provide sufficient "contacts, ties, or relations,"
with that State to give its courts jurisdiction over
appellants in this stockholder's derivative action. This
argument is based primarily on what Heitner asserts to
be the strong interest of Delaware in supervising the
management of a Delaware corporation. That interest is
said to derive from the role of Delaware law in
establishing the corporation and defining the obligations
owed to it by its officers and directors. In order to
protect this interest, appellee concludes, Delaware's
courts must have jurisdiction over corporate fiduciaries
such as appellants.
This argument is undercut by the failure of the
Delaware Legislature to assert the state interest
appellee finds so compelling. Delaware law bases
jurisdiction not on appellants' status as corporate
fiduciaries, but rather on the presence of their
property in the State. Although the sequestration
procedure used here may be most frequently
used in derivative suits against officers and
directors, the authorizing statute evinces no
specific concern with such actions.
specific jurisdiction
out-of-state activities having in-state
effects
World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson
(U.S. 1980)
Okla.Stat., Tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(4) (1971)
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a
cause of action or claim for relief arising from
the person's . . . causing tortious injury in this
state by an act or omission outside this state if
he regularly does or solicits business or engages
in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in this state . . .
.
The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can
be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a
federal system. The protection against
inconvenient litigation is typically described in
terms of "reasonableness" or "fairness."
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no
inconvenience from being forced to litigate
before the tribunals of another State; even if the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its
law to the controversy; even if the forum State is
the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of
interstate federalism, may sometimes act to
divest the State of its power to render a valid
judgment.
stream of commerce
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
(U.S. 1971)
This is not to say, of course, that
foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But
the foreseeability that is critical to due
process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State. Rather, it is
that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.